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ESTONIAN LANGUAGE POLICY 1988-1997

Mart Rannut

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Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION	6
1. TOPIC.....	6
2. LITERATURE AND RESEARCH.....	8
1. <i>Specific studies</i>	8
2. <i>Projects</i>	8
3. CONVENTIONAL FORMALITIES.....	11
1. <i>Reliability of the sources used</i>	11
2. <i>Transcription and translation</i>	11
2. THE SOCIETAL STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE	12
1. THE PARADIGMATIC CHANGE OF SOCIETAL STRUCTURE.....	12
1. <i>Modernity versus postmodernity</i>	12
2. <i>Societal structure</i>	12
3. <i>Underlying power structure</i>	13
3. SOCIETY AND POWER	14
1. POWER.....	14
1. <i>Power within society</i>	15
2. <i>Power in consciousness industry</i>	16
2. SOCIETY.....	20
1. <i>Groups</i>	20
2. <i>Immigrants</i>	20
3. <i>Minorities</i>	21
4. <i>Indigenous peoples</i>	23
5. <i>Ethnicity</i>	24
6. <i>Attitudes towards mainstream</i>	26
7. <i>Nationalism</i>	28
8. <i>Conflict</i>	29
9. <i>Conflict management</i>	30
10. <i>Security</i>	32
11. <i>Foreign policy instruments</i>	32
12. <i>Realpolitik</i>	<i>Error! Bookmark not defined.</i>
4. LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY	33
1. LANGUAGE STATICS.....	34
1. <i>Speech community</i>	34
2. <i>Mother tongue</i>	34
3. <i>Bilingualism</i>	34
4. <i>Diglossia</i>	35
5. <i>Language functions and status</i>	36
6. <i>Language maintenance</i>	38
2. LANGUAGE DYNAMICS.....	39
1. <i>Language instability</i>	39
2. <i>Language contact</i>	39
3. <i>Language choice</i>	40
4. <i>Language conflict</i>	40
5. <i>Language loss</i>	41
6. <i>Language shift</i>	41
7. <i>Language attrition</i>	42
8. <i>Language death and language murder</i>	42
9. <i>Pidginization and creolisation</i>	43
5. LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY ISSUES	44
1. INTRODUCTION.....	44
1. <i>Framework of language policy</i>	44
2. <i>Aim of language policy</i>	46
2. DEFINITIONS.....	47

1. <i>Language planning</i>	47
2. <i>Structure</i>	47
3. <i>History</i>	48
3. THEORIES OF LANGUAGE PLANNING.....	49
1. <i>Structural models</i>	49
2. <i>Psychological models</i>	50
3. <i>Functional models</i>	51
4. <i>Minority protection</i>	53
5. <i>Nation-building</i>	54
6. <i>Language spread</i>	56
7. <i>Language policy options</i>	57
8. <i>Implementation strategies</i>	58
6. ACQUISITION PLANNING	59
1. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES.....	59
1. <i>Submersion programme</i>	60
2. <i>Transitional programme</i>	60
3. <i>Immersion programme</i>	60
4. <i>Language shelter programme</i>	60
5. <i>Segregation programme</i>	61
2. OTHER FACTORS.....	61
1. <i>Language learning motivation</i>	61
2. <i>Programme organisation</i>	62
7. LANGUAGE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW	64
1. INTRODUCTION.....	64
2. LINGUISTIC LEGISLATION.....	64
3. LINGUISTIC HUMAN RIGHTS.....	64
1. <i>Human rights systems</i>	66
4. TARGET GROUP APPROACH.....	69
1. <i>Protection of linguistic rights of aliens</i>	70
2. <i>Linguistic human rights of indigenous peoples and minorities</i>	72
5. HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH.....	72
1. <i>Freedom of expression</i>	72
2. <i>Principle of non-discrimination</i>	72
3. <i>Principle of minority protection</i>	74
6. APPROACH BASED ON FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS OF LANGUAGE.....	76
1. <i>Official language</i>	76
2. <i>Court</i>	76
3. <i>Education</i>	76
4. <i>Media</i>	78
7. CITIZENSHIP.....	78
1. <i>General</i>	79
2. <i>Citizenship and language</i>	80
3. <i>Nationality and territorial change</i>	80
8. OCCUPATION.....	81
8. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SOVIET LANGUAGE POLICY	83
1. THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION.....	83
1. <i>Previous research</i>	83
2. <i>Factual characteristics</i>	83
3. <i>Underlying principles</i>	83
4. <i>State structure</i>	85
5. <i>Structure for the analysis of language policy</i>	86
9. LENIN: AGAINST TSARISM	87
1. THEORY.....	87
2. PRACTICE.....	89
1. <i>Lingua franca</i>	89
2. <i>Kin languages</i>	90

3. <i>Minority languages</i>	90
4. <i>Conclusions</i>	91
10. STALIN: NO PERSON, NO PROBLEM 1923-1954	93
1. THEORY	93
2. PRACTICE	93
1. <i>The Russian language</i>	94
2. <i>Kin languages</i>	95
3. <i>Minority languages</i>	95
3. CONCLUSION	95
11. PERSONS WITHOUT ETHNICITY: 1950S - MID-1970S	96
1. THEORY	96
1. <i>Lingua franca</i>	96
2. PRACTICE	97
1. <i>Russification</i>	97
2. <i>Minority languages</i>	97
12. IDEOLOGISATION OF LANGUAGE USE IN THE 1970S	98
1. THEORY	98
1. <i>The linguistic ideal</i>	100
2. <i>The Russian language</i>	100
3. <i>Kin languages</i>	102
4. <i>Minority languages</i>	102
5. <i>National-Russian bilingualism</i>	102
6. <i>The language situation in the 1980s</i>	103
7. <i>Migrant policies</i>	105
2. CONCLUSIONS	105
3. GORBACHOV'S PERESTROIKA	106
1. <i>Theory</i>	106
2. <i>Gorbachev's language policy</i>	107
3. <i>Centre-republics tension</i>	108
4. <i>Language laws of the republics</i>	109
5. <i>Disintegration</i>	110
6. <i>Conclusions</i>	110
13. ESTONIAN LINGUISTIC DEVELOPMENT	111
1. INTRODUCTION	111
2. STANDARDIZATION OF THE ESTONIAN LANGUAGE	112
14. THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA 1918-1940	112
1. ETHNIC DATA	112
1. <i>Language policy and status planning</i>	113
2. <i>Corpus planning</i>	113
3. <i>Acquisition planning</i>	114
4. <i>Legal basis</i>	114
<i>Education for minority language speakers</i>	114
5. <i>Ethnic composition</i>	115
<i>Official language teaching</i>	115
<i>The teaching of foreign languages</i>	115
<i>Universities and other institutions of higher education</i>	115
6. <i>Estonian-Russian bilateral relations</i>	116
7. <i>Conclusion</i>	116
15. SOVIET OCCUPATION	117
1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	117
1. <i>Developments during World War II</i>	117
2. <i>First decade of occupation</i>	118
3. <i>Khrushchev period</i>	118
2. INSTRUMENTS AND STRUCTURE OF CONTROL	118

3. IDEOLOGICAL BRAINWASH.....	120
4. SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGES AFFECTING ETHNIC COMPOSITION.....	120
5. TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL REALLOCATION OF LANGUAGES.....	121
6. LINGUISTIC SITUATION.....	122
7. LANGUAGE POLICY OF RUSSIFICATION.....	123
1. <i>General</i>	123
2. <i>Implementation of language policy</i>	123
3. <i>Conclusion</i>	124
8. ACQUISITION PLANNING.....	125
1. <i>General</i>	125
2. <i>Russian language promotion</i>	125
<i>Education for Russian-speakers</i>	126
<i>Education for (other) minority language speakers</i>	126
<i>Teaching of foreign languages</i>	126
3. <i>Conclusions</i>	126
9. CONCLUSIONS.....	127

1. Introduction

1. Topic

The topic of the dissertation covers mainly the area of language planning and policy in the framework of sociological, political and linguistic diachronic and synchronic developments in Estonia, as well as Estonia's political bilateral links with Russia and multilateral links with other countries and international organisations, focusing upon **status planning** as the motor of language policy development. The focus of the work is thus as following:

- topic: language planning and policy;
- kind of research: multidisciplinary, linking linguistic methods to those available in philosophy, sociology, international law, educational and political sciences;
- research level: macro;
- method: analysis of empirical material;
- geographical focus: Estonia and its place in larger political systems;
- time focus: focusing mainly on the period of 1988-1996, with diachronic analyses covering linguistic and other related developments dating back to the beginning of the 20th century.

All the material may be divided into four main parts:

- **theory**, tackling language planning, various societal models, foreign policy and various related issues of international law;
- **history**, describing the Soviet and Estonian language policy within the common framework;
- current Estonian **domestic language situation** and corresponding language policy;
- linguistic aspects of **foreign policies** (Estonian-Russian bilateral and international sphere).

The algorithm of the work is thus as follows:

- Creation of a theoretical model, based on power relations in domestic, regional and global sphere, and reflected in linguistic phenomena within respective frameworks.
- Monitoring the adequacy of the model through the development of the linguistic situation of the Soviet Union and Estonia.
- Application of the model to Estonia's current situation. Power relations within Estonian society and between Estonia and other subjects of international law are monitored through various language-related phenomena. The language developments, influenced by the power relations involved in Estonia and its foreign policies, are analysed at the macro level. The empirical material is focused on the practical implementation of the Estonian language policy and its reflections in other spheres. The role of language in relation to power structure within Estonian society in domestic as well as in international sphere is discussed. In order to provide the impact of social memory historical past is taken account.

The general question for the whole work is as follows: What is language policy and planning and how are these applied in Estonia and what is the outcome of it? To this general issue some subordinated questions are applied:

- What goals and strategies are behind the different language planning activities (i.e. development, empowerment and power relations)?
- What tools are there in disposal of a language planner and what kind of qualitative results may be expected?
- What is the attitude of other subjects of international law (states and international organisations) engaged in the issues of Estonian language policy? What are their goals and motives?
- What are the perspectives forecasted by the implicated institutions?
- To what extent do the programmes, plans and trends fulfill the aims and why? What are the underlying principles?

The organisation of the present work is as follows.

The first part is dedicated to the linguistic and legal framework for theoretical status planning. The following central issues are tackled here: terms defined, structure clarified, overview of previous studies given. The main issue in this chapter is to provide an explicit framework and a convenient apparatus for theoretical approaches to the issue of language change, and especially for the process of language shift inherently linked to power shift. Methodology of the present work will be presented, together with a discussion of language shift and its status aspects in general. The scientific literature in this field has strength of particular kind, by focusing on linguistic case studies and drawing conclusions based on those. However, the study of the process in general, using instruments made available by different scientific disciplines, has still a vast potential, with only a few interdisciplinary fundamental

works dedicated to the topic. Therefore, in an attempt to combine different phenomena in this field into a common framework, a general model for language shift is proposed. With the help of this model the process is described on macro level (covering the whole community) as well as on micro level, taking the language contact of any individual as the starting point. The possible scenarios are studied and the factors engaged in this process are analysed. The second part attempts to find suitable framework for language acquisition. The third part of the chapter attempts to situate theoretical language status issues in a broader legal context and to develop an analytical framework which takes into account the legitimate needs and interests of the state, and the rights and interests of the individual speaking a language other than an official language. The proper place and role of human rights in matters relating to language are discussed.

The material presented in the theoretical part is deliberately unbalanced, leaving more room to the notions important in the Estonian language policy context. The aim is to monitor how the power structure of society is reflected in language policies, and to trace the development of language within society from the idealistic notion of state-nation-language proposed two centuries ago through to its accommodation to the needs of contemporary society. The role of language as the cornerstone of nation-building has been maintained, along with the role of a common language as the primary generator of linguistic homogenisation. In analysing the basis for the establishment of the common language we assess the roles of three groups that may influence policy: the emerging state bureaucracy, groups representing economic interests, and the ethnic majority, by considering their interests, instrumental and primordial, in language. The presentation and analysis of various policy options and their implementation, the relationship between the common language and other languages, through the prism of three language policy models: language spread, nation-building, and minority language protection, is provided. As the legal aspects (linguistic human rights included) that regulate the relationships between various models are of greatest concern in minority language protection, the issue of instrumental and collective rights is considered in more detail together with the interaction of the three language policy models.

In the second, historical part of the research on Soviet and Estonian language policies (chapters 3 and 4) various paradigms of language policy are considered in the above-mentioned context, with special attention provided to the processes of change of a paradigm. The third chapter analyses the linguistic policies and situation of the Soviet Union, a totalitarian multilingual empire whose linguistic policy was based on the ideological postulates of Communism. The fate of languages on the territory of the former USSR is described and analysed. In presenting a historical overview of the linguistic policy in the former Soviet Union, attention is paid to the ideological goals influencing language policy, to their realisation, and to the results obtained. For the purpose of clarification of developments, differentiation between ideology and implementation, short- and long-term goals, intentional and unintentional (in good faith), motives and consequences is provided.

In the fourth chapter dedicated to Estonian language policies in the past, two main trends, russification and the maintenance of one's own language are analysed through a detailed analysis of the data available. In Estonia, two periods of paradigmatic change are described, in the 1940s, when the Soviet language policy substituted the language policy of independent Estonia and around 1990, when the Soviet language policies were turned down and restitution-based language policy introduced. The conflict of two entirely different and incompatible systems of cultural values led to the dismissal of one paradigm that, however, proved to be nondurable, due to built-in tensions and inherent conflicts, suppressed by the totalitarian system which lost the grip when resources became insufficient.

The third part, comprising fifth chapter, deals with the current language situation in Estonia and corresponding language policy. Legal acts are analysed and their influence on the Estonian society is assessed with the help of various statistical data and linguistic and demographic surveys.

The fourth part presents the foreign policy analysis in language matters on bilateral (Estonian-Russian, chapter 6) as well as multilateral level (chapter 7). In the sixth chapter Estonian-Russian foreign relations, concerning language issues, after regaining sovereignty in 1991 are discussed. Due to the termination of occupation and restitution of independence in the Baltic states in August 1991 Russia (at that time USSR) lost sites of strategic (defense system) as well as economic (Baltic ports) interest. To regain the influence, besides economic stimuli, the Russian-speaking and -minded population has been used by Russia, claiming systematic human rights violations and ethnic cleansing taking place against this target group. The normalization has been hindered by conflicting interests of the Baltic states on one hand and Russia on the other (e.g. Russia's demand for the UN peace-keeping mandate on the territory of the former USSR).

The seventh chapter is dedicated on the analysis of foreign expertise in language matters. To investigate the alleged human rights violations, several international human rights missions have visited the Baltic states and provided their recommendations. The most active in promoting human

rights and integration has been the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe with missions in Estonia and Latvia. The OSCE opened mandate for investigating the Baltic situation by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Several others, like the United Nations, Council of Europe, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Federation and other international organisations have sent human rights investigation missions to the Baltic states and produced reports afterwards.

Chapter 8 sums up the findings of the present study, explains its limitations and implications, and puts forth a number of suggestions for future research. The current administrative and legal mechanisms of regulation of language shift at domestic as well as international level are evaluated and recommendations are made in order to improve their efficiency and expediency of these mechanisms in counteracting language shift and assimilation.

2. Literature and research

1. Specific studies

During the pre-WW II period sociolinguistic research in Estonia was minute, mostly connected with the lexical structure of Estonian, influence of other languages to it and etymology, with the main linguistic emphasis on corpus planning. In this domain, the debates on language purism that took place in 1920s and 1930s provided occasional remarks on the subject.

During the Soviet occupation sociology was connected with the ideological discipline of *historical materialism*. Thus the sociolinguistic research was restrained to a confirmation of ideological postulates. The most thoroughly studied one was the national language-Russian bilingualism as a marker of the shift to Russian. Nevertheless the results obtained during this period proved to be of significant scientific value. We might mention the works of Paul Ariste, Helle Leemets, Anne Reitsak, Savvati Smirnov. Estonian researchers in contrast to others in the Soviet Union did not apply the term bilingualism to the case of foreign language usage (Russian was regarded a foreign language in Estonia). Contrastive linguistics was developed, though it focused around Estonian-Russian relations (Anne Reitsak). A special group of studies focused on the language of Estonians in diaspora: Estonian-Russian in the Caucasus Eduard Vääri, Joel Sang, Siberia Lembit Vaba, Jüri Viikberg, in Leningrad Eduard Päll, Estonian-Swedish in Sweden: (Raimo Raag, Juhan Tuldava), Estonian-English (A. Jõgi). Mention should be made of multilingual aspects of child language studies by Els Oksaar. Dialectological studies by Karl Pajusalu, Jüri Viikberg etc. Corpus planning should be stressed. Tiiu Ereht, Henn Saari, Peeter Päll. Language planning studies were carried out by Valter Tauli, an Estonian researcher in Sweden. The initiators of changes in the Soviet Union in the language policies were Estonian researchers, esp. Mati Hint's article in *Druzhba Narodov* in 1988 had significant influence for the whole corps of sociolinguists in the Soviet Union.

Beginning with the perestroika and the disintegration of the Soviet Union several articles on language policy, language planning and language rights concerning the situation in Estonia appeared. (Arvo Eek, Martin Ehala, Francois Grin, Mati Hint, David Laitin, Jacques Maurais, Uldis Ozolins, Mart Rannut). Sociopolitical research was done by several domestic as well as foreign researchers. For example, David Laitin resided in Narva-Jõesuu in 1993-1994, and produced an article (Laitin 1995) on the formation of Russian-speaking minority. Several other sociological surveys have been published (cf. chapter 5).

Nowadays sociolinguistic research is carried out in the Estonian Language Institute (psychological ethnolinguistic factors, contrastive studies, minority studies and bilingualism, etc.), Tartu University (dialectological and communication studies), Tallinn Pedagogical University (teaching Estonian as a second language), and Institute for Social and International Studies.

2. Projects

Besides individual research several major projects in the domain of language planning have been started.

Since 1995 four major projects have been initiated, VERA (with the task to provide the fundamentals of integration of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia), the Tallinn City Government project, the UNDP project on integration and Estonian Language Strategy Centre, with the task of providing program for language policy for the next 10-15 years, and governmental theses on integration by Siimann's government. However, lack of solid theoretical basis and the insufficient cooperation with specialists in the domain of language and sociolinguistics has hindered the work on all of these projects.

Most successful so far has been VERA. In April 1996 the then Minister of Education Jaak Aaviksoo established a working group with the task to provide the fundamentals of the national

program of integration for the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. The program called VERA included the cream of Estonian sociologists. The main domains to be studied included:

- the relations of non-Estonian youth with the Estonian society and its theoretical considerations;
- the current situation of integration and the trends concerning the non-Estonian population;
- the analysis of the Russian-medium education;
- the regional aspects of integration and education;
- the elaboration of future scenarios, that enable to see the results of possible steps as well as the problems connected to it in order to make rational choices;
- the concept for future research.

The working group has produced two volumes containing their research results. The first one, *Vene noored Eestis: sotsioloogiline mosaiik* (Järve 1997), focused on sociological evaluation of Estonian ethnic situation, the follow-up *Väljakutse Haridusele* (Lauristin et al. 1998) attempts to clarify the educational aspects of the non-Estonian community. The main thrust seems to be based on ethnicity.

In 1997 the UNDP initiated an integration project with the task of drafting a framework document for providing overall integration strategy to the open and stable society. The drafting group defined the integration to the Estonian society as the mutual acceptance by ethno-linguistic groups, whose maintenance is not threatened, with the general communication in Estonian and loyalty to the Estonian state by all its residents. The strategic goal of integration is the guarantee for the long-term societal security. The tactical goal is to the control of the processes of the transitional period based on legality and international norms. Language policy is viewed as one of the main means of societal integration. The goal of the Estonian language policy is the multicultural society with one state language together with several native languages. The task of the national language policy has been the protection of the Estonian language, restitution of its societal functions and enlarging of its functional domain. It is necessary to increase the political apparatus working on language policy issues and increase its status. The results were produced in a paper (UNDP 1997). The aim seems to be fixed through political goals based on security and stability.

Language training is part of the general aim of **European's Union's Phare Country Programme's** support to educational and social reform in Estonia. Its general aims include the support of the integration of non-native speakers into Estonian society, and to assist the Estonian society to become an open society. Specific objectives in this case are to enable Estonia to work out a national language strategy and make proposals to policy makers, and to enable co-ordination of different language project departing from strategic plan. The immediate beneficiaries of the programme should be both institutions dealing with language policy and strategy issues, and Estonia's non-Estonian-speaking population. The EU-financed project **Estonian Language Strategy Centre** (European Training Foundation, Contract N.ETF/96/VET/0009, signed 8 July 1996, further ETFC) financed from PHARE resources of the European Union has the task to provide national language strategy for the next 15 years. The project proposal titled *Strategic Planning and Co-ordination for Integration and Language Learning in Estonia* was presented by the Estonian Ministry of Culture and Education together with the Estonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the Stability Pact meeting in Copenhagen on 1 November 1994. The goal was then to develop a new comprehensive strategic plan for Estonian as the second language learning in Estonia and enhance co-ordination of current and future language learning efforts. The plan included the establishment of the Estonian Language Centre, an Estonian language strategic planning and coordination unit. The Programme's planned length is for two years with the budget of 200,000+200,000 ECU, though it is anticipated that local and bi-lateral funding will sustain the Centre for an as-of-yet undetermined longer period. The essence of the project is to work out an integrated national language strategy for the next 10-15 years.

The Centre simultaneously acts as the project's implementation unit. It is foreseen that the unit will be run within the context of an education programmes-related Programme Management Unit, which would be set up as a legal entity in the form of a foundation and is currently under development (ETFC: 1).

The draft language strategy document specifies the aims of language strategy as following (ETFC: 5-6):

- **To establish principles for the development of language policy and implementation**, which would lead to the development of cooperation between peoples and states. The aim of practical language policy is to change attitudes and stereotypes in Estonian and non-Estonian communities facilitating a more positive approach from all sides.
- **To help to establish conditions, which would facilitate the implementation of these principles and the preservation of the stability in the state system** and to foster interpersonal communication, development of culture, education and science as well as economic progress;
- **To consider language learning (LL) as a part of language competence** and to foster development of

the Estonian language as a carrier of self-determination and cultural heritage. The LS is also a part of cultural policy and preservation and development of the Estonian language will be guaranteed not so much by setting requirements for language competencies, as by creating cultural values in this language, which enables it to make a contribution to the culture recognised by the world;

- **To overcome the limited approach to language learning when dealing with language issues in general within the country.** It should broaden the area of communication between different communities, which at the moment are hampered by over-politicisation of language issues. The task of the state language policy is to help to overcome the oversimplified approach to language issues which over-emphasises oppositions and contrasts. It is essential to have a better understanding of ethnic identities than that based on the ethnic language only. The LS must concentrate on development of positive attitudes in Estonian and Russian-speaking mass media.

The tasks of the Estonian Language Strategy are determined as following:

- Attribution of equal value to different mother tongues used in Estonia, recognition of the right to education in the native language and development of culture, the implementation of which is based on self-initiative of the language group and means with additional support by the state;
- Polyfunctional development of the Estonian language as an essential means of preserving the ethnic culture, identity and population;
- Development of a balanced multilingual society based on one state (official) language;
- Development of coherent language policy based on objective information, gained by relevant system of longitudinal research.
- Consideration of regional differences of the area of the Estonian language;
- Implementation of language policy in the way, which will support the growth of coherence in society and develop the potential for integration into Europe.

Though the program fixed linguistic aims as fundamental, due to the political endeavours by Vähri's (1995-1997) and Siimann's (1997-) governments, the program management excluded scientists. As a result, the program turned out a total failure, with a court case pending for the theft of intellectual property. However, in order to fulfill the requirements set for PHARE, the program was adopted secretly by the Estonian Government as p. 36 of the Government session agenda from 21 April in the form of protocol no. 17 under the title *Language strategy of the non-Estonian population*, signed by Mart Siimann, Prime Minister, Paul Varul, Minister of Justice, and Uno Veering, State Secretary. The work of the Centre was terminated in the second half of 1998.

Nothing is known about the Russian-population-focused **Tallinn City Government project**, besides the significant amount of money allocated for it 500,000 EEK. The work was commissioned by the Vice-Mayor of Tallinn Peeter Kreitzberg from an unknown firm with no expertise in the field concerned. According to the recent data, the project has failed, with a substantial amount of money missing.

Direct governmental policy is revealed in several documents prepared by Andra Veidemann's (Minister without portfolio in Prime Minister Siimann's government) bureau. The theses on **Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society** were adopted by the government in 10 February 1998. The program views the main dichotomy of the Estonian society as political. On this basis, the risk of two separate communities formed in one state is seen, with increasing unemployment and criminal rate among young non-Estonian generation. Thus, national strategy of integration is proposed, based on the decrease of the number of stateless persons, improved national language teaching, participation of non-Estonians in social life. Stress in this policy is:

- laid on future, connected with stability, modernity and development;
- laid on children and youth;
- active participation of non-Estonians;
- societal security.

National programme of integration will be initiated in 1999, planned for the next 10 years.

National goals are the following:

- change of attitudes by state;
- decrease of the number of non-Estonians through naturalisation by jus soli principle;
- educational system made central in integration;
- improvement of Estonian proficiency among non-Estonians;
- increased participation of non-Estonians in social and cultural life;
- decrease of territorial separation by promoting mobility;
- political integration of ethnic non-Estonians to the legislative and executive structures

In order to carry out these ideas in practice, **Integration Fund** as a semi-governmental organ was created by the Minister of Interior on 31 March, with the task to collect information and coordinate

projects supporting integration, together with drafting a plan for integration. In this way the Fund seemingly attempts to achieve better results in the same domain than the others above, which have produced failures. However, taking into account the similar attitude of emphasizing political representation instead of scientific knowhow, one should be modest in expectations.

3. Conventional formalities

1. Reliability of the sources used.

The reliability of the sources used comes into consideration in the cases of protocols of the Language Protection Committee and Committee on the status of Estonian. These protocols were questioned afterwards by several participants, among them the letter from Mati Hint from 1 December 1990, calling into question the neutrality and the objectivity and stating that there may be no secrets in language policy.

The reliability of the Soviet statistical data was questioned by Dellenbrant (1990) who came to the following conclusion: *Soviet statistics are less than ideal for analysis. Elections serve other functions than in the West...As for the quality of data, it is either Soviet data or no data at all.*

2. Transcription and translation

Transcription of Russian names is based on the international romanization rules adopted at the UN conference in Montreal in 1987. In several quotations and references, the French version is used, as preferred by the authors themselves. Translation into English is added in order to secure understandability.

2. The societal structure of language

1. *The paradigmatic change of societal structure*

1. Modernity versus postmodernity

The contemporary world has been undergoing fundamental changes, qualitatively affecting social, economic and political systems which came into being in the West in the period since the 18th century and which are frequently referred to by the summary term **modernity** (Giddens 1990, O’Riagain 1997). This set of societal systems reflected the needs of industrial society. According to O’Riagain (1997), the principal characteristics of the systems of modernity include the ordered division of labour, the structuring of social class, the rationality of exchange, the search for ordering principles in every department of life and the rise of nation-state, among others (Taylor-Gooby 1994). In contrast, the characteristics of **post-modernity**, catering for the needs of information society, are institutionalised pluralism, variety, contingency and ambivalence (Giddens 1990), resulting in the synergetic approach, empowering the most powerful, however, simultaneously leaving more undetermined space for minor-level phenomena, due to expanding recognition of chaotic processes within society, based on non-linearity. In these new conditions number of processes appear central, among these shift from the manufacturing base to service base and other employment patterns, and overall globalisation. In this framework, post-modern state is geared towards enhancing competitiveness within the context of an internationalised framework (Jessop 1994), thus language and cultural policies are geared towards the creating the conditions which are considered to promote economic competitiveness. Globalisation is considered in terms of the ranges and timespans of human mobility and as a socio-cultural and communication phenomenon (O’Riagain 1997: 19), to which Anthony Giddens (1984) refers as time-space distanciation. Joenniemi (1994: 6) points out that in the domain of politics the post-modern view, which, in contrast to the former, modern view, focuses less on high politics and locates the issues more in the sphere of low politics of accidental, uncontrolled and chaotic, with small, fractioned violence. Its preoccupation is with “soft” societal politics, stressing socio-economic and cultural issues affecting identity. It elevates integration and fragmentation into the position of key variables (ibid., 7-8). This may be connected to the emerging security view, recognizing terrorism (with the uncontrollable production and sales of various weapons of mass destruction) as one of the main threats to the contemporary security structure.

These changes have a direct impact on multiculturalism and multilingualism, and the regulation of these through language planning and policy, which we are going to discuss below.

2. Societal structure

The current political situation is significantly different from the Herderian times that produced the triad of *etat-nation-langue* that was idealised up to the beginning of the 20th century. This led to the substitution by nation-states of collapsed empires that were unable, among other things, to cope with linguistic diversity and implement integrative and cost-effective language policies. The solution for facilitating societal balance was found in the form of the nation-state, which in turn has shown itself to be a temporary one as well. With the birth of international organisations, transnational corporations and global media as well as information networks, a good deal of power has shifted away from states, save the most totalitarian ones. Simultaneously, the homogeneity of a state showed itself to be wishful thinking in most cases, as seen in the revival of hidden minorities and increasing migrational flows. Therefore in order to describe the current position with societal power as an integral element, a new paradigm is necessary. One component of this paradigm has to be language, which over time plays an even more central role, penetrating all domains of society and leaving less room for negotiations over language choice. The reason for the importance of language seems to be a transformation of it into a political object and resource like other politically negotiable objects and resources (Ozolins 1993: 34) in both the primordial and instrumental senses (Phillipson et al. 1994: 9). From the primordial point of view, language is seen as an integrative component of ethnicity and a natural symbol of inherent group rights, simultaneously being, due to the exclusive nature of language, one of the most common differentiating factors in human affairs. Any negative change that may be linked to language is thus a visible signal for those operating in defence of their ethnolinguistic interests. In this way language has maintained its role as an organizer of ethnic divisions within society. These divisions are sustained by boundary-maintenance mechanisms: *ideologies, rules, practices which serve to maintain ethnic group*

distinctiveness by maximising close social relations between ethnic insiders and by strictly limiting and controlling social relations between insiders and outsiders (Kallen 1996: 119).

Simultaneously, the increase of the instrumental value of language and its exclusive characteristics, rearranging society on a language domination axis, is inevitably connected to the economic and social well-being of its speakers. Thus language acts as a regulator of (unequal) access to power. Taken together, both primordial and instrumental values tend to produce a synergetic effect, making language one of the most important factors in the contemporary political scene.

Another component in our modernized triad seems to be power, which on a macro-scale was available only to states earlier. Power, sufficient to reproduce nations with all their characteristics generation after generation, was traditionally controlled by states, based on principles of territoriality, sovereignty and exclusivity (Buzan 1993). Thus, states concentrated power, together with authority and identity.

However, the current situation may be characterised by a different pattern of power distribution, influencing directly the security agenda of states and the behaviour of nations. Thus, the principle of the territoriality of power will be just one among several principles. However, power itself stays as a cornerstone in the build-up of modern society, but in a substantially modified form. Power is qualitatively more transmitted through language as a channel, used as an instrument of manipulation in discourse. It means that beside resources and structural agents, ideological agents have come to the forefront of policy-making (including language policy). Neither linguistic human rights nor language policy in general are the focus of interest of any state (though, together with diminishing power in other spheres, states have taken more interest in language matters, e.g. France). State interests are usually elsewhere than in language policy, more firmly concentrated in the economy, security, social policies. The sort of language policy adopted is the consequence of decisions taken in other domains, for achieving goals that usually have little in common with language issues. Behind these domains, two opposite factors, called the market and market correctives (Tomashevski 1996: 104, Skutnabb-Kangas 1996) influence development, creating order and structure in the domain concerned. In this way, human rights, linguistic human rights included, act as correctives to the free market, meaning they should guarantee that the basics needed for survival and for the sustenance of a dignified life overrule the law of supply and demand, thus being outside market forces. A state is successful if these two factors are in balance. Among other non-tradable issues, McGarry and O Leary (1993: 16) list other ethnicity-related matters, like nationality, territorial homelands, and culture. When overridden, they tend to create zero-sum conflicts.

The third component in our paradigm is society - the subject that makes use of power and is simultaneously an agent of it. In contemporary times the term society need not denote a nation any more, or even any homogenous language group, but rather a group with common or similar (possibly linguistic) interests. According to several researchers, starting with Popper (1945) new form of society is reflected in several features, like openness, globalism and access to information. Open society as a form of social organisation emphasizes peaceful cooperation as the means of rational behavior in the conditions of non-existence of monopoly of truth. Information society emphasizes the fact that access to information determines power relations. The features of this society are depicted as follows:

- society is innovative, with accelerating modifications of residual and employment environment;
- overall information net with everybody plugged in;
- services and education are global and usually offered through telecommunication network;
- the concept of continuous education has been implemented in all domains.

All these conditions require formalised language environment with written standard, with language functioning on a native competence level. The inherent structure of the contemporary society is influenced by the power relations channelled through the instrumental functions of language, as well as by language directly, through its primordial side. In order to reveal the connections between these three components, we focus on the issues of power reflected through societal structures functioning in a language.

3. Underlying power structure

The role of language as the cornerstone of nation-building is maintained by states, together with the issue of the common language as the primary generator of linguistic homogenisation, a form of homogenisation of cultural practices. Various arguments in support of the common language are proposed, economic as well as political ones. Stewart (1968: 541) observes that different languages are not competitive when they are used by different people for the same things, or by the same people for different things. Conflict arises when two or more languages are defined as appropriate for use in the same situation by the same people. Thus, the common language as a negotiated neutral code is seen as

the best solution for avoiding conflicts and strengthening integrity and security. In analysing the basis for the establishment of the common language, one has to assess the roles of three groups that may influence decisions: the emerging state bureaucracy, groups representing economic interests, and the ethnic majority, by comparing their respective instrumental and primordial interests in language.

The role of language in state bureaucracy has been constantly increasing. Though the sovereignty of a state in international terms has diminished, its role as a major purveyor of services, employment and economic opportunities has expanded. It provides a wide range of services and regulatory mechanisms for the society. Thus, states explicitly value instrumental aspect of language and claim to base their language policies on the principles deriving from these instrumental values. However, language has been skillfully implemented as a power instrument of the elite on a major scale by states, though as a hidden agenda. A government may directly affect the political power structure of the state by making language knowledge a predominant factor in access to employment and education opportunities, as native speakers of the official language are more likely to reach the higher echelons of the state machinery. The central role of a language means professional and bureaucratic employment opportunities, linked with significant economic benefits. Thus, the introduction of the common language may seem to promote instrumental value, however, it is linked to primordial value, simultaneously producing inequality.

The interests of the state are usually complemented by the market economy, playing a major role in power structures. In this domain the two values surface again. Language is not used only as a neutral means of communication. Economic losses and gains are immediately reflected through the status of those beneficiaries, speakers of a certain language. In this way, language is viewed as a resource, knowledge of which may provide a privileged position. The economic policy is usually based on a quite valid understanding that monolingualism in a monolingual state is economical. However, the other valid claim, that multilingualism in multilingual states is economical, is usually substituted by the false hybrid of the two claims (cf. Galtung 1988). The reason for this seems to stem from the primordial agenda, connected with linguistic groups. The same twofold scheme directing language interests in the common language policy seems to be true in other domains also.

The role of the ethnic majority seems to be crucial in the common language choice. If ethnic majority is identified primarily with language and powerful enough, its language choice is transferred to emerging state bureaucracy and economy. If the ethnic majority lacks the necessary support within society, language choice is further negotiated (cf. India). If the ethnic majority is characterised primarily by other criteria than language, these other criteria may be taken as the basis for language choice (Malay as the language identified with Islam was adopted in Malaysia, instead of Javan, the language spoken by the majority). Thus in the case of the ethnic majority, the instrumental factor is secondary to primordial.

In order to reveal the connections between these three components of our new postmodernist triad *power-society-language*, we focus on the issues of power reflected through societal structures functioning through language. This chapter aims thus at outlining the general theoretical background for the research on language functioning within society and language planning. Key terms to be used in the following chapters will be provided. The chapter starts with the discussion of structure of society, based on the distribution of power. In the next part language functioning in society is attached to the societal structure, and the final part describes the management and manipulation of language(s) in society, (also) through language policy and planning.

3. Society and power

1. Power

Power is a phenomenon that is observed by everybody and understood by nobody. The various theories available cover various aspects of it and enrich each other, however not comprising a perfect tool to tackle main societal challenges. From the most known theories of power let's name just a few: power derived from economic base, proposed by **Marx**, from the barrel of a gun (**Mao**), depicted as a heterogenous relation and not homogenous commodity (**Foucault**), and thus can be divided, **Gramsci**, **Galtung**, **Giddens**, **Althusser** and many others. Besides this several researchers have studied the relationships between power and various societal phenomena, especially in the domain of consciousness industry (power in education, mass media and religion, cf. Skutnabb-Kangas 1997). Below, we are going to review shortly some of the basic modern theories concerning the mentioned domains: power within society in general, and power in education and in language.

1. Power within society

Among the numerous researchers dealing with the notion of power **Michel Foucault** holds a prominent position. Foucault's point of departure is the notion of power as something which cannot be possessed. However, the exact definition seems to be difficult to provide, as Foucault's concept of power changes throughout his works. In the 1980s Foucault seems to deal with power only in relation to the self and the construction of subjects. In 1970 he characterises his earlier perception of power in the 60s as traditional, related to e.g. institutions of society. There seems to be a shift in the perception of power as being either repressive, a negative form or a positive productive form. Furthermore, Foucault uses the concept of power in different ways and emphasises its importance differently in the different works. However, it is possible to locate some general overall characteristics of his concept of power.

Foucault believes that the primary presence of power forms a moving base of power relations, which are always local. Power relations are fragmented points which are constantly changing and appear in different contexts. Power is not an abstraction but it exists only when it is put into action as a relation between one point and another. The different power relations are both moving and concrete elements, in which a social, cultural, and ideological order is reflected. Thus, it is important to point out that power relations constitute any social network of relations in constant activity; they are not structures above a society, in fact any society implies power relations.

The concept of power is not personal, which means that power cannot be owned by individuals, nor can it be traced back to references such as capital. Hence, power cannot be owned, shared, conquered nor robbed of somebody. For Foucault, power is a product of relative strength, revealed at a more abstract level of a two-part struggle between e.g. those in power and the suppressed, or power and counter power, thus it is not possible to locate active and passive part in the struggle.

The concept of **counter power** is essential for the power to exist. The struggles against it give the power the possibility of expanding itself and absorbing the counter power in a dynamic interrelation. Foucault emphasises that counter power often manifests itself in anti-authority struggles, and that these struggles have some common features. They are described as being transversal in the sense that they are not limited within a specific country, class or culture, the aim is to fight the power directly in the different contexts in which it appears, and the struggles look for the immediate enemy and do not necessarily find solution for problems at a future date. The anti-authority struggles are performed on different levels, both organised and non-organised. Examples of organised struggles are as different kinds of organised groups that do not accept the way they are being defined by certain power relations in society. The non-organised reactions are more difficult to point out, since they can be characterised as individual reactions to a micro situation, an expression of an individual need. Hence, the non-organised struggles are often not regarded as anti-authority struggles but they can form the basis of organised struggles.

The task of counter power is not to eliminate the "evil power", rather to make the relations dynamic, and therefore the analysis and problematisation of the power relations of a society, its historical backgrounds and sources, as it is essential in the struggle for change.

Antonio Gramsci's concept of **civil society** is based on an idea that we live in a society which is not controlled only by economy or the state, but through networks which are built up of voluntary relations through trade unions, political parties, cultural and community organisations. When the state is not controlled by force, then the intellectual and moral leadership, which is acquired through **hegemony**, plays an important role in achieving the economic and political power. The ruling class has to have power over other classes and that is accomplished by providing the intellectual and moral ideas that bind people together. This knowledge is provided and controlled through education and it should be received by others as being **common sense** (Andersen 1988: 89-90). Phillipson (1992: 72) stresses that hegemony refers to dominant ideas that we take for granted as the natural state of affairs, rather than a choice which reflects particular interests. Hegemony is thereby a covert way of exercising power by combining dominant group's own ideas with other classes' and groups' interests. Bocock (1986: 63) emphasises the capacity of the dominant group to provide intellectual, moral, and philosophical leadership and to pursue policies which can be presented plausibly as being in the interests of the whole people, of the nation. Intellectuals play an important role in empowering the dominant group by performing the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind together members of a class and form a common identity. Through hegemony, networks of civil society will be turned into ideological networks of the dominant group, which will then be *...the sole authorized representative of all the different interests of a socially and culturally diverse society* (Tosi 1988: 91). The struggle for hegemony challenges the established structures of society through counter hegemonies. A new structure will become valid only after it is strong enough and fully developed, the old structure having already used its potential. New form of state and new types of society are thereby developed with new intellectual and moral orders (Gramsci in Hoare and Smith 1971: 404).

According to Gramsci's theories, hegemony can be attained through three phases of progression.

The first phase is the economic operative level, where a particular group is aware of its specific interests and conscious of its unity and homogeneity. A trader feels obliged to stand by another trader, but they do not organise a wider social group including other professional groups. On a second level, consciousness is reached that the whole social class shares the same interests, but only on the economical level. At this stage, the problem of State is posed. The group demands to participate in legislation and administration, but still within the existing fundamental structures. The third phase is the political phase. It is reached when the group realises that its interests can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. Interests are incorporated and an ideology is formed bringing about both unison of economic and political aims and intellectual and moral unity. Hegemony of a fundamental social group over series of subordinate groups is thus formed (Gramsci in Hoare and Smith 1971: 182). As Phillipson (1992: 76) notes, the existence of alternatives to the prevailing hegemony provides openings both for influencing the dominant order and for challenging it.

In his approach to power, Galtung (1980) identifies three types of power: innate power, resource power and structural power. The means used to assert power are respectively persuasion, bargaining, or force. For Galtung, power requires senders or receivers, as power is a relation, not a property or attribute of somebody or something. Structural power can, according to Galtung, lead to resource power, and vice versa. One form of power is convertible to another: structural power into accumulation of resources, resource power into sufficient command of the structure to get into positions of structural power (ibid.: 64, quoted in Phillipson 1992: 273). In his later work (Galtung 1996) develops the system of power by providing distinction between violence and power. Violence may be either direct (with sender) or indirect (structural). The two major forms of structural violence are witnessed in politics and economy, being repression and exploitation correspondingly. Behind these, according to Galtung, is cultural violence: all of it symbolic, in religion and ideology, in language and art, in science and law, in media and education. The function of it is to legitimize direct and structural violence, that in most cases is the monopoly of State. For Galtung (1996: 2), power is the same kind though larger notion that may be divided into four types: cultural power moves actors by persuading them what is right and wrong, economic power by the carrot method of *quid pro quo*; military power by the stick method of "or else"; and political power by producing decisions. The general perspective of power is legalistic, without questioning law as one more source of structural and cultural violence (ibid.:35).

Galtung's theory of imperialism (developed further for implementation in language domains by Phillipson (1992) and Skutnabb-Kangas (1988, 1996, 1997) starts from the key notion of imperialism as a type of relationship whereby one society (or collectivity in more general terms) can dominate another (Galtung 1980: 107). The theory derives from the unequal distribution of power between a dominant Centre (the powerful western countries and their interests), and dominated Peripheries (the underdeveloped countries), which in their turn are further distributed respectively by Centre-Periphery relationship (resulting in the consolidation of elites). Elites of both the Centre and the Periphery may share common interests with the norms dictated from the Centre and internalized by elites of the Periphery. Earlier, colonizers themselves comprised the elites in the Periphery, changed to indigenous, controlled by or under the influence of the Centre. In the latter phase various international organisations (economic, political, military, etc.) play a key role. The next phase will reflect the diminishing need for physical presence of the exploiters and increasing control of societal consciousness due to the advances in technology, thus corresponding to the needs of postmodernist information society.

Thus, Galtung's theory is concerned with the structural relations between rich and poor countries and the mechanisms by which the inequality between them is maintained. This conceptual framework provides useful for analysing other types of situations with asymmetrical links, with norms, ideals and ideologies in one end and modelling, transfer and accommodation in the other.

2. Power in consciousness industry

The notion of consciousness industry was brought to fore in Skutnabb-Kangas (1997), emphasizing the increasing importance of the domains of education, mass media and religion in internalization of hegemonic relationships through language. The division of these domains may be rather artificial and in most cases, unnecessary, as the intertwined domain of educational and linguistic aspects in power analysis testifies. Several authors have contributed in both domains successfully (cf. Bourdieu 1970, 1991, Fairclough 1992, 1994, establishing power-discourse link, as well as Skutnabb-Kangas (1997), Phillipson 1992, Cummins 1994, and many others).

Pierre Bourdieu has expanded his theory to several social domains, education and language included. His theory is based on two central notions: market and habitus. The first bears strong similarity to economic markets which are a structured set of relationships between producers and consumers, being a site of struggle and competition where individuals or agents strive to maintain or alter their position and where their capacity to compete is determined by the volume of capital they possess. The concept of market

is applied to several social fields. Bourdieu (1991: 37) speaks about structures of linguistic market, which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and censorships. In Bourdieu's linguistic market linguistic competence functions as capital. Languages are always spoken in a particular market and the characteristics of these markets accords them a certain value. It is part of the practical competence of speakers to know when, where, and how to speak one language rather than another in order to derive a profit most advantageous to their interests. The distribution of linguistic capital is related to and indexes the distribution of other forms of capital which together define the location of an individual within the social hierarchy. Markets have various degree of autonomy. Thus a language competence can have value in one market and denied in another. Bourdieu considers nation-states in possession of unified national markets in all fields of social life. Social deviations are resolved with the concept of internal markets. To the degree that they are autonomous from the national market, internal markets can establish and maintain their own norms.

Habitus denotes a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks. The habitus also provides individuals with a sense of how to act and respond in the course of their daily lives. It orients their actions and inclinations without strictly determining them. It gives them a feel for the game, a sense of what is appropriate in the circumstances and what is not, a practical sense (Thomson 1991: 12-13, quoted in O'Riagain 1997: 22). Within the home and school in early childhood, the system of successive reinforcements or refutations has thus constituted in each one of us a certain sense of the social value of linguistic usages and of the relation between the different usages and the different markets, which organises all subsequent perceptions of linguistic products, tending to endow its with considerable stability (Bourdieu 1991: 82, quoted in O'Riagain 1997: 22). These dispositions, called the logic of practice by Bourdieu, are formed primarily in childhood, by the internalisation of the practices of adults which in turn reflect the family's social position. While the dispositions are acquired by an individual, they tend to reflect a common response to common conditions. While the logic reflects past and present conditions, it is also informed by the social trajectory, that is, realistic expectations of the upward or downward mobility facing family or social group to which they belong.

The relationship between the linguistic habitus and the linguistic market thus works to define the acceptability of a language. The durable dispositions, perceptions and attitudes which constitute the linguistic habitus are linked to the market as much through their conditions of acquisition as through their conditions of use. Strategies of language assimilation and dissimilation (Bourdieu 1991: 64) are linked to the more general strategies of social reproduction adopted by groups and individuals (intergenerational transmission of advantages). One cannot save the value of competence unless one saves the market, the whole set of political and social conditions of production of the producers/ consumers' (Bourdieu 1991: 57).

Bourdieu's theory of social and cultural reproduction considers pedagogic actions as an instrument of transforming power into legitimate authority, the internalisation of the values of the dominating culture resulting in self-discrimination. Through education and other forms of pedagogical activities a **habitus** (the product of the internalisation of the arbitrary culture which is transferred during the education) is formed. The habitus is a framework, a combining principle for behaviour, attitudes and perception of the surrounding world (Bourdieu 1970: 31, 39). According to Bourdieu there is a distinction between primary and secondary habitus. The primary pedagogical activity, which is often exercised at home, forms the primary habitus that is characteristic for the social class or group to which the individual belongs. The secondary habitus is the result of the secondary pedagogical activity which is exercised in school (ibid.42-43).

During the education certain significations that are regarded as legitimate, are imposed on the individual. The imposition of significations which is exercised in school is, according to Bourdieu, consistent with the arbitrary culture of the dominating group (ibid.:9). Bourdieu describes the culture as arbitrary, since it is not based on a naturally defined foundation, even though it is passed on as such (ibid.:8). He explains it as follows (ibid.:7):

In any given social formation, the PA (pedagogic action) which the power relations between the groups or classes making up that social formation put into the dominant position within the system of PAs is the one which most fully, though always indirectly, corresponds to the objective interests (material, symbolic and, in the respect considered here, pedagogic) of the dominant groups or classes, both by its mode of imposition and by its delimitation of what and on whom, it imposes.

The pedagogic action is dependent on the pedagogic authority, i.e. the action and the signification which is passed on - the dominating culture - is accepted and perceived as legitimate (ibid.: 11, 13). He states (1970: 26):

a pedagogic agency commands the PAU (pedagogic authority) enabling it to legitimate the cultural

arbitrary that it inculcates, only within the limits laid down by that cultural arbitrary,... it reproduces the fundamental principles of the cultural arbitrary that a group or a class produces as worthy of reproduction, both by its very existence and by the fact of delegating to an agency the authority required in order to reproduce it.

Thus, the pedagogic action becomes the main instrument in the transformation of power into legitimate authority which everybody is able to recognise. This is what Bourdieu calls a **symbolic exercise of violence** (ibid.: 15). Bourdieu emphasises the importance of symbolic relations, meaning the accepted definition of reality, and the contributions of the images of legitimacy, to exercise or maintenance of power (cf. Gramsci's hegemony).

According to Bourdieu, a prerequisite for the pedagogic work in school is that the children possess an adequate primary habitus, i.e. possess the cultural capital of the dominating culture. The pedagogic work is situated in a continuum between implicit and explicit pedagogy. **Implicit pedagogy** means that the arbitrary culture is internalised unconsciously, since the general principles only are passed on to the students through the practical education act. **Explicit pedagogy** means that the principles are explicitly articulated in the education (ibid.: 47).

According to Bourdieu the transference and reproduction of the dominating culture contributes to the social reproduction, since the children who possess the requirements of a certain cultural capital are able to monopolise it (ibid.: 47). The pedagogic authority, which is unseparable from the pedagogic action, is recreating the power relations in relation to education.

Concerning the consequences of the implicit pedagogy (or **hidden curriculum**, as the phenomenon is sometimes referred to), the dominating culture becomes "mechanism of selection", which decides and excludes the students who are able to deal with the dominating culture, and those who are not. Since the pedagogic work leads to an internalisation of the principles of the dominating culture (the creation of habitus) and the recognition of the legitimacy of the dominating culture, the dominated will perceive their own culture as illegitimate. Like this, the pedagogical work does not only become excluding, the dominated are also internalising criteria for judging, so that the dominated are excluding themselves, because of low expectations of their own abilities (ibid.:40-42, 153).

Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (1997), developing the ideas of Galtung (1980) starts from the idea of **global control** that is exercised to an increasing extent by means of language. This involves the ideas of dominant groups **colonising consciousness** via consciousness industries (education, mass media, religion; cf. the concept of postmodernist information society!). Language is a vital element in facilitating such control. Language itself can serve hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes: it can prevent or permit analysis of struggles, it can serve to intensify control or resistance to it. To permit an increased exercise of control through the consciousness industry is the main reason why dominated groups are forced or enticed into learning the dominant languages at the cost of their own, rather than in addition of their own, i.e. by means of subtractive rather than additive language learning. This helps the ideas of the dominant group more easily to penetrate the minds of the dominated, and the full development of languages is forestalled.

One of the strategies in the unequal distribution of power and resources concerns the **validation** of material and non-material resources. It involves the **invalidation of the non-material resources of dominated groups**, including their languages and cultures. Invalidation transmits one of the important messages of the process of colonising consciousness, namely that subordinated groups internalize the legitimacy of their subordination. Non-material resources can be invalidated by making them invisible (cf. African languages!), or be stigmatized as handicaps or problems, rather than resources (cf. much of the minority discourse!). **Stigmatization and devaluing** of dominated groups together with their languages, cultures, norms, traditions, institutions, etc, and **glorification** of dominant groups and their values are two strategies of validation. The activities of dominant towards dominated is functional and beneficial to dominant (through helping, giving aid, civilizing, modernizing, teaching democracy, etc.), and is legitimated through **rationalization** of their relationship economically, politically, psychologically, educationally, sociologically, linguistically. etc. In this way, the term covers wider array of social activities than **legitimatization**, the term used by several other researchers. Such processes of validation follow the model of racist discourse, with language replacing race: dominant languages and cultures are glorified, dominated languages and cultures are stigmatized, and there is a rationalization of the act of glorifying and stigmatizing and of the relationship between the languages and cultures. Skutnabb-Kangas considers the stigmatization, glorification and rationalization processes fundamental to the reproduction and hierarchization of groups on the basis of race, ethnicity/culture or language. This phenomena, called racism, ethnicism (Mullard 1988) and linguisticism (Skutnabb-Kangas 1986, 1988) are defined as *ideologies structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and (both material and non-material) resources between groups which are defined on the basis of race, ethnicity and culture or language.*

Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 87) makes this framework of power explicit, bringing in structural agents like

the state, institution, laws and regulations, and even budgets (for example in teacher training or for materials), and ideological agents as norms and values ascribed to different languages and their speakers. Resources can be material or nonmaterial (languages, cultures, experience, education, knowledge, time). Structural power one has by virtue of one's position. Both structural power and material resource power are unequally distributed between different groups in the world. According to Galtung (1980, commented in Skutnabb-Kangas 1996: 87), structural power and resource power are convertible into each other. Social construction of nonmaterial resources by the dominant groups depict their own resources as real, valuable and convertible, while the resources of the dominated groups are treated as nonresources or even handicaps (one has to learn the language of majority). Only those nonmaterial resources that are seen as valid and valuable can be converted to material resources and to positions of structural power.

Robert Phillipson (1992) has further revealed some myths of non-ideological forms that disconnect culture from structure, divorced from social, political, and economic realities. Ideological function of language is legitimated in terms of two criteria, the one a goal, namely material advance, the other a means, namely efficiency (ibid: 68). Thus, a typical linguistic pattern is created through persuasion, bargaining, or threats., with the dominant language creating an exalted image of itself, other languages being devalued, and the relationship between the two rationalized in favour of the dominant language. Phillipson (1992: 53) emphasizes the role of language in the development from imminent physical exploitation to increasing societal consciousness, paralleling the way power can be exerted by means of sticks (impositional force), carrots (bargaining), and ideas (persuasion). Language is considered the primary means for communicating ideas. Therefore, according to Phillipson (ibid.) an increased linguistic penetration of the Periphery is essential for completing the move away from crude means, and even the more discreet means of asymmetrical bargaining, to control by means of ideas.

Jim Cummins applies his power concept mainly on micro-level educational aspects. However, for our purpose, he introduces several fruitful notions. Cummins differentiates between the concepts of coercive and collaborative relations of power.

Coercive power refers to the exercise of power by a dominant group to the detriment of a subordinated group, assuming that power is a measurable concept where one group can have more power on behalf of another group. The powerful group legitimises its superiority over a subordinated group with the means of language. Cummins distinguishes between two levels at which power is negotiated, namely **micro-interaction** and **macro-interaction**. The former reflects interaction between e.g. educators and students in the classroom, and the latter reflecting interaction between dominant and subordinated groups in society at large. Macro-interaction could be, for example, the division and notion of underdeveloped countries and developed countries only focusing on development and resources from the point of view of dominant countries, creating an image of underdeveloped countries as being dependent on the help from developed countries.

Coercive relations of power operate to maintain the division of power and resources in society, based on fixed assumptions that cannot be negotiated. This makes the redistribution or negotiation of power impossible.

Collaborative relations of power, on the contrary, operate on the basis of more equal interaction among groups or individuals. The participants are empowered through collaboration. In this case, power is shared and not predetermined, which leads to an additive process where the groups are empowered.

Cummins (1994: 165) refers to empowerment on micro-interaction level as

the interaction process whereby students develop the critical abilities and the personal confidence in their own identities to acquire the knowledge and skills they need to take control of their own lives and to envisage and plan their futures.

Cummins uses Chomsky (1987), where Chomsky tries to conceptualise the means of control used by powerful nations to protect their interest and thus to suppress the less powerful ones.

Cummins (1994: 169) shows the algorithm of neutralising the threat of a good example in preserving global and domestic power structures. The goal is to ensure that the economic and political interests of the dominant group are not threatened by deviant initiatives that might empower emergent nations or minority groups. The method used is to exert economic and political pressure to ensure that implementation of the deviant political initiative is destabilized and outcomes are negative. If positive outcomes emerge despite this pressure, then, in order to maintain control these should either be ignored, denied or distorted. As a result, the failures of the deviant initiative under these conditions will demonstrate that attempts at dominated group empowerment are ill-conceived and ill-advised. Dominant group control can be re-established under the guise of equality and justice.

Wetzel (1993) has shown the interconnection of power and social structure, causing repercussions in communication patterns. O'Barr and Atkins (1980) have used for describing the phenomena of power vertical relationships, elsewhere termed powerful and powerless speech. They compared the differences

between vertical relationship interaction patterns, regarding how the linguistic conventions of a group are to be described in terms of standard language and the conventions which inform it. They came to the following conclusions:

- 1□ Power is tied to domination;
- 2□ Power creates choice, engenders individual autonomy;
- 3□ Power is unidirectional, non-reciprocal;
- 4□ Power is self-actualizing in terms of ego;
- 5□ Power is evidenced in command and decision-making

As discourses create hierarchies also among languages, so that the status of some languages are established at the expense of others. These discourses are inscribed and reproduced through the habits of everyday life. Belief in the authority of certain languages is inculcated in speakers through the ordinary practices of institutions such as schools, labour markets and state bureaucracies. This standard is spread even by those who do not control it, to the detriment of their own identity and culture. Bourdieu (1977, referred to in Gal 1996: 590) has called this asymmetry between competence and evaluation **linguistic domination**. Thus, power is manifested through the institutions that create linguistic domination.

2. Society

In this chapter we are going to review the formation of groups in connection of power, ethnicity as a major criterion for this formation, nationalism as a motor for the formation ethnic groups, conflict as a natural state between the interests of various groups, conflict management, security and foreign policy instruments to achieve it.

1. Groups

Each society contains sub-systems more or less distinct from the rest of the population. These function differently concerning the controlling value system and access to rewards in the society. Schermerhorn (1970: 12-14, quoted in Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 17) has described the situation of groups within society by using the two dimensions of size and power as characteristics of groups:

Table Social group system

Dominant Groups

FEATURES	SIZE	POWER	CLASSIFICATION
Group A +	+		Majority Group
Group B	-	+	Elite

Subordinate Groups

Group C	+	-	Mass subjects
Group D -	-		Minority Group

Most societies incorporate in this way various groups, defined by Bell (1975) as plural societies, denoting *segmented sociological groups which can establish effective cultural and political cohesion within the society and make cultural, economic, or political claims on the society, on the basis of that group identity* (Bell 1975, quoted in Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 138). Competition between plural groups takes largely place in the political arena, as economic competition is dispersed between interests and occupations. Bell (*ibid.*) points out that the economic order has become increasingly subordinated to the political system: first, because of the need to manage the economic system; and second, the rise of non-economic values (environment, ecology, health, culture) has led to the demand for the control of the economic production. Bell stresses that political competition is direct and tangible, the rewards are specified through legislation or by the direct allocation of jobs and privileges.

Below, we are going to review the most common dominated groups: immigrants, indigenous peoples and minorities, and their relation with mainstream.

2. Immigrants

Besides domestic groups constantly redistributing power, power balance may be changed by outside factors. One of these is immigration. There are three main reasons for migration:

- shortage of workers in host countries

- refugee flows
- higher living standard of host countries.

In order to secure stability of the society concerned, the influx of immigrants must not exceed the rate of integration into society. Soysal (1994: 30) has provided the indicators of integration for immigrants:

- *migrants' degree of satisfaction with life in the host country*
- *their adherence to the values of the society*
- *occupational achievements and income mobility*
- *the educational attainment level of their children*
- *rates of intermarriage*
- *the relative absence of discrimination*

There are significant differences between the states concerning their attitudes toward acceptance of immigrants into their societies. Various attitudes of states have been presented through the three models of legal integration (PO-S-MG (94)):

The social inclusion/national exclusion: countries have given immigrants gradually more access to social and civil rights of denizenship (permanent residence), but have made access to naturalisation difficult and have generally excluded subsequent generations of immigrant ancestors from internal citizenship by the *ius sanguinis* principle. Examples are Germany, Switzerland, Austria. These countries encourage also return movement.

Legal integration through naturalisation: immigrants may be allowed to stay as alien residents indefinitely. Naturalisation is seen as the natural outcome of integration, and by making it accessible after a reasonably short residence period, and at relatively low costs, immigrants are encouraged to choose it. Children born in the country become citizens at birth or at majority. Examples are France, the USA, Canada, Australia. It is usually one-way integration.

Normative approach combines some features of the other two. Settlement in one country and continuing social ties with, and orientation towards another one are no longer mutually exclusive. These countries accept dual citizenship.

Shafir (1995:18) has divided the reaction of societies towards admission of immigrants into two basic behaviours, either **hegemonic** (confidence in economic expansion and attendant cultural hegemony) or features of **corporate nationalism** (outside forces are viewed as a threat).

The traditional form of stratification of host-immigrant is horizontal, where immigrants are left the lower income end of the society. In this case, integration takes place through the social mobility of immigrants from lower to higher social echelons.

Rex and Moore (1967: 14) have depicted power relations in host-immigrant framework as follows:

- host society as compounded of groups in a state of conflict with one another about property and about power, as well as of groups with differing styles of life arranged in a status hierarchy.
- the relationship of a newcomer to the host society can vary along several axes other than those which refer to the extent to which he has accepted the culture patterns of his host and gained acceptance as a *role-player* in the social system of his host.
- immigrant is not simply moving from one culture to another, but being cut off from his native culture and groping for some kinds of cultural and social signposts in a colony structure which belongs neither to his homeland nor to the society of his hosts.

The starting point is usually minimum situation for an immigrant: no effective contact with the society of his home country, ties with the country of immigration are limited solely to the bond of employment.

Second stage may be described by the situation where individual still lacks more than a contractual tie with the host society, but has built up a primary community among his fellow-immigrants. Attempts to reproduce at least some of the social institutions of his homeland, provides himself with a norm-governed home into which he can retreat.

Two further developments follow: incorporation of the immigrant into the society as a legal citizen having the social rights of a citizen, and gradual extension of contractual ties with other groups and the modification of those so that they come to be governed by new norms. All these developments correspond to the changes of societal relationships and, on macro level influence power distribution between groups

3. Minorities

For the cause of this research we are going to analyse the concept of minority from legal aspect.

It is generally recognised that minorities should be permitted to maintain activities and characteristics peculiar to the group. Linguistically they are entitled to use their language with other members of their

group. However, as de Varennes (1996: 130) remarks, there remains in practice a multitude of problems related to the identity of individuals who may claim these benefits, as well as uncertainty as to its exact content. There has been considerable discussion on the definition, concerning mostly the criteria of citizenship and self-assessment (endo-definition). For example, De Varennes (ibid.:137) argues against dominance and citizenship, as this, according to his views, excludes non-citizens, like immigrants and refugees as well as dominant minorities as e.g. the Catalans in Spain.

All the views agree on the point that it is not always possible to draw a clear overall dividing line between minorities and other groups. However, it is clear that the concept should carry functional load in order to provide special measures of protection for vulnerable groups. Criteria used in most definitions are according to Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994:107) number, dominance, ethnic, religious or linguistic features which are different from the majority of the population, a wish/will to safeguard, preserve their culture or traditions or religion or language, nationality.

At different times the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has considered the following three definitions:

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.

This is a definition of F. Capotorti (1979: para. 568), whom, in order to clarify the scope of Article 27 of the CCPR the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities appointed to carry out a study, examining the status and treatment of minorities throughout the world and exploring topics such as discrimination on the grounds of language and freedom of expression for minorities. The report contains the above definition of minority. This definition emphasizes the politico-legal status of a minority, excluding several non-majority populational groups. It comprises sociological, political and numerical conditions. The definition was not adopted, however it was a landmark for the main line of understanding. This definition was followed by the one proposed by J. Deschenes (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para.181), following the basic lines of Capotorti:

A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical majority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.

and a definition of A. Eide (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, para. 29), avoiding the constraint of citizenship: *...any group of persons resident within a sovereign state which constitutes less than half the population of the national society and whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, religious or linguistic nature that distinguish them from the rest of the population.*

None of these definitions found united support from the member states of the United Nations. Thus, UN Human Rights Committee turned to this issue in its General comment No. 23(50) on Article 27/Minority rights, in April 1994 (Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.):

5.1 *The terms used in article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, a religion and/or a language. Those terms also indicate that the individuals designed to be protected need not be citizens of the State party. In this regard, the obligations deriving from article 2(1) are also relevant, since a State party is required under that article to ensure that the rights protected under the Covenant are available to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, except rights which are expressly made to apply to citizens, for example, political rights under article 25. A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under article 27 to its citizens alone.*

5.2 *Article 27 confers rights on persons belonging to minorities which "exist" in a State party. Given the nature and scope of the rights envisaged under that article, it is not relevant to determine the degree of permanence that the term "exist" connotes. Those rights simply are that individuals belonging to those minorities should not be denied the right, in community with members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to practice their religion and speak their language. Just as they need not be nationals or citizens, they need not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even visitors in a State party constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those rights....The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision by that State party but requires to be established by objective criteria.*

Thus, in its comment the UNHRC made several qualitative turns in the established patterns of determining minority. According to the comment the political link to the state was insignificant, together with the period of existence (i.e. the time of residence of the members of a linguistic minority, cf. Alfredsson (1991) expressing opposite view just two years before). However, a strictly numerical categorisation remains.

Though explicit in its views, the document itself belongs to the category of soft law of international human rights standards, being non-binding for member-states.

In the case **Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada** the UNHRC observed that Article 27 refers to minorities in states. Thus, a group may constitute a majority in a province but still be a minority in a state and thus be entitled to the benefits of Article 27. Except this notion, the issue of minorities-in-minorities/regional linguistic majorities have been left out from the view of international law.

Maurais (1997: 140) defines **regional linguistic majority** as *linguistic group who, though in a majority in their historic territory (where they may nevertheless be experiencing some form of assimilation), is a minority at the national level*. This is the case of Anglophone/Francophone in Quebec, Castilians/Catalans in Catalonia and in many other places. Maurais (1997:141) points out that the concept of regional majority languages cannot refer to the languages of an immigrant population, that is this type of language is non-transportable. Immigrants are usually expected to adapt to their new country, to learn the official language, or one of the official languages. Immigrants who settle in a territory with a regional majority language, may become the stakes in the linguistic power game (ibid.). As still no specific definition of minorities exists in "hard" international law, it is easy for power-holders to interpret law in their interests. This state of affairs seems to be due to the lack of interest among states to grant minorities any rights, as perceived as a threat to integrity and security.

Minority is characterised by several features necessary for its maintenance. Among these Allardt (1996: 349) provides segregation from the dominant group, as a kind of restriction in the interaction between the majority and minority. According to Allardt (ibid.), segregation implies that some space (territory or spatially organized institutional arrangements) is reserved for members of the minority.

4. Indigenous peoples.

The definition of indigenous peoples is also problematic. The first definition was developed for the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention and Recommendation (1957) concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries in its first article:

a) members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries whose social and economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;

b) members of tribal or semi-tribal population in independent countries which are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation, and which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with the institutions of the nation to which they belong.

The definition had several inadequacies. Indigenous peoples were described in negative terms, using words such as *less advanced stage*. It did not distinguish between individual and collective rights (Thornberry 1991). The term *peoples* was not used, *tribal* was used without definition. The main thrust of the Convention seems to be assimilational, in order to overcome this *less advanced stage*.

The ILO Convention No. 169 (1989) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries provides a new definition in the first article, formulated in a more positive way:

a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions by special laws or regulations;

b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

c) Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.

Most indigenous peoples fulfil most of the criteria in the definition of a minority whereas the opposite is not the case, as indigenous peoples have to fulfil the criterion of being colonised peoples, and several other criteria. The rights for indigenous peoples frequently overlap with those granted to minorities in international instruments. This has been the guideline for drafters of new conventions. For example, article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is otherwise identical with article 27 of the CCPR, contains an addition *or who is indigenous*. De Varennes (1996: 263) notes that

indigenous peoples benefit from more rights than individuals and minorities in general. The ILO Convention No. 169 makes it the duty of the state to provide necessary resources for the maintenance of the indigenous languages, customs and practices. This makes the indigenous peoples the only group that are ensured linguistic rights, having the state as a duty-holder.

5. Ethnicity

Bell (1975) has remarked that the social units that combine instrumental and symbolic purposes are most highly effective. The two such dominant modes of feeling and action in the political history have been class and ethnicity. With the class struggle more institutionalised, ethnicity has become the main carrier of major group values to identify with. Ethnicity is one of the most effective factors in group mobilisation indeed, enabling to challenge current power distribution within society. There are many overviews of ethnicity (see for instance Berger and Luckmann (1979), Bromley (1984), Lange and Westin (1981), Liebkind (1984), Sandlund (1976), Tajfel (ed) (1978), Devetak (1996)).

Devetak (1996: 203) provides various interpretations of ethnicity, ranging from a group affiliation to a self-conscious collection of people united or closely related, by shared experiences. In the first meaning, the term **ethnicity** is used to denote *a bond (self-perceived and/or ascribed by others, with or without subjective justification) to a historically continuous authenticity collectivity* (Fishman 1983). Smith (1986, quoted in Hutchinson, Smith 1996: 7) provides the following **criteria of ethnicity**:

- 1 a **common proper name**, to identify and express the essence of the community;
- 2 a **myth of common ancestry**..;
- 3 **shared historical memories**, or better, *shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration*;
- 4 **one or more elements of common culture**, which need not be specified but normally include *religion customs, or language*;
- 5 a **link with a homeland**, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnic, only its symbolic *attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples*;
- 6 a **sense of solidarity** on the part of at least some sections of the ethnic's population.

Ethnicity is seen by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) as a relation, not as a characteristic of an ethnic group. She distinguishes three stages in the development of the ethnicity definition: exo-definitions (identification by others), endo-definitions (self-identification) and ambo-definitions (relational identification). Both exo- and endo-definitions attribute ethnicity to the ethnic group concerned as a characteristic of the group or person. Many of these definitions of ethnicity list characteristics which a group has to possess in order to qualify as an ethnic group.

Fishman (1989: 24) remarks that ethnicity has two aspects of a collectivity's self-recognition as well as of its recognition in the eyes of outsiders. In his explanation of ethnic identity, Fishman (1977: 23, see also 1989:24-33) presents the following three characteristics: **paternity** (descent), **patrimony** (cultural patterns), and **phenomenology** (value system). He also remarks that ethnicity requires not only boundaries, but opposition across boundaries for such identity to be most fully articulated (Fishman 1989: 33). Bell (1975, quoted in Hutchinson, Smith 1996: 141) points out that *societies undergoing rapid social change, or nation building, or territorial or political expansion, can escape or postpone internal political difficulties - the fear of established groups for the loss of privilege, the demand of disadvantaged groups for the reallocation of privilege - by mobilizing the society against some external "force", or for some common ideological purpose.*

In the system proposed by Allardt the group has to have

1. *self-categorization (self-identification)(cf. phenomenology)*;
2. *common descent (factual or mythical)(cf.paternity)*;
3. *specific cultural traits, e.g proficiency in a specific language (cf. patrimony)*;
4. *a social organization for interaction both within the group and with people outside the group* (Allardt and Starck 1981: 43).

As Allardt, Miemois and Starck (1979: 11-12) show, there are no criteria for inclusion in an ethnic group that all the members should fulfil, but it is sufficient that some members fulfil all the criteria, and every member must fulfil at least one. members. People can belong to the same ethnic group, on different bases (Allardt and Starck 1981: 42). According to Allardt (1981: 43), sociolinguists like Fishman (1977: 16-26) tend to be content with the first three criteria (which are individual characteristics), while social anthropologists like Barth (1969: 15-16), tend to emphasize the social organisation of the group. Allardt considers necessary to combine both types of criteria, i.e. both individual and group characteristics.

Skutnabb-Kangas (1987: 7) draws attention here to the **human rights aspect**. Exo-definitions define people as members of an ethnic group on the basis of one or more of the criteria, regardless of

whether the people themselves self-categorize as members. On the other hand, forced other-categorizations are seen by many researchers (e.g. Liebkind 1984, 19) as violations of basic human rights. According to a human rights oriented argumentation, it should be the right of every individual and group to have their own definition of their ethnic group membership accepted and respected by others. Self-identification, a human right, works only when the power relationships between the parties who negotiate about a group's or an individual's ethnic identity are equal (cf. Kurds in Turkey, for an elaboration see Skutnabb-Kangas 1994).

Another parameter of ethnicity is its **visibility** (recognizability, cf. Zaagman (1995) on the views of HCNM on minorities), consisting of its numerical strength and the degree of mobilisation (or awareness). According to Bromley (1984: 8) the term **ethnos** *has always denoted not only "small" peoples, but also multi-million communities: Russians, English, French, etc.* The narrower interpretation of ethnicity is understandable when realising that *unmobilized and unthreatened ethnicity* (Fishman 1977: 49) as a research object is more difficult because of its lesser degree of saliency than the conscious ethnicity that often characterizes groups which have to struggle to maintain their ethnicity, i.e. minority groups.

The criteria for **identification of ethnicity** vary usually. In this case, Bromley (1984: 10) sees the self-identification of the group as the most important and most resistant to outside influences common trait when defining ethnos (ethnic group or community). This can be operationalized in terms of the name it gives itself, the **endoethnonym**. This is a necessary but insufficient characteristic of ethnos. Bromley distinguishes several other bases for self-identification for communities which do not necessarily denote ethnoses, like **politonyms**, to denote *people (citizens) living within the boundaries of one or another social organism ...or political formation* (1984: 10), and **toponyms**, *when the group's self-identification originates from the name of the territory it inhabits* (ibid.: 10). The difference between ethnonyms on the one hand and politonyms and toponyms on the other hand is for Bromley the stability of the self-identification. Tribes, nationalities and nations *are known to be stable communities existing under one and the same name of their own for many generations* (ibid.: 10), while when a group of people move outside the original settlement, both the politonym and the toponym often are not retained by the second and further generations (while the endoethnonym might) (see also Leontyev 1994).

Bromley (1984: 10) also discusses the possibility of two or three of these coinciding. The coincidence of politonym and ethnonym is especially characteristic of relatively mono-ethnic states. This can be a result of either politonyms turning into ethnonyms or vice versa, ethnonyms turning into politonyms, which makes it more complicated to distinguish ethnic communities from political (and geographical) ones.

Maintenance of ethnic identity is one of the most disputed current issues. Gellner (1983) notes as a constraint for ethnicity that the homogenizing tendencies of advanced industrialism and nationalism leave little space for sub-national ethnic identities. Economic and cultural globalisation as well as global information network tends to reduce ethnicity to the folkloristic margins of society. Ethnicity has become a residual category for people to fall back on when other projects and loyalties are found wanting (Hobsbawm 1990, referred to in Hutchinson, Smith 1996: 13). Arguing with that, Kallen (1996:119) has developed the model proposed by Magnet (1987) concerning prerequisites for the development and maintenance of a distinctive minority ethnoculture:

- **symbolic ethnicity:** *a living community of collectively identified members committed to preservation of ethnocultural distinctiveness;*
- **structural ethnicity:** *the development and maintenance of a viable institutional infrastructure for intra-ethnic communication and interaction and for trans-generational cultural transmission;*
- **anti-discrimination:** *sufficient political and economic resources (voting power and buying power) to defend the minority community against external discrimination, and to lobby effectively for collectively desired social changes.*

Boundary-maintenance mechanisms are ideologies, rules, practices which serve to maintain ethnic group distinctiveness by maximising close social relations between ethnic insiders and by strictly limiting and controlling social relations between insiders and outsiders (Kallen 1996:119)

Ethnic identification distinguishes ethnic awareness and ethnic consciousness. According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990), the former means an awareness of one's descent, without necessarily resulting in any kind of conscious evaluation of it, whereas the latter would imply using one's ethnicity as a dynamic force. According to Fishman (1977: 35), *ethnicity, as a highly conscious, instrumental, outward oriented ideology, is abundantly in evidence in the Western world, and heightened language consciousness...mobilizes and solidifies the ethnicity collectivity* (ibid.: 34). For example, attempts to constrain language use, might result in a higher degree of ethnic consciousness.

Most definitions of ethnicity include **language** as one of those cultural traits which belong to defining characteristics of an ethnic group. This is the case even in the face of those exceptions where the capacity to speak the language has been lost (see Fishman 1977, Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1986b,

1987). Thus claims that a culture can survive even without language (Edwards 1977, Bratt Paulston 1981, 1986) should rather be taken as the exceptions they are. On the other hand, the group formed on the basis of language need not match the ethnic group concerned, as there might be several ethnic groups using the same language, or ethnic identity may extend over several languages (cf. Jews, Roma, etc.). Thus, linguistic identity (or linguonym, cf. Leontyev 1994, Skutnabb-Kangas 1990) forms one of the central partial identities together with political, territorial and ethnic ones.

6. Attitudes towards mainstream

In order to determine the various choices of group behaviour towards mainstream, John Berry (1992) proposes four main forms he calls **acculturation**, depending on two markers, maintenance of one's cultural identity and availability of links with other ethnic groups.

Assimilation is characterised by the shift to mainstream culture and ethnic group.

Integration is based on the links with the mainstream culture for wider societal applications together with the maintenance of one's own culture and language.

Separation is based on the denial of links between one's own culture and mainstream culture.

Marginalisation is characterised by avoiding contacts with the mainstream together with the loss of contacts with the members of one's own cultural or linguistic group.

A more developed system is suggested by Skutnabb-Kangas (1987: 21-30), which comprises all the elements used by Berry (1992) in the affective component of **cultural competence**. Thus, different phases in integration process are described by Skutnabb-Kangas (1987, 1994: 107-109) as changes in the different components of the cultural competence. Cultural competence is based in this case on the definition of culture as *both the material and the ideological ways in which a group organizes, understands and reproduces its life as a group* (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1985: 51).

Cultural competence is analyzed in terms of four constituents by Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1983: 61-68, 1985: 50-52): cognitive, affective, behavioural and awareness-related, which are referred to below. According to them, the cognitive/intellectual/scholastic/literary component relates to knowledge about the relevant culture. The knowledge component of cultural competence includes knowledge of the language/languages pertaining to that culture, together with some knowledge about the history and traditions of that culture, knowing how different institutions (both concrete and abstract) function, how people behave and react in a concrete environment.

The affective/emphathetic/identificational component relates to deep, positive feelings about and attitudes towards a culture, an understanding of it from the inside, and an identification with it or parts of it, including acceptance of (most of) its norms and values.

The behavioural component of cultural competence is the capacity to act in culturally appropriate ways with members of a given cultural group. Being cognitively competent in a foreign culture may lead to adequate behaviour, even if the affective cultural competence is lacking.

The metacultural awareness is an understanding of the distinctiveness and relativity of one's own (and other) cultures, consciously being able to reflect over one's own and other cultures, at times distancing oneself from them and looking at them as objects. A precondition for being able to do that is at least some knowledge of other cultures with which to compare and contrast one's own. Monocultural people by definition have thus a low degree of metacultural awareness.

Assimilation is defined by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) as 1. *disappearance of distinctive ethnographical features, i.e. objectively the loss of specific elements of material and non-material culture and subjectively the loss of the feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group*; 2. *simultaneously, acquisition of traits belonging to another culture, which replace those of the former culture, accompanied by the subjective feeling of belonging to the second culture* (modified after Drobizheva and Guboglo 1986).

In most cases assimilation is forced assimilation. Minorities and other vulnerable groups are forced through the same means which are normally used for control (physical violence, force, bargaining, gratifications, persuasion). Positive result is often achieved through ideas, psychological means: positive reinforcement in relation to the majority languages, and shame and guilt in relation to the minority languages and cultures (Skutnabb-Kangas 1990).

Drobizheva and Guboglo (1986) define **integration** as *formation of a series of common features in an ethnically heterogenous group*. Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) reviews integration as a **process and a socially constructed relation** which the minority and the majority have to negotiate reciprocally, and where both have to change. A majority can prevent integration by refusing to change itself, regardless of how ready a minority group is for integration. It is the degree of integration (and wish to integrate) of the whole society that has to be assessed. The results of the process of negotiating integration depend crucially on the power relationships between those who negotiate, the majority and the minorities. Hallik (1997: 101) has added to the notion of integration several other aspects, according to whom regime of integration possesses the following societal characteristics:

- absence of major antagonistic groups;
- the contacts and cooperation is based on the exchange of results of work (products);
- the usefulness of other groups is felt psychologically;
- needs and interests of other parties are respected;
- the number of those groups whose status, rights and obligations are regulated differently from the rest is marginal;
- the behaviour of a group as a collective subject before the state or the society concerned does not rule out the autonomy in the range of their competence and special interests.

Level of integration may thus be evaluated through the impact of one's ethnicity to his/her status and welfare. It means that, in this case, ethnic boundaries shift and have different meanings in various domains, these are not reproduced in the socioeconomic or political sphere. Outside ethnocultural identity the marker of ethnicity has symbolic value and is linked to individual choice and self-evaluation. Decrease of ethnic differences results in this interpretation in the increase of societal stability. Consequently, multiculturalism means that independently from different ethnic characteristics there exists the common political society for all groups (Hallik 1997:107).

Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) regards integration as a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for forming a national ethnic minority. It also includes metacultural awareness as a requisite for recognising the specific cultural traits formed by the group, the traits which set it apart from both the original culture and the new country's majority culture.

A succession of phases in the gradual process of becoming (or failing to become) culturally competent in a new culture which one has moved to, is observed by Skutnabb-Kangas (1987, 1994), beginning with exclusion or segregation, moving through functional adaptation and acculturation to a final stage that can be integration, assimilation or marginality.

In order to follow the possible processes through subsequent phases, we make use of the work of Skutnabb-Kangas (1987: 27) concerning the following table and explanations.

Possible phases in cultural assimilation/integration/marginality

	ORIGINAL CULTURE				NEW CULTURE			
	know- ledge	affec- tive	beha- viou- ral	meta- cultu- ral awa- reness	know- ledge	affec- tive	beha- viou- ral	meta- cultu- ral awa- reness
SEGREGATION	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-
FUNCTIONAL ADAPTATION	+	+	+	-	-/+	-	-/+	-/+
ACCULTURATION	+	+	+	-/+	+	-	+	+/-
INTEGRATION	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
ASSIMILATION	+/-	-	+/-	+/-	+	+	+	-/+
MARGINALITY	-/+	-	-/+	-/+	-/+	+	+	-/+
2ND GENER. MARGINALITY	-/+	-	-/+	-	-/+	-/+	+/-	-

Segregation (either voluntary or forced, often for socio-economic reasons) is seen by Skutnabb-Kangas (1987) as the starting point for new migrants. When arriving, the immigrant is culturally competent in the original culture, but often does not know the language, institutions or customs of the new environment. Table above represents this position by indicating that the immigrant is fully competent (+) in the original culture (the knowledge, affective and behavioural components) but not at all in the new. The original culture is familiar, the new culture unknown. Therefore metacultural awareness may be underdeveloped, especially vis-a-vis the new culture.

When the immigrant starts **functional adaption** (by learning some of the new language, becoming familiar with the surrounding environment). By acquiring the instruments needed to be able to function in the new country, and also to be able to behave adequately, one has now acquired some of the cognitive and behavioural components of cultural competence in the new culture, in addition to still possessing those of the original culture. Successful functional adaptation presupposes a degree of affective motivation to acquire the necessary linguistic competence to be able to function in the foreign language.

Acculturation as the next step means not only functional adaptation, but also acceptance of the norms and value judgements of the new society. When this phase of subjective internal adaptation has proceeded far enough, there is a considerable proficiency in the language code and the use of it for relevant purposes, a feeling that one does not have many linguistic difficulties in everyday life. The proficiency is necessarily diglossic, functionally differentiated, so that the immigrant is proficient in those domains, those linguistic and cultural areas to which there has been access in the new country. The immigrant who is to some extent bilingual/bicultural at this stage, will invariably possess some degree of metacommunicative and metacultural awareness at this stage.

After acculturation (which is not reached by all immigrants) there are several possibilities. In **integration** the norms and values of the new culture are accepted in addition to the norms and values of the original language and culture, not instead of them. The immigrant would thus be bilingual/bicultural, and have two coexisting sets of norms and values. At this stage the immigrant would have the affective component of cultural competence in both cultures: **additive bilingualism** (Lambert 1975, Cummins 1984, Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, Hakuta 1986) and **additive biculturalism**. In later stages of integration a new culture may be formed, those cultural traits which at the group level set the new ethnic minority apart from both source cultures.

Assimilation would be another possible "final" stage, according to Skutnabb-Kangas (1987). Assimilation would mean that the immigrant would have accepted the norms and values of the new culture to the extent where that would have meant a rejection of the norms and values of the old culture at the level of the affective component. This might to a certain extent also apply to language. Thus assimilation represent for the first generation a subtractive bilingualism/biculturalism. The new language would become the dominant language, the easiest one to speak, and for the second and third generation immigrants it would be the only productive language.

A third possible "final" stage for the first generation immigrant would be the well-known **marginality**, with less than complete competence in both languages and cultures, especially in relation to the affective and awareness components (Skutnabb-Kangas 1987).

7. Nationalism

Giddens (1985: 164) defines society as *a clustering of institutions combined with the feeling of common identity*. Ethno-national communities are not automatically or necessarily the prime basis for society. People live with multiple identities with no compulsory clear and permanent hierarchy in relation to each other. In situations of mobilisation hierarchy is formed, with national identity organising the other identities around itself (Wever 1993:22). The standardisation of administration and law within it, and, in particular, state education, transformed people into citizens of a specific country (Hobsbawm 1983, quoted in Hutchinson and Smith 1996:77). Gellner agrees with it, stating (Gellner 1964, quoted in Hutchinson and Smith 1997:59): modern loyalties are centered on political units whose boundaries are defined by the language of an educational system, they must be large enough to create a unit capable of sustaining an educational system. Wever claims that national identity involves political (civic) and cultural identity. National mode of identification is still very strong, thus, when threatened it takes priority and rearranges all other identities accordingly.

Smith (1991:14) defines a nation as *a named human population sharing an historic territory, common, myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members*. According to Weber, nations are built on some objective basis, the most common of which is language.

Nationalism is a political programme referring primarily to the nation. The distinction is between the nation as a social fact and nationalism as political action (Wever 1993: 38). Nationalism is a

phenomenon connected so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but with its uneven diffusion (Gellner 1964, in HS: 61). Nationalism seems to be an inevitable phase through which any society must proceed on its way towards modernism (Smith 1971:95). It begins as a response to a crisis, as observed by several researchers. In this case, integration of economic culture is no threat in balance of employment and inflation. Threat comes to the basis for national identification - historical heritage, national landscape and shared language, forming altogether national identity.

Gellner claims (1983:1) *Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violations of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.* Thus, state treated as normative, is a necessary condition for nationalism. It also possesses various solutions for the expression of nationalist sentiment, one should recall here Max Weber's definition of the state as *agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence* (Weber 1968). The same is stated by Gellner, according to whom state exists there where specialised order-enforcing agencies such as police forces and courts have separated from the rest of the social life (cf. Althusser 1970 on state apparatus). Nation is based on the shared culture and shared recognition. Industrial society is characterised by occupational division and mobility, standardisation and centralisation, access to education (which confers identity on learners), precise communication, including the same shared and standardized linguistic medium and script (Gellner 1983: 35), controlled by the state, and becoming a universal norm. Thus, according to Gellner, nationalism reflects the objective need. Nationalist ideology suffers from false consciousness in the sense of being rooted in the folk culture and protecting it. In fact nationalism helps building up an anonymous mass society and that it is the social structure and the combination of certain interacting factors within the industrial society which has given birth to nationalism its ideas of belonging to a nation. The conditions in which nationalism becomes the national form of political loyalty, Gellner sums up in two propositions (Gellner 1964, quoted in Hutchinson, Smith 1996:56):

- universal literacy recognised as a valid norm;
- jobs depend on education in some linguistic medium.

Hobsbawm (1992) has used Hroch's division of history of the national movements into 3 phases, developed for the 19th century Europe, reaching opposite results: *...Phase A was purely cultural, literary and folkloric, and had no particular political or even national implications...In phase B we find a body of pioneers and militants of "the national idea" and the beginnings of political campaigning for this idea..." The phase C is when "national programmes acquire mass support, or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they represent* (Hobsbawm 1992:12). In order to be called a nation, people had to fulfill the following principles: numerical threshold, historic association with a current state, existence of a long-established cultural elite, proven capacity for conquest. In 1870-1918 these principles changed: threshold-principle was abandoned, ethnicity and language criteria became crucial, with sharp shift to the political right.

In conclusion to the discussion about nationalism, one has to distinguish between the congruence of linguistic and political identity, ultimately striving through nation-building towards nation-state, and that of ethnic and political identity, leading in overdoses through ethnic mobilisation to nationalism. Though these two usually overlap in functional domains of language, with language having instrumental value, this should not be interpreted as the fusion of linguistic and ethnic identities.

8. Conflict

Conflict is a natural consequence of human interaction. It may be defined as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals (Coser 1955: 8, quoted in Abrahamsson 1972: 72). A necessary condition for conflict is the existence of at least two identifiable parties, engaging in mutually hostile or violent interaction, evidencing incompatibility of values and goals (Höglund, Ulrich 1972: 18). There is evident a fundamental concept of symmetry between parties in conflict as to size, power, and goals, etc., but not necessarily means and ends. Conflict demands mutual hostility. There are three levels of conflict: **structural** (based on units of social organisation), **interactional** (hostile interaction), and **ideological** (incompatible goals) (Höglund, Ulrich 1972:32).

There are several methods of conflict prevention. In order to avoid or eliminate conflict Höglund and Ulrich (1972:33) distinguish **restrictive or inhibitive methods**, based on direct attack on conflict in order to damp or extinguish its processes. All kinds of normative controls belong to this category. **Redirective or innovative methods** contain efforts of indirect influence on conflicts by diverting the attention or energy of the parties away from the conflict (new channels for interaction, new instruments in the repertory of action, increase of the saliency of values other than the ones at the

core of the conflict.

Abrahamsson (1972:73) describes the usual conflict elimination as attempts at conflict resolution rather than the removal of the causes of tension. It means the elimination of excess conflict by establishing certain limits within which antagonism is kept and under what conditions conflicts tend to expand over these limits. However, unresolved conflict may lead to frustration, which may lead to aggression, which may lead to violence (Galtung 1996:36). While conflict formation entails disharmony, conflict solution may be defined as a new formation that is acceptable to all actors, sustainable by actors (Galtung 1996: 89). Denitch (1980: 316) draws attention to the fact that the most poisonous intraethnic relations occur in the rare cases where the dominant political ethnic group is seen as culturally more backward than the subject groups. In that case, neither is the dominant ethnic group accorded grudging tolerance because of its modernising role nor can it assert its cultural hegemony over the subordinate groups.

9. Conflict management

In order to prevent and manage conflicts the state has to provide specific strategies for action. There are two different, mainly incompatible groups of strategies: one, based on conflict elimination, the second on the management of conflict. McGarry, O'Leary (1993: 4) present the taxonomy of the practical macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation (covering both conflict termination and conflict management), which accords with the theoretical options above. The political strategies which seek to eliminate ethnic differences, at least within a given state, are genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition, secession (self-determination), integration and/or assimilation. Of these there are moral justifications for partition/secession and arguments for integration. Forced population transfers and genocide are explicitly prohibited in international law and thus, outside our specific interest. The methods for managing the coexistence of the official language and minority languages are hegemonic control, arbitration (third-party intervention), cantonisation or federalisation and consociationalism or power-sharing (Ibid.).

The democratic solutions of "getting rid" of conflict, the methods of **partition, self-determination and secession** are compatible with the standards of human rights. However, these solutions themselves may be reactions resulting from the lack of human rights and other civic freedoms, in the discriminative situation, where the implementation of the right for self-determination is the only way out. Among other reasons McGarry and O'Leary (Ibid.) have noted also the possibility of the pragmatic expectations that the new nation-state will have greater economic and political freedom, the wish to have a state in which different public policies will be pursued and the desire for power and prestige amongst nationalist elites. As a rule, states tend to avoid this solution, as this weakens the state considerably. By gaining in the exclusivity, the state loses besides a considerable amount in power, also some of its resources. The factors decreasing the possibility for this solution are internal territorial segregation with self-government, demographic stability and dominance of the generous majority, a history of pre-democratic co-operation amongst ethnic political elites which gives the post-authoritarian state a reasonable chance of promoting accommodation.

Integration, concurrent with assimilation is built upon the idea of rearranging the identity of the relevant ethnic communities into a new identity. Depending on the methods used, with the identity immersed or submerged in the majoritarian language, the result may be either integration or assimilation, the last one definitely in discord with the human rights standards. Assimilation in the homelands of indigenous speakers means the destruction of a local culture, language, and sometimes, religion. Inglehart and Woodward (19XXX) set out two conditions under which a language exerts a strong assimilational influence: language of a prosperous country, and no barriers for acquisition. Milton Gordon (referred to in Shafir 1995) provides seven stages of assimilation starting from cultural (acculturation), structural (entry to institutions), marital, identificational, attitudinal, receptional, up to civic assimilation. Quite to the contrary, integration is in full accord with human rights, though achieving this may be accompanied with some coercive measures, like compulsory education. The main problem seems to be in the actual and timely differentiation of integration and assimilation. The same educational system that produced the benefits of integration to parents may bring along assimilation to their children. There are views (for instance Teske & Nelson 1974) which see assimilation and acculturation as fundamentally separate, distinct processes, where *assimilation is ... not dependent on some n'th degree of acculturation and is not, as many have suggested or implied, a phase or end-product of acculturation* (Liebkind 1984, 33). However, most of characteristics used to describe assimilation and acculturation form continua with different degrees. (For a critical overview, see Ölund & Schierup 1985). Thus, methods of partial segregation may be necessary to introduce in education (e.g language shelter programs) and neighbourhood, in order to avoid complete assimilation.

Nordlinger (1972: 36-39, referred to in McGarry, O'Leary 1993: 20) has drawn attention to the fact that

unless assimilation/integration projects are targeted at people willing to acquire a new civic identity (like voluntary migrants) and to modify their ethnic identity, they produce rather than provoke conflict

Of the coexistence strategies for the official and minority languages the most common system practised in multilingual states is a concept of **hegemonic control**, developed by Ian Lustick (1979), based on coercive domination and elite co-option. Lustick provides the following criteria: resources are allocated according to the dominant group's interest as perceived and articulated by its elite. Thus, the dominant group extracts what it needs and delivers what it sees fit, with no hard bargaining taking place, as the official regime, or state apparatus acts as the administrative instrument of the dominant group. The existing political order is legitimated by the ideology of the dominant group. Hegemonic control need not rest, although it often does, on the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community, as it is sufficient to control the relevant coercive apparatuses. Hegemonic control is therefore coercive and/or co-optive rule which successfully manages to make unworkable an ethnic challenge to the state order. Thus, it determines the qualitative features of language policy. However, hegemonic control itself need not require any assimilationist steps to be taken toward other languages. Theoretically, it may prescribe any of the three language patterns. The very point lies in the amount and scope of power. The most important is the control of the relevant coercive apparatuses. Hegemonic control may be limited just to the task of keeping a state in ethnic balance with hegemonic methods.

Hegemonic control contradicts the very core of human rights standards, constraining a dignified life for certain groups. However, it may formally accord with most of the individual human rights principles. The reason lies in the structure of the hegemonic control, which may be based on the powerful majority, gaining all the necessary decisions to be made. The other option is the divide and rule method, which enables to keep powerless minorities neatly in line. McGarry and O'Leary (1993) remark that though in liberal democracies hegemonic control appears less feasible than in authoritarian regimes, one has to agree that a majoritarian system of liberal democratic government, designed to create strong powers for the governing party, is no guarantee of liberty for ethnic minorities.

Arbitration and mediation in ethnic and linguistic issues is more spread in international relations. Usually it concerns a conflict-regulation where the neutral third-party intervention is necessary. Integral to the concept of arbitration is that the disinterestedness of the arbiter makes it possible for this person (or institution or state) to obtain the support of the linguistic and ethnic groups concerned. Arbitration is distinguishable from mediation because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate them. Arbitration of ethnic conflicts is of two broad types, the internal (various types of Ombudsman and tribunals in addition to the Court) and the external (popular for border issues). External arbitration is used when the conflict cannot be successfully managed within the relevant political system and the solution must be proposed from outside. The same applies to mediation, with internal (various round tables, *ad hoc* mediation groups and Commissioners) and external institutions (the High Commissioner on National Minorities within the OSCE, the CBSS Human Rights Commissioner, the UN Human Rights Committee, etc.). The problems may arise from the larger system of high diplomacy, making the neutrality-keeping in decision-making enormously difficult.

The last two strategies, **cantonisation and/or federalisation and consociationalism or power-sharing** are fully compatible with linguistic human rights. Under cantonisation the relevant multi-ethnic state is subjected to a micro-partition in which political power is devolved to (conceivably very small) political units, each of which enjoys mini-sovereignty. Federalism is similar, with the units usually much larger than cantons. Federalism is based on a federal society, requiring the boundaries between the components of the federation to match the boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious or linguistic communities.

Principles of **power-sharing and consociation** operate at the level of an entire state, or within a region of a state. Lijphart (1977, quoted in McGarry, O'Leary 1993: 35) has provided four features for consociational democracies:

- a grand coalition government representing the main segments of the divided society;
- proportional representation, employment and expenditure rules apply throughout the public sector;
- community autonomy norms operate under which ethnic communities have self-government over those matters of most profound concern to them;
- constitutional vetoes for minorities.

The principles are based on the acceptance of the ethnic pluralism for some groups. They aim to secure the rights, identities, freedoms and opportunities of all ethnic communities, and to create political and other social institutions which enable them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation. It is based on three requirements: national identity should be weak, the benefits of peace must exceed the benefits of conflict, and the political leaders must enjoy political autonomy necessary

for making compromises. Thus, according to Horowitz (1985: 571, referred to in McGarry, O'Leary 1993: 37) consociationalism may only be practicable in moderately rather than deeply divided societies..

As it seems, the democratically acceptable methods of management either separate the domains of ethno-linguistic interest or demand consensus, which may easily lead to Hobbesian thinking of any solution better than none. As a result, the solutions achieved might be economically ineffective, further deepening the schism between various linguistic interests. However, such policies provide conditions for language maintenance, with the space for developments controlled by the speakers themselves.

10. Security

According to Weyer (1993: 23), societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. Societal insecurity is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms.

State security is the referent object in four sectors: political, military, economic and environmental. State security can be influenced by the security or insecurity of a society on which it is based. The referent object of societal security is society. In the case of nation-states the difference will be small. When nation and state do not coincide, the security of a nation might increase the insecurity of a state (cf. Corsicans in France!). At the collective unit level, there are two organising centres for the concept of security: state security and societal security. Both of these are influenced by individual and international levels.

Solutions are political definition of nation, with ethnicity irrelevant, or defining (synthesised) cultural identity, or building a layered structure with at least two simultaneous identities for everyone. Multinational states are more likely to generate problems of societal insecurity than are nation-states. The fusion of nation and state usually contributes to the security of both.

In Western Europe one may observe classical interstate cooperation in the field of security (NATO and the OSCE), the creation of a superstate, the European Union, the emergence of sub-state and around-state structures (Buzan 1993). Tendency seems to be towards the dissolution of the modern state system, with political authority dispersed on more levels, thus undermining sovereignty of the state and producing overlapping authorities. (Previously the state was the primary level, from which sub-national and international developments were derived and delegated.) It may result in society feeling its identity threatened. Therefore identity is strengthened through culture, opposite to the simultaneous process of de-nationalisation. State security and societal security are differentiated as separate fields, with separate referent objects. If security concerns on the societal side escalate to a level where the state is called in, this will enforce the model of nation-state, by tightening the link between nation and state.

11. Foreign policy instruments

Power is imminent not only in domestic policies, but also between the states, which may also be divided according to power relations. In order to achieve one's goals, a State may make use of several foreign policy instruments to assert pressure. Steinmetz (1994) has listed various foreign policy instruments suitable for this purpose. The strategy and tactics may range from persuasion to compellence, from the use of diplomacy and economic inducements to the imposition of economic and military sanctions. The instruments of foreign policy may be used individually or in combination. The strategy and tactics may range from persuasion to compellence, from the use conjunction with each other.

1. **Diplomatic measures** are usually the initial step, least costly and center on processes of communication, persuasion, and negotiation. These are usually divided into private and public diplomacy. **Private diplomacy** which may preserve a political atmosphere conducive to continued friendly relations, however, it may often appear too soft. **Public diplomacy** includes public addresses, policy statements, public meetings with opposition, changes in the quantity and quality of contacts. It demonstrates the intentions overtly; however, it may aggravate sophisticated situations. Besides diplomatic measures associated directly with government-to-government relations, Steinmetz distinguishes **informal penetration**, used by giving advice or financial support to various levels and interest groups within the society.

2. **Economic and/or military measures** are more costly, but may be deemed necessary to effect policy changes abroad. **Economic sanctions** may be imposed as a means of inflicting "pain" to achieve

desired objectives in target states. Such strategies may include embargoes, boycotts, tariff increases, quotas, withdrawal or non-conferral of most-favored-nation (MFN) status, denial of licenses, the freezing of assets, or suspension of aid. Trade relations may also be manipulated through intermediary institutions. Trade sanctions, and more specifically import restrictions, are among the most effective forms of non-military sanctions. However, evidence of the effectiveness of economic sanctions in altering policy or effecting leadership changes seems to be inconclusive. Sanctions may be effective in deterring future misbehavior rather than modifying present behavior. Also the example of punishment may discourage other countries from engaging in the same kind of activities. **Economic inducements** to encourage change may be offered as well, in the form of favourable tariff agreements, grants of MFN status, tariff reductions, subsidies for exports or imports, license approvals, provision of aid, and investment guarantees.

Military measures comprising inducements and sanctions cover aid or permission of import or export of weapons, or may be used as a means of demonstrating commitment to friends, forestalling unfavorable regional military balances, maintaining favorable relations, influencing governments, establishing transit, economic, or basing rights. Military sales may serve security purposes and contribute to the development of infrastructure necessary for economic and social progress.

Besides efforts implemented by a single state **multilateral efforts** form another power exertion mechanism. Pursuit of strategies in multilateral institutions is necessary where the state has no direct bilateral leverage, or where the success of bilateral economic sanctions may be undermined by other nations in the international community. On the political level, institutions such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe and OSCE provide an opportunity to demonstrate convictions with public statements and votes. In the economic sphere effective multilateral efforts may be pursued via international and regional lending institutions. Multilateral sanctions provide an opportunity to establish clear signals of dissatisfaction which will be recognized by both governments and the forces that oppose them.

All these tools of foreign policy have no direct link with language and other cultural phenomena, but rather with military, economic and cultural power, reflected in the form of **realpolitik**. Steinmetz (1994:3-4) has shown that realpolitik assumes states to be central actors in an anarchic and “essentially competitive” environment. Rationality, rather than the individual preferences of decision-makers or an assumed universal morality, guides foreign policy decisions. Such decisions are calculated in “terms of interest defined as power”, where power is used as an end in itself, or as a means of achieving other national interest goals. A successful policy of *realpolitik* would, therefore, be one that serves to preserve and strengthen the state. This is implemented directly by the states themselves or through international governmental organisations.

12. Preventive diplomacy

In order to prevent the escalation of dispute into armed conflict, States have been obliged to apply peaceful dispute resolution methods, mentioned in the article 33 of the UN Charter. The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, expressed the idea that action should be taken in order to prevent disputes from arising between parties, *to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur* as well as affirming the goal by stating that *the most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to cease tensions before they result in conflict* (Boutros-Ghali 1992, quoted in Birckenbach 1997: 4). As Birckenbach (1997) notes, preventive diplomacy has existed in shadow of power based international strategies regarding emerging conflicts. Thus, preventive diplomacy in its strict sense means a problem solving response which attempts to reconcile disputing parties’ interest through conceptual and diplomatic breakthroughs, and abstains from the idea of deterrence through threat of adverse consequences (Birckenbach 1997:6). Successful conflict intervention is based on the criteria that a new constellation allows one better to approach conflict resolution than a previous formation would have.

4. Language in society

The framework of this sub-chapter provides the division of individual and collective phenomena, attached to languages and to speakers. The focus is laid only on the collective aspect. The notions depicting the balance of power, having the characteristics of dominating/dominated and the resulting processes are reviewed. Relations between a language and its dialects as well as changes concerning language corpus are not discussed. Language as a control mechanism for power within society is analysed.

1. Language statics

1. Speech community

The term **speech community** comes from Bloomfield (1933: 42), who used it as a translation from the German *Sprachgemeinschaft* (Madera 1996: 169). A speech community does not necessarily match with the notions of nation, ethnic group or minority, though it often does. As Hymes (1974: 47, referred to in Goebel et al. 1996: 169) has noted, it also does not equate to language, as the boundaries of a speech community does not coincide with the boundaries of the area where a language is used (cf. English!). Therefore, Hymes describes a speech community as a *community sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech. Such sharing comprises knowledge of at least one form of speech and knowledge also of its patterns of use* (1974: 51).

Labov (1972: 27) emphasizes the role of shared norms, which are observable in overt types of evaluative behaviour and in the uniformity of abstract patterns of variation, with Fishman (1971: 234) adding the role of language as a symbol of identity and integration. Thus, the determination of speech community membership is not based solely on linguistic knowledge or ability, but also on historical, social and psychocultural factors (Madera 1996: 174).

2. Mother tongue

Skutnabb-Kangas (1981:18) has proposed a systematized framework for the most common definitions, based on origin, competence, function, attitudes (internal and external identification) as well as automacy (language of counting, thinking, dreaming, etc.). Thus, in Skutnabb-Kangas (1990:9) a person may have several mother tongues especially according to definitions by origin and identification, but also according to other criteria; the same person can have different mother tongues, depending on which definition is used; a person's mother tongue can change during her lifetime, even several times, according to all other definitions except the definition by origin. Skutnabb-Kangas (1984a, 90) suggests the following definition:

The mother tongue is the language one has learned first and identifies with.

3. Bilingualism

Bilingualism can result from two different situations: the second language is acquired when speakers of two languages come into contact (**natural bilingualism**) or the second language is learned in a formal situation such as schools (**learned bilingualism**). A combination of these is also possible.

In most cases bilingualism for an individual is a step towards acquiring more languages. However, there are cases when bilingualism leads to monolingualism. For example, there are immigrants, whose grandchildren or, even worse, children are not able to speak the language of their (grand)parents (Wong Fillmore 1991). The same can apply to powerless linguistic minorities and other threatened groups (e.g. populations of occupied territories) who tend to lose their language one or two generations after the population becomes overwhelmingly bilingual. Education, especially language education, plays a major political role in homogenisation which is one step towards monolingualism (referred to by, [some] politicians, as national integrity), and multilingual diversification, one step towards multilingualism (Rannut and Rannut 1995).

There is a multitude of definitions of bilingualism (see for discussion Skutnabb-Kangas 1981: 12-20), up to the maximalist view, requiring native-like competence in two or more languages. Defining bilingualism like this is, according to Colin Baker, too ambiguous and extreme (Baker 1993:7). However, there seems to be a tendency, according to which minorities prefer to define bilingualism in a more demanding way, using competence, function and identification as criteria (Skutnabb-Kangas 1990). Bilingualism may be a both collective and individual phenomenon. However, these phenomena are asymmetrical, as Mackey has observed (1970: 554-555): *An individual's use of two languages supposes the existence of two different language communities; it does not suppose the existence of a bilingual community. The bilingual community can only be regarded as a dependent collection of individuals who have reasons for being bilingual.* Thus, a self-sufficient bilingual community has no reason to maintain bilingualism; only the contact between different linguistic communities results in bilingualism, as Fishman has claimed (1969?). However, this view has been disputed as eurocentric (cf. Pattanayak, Dua, Khubchandani). Frequently collective bilingualism is asymmetrical in that one part of the community (whose members have less power or status) knows the language of the other part, but not vice versa (Cluver 1993). As Maurais (1997:153) remarks, social bilingualism is usually an intermediary step to later unilingualism in the dominant language).

According to Skutnabb-Kangas the same criteria which are used to define mother tongue, can be used to define bilingualism. As an individual phenomenon, Skutnabb-Kangas (1990:10) defines bilingualism as a

desirable goal in minority education as follows:

A speaker is bilingual who is able to function in two (or more) languages, either in monolingual or multilingual communities, in accordance with the socio-cultural demands made on an individual's communicative and cognitive competence by these communities and by the individual herself, at the same level as native speakers, and who is able to identify positively with both (or all) language groups (and cultures) or part of them.

According to the research data, high-level bilinguals who know both their languages well, perform better than comparable monolinguals tests which measure some general intellectual factors, cognitive flexibility, divergent thinking, different aspects of creativity and of metalinguistic awareness (sensitivity to feedback cues, separating form and content etc) (Skutnabb-Kangas 1990, see Cummins 1984, 1988 for an overview). They also learn other additional languages better than monolinguals. The fact that many multilinguals have done and still do poorly on tests and in school seems to be a result of neglect of one of the languages, normally their mother tongue, or a generally badly planned education (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1984a).

Lambert distinguishes between **additive bilingualism** where the second language does not influence the first language and usually occurs amongst members of dominant groups; and **subtractive bilingualism** where the second language weakens the first language and leads to a drop in its status (Lambert 1974).

4. Diglossia

Diglossia is the systematic use of two forms of the same language or two languages in a given speech community in such a way that each variety is associated with certain domains of social activity in which the other variety is normally not used (such as formal administration or religion versus informal, family situations) or for certain social functions (such as literary versus colloquial). This implies that the status of the two varieties will differ. Diglossic and polyglossic settings relate only to group relations, as Haarmann has shown (1983:375).

Initially Ferguson (1959) defined diglossia as the coexistence of **two varieties** of a particular type from one language. His criteria for distinction were social prestige, degree of standardisation, richer technical and scientific terminology. Thus Ferguson 1959:325 limited diglossia to *speech communities (where) two or more varieties of the same language are used by speakers under different conditions with no attempt ...made...to examine the analogous situation where two distinct (related or unrelated) languages are used side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly defined role.*

Fishman (1967,1972) noticed that relations completely equivalent to those outlined by Ferguson can be found between languages belonging to different families. Therefore, Fishman (1970) introduced a notion that diglossia could be extended to situations where forms of two genetically unrelated languages function in L and H domains, one for prestigious, other for more informal purposes (**extended diglossia**).

Kloss (1976) has suggested that a distinction should be made between in-diglossia (Binnendiglossie), when the high and low varieties are *nach verwandte Sprachformen* and out-diglossia (Aussendiglossie), when the high and low varieties are not related to each other. A similar kind of differentiation has been proposed by Timm (1981), who distinguishes between interlanguage diglossia (diglossia between different languages) and intralanguage diglossia (diglossia within the same language).

In Morocco **triglossia** is witnessed, with a M variety (French) between H (Classical Arabic) and L (Moroccan Arabic). In order to cope with all the variety, Fasold (1984) proposes terms single nested up-diglossia (with more than one H variety) and single nested down-diglossia (more than one L variety).

The main difference between bilingualism and diglossia is the markedness by power factor of the latter which, due to the nature of diglossia (cf. Schiffman 1993) is balanced, and often invisible. Power relations seem to establish diglossic framework and these will emerge in the case of an attempt to change diglossic pattern. However, due to the inequality of powers themselves, diglossic structure cannot provide long-term security for stable maintenance, resulting in language shift taking place domain by domain.

Fishman (1972) has studied the interconnections between bilingualism and diglossia in a detail. According to him, microlevel situational switching is governed by common allocation, i.e., by widespread normative views and regulations that commonly allocate a particular variety to a particular cluster of topics, places, persons, and purposes. On macrolevel, he notes the positive influence of diglossia with bilingualism: were the rules not compartmentalized, i.e. were they not kept separate by dint of values, domains of activity, and everyday situations, one language would displace the other as role and value distinctions merged and became blurred (1972: 96). Bilingualism without diglossia tends

to be transitional. Without separate though complementary norms and values to establish and maintain functional separation, that language which is fortunate enough to be associated with the predominant drift of social forces tends to displace the others.

5. Language functions and status

The issue of language functions and status seems to be an aspect of language with no major common understanding emerging. Difficulties start with the definitions and structure of the terms concerned. For instance, Edwards (1996: 703-704) distinguishes **language prestige**, based on historical record, **language function**, based on current use, and **language status**, referring to its potential. Language function, prestige and status are imminent on macro level of language, revealing thus power relations linked to language, resting upon social perceptions of speakers. Though the notions discussed are assigned to language, in reality these are associated with the group of speakers of that particular language. The same is true about the terms carrying corresponding negative connotation (**stigma**), as languages cannot contain inherently favourable or unfavourable elements. This view accords with that expressed by Ammon and Hellinger (1992), who have regarded language status (together with its function, role and use) in opposition to structure or corpus. According to Ammon (1989) language functions and its status are interrelated, with status being the consequence of the functions attached (cf. Edwards's potential). Utta von Gleich (1989) argues in this respect that status refers to a position within the respective system, whereas function refers to the use made of the language in a society. Haugen (1956) has shown that language functions are characteristic of social groups and communities. Language may become a barrier to the social mobility of the individual, leading to frustration or contempt towards the mother tongue (cf. linguistic counterhegemonies in Skutnabb-Kangas 1982). Often the issues of language status and function are regarded in a wider system of language description, reserving space for those according to other criteria of the system build-up. The interconnection of these two may be described in various ways. According to Mackey (1989), language status has several dimensions - demographic, geographic, cultural, economic and juridical, while the functions of a language can be directly observed in the language behaviour of the population of any area. The status of a language can be modified by changing its functions within certain limits. Any language status strategy must depend on the difference between the status (*de jure*) and the corresponding functions (*de facto*). Language function depends on language competence, and competence is maintained by use (Mackey 1979). The need to accord status to a language legally arises in situations of language conflict either felt or feared. He distinguishes the following statuses:

Linguistic status is based on language as system of structures and units, with varying degrees of standardization and lexical extension. Criteria for this is standardisation, (lack of) diversity, interlingual distance (kin languages) and writing system (script, orthography). **Demographic status** concerns numerical aspect, literacy (increases the use and usefulness of a language by providing a market for its products, effect diminishes in the oral mass media), production (the more there is to read the more economically dominant). **Cultural status** is associated with cultural products, language of science and technology, as well as language of education. **Legal status** covers areas of jurisdiction: levels of jurisdiction, involving non-state languages, and domain-restricted status within each level of jurisdiction (e.g. education).

Stewart (1968, 1970) employs four attributes to set up a language typology: *standardization* (the codification and acceptance, within the community of users, or a formal set of norms defining "correct" usage), *autonomy* (the function of the linguistic system as a unique and independent one where two historically related systems exist but where structural difference is fairly marked and where there is no sociolinguistic interdependence, each will be autonomous in terms of each other), *historicity* (the linguistic system is known or believed to be the result of normal development over time), and *vitality* (the use of the linguistic system by an unisolated community of native speakers). Language status implies a dual perspective in Stewart (1968): status derived through the attitudes and values attached to a variety and status derived from the functions of a variety within the speech repertoire of that subculture. For multilingual environments Stewart specifies language functions of each of the linguistic systems and their degree of use: /

1. **Official:** function as a legally appropriate language for all politically and culturally representative purposes on a nationwide basis.
2. **Provincial:** function as a provincial or regional official language.
3. **Wider communication:** the function of a linguistic system (other than one which already has an official or provincial function) predominating as a medium of communication across language boundaries within the nation.
4. **International:** the function of a linguistic system (other than above) predominating as a major medium of communication which is international in scope.

5. **Capital:** the function of a linguistic system (other than o and p) as the primary medium of communication in the vicinity of the national capital.
6. **Group:** the function of a linguistic system primarily as the normal medium of communication among the members of a single cultural or ethnic group, such as a tribe, settled group of foreign immigrants
7. **Educational:** the function of a language (other than o and p) as a medium of primary and secondary education, either regionally or nationally.
8. **School subject:** the language (other than o and p) is commonly taught as a subject in secondary and/or higher education.
9. **Literary:** the use of a language primarily for literary or scholarly purposes.
10. **Religious:** the use of a language primarily in connection with the ritual of a particular religion.

Fasold (1989) distinguishes the following language functions:

The **official function** of a language seems to require standardisation, a sufficiently large cadre of educated citizens who can use the language well.

The **nationalist function** requires the following sociolinguistic attributes:

- the language serves as a symbol of national identity
- it must be acceptable as a symbol of authenticity
- major sociocultural groups in the country have no alternative nationalist language
- the language must be seen as a link with glorious past

The **educational function** requires three attributes:

- it must be understood by the learners
- teaching resources must be available in that language
- it must be standardized

Dua (1989) analyses language function and status in the framework of a larger system with three dimensions: language dimension, community dimension and societal dimension.

Language function is the element of the language dimension, which is considered independently of its speakers and the societal context in which it is situated. It is characterized in terms of language use, language structure, language production and language function. He has proposed the following domains of language use (Dua 1989: 134-5): home, education, official, court of law, media, business, trade and market, religion.

Language function is regarded in terms of its value as a resource and a symbol:

- **instrumental function** depends upon its significance for higher education, job opportunities, social mobility and economic prosperity on the one hand, and its pragmatic value for political-geographic integration on the other.
- **integrative function** involves the symbolic significance of a language for group solidarity, identity, and socio-cultural integration at the local, regional or national levels across different language and social groups.
- **communicative function** for highlighting the role of a language for both the intra- and intergroup communication.

Status is the component of the community dimension in Dua's model, containing demographic status, social status, social differentiation and language attitudes, presents the static and dynamic sources of power of a language group which determine and define the functional status of language.

Demographic status covers absolute number of speakers of a language, proportion of speakers of a language in a region, regional distribution of speakers of a language, rate of population growth/decrease.

Social status is characterised by following factors: socio-cultural symbols and values, history, economic position, socio-political mobilisation.

Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 124 Saskatoon) has added the following aspects to language function framework:

- 1 Language as essential homogenising element in state-building,
- 2 important means of control and domination,
- 3 tool for maintaining colonial structures as well as
- 4 means for counter-hegemonies.

Fishman (1966: 428) has warned about the possible merger of function and domain, proposed by him in 1964, in the writings of some linguists, which should be kept apart. Researchers agree that there is a strong connection between status and function. Status of a national language may be increased by increasing the type and number of its functions by promotion and/or coercion. By defining the number and distribution of language functions within the jurisdiction of the state and the levels of use within its institutions the state can influence the uses of an official language, provided that there is sufficient competence and no immutable diglossic dichotomy. The state can do this through the use of

certain administrative tools at its disposal, such as the promotion of personnel by language, publication and aid to publications, use of the media, translation and interpretation, public notices and public documents, social promotion and social organisation.

However, the activities of the state should correspond to actual power relations. Community determines the conditions for learning and use of languages. Language is always a social instrument and may become a social symbol. Language dominance causes language acquisition, but also language loyalty and defensive isolation.

6. Language maintenance

The term **language maintenance** is used for two various occasions: one, to refer to the situation where a speech community continues to use its traditional language in the face of a host of conditions that might foster a shift to another language, denoting collective behaviour (opposite: **language loss** or **language shift**), and the other for individual speakers, as opposite to **language attrition**, to retain competence/proficiency in a language where that language no longer has an active environmental support (see Hyltenstam and Stroud (1996: 567), they suggest the term **language retention** for individual speakers). Here, in accordance with the topic we are going to focus on the collective aspect only. The basic condition for language maintenance is provided by Stewart (1970: 541): *Multilingual systems may be considered stable when the different linguistic systems are geographically, socially and functionally non-competitive*. However, this is not the case with the majority of languages. Thus, other solutions enabling the maintenance of a language should be found.

Fishman (1966: 442-444) has made the following generalisations:

- Language maintenance is a function of intactness of group membership or group loyalty, particularly of such ideologized expressions of group loyalty as nationalism;
- urban dwellers are more inclined to shift; rural dwellers (more conservative and more isolated) are less inclined to shift;
- the more prestigious language displaces the less prestigious language.

Born (1989) has listed the conditions which facilitate the maintenance of cultural boundaries and operate as language maintenance factors as well:

- **geographic:** Physical separation from the environment through residential concentration, (frequently in isolated areas, combined with limited physical mobility);
- **economic:** socio-economic autonomy and self-sufficiency resulting in overlapping social networks and limited contacts with outsiders as well as non-participation in the patterns of upward mobility including secondary and post-secondary education;
- **social:** diglossia supported by high-status institutions, usually churches and schools, where the language concerned is dominant, a simple and tight community structure in terms of social networks and the system of sanctions and rewards they impose on the individual, the presence of religious and/or cultural leaders able to reinforce community standards, endogamous marriage patterns supported by a high birth rate.

Hyltenstam and Stroud (1996: 568) provide two general conditions for language maintenance: at first, there must be **language contact**, and second, there must be a **power differential** between the groups concerned. Among other conditions that reflect or determine the status concerning the power differential they list political-legal conditions, i.e. whether there are legislative means to enjoy the corresponding rights, implementation of these, economic conditions, societal ideology, visibility of the sociocultural norms, and education. For internal characteristics the data concerning demography, the language, level of heterogeneity, the existence of important niches, prevailing type of ethnicity, internal organisation and institutions, media and culture are necessary.

The basic condition seems to be the **inherent high status of language**. According to Born (1989), the survival of languages depends only to a limited extent on the public attitude, language laws and language policies of the surrounding society. More important are the forces operating within the social structure of the linguistic community concerned. Language maintenance can be expected when the community resists assimilation by maintaining the cultural boundaries separating it from others. As long as the language has a high internal social status in the community, i.e. highly integrative function, language maintenance continues, and even a low external status, i.e. negative categorisation on the part of environment is unlikely to result in language shift even if the pressure toward assimilation exerted by others is strong.

The elaboration and vitality of these prerequisites, including primordial as well as instrumental aspects, is based on different clusters of rights, among the language rights, based on specific interests and entailing corresponding duties for others. Several linguistic rights may be enjoyed in communion with others, i.e. collectively through individual beneficiaries. For example, language maintenance as

the utmost condition for preserving linguistic heritage is implemented in two different processes connected with each other, the socialisation of children (intergenerational language transmission), and the existence of a variety of contexts for use and the development of language.

As a similar term, **language loyalty** is used, either to denote the same as language maintenance (cf. Weinreich 1970: 83), or the bond of maintenance between a state and an individual. In the latter case, national language strengthens instrumental and sentimental forms of attachment of the individual with the social system. As loyalty to national language cuts across diverse socio-cultural groups and bonds of local identities, it performs a unifying function and promotes national integration and identity. As the national language may be used for wider communication among diverse language groups and in the domains of education and administration, it is considered as an instrument for the development of political, economic and social institutions at the national level. Thus it is considered as an indispensable element in nationality formation and national development. In Dua's (1989) model language attitudes comprise two types : language loyalty and language pride. While language loyalty refers to intellectualistic and nationalistic attitudes (Weinreich 1968), pride reflects personal emotional attachments. Loyalty unites and distinguishes from others, whereas pride accords prestige and status to a language as a mark of group identity.

2. **Language dynamics**

1. **Language instability**

There are three factors of **linguistic instability**, according to Labrie (1996: 826-827): variation, change and spread. **Language variation**, being synchronic dimension, supposes the differences, either geographic, functional or social, resulting from the inequal distribution of power through linguistic variety of the same speech community. **Language change**, being diachronic dimension, implies that every language variation is the result of **language contact**, producing changes (addition, modification or loss of elements or rules, cf. Cluver 1993) in language structure (phonology, morphology, lexicon, semantic level, syntax, rules of discourse, etc.). Eastman (1991: 147) regards some of the external causes of language change as a consequence of social change, which moves in the direction of perceived power and prestige. The same has been noted by many, among them Nader (1970: 277): *It has regularly been stated by some linguists and anthropologists that the prestige factor often leads to extensive borrowing from one language to another.* Mühlhäusler claims in this connection that subordination of a minority population at the political-economic level is linked to attrition and simplification of the language of the minority. The last, **language spread**, being spatio-temporal dimension, concerns the possible use of every language variety, varying in time and space through acquisition and assimilation of speakers, these two phenomena linked with **language prestige (or status)** and **language function (or role)**, both deriving from power configuration within society. These three factors may be regulated through **language policy** (cf. Corbeil 1983).

2. **Language contact**

Cluver (1993: 22) defines language contact as a situation in which two or more languages are used by groups living in very close geographical or social contact and elements of the one language are absorbed by the other language. One result of language contact is that speakers are frequently bi- or multilingual. Language contact may lead to language shift or to the development of a contact language or pidgin. Reaction to the effects of language contact takes the form of language maintenance. Usually researchers have not been strict when using the terms denoting language contact (cf. Abderrahman 1996). Due to the power structure within society the additional synergetical unit makes collective unequal to the sum of individual phenomena, therefore supposing different framework and, consequently, different terms.

Outcome of a language contact has drawn attention of several researchers and produced several theories. Some, like Slobin (1973) note primacy of linguistic factors like highly regular and transparent grammar. Thomason and Kaufman (1991:35, quoted in Abderrahman 1996:18) claim that linguistic considerations are relevant, but they are still secondary. According to Whinnom (1971:92-7, quoted in Thomas 1991:122) four barriers control the transfer of elements from one language to another:

- 1 ecological (whether or not the languages are in contact).
- 2 The ethological (whether or not there is some emotional impediment).
- 3 The mechanical (whether or not there are insuperable structural differences between the languages).
- 4 The conceptual (whether or not the conceptual world of one speech community is rejected by the other).

3. Language choice

Changes in language choice reflect an underlying change in social norms and frequently lead to language decline (Cluver 1993). Language choice is frequently based on political factors which include the consolidation of power relations or the building of a nation (Eastman 1983:15). Weinstein (1990:6) has shown that the reasons for the choice of a particular language for specific function can often be found in particular groups who benefit by this choice.

Khubchandani (1994) stipulates in this case the role of language as a symbol of status and progress. Usually language choice is directed by the following patterns: language identity patterns are in consonance with communication patterns, loyalties based on language identity have acquired political salience, and language caters to all the needs of the speaker. Thus, according to Khubchandani (1994) choice of language is determined by:

- the **pragmatic demands of the situation**, depending on the listener's capacity and speaker's ability as well as their cultivation of language
 - the **institutional factors of identification**; language serving as a label for status, prestige and fashion
- The second factor adds sentimental affiliation to one or both of these languages.

Concerning the language choice on individual level, Herman (1970: 499-503) draws attention to the following factors: the freedom of language choice will be determined by the degree of language tolerance in the particular society. This tolerance refers not only to permissiveness toward the use of other language but also to the attitude toward a faulty use of the national tongue.

Language loyalty will cause a person to use the particular language in a wide variety of situations and he will be impervious to the requirements of the immediate situation or to his personal needs.

When the situation provokes insecurity or high tension, one will be hesitant to use a language in which he is not proficient and will prefer the familiar tongue. Persons with high sensitivity of criticism will not readily use a new language in which they are not proficient unless there are other compelling circumstances. The person who is not concerned about group identifications can act more freely in terms of the demands of the immediate situation. The more task-oriented the behaviour, the less likely are personal needs or group identifications to enter. When well-established patterns of behaviour characterize a relationship it is more resistant to background influences and changing personal needs.

4. Language conflict

Stewart (1968: 541) observes that different languages are not competitive when they are used by different people for the same things, or by the same people for different things. He continues: (1970: 541): *Language conflicts can occur if this complementary relationship is upset, either by a natural historical process or by direct administrative intervention.*

Mohan (1989:73) identifies three causes of language conflict:

- a change in the power-balance underlying societal bilingualism;
- blocking of social mobility by the presence of a majority language used in all the prestigious domains;
- fear of loss of ethnic identity that could follow language shift

Stavenhagen (1990:93) states that the causes leading to cultural conflicts are generally linked to historical reasons in societies where resources and power have been unequally distributed.

The reason for tension may be the situation when the supremacy of a given language goes counter to the needs and aspirations of large sections of populations (Baetens Beardsmore, Wyllemyns 1986), power balance is altered. Usually, power issues may be deducted from the views concerning the conflict. Mühlhäusler (1996) remarks that language contact situations invariably involve intergroup conflict over the allocation of scarce resources. Very often language conflict carries symbolically the conflict of another order, like economic conflict (Nelde 1991). Thus, language conflict is a reflection of underlying social conflict, the basic force of which is felt to be inequality.

Kelman (1971:34, quoted in Cluver 1993: 21) identifies language policy as one of the causes of language conflict. A language policy may be interpreted as threatening to a particular group's identity by degrading their language, undermining their cultural self-development and inhibiting their literary expression. Because their language is not given due recognition, members of their group are denied equal opportunities and thus have limited socio-economic mobility. According to Kelman (1971: 36) instrumentally based grievances (the idea that the minority language excludes its speakers from full participation in the political and economic systems) are a primary impetus for major language conflict.

Thus obstructing access to jobs, education, economic and social advancement by introducing language requirements may give rise to conflict. When language differences coincide with other significant differences, the risk of alienation and conflict is increased. McRae (1989:6) points out that when these conditions are accompanied by the exclusion of certain groups (and their languages) from the centres of

political decision making, the risks of language conflict are enhanced.

The claims presented above accord with the study by Allardt (1981), who shows that ethnic (or linguistic) militancy is related to some form of relative deprivation, historical memories of persecution, and to unfulfilled aspirations. Ethnic mobilization seems to be positively correlated with the availability of resources, according to Allardt (ibid.).

Thus, in general, the generator of conflicts seems to be various set of constraints in the transformation of one kind of power into another, in order to create a new level of balance within society. If in this process, language is connected with one of the kinds of power, the process turns into linguistic conflict.

The solutions for linguistic conflicts may be based on territory, personal abilities and functions, correspondingly based on the principle of territoriality, the personal principle and the diglossic principle by defining distinct social spheres for each language. Thus, solutions are based either on strengthening the constraints on power transformation, or eliminating these all.

5. Language loss

As Kees de Bot (1996: 579) suggests, due to the variety of use and interpretation of various terms, shown by Waas (1992, 1993), for simplifying unnecessarily sophisticated matters, the term **language loss** refers to the decline of linguistic skills both on individual and community level. **Language shift** denotes the loss of linguistic skills between generations, while **language attrition** refers to loss of skills in individuals over time.

For the purpose of the work the native language loss in the second language environment (L1 in L2) is reviewed here.

Gonzo and Saltarelli (1983, referred to in Kees de Bot 1996: 580) have shown that in society both language attrition and language shift occur usually jointly. For example, in a speech community in the situation of language contact with power differential, attrition of the native language is witnessed through non-use and interference, such a set is transmitted to the next generation only in a reduced form (language shift), where the same process is repeated.

6. Language shift

Language shift takes place in multilingual societies among the community in a dominated position, resulting usually in bilingualism. As in bilingual communities languages are allocated to different situations and social functions on the basis of interlocutor and/or of context and topic, i.e. in the form of diglossia (Gal 1996: 587). Thus, **language shift** denotes the resulting reallocation of languages and sometimes the death of one of the languages. As Paulston (1993) shows, the power pushing a community of speakers towards language shift should not necessarily come from numerical strength, but through the control of institutions, like education and judicial system. Thus it may be viewed as a process or as a result.

Dorian, depicting the result (1982:44), is on the opinion that language shift occurs when a language used in a community is replaced by another. During this process, the dominant language takes over functions that were assumed by the dominated language. This gradual displacement of one language by another is what defines language shift, according to Abderrahman (1996). Willemyns (1992) has defined language shift as assimilation of members of linguistic community A to linguistic community B, motivated by a want for upward social mobility. Thus the shift always occurs from a less prestigious to a more prestigious community. The shift can be stopped only if the prestige language ceases to be the prestige language.

Willemyns distinguishes intergenerational and intragenerational language shift (measured by the comparison between an individual's language of early childhood and her or his home language). De Vries has shown that bilingualism, besides being a necessary condition for language shift, may also be a sufficient condition of language shift. The most common and non-complex case of the shift with the number of the languages $n=2$, denoting the classic language shift has been used by several authors to explain the phenomenon (see scheme 1), starting with Haugen (1953: 370), using the notations of *A*, *a* and *B*, *b* for two languages, with capital letters symbolizing full and lower-case letters limited proficiency:

$$A > Ab > AB > aB > B$$

According to this model language shift takes place proceeding from monolingualism in the minority language over phases of bilingualism in the two languages to monolingualism in the majority language. The model shows the threat to maintenance as soon as there are no monolinguals left in the minority community. Fishman (1972: 115) has suggested a strict domain separation, i.e. diglossia, as a solution for the maintenance of the minority language. The has been modified to the concrete situations, and, taking into account the dynamics of the process, the middle phase is usually left out, like the model

proposed by Denison (1977)

$$X \rightarrow XI/YII \rightarrow XII/YI \rightarrow Y,$$

I II III IV

where of the contacting languages X and Y, X is the ousted language, Y the ousting language, and the Roman number designates status order (below four separate stages of the process are designated). (For the convenience of according the symbols with those used by Fishman (1989, like Xmen, Yish) we have changed original A and B for X and Y).

There are several factors that strengthen language shift. Usually these factors divide the community into several sub-units and thus hamper communication. Moelleken (1996: 395) names here different religions or confessions practiced and different writing systems. One should also add geographical and political splits.

Mühlhäusler (1996: 298), studying language shift in the Pacific, has turned attention to other factors producing language shift, like factors affecting ecology of speakers: change of nature (plantations), states of the mind, philosophies and religious frameworks, transmitted socially from generation to generation, new diseases, drinks and drugs, but also more common phenomena, likelabour movements and genocide, newcomers, change of material and non-material culture with destruction of old, change of communication networks and residential structure leading to overpopulation and urbanisation with vertical societal structure, position as the receiving end of information. However, the result is same: introduction of hierarchical systems based on power, hierarchy of languages, connected with economic hierarchy.

In the present work, the term **language shift** will be used to refer to a gradual takeover of functions of one language by another within a community.

7. Language attrition

The term **language attrition** denotes, first, phenomena reflecting any decline in language skills at the level of individuals (general term), and second, any change of language habits at the level of a community of speakers, a deviation of a language feature from a certain norm (Abderrahman 1996). Being individual counterpart to community-level language shift, its main development line corresponds to that of language shift (cf. S1 - S1s2 - s1S2 - S2, where S1 and S2 are språk ett, två (Skutnabb-Kangas in Bilingualism or Not:70)

According to Major (1993), first language attrition refers to the diminishing competence in a language, varying in degree from complete loss, like language death, to loss of proficiency, to change in language contact situations. In most cases L1 loss includes concomitant learning of an L2 and integration into L2 culture. Thus, second language acquisition and first language loss seem to be inextricably linked. In general, it is reasonable to assume that the better one does at L2 language and culture the more likely that person will undergo L1 loss. A number of social and affective factors have been linked to second language acquisition such as cultural identity, attitude, motivation, accommodation, ego permeability, the affective filter, and risk-taking.

Seliger and Vago (1991: 3) point out that the primary concern is the disintegration or attrition of the structure of the first language in contact situations with a second language. Bilingualism is a natural setting for the unraveling of native language abilities. Attrition phenomena develop in bilingual individuals as well as bilingual societies, in both indigenous and immigrant communities. At its extreme, attrition leads to what has come to be known as **language death**.

The language of the bilingual develop patterns of dominance or strength, usually in relation to the domains in which the languages are used (Fishman 1972). The domain relationships of the languages can change such that the host or first language is weakened by the increasing frequency of use and function of the second language.

8. Language death and language murder

Language death is sometimes included under the notion of language shift. According to Abderrahman (1996) the main difference between language shift and language death is that in the former case, a language continues to exist, usually somewhere else than where it has lost its spe, whereas in the latter case a language simply ceases to be used. Thus, Herman Batibo (1992) defines language death as sudden and radical death of a language by dying or extermination or threat of it, provided the continuation of the use of a language concerned.

Sasse (1992) divides language death as a process into three periods:

1. Primary language shift: first and second language change places in the community
2. Language Decay
3. Language Death or Language Replacement

As a motor of the developments he recognizes External Setting (extralinguistic factors causing pressure) that influences Speech Behaviour (use of domains, attitudes) that correspondingly influences Structural Consequences (changes in language).

Bereznak and Campbell (1996: 659, cf. Campbell and Muntzel 1989) distinguish several kinds of language death, each of which is characterised by certain linguistic attributes:

- 1 **Sudden language death** is characterised by abrupt disappearance, as its speakers die or are killed in a short period.
- 2 **Radical language death** is resulted by severe political repression coupled with genocide, speakers stop speaking it as a survival strategy.
- 3 **Gradual language death** as most common takes place in the community which due to prolonged language contact (plus power differential) shifts gradually to the dominant language.
- 4 **Bottom-to-top language death** starts in the more informal social functions, but retains longer in formal and ritual functions.

Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 84-85) has turned attention to the fact that language death does not necessarily imply a causal agent, it is usually seen beyond the control of any agents, regarded as inevitable concomitants of social change. However, language death has structural and ideological causes, which can be identified and analysed.

Linguicide (linguistic genocide) implies that there is an agent involved in causing the death of languages. An active agent with the conscious intention to kill languages (1 in Cobarrubias's list) would cause linguicide, whereas the next two would fall within the domain of language death.

Linguistic genocide is defined in Article 3 (1) of the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) as *prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group.*

Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 86) has observed: *Crude biologically argued racism has, as official state ideology, largely been superseded by ethnicism and linguicism. Instead of superior races, certain ethnic groups (or cultures) and languages are now presented as fitter to rule and expand. Others are expected to adopt these cultures and learn the languages for the sake of modernization, development, democracy, and the technology and values associated with dominant market forces, and to do it at the expense of developing their own languages and cultures, not in addition to them.* Linguicism is defined here (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988: 13) as *ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language.*

9. Pidginization and creolisation

In certain cases of extended language contact between groups of people with no language in common, instead of the spread of bilingualism common in Europe, some form of oral modification is introduced due to the communication pressures. Among the conditions the comparatively similar size of the language communities in the continuous language contact and the number of communities engaged. This may be facilitated also by a specific function (e.g. plantation management, trade), with no familiar common language to cope with those specific linguistic needs. In this aspect, the new code generated achieves initially complementary status, used merely as a tool for specific purposes.

Mühlhäusler (1996b: 642) provides the following conditions of pidginization instead of bilingualism:

- the desire for socio-cultural distance;
- a large number of languages in contact;
- lack of typological similarities among the languages in contact;
- a large area of currency.

During the contact the language with lower referential and non-referential potential acquires substrate status to use a new code, starting from mainly non-verbal communication. It proceeds with oral code-switching, which decreases the social distance. Simultaneously, it brings along increased diffuseness in the older linguistic system in use, absence of stable shared codes and low comprehensiveness with frequent distortions. Mühlhäusler (1988) calls it **jargon**, used as a medium of intercommunication by people who are not speakers of the original language, also called **idiolect** or **secondary hybrid**. The most visible characteristics is the mix of lexicon. In current urban jargons in the multilingual environment the same phenomena may be traced: weakened position of indigenous languages with the in-group language contacts hindered at the cost of out-group contacts, producing a new mix, urban *lingua franca*, not only for the speakers of other languages, but also for the group. Sometimes it is accompanied with some specific marker (in case of Tsotsi Taal, unintelligibility to monolinguals in Afrikaans).

TARTU ÜLIKOOLI
EESTI KEELE ÖPPETOOL

As the next step, **pidgin** as the reduced form of contacting languages may be generated, additional to the native languages of speakers, still restricted to limited functional (and sometimes, regional) domain. Contrary to jargon it moves toward stabilisation and reduction of variability, in order to increase efficiency of communication in the domain used. Pidgin is characterized by norms of acceptability, being culture-neutral (Mühlhäusler 1988). In the course of time, a new identity for the community is founded, which is neither traditional indigenous nor of the colonizer, with its own social and linguistic norms, based on common ground out of the comfort zone, having neutral instrumental functions. Next step is the structural expansion, increasing the referential and non-referential potential, and acquiring new functional domains and forcing other languages out. If no significant monolingual resources for languages under attack are available (e.g. displaced communities caused by slavery), a radical break in language transmission is generated. If it produces an environment for the next generation as native speakers of it, by covering necessary functional domains of a language, it transforms into **creole** language, often associated with cultural mixture. Usually afterwards decreolisation takes place during post-creole restructuring continuum, with a number of varieties (cf. American Black English), the form of language shifting towards the dominant lexifier language. The same may happen to pidgin (post-pidgin phase). However, there are several cases when a creole language has been provided with literary form and legitimized, and further has assumed official linguistic identity. Besides these, **creoloid** languages exist, which go through only partial language shift (see Holm 1988), like Yiddish, Afrikaans, Pitcairnese, or, in the case of related languages **koine** might be developed (like the language in the Russian-Ukrainian contact area in East Ukraine).

5. Language planning and policy issues

1. Introduction

All the static and dynamic phenomena of language within society take place due to certain power configurations (or their changes). The instruments used for the latter belong to the domain of language policy and planning. Thus, as Eastman (1983: 103) shows, *language planning is concerned with how language can be conducted and interpreted successfully in a speech community, given the language goals of that community. It looks at the choices available to a speech community and at possible recommendations of language policy for adoption by that community.* Language planning is a macro-level action, related to the phenomenology of a collective identity (Haarmann 1986: 83). It is a long-term process, affecting language change towards planned direction at least for a generation (Maurais 1997).

The area concerned makes use of several terms like language planning, language policy and language politics (Szepe 1995), each of which is defined by a multitude of ways. More common approach regards language planning and policy as the same domain (cf. Hornberger 1994, 1996). Reasons for it seem to be difficulties in separation of planning and policy diachronically (both may be produced simultaneously, may intermingle and mix) as well as functionally (domains and activities may overlap, same persons may be engaged in both domains). However, there seem to be a number of differences:

- language policy is carried out by politicians, i.e. persons to whom electorate has vested power for a certain period,
- language planning is done by experts in this domain (researchers), who are responsible for the scientific quality.

Tollefson (1992) has emphasized this distinction in his definition: *Language policy is language planning by governments.*

Overviews of language planning and policy have been written, among others, by Ricento and Hornberger (1996), Cooper (1989), Hornberger (1989), Fishman (1974), Hornberger (1994), Kloss (1977), Leibowitz (1969, 1971), Phillipson (1992), Ruiz (1984), Wood (1980), Tollefson (1991), Eastman (1983).


1. Framework of language policy.

Language policy covers a level of (directed) language usage within the three-level hierarchical system of language in society (linguistic, societal and political), consisting of elements on these levels as well as the links between these elements. This may be studied via the paradigm of **sociology of language**, focusing upon the entire gamut of topics related to the social organisation of language behavior, proposed first by Fishman in several of his earlier works (1970, 1972). The first level of this hierarchy is **language environment**, based on individual language contacts. Language environment may be continuous or discontinuous on the territory concerned, depending on the success of language contacts between speakers. In the case of monolingualism language contacts are always continuous, as

communication is based on the common language of speakers. In the case of two or more languages, language contacts are usually limited to the those speakers competent in the common language. The marker of continuity/ discontinuity of individual language contacts enables to form several compound quantitative markers like structure and spread of a language. The qualitative structure, based on language attitudes, is expressed through language-related symbolic and status phenomena. Bourdieu (1977) has drawn attention to the link of language use, and consequently to language environment and authority, exercised by social environment.

The next level - **language policy** - concerns social environment and deals with the manipulation of society by modifying its linguistic characteristics. Thus, **language policy**, in order to control and direct society toward the determined goals by authorities, consists of deliberate attempts to regulate language spread and to control communication by creating necessary legal and administrative structures. However, the domain of language policy is significantly narrower than that of language environment, covering official and public functions of language. According to Calvet (1986: 20, referred to in in Labrie 1996: 829) language policy is the set of instruments consciously used in the domain linking language and social life. Thus, language policy is based on the legal system, the administrative system (implementation), the control system (either ombuds(man), legal chancellor or special tribunal, etc.) of a state or (autonomous) territory, while the research and evaluation mechanism connected to it belongs to the domain of language planning. Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) position the domain of language policy as follows: *Language policy is concerned with language matters at the collective level, whether suprastatal, statal, or substatal. It is guided by overall policy concerns such as appropriate educational policy or the facilitation of democratic citizenship. The focus in language policy studies on the collective level implies a concern with social structure and power.* Language policy reflects the power balance within society, being the channel of transforming social relationships into linguistic ones. In this way, it may enlargen democtratic processes and promote human rights standards, but it may also produce inequality and linguicism (cf. Skutnabb- Kangas (1988, 1996, 1997, Phillipson 1993, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 1997, Calvet 1987). Davis (1990) differs here intended policy, involving the government's language policies and goals, and implemented policy which includes the effects of language policies and practices have on individuals within society. Thus, language policy may be implicit, when language processes are influenced indirectly, through norms and administrative institutions created primarily for other purposes (e.g. consumer protection, issuing documents and certificates, court and police work procedures), or explicit, in the framework of a firmly established structure with the clear distribution of tasks and domains between institutions responsible for language policy. These institutions are created and modified according to the proposals deriving from the level of **language planning**, relieved of practical implementation and control procedures. **Language planning** itself may be defined as a systematic arrangement of norms and procedures for control and regulation of communication with the aim to direct the use and development of languages. Language planning is traditionally divided into **status planning** (choice, use and regulation of language issues in the society), covering official language planning, minority language planning and foreign language planning (cf. Fishman 1972), **corpus planning** (standardisation, codification and development of language corpus), **acquisition planning** (regulation of language spread via language teaching), covering mother tongue teaching, second language teaching and foreign language teaching. In concrete cases these domains may overlap.

Most of the language planning activities serve political goals. The position of language planning may be depicted through the graph, based on the channels of influence in Galtung (1996: 27). The proposed three-level system functions in two opposite directions, through the chain of scientific influence and of political dependence, which mutually restrict each other and provide in this way a control mechanism.



Efficiency of scientific network depends on the skills and qualifications of researchers, while that of political network depends on the level of democracy and transparency of society. In the latter, the role of political elites is to transmit non-scientific signals to researchers. In a totalitarian society, ruled by elites, it means that researchers are not free in their decisions, thus producing language plan according to the needs of political elites, instead of society. Galtung has explained this by tendency of *elites to seek advice that can be accommodated within their own paradigms, not advice they might identify with the opposition or with opposed countries. They will generally see researchers as producers of premises, not of conclusions, and as servants, not as dialogue partners* (ibid.: 27).

2. Aim of language policy

The main goal in language policy is the regulation of communication within and around the society by creating the functional environment of the language concerned through legislation and institutional framework as well as language promotion and persuasion in order for every language community and the society as a whole to be competitive and maintain the language(s) concerned. Lo Bianco (1987) has pointed out four main domains of language policy within society, called 4-e-policy: **enrichment** (cultural heritage issues), **equity** (human rights issues), **economy** (diversified mother tongue and second language learning and maintenance programs enable cut costs (cf. special schools), thanks to foreign language planning better performance in international level, incl. business (current trend from goods to services, demanding major increase in foreign language fluency)), **external** (conflict prevention and resolution, good relations with neighbours).

Absence of language policy may lead to societal situations typical features of which are: linguistic majority rule, marginality of minor groups, high level of functional illiteracy and criminal rate, especially among second-generation immigrants, xenophobic attitudes of the majority, feeling of threateness among minorities and immigrants leading to prevailing minority complex, absent foreign language policy causing backward and ailing level of competitiveness in the international market, low performance levels in the international arena, including representation in various international organisations, unbalanced and costly societal structure due to the linguistic barriers within and around the society. The society with perfect language planning with the treats of cultural diversity, high level of tolerance, feeling of security among minorities and immigrant groups and research-based foreign language planning is still, unfortunately an ideal. However, positive experience in various domains of language policy may be found around the world in various countries.

In order to get the right grasp of language policy and planning issues, one has to differentiate between the viewpoints of a state, based on management, dividing languages as national (official), minority and foreign, and a personal one, based on the intricacies of acquisition, recognizing native language (mother tongue), second language and foreign language categories. To each category of the two viewpoints, Ruiz's (1984) orientation model may be applied, accounting for the role played by attitudes (often unconscious) *toward language and its role, and toward languages and their role in society*, which Hornberger (1994: 83, my adaption, MR) characterizes as follows:

1. language as problem orientation which would tend to see languages as problems standing in the way of the incorporation in society, and to link language issues with the social problems characteristic of such groups;
2. language as right orientation which would tend to see languages as a basic human and civil right for their speakers, and to seek the affirmation of those rights, often leading to confrontation, since a claim to something is also a claim against something else;
3. language as a resource orientation which would tend to see languages as resources not only for their speakers, but for society as a whole, and to seek their cultivation and development as resources, in recognition of the fact that they are exhaustible not by use, but by lack of use.

Such orientated categories with specific language attitudes and roles provide us the bricks to be modified with the tools of language planning and policy. These are kept together by power relations, reflected in the tensions around language policy. In this way the orientated categories accord with the definition of language planning-policy provided by Tollefson (1992), as the institutionalisation of language as a basis for distinctions among social groups (classes). Thus language policies, sometimes with unconscious or hidden agenda, produce language environments. Power issues in language planning may be observed through explicit political decisions, interventions of social forces, ideologies and orientations.

2. Definitions

1. Language planning

The term language planning was introduced by Einar Haugen, who had heard it from Uriel Weinreich (Haugen 1965: 188, quoted in Cooper 1989:29). The term was initially connected with decolonisation and resulting need in determining official language and further development for coping with new functions it confronted. Thus, Rubin (1971, p.218) defined language planning as the pursuit of *solutions to language problems through decisions about alternative goals, means, and outcomes to solve these problems.*

This definition accords with that of many others, for instance with that of Jernudd and Das Gupta (1971): *organized efforts to find solutions to societal language problems; Rubin (1973): an approach to the study of change in language and language use in order to make predictions about how to bring about change; the evaluation of linguistic change (Haugen 1966); the activity of manipulating language as a social resource in order to reach objectives set out by planning agencies which, in general, are an area's governmental, educational, economic, and linguistic authorities (Eastman 1983:29); all conscious efforts to affect the structure or function of language varieties, involving creation of orthographies, standardisation and modernisation programs and allocation of functions to particular languages within multilingual societies (Tollefson 1991).* Cooper (1989: 30-31) has compared dozen different definitions of language planning, arriving finally to his own : *Language planning refers to deliberate efforts to influence the behavior of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes (ibid.: 45).*

As a counterweight we could add the definition of language planning based on economic vision, as creating language demand together with language supply, which could be interpreted as one criterion of it. One of the problems in defining seems to be the everlasting expansion of the domain of language planning, as Jernudd (1991) points out.

In order to comprise all the basic markers of language planning we suggest a list of these instead of a definition:

- initiated by extralinguistic factors
- deliberate (attempt of) language change (Rubin and Jernudd 1968)
- on macro level (Rubin and Jernudd 1968)
- covers acquisition, structure and functional allocation of language
- future-oriented (Rubin and Jernudd 1968), long-term (Maurais 1997)
- by rearrangement aimed at language functions, territorial language environments and requirements affecting speaker behaviour and choice
- by means of specific programs or plans
- realised through legislation, administration and public-relations activities
- ideology is based on modernisation (Rubin and Jernudd 1968), fair share, consensus and/or ethnic or religious values
- social change as goal (Cooper 1989)

Thus, as can be seen, language planning is ignited from extralinguistic factors producing dissatisfaction or tension, and the goal is to modify language in order to provide solution to extralinguistic dissatisfaction (for generalisations, see Cooper 1989: 183-185).

2. Structure

Contemporary language planning theories distinguish three foci (or aspects or domains): corpus, status and acquisition planning. The distinction between language corpus planning and language status planning was originally made by Kloss (1969). According to this distinction language corpus planning is generally considered as a linguistic activity involving mainly the structural aspects of language. In the similar vein, Mühlhäusler (1996) defines **corpus planning** as planning of changes in the structure of language. In exemplifying this, Cooper (1989: 31) provides the creation of new forms, the modification of old ones and the selection from alternative forms in a spoken or written code. Discussing the link between corpus and status planning, Fishman (1979: 2) stipulates: *status and corpus planning are usually (and most effectively) engaged in jointly.* Later, Fishman (1987: 423) has clarified the nature of the link by subordinating corpus planning to status planning: *Status planning is the real engine of the language planning train. Only when status planning is seriously enforced does corpus planning really take root.. the products of corpus planning have no dynamic of their own. Many languages will never get much corpus planning codification or elaboration, and even less implementation.* Following Fishman, Dua (1989) emphasises **status planning** as the most crucial

dimension of language planning, involving not only decision-making, policy formation and language allocation that accord status to a language, but also dynamics of change that can modify, enhance or restrict it. Status planning, according to Mühllhäusler (1996), is concerned with the functional allocation of languages and involves matters like official language, medium of instruction and vehicle of mass communication. Thus, the allocation of languages or language varieties to given functions seems to be the main focus (cf. Cooper 1989: 32). As a partially matching activity, Haarmann (1986: 87) introduces **prestige planning**, defined as a cluster of individual ecological variables which imply evaluations of language planning activities by the speech community.

Fishman (1983: 382) has warned that the above mentioned distinction between status and corpus planning may be in practice not so clear, due to the interdependence of these foci. Haugen (1972, 1983) has elaborated this dichotomy further, providing two binary distinctions - status/corpus and policy/cultivation. In his revised model of language planning (Haugen 1983) he integrates the distinction between status planning and corpus planning with his earlier characterisation of language problems in relation to the distinction between society and language on the one hand, and between form (policy planning) and function (language cultivation) on the other. Thus, corpus planning concerns language and encompasses the codification that involves graphisation, grammatication and lexication, and the elaboration that involves terminological modernisation and stylistic development. While codification may be subject to policy planning as it deals with form, elaboration is considered linguistic as it involves only language cultivation.

In (1989: 33) Cooper adds acquisition planning as a separate focus of language planning. He explains this with the help of twofold nature of language spread, based on increasing language uses, a case of status planning, and also on increasing the number of users, as a result of acquisition. Thus, adoption of a separate focus seems to be justified.

3. History

According to Eastman (1983: 107), language planning (LP) has its roots in the past: pre-twentieth-century activities included search for international languages as universal systems of communications, work of language academies, which go back as far as the sixteenth century. From the first half of the 20th century one may recall the corpus planning activities in Turkey, which as a matter of fact reflected ideological, i.e. power shift and thus compulsorily affected status mechanisms also. To the same period belongs the campaign of eradication of illiteracy in the Soviet Russia (see 4.1-4.2). In the 1930s members of the Prague School of Linguistics discussed language problems that arise as a nation or state develops, namely language cultivation. However, the discipline as such was formed in the second half of the 20th century.

During its short history the orientation moves from seeing planning chiefly as a tool of standardization (1935-1959), to seeing it as the study of language problems and their solutions (1960s), to the study and practice of managing language change (1970s), to an awareness that is necessary to evaluate language change, given the nature of the context in which it occurs (multiethnic, supranational, and the like) (ibid.: 110).

The term language planning was, according to Einar Haugen, first used by Uriel Weinreich. The idea of language as a plannable societal resource developed as an area of sociolinguistic research in the 1960s, with emphasis on actual language planning, both in problem-solving and standardization aspects..

Another topics analysed during that period were the national language problem in ethnically complex states, and standardization. As Dua (1985) remarks, language planning has been one of the most quickly enlarging fields in linguistics. Starting from 1960s it has been open to any attempt of falsification through practical implementation. Thus, the applied aspect has provided besides effective control mechanism also a basis for further theoretical elaboration.

In the 1970s emphasis changed to planning for change rather than planning for problem-solving purposes per se. This development is observed by Jernudd (1983: 121): *By the beginning of the 1970s the field had a two-pronged emphasis: standardization (cultivation, development) in national settings, on the one hand, and solving problems in the multiethnic communities, on the other. The other area of LP concern to emerge in the 1970s was the role of planning in the context of LWCs. In the 1990s language planning is also motivated by migrations and ethnic relations, by the maintenance of state power by the one interest group, by consequences of economic globalisation of the economy, by the growth and increased intensity in use of global, regional, and local networks of communications (Jernudd 1991:130).*

3. Theories of language planning

There are various methods of dividing a considerable number of language planning theories (or ideas of these). Mühlhäusler (1996) divides the bulk of language planning theories into the following groups: **Classical theory of language** is based on the assumption that language loss and maintenance reflect the free and rational choices that speakers make (rational choice), while the principal argument of **historical-structural theory** is that minority speakers do not have a free choice but are controlled by the social, economic and ideological forces. Simultaneously, he criticises Tollefson's argument about significant improvement in Marxist societies (Mühlhäusler 1996:314). **Reversing language shift theory** (Fishman 1989, 1991), **deficit reduction/empowerment theories** (focusing on technocratic approach to modernise languages) and **domain separation/diglossia theories** are regarded as separate groups, the last ones based on the assumption that traditional languages can be contained in a restricted range of contexts whilst other domains are reserved for English. Domain-separation is associated with unequal distribution of power and leads to diglossia. The final group is made of **ecological theory** stressing maintenance, based on the survival of structured diversity. Central in this system are functional links. Language loss is preceded by loss of its non-linguistic support system.

Below we are going to review various models, grouped into three "waves" or generations.

The markers that will be used, are:

- explicit algorithm,
- systemic approach,
- predictability,
- target situation
- explicit power relations.

1. Structural models

The first language planning models followed the structure of those proposed in other disciplines of social science in 1960s. Language planning was viewed as descriptive and predictive procedure, with Tauli adding prescriptive (1973). Tauli (1974) maintains that *a language can be evaluated, altered, corrected, regulated, improved, and the new language can be created at will*. However, in his theory the power component is missing, denying the fact that the goals and objectives of language planning and its scope depend on social policy, its historical background and role of language planning in societal planning. Even same goals might need different approaches in various social contexts (political system etc.)

In her excellent overview Eastman uses the traditional approach:

Language policies are formulated, codified, elaborated and implemented. The formulation of language policy is a process of deliberation and decision-making. The codification of language policy refers to the technical preparation of the decided-upon policy. Elaboration of a language policy means the extension of the decided-upon language(s) or writing system(s) to all spheres of activity in which its use is envisioned. Elaboration, unlike formulation and codification, goes on the whole time that a policy is in effect. The implementation of language policy is the procedure used to bring about the change in language that allows the policy objectives to be realized (Eastman 1983: 7-8).

In similar way, Jernudd and Das Gupta (1968) depict planning as the utilization of resources in a consciously controlled manner, based on national resources, like labour, infrastructure, tools, reserves (its economic aspect). Authorization for planning is obtained from the politicians. A body of experts is delegated the task of preparing a plan. Experts estimate existing resources and provide developmental targets. Based on this, a strategy of action is elaborated, authorized by the legislature and implemented by the organisational set-up. Implementation of the tasks may be evaluated by planners. Language is regarded as a societal resource. Language planning can proceed by identifying the concrete areas of society that demand planned action regarding language resources. An optimal design of a plan would require the coordinated attention of political, educational, economic and linguistic authorities.

Such analytical models were proposed by Haugen (1966, 1969), Rubin (1971), Jernudd (1971), DasGupta and Neustupny (1970), among several others.

According to Rubin and Jernudd (1971), *Language planning is deliberate language change, that is changes in the systems of language code or speaking or both that are planned by organisations that are established for such purposes or given a mandate to fulfill such purposes. As such, language planning is focused on problem-solving and is characterised by the formulation and evaluation of alternatives for solving language problems to find the best (or optimal, most efficient) decision.*

Rubin has discussed evaluation in relation to the stages of language planning in (1971), consisting of fact-finding, planning, implementation and feedback. Evaluation can help the planner, as Rubin points out, to *identify and construct alternative goals, strategies and proposed outcomes.*

Her rational model assumes that the nation or government is the sole agent making choices and that it chooses from available alternatives ranked according to their value or usefulness in achieving specified objectives. The agent commonly evaluates competing language plans within the framework of cost/benefit analysis; maximizing national economic growth while maintaining political stability and control is usually the goal (Rubin 1986).

Haugen proposed a decision model in (1966) and elaborated some aspects further in (1969). In it he discusses policy formulation (functional allocation), codification (establishment of basic patterns), elaboration (securing intertranslability) and implementation (enforcement or encouragement of acceptance by population). Neustupnž has added cultivation here, dealing primarily with stylistic varieties of national standard, thus belonging to later and more advanced stage of language planning. In his (1983) work Haugen presents a revised model of language planning in which he integrates the distinction between status planning and corpus planning with his earlier characterisation of language problems in relation to the distinction between society and language on the one hand, and between form (policy planning) and function (language cultivation) on the other. Thus, corpus planning concerns language and encompasses the codification that involves graphisation, grammatication and lexication, and the elaboration that involves terminological modernisation and stylistic development. While codification may be subject to policy planning as it deals with form, elaboration is considered linguistic as it involves only language cultivation. Dua (1985: 118-119) argues that as lexicon is connected with socioeconomic markers, it cannot be dealt separately from cultivation.

Theory of language problems (Neustupnž 1968, 1978, Jernudd, Neustupnž 1987) concerns relationships between discourse and peoples' behaviour towards language, based either on linguistic or non-linguistic interest.

All these elements have been attempted to combine by Hornberger (1994), who presents a framework identifying two language planning approaches - policy planning (on form) and cultivation planning (on function) - and three types - status, acquisition, and corpus planning. Her policy-planning approach attends to matters of society and nation at the macroscopic level and is mainly concerned with standard language, whereas the cultivation-planning approach deals with matters relating to language/literacy at the microscopic level and is mainly concerned with literary language. Status planning concerns uses of language, acquisition planning concerns users of language, and corpus planning deals with language itself (1994: 402).

This first wave of language planning theories, as may be observed, deal mostly with (some linguistic aspect of) nation-building. Though, thanks to thorough analysis, algorithm of language planning has made very explicit, these models still lack systemic view, resulting in the lack of predictiveness, and power issues. Though carved out sometimes to the smallest detail, they provide an algorithm for a bureaucratic problem-solving machine. As a matter of fact, in several other disciplines of social science, this kind of planning was abandoned long ago (for critique on this kind of models, see, for example, Dunleavy and O'Leary (1992)).

2. Psychological models

The second group covers a set of models known as accommodation (CAT) models, rooted to the Giles (1973). These models address minority maintenance issues. According to Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977, cf. *ethnolinguistic vitality*) linguistic minorities can be grouped by status, demographic and institutional support factors. The status factors pertain to a speech community's economic wealth, its social status, its socio-historical prestige and the status of the language used by its speakers. The demographic factors are discussed under two headings: the group distribution factors which include national territory for the group, group concentration over a given territory and the proportion of the ingroup in relation to the outgroup; and the group number factors which include absolute number of the speakers of a group, birth rate, mixed marriages, immigration and emigration. The institutional support variables refer to the extent to which a language group receives formal and informal representation in the various institutions of a nation, region or community such as mass media, education, government services, industry, religion and culture. The principal reasons why language comes into being and continues to be maintained is seen in the speakers' wish to mark their separate identity by means of a shared language and by accommodating their speech to that of perceived role models (e.g. political and cultural leaders). LePage and Tabouret-Keller (1985) show this when languages are reinstated as core values of a community.

Since the 1970s research on social psychology of language has produced several models rooted in its parent discipline, extending however to several other domains. In language planning, Giles together with his colleagues developed a model for language shift/maintenance through code-switching known formerly as **speech accommodation theory (SAT)**, now **communication accommodation theory (CAT)**. The determinants of code-switching are classified into three major categories:

normative factors, including the situational taxonomies of speech norms, motivational factors, including speech accommodation and social categorization effects, and sociostructural factors, including the relative vitalities of language groups in terms of group numbers, power and status (Hyltenstam 1996: 42). The concept of ethnolinguistic vitality refers to ability to survive in alien linguistic environment. Ethnolinguistic vitality is measured with reference to three sets of structural variables: status (group's economic resources, social status, prestige of the language), demographics (number of speakers, distribution and population trends measured primarily by birth rates and migration) and institutional support (representation of speakers within formal and informal institutions). The main assumption is that speakers who perceive their own group vitality to be high have more positive attitudes about the use of their own group language than those who perceive it to be low, and tend to diverge more in intergroup encounters (ibid.: 43).

Tollefson (1991) has provided a selective list of the theories belonging to the same vein. **Similarity attraction theory** claims that people are attracted to those whom they perceive as having similar beliefs, values and attitudes. **Social exchange theory** argues that the decision to converge or diverge is based upon cost-benefit analysis. **Causal attribution theory** assumes that individuals seek to attribute motive to convergence and divergence. **Ingroup distinctiveness theory** seeks to explain linguistic and cultural variation by claiming that groups look for ways to increase their distinctiveness in a way that seems favourable to them.

Though being productive and fruitful in terms of implementation in several other domains, in language planning domain these lack predictiveness. Power relations in intergroup contacts, treated in more recent studies, still lack dynamics. In addition, some of the universal postulates of CAT have been argued against, in the light of current studies (ibid.: 43-44). Recent theories have grown too complex, simultaneously losing practical usefulness.

3. Functional models

The ideas based on language functions within society and their interrelations have enabled to reach the next level in language planning models. The acceptance of power relations as engines of language planning has enabled to distinguish three types of models based on extralinguistic factors dealing with power distribution behind those, namely minority protection, nation-building, or (global) (language) spread. There are different stresses in identity modification between language policy models. While minority protection stresses ethnic (and, in the case of non-dispersed groups, toponymic) features of identity, nation-building politonymic and toponymic features, is postmodernist language spread model only linguonymic with instrumental qualities of language stressed, in contrast to modernist politonymic. In both forms of language spread creation of ethnonym through ethnic mobilisation is avoided. When comparing modernist and postmodernist language policies, the latter seems to be more cost-effective (see Philipson 1992 on this point).

All these models should be discussed in the framework of transfer from modernity to post-modernity (cf. O'Riagain 1997). Current period witnesses the transformation and modification of societal links to the needs of postmodernist information society. It carries direct impact on language policies listed in the chart below:

MODEL	LANGUAGE SPREAD	NATION-BUILDING	MINORITY PROTECTION
MARKET	global	national	internal
IDENTITY BASIS	imperialistic	civic	ethnic
STATE DESIRED	incipient	incipient/mobilised	mobilised

MODERNITY

STRATEGY	subtractive	subtractive	non-discriminative
STATUS	territorial contact, subtractive ideology	state as power distributor	domestic issue, minority regarded
CORPUS	one locus	state responsibility and control	collective and indigenous

ACQUISITION	submersive models	maintenance models	submersive or segregational models
POST-MODERNITY			
STRATEGY	additive	subtractive	non-discriminative not to the detriment of other Ls
GOAL	linkage to national system	hierarchy	equity
NEGOTIATION STATUS	in other L's domain functional contact, additive ideology, neutrality	both possible diminishing state power legal regulation	in one's own domain international issue, several competitive legal systems, minority floating and individual minority initiative,
CORPUS	several loci		
ACQUISITION	additive learning	compulsory	minority-interest-based models

The transformation from one model to another is based on the following steps:

- power shift within society and search for new balance;
- creation of new elites by transforming the rules of the social mobility process;
- build-up of institutional support for new balance;
- transformation of social network patterns;
- power reproduction mechanism accommodated to the new balance.

In addition, the role of public relations and marketing (persuasion) expands increasingly.

Most of the models allow different approaches to the same phenomena (marketing, power structure, problem-solving, etc., cf. Cooper 1989). The various possible language planning models are captured in the following taxonomy.

TABLE

Various relationships of language planning models

LS = language spread of LWCs;

NB = nation building for the official and common language;

MP = minority language protection

LS	NB	MP	Examples
-	-	+	pre-statal situation
-	+	-	homogenizing state (Turkey, Slovakia, France, etc.)
-	+	+	multilingual state, national language and minority languages (Spain)
+	-	-	post-colonial Africa with former colonial language as lingua franca
+	-	+	powerful LS (South Africa), powerful MP (Switzerland)
+	+	-	competing dominant languages (Algeria)
+	+	+	multiple overlapping models (India)

Two relationships commonly occur and need further attention:

- **The relationship between language spread and nation-building (LS-NB relationship).** As this relationship is usually (but not always) reflected through the behavior of sovereign states, the language-spread model makes use of foreign policy instruments, ranging from informal penetration (including pedagogy) to diplomatic, economic and military measures. Most of the measures belong to the non-legal domain (exceptions are the World Trade Organisation, WTO, and the proposed Multilateral Agreement for Investment, MAI, agreement on the free flow of goods, including cultural goods (films, videos, etc.), with France obstructing it, and some aspects of humanitarian law).
- **The relationship between nation-building and minority protection (NB-MP relationship).** Here language planning has to accommodate human rights standards most. It will be discussed further below.

One can also observe cases of the substitution of LS-NB relationship by the NB-MP

relationship, in response to outside pressure, as the legal framework in the latter is much more powerful. It usually means that a state uses the situation of the kin minority in other states to increase its influence there, when the legal status of a formerly dominant language has changed from overdog to underdog. In this case the minority becomes a pawn in a wider political game (as is the case of the Baltic states vis-a-vis Russia, cf. the comparable situation of a regional majority language like French in Quebec, Maurais 1997).

4. Minority protection

The models of minority protection are based on the idea of ethnic mobilisation, thus deriving from ethnicity.

In the domain of minority protection the pioneering work has been done by Fishman at the break of 1980s/1990s, introducing his model in several of his works at that time. As a matter of fact, his model provides the solution for minority maintenance and also the algorithm for transformation the situation to nation-building model with several markers of officiality and state support. For the minority protection-model he proposes the following: To stop the decay of the threatened language, two consequent steps should be taken, firstly, a clearly structured diglossia with explicit domains for the threatened language usage should be established in order to stop further.

J. Fishman (1991) has proposed a detailed **Graded Intergenerational Dislocation Scale** (GIDS) for this purpose, starting from the personal language affiliation of the adult population in the oral usage, expanding it to literacy, next generation education, later to the local mass media and services, and ultimately, to nationwide levels like governmental operations and higher education. Fishman (1991: 92-95, 398-399) identifies the intergenerational transmission of a threatened language in everyday contexts (home, family, neighbourhood) as the single most crucial construction of language maintenance. Here, the first task is to establish a complimentary relationship between languages and their allocation into non-competing domains of communication by attaching usage of certain language to every functional domain, thus creating a diglossic situation, where language choice does not depend on the language preference of the contact partners (as in this case the individual's freedom of choice normally favors the dominant cultures and languages), but on the domain of usage. The second task is to strengthen ties inside the threatened community, connecting language to the culture of the speakers of the local language concerned, recreating maintenance structures in education and public services and building the common language-that creates symbiosis of identity with symbolic value and ideology. In order to make the language competitive, the referential and non-referential power of the language should be increased through introduction of the literary standard and lexicon corresponding to the needs of the community. In this aspect the policy differs entirely from the marketing of majority and global languages, which are promoted as neutral tools to cope in the contemporary multilingual society, without a direct transparent link to alien culture and ethnicity.

Thus, deriving from the fixed order of societal phases for linguistic minority, it provides logical time scope to planning and enables to predict the developments. Based on linguistic groups (X- and Y-men) as units, it contains synergetic aspect. As it is built on minority-majority axis, the power relations are constantly explicit.

Ecological view of language and resulting language policy gains continuously prominence. **Haugen** (1972) introduced the term **language ecology** as the study of interactions between any given language and its environment. It should be concerned with the cultivation and preservation of languages, with the status of languages, functions, and attitudes, and ultimately with a *typology of ecological classification, which will tell us something about where the language stands and where it is going in comparison with other languages of the world* (1972: 337).

Haarmann (1986: 3) describes language ecology as *an attempt to find ecological principles applicable to social study of language, an attempt to construct models of ecological relations for the purpose of elaborating a general theory about such relations*. Thus, it is characterised by ecological reasoning and systemic approach, concentrating on the dynamics of variables in an ecological system **Mühlhäusler** (1996) has defined **linguistic ecology** (cf. contact linguistics) as the ecology of language that can be defined through interactions between any given language and its environment.(cf. Haugen 1983)

Up till now it is difficult to speak about theory here, as it consists of a modest number of principles, explained best in his works (1994, 1996). Language and its physical environment through contacts produce changes in the structure of languages: lexical, phonetical and grammatical borrowings, changes in name and numerical systems, etc. Based on the field research in the Pacific, it has several innovations that need more attention in the future. To some extent, his notion of ecology is comparable to that of environment.

Mühlhäusler (1994) has considered the impact that language teaching has on linguistic

ecology:

When speaking of linguistic ecologies we focus on the number of languages, user groups, social practices and so forth that sustain this language ecology over longer periods of time. Language teaching involves the introduction of a new language into an existing language ecology. (ibid.: 123).

The ecology-of-language paradigm, a similar version by Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) involves

- human rights perspective
- equality in communication
- multilingualism
- maintenance of languages and cultures
- protection of national sovereignties
- promotion of foreign language education

However, in the framework of language policy, ecological models represented through a set of principles, seem to be still quite embryonic.

5. Nation-building

Nation-building focuses on the building of a civic society (cf. Fishman's nationalism!) with national language providing the necessary link for the society concerned.

The main feature of this model lies in the hidden power structure in planning, seemingly implying a thorough problem-solving procedure. The reason is usually the accordance of activities of language planners with those in power, resulting in the neglect of power dimension as insignificant and overemphasizing non-ideological decision-making.

Fishman (1972) has proposed a model which postulates three types of decision. Choice of a national language is determined by the need of local elites to promote socio-cultural integration. Choice of national language depends on whether there exists locally a Great Tradition, in which case this is opted for, nationalism can build on it, and a fusion of traditional and modern spheres is attempted. Secondly, there may be competing Great Traditions within the same nation requiring a compromise between political integration and separate authenticities. Thirdly, where there is no Great Tradition at the national level, selection of a national language is governed by considerations of political integration (principle of nationalism).

As de Varennes (1996: 9) remarks, though the sovereignty of a state in international scale has diminished, its role as a major purveyor of services, employment and economic opportunities in the domestic arena has expanded. It provides a wide range of services and regulatory mechanisms for the society. Thus, states explicitly admit the instrumental value of language and claim to base their language policies on the principles deriving from the instrumental characteristics of language. However, language has been skillfully implemented as a power instrument of the elite (usually majority) on a major scale by states, though as a hidden agenda. A government directly affects the political power structure of the state by making language knowledge a predominant factor in access to employment and education opportunities, as native speakers of the official language are more likely to reach the higher echelons of the state machinery. The central role of a language means professional and bureaucratic employment opportunities, linked with tangible economic benefits. Thus, the introduction of the common language is a solution for the instrumental purpose of language, producing simultaneously inequality in the primordial aspect.

The interests of the state are usually complemented by market economy, playing a major role in power structures. In this domain the two characteristics surface again. Language is not used only as a neutral means of communication. Economic losses and gains are immediately reflected through the status of those beneficiaries, speakers of a certain language. In this way, language is viewed as a resource, knowledge of which may provide a privileged position. The economic policy is usually based on the understanding that monolingualism in a monolingual state is economical, a true one indeed. However, the other right claim, that multilingualism in multilingual states is economical, is usually substituted by the false hybrids of the two claims. The reason for this seems to belong to the primordial agenda, connected with linguistic groups. The same twofold scheme directing language interests seems to be true in other domains also.

The common language policy focuses on the aim of linguistic homogenisation (in reality there might be a linguistic conflict), based on three pillars: societal (it is usually based on majority), political (promoted by states) and economic (it is claimed to be cost-effective in business). For this purpose the state has chosen at least one language in the discharge of its duties, rejecting several others, and constraining economic opportunities for their speakers. In this way language has become highly politicised, being intimately connected to economic and social mobility, as Lo Bianco (1987, 1) stipulates: *In a world which is becoming more dependent on language, its skilled and proficient use is a*

key factor in economic and social opportunities. Language policies affect the identity of communities and patterns of participation living within the control of the state. And even if no official language policies are declared, this is also a form of policy, influencing negatively linguistically dominated groups, as the state's liberal *laissez-faire* policy benefits dominance.

The reasons for introducing the common language policy are the following (Mazrui 1996: 115-116, my summary, MR):

- to aid the consolidation of the national market (and the integrity of the state);
- to improve the characteristics of mass mobilisation and organisation of labor;
- to improve the dissemination of information;
- to contribute to effective social policies;
- to create counterhegemonies and transform foreign relations by establishing linguistic barriers against outside penetration;
- to retain national human resources and resist the outward flow of national expertise (brain drain).

However, in the context of modern government, one is restricted in the available options. Laitin (1996: 56-57) names the following constraints:

- the standard tasks performed by contemporary states involve significant contact with ordinary citizens, hence the need for effective communication along multilingual lines;
- international human rights standards are respected more than before;
- modern bureaucracies tend to self-interestedly resist policies promoting any form of language change.

The list above proves that the common language decision is inevitable, as de Varennes (1996) remarks: no government can afford to provide services and official documents in every language spoken on its territory, thus a state must necessarily restrict itself to the use of a limited number of languages in

its contacts with its citizens. *Most countries provide constitutional or legislative measures for an official language, or may proclaim a national language. This does not necessarily imply exclusive use by a state: there are sometimes, but not always, additional measures providing for some use of other languages by government institutions. A few states do not always clearly have a legislated or constitutional official language, though in effect by tradition, omission or by other measures, they recognise or permit the official use of only one language* (de Varennes 1996, 9). Thus, the common language policy is the underlying feature of the nation-building model.

This model is usually linked by powerful links to the language-spread model (so-called Languages of Wider Communication, LWCs) and to the minority-protection model. In relation to the first, the nation-building model often has to play second fiddle; in relation to the second, it can often do as it pleases. Thus while perfectly well founded in law, the nation-building model when combined with the common language principle may easily veer towards illegal discrimination and violation of human rights standards (de Varennes 1996). The origins of this are often primordial, with reference to national unity and territorial integrity. There may be three variants of how this functions:

1. the common language(s) with some other languages that enjoy some sort of functional freedom and legal protection;
2. the common language(s) with other languages that are not legally protected;
3. the common language used exclusively.

This last option, based on an assumed and false link between monolingual state policy and national unity, represents a die-hard phenomenon, as Phillipson et al. have shown (1994, 4-6).

Dua describes his model, fit for nation-building goals, in two works (1985 and 1989). The former one has the emphasis on the structure, however introducing also psychological characteristics, the latter, slightly modified version has several systemic elements, thus qualifying to the last group. In any case, Dua's model is different from others and worth of further studying.

Dua (1985) starts from the two clusters of problems that Fishman (1968) has pointed out: the question of national language as a unifying symbol and efficiency and instrumentality of communication and politico-geographic integration.

Typology of language problems includes language appearing as a symbol, language structure (writing, spelling, pronunciation, vocabulary, syntax, forms of discourse, problems of speech, language use and users, and language material).

Dua outlines the approach in terms of three systems - the resource system, the social system and the planning system, the elements of the systems and interrelationship between them and the interdependency between the systems, focusing on constraints. Four components of the language system: language divisions, functional allocation, language structure and language material. The first two components constitute grounds for resource constraints and the other two for production constraints. The patterns of language divisions can be characterised in terms of the number of language groups, their numerical strength and geographical distribution, and their socio-cultural, historical and

political situation within the speech community.

Functional allocation involves the distribution and control of the resources of knowledge, power and prestige and other socio-economic advantages associated with language. Language structure concerns the problem of creating, changing or adopting a writing system or carrying out orthographical reforms as well as expansion of vocabulary and technical terminology. The production of language materials is bound up with the levels of the development of a language, its use in different domains and policy matters regarding publication, production and promotion.

Four components which would be required to characterise any social system are in Dua's system the cybernetic capacities, the goals and objectives, the interdependence between various activities of the system and the participation of the subjects in acquiring knowledge, setting goals and conducting activities of planning. Cybernetic capacities include basic data (sociolinguistic situation, language problems, goals and objectives of planning, resources, modes and strategies of planning), functional relationship between the different types of it. The internal constituents of the planning system include actors, organisations, decision-making process and control mechanism, The external factors relate to time, scope and evaluation of planning. Four kinds of actors perform different functions in the planning action: preparation of the plan, decision-making in planning, execution of plans, control of planning activity. In addition, Dua recognizes public participation as an inherent constituent of his model.

6. Language spread

In the contemporary discussion language-spread policy utilizes models different from those in the minority protection and common language (nation-building) areas. Language-spread models have been so far neglected by language modelists at large. Cooper's (1989: 98) framework *What actors attempt to influence what behaviours of which people for what ends under what conditions by what means through what decision-making process with what effect?* regards language planning as a conscious and deliberate manipulation of the linguistic resources of a society to achieve certain educational, political and economic ends, assessed through the framework of functional adequacy, popular acceptance and the enhancement of democracy. Cooper reviews language planning as compound activity, enabling various approaches for the analysis, among these language planning as marketing, as the pursuit and maintenance of power, and as decision-making.

The most sophisticated model in this domain seems to be Phillipson's *Linguistic Imperialism* (1993), the phenomenon defined by Phillipson (1993) as the dominance of a language, asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between the language concerned and other languages. In this work post-colonial power patterns concerning the spread of English as LWC is depicted. Language planning as marketing has been developed by Phillipson (1992: 271) by classifying the arguments into three sets, relating to capacities (what language is), resources (what it has), and uses (functional, what language does). In addition to Phillipson, Ammon has provided useful checklist for the issues in (1995).

Several critical approaches (Tollefson 1991) tend to problematize language as a mechanism of social control by dominant elites; they stress that all language policies are ideological, although the ideology may not be apparent. According to him (ibid.), the dominant critical model in LPP over the past 20 years or so has been the historical-structural approach, which assumes

1. that all language plans and policies represent and reflect the sociopolitical and economic interests of majoritarian or dominant interests;
2. that these interests are often implicit and are enmeshed in hegemonic ideologies that serve to maintain the socioeconomic interests of ruling elites;
3. that such ideologies are reflected at all levels of society and in all institutions, whether government agencies, planning bodies, legislative or judicial bodies, school boards, or other entities;

4. that individuals are not free to choose the language(s) that they will be educated in or be able to use in specified domains, as all choices are constrained by systems that reinforce and reproduce the existing social order, which of course favor particular languages in particular contexts for particular sociopolitical ends favored by interested parties, usually dominant elites (or counter elites). It accords with a diffusion-of-English paradigm by Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1996), based on Tsuda (1994): and an, characterized by:

- capitalism
- science and technology
- modernization
- monolingualism
- ideological globalization and internationalization
- transnationalization
- Americanization and homogenization of world culture
- linguistic, cultural and media imperialism

However, even the most sophisticated models do not produce planned results, due to non-linearity. Jernudd (1991: 407-408) has drawn attention to this phenomena of nonlinearity in language planning and policy: *A common characteristic of all analytical and theoretical approaches to LPP thus far is that none offers a model that can predict the consequences of a particular policy or show a clear cause/effect relationship between particular policy types or configurations and observed outcomes.*

Language spread as *an increase, over time, in the proportion of a communication network that adopts a given language or language variety for a given communicative function* (Cooper 1982: 6) is the main criterion for one specific type of language policy models. The main constraint for such models is the acceptance of formal sovereignty of target societies, thus making direct penetration impossible. Thus, various tools of foreign policy are used for reaching the aims. Usually, promoting specific language interest as an ideology is a disguise for other, like political and economic interests rendering hegemony and influencing power distribution. The main feature here, due to the constraint deriving from sovereignty is the additive nature of promotion and marketing of the language concerned. Among the parameters of power Kachru (1986: 130) lists functional (wider access to scientific, technological, and cross-cultural domains of knowledge and interaction), attitudinal (symbolises neutrality, liberalism, status and progressivism), material (international mobility, economic gains and social status) parameters. Another feature of his scheme (ibid.) is pluricentricity, reflected in the nativization and acculturation of the language concerned.

Thus, language spread policy is defined in Ammon (Ed.) (1992) as comprising all endeavours, directed or supported by institutions of a state, which either aim at spreading a language beyond its present area and domains or which aim at preventing the retraction of a language from its present area and domains. Phillipson (1992: 273ff.) has made use of Galtung's three types of power to show how the structure of language spread is established through negotiation, constitution and affirmation. Innate power, deriving from exceptional qualities, permitting the power sender to influence receivers, establishing unequal power distribution. Language-extrinsic arguments contain material resources and immaterial resources, convertible to each other. The third type of argument refers to what language spread object does. The functions carried out through the language concerned reflect the structural power of the position of the language in the hierarchy of languages. Phillipson (1992: 287) has observed that *claiming that the expanding language is neutral (a tool, an instrument) involves a disconnection between what English is (culture) from its structural basis (from what it has or does). It disconnects the means from ends or purposes, from what the language has been used for.*

7. Language policy options

In the case of multilingual environment, a state has to provide a rationalization strategy. The strategy adopted has to solve two issues, firstly, designate the common language(s), and secondly, find the solution for other, minority languages. Concerning this last aspect, Cobarrubias (1983) has clarified the options by elaborating a **taxonomy of state policies** directed towards minority languages:

- attempting to kill a language;
- letting a language die;
- unsupported coexistence;
- partial support of specific language functions;
- adoption as an official language.

The last two accord with the first option for the common language(s), providing breathing space also for (some) other languages. The fourth (partial support) and the fifth (recognition as an official language) provide maintenance (not necessarily sufficient) for a minority language and enable legal

coexistence together with the official language. In all the cases one deals with the phenomena emerging from **linguistic imperialism**, defined by Phillipson (1993) as the dominance of a language, asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between the language concerned and other languages.

8. Implementation strategies

The relationship between the nation-building and minority-protection models can be seen in the implementation of specific strategies for action. There are two different, largely incompatible sets of strategies: one that introduces the exclusive use of the common language, constrains and ousts other languages; the other set of strategies is based on managed cooperation between the state-promoted common language and minority languages. McGarry & O Leary (1993, 4) present a taxonomy of the practical macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation (covering both conflict termination and conflict management), that we shall apply below to various related language situations deriving from NB-MP relationship.

The political strategies which seek to introduce the common language usage pattern by eliminating ethnic differences, at least within a given state, are genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition, secession (self-determination), integration and/or assimilation. Of these there are moral justifications for

partition/secession and arguments for integration. Such linguicidal methods as forced population transfers and genocide are explicitly prohibited in international law and thus fall outside our particular concerns. The methods for managing the coexistence of the official language and minority languages are hegemonic control, arbitration (third-party intervention), cantonisation or federalisation and consociationalism or power-sharing (Ibid.). Partition, secession, cantonisation and federalisation may lead to the introduction of the principle of the territoriality of language, while the personal principle is manifested through assimilation/integration.

The democratic solutions of "getting rid" of minority languages that are based on the territorial principle

are those of partition, self-determination and secession (cf. Czechoslovakia, Bangladesh), and compatible with the standards of linguistic human rights. However such outcomes may themselves derive from reactions to the absence of linguistic human rights and other civic freedoms, from situations of linguistic or cultural discrimination, where the implementation of the right to self-determination is the only way out (McGarry and O Leary, Ibid.).

Linguistic integration, concurrent with assimilation is built upon the idea of rearranging the linguistic identity of the relevant ethnic communities into a new identity, along with proficiency in the common language. This follows the personal principle. Depending on the methods used, with the identity immersed or submerged in the majoritarian language, the result may be either integration or assimilation, the last one definitely in conflict with linguistic human rights standards. The other differentiating factor may be the functional allocation of languages, which is denied in assimilation. Linguistic assimilation in the homelands of indigenous speakers means the destruction of a local culture, language, and sometimes, religion. By contrast, integration is in full accord with linguistic human rights, though achieving this may be accompanied by some coercive measures, like compulsory education. De Varennes (1996, 297) has clarified this issue: *...A state has an obligation to ensure that teaching of a national language is always provided, at least as a second language in all schools, if it is to respect the non-discrimination principle. This has been shown and acknowledged to be necessary in order not to create a de facto segregation between members of various language communities within a country, as well as being confirmed in the Belgian Linguistic Case. The dangers of state education confining individuals in a linguistic ghetto, unable to accede high echelons of activities in the greater national community because of their never having been granted the possibility of learning the national language, has occurred in the past and would in every situation constitute discrimination on the basis of language.*

The main problem seems to be in the actual and timely differentiation of integration and assimilation. The same educational system that produced the benefits of integration to parents may bring along assimilation to their children. Thus, it may be necessary to introduce methods of partial segregation in education (e.g language shelter programs) and neighbourhood, in order to avoid complete assimilation.

Of the coexistence strategies for the official and minority languages the most common system practised in multilingual states (cf. the Soviet Union) is a concept of hegemonic control (see Lustick, 1979), based on coercive domination and elite co-option. Lustick provides the following criteria: resources are allocated according to the dominant group's interest as perceived and articulated by its elite. Thus, the dominant group extracts what it needs and delivers what it sees fit, with no hard

bargaining taking place, as the official regime, or state apparatus, acts as the administrative instrument of the dominant group. The existing political order is legitimated by the ideology of the dominant group. Hegemonic control need not rest, although it often does, on the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community, as it is sufficient to control the relevant coercive apparatuses. In multilingual states, it also prescribes the form of language policy. However, hegemonic control itself need not require any assimilationist steps to be taken toward other languages, as the main goal is in the maintenance of stability through hegemony.

Arbitration and mediation in ethnic and linguistic issues are more common in international relations. Usually it is a matter of conflict regulation where a neutral third-party intervention is necessary. Arbitration is distinguishable from mediation because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate them. Arbitration and mediation are of two broad types, the internal (various types of Ombudsman and tribunals in addition to the Court) and the external (popular for border disputes). External arbitration and mediation are used when the conflict cannot be successfully managed within the relevant political system and the solution must be proposed from outside. Mediation has become increasingly popular, with a wealth of institutions operating internally (various round tables, ad hoc mediation groups and Commissioners) and externally (the High Commissioner on National Minorities within the OSCE, the CBSS Human Rights Commissioner, the UN Human Rights Committee, etc.). Problems may arise in the wider arena of high-level diplomacy, making the observance of neutrality in decision-making enormously difficult.

The last two strategies, cantonisation and/or federalisation (Switzerland) and consociationalism or power-sharing (Lebanon) are fully compatible with linguistic human rights. Under cantonisation the relevant multi-ethnic state is subjected to a micro-partition in which political power is devolved to (conceivably very small) political units, each of which enjoys mini-sovereignty. Federalism is similar, with the units usually much larger than cantons. Federalism is based on a federal society, requiring the boundaries between the components of the federation to match the boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious or linguistic communities.

Principles of power-sharing and consociation operate at the level of an entire state, or within a region of a state. Lijphart (1977, quoted in McGarry & O Leary 1993, 35) has provided four features for consociational democracies:

- 1 a grand coalition government representing the main segments of the divided society;
- 2 proportional representation, employment and expenditure rules apply throughout the public sector;
- 3 community autonomy norms operate under which ethnic communities have self-government over those matters of most profound concern to them;
- 4 constitutional vetoes for minorities.

As it seems, the democratically acceptable methods of management either separate the domains of ethnolinguistic interest or demand consensus, which may easily lead to Hobbesian thinking that any solution is better than none. As a result, the solutions achieved might be economically ineffective, further deepening the schism between various linguistic interests. However, such policies provide conditions for language maintenance, with the space for developments controlled by the speakers themselves.

6. Acquisition planning

Acquisition planning as a part of general language planning has its own foci, on which the effectiveness is dependent. These are the following:

- type of educational programme;
- amount of learning;
- other factors.

Below we are going to review these basic criteria in detail.

1. Educational programmes

The effectiveness of acquisition planning on macro scale is dependent on the suitability to the target group of learners of the educational programmes used. Here we have used the division of educational programmes proposed by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990), based on the following criteria: numerical strength (majority/minority), access to power (mass/elite) and language of instruction (mother tongue/second or foreign language) and linguistic (bilingualism, or dominance in one of the languages, either L1 or L2) societal goals (taking into account the interest of the group concerned or not).

1. Submersion programme

According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) **submersion programme** is a programme:

- for non-elite children with a low-status mother tongue different from that of the elite
- instruction conducted through the medium of a foreign or second majority language with high status,
- classes with some children as native speakers of the language of instruction, and some not,
- the teacher does not understand the mother tongue of the minority children.

This programme results in subtractive language learning where the language of the elite constitutes a threat to the non-elite children's mother tongue (MT), which runs the risk of being displaced or replaced (MT is not being learned (properly)). According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) this is the most common - and most disastrous - method in the present world for educating minority children.

Africa (1980) has depicted submersion for a non-elite majority as education through the medium of a former colonial language, producing academically and linguistically poor results. The linguistic goal achieved is dominance in foreign language for the elite, and, for the masses, dominance in their mother tongues together with limited proficiency in elite language.

Submersion programmes are still by far the most common way of educating both indigenous and immigrant minorities in most countries in the world, as shown by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990). Societally this means assimilation for some (depending on whether the country in question allows assimilation or not) and marginalisation for the many.

2. Transitional programme

According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) a transitional programme is a programme:

- for linguistic minority children with a low-status mother tongue,
- initial instruction through the medium of their mother tongue for a few years,
- mother tongue is used only in order for the children to learn the majority language better,
- on the satisfactory oral level in the majority language orally, children are transferred to a majority language medium programme.

A transitional programme is a more sophisticated version of submersion programmes (Skutnabb-Kangas 1984: 125-133, 1990).

3. Immersion programme

An immersion programme is a programme

- for linguistic majority children with a high-status mother tongue,
- based on voluntary choice (among existing alternatives),
- instruction through the medium of a foreign (minority) language,
- classes with majority children with the same mother tongue only,
- the teacher is bilingual so that the children in the beginning can use their own language, and where their mother tongue is in no danger of not developing or of being replaced by the language of instruction (additive language learning situation).

Immersion programmes (Lambert 1972, Swain and Lapkin 1982) for majority children through the medium of an L2 (Lambert and Taylor 1982) lead to high levels of bilingualism and success at school (Swain and Lapkin 1982). The societal goals include linguistic and cultural enrichment for the powerful majority, and increased employment prospects and other benefits for an elite (Skutnabb-Kangas 1990).

4. Language shelter programme

According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) language shelter programme or maintenance programme is a programme:

- for linguistic minority children with a low-status mother tongue
- based on voluntary choice (among existing alternatives),
- instruction through the medium of their own mother tongue,
- classes with minority children with the same mother tongue only,
- the teacher is bilingual and where they get good teaching in the majority language as a second/foreign language, also given by a bilingual teacher.

Language shelter programmes or mother tongue maintenance programmes show high levels of success

thanks to the linguistic goals (bilingualism) and societal goals (equity and integration).

5. Segregation programme

According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) segregation programme is a programme:

- for linguistic minority children with a low-status mother tongue,
- no choice,
- instruction through the medium of their own mother tongue,
- classes with minority children (with the same mother tongue) only,
- the teacher may be monolingual or bilingual but is often poorly trained
- discriminative economic and financial constraints in education (the class/school has poorer facilities and fewer resources than classes/schools for dominant group children),
- the teaching of the dominant language as a second/foreign language is poor or non-existent.

The main linguistic goal is satisfactory (i.e. poor) knowledge of L2, combined with the societal goal of non-equity, thus it provides the same results for dominated groups, while the numerical majority or minority position is insignificant (Skutnabb-Kangas 1990). Tailored for a mass (powerless majority), segregation programmes produce poor results, meaning scholastic failure for the majority of those who start school and low levels of cognitive/academic proficiency (see Cummins 1984) in both languages. This fits with the linguistic goal, dominance in L1, (with enough L2 for low-level jobs and administrative control but ideally not for high-level cooperation between different linguistic groups) and the societal goal, perpetuation of status quo. The same applies for a minority in this educational programme, resulting in low levels of success.

2. Amount of language learning

Amount of learning may be determined in two ways. Van Els (1993: 6) tackles the problem of language competence:

There seems to be general agreement that a description of language proficiency in terms of categories and numbers of words and morphological features is inadequate, and that the preferred way should be one in terms of notional-functional categories, starting from language use situations.

Sajavaara (1993: 34) emphasizes communicative satisfaction as a goal, with interactants having reached a state where they are satisfied with the result of their interactional endeavours. The traditional way implies the number of language lessons conducted. This method has proved suitable for comparing of language learning among peer groups in comparable conditions, for example, foreign language learning (cf. van Els 1994).

However, this idea can't be used in the situation where languages do not share the same position in language policy models (minority vs. national language or national language vs. LWC) or if these models differ (nation-building, language spread or minority protection).

The second method overcomes the difficulty by providing flexibility and indirect measurement technique. This may be deduced from the idea elaborated by Grin (1995), based on the profit obtained from language in the framework of cost-benefit system. Initially, as a rule costs exceed by far the benefits obtained from the acquisition of the basics of language. During the learning process the benefits increase and may bypass costs at the certain point. This means that enlarging one's language competence is profitable and presumably needs no outside encouragement for continuation. This puts for the authority responsible for language acquisition planning forward a double challenge, first to create linguistic environment with the minimal length of the acquisition process beyond the point where profit from language acquisition is obtained, and second, use power (resource, structural, etc.) to aid and smooth up acquisition process. This method enables to specify. Thus, the second method measures language learning through measuring results instead of factors engaged in acquisition process.

3. Other factors

1. Motivation and orientation

Social-psychological theory of language learning (Lambert et al. 1970: 473) holds that *an individual successfully acquiring a second language gradually adopts various aspects of behaviour which characterise members of another linguistic-cultural group. The learner's ethnocentric tendencies and attitudes toward the other group are believed to determine learner's success in learning the new language. One's motivation to learn is thought to be determined by one's attitudes and orientation toward*

learning a second language.

The theory distinguishes two types of orientation (ibid.: 473-474): *The orientation is instrumental in form if the purposes of language study reflect the more utilitarian value of linguistic achievement, such as getting ahead in one's occupation, and is integrative if the student is oriented to learn more about the other cultural community as if he desired to become a potential member of the other group.*

The proper orientation toward the other group is developed within the family. The integrative motive is not due to having more experience with the language concerned at home but more likely stems from a family-wide attitudinal disposition (ibid.:475).

According to Skutnabb-Kangas (1990), there are two antagonistic groups of theories in minority education: deficit and cultural enrichment theories. **Deficit theories** are based on the basis that there is something wrong either with the minority child (L2-related handicap, the child does not know enough of the majority language), the minority parents (socially conditioned handicap - the parents are working class or peasants), the whole minority group (culturally conditioned handicap, the child's cultural background is "different"), or all of these (L1-related handicap, the child does not know her own language and culture properly, and this leaves her without a firm basis for L2-learning, and gives her poor self-confidence). To a small extent there may also be something lacking in majority individuals (not systems), peers and teachers who may discriminate, because they have not had enough information about minorities (Skutnabb-Kangas 1990). The goal is to reach competence in majority language fast, but as long as the children still speak their original mother tongue, the school should help them to appreciate it.

The **enrichment theories** stress that schools should be adapted to the children, not vice versa. The child's mother tongue and cultural and social background should be a positive starting point for the school. The existence of minorities is seen as costly but enriching for societies, and bilingualism/biculturalism is seen as beneficial and stimulating for the child. If minority children experience problems in school, these may be due to the extra work involved, or to either similar reasons as for monolingual children, or these reasons and racism, linguicism and discrimination.

There seem to be some exceptions to the overall picture. First, the children belonging to the temporally immigrated families of elites, like diplomats, international businesspeople and civil servants, etc (Baetens Beardsmore 1995), and labour migrants who have set up their own schools often at their own expense and administration. The last group that enjoys the best protected educational rights are present or former power minorities (elites, like white South Africans, or Swedish-speakers in Finland, a former power minority, or descendants of former colonisers).

2. Programme organisation

Programme organisation foresees the creation of optimal conditions for efficient L2-learning and bilingualism. The preconditions for learning L2 effectively and for becoming bilingual have been grouped by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) into four categories: organisational factors, learner-related affective factors, and linguistic, cognitive, pedagogical and social L1-related and L2-related factors, respectively. Organisational factors have the main impact in education. **Alternative programmes** are only available in maintenance and immersion contexts. These programmes are optional. By contrast, children in segregation or submersion programmes have no choice. The **composition of the class**, whether there are in the same class both native speakers of the medium of education (ME) and pupils for whom the ME is an L2. This is a normal situation in submersion programmes, disadvantaging the L2-learners. In all the other programmes pupils are, in relation to prior familiarity with the ME, on an equal footing in that initially either they all know the language of instruction (segregation and maintenance) or none of them do (immersion).

3. Other factors

Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) provides also other significant markers in the case of minority education. First it concerns the **quality of teachers**, who should be both bilingual and well trained. In immersion programmes, the bilingual teacher understands everything in L1, even if one only speaks L2 to the children. Thus the children can communicate all their needs to the teacher initially in their L1, and only later start doing so in L2 when they feel confident enough. Bilingual teachers are a must in second language contexts, where the pupil hears L2 outside school anyway. Especially in relation to small children, it is psychological torture to use monolingual teachers who do not understand what the child wants to say in L1. It also implies the availability of **bilingual materials**.

The learner-related affective factors suggest a **supportive learning environment** and non-authoritarian teaching to reduce anxiety. **Internal motivation** is increased when the pupil is not forced to use L2, and can start producing L2 utterances only when she feels ready for it. The need for a "silent period" before having to produce anything in the new language has been stressed by many researchers. Again this

emphasizes the importance of bilingual teachers, as the child is being forced to use L2 if the teacher does not understand the child's L1. High motivation is also related to an understanding of and sympathy with the educational objectives and to sharing in responsibility for one's own learning (which is difficult without bilingual materials, for instance dictionaries). **High self-confidence** is related to whether learners have a real chance of succeeding in school, and to favourable teacher expectations. One of the conditions for this is that the teacher accepts and values the child's mother tongue and cultural group, and is sympathetic with the parents' way of thinking, even though the teacher might have a different class background from the parents. The importance of affective factors has been highlighted during the last two decades (see work by Krashen and others, e.g. Krashen 1981) and new approaches to second language learning have developed (e.g. Lozanov's suggestopedia). There is a positive correlation between a plus-rating on these three factors (low anxiety, high motivation and high self-confidence) and the successful programmes.

Linguistic, cognitive, pedagogical and social language-related factors should also not be underestimated.

Linguistic development in L1 is inadequate when the MT is taught badly, as in most segregation programmes, or not at all, as in most submersion programmes. It should also be mentioned that a couple of hours a week of mother tongue instruction for a minority child is not language teaching (as shown in, for instance, Källström 1988). It may give the child some emotional security and a chance to talk about problems with an adult who speaks the same language. It looks as if the school is doing something when mother tongue teaching is provided, but the time is much too short for any serious language work to be done. Often problems with time-tables, space, insecure mother tongue teacher employment terms, etc further reduce the actual time for teaching. There are teachers who have lessons in a dozen schools or more. This type of mother tongue teaching does not prevent language shift from a minority mother tongue to the majority language in an assimilationist context.

Another factor is **cognitively demanding subject matter** to promote the common underlying proficiency for all languages (see Cummins 1984, Skutnabb-Kangas 1984). This is done through the medium of L1 in maintenance and through L2 in immersion programmes (where it is made sure that the children understand, and where it has been shown that they can transfer the knowledge - see Swain & Lapkin 1982). The input may satisfy this criterion in some segregation programmes, because the pupils at least understand the instruction. With submersion, when both language and subject matter are unfamiliar, it is less likely (for details see Skutnabb-Kangas 1984). If the child learns how to use language as an effective instrument for thinking and problem-solving in one language (by getting a lot of relevant knowledge and using it), this capacity can also be transferred to other languages.

In addition to L1-development in school, pupils also need **the opportunity to develop their MTs outside school in linguistically demanding formal contexts**. Otherwise they are restricted to being able to discuss everyday things in informal settings only. This opportunity exists at least to a certain extent for all indigenous groups, but not for immigrants. Some groups may therefore be able to compensate for inadequate school provision outside the school setting. A more general factor which influences whether the language learning situation is additive (Lambert 1975) or subtractive, is the degree to which **L2-teaching supports or harms L1-development**. Only submersion programmes threaten the MTs in this way.

Linguistic development in L2 is inadequate when the L2 is badly taught. A good L2-teacher knows both languages and can teach contrastively. Also relevant is the adaptation of L2-input to pupils' L2 level.

Absence of the **opportunity to practise the L2 in peer group contexts outside school** may be due to practicalities (immersion children do not meet many L2 children), or to a shortage of L2 native speakers.

Exposure to native speaker L2 use in linguistically demanding formal contexts depends on the existence of L2 institutions staffed by native L2 speakers. This exposure may have been the most decisive single factor in immigrant contexts explaining why some children have succeeded, against all odds. Skutnabb-Kangas (1995: 12-14) has provided principles for multilingualism through education:

1. *Support (= use as the main medium of education, at least during the first 8 years) the language which is least likely to develop up to a high formal level.*
2. *Group the children initially together with children with the same L1. No mixed groups initially, and especially not in cognitively demanding decontextualised subjects.*
3. *ALL children are to become high level bilinguals, not only minority children.*
4. *All children have to be equalized vis-a-vis their knowledge of the language of instruction and the status of their mother tongues:
A All children know the language of instruction
B No children know the language of instruction
C All children alternate between "knowing" and "not knowing" the language of instruction*
5. *All teachers have to be multilingual or minimally bilingual.*
6. *Foreign languages should be taught through the medium of the children's mother tongue and/or by teachers who know the children's mother tongue.*
7. *All children must study both L1 and L2 as compulsory subjects through 1-12.*

8. Both languages have to be used as media of education in some phase of the children's education, but the progression is different for minority and majority children.

7. Language-related aspects of international law

1. Introduction

In this sub-chapter we attempt to clarify some concepts of international law directly influencing language planning and policy. In this aspect international law behaves as a constraint and corrective in the linguistic domain. The issues analysed here are: linguistic legislation and language rights, linguistic human rights included, occupation and citizenship.

2. Linguistic legislation

Hamel (1977:2ff) notes that linguistic legislation typically emerges as a necessity to protect the rights of one language group against another when a linguistic group sees its language menaced by some other language(s) - or rather by their speakers - within the same national territory. Most of the time the claim for linguistic rights and their legislation seeks to grant at least some of the support and conditions for survival to subordinate languages that dominant languages naturally enjoy.

According to Turi (1994: 6), linguistic coexistence, based on contacts among various languages may create problems and conflicts. States therefore establish legal standards with respect to the official or public use of languages (legislation, justice, public administration or education) and less often in private use of language (culture, communications, labour, trade and business). As no state is required to know all the languages of its citizens and other residents, they ensure a degree of order and thereby assign priority to one or a few languages in order to guarantee a minimum of linguistic comprehensibility in various territorial contexts.

The language policy of the states may take the form of legislation containing language rights, obligations and constraints created for this purpose. Turi (1994: 7-9) has provided the general principles of linguistic legislation:

- law takes over what is legally definable;
- language legislators take action either to protect and promote linguistic majorities or linguistic minorities;
- language legislators legislate mainly with regard to the written language;
- most often, language legislators are concerned with the quantity or presence of languages (their status);
- language legislators are usually concerned with form and not with content;
- the most important fields are instruction and communications;
- language laws apply both to languages and their users.

Legislation on the status of languages is known as **structural** language legislation, legislation concerned with the use as well is called **functional** language legislation. The last type may be divided into the various categories of functional linguistic legislation, depending on their areas of application and on their functions. The most common, **official** language legislation applies only to areas of the official usage of languages, while **institutional** language legislation is concerned with the non-official area of language usage. **Standardizing** language legislation governs the official standardisation of certain technical terms and expressions, **identifying** language legislation identifies one or more languages. **Majority** language legislation protects mainly or solely linguistic majorities and their languages, **minority** language legislation (historical) linguistic minorities and their languages. Legislation without real sanctions may be called **declaratory** or **non-binding**, and with sanctions **enforceable** or **binding**. **Liberal**, or **non-discriminatory** language legislation recognizes the right to the language, while **non-liberal**, or **discriminatory** language legislation does not do so. The law defines the domains where the official language is to be used. All the other domains are to remain untouched.

3. Linguistic human rights

States that represent the nation-building interest, have obligations vis-a-vis their citizens and residents concerning languages. These obligations are firmly rooted in linguistic human rights, providing

standards for the use and acquisition of languages, as regards minority and national languages. These rights may be found in domestic as well as international law. Language has belonged to the periphery of the contemporary human rights paradigm, gaining prominence only during the last decade (cf. Giordan (1991), de Varennes (1996), Stavenhagen (1988), Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1989, 1994).

The more general human rights instruments usually mention language only in passing, usually confirming non-discrimination on the grounds of language. The principal thrust in this case is to provide equality of treatment. The protection from discrimination on the grounds of language is seen in the wider context of the raising of these standards of protection of all human beings. Everyone is protected from linguistic discrimination by, on the one hand, general human rights instruments containing such anti-discrimination clauses, and, on the other hand, instruments specifically designed to protect from discrimination. The problem with these lies in their vagueness, that enables effectively to ignore these. From all of the international human rights protection systems available, only European one provides a mechanism for thorough litigation and thus, further clarification.

Linguistic human rights have several specific features, like an explicit **power dimension**. As Hamel (1997:7) says: *Gaining rights, access and the resources to implement such rights, however, is usually a threat to an existing status quo. Certain rights to something are at the same time rights against something or someone, such as the privileges of dominant groups.*

Hamel (1997b: 123) has also stressed **collective dimension**: *While fundamental rights can be enjoyed by the individual and only have to be granted by the state, the cultural right to use a specific language requires the existence of a community (Braën 1987, Turi 1993). If a linguistic minority wants to have their linguistic rights extended beyond the level of tolerance in private domains, a specific initiative or intervention of the state is necessary in order to create the conditions for this right to be exercised in certain institutional contexts, such as education.*

Freedom of choice is often considered as being detrimental to linguistic minorities.. Such non-intervention in language matters is favourable to the dominant language in the existing language competition (Maurais 1997:144).

In most cases, international law does not deal with languages directly, but regards them as

- 1) markers of identity and dignity
- 2) of persons belonging to a specific group,
- 3) expressed in various language functional domains.

This enables us to use three approaches in clarifying the concept of language rights. The most traditional one is based on the target groups, the second on human rights principles, and the third on functional domains of language within society. There are three main threatened groups, which commonly represent linguistic characteristics different from their environments: linguistic minorities, aliens and indigenous peoples. Usually they are politically and economically disadvantaged and subjected to acculturation pressures and social discrimination. Although international law recognises collective rights, all the linguistic rights are attached to individuals, so persons belonging to these may enjoy these rights in community with others. The second approach, used largely by de Varennes (1996), is based on universal human rights principles of non-discrimination, freedom of expression and minority protection.

According to Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994, 71), linguistic human rights may be regarded as essentially covering two rights: the right to learn an official language in the country of residence, in its standard form, and the right to one's mother tongue: *International human rights instruments regard linguistic human rights in relation to the mother tongue(s) as consisting of the right to identify with it/them, and to education and public services through the medium of it/them, whereas mother tongues are defined as 'the language(s) one has learned first and identifies with'.*

The second distinction concerns whether these rights should be collective, to be enjoyed by the minorities as groups, or individual, to be enjoyed by the individual member of the group (Lerner 1991). The main practical concern has to do with the implications for individuals upon whom duties will be imposed in the name of group rights that might be detrimental to their well-being. Individual language rights include the right not to suffer undue interference and discrimination.

According to Coulombe (1993), this means the right to speak any language at home and on the streets and to use it in private correspondence, to keep native names and surnames, to use it within one's cultural and religious institutions, including newspapers, radio stations and community centres, etc. However, the respect for individual rights does not serve to heal collective social disparities, as individual rights derive from the individual's personal capacity and appear to be insufficient to sustain vulnerable languages.

Collective language rights protect language group membership and its identity, based on an individual's membership in a given community. Coulombe (1993, 146-148) distinguishes two kinds of

collective language rights: the right to sustain one's language and the right to live in one's language. In the first case the State's duties might include public funding for minority language schools, governmental services in the minority language, or even affirmative action programs for the hiring of members of the linguistic minority in the public services. The second case would require that one's language be used and understood in a variety of everyday situations, both private and public. The distinction between these two seems to be at the level of the participation of the majority and the obligations of the State concerning minority maintenance. Most of the language rights have to be connected to territorially-based linguistic communities that are above a certain critical number, as they are not transportable. These communities themselves have to fulfill certain socio-economic, demographic and linguistic conditions. The distinctive feature of a group right is that it does not take into account the respective sizes of the right-holder and duty-holder, for example majority and minority.

However, there is no right to the continued survival of a linguistic group, as there is no basis for preferring its vital interests to those of a comparable group. Instead, Réaume (1994, 30) suggests the right to linguistic security, based on two key processes. One is the socialisation of children into the language through the child's extended family and kinship group and the public educational system (comparable to Fishman's (1991) intergenerational language transmission). The second is the range of contexts for use of the language, which must be sufficiently rich to sustain the complexity that contributes to future development (the issue of language domains). The right to linguistic security can be understood as the right to pursue the normal processes of language transmission and maintenance without interference. This would preclude any attempt to prohibit use of the language in the normal range of contexts or to prohibit the education of children of the group in the language. A collective right to linguistic security would impose duties on other groups not to use numerical superiority or political dominance to prohibit the use of a minority language. With two or more languages sharing social structures, there is a threat by organising social institutions to suit majority practices exclusively (though it may be advertised as the common language policy with a purely instrumental goal), like the public school system or governmental structures. In order to avoid such an outcome, a fair compromise, based on the principles of minority protection, should be found. Contemporary international law provides the space for introducing fair and acceptable solutions for the maintenance and management of minority languages only in the case of goodwill of the State. However most of the principles in international law are insufficient to require that. They either belong to soft law, are too implicit, or deal mostly with individual rights, and establish the ultimate limit to minority protection to the detriment of the majority language.

1. Human rights systems

There are three main systems of international legal instruments dealing with the linguistic minority protection: UN, Council of Europe and OSCE (for exhaustive coverage, see Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994), de Varennes (1996), Skutnabb-Kangas (1997)).

The practical task of protecting human rights is primarily the responsibility for each state. At the national level, rights can be best protected through adequate legislation, an independent judiciary, the enactment and enforcement of individual safeguards and remedies, and the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions. National human rights institutions must be a body established in the Constitution or by law to perform particular functions: educational and promotional activities, the provisions of advice to governments on human rights matters, and the investigation and resolution of complaints of violations committed by public entities. The formulation of the principles relating to the status of national institutions, endorsed by the General Assembly in 1993. The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirmed this in the same year and called upon governments to strengthen such bodies.

At international level, the task could not or would not be assumed by only one organisation. Promotion and protection of human rights is based on multi-level system. The international system relies heavily on the support it receives from regional human rights systems such as those operating in Africa, the Americas and Europe. Regional human rights systems have played an important complementary role in reinforcing international standards and machinery by providing the means by which human rights concerns can be addressed within the particular social, historical and political context of the region concerned (NHRI 1995: 3). Strong and effective national institutions can contribute substantially to the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Concerned community and non-governmental organisations play a special role in the development of a universal culture of human rights. Non-governmental organisations by their very nature have a freedom of expression, a flexibility of action and a liberty of movement which, in certain circumstances, allow them to perform tasks which governments and intergovernmental organisations

are unable or even unwilling to perform (NHRI 1995: 3).

Due to the large variety of language situations, the UN has been implicit on this point. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989 and having so far most ratifications, mentions the maintenance of identity including nationality and name, as a duty of state. The articles concerning protection of child's different ethnic background, do not go further from traditional clauses, except Article 30, which includes indigenous children and uses non-sexist language.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted in 1992, decrees that the states shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity, making the states responsible for adoption of appropriate legislative and other measures in order to achieve those ends. States are called to take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs. However, when it comes to linguistic rights in education, not much and explicit is required: persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.

The European human rights system is based on the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in 1950 and in force since 1953. The only human right providing linguistic protection is guaranteed in Art. 2 of the first protocol, granting the right to education. The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted it as the right of subjects to avail themselves of the means of instruction available at a given time, and not to have any particular type of education established. The European Court also stated that this right would be meaningless if it did not imply ... the right to be educated in the national language, or in one of the national languages (the Belgian Linguistic Case). This appears to give the state the right to decide what languages education should be offered in. The European Court added that for the right to education to be effective, it is also necessary that the individual who is the beneficiary should have the possibility of drawing profit from the education received. This is specified as *meaning the right to obtain ... official recognition of the studies ... completed*, i.e. the right to credentials (Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson 1994:86).

In addition to the traditional non-discrimination clauses, the European human rights system has acquired considerably more powerful instruments for minority protection during recent years. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was adopted in 1992 is a comprehensive document on the use of language in education, public services, media, cultural, economic and social life. Each state can specify which minority languages it wants to apply the Charter to. The languages of migrants are explicitly excluded. The formulations enable to limit the application to minute improvements with the escape clauses available (RP, TSK 1994).

According to the decision of the Vienna Summit in October 1993 the text of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was prepared and agreed unanimously in November 1994. The text is accompanied by a substantial Explanatory Report. The Convention stipulates that the protection of national does not fall within the reserved domain of the states. Language is one of the central themes of the document, articles 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 deal primarily with these matters. The inherent weakness of the document is the failure to define the term "national minority". Escape clauses figure prominently in the more detailed provisions for language, especially in education (Articles 12 - 14), using the clauses "where appropriate", "within the framework of their educational systems". The Convention clarifies also that the exercise of the educational right shall not entail any financial obligation for the states.

The Final Act of the CSCE from 1975 contained only a limited reference (Principle X in the Declaration of Principles) to the issue of minorities that can be interpreted as providing implicit guidelines for language policies, based on equality before the law, full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and protection of legitimate interests of persons belonging to national minorities.

The Vienna Final Document from 1989 makes two explicit references to the rights of national minorities. The section on cooperation and exchange of cultural activities article 59 allows the members of national minorities to preserve and develop their own culture in all aspects, including language, literature and religion. In the section concerning education, article 68 ensures the right to members of national minorities to impart and receive education about their own culture, including education in the form of the parents' communication of language, religion and cultural identity to their children.

Due to the end of the Cold War the CSCE reflects a gradually increased interest in the question of minorities. In Vienna Meeting in 1989 it was decided to hold a series of conferences on the Human

Dimension, consequently held in Paris in 1989, in Copenhagen in 1990 and in Moscow in 1991.

The most important instrument of minority protection in this system is the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), that states unambiguously that national minorities should have the right to maintain their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, the right to seek voluntary and public assistance to do so in educational institutions, and non-assimilation against their will. The Copenhagen Document goes into more detail in specifying how national minorities should be protected. However, by avoiding the definition of the term "minority" and having no legal value for judicial system, it leaves the door open for different interpretations and possible creation of double standards.

The thrust of the CSCE (OSCE) concerning linguistic human rights has always been on the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Thus the scope of the linguistic rights has been limited by the notion of *national minority*. Johannessen, Hvenegård-Lassen (1992: 6): the CSCE-process operates exclusively with the term "national minorities". Thus it holds implicitly the notion of a nationality living in a well defined territory, which for some historic reason is theirs, but is placed within the borders of a state, governed by a different nationality. The term would not however, apply for the migrant workers, the refugees, the gypsies and the Jews (in Diaspora) and deported groups not living in "their own" territory.

In comparison, the UN-concept, operating with ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, is much broader than the CSCE-concept (Johannessen, Hvenegård-Lassen 1992: 6)

Though Part I Number 31 Paragraph 2 of the Copenhagen Document, which reads as follows: *The participating states will adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose of ensuring to persons belonging to national minorities full equality with the other citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms* might be regarded as providing the clue for interpretation, according to which members of national minorities should be citizens of the state concerned, several international lawyers (Weiss, Blumenwitz, referred to in Geistlinger 1995) have cast doubt on this sole argument.

The most significant step in the OSCE framework has been taken by the HCNM, in making available the **Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note**, October 1996, The Hague (for the use of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoep). These guidelines were worked out by a small group of experts on human rights and education (including TSK). They represent an interpretation of present human rights standards.

The recommendations are based on several basic human rights and freedoms. These are the following (Sieminski 1997: 5):

- the right of everyone to education (Article 13 of the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights);
- the right of individuals and bodies to establish private teaching institutions (Article 29.2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child);
- freedom from discrimination (Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
- the right to belong to a minority (Article 27 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
- freedom of assembly (Article 21 of the CCPR)
- the right to participate in public affairs (Article 25 of the CCPR)
- minority education related provisions of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National minorities of the Council of Europe and the Copenhagen Document of the OSCE.

The right to education is dealt with in general terms. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to national or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, article 4.3 stipulates that *States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.*

Article 30 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child only refers to the right of a child belonging to a minority to use his or her language in community with other members of the minority

Article 34 of the OSCE's Copenhagen document stipulates that the participating States will endeavour to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities... will have adequate opportunities for instruction of their mother tongue or in their mother tongue. Article 14 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe proclaims this right in a similar fashion.

Being implicit enables an extensive range of interpretations. The reason for such a general formulation is the need of the minority rights formulations to be as inclusive and as universal as possible, based on realistic grounds, providing flexibility for the states adhering to the corresponding human rights

instruments

The major thrust of the Recommendations stresses equality and freedom through integration. Persons belonging to national minorities are encouraged to learn the official language of the State.

An educational system can only truly respond to the needs of the communities if its structures allow for the democratic input of communities at the local level in the form of democratic decentralisation.

The importance of parents being able to opt for alternative forms of education for their children. Thus, the right balance of multilingualism is sought in the form that, wherever possible, the language of the minority should be used as a medium of instruction and the state language should be introduced gradually, giving the mother tongue the space and time it needs to establish itself firmly in the child's psyche, so as to facilitate cognitive learning in any language. The Recommendations emphasize that parallel structures functioning in isolation from each other are not a solution that would contribute to social integration throughout the national society.

In the section **The spirit of international instruments**, bilingualism is seen as a right and responsibility for persons belonging to national minorities (Art. 1), and states are reminded not to interpret their obligations in a restrictive manner (Art. 3). In the section on "Minority education at primary and secondary levels", mother tongue medium education is recommended at all levels, including bilingual teachers in the dominant language as a second language (Articles 11-13). Teacher training is made a duty on the state (Art. 14):

11) The first years of education are of pivotal importance in a child's development. Educational research suggests that the medium of teaching at pre-school and kindergarten levels should ideally be the child's language. Wherever possible, States should create conditions enabling parents to avail themselves of this option.

12) Research also indicates that in primary school the curriculum should ideally be taught in the minority language. The minority language should be taught as a subject on a regular basis. The State language should also be taught as a subject on a regular basis preferably by bilingual teachers who have a good understanding of the children's cultural and linguistic background. Towards the end of this period, a few practical or non-theoretical subjects should be taught through the medium of the State language. Wherever possible, States should create conditions enabling parents to avail themselves of this option.

13) In secondary school a substantial part of the curriculum should be taught through the medium of the minority language. The minority language should be taught as a subject on a regular basis. The State language should also be taught as a subject on a regular basis preferably by bilingual teachers who have a good understanding of the children's cultural and linguistic background. Throughout this period, the number of subjects taught in the State language, should gradually be increased. Research findings suggest that the more gradual the increase, the better for the child.

14) The maintenance of the primary and secondary levels of minority education depends a great deal on the availability of teachers trained in all disciplines in the mother tongue. Therefore, ensuing from the obligation to provide adequate opportunities for minority language education, States should provide adequate facilities for the appropriate training of teachers and should facilitate access to such training.

Finally, the Explanatory Note states that

Submersion-type approaches whereby the curriculum is taught exclusively through the medium of the State language and minority children are entirely integrated into classes with children of the majority are not in line with international standards (p. 5).

Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the human rights domain has been a major political playground for states in the domestic as well as international affairs. Sometimes it has been used as a propagandistic instrument with no or minor legal value (in case of states where the principle of rule of law was not respected), or as an area of diplomatic interference into the internal affairs of another state.

4. Target group approach

In most cases, international law does not deal with languages directly, but regards them as 1) markers of identity and dignity of 2) persons belonging to a specific group, 3) expressed in various language functional domains. This enables us to use three approaches in clarifying the concept of language rights. The most traditional one is based on the target groups, the second on human rights principles and the third on functional domains of language within society.

There are three main threatened groups, usually representing linguistic characteristics different from their environments. These are linguistic minorities, aliens and indigenous peoples. Usually they are

politically and economically disadvantaged and subjected to acculturation pressures and social discrimination. Although international law recognises collective rights, all the linguistic rights are attached to individuals, so persons belonging to these may enjoy these rights in community with others.

1. Protection of linguistic rights of aliens

From the three groups mentioned above, aliens belong to the part of the society that is more vulnerable than others and has traditionally been subject to discrimination. In the case of migrant workers and other citizens of a country they are not residents of, the difficulties may be created by the division of responsibility between the host country and the country of origin. In the case of stateless persons and those who have lost their link to their country of origin, including asylum seekers and refugees, special protection may be necessary in order to establish the duty-holder and its responsibilities toward these groups (Drzemcewski 1988).

All the fundamental human rights principles are enjoyed by everyone. In addition, several conventions define the rights and obligations of some specific group of aliens, like migrant workers and members of their families (International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, etc), stateless persons (UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness) and refugees (Convention relating to the status of refugees). The necessity of these conventions is due to the specific problems the aforementioned groups have to cope with (recruitment, family reunification, remittances, political participation, naturalisation, repatriation, etc.).

As Lerner (1991: 129) has noted, such migrants belong to the "blue collar" working classes; for that reason, the subject is generally dealt with under the heading of migrant workers. In this case, the issues regulated legally concern the status and the rights of these persons, so as to make their adaption and adjustment as easy as possible and to permit them to keep their identity, to the extent to which this is compatible with the legal system of the receiving state. Each domestic legal system treats the subject differently. However, the need for special human rights standards, the magnitude of the phenomenon and its transnational implications made it necessary for international law to deal with the subject also. While under its constitutional mandate the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the principal institution for the establishment of a regulatory regime for migratory employment, questions relating to migrant workers are of interest to various organizations within the United Nations system. The UN itself is concerned with the economic, political and legal aspects of migration; UNESCO is interested in the educational and cultural issues affecting migrant workers; and WHO is concerned with the migrants' health problems.

Among the pertinent regional instruments in this domain, noteworthy are the ones developed in Europe: the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1955 European Convention on Establishment (with Protocol) providing guarantees concerning entry, stay and treatment of nationals of one party in the territory of other parties, the 1961 European Social Charter and its 1988 Additional Protocol, and the 1977 European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers.

While the European Convention on Human Rights is concerned primarily with civil rights, the European Social Charter (ESC) address primarily economic and social rights. In its Appendix, the ESC provides that aliens who are lawfully resident in the territory of a state party or work regularly there are entitled to the rights enumerated in the Charter.

The main human rights instrument designed especially for the protection of aliens in the framework of the European human rights system is the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. The convention was adopted in May 1977. According to the explanatory report the aim and purpose of the Convention is to regulate the legal status of migrant workers so as to ensure that as far as possible they are treated at least equally with national workers as regards living and working conditions and to promote the social advancement and office outside the territory of that Contracting Party.

Only a handful of articles deal with the linguistic rights. Article 14 states the principle of equality of treatment between migrant workers, members of their families officially admitted and nationals, as regards admission to education and training establishments. Equal entitlement to admission to universities, and higher education establishments in general, does not rule out the possibility of restricting the admission of migrant workers and members of their families, as of nationals, to such establishments on the basis of a *numerus clausus* laid down by a Contracting Party.

Art 14.1 states: *Migrant workers and members of their families officially admitted to the territory of a Contracting Party shall be entitled, on the same basis and under the same conditions as national workers, to general education and vocational training and retraining and shall be granted access to higher education according to the general regulations governing admission to respective institutions in the receiving State.*

2. To promote access to general and vocational schools and to vocational training centres, the receiving State shall facilitate the teaching of its language or, if there are several, one of its languages to migrant workers and members of their families. ...

5. The Contracting Parties concerned, acting in close co-operation, shall endeavour to ensure that the vocational training and retraining schemes, within the meaning of this Article, cater as far as possible for the needs of migrant workers with a view to their return to their State of origin.

Article 15 provides that the teaching of the mother tongue of children of migrant workers will, so far as practicable, be the subject of action by common accord between the Contracting Parties:

The Contracting Parties concerned shall take action by common accord to arrange, so far as practicable, for the migrant worker's children, special courses for the teaching of the migrant worker's mother tongue, to facilitate, inter alia, their return to their State of origin.

Each Contracting Party shall provide.. in the case of civil or criminal proceeding the possibility of obtaining the assistance of an interpreter where they cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

The UN has been involved with the human rights of migrant workers since the July 1972 session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which invited ILO to examine the matter. After deliberations in 1974 and 1975, the ILO in 1975 adopted Convention No. 143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) together with the Migrant Workers recommendation No. 151. This Convention combines two distinct parts: (1) migration in abusive conditions, and (2) equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers.

In certain respects, the Convention ensures that the protected persons shall have the basic right of access to education on the basis of equality with nationals, thus enabling access to formal education through the medium of the language(s) of the host country. Access to education shall not be denied on the grounds of irregularity of stay and employment either parent of the child (Art.30).

The scope of the right to equality with nationals is much wider in relation to documented workers. In the State of employment, they enjoy equality of treatment with nationals in the matters of access to educational institutions and participation in cultural life (Art.43). Members of the families also have in the State of employment the right of equality with nationals in relation to access to educational, vocational institutions with the additional requirement that the State of employment in collaboration with the State of origin shall facilitate their integration in the local school system (Art. 45), thus forcing the authorities concerned to take affirmative steps to guarantee equal opportunities via successful integration patterns.

The United Nations adopted the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990. Having only 3 ratifications from the 20 necessary, it has not entered into force yet. Human rights in this document are grouped in two categories: rights available for all migrant workers including the non-documented (Part III) and rights only for documented workers (Part IV). Many of the rights in Part III are reaffirmation of existing human rights in other international instruments in the specific context of migrant workers. The innovations may be found in the form of hitherto unrecognised rights like the right to recourse to consular or diplomatic protection, the right to information regarding working conditions, the right to equality with nationals in educational, social and health services, as well as the right to exemptions from import and export duties.

The conventions provide little support for cultural and language maintenance for immigrants, thus differing significantly from minorities. Alfredsson (1990: 14) explains: *Immigrants from many different ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins voluntarily moving to and settling in one country, including migrant workers who chose not to return, are another category of people who may not require minority protection. They may be compelled by economic and other conditions, but they are nevertheless exercising a "free" choice and should accept the drawbacks and not only the benefits of that selection. This view coincides with a requirement often suggested, namely that a minority be well-established over a period of time before they are accorded special minority rights.*

The same idea is shared by Thornberry (1991: 171): *States can hardly be expected to promote foreign culture at their own expense; this obligation, if one exists in any legal sphere, would naturally devolve upon the home state of the group.*

In conclusion, it is clear that no protection against assimilation is provided for aliens. The main protection basis - equality before the law - is neither sufficient nor suitable for language maintenance. Both language shift mechanisms - functional and demographic - have the full unrestricted domain of operation at their disposal, resulting in language loss among immigrants during two-three generations.

2. Linguistic human rights of indigenous peoples and minorities

The other two groups mentioned above - indigenous peoples and minorities - enjoy much more extensive protection, not limited to non-discrimination clauses. The linguistic rights of indigenous people(s) are provided in the ILO Convention no. 169 adopted in 1989, which promotes controlled segregation (in contrast to the previous ILO Convention no 107, promoting integration, that resulted in assimilation). As the linguistic situation of indigenous people(s) varies to a large extent, protection clauses cover a wide range of issues. The main emphasis of the whole convention is directed towards the right of being different, and maintaining these values by establishing additional measures and rights in the social and traditional economic sphere.

5. Human rights principles-based approach

The second approach, used largely by de Varennes (1996), is based on universal human rights principles of non-discrimination, freedom of expression and minority protection. The following follows the lines of thinking of the work mentioned.

1. Freedom of expression

The principle of freedom of expression is worded in ICCPR art 19(2). Traditionally, freedom of expression was deemed to guarantee effective political and social debate essential for the proper operation of any democratic system. More recently it has been considered individualistic in orientation, allowing persons to freely communicate amongst themselves in order to impart and receive information. It permits restrictions which are provided by law and necessary either to respect the reputations of others, or to protect national security, public order, health or morals. A number of national jurisdictions clearly distinguish between the public use of language and private use as it relates to freedom of expression. Matters relating to the public use of language escape what is defined as freedom of expression, because such use involves a government's obligation to provide administrative, judicial or other government services - services which are usually provided in the state-sanctioned language.

An individual has the freedom to impart information to others, and even to his government, in any language, but the state does not have a corresponding obligation to receive such information nor to respond to the individual's exercise of his freedom. Thus, freedom of expression does not impose a positive linguistic obligation on states, but rather protects a right to non-interference of the state in private matters. The state machinery is entitled to operate exclusively in the language of its choice in its activities and is perfectly within its competence to require individuals to submit to this choice. Trial is not a private affair, being a public function carried out by a segment of the state apparatus. In the case *Yves Cadoret and Hervé Le Bihan v. France*, who appearing before the Tribunal correctionnel of Rennes, were not allowed to use their mother tongue Breton, the UNHRC found the communications inadmissible.

Both the UNHRC and the European Commission (art 9 and 10 in EHRC) in the court cases have pointed out that freedom of expression does not guarantee the right to use the language of one's choice in administrative affairs. The freedom of expression does not imply the right to signs, posters, etc. in foreign language only either. UNHRC 1993 handed down a decision in *Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada* concerning the language of outdoor commercial signs. A state may choose one or more official languages, but it may not ban the use of non-official languages in an entirely non-governmental realm. Here UNHRC clearly pointed out that a government may require that the official language of the state be used in conjunction with an individual's language of preference without this constituting an interference with freedom of expression. It entitles the use of language of his choice, although he is given the additional burden using two languages instead of one. (De Varennes 1996:51). The use of a second language is validated by "public interest" considerations, and may require that this additional language be given greater prominence. This is the approach favored in a number of countries.

Thus, a state may legally claim to encourage communication through the bond of a common, unifying language. However, common language may not mean an exclusive language.

2. Principle of non-discrimination

Not all distinctions are necessarily discriminatory: equality and the right to non-discrimination require that individuals be protected against unreasonable or unacceptable differential treatment. UNHRC 1989 General Comment on Non-Discrimination explains the matter:

The term "discrimination" should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or

preference which is based on any ground such as...language... and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean identical treatment in every instance.

The requirement of the ability to speak or write can impose a burden that may be unjustifiable. For example, even the requirement of the ability to speak English in England must be reasonably related to the tasks involved in a rational and balanced way..(**Raval v. DHSS**, 1985 the United Kingdom).

Advisory Opinion of 19 January 1984 on the proposed amendments to the naturalisation provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. one of the amendments was to require that an applicant had to be able to speak, write and read Spanish in order to acquire citizenship. The Inter-American Court stated the following: *...No discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations which are contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. It follows that there would be no discrimination in differences in treatment of individuals by a state when the classifications selected are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under review. These aims may not be unjust or unreasonable, that is, they may not be arbitrary, capricious, despotic or in conflict with the essential oneness and dignity of humankind.*

On the issue of imposing a language requirement in order to be eligible for citizenship, the court had no difficulty accepting that it was not unreasonable nor unjustified to require proof of the ability to communicate in the language of the country (the official language and that of the majority). In final assessment, the Court was of the opinion that it was not unreasonable, disproportionate, nor arbitrary to require persons desiring to acquire Costa Rican nationality to know the official language well enough to read and write in Spanish and to communicate in it.

UNHRC, responding in the case **Guesdon v. France** and **BDMcI v. Canada** seemed to adopt the position that since everyone was subjected to the same requirement, it was impossible to speak of discrimination.

Article 3 of the European Union regulation 1612/68 permits conditions relating to linguistic knowledge required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled. In **Groener v. Minister for Education**, the European Court of Justice established another possible exception: there may be social and cultural considerations which are relevant in determining whether linguistic requirements are discriminatory or not: *The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language of a member state which is both the national language and the first official language.*

In **Ministère Public v. Mutsch** the court stated that the principle of equal treatment means that European Union workers and their families have to be able to avail themselves of the same linguistic rights as the state's own citizens.

In **Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt**, who failed to take their oath in Dutch after elected, were denied the right to sit on the Council. The European Court came to the conclusion that in the circumstances the measure adopted by the state was not unreasonable nor disproportionate: *The aim is to defuse the language disputes in the country by establishing more stable and decentralised organisational structures...In any consideration of the electoral system in issue, its general context must not be forgotten. The system does not appear unreasonable if regard is had to the intentions it reflects...*

In the **Belgian Linguistic Case** the court recognised that Article 2 of the First Protocol of the Convention (right to education) was of no assistance to the petitioners since the right to education does not in itself enshrine the right to the establishment or subsidisation of the schools in which education is provided in one's preferred language.

Legitimacy of goal or objective, social and cultural considerations have to be taken into account. Often perceived as a vital issue in a number of states is the policy of an official or single language as a means of ensuring that all citizens are united through a common language and thus able to participate fully in the national community and fully enjoy all of its benefits...Promotion of a single (usually the majority) language as the national language is not uncommon, nor illegitimate, policy. However, it arouses several concerns. In this aspect, de Varennes (1996: 90) has noted that the legitimate objective of having a state lingua franca does not mean that all language differences need to be eradicated. The argument for a common language appears valid in order not to confine individuals to linguistic ghettos, thus limiting their access to the higher echelons of activities in the greater national community. To require from nationals of a state some knowledge of a common language, whilst constituting an additional burden for those individuals having a different primary language, would then appear to be a reasonable measure in many countries, as long as it does not entirely exclude the use of other languages (Ibid.: 92).

However, de Varennes remarks: *According to a number of international instruments, when a relatively*

large number of individuals belonging to a minority use a language different from the state-sanctioned one, it would appear unreasonable not to provide some level of state services and activities in their language. Usually the share, numerical value and other characteristics are expressed explicitly, by using expressions like substantial numbers, appropriate measures, where possible, according to the situation of each language, etc. To some extent, this can be tied in to several factors like financial constraints, absolute and relative numbers of speakers, geographical concentration, availability of a written form, type of the legal link between speakers and state and minority language usage performance and frequency. However, it must be admitted that a state has no choice to limit the languages used, due to the limits of resources, either human, financial or material. It is submitted that government attempts to correct past objectionable state legislation and practices, particularly those which amounted to violations of human rights such as freedom of expression or the right to equality, are legitimate considerations which ought to be assessed in conjunction with other factors in determining the reasonability of a present-day language preference (Ibid.: 99).

3. Principle of minority protection

The right of individuals belonging to a linguistic minority to use their language with other members of their group has been part of international law since the time of the minorities treaties under League of Nations supervision. This right has been repeatedly confirmed in a number of treaties, including Art. 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (CCPR, adopted in 1966, in force since 1976), stating:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

From this article derives the notion of special measures as the main maintenance mechanisms for minority languages. This means that besides all other rights (e.g. concerning political participation), a special system of rights is necessary in order to create a real equity. This system has a twofold task, firstly, to provide additional inherent minority structure, eliminating all obstacles of in-group language usage, and secondly, to protect the minority concerned by partly substituting the hierarchical structure that unites the minority with other parts of the society, thus filtering out the direct influence and channelling it through the appropriate structures providing minority protection (e.g. autonomy and self-government structures, education on the additive basis). For indigenous peoples and immigrant groups the hierarchical structures promoting uniformity seem to be directly harmful, bringing along subtractive policies and assimilation. The solution provided by international law seems to be assimilation of immigrants and non-integration of indigenous peoples, avoiding the creation of bilingual communities in these cases. The main difference seems to be the decision-making: while in the case of immigrant communities international law accepts that decisions are made solely by the state, minorities and indigenous peoples have the right to form the inherent communal structure according to their will (however, not to the detriment of other groups) and to establish relations with other parts of the society, taking mutual demands into account. The main idea behind this seems to be an effort to provide the groups concerned with the control on decision-making in the affairs influencing the group. However, due to the "softness" of these international instruments, the scope of international protection seems to be modest.

The protection mechanism of linguistic minorities is based on two mutually related principles, covering both the individual as well as the collective aspects of the rights:

1. Equal rights and non-discrimination on the grounds of language, enjoyed by everyone.
2. Obligation of the states to provide special rights and special measures in order to protect the linguistic heritage of minorities. These can be defined as requirements to ensure suitable means, including differential treatment, for the preservation of linguistic characteristics for the linguistic group concerned. The aim of such special measures is to ensure the implementation of linguistic rights and should lead to the achievement of conditions which, to the degree possible, are equivalent to those enjoyed by the majority. Alfredsson and de Zayas (1993: 6) confirm this: *Special rights for minority groups can be defined as the requirement to ensure suitable means, including differential treatment, for the preservation of minority characteristics and traditions which distinguish them from the majority of the population. Among these means are the implementation of special measures or positive action involving the rendering of concrete services, such as schools providing education in the minority language.*

Much of the further development of a mother tongue, especially in the more formal domains, takes place within the school system. Therefore it is important to see what kind of educational language-related human rights are guaranteed in legal covenants and other declarations of human rights. In order to assess this, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas propose a grid, capturing some of the relevant dimensions of

language rights (1986, 1989). The two dimensions used are degree of overtness and degree of promotion, measured in the framework of legal continuum. Their review (1989) concludes that no legally binding declarations are mother tongue maintenance-oriented. None of them comes further than to overt non-discrimination prescription. In fact, most of them only require covert toleration of minority mother tongues. In the same review (1989) we also show that not even overt maintenance-oriented permission is enough for minority (or powerless majority) mother tongues to be maintained and developed. A central conclusion in the review is that the existing international or "universal" declarations are in no way adequate to provide support for dominated languages. There is a significant difference, however, between the need of dominated minority languages for protection in order to ensure their survival and basic justice on the one hand, and the urge to promote European unity through multilingualism for "international understanding" on the other. It is undoubtedly a human right to learn one's mother tongue, a right that speakers of the dominant language take for granted for themselves. Is it though, in the contemporary world, a human right to learn several languages in school. It is imperative to differentiate between necessary rights and enrichment-oriented rights. The rights are necessary for linguistic, psychological, cultural, social and economic survival for minorities and for basic democracy and justice. These rights should be seen as linguistic human rights. Most minorities do not have these rights at present. The right to learn foreign languages in school is on the other hand oriented towards enriching the linguistic repertoire of both majorities and minorities over and above linguistic necessities.

There are two interpretations of the Article 27. The first has interpreted the provision as a tool to encourage the States-Parties towards positive action by providing the means of survival for a minority by recognising the use of minority languages in public instances and the provision of financial support. De Varennes (1996) represents the second trend: *As for the actual content of the right, it has a "wide" coverage, in the sense that it can affect any individual who is a member of a linguistic minority, but it is also "shallow", in the sense of only requiring from the state positive measures needed to ensure there is no interference in the use of a language by a minority community and its members. Instead of imposing the creation of state institutions and programmes specifically tailored for a minority's survival and development, a state must instead neither inhibit the private and community use of a language, nor permit others to do so. (Ibid.: 172-173).*

Many scholars (Thornberry 1991, Skutnabb-Kangas 1991, Stavenhagen 1996) have criticised the vague formulation of Article 27, as it leaves the recognition of minorities to the state rather than based on objectively established criteria, or to the groups in question. Besides the negative formulation (*shall not be denied*) used, the state is not made the duty -holder of ensuring these rights are reachable. Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 18) has summarised the issues concerning the article 27 as following: interpreted as excluding (im)migrants, excluding other groups, which are not recognised by the state, no positive rights to maintain or even use one's language, no obligation to the states. .

In April 1994 UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 23(50) came forward with the positive interpretation of the CCPR Art. 27. It stated following:

6.1 *Although article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does recognize the existence of a "right" and requires that it shall not be denied. Consequently, a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the exercise of this right are protected against their denial or violation. Positive measures of protection are, therefore, required not only against the acts of the State party itself, whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also against the acts of other persons within the State party.*

6.2 *Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practice their religion, in community with the other members of the group. In this connection, it has to be observed that such positive measures must respect the provisions of articles 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant both as regards the treatment between different minorities and the treatment between the persons belonging to them and the remaining part of the population. However, as long as those measures are aimed at correcting conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under article 27, they may constitute a legitimate differentiation under the Covenant, provided that they are based on reasonable and objective criteria...*

...9. *The Committee concludes that article 27 relates to rights whose protection imposes specific obligations on States parties. The protection of these rights is directed to ensure the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole...*

The goal and intent of the Article 27 was to ensure a minimum level of rights, not necessarily available to other individuals, which would not restrict the ability of minorities to freely use their own language,

whilst not imposing any obligations upon the states to intervene actively in assisting the minorities in their private affairs. However, the UNHCR in its General Comment acknowledges that *Article 27 relates to rights whose protection imposes specific obligations on state parties.*

The HRC was on the opinion that it was correct for a state to adopt measures that go beyond protection and which actually assist a minority's ability to maintain its language.

Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 18) clarifies the novelties:

the article is seen by the Human Rights Committee as protecting all individuals on the State's territory or under its jurisdiction (i.e. also immigrants and refugees), irrespective of whether they belong to the minorities specified in the Article or not;

stating that the definition of a minority does not depend on a decision by the state but requires to be established by objective criteria;

recognising the existence of a right;

imposing positive obligations on the states.

De Varennes (1996: 168) has drawn a list of minority rights. According to him, the rights to use a minority language are:

- the right of a linguistic minority to carry on its own educational activities in its language, that is the right to establish, manage and operate their own educational institutions where their language is used as the medium of instruction to the extent deemed to be appropriate by the minority itself.
- the right of a linguistic minority to use its language within various cultural, social or political organisations.
- right to personal or geographic names in a minority language
- right to the private use of a script used by a minority
- right to minority media
- right to use minority language at home and in public

In addition, two clarifications should be made. Reasonable restrictions are permissible when they are in place for the minority's own protection (ibid.: 168). It is also not illegitimate to provide some type of preference or additional rights and privileges for national minorities.

6. Approach based on functional domains of language

1. Official language

Official language status signals that the use of such language in a state is provided by law. Thus state recognizes its legal obligation to respond in the official language. Therefore the requirement of the official language is appropriate. It also prescribes the language to be used in state functions and documentation.

Whenever the number of individuals speaking a minority language in a state is substantial, especially if they are citizens, public authorities in regions where these individuals are mostly concentrated should be able to respond to their requests as well as offer public services in their primary language.

2. Court

Most international treaties dealing with civil and political rights (Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, etc.) have provisions recognising that when an accused faces proceedings in a language which he does not understand, he shall have the right to the assistance of an interpreter, most often free of charge. If a person is being charged of a criminal offence, he must also be informed of the nature of the charge in a language which he understands. These linguistic guarantees are not linked to the number of people speaking that language in a state. However, the UNHRC in *Guesdon v. France* noted that Article 14 of the ICCPR does not have the effect of entitling an accused in criminal proceedings to express himself in his language of preference. The main motivation for recognition of the right to an interpreter is to ensure that all parties are heard in a fair manner and that justice be done in the end.

3. Education

In general, international instruments recognising a right to education have consistently excluded a parent's automatic right to choose the language in which his child would receive a state's educational services (Art 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art 5 (e)(v) of the Racial Discrimination Convention, Art 28(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the

Child). It appears clear that the right to education was never intended to include the right to education in one's own language.

More recent treaties and international instruments have begun to recognise a link in public education between overall numbers of individuals sharing a same language, and a state's corresponding obligation to provide schooling for them in their language, when this is practical and reasonable including the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Article 4(3)), the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (Paragraph 34), and the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (Article 14(2)).

Article 8 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages reflects the sliding-scale formula, where the bottom end represents the minimal entitlement and higher up more generous rights may be found. Article 8 is applicable *according to the situation of each language*.

A state is also under the obligation to provide some instruction of the official language to ensure these individuals are not excluded from participating in the larger society, and to avoid creating inequality by prohibiting them from having access to the activities and benefits linked to this knowledge. The international instruments mentioned earlier usually add that acquisition of the official language must also be possible as part of a state's non-discriminatory education policy.

While a state only has an obligation to act in a non-discriminatory way in the provision of public schooling when there is a sufficiently large number of students that are affected by the language choices of the state, the approach concerning private education is different. It appears to be a generally accepted standard to allow members of a linguistic minority to freely carry on activities in their own language. There also appears to be a growing consensus that this includes the right of parents to instruct privately their children in their language, free from state restrictions, save general educational standards and the government's legitimate interest in requiring from all citizens some knowledge of the official language, but also without any obligation on the state to provide financial support. The widespread recognition in international law of a linguistic minority's right to create and operate its own educational activities and institutions, as reflected in international instruments (Paragraph 32.2 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Article 11 of Parliamentary Recommendation 1134(1990) on the Rights of Minorities (Council of Europe), Article 5(1)(c) of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, Article 30 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 27(3) of the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, and Article 13 of the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities) supports the argument that this has now become a generally recognised international standard (de Varennes 1996: 219-220).

The financial aspect is clarified in the Paragraph 32.2, stating: *to establish and maintain their own educational...institutions, organisations or associations, which can seek voluntary financial and other contributions as well as public assistance, in conformity with national legislation*. The UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education also recognises that a state may require from private minority institutions that their standard of education not be lower than the general standard approved by the competent authorities (Article 5(1)(c)(ii)).

A state may legitimately require that all children in private minority educational activities also learn the official language without this being perceived as an interference with the minority's right, as long as the minority can continue to use its language as medium of instruction to the extent it feels is appropriate. This is acknowledged in instruments such as the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (adopted in 1960, entered into force in 1962), where it is stated that linguistic educational activities must not prevent *members of these minorities from understanding the culture and language of the community as a whole and from participating in its activities...*

Article 5 states:

1. The State Parties to this Convention agree that:

(a) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; it shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(c) It is essential to recognise the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own education activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language, provided however;

(i) That this right is not exercised in a manner which prevents the members of these minorities from understanding the culture and language of the community as a whole and from participating in its activities, or which prejudice national sovereignty;

(ii) That the standard of education is not lower than the general standard laid down or

approved by the competent authorities; and

(iii) That attendance at such schools is optional.

Thornberry (1991:290) remarks that the state is not made the duty-holder of the minority education. Simultaneously, specific limitations are provided, like any alternative form of education must conform to such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, thus the rights of national minorities in the linguistic minorities in the linguistic field are made to depend on the educational policy of each State (*Ibid.*: 289)

In the Hague Recommendations, mother tongue medium education is recommended on all levels throughout the primary and secondary education. The education of the high level bilingual teachers is made duty of the state (Article 14). All teachers teaching the official language as a second language should be bilingual (Article 11-13).

4. Media

Many international instruments (Article 17 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, Article 11 of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages) confirm that media (television, radio, publications) and language concerns should be divided into two broad categories: state controlled media and privately-run operations. The latter would normally require non-intervention by the state in decisions concerning language use or preference. Article 11 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages provides that when the number of speakers of a minority or regional language reaches a certain level ("according to the situation of each language"), public authorities should adopt measures aimed at ensuring that they are properly served in their language by private media when these authorities are active in this field.

State media must conform to the requirements of non-discrimination on the ground of language.

7. Human rights related to power

Various constellations of proposed language policy models cause frictions and possible escalations of tensions. For this task, various domestic as well as international instruments are put in use, including human rights-related, diplomatic, as well as those directly used in language planning. Though devised as universal constraints against power turned against the principles of humanity, in *realpolitik* we confront several constraints relating to power structure. Provided material enables us to make the following conclusions concerning the link between international human rights standards and *realpolitik*:

- **international human rights standards are not applicable by international organisations towards the political power centres, like Russia, the United States and China.** This may be monitored in the impotent behaviour of the UN Human Rights Committee, regularly attempting and always failing to condemn human rights violations in China during past years. The same applies to HCNM, who has never interfered in the domestic problem solution between Russia's central government and minorities, even when large-scale casualties are imminent (cf. Chechnya, Tatar problems, etc.). The same applies to the United States situation, with legislation introduced violating the Hague recommendations on bilingual education (cf. referendum in California in June 1998), or denying social benefits from legal immigrants (federal law introduced in 1997), reflecting overt discrimination. Also Russia's admittance to the Council of Europe, with the membership tied to the following of the European Convention for Human Rights, with Russia far from fulfilling the condition, has made the universal nature of human rights doubtful and implicit.
- **spread of double standards.** This position benefits other politically more powerful European and Europeanized countries, which may ignore or interpret according to their own convenience the standards without the threat of major international condemn. Here one might recall allegedly racially motivated beatings of immigrants by German police as well as arsons, violence caused by xenophobia in Scandinavian countries and France, etc. Double standards harm the political periphery most, by creating conditions that may lead to the weakening and destruction of the society in the interest of some power state (cf. the April 1998 crisis in Latvia and the active position of HCNM in promoting standards applied nowhere else!). Thus, allegations of rubber rulers, voiced by the Eastern European countries, have been popular in the imminent past.
- Birckenbach (1997: 19) speaks about the **subordination of human rights to reasons of state**, meaning that rights are protected insofar as being politically and economically in the national interest. The reasons of these deviations and different interpretations seem to originate from the different views on security. The application of preventive diplomacy as a significant instrument of postmodernist foreign policies may be witnessed regarding the conflicts over citizenship in Estonia.

As citizenship represents the direct access to power, this has caused extensive dispute on the issue. Birckenbach (1997:6) distinguishes here a domestic, a bilateral and an international dimension. From Estonia's perspective the national security interest may be observed. From the non-citizens' point of view the same decision was simply an act of injustice, allegedly not aware the sophistications of international law concerning Estonia's occupation. Russia interprets the situation as a massive violation of human rights. The international community is mainly interested because of the risk that any dispute might escalate into violence threatening European stability, as developing ethno-political confrontation could affect international relations in Europe.

8. Citizenship

1. General

International law gives states great - though not unlimited - freedom in setting requirements for citizenship. Under Article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, *it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its citizens... (but) the citizenship law of a State shall be recognized by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international customs, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to citizenship* (Groenendijk 1993).

There are two basic principles of establishing citizenship. *Ius sanguinis* is the principle by which one acquires citizenship through, literally, "blood". One is considered a citizen of a country if one's parent(s) was also citizen of this country. The other main principle of granting citizenship is *ius soli*. Under *ius soli*, one gains citizenship by dint of being born on the territory of the country concerned.

Chan (1991) argues that nationality denotes a specific legal relationship between an individual and international law, and provides his State of nationality with the *locus standi* to protect his interests in the international arena.

The concept of nationality was intended to regulate relationships among sovereign States. The Permanent Court of International Justice declared in 1923 in the *Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case* that the question of nationality was a matter within the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction:

The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of this Court, in principle within this reserved domain.

In 1930 at the Hague Codification Conference, held under the auspices of the League of Nations. The Conference adopted the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, a Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, and a Special Protocol concerning Statelessness. The Convention and the Protocol entered into force on 1 July. Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (the 1930 Hague Convention) states that (it) *is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals*. Article 2 further states that *any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State*.

Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared *that everyone has the right to nationality and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality*. The Article covered three distinct rights: the right to have a nationality, to retain that nationality, and to change that nationality.

Article 1 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (in force since 1975) provides that a Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Article 4 extends the obligation of the Contracting State to a person, born outside its territory, who would otherwise be stateless, if one of his parents at the time of the person's birth is a national of that Contracting State. Article 5 lays down the general principle that if the law of a Contracting State entails a loss of nationality as a consequence of any change in the personal status of a person, such loss shall be conditional upon possession or acquisition of another nationality. Article 6 deals with the loss of nationality of spouse and children. Article 7 spells out exhaustively the circumstances whereby renunciation resulting in statelessness would be permitted. Article 8 provides that a Contracting State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless. It would, however, be permitted if the person concerned has, *inter alia*, conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State. Article 9 lays down the restriction that a Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. Article 10 imposes an obligation on Contracting States to prevent statelessness upon

territorial transfer.

Article 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that every child has the right to acquire a nationality. Though, being enforceable treaty obligation, it is considerably weaker than the general right to nationality mentioned in the UDHR.

Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that a child shall have the right to acquire the nationality of the State of birth if he is otherwise stateless at the time of the birth.

The right to nationality is not included in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). It is no doubt within the national sovereignty of each State to decide the basis of its nationality law (Chan 1991:13).

However, sixty years later the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared that nationality was an inherent right of all human beings; the manners in which States regulate matters bearing on nationality could no longer be deemed within their sole jurisdiction, but are circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights (Amendments to the Naturalisation Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion of 19 Jan. 1984, OC-4/84).

The International Court of Justice has stressed the fact that nationality must be based upon a real and effective link between the individual and the state: *According to the practice of states, to arbitral and judicial decisions, and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than with any other state.*

Thus, the competence of States in determining nationality could be affected by international law.

However,

nationality cannot be bestowed or acquired under international law, but only under domestic law. the competence of States changes with changing international relations. The right to nationality can hardly be considered to be a part of customary international law, according to the consenting opinion of the large body of experts.

2. Citizenship and language

Language tests as a component of the naturalisation process are a widely accepted international practice. A link between language skills and the granting of a citizenship are common in many Third World countries, but also in several Western countries. In the United States, section 304 holds that: *No person...shall be naturalised as a citizen of the United States upon his own petition who cannot demonstrate: (1) an understanding of the English language, including an ability to read, write and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language.* Article 65 of the Code de la Nationalité française declared that *no one can be naturalised if he does not justify his assimilation to the French community, notably by a sufficient knowledge, depending on his condition, of the French language.* In Canada, knowledge of French or English is deemed necessary for naturalisation (Article 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act). In Switzerland, knowledge of at least one official language is required, in the United Kingdom the British Nationality Act acknowledges that citizenship can be acquired by those with a knowledge of either English, Gaelic or Welsh. In Denmark the requirement is worded in the need to understand and express oneself, Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain require sufficient knowledge, Turkey demands speaking well enough, Croatia fluency (Harremoes 1993)

In conclusion we have to agree with Müllerson 1993: *Though citizenship is clearly a prerogative of the state in the sense that the state is not obliged to grant it to anyone, once it has initiated a naturalisation process it must respect the human right to equality and non-discrimination in its politics.*

3. Nationality and territorial change

Automatic change of nationality is a predominant principle in State succession, based on a substantial connexion with the territory. Upon a change of sovereignty, the nationals of the transferring State who are habitually resident in the territory will *ipso facto* lose their former nationality and acquire the nationality of the acquiring State. However, this principle has been argued by several experts, as State practice since the beginning of this century is not as conclusive as suggested. Nationality is perceived by many new States as a key to the achievement of national unity. It is obvious that territorial residence alone would not be able to fulfil the new political function of nationality. In order to achieve national unity, the States are looking for, in most cases, a genuine and effective link between the population and the State.

Article 10 of the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) provides that every treaty for the transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to ensure that no person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer.

It is submitted that upon change of sovereignty, all persons who have a genuine and effective link with the new State will automatically acquire the nationality of the new State. It is primarily within the competence of each State to determine what constitutes a genuine and effective link in the conferment of its nationality, subject to the presumption of avoidance of statelessness and the duty not to enact or apply any law on a discriminatory basis. Habitual residence will give rise to the presumption of a genuine and effective link. It is settled rule of customary international law that residents of the transferred territory who have a nationality other than that of the predecessor State would not be affected by the change of sovereignty.

9. Occupation

Occupation is one of the crucial points for the legitimation of Machiavelli's famous phrase *La forza fa giustizia* (might makes right). However, from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 the idea began to develop that the territorial change should need assent by third parties. Thus, the global community began to withhold the changes of territorial changes brought by force or the threat of force, now commonly known as Stimson doctrine.

The main leap in this direction was taken by the League of Nations, founded in 1920, which developed international awareness of the need for collective security, expressed in article 10 of the League Covenant:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in the case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council should advise upon the means by which this obligation should be fulfilled.

These principles were elaborated in the Treaty of Paris, August 17 1928, known also as the Kellogg-Briand Pact:

Art. I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Art. II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

The establishment of the UN system expanded the article 10 of the League Covenant in the article 2(4) of the UN Charter, declaring:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In 1970 the UN Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States adopted a declaration containing the following principle:

No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.

The declaration was adopted by the 25th session of the General Assembly (Hough 1985: 465).

In 1969 the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf case made explicit the conditions necessary for the formation of a positive rule of customary international law. First, it requires constant and uniform usage based on consistent repetition, a sufficient degree of generality and a certain lapse of time. The doctrine of nonrecognition has withstood these requirements, stretching refusal of recognition of territorial conquest in time and space to the general standards of international law.

In connection with the topic, one has to be aware of the requirements of humanitarian law concerning occupation, especially the IVth Geneva Convention, which states in Article 49:

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other Country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. [...] The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

10. Conclusions

The first chapter provides the theoretical basis suitable for the systematic description of the linguistic processes taking place in Estonia and in the larger regional framework diachronically and synchronically by revealing links between the parts of the language policy model concerned and its

underlying power structure. For this purpose, a new paradigm for the postmodernist information society is proposed, consisting of *power-society-language* triad, instead of the modernist *language-nation-state* of the industrial society, characterising the modernist period. In order to reveal the connections between these three components of our new postmodernist triad *power-society-language*, we focus on the issues of power reflected through societal structures making use of language. Key terms related to language functioning within society and language planning are presented. The chapter starts with the discussion of the structure of society, functioning as a distribution mechanism of power. The role of language within society, attached to the societal structure and the management and manipulation of language(s) in society are discussed, (also) through language policy and planning.

With the sovereignty of states decreasing, regional and global interests have been gradually taking precedence over national. Economic and security interests have gained priority, affecting language policy directly. Thus, language policy, following primarily power interest, has shifted from the domain of cultural to that of social interests, among these especially security-related interests, reflecting power balance globally and regionally. Consequently, the scope of language policy should be interpreted accordingly in terms of *realpolitik*, reflecting access to (or monopoly of) political power rather than protection of cultural values.

Thus, in the modern world the relationship between language and power is much more sophisticated than the traditional language-nation-state equation presumes. The choice of the common language, tied to substantial benefits, is crucial for the further distribution of power, dividing languages to be linked either to nation-building or to minority protection. Nation-building itself is often under the pressure of the language spread of LWCs, especially when the language-spread model takes the place of the minority-protection model with power relations left intact. Thus, it confirms the thesis that dominant languages in multilingual communities and in a multilingual world are dominant because their speakers have the power to secure the advantages for their own group, among them linguistic advantages (Phillipson 1992: 307). In this case, negotiations over new power balance take place over new rights to be acquired, confirming and consolidating new conquests, compared to the opposite situation in the case of minority protection model, aiming to protect and maintain existing language environment by promoting inherent ethnic and other cultural features. Nation-building model varies in different countries, extending from civic (combined political and linguistic identity, with the guarantees to maintain the ethnic and cultural component) to nationalistic, with ethnic and political identities tied up in political programs.

Conflict emerges when several groups with incompatible interests identify their goals as access to power. With minority defined through cultural (ethnic) identity with political and numerical constraints, it avoids the confrontation. XXX. However, with the elimination of the political constraint and simultaneous mobilisation, minority may turn into a political nation with its own state. A constant conflict may be observed between the representatives of language spread and nation-building, with a mechanism of foreign policy trying to solve disagreements and avoid tensions.

The main focus remains however, in the power relationship between nation-building and minority protection, being the main domain of linguistic human rights. Here, besides clarifying the rights attached to the common language of the State and minority languages, the collective aspect should be introduced explicitly, providing linguistic security for minorities. From here derives the need for a multiple language planning model that may cover language spread, nation-building and minority protection within the same framework, with explicit links and constraints, based on linguistic human rights.

Various constellations of language policy models cause frictions and possible escalations of tensions. For this task, various domestic as well as international instruments are put in use, including human rights-related, diplomatic, as well as those directly used in language planning.

Here we confront several constraints relating to power structure. Birckenbach (1997: 19) speaks about the subordination of human rights to reasons of state, meaning that rights are protected insofar as being politically and economically in the national interest.

8. Historical overview of Soviet language policy

1. Theoretical introduction

Language policy has been crucial for the fate of the Soviet Union. The USSR was constructed during the politically tumultuous 1920s employing an approach to various ethnic groups that provided a language policy that enriched the cultures and raised the status of local languages. The same is true about the end of the Soviet Union, when the local language policies aimed at the redistribution of the status between local languages and Russian gave rise to ethnic mobilisation and consequent disintegration.

1. Previous research.

Several works have been published on the subject of Soviet language policy. Besides the studies making use of ideological patterns (either pro- or anti-Soviet), several in-depth linguistic studies covering the macro-level of Soviet language planning efforts have appeared, among them those of Kreindler (1985), Lewis (1972), Kirkwood (ed., 1989), Nahaylo and Swoboda (1990) and Comrie (1981). Several works focus on single ethnic groups (Allworth (1980) on Russians, Fierman (1990) on Uzbeks, Lallukka (19) on Komi, Marshall (1996), or on several ethnic groups (Loeber et al. 1990 on the Baltic issues).

2. Factual characteristics.

The USSR contained over 100 autochthonous nationalities, 22 of which comprised more than a million individuals in the most recent (1989) census. According to the first all-Union census of 1926, there were more than 130 nationalities; the method of defining a nationality was, however, implicit. During the later censuses political decisions affected the number of nationalities. For example, Veps and several other Fenno-Ugric nationalities were not taken into account during several censuses and 18 groups listed in the 1959 census were dropped in 1970 (Fedyshyn 1980: 153).

Slightly over half of the population was Russian and seven-tenths were Slavic (Appel and Muysken 1987). Fifteen republican languages (the Soviet Union consisted of republics, 15 in number in later decades) were spoken by more than 90% of the population. Altogether 22 languages were spoken by more than one million speakers each (cf. table 1).

The number of nationalities was not equal to the number of languages, as some groups switched languages and others (Jews, Karelians) claimed several languages as their mother tongues (Marshall 1996:9).

Table 1

3. Underlying principles.

The Marxist transformation of the world system from capitalist to communist, initiated with the 1917 October Revolution, also envisaged a fundamental reshaping of the Tsarist language policies in the Russian Empire. However, the new, emerging pattern was not based on the concept of the nation-state, popular at that time in the West, but rather catered for the ideological schemes of the new elites of Russia.

Soviet language policy may be divided into five periods, roughly corresponding to the active ruling periods of the Soviet leaders (Lenin, Stalin, Hrushchev+ Brezhnev, collective power-sharing during stagnation, and Gorbachev's perestroika), all starting with an overture of vague and conflicting steps, due to the power fighting among the ruling elites (cf. Stalin vs. Trotzky, Khrushchev vs. Beria, Gorbachev vs. Ligachev). Thus, for a while, the former language policy was maintained under a new regime, and changed gradually according to the urgency and importance of the matter.

As the Soviet state was built on a socialist ideological structure, it may be regarded as a common framework for one paradigm consisting of ideological postulates that were also reflected in language policy. These principles were implemented differently, depending on features originating in human behaviour (individual features, power relations). Direct political pressure was exerted via decrees, laws and Communist Party resolutions. These methods of declaring policies were backed up by administrative mechanisms, themselves often primed by hidden agendas and other methods of

control (including censorship). In addition to political pressure were economic (redistribution of goods and finances, access to resources), social (e.g. migration) and socio-cultural pressures (education system, mass media) as well as the operational freedom of closed systems like the Soviet Armed Forces (cf. the treatment of conscripts) and the KGB.

Like other language policies carrying extra-linguistic factors directed by power relations, Soviet language policy cannot be explained through inherent principles. There seem to be at least two explanations for this implicitness. In the first place, an explicit Soviet language policy *per se* never existed as it was merely one dimension of Soviet Communist ideology (cf. Goble 1994). Secondly, this implicit policy was never stable as it had to reflect the current views of the incumbent General (up to Brezhnev the First) Secretary of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). These views were spread through Communist Party documents, always supported by appropriate quotations from Marx, Engels and especially Lenin. Furthermore, all Soviet leaders have in their statements on national questions always referred to Lenin, presenting Lenin's nationality policy as the basis for their own, no matter however different it might have been (Urdze 1990:355). Lewis (1972: 51, quoted in Marshall 1996: 16) describes this:

The difficulty in studying language policy in the Soviet Union during the last fifty years is to identify at any time the exact target of a policy statement or expression of attitude, whether it is directed to language as ethnic symbol... or language as the instrument of proletarian advancement... Language policy in the USSR (was) apt to oscillate because of the attraction of these two poles of influence. Writers seldom (made) any clear distinction between them and more often than not, confused them.

Nevertheless, some general principles influencing language policy can be adduced. These principles may be divided into **ideological**, deriving from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin and influencing language policy indirectly, and **linguistic**, directly setting constraints on the development of languages.

The **ideological principles** that influenced language policy most were the following:

- (1) **The primacy of class over ethnicity**, according to which the logical outcome of the class struggle (which serves as the motor of historical development) is that the most progressive class, the proletariat, must rule society. At the time of the October Revolution, the attempt to introduce such a class-based approach led to the primacy of one million "proletarians" (the ideologically conscious in Petrograd and Moscow) over 140 million "non-proletarians", and further, to the rule of the Communist Party apparatus, "the leading and directing force of the society and the vanguard of the proletariat", over all others. To keep this structure in balance, the dictatorship of the proletariat (meaning, in fact, the Communist Party apparatus) was introduced, leading to a totalitarian regime. Such a hierarchical structure kept citizens under strict control and surveillance. Ethnicity in this case was an erratic factor in the task of control. Consequently, as the structure of primacy of class over ethnicity was considered the basic structure of society, other multiple hierarchies, e.g. those based on ethnic, linguistic or cultural markers, as well as "foreign bodies" for the new state system, such as churches, remnants of other classes and survivors of pluralist society, were either eliminated or "neutralised".
- (2) **Ethnicity was regarded as a temporary phenomenon** and an inherent feature of capitalism, generated by the capitalist form of production and doomed to perish with capitalism. As a matter of fact, this idea accorded with the ideas expressed in the West, where the disappearance of ethnicity was instead connected with modernisation (Allardt (19), Castles (19), Nikolinakos (19)XXX).
- (3) **The individual had no place in history or in society except as defined in a set of societal relations**, and according to the **principles of class struggle**. These relations were regarded first and foremost as economic, with no need to take account of ethnic or linguistic factors.
- (4) Soviet society was seen in all essentials as a **final state**, an *Endzustand* (Galtung 1996: 245), with no autonomous inner dialectic, only minor operations still to be carried out in a technocratic manner from above, inspired by the scientific, technological revolution. Thus, there was no room left for qualitatively new ideas concerning the state and society; all the fundamentals had to come from the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.
- (5) **Communism was depicted as an objective and historically progressive inevitability**. Like other visions of future society elsewhere, Communism was described as the most perfect order of society. It should have several features, including the absence of state, police and prisons as well as nations and ethnic groups, thus leading to total monolingualism.
- (6) **Ideologisation of all spheres of society** included tight control over social sciences, among these sociolinguistics.

Linguistic principles, also based on this ideology, had direct influence on language policies.

These were the following:

(1) The dogma that the problems originating from ethnicity, "**the national question**", had long been solved and that there were not, and would never be, any ethnic or linguistic conflicts between nations or between the central government and these nations. This view was established as an ideological dogma and brooked no argument. Pool (1980: 245) remarks on this: *The strategy that Soviet language identifiers generally follow, in order to cope with conflicts between the identities of languages, is conflict denial rather than conflict resolution.* The reality was trimmed to theory by force of the totalitarian system. In reality, political boundaries, drawn deliberately by officials far away, united some nations and ethnic groups by compulsion while separating others (e.g. in Central Asia, Karabakh). The rule that to each local state apparatus belonged one nationality, placed scores of non-titular ethnies in a predicament. Many ethnic groups vanished from public records and were thus exposed to complete assimilation (Lemaitre et al. (1993:123), Kolga et al. (1993). This is remarkably similar to the fate of African languages after the Berlin meeting where the European powers divided Africa between them.

(2) **Ethnicity and native language were determined with the help of different criteria.** For Soviet language theory, language had only an instrumental function, and there was no view of ethnicity as being importantly related to language (Ozolins 1994: 163). Thus, there was no need for these to coincide. The criteria for group membership that referred to ethnicity was based on descent or ancestry, language being its natural component. Haarmann and Holman (1997:118) have remarked: *In the early years of Soviet rule, when Russian did not yet exert strong assimilatory pressure, the duality of membership in a nationality by descent and in a national speech community by language was not experienced as a source of conflict.* The first census in 1926 counted the ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, mostly deriving from self-identification. This shifted from endo- to exo-criteria during the next censuses, together with developments in the Soviet language policies, intensifying Russification. While during the first census the difference between descent and native language was considered marginal, according to the data of the 1970 census this covered 14.4 per cent of the non-Russians. This might be the reason why this position was changed to some extent in the 1970s with the introduction of the Russian-speaking *homo soveticus*, as an ideal for future Soviet society. Consequently,

(3) **the shift to Russian by ethnic non-Russians** was considered a positive sign of development in the direction of a Communist future. However, the official theory started by Marr about **convergence and fusion of languages** inside the socialist system was still respected. Thus, it was considered that

(4) **languages in and outside the socialist system developed according to different laws.** While the ruling ideology saw language as a means of exploitation inside the capitalist system, the national question was claimed to have been solved inside the socialist system. Instead of struggle and shift, convergence and fusion were said to be blossoming (cf. Trubachev 1987).

(5) **The Soviet Union was regarded a multilingual state, consisting of multilingual republics.** Thus, besides the centre-periphery issues, multilingualism also affected the intrarepublican issues. All republics were considered multilingual (Desheriev 1976:11) and in need of an interethnic language. This language (Russian, as a matter of fact) was planned to be a common language for all the republics. Thus, a double-layer multilingualism was proposed, having personal multilingualism characteristics as well as the characteristic of territoriality, with a lingua franca functioning on the higher level and titular languages of ethnic units on the lower level.

4. State structure.

McGarry, O'Leary (1993: 33) characterised the political system of the Soviet Union as a kind of pseudo-federalism. In a genuine federation the central government and the provincial governments both enjoy separate domains of power, although they may also have concurrent powers. Federations automatically imply codified and written constitutions, and bicameral legislatures. In the Soviet Union, the Constitution was not regarded a legal document and though the bicameral legislatures existed, delegates were chosen by Communist Party officials, who, for the show of legitimacy, had to be elected by the system of equality of candidates and mandates.

When analysing Soviet language policy, one must differentiate between Russian, other Slavic languages, remaining autochthonous languages and migrant languages, whose fate developed in accordance with ideological clichés as well as societal attitudes and influences inherited from the Tsarist period.

Language policies were implemented through different power grids in the Soviet state. There were four main grids, each having its specific inherent language policies and routines, and differing in its centrifugal/centripetal impact. These were the following:

- ethnic division of the state into republics, autonomous republics and smaller ethnic (autonomous)units, having potentially centrifugal impact on their constituents;

- a unified ideological system covering the whole country and functioning in Russian (at least since Stalin's reign), having centripetal influence;
- a unified economic system with direct centripetal subordination (without interference from the republican level) of the main bulk of industry to Moscow, affecting appointments, choice of new industrial sites and economic migration. Almost the whole system functioned exclusively in Russian, except for local food processing plants and other minor enterprises that used local languages as working languages;
- a unified military system operating in Russian and having centripetal impact. This system was accompanied by the KGB, a similar structure responsible for intelligence matters.

The first system was built mainly on ethnolinguistic markers of residents. Up to the year 1991, the Soviet Union was composed of ethnic units that were divided into 3 categories, consisting of:

- 1□ the 15 Republics comprising the Soviet Union;
- 2□ Autonomous Republics (20), and
- 3□ Autonomous (or National) Areas and Districts (18), the last two categories being subordinate to the Republics.

The division reflected quite adequately the situation of various languages in the Soviet Union. (This will be discussed in more detail in 4.5). Zaslavsky (1997) has drawn attention to the fact that the Soviet Union state erected passport barriers between different ethnic groups (and before that, barriers of a non-passport regime), and administratively linked each ethnic community to its own territory and political leadership (which are preconditions for independent states). In some spheres structural isomorphism was significant, like in education and science (independent Academies, set of research institutes). It had a quite positive impact on the development of peoples. Lieven and McGarry (1993: 65) are right in stating that federalism in the Soviet Union was never a complete fraud. For example, in 1914 Volga Tatars were culturally ahead of all other Islamic peoples. By the end of the Soviet Union, all those peoples that possessed their own SSR (Union republic) left the Volga Tatars, without their own SSR, behind in this respect. By modernising republics and creating industrial and educational networks the Soviet Union prepared the way for peaceful disintegration in the case of the decrease of coercive power, with the foundations laid by Soviet nationalities policy. The constraints in this respect were the primacy of all-Union legal acts over local ones and non-democratically elected (i.e. nominated) political institutions.

In the last three systems, producing centripetal power and thus counterbalancing the first centrifugal one, power was based on a rotation principle, demanding from managers knowledge of Russian as the linguistic medium. Moreover, in order to control the possible centrifugal blast of ethnolinguistic potential, the first system was subordinate to the second, with all the main decisions taken on the corresponding ideological level. Even the court system was dependent on the ideological system, leaving democracy and human rights protection practically non-existent. At the beginning, most of the governing bodies of the territorial ethnic units operated in their titular language. Afterwards the shift from the titular language of the unit to Russian took place, starting from lower-level units.

The third system was almost a state within a state, with major decisions taken by *Gosplan* (State Planning Committee) in Moscow. Depending on the republics, Gosplan operated 80-90% of the industrial potential of the country.

The fourth, the military system, constituted its own hierarchy and was financially independent of the other systems. All four systems had direct access to the highest level of government, the Politburo, as, from the beginning of the 1960s, their representatives were members of it.

Despite the high level of collectivisation and hierarchical structures, the system operated ineffectively. The reason, according to Galtung (1996: 245) was that the Soviet collectivism was institutional, not based on a collective Self. He remarks on this subject: *To organize the Brothers Karamazov in a kolkhoz was never very meaningful, and certainly not easy. And they have survived; the Kolkhoz not.*

5. Structure for the analysis of language policy.

The aim of Soviet language policy was the homogenization of society according to the ideological values of the Soviet society. This was supposed to penetrate every aspect of public and private life (Haarmann and Holman 1997: 115-116). In this area there were three main issues which the language policy of the Soviet Union had to tackle from the very first days of the existence of the state:

1. the issue of the *lingua franca*
2. the fate of the kin languages to Russian - Ukrainian and Belorussian: should they exist separately or should these be merged with Russian? Note: XXXFishman comments the case with *ausbau* codes relative to each other, where anti-modelling must be recognized. Here model and anti-model stem from the same language (Fishman 1974: 16), making the creation of a distinct linguistic

identity difficult.

3. attitude towards all other languages (develop, maintain or murder? cf. Cobarrubias (1983), Skutnabb-Kangas (1997)).

The solution of these issues was based on the critical balance between the functional ranges of Russian versus those of non-Russian languages, deriving from the division of power between the national (ethnic) elites of the centre and of the periphery of the Soviet Union (cf. Haarmann and Holman 1997:115).

9. Lenin: against Tsarism

1. Theory

As Fishman (1989,14) has noted about classical Marxism, Marx and Engels were vituperative with respect to nation-into-state language and ethnicity movements, due to their obviously disruptive impact on the class struggle and on proletarian unity. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx said that the proletariat had no nationality. Karl Marx considered nations and their cultural heritage to be residues of the past with no significance as markers of identity in a future communist society (Haarmann and Holman 1997: 117). Engels advocated that minority cultures and languages should be suppressed with *iron ruthlessness* (Kymlicka 1997: 9). As a matter of fact, these views respecting the rights of majorities only were along the lines of other contemporary thinkers, the main difference being the temporary nature of nationality in the Marxist thought (cf. Skutnabb-Kangas 1996). Followers in Russia denied any subjective validity or functional need for ethnicity, and saw it as an essentially manipulated, manufactured by-product of elitist efforts to gain mass support for political and economic goals (Gellner 1964, referred to in Fishman 1989). However, there were other opinions. Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein and Otto Bauer, Viennese Marxists of the beginning of the 20th century represented another trend of thought, which introduced autonomy also to linguistic spheres. Lenin, with multiethnic roots from the Russian multilingual empire, was well acquainted with the issues of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. Thus, the discussion of the national question takes up considerable space in his writings.

One has to differ Lenin's writings, with pre-revolution theoretical writings not always in accord with his post-Revolution practical guidelines. Though most of the ideological postulates remained the same, difference is observable in his attitude to the issues of self-determination, national culture and minority schooling. In 1913 Lenin expressed opinion that *it would certainly be harmful to advocate division of schools according to nationality...* Concerning culture, he was categorical: *The slogan of national culture is a bourgeois fraud* (Lenin 1913).

As a top statesman in the post-revolution period, Lenin accepted the reality of multilingualism of the state. Any attempt to change the balance he considered to be an unforgivable opportunism. Lenin (1922) demanded strict guidelines for the use of national languages in non-Russian republics and control over their implementation. The regulations should be drafted by those republics themselves. This idea was implemented in several ethnic territorial units. Basically he considered this issue as a significant constraint in unity of the class struggle that must be overcome with whatever cost. At the same, he fought against any fraction that might threaten the proletarian unity (cf. the struggle against the ethnically based Jewish *Bund!*), thus making the understanding of his real intentions in the linguistic field difficult. Note: XXX Kreindler (1985) has proposed here the framework of ideas originating from two contrastive traditions, Eastern and Western tradition.

In his works and afterwards, deeds concerning language policy, Lenin had to tackle a complex matter, containing the issues of **self-determination of peoples, the role and the status of the Russian language, and the free development of other languages.**

Lenin's main goal was to overcome Tsarism in Russia, a view that was shared by many others. Thus, in order to obtain support from the enemies of the common enemy the Tsar, he supported the **principle of self-determination** of the peoples of Russia. However, he was cautious and even negative about the ideas of Kautsky, whom he criticized heavily (1918).

Lenin's theoretical writings on nationality policy (covering ethnic and linguistic issues), written mostly 1913-1914, a long time before the 1917 revolution, were not a separate part of his concept but a logical consequence of the need to unite all proletarians in Russia to weigh a war for the socialist revolution.

In order to reach this goal it was necessary to provide freedom for small nations up to the separation (Lenin *On Nationalities' Policy and Proletarian Internationalism*, referred to in Urdze (1990)). The basic principle for Lenin to implement this was to establish equality between nations. In 1913 he wrote (Lenin 1913): *The Marxist national programme... advocates firstly, the equality of nations and languages and the impermissibility of all privileges in this respect (and also the right of*

nations to self-determination); secondly, the principle of internationalism. Referring to Tsarist Russia as a prison of peoples, Lenin wrote in 1914, before the revolution, demanding that, in accordance with the first principle, the primacy of class should not be interfered with any ethnic conflicts. This was to be guaranteed by full equality of languages: *The interests of class struggle demand full equality of nations in order to eliminate any ethnic distrust... Full equality includes denial of all sorts of privileges for any language* (Lenin 1914). XXX p. 16 in Critical Remarks. Based on this principle, one of the first steps after the October Revolution was to declare all national languages in Russia equal, as witnessed by the November 1917 *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*. This view was incorporated to the Second Program of the Russian Communist (bolshevik) Party in March 1919. Lenin's ideas on self-determination were not unique in Russia. On April 10, 1917, after the abdication of the Czar, Prime Minister Lvov declared that Russia repudiated its domination over other nations and called for a stable peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. More political support for the principle of self-determination was provided by the first All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks in May 1917 and the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets on June 21 the same year.

The Declaration of Peace issued by the Soviet Government (Laserson 1943: 10-11, quoted in Hough 1985: 322-323):

...By annexation or seizure of foreign territory, the government in accordance with the legal concept of democracy in general and of the working class in particular, understands any incorporation of a small and weak nationality by a large and powerful state without a clear, definite and voluntary expression of agreement and desire by the weak nationality, regardless of the time when such forcible incorporation took place, regardless also of how developed or how backward is the nation forcibly attacked or forcibly detained within the frontiers of the larger State, and finally, regardless of whether or not this large nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.

If any nation whatsoever is detained by force within the boundaries of a certain State and if that nation, contrary to its expressed desire - whether such desire is made manifest to the press, national assemblies, in parties' decisions, or in protest and uprisings against national oppression - is not given the right to determine the form of its State life by free voting and completely free from the presence of the troops of the annexing or strange State, and without the least pressure, then the adjunction of that nation by the stronger State is annexation, i.e. seizure by force and violence.

The Declaration of Peace was followed by the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia on November 15, 1917. Among other things it stated:

The Congress of Soviets has proclaimed in June of this year the right of Russia's nationalities for free self-determination. The Second Congress of Soviets has confirmed more categorically and determined this inalienable right of Russia's nationalities.

The Council of the People's Commissars, executing the will of those Congresses, has decided to lay down as a foundation of its policy toward the problem of Russia's nationalities, the following principles: 1. The equality and sovereignty of Russia's nationalities; 2. The right of Russia's nationalities to free self-determination up to seceding and the organization of an independent state.

Thus, though supporting the principle of self-determination of peoples, it had an ideological constraint, based on the understanding of obstruction to the unity of proletariat through the implementation of it, making the realisation of it unthinkable in the case of Soviet system for those who were too weak to defend their freedom. Such a Catch-22-type situation led to the occupation of states with bourgeois order and also with ideologically similar order (Georgia, the Ukraine).

In order to erase the national resentment against the Russians among non-Russians, accumulated during Czarist assimilation policies, and to distance himself personally from the Russification policy of the Tsarist Russia, based on the obligatory use of Russian and the compulsory teaching of Russian in schools in non-Russian areas, and hated by non-Russian nationalities (ethnic groups), Lenin provided a different solution. This was the reason, provided by Goodman (1979: 718), why Lenin introduced the **right of each nation to use and freely develop its own language** as the first step toward the voluntary adoption of a language common to all nations. This would happen, according to Lenin, due to the economic factors of development, i.e. modernisation: *The demands of the economic factors will, of their own, determine which language of a given country the majority would profitably learn in the interests of trade. This determination will be the more certain and the populations of different nations will voluntarily adopt it the more quickly and widely, the more democracy will be consistently introduced.* (Lenin: *Liberally I demokraty v voprose o iazykakh*, Sept. 18, 1913, quoted in Goodman 1970: 718). Lenin (1913) wrote: *The requirements of economic exchange will themselves decide which language of the given country it is to the advantage of the majority to know in the interests of commercial relations.*

Goodman (1970: 720) suggests that before the revolution Lenin had held that the process of assimilation of nations was already in progress under the bourgeoisie, and that it would be greatly

accelerated by the advent of socialism, thus promises would not do harm anyway. CXXX Critical Remarks 18,20. Lenin (1913) stated: *The proletariat welcomes every kind of assimilation of nations, except that which is founded on force or privilege... The proletariat.. supports everything that helps to obliterate national distinctions and remove national barriers, it supports everything that makes the ties between nationalities closer and closer, or tend to merge nations.*

Lenin's view of conflict-free interethnic relations was strongly tied to the class struggle as the motor of history. Thus, Lenin did not exclude violence, quite to the contrary, he personally promoted this (cf. Solzhenitsyn 1988), only by dividing the society according to class frontiers.

The role of the Russian language in Lenin's writings seems to be ambiguous. In accordance with the principle above, Lenin firmly condemned any special legal status for Russian, like that of a state language (Lenin: *Nuzhen-li obiazatelnyi gosudarstvennyi iazyk?* Jan. 31, 1914; *Razvrashchenie rabochikh utonchenym natsionalizmom* May 23, 1914). On the other, Lenin specifically favoured the widespread use of Russian within the Empire, if it could be introduced without compulsion: *The progressive significance of the Russian language for a vast number of miserable and backward nations is indisputable* (Lenin: *Pismo S.G. Shaumianu*. Dec. 6, 1913, quoted in Goodman 1970:718). As Goodman has observed, Lenin recognised *the unquestionably progressive significance of centralisation, of large governmental units, and of a single language*, yet he opposed the mandatory adoption of Russian as the official state language (ibid.). Lenin also condemned compulsory teaching of Russian, however regarding learning Russian as civilized language positive.

To these two Leninist principles lot of lip service was paid during the whole history of the Soviet Union (cf. Svejcer 1986, referred to in Ozolins 1994): Russian was never called the official language, but instead, it was regarded as the interethnic language of the Soviet Union with all the functions of the official language. Similarly, learning Russian was even under the coercion always labelled as voluntary.

2. Practice

After the 1917 Revolution when most of the bigger nationalities under the Tsarist rule seized the opportunity for **self-determination** and declared themselves independent, this type of rhetoric ended. Red Army was formed, with one task amongst others to bring back prodigal nationalities to the Russian empire by any (including violent) means. The task was fulfilled only partially and terminated with the bilateral treaties with the neighbouring states, though attempts were made, under the guise of unsuccessful "uprisings" also in the later period (e.g. in Estonia in Tallinn on 1 December 1924, in Romania in Tatar Bunar on 15 September 1924). It seems that the implementation of the adopted principle of self-determination depended most of all on the actual power of the Red Army.

Though the principle of **equality of languages** was hailed officially, the attitude towards various languages differed. First, the language of communications had to be established, then the attitude towards the kin languages of Russian, the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages, and last, the role of all other languages determined within the borders of the Soviet Russia afterwards renamed the Soviet Union.

1. Lingua franca

In the 1920s, the chief propagandists spread the theory of the export of Communism, according to which all countries by chain reaction would soon become socialist. The dominant view was that in this scenario, the language would certainly be based on the Latin alphabet, but opinions differed on the choice of language. Goodman (1970) notes that it was assumed that the future world language would be based upon Western European, rather than Russian, roots. For example Leo Trotzky, Chief-of-Arms of Soviet Russia, promoted the learning of Esperanto and even demanded knowledge of it from his officers until the year 1923 (refXX Kommunist). Consequently Trotsky was also the main apologete for Latin alphabet. There were also other proposals, though Russian continued to function in the central bureaucracy. Even as late as in 1930 Soviet Commissar of Education Lunacharskii proposed the imminent latinisation of the Russian alphabet (Lunacharskii 1930: 20-26, referred to in Fierman 1990: 215). Reasons for the Latin alphabet seemed to be the following:

- to secure the Soviet Power by elimination the connection with Islam among the speakers of languages with Arabic script; this was the reason why the literacy campaign was started with Turkic languages,
- taking into account the export theory of Communism, to make the future sole language more acceptable for Western Europe,
- russificatory policies of the tsarist regime were fresh in mind. In this connection Goodman (1970: 726) notes: *...the adoption of Latin, instead of the Cyrillic, script within the Soviet Union avoided the odious connotation of Great Russian chauvinism, an attitude that was still officially condemned during*

his early period,

- there were several attempts to introduce Latin alphabet-based literary minority languages even before the Soviet power. For example, in 1917 S.A. Novgorodov, a Yakut linguist, developed Yakut script based on Latin alphabet.

2. Kin languages

The attitude towards Ukrainian and Belorussian was sophisticated. Though both languages counted millions of speakers, they were mutually comprehensible with Russian. Thus, extralinguistic factors played the main role in forming the official position. According to Dingley (1989) Lenin saw Ukrainian as a *tool for the communist education of the working masses*. However, in his pre-revolution writings he foresaw the assimilation of Ukrainian, and considered it progressive: *The assimilation... of the Great-Russian and Ukrainian proletariat is an indisputable fact. And this fact is undoubtedly progressive* (Lenin 1913).

Goodman (1970: 724) reports that, due to the linguistically unbalanced situation in the (eastern) Ukraine with Russians forming majority in towns and Ukrainians in the countryside, during the period of 1920-1923 Lebed's theory of the struggle of two cultures was applied, intending to produce the victory of Russian over Ukrainian, on the ground that the future belonged to the Russian-speaking urban proletariat which possessed a culture superior to the backward-looking, Ukrainian-speaking peasantry. The position of Ukrainian was improved on the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1923 and Lebed's theory rejected. However, as Ukrainian was not considered a real language, the teaching of Russian was made obligatory in the Ukraine in 1923.

The success in the development of Belorussian was not connected to the Soviet power, but to the liberty from national persecution. Cultivation of Belorussian language increased considerably during WWI. In 1918 the first thorough grammatical survey of the Belorussian language was published by Tarashevich. Schools and a teacher training college were opened, operating in Belorussian.

3. Minority languages

Levits (1990:54) has pointed that the 1917 revolution was primarily a Russian revolution. It was assumed that the revolution would spread from Russia to the rest of the world (the so-called export theory of Communism). Thus the initial years after the Russian 1917 revolution were characterised by constant efforts of ideological penetration into the minds of non-Russian peoples. Achieving this involved an enormous amount of communication which was most efficient in the native language of target groups (Fierman 1990: 213). In order to decrease opposition against government measures, indigenous functionaries were used for introduction the new policies. This process was called *korenizatsia* (indigenization) of the local ruling apparatus of the non-Russian areas. According to the *korenizatsia*, several schools and courses were started to prepare local cadres. Initially these operated in Russian and afterwards switched to local languages (Desheriev 1976:11). Part of the local cadres was educated in special educational institutions in major cities in Russia.

The other reason for such policy seems to be the necessity to coopt the nationalities to counter the Whites and other nations' invading armies (Piper 1968, Seton-Watson 1986, Szporluk 1990, referred to in Marshall 1996: 8).

Together with the former, the free development of languages was respected and gradually implemented, depending mostly on the political value of the specific ethnic group. The reason for this was the sophisticated linguistic situation in Russia.

From the 120 languages 90 were used only orally. Russian was the official language of the state apparatus, however, not spoken among non-Russian peoples, with a marginal level of literacy. According to Crisp (1989) the Tenth Session of the Communist Party that was held in March 1921 was the main initiator of ethnic awakening and eradication of illiteracy. The Session adopted a resolution on the national question that put the task before the party to develop and strengthen national language-medium operated court, administration and other institutions using for this purpose local people knowing the traditions and habits of the local population, and to develop press, school, theatre, cultural institutions in local national language. It meant, first of all, creating literacy (including development of necessary materials and writing systems for many languages, publication of these materials, mother-tongue medium education, training local pedagogical staff and publishing in local languages). Simultaneously, unification of schooling and education was carried out, together with policies which required Russians to learn local languages. Following the *lingua franca* line of thought, during the 1920s the Latin alphabet was introduced for languages which were either not alphabetised or used a non-Cyrillic alphabet (the entire literacy campaign was connected to spreading Communist ideology and converting people to Communism).

According to Crisp (1989), two linguistic decisions changed the corpus of languages: first, **primacy of the phonetic principle** (1926) thus separating related languages and elevating dialects to languages, causing fragmentation of ethnic groups (cf. Mari, Komi, etc.). The second decision prescribed **all loanwords to be written in their Russian form** (cf. Trubachov 1979: theory of a common terminological stock for all Soviet languages). From these steps Goodman (1970: 725) traces the beginning of the rise of the Russian language: *The logical result of this policy was that Russian increasingly became the lingua franca of the non-Russian peoples.*

Institutional management of nationality policy was one of the priorities. The topic was continuously discussed on the Congresses of Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party. Governmental bodies were founded like the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs (Narkomnats) with Stalin at the head, and the Council of Nationalities, leading to the process of *korenizatsiya* (local rooting). Several special nationality fora were arranged, dedicated to the issues of Turkic and other peoples of eastern regions of Russia, where the Soviet power was in need of further support. At the time of revolution, many of the pan-Turkic-minded Tatar intelligentsia favoured the creation of a single language for all or a very large group of Turkic speakers. Thus the Bolshevik decision to create several languages instead was a logical corollary to counter pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic currents (Fierman 1990: 213).

4. Conclusions

Researchers are of different opinion when evaluating Lenin's national and linguistic policies. Marshall (1996) considers these beneficiary while Fierman (1990: 206) sees just efforts to destroy a complex network of religious and regional identities which threatened the integrity of the state and to begin the creation of a new Soviet identity. Conquest (1972: 126) has remarked that Lenin had no political philosophy covering a post-revolutionary period, thus he preferred *ad hoc* solutions and authoritarian expediency to secure the implementation of these.

Heath (1976: 14-15, referred to in Sonntag 1996: 400) has drawn attention to the similarity of the reactions to societal multilingualism concerning American, French and Bolshevik revolutions: to enlist the support of the populace for the revolution, multilingualism should not be suppressed. Suppression could lead to alienation and resistance to the revolution; acknowledgement and use of multilingualism (for example, in revolutionary propaganda) could help legitimate the new regime.

When compared Lenin's rule to the previous period of the tsarist imperial rule, one witnesses a major development concerning the minority languages in Russia. Ethnic differences and linguistic variety were accepted, mother tongue was promoted in several functional and regional domains, principles of federalism were introduced. However, due to the ideological influence, hegemonic control (McGarry and O'Leary 1993, discussed in 2.2.3) was re-established, with resources allocated by the Centre, no signs of hard bargaining between the ethnic elites and the Centre, controlled by Russians. The Centre acted as the administrative instrument of the special ideological-ethnic elite, with the existing political order legitimated by the ideology of this elite. Thus, the power distribution and the allocation of rights between ethnic groups in the Soviet Union was non-permanent, depending on the power configuration between the four power grids.

Instead of continuing Tzarist colonial language spread by shifting Russian-speaking elites from the Centre to Periphery (cf. Phillipson 1992: 52), Lenin suggested indigenization of elites, with strong ideological links with the Centre. Lenin thus proposed extended minority protection regime to territories inhabited by non-Russians, with Russian developed among ethnic Russians in Russia along nation-building lines, and temporarily up to the finding of a suitable candidate, limited language spread model. Lenin's nationality policy enabled to develop toponymic, ethnic and linguistic identities, only politonymic identity was a taboo.

For kin languages choice for identity development was much more limited. Considered as a reargard of Russian language, only Ukrainian and Belorussian toponymic identity was promoted, with ethnonym and linguonym severely restricted.

When comparing the Soviet Union (Russia) of that period with the other states that emerged from the ruins of the czarist Russia, then the titular languages of those were in a comparably better position than these would have been in the Soviet conditions (Ukrainian or Kazakh vs. Polish or Finnish!). What concerns the minority languages inside the other states (e.g. Livs in Latvia, Sami in Finland), then their conditions were not always better than those in the Soviet Union.

According to the classification provided by Cobarrubias (1983) we could trace three different policy options used at that time:

- unsupported coexistence (concerning several languages not taken account);
- partial support of specific language functions (the languages that were recognised but not included in the federal ethnic structure as official); and
- adoption as an official language (in the ethnic units of the federal structure).

Compared to the following periods the Central power was weak. Therefore, the language policy options were influenced, in addition to ideology, by the need to consolidate the integrity of the state, improve the characteristics of mass mobilisation and the dissemination of information and ideology, as well as to create counterhegemonies against the outside and inside class-based threats (cf. Mazrui 1996: 115-116).

One has to agree that none of the three main principles affecting directly language policy and cultural well-being discussed above were respected to the full extent. The building of the ethnic system took place in the conditions of the Red Terror. Any attempt that was regarded harmful for the established guidelines was punished severely. The principle of self-determination was denied in fact. Concerning the other two principles, several positive developments took place. Russian still functioned as the official language, but to a significantly minor and less submersive extent than in Tsarist Russia. Several functional domains that operated in Russian before were taken over by local languages. The need to win the cooperation of various ethnicities led to the program of *korenizatsia* and successful eradication of illiteracy (in some cases like Tadjik, previous form of literacy). However, one has to distinguish the active and passive role of the Soviet state in various developments of language planning. For most of the active steps taken by the Soviet state in language planning an extralinguistic political reason may be found (opposing Islam, coopting peoples against war enemies, spreading ideology). Crisp (1989) mentions that Turkic Alphabet Committee was reorganised in 1930 into an All-Union Committee for the New Alphabet, with the task to eliminate Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic identities, according to Fierman (1990: 206). The passivity and non-interference of the state in the free development of nationalities concerning some nationalities was usually caused either by insufficient power or non-interest in the issue.

Haarmann and Holman (1997:118) have pointed out among the main tasks of the Soviet language planning the elimination of illiteracy, the creation of writing systems for hitherto unwritten languages, the provision of teaching materials in local languages, and the use of local languages in the mass media (i.e. press and radio), the main bulk of which was accomplished during Lenin's political influence. In 1934 Slavin and Khodzaev (1934, referred to in Goodman 1970: 726) reported that 72 nationalities of the USSR, formerly without alphabets, had received them, of which 64 were based on the Latin script.

Soviet language policy put the main thrust on latinisation and creation of new literary languages. This was followed by the systematisation of their orthographical and terminological systems and publication of normative grammars and textbooks. As a matter of fact, these developments were achieved locally, with no firm policy line from Moscow.

Reasons for such policy seem to be the following:

- 1□ relative freedom for researchers and local administrators in language issues,
- 2□ common goals for scientific and political network (see 2.4.8). The political goal was to gain support in the areas with domination of Islam through literacy and latinisation (Crisp 1989), in Russia and other Slavic parts to gain support for Communism (Dingley 1989).
- 3□ relative weakness of the state, civil war and disobedience, multiple hierarchies (like New Economic Policy, cf. Kirkinen et al. 1986). For example, according to Fierman (1990: 204) most armed resistance to Soviet power was crushed and political control consolidated in the Central Asia only in the late 1920s.
- 4□ the wave of romantic nation-state ideal reached Eastern Europe and Russia;
- 5□ blossoming of the export theory of Communism (Crisp 1989).

Afterwards, these actions were regarded as overbalanced and inconsistent. The Grand Old Man of the Soviet language policy of the 1970s, Desheriev (1976:15) concludes XXX my erroneous translation: *During 1920s enormous difficulties were faced in implementation of language policy...Errors and miscalculations of that time were corrected during the following years. During 1920s very much was done to create literacy and expand functional spheres of previously illiterate languages. During these years basis for overexpansion of social functions of some literary languages of autonomous republics, regions and districts was laid. This process continued during the first half of 1930s. Local languages were used in schooling up to 7th or 8th grade. Life showed the inconsistency of this action, and teaching in local languages was reduced to elementary schooling.*

As a result in several languages (like Chechen), mother tongue schooling was never introduced, due to the continuous pressure, allegedly asserted by parents, demanding Russian instead (Desheriev 1976:15).

In Bourdieu's (1991) sense, Lenin enabled to create internal linguistic markets expanding to several functional domains and elevating the status of local languages as capital.

10. Stalin: No person, no problem 1923-1954

During Lenin's reign Stalin was, in addition to other duties, in charge of ethnic and linguistic issues, being the Head of People's Commissariat on Nationalities (*Narkomnats*). At that time several collisions between Lenin and Stalin took place on ethnic issues, like representing different viewpoints on the formation of the structure of the future Soviet Union. Though Stalin produced articles and books on national question, he almost never spoke on this particular topic (cf. Goble 1994), being just an effective manager and manipulator.

According to Goble (1994) the beginning of Stalin's reign was triggered by Lenin's departure from politics due to his fading health in 1923 and subsequent death in January 1924. *Narkomnats* was discharged at the end of 1923. However, as Stalin had other, more important things to carry out, including power struggle in the Kremlin, the nationalities policy line initiated during Lenin's reign, developed without major reshufflings in major part of the Soviet Union up to the beginning of 1930s.

1. Theory.

According to Galtung (1996: 244) Stalinism consisted of three elements, the Russian element, trying to incorporate some of the more fundamental aspects of history and social structure; the Orthodox element, trying to characterize a branch of Christian theology (with Orthodox History instead of Orthodox God); and Marxism, to build into the thinking some basic elements of that particular ideology. These elements enriched the Soviet linguistic policy as well.

The main shift in ideological dogmas was the acceptance of Socialism in one country, as opposed to Trotsky's call for a world socialist revolution. It emerged as a new ideological dogma about the struggle between the capitalist and socialist camp. This struggle was reflected at the linguistic scene, where it was depicted as a struggle between the capitalist English and socialist Russian: American colonizers, aspiring to world domination, were allegedly seeking to have English recognized as the world language which should replace all other languages (Lomtev 1949: 136, quoted in Goodman 1970: 723).

Stalin introduced his formula of culture in 1925 (*O politicheskikh zadachakh Universiteta Narodov Vostoka*, referred to in Goodman 1970: 719): **national in form, socialist in content**. Ethnicity and native tongue belonged, according to this division, to the ideologically established category of form with the main restriction to avoid ideological issues. Consequently, cultures and peoples perished, whereas **ethnicity and native tongue** were left in peace. It enabled the use of languages inside the language community concerned in education, administration and other functional domains, the ultimate limit being not to the detriment of local monolingual Russians. Thus, a form of diglossia emerged that provided a niche for the maintenance of local languages in restricted functional domains.

Several other developments took place at the ideological front of language planning. The term *sblizhenie* (convergence) was introduced, but assimilation as a term denied. With the term of *gosudarstvennyi yazyk* (national language) being ideological taboo, Russian language with the title *velikij* (great, Lenin's term) was named the language for interethnic communication (*yazyk mezhnatsionalnogo obshchenia*).

2. Practice.

Most of the Leninist principles concerning language policy were modified in content during the reign of Stalin. Instead of the Communist export theory, the goal of reaching Communism within the period of one generation became the primary slogan. During the reign of Stalin (1924--1953), it meant using severe measures to carry out the policy, including executions, and Gulag facilities (Solzhenitsyn 1972). This was made possible due to the strengthening of the Soviet Union, decrease of anarchy, extermination of NEP (New Economic Policy) and other hierarchies directly not under state control. It also reflects the end of the power struggle inside Kremlin. In 1927, Leo Trotsky was exiled, in 1929 Bukharin and Zinoviev executed, in 1932 Kirov killed. These events provided the basis for drawing harder ideological lines within society. Thus, according to the first principle of the class-based approach, the state, led by ideological principles, turned against the enemy of the working class. In reality it meant the persecution of intellectuals, including Russian intellectuals. According to the second principle, regarding ethnicity as a temporary phenomenon, the state opposed and constrained any further attempt to develop and elaborate other languages than Russian, many researchers, administrators and cultural activists in this field were persecuted (Nutt 1989). In the process of liquidating harmful or unnecessary relations, whole nations and ethnic groups were deported, including the Kalmyk, the Ingrians, the Cherkess, the Chechens, the Ingush, the Jews, the Balkars, the Meshi, the Crimean Tartars, the Volga Germans, etc. Several migrant languages maintained their speakers and were spoken in the territory where their speakers were collectively deported by Stalin's orders, which may have led to some further ethnolinguistic conflicts afterwards.

The logic behind it was simple: ethnicity as a temporary phenomenon affiliated with capitalism had no place in the future societal order of Communism. Thus, the decrease of the number of languages spoken was interpreted as a positive sign, if at all. Language variety and maintenance was seen not only as a nuisance, but ideological backwardness. The solution could not be the substitution of one language by another (this would have been a capitalist way), but the elimination of the whole ethnic structure, achieved with the help of migrational flows, deportations, the mechanical mixing of people at their work places, and even through mixed marriages. In this course little attention was paid to the rights of an individual, according to the ideological principles. Rule of law as a possible constraint to rearrangements of society was non-existent. As Stalin put it: *No person, no problem*.

1. The Russian language

The attitudes and principles concerning the *lingua franca* changed at Stalin's time of rule. During the first years of his reign Stalin made one statement in *O politicheskikh zadachakh Universiteta Narodov Vostoka* (1925, referred to in Goodman 1970: 719), where he made clear that he did not support the idea of a single universal language. However, after strengthening his own political position (by liquidating possible rivals), he had enough time to return to the nationalities issue in 1929-1930 as well as to start the purges seriously.

Thus, the development of Russian as the interethnic language was intertwined with the manoeuvres in politics. In order to weaken the position of Trotsky, Stalin attacked the export theory of Communism by Trotsky, dating back to 1906. This action led to the consequent re-evaluation of the linguistic postulates concerning the *lingua franca*.

1930 was the end of equality of languages in the Soviet Union, with Stalin attacking Great Russian language for the last time (Stalin: *Politicheskii otchet Tsentralnogo Komiteta XVI s'ezdu VKP(b)* June 27, 1930, quoted in Goodman 1970: 725). As the export theory of Communism failed in practice, it was time to re-evaluate the linguistic dogma. In Stalin's report to the 16th Party Congress in June, 1930 he claimed the support to Lenin's views that with the victory of socialism national differences and national languages will begin to die away, that after this victory national languages will begin to be supplanted by one common language. He made clear that this common language will not be Great Russian, but something new. This language will appear in the second stage of world socialism, when a single world socialist economy has been successfully constructed. Before that period there might be several common languages for different groups of nations. *The final stage will arrive when practice has convinced nations of the superiority of a common language over national languages* (Stalin: *Natsionalnyi vopros*, quoted in Goodman 1970: 722). Languages were thought to be bourgeois manifestations doomed to die out with time, and their death would be a major achievement of the Soviet state.

Stalin's position was accompanied by the linguistic theories of Marr. Theories of Marr suggested that the linguistic road to the socialist future lay not through stable bilingualism or even language shift, but through a process of language crossing to which all languages would contribute and which would result in a hybrid directly reflecting a higher stage of human political development (Crisp 1989). Language was not tied to nation, but instead, to class. Marr considered language as an element in the Marxist superstructure dependent upon the economic base of the society (Goodman 1970: 729). The world economy should create the world language. Armed with the support of Stalin, these ideas stopped most of the linguistic research in the Soviet Union throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Even after the denunciation of Marr by Stalin in 1950, the thesis about Russian as the language of the future socialist world was maintained. During the 1950 linguistic discussion, Stalin further refined some aspects, however not adding any novelties (Stalin: *Tovarishu A. Kholopovu* July 28, 1950, referred to in Goodman 1970: 723).

With the export theory of Communism rejected and the world revolution delayed, the Russian language was chosen as the substitute to fulfil this historic task, at least for a while. Goodman (1970: 729) writes that by 1949 Soviet theoreticians were asserting categorically that Russian was predestined to be the future world language. Gradually, the concept of Russian as an "older brother" was introduced (d'Encausse 1980, quoted in Urdze 1990). Russian was marked as the interethnic language first time in the All-Union Komsomol Congress in 1930s (Vare 1989). This period marked the beginning of the gradual rise of the status of Russian as *primus inter pares* in order to guarantee effective communication and cooperation in the political, cultural, and economic spheres. The knowledge of Russian was attributed a major factor to success (Haarmann and Holman 1997: 116). However, only the instrumental function of Russian was stressed at that time.

2. Kin languages

Stalinist language policy was introduced for the kin languages of Russian first.

As language shift was far more simple among kin languages, during the second half of 1920s language policies promoting Ukrainian and Belorussian were stopped and their activists were imprisoned and executed as nationalists. Dingley (1989) remarks that in 1929, after the New Economic Policy had been put to an end, the political climate promoting Ukrainization changed rapidly. Further Ukrainization was labelled as nationalism, corpus planning stopped for a while and started again in 1934 as direct borrowing from Russian. The former work was attacked fiercely: *Belorussian and Ukrainian nationalists injected into their native speech elements of the Polish gentry's speech... In essence, this was a policy of betrayal of national interests, a policy of cosmopolitanism* (Lomtev 1949: 135, quoted in Goodman 1970: 727-728).

The same fate was reserved for the policy promoting the Belorussian language. Like in the Ukraine, in the end of 1920s most of the activists were imprisoned or exiled. On 26 August 1933 Belorussian Communist Party published an official decree listing a set of reforms of actual structure of the language, the aim being convergence of Belorussian to Russian in both orthography and grammar. The 1937 Russian-Belorussian dictionary by A. Aleksandrovich strived to show that Belorussian is really nothing more than Russian with slightly adapted spelling.

3. Minority languages.

Compared with Ukrainian and Belorussian, Stalinist language policy reached other languages considerably later. The indigenization process was terminated at the beginning of 1930s, with most of the local leaders executed (XXX Komi-permi referents). In the next stages, the mix of locals and Russian in-migrants were used as administrators. In choosing personnel for the ruling apparatus from non-Russians, linguistically and socioculturally more Russian-adapted or assimilated members of the non-Russian peoples were especially preferred - for example, persons from mixed marriages, those with a durational residence in Russia, who had studied there or had personal ties with Russia (Levits 1990:55).

The improved status of Russian led to two significant changes in the language policy of the Centre, concerning the alphabet and the teaching of Russian. As a consequence of the new balance with Russian as the primary language, the Cyrillic alphabet used by the majority population was compulsorily introduced for every language inside the Soviet Union of the 1930s. According to Crisp (1989), the Cyrillic reform of 1938 was introduced without any public discussion and other scientific activities, accompanied by the introduction of Russian as a compulsory subject in schools (Decree of 13 March 1938). This was not very successful due to the lack of teachers and teaching materials. Also in the 1930s the implementation of Russian-medium secondary schooling for the speakers of minority languages was gradually introduced, while Russian in other schools was taught as subject.

Russification started in a full swing. As Goodman (1970: 727) notes, the Soviet leaders frankly stated that the purpose of forcing these non-Russian peoples to adopt Cyrillic script was to accelerate their learning of Russian and to broaden the influence of Russian culture (Mordvinov 1950). The non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union were required to use international terms of foreign origin in the form in which they have been adopted in the Russian language (Goodman 1970: 727). XXX Note: Comparison with the West shows the similar features of language policies during the same period, cf. Amerindians, immigrants in the USA, Alsatians in France, etc.

3. Conclusion

During Stalin's reign the main language planning events were the replacement of Latin alphabets by Cyrillic, the abolition of written forms of some minor languages and introduction of Russian as a compulsory school subject. In linguistic research the period may be called a "silent period" as no major linguistic event took place and no major publication took place. According to 2.4.8 the everstrengthening grip of the totalitarian structure limited scientific freedom to marginality. The scientific community, linguists included, provided texts according to orders from politicians. Thus, the scientific value of these (cf. theories of Marr!) reflected the level of interference and control.

The practical ethnolinguistic policy was subordinated to other power grids, thus tightening hegemonic control. Other methods of the macro-political forms of ethnolinguistic policy were introduced, like genocide and forced mass-population transfers (McGarry and O'Leary 1993). The deportation of several peoples changed the linguistic map of the Soviet Union considerably. However, the focus of the policies was directed against the person, not language, so we could call the period of unsupported coexistence for the minority languages, with several cases of letting a language die, according to the classification provided by Cobarrubias (1983).

When compared to Leninist ethnolinguistic policies, the difference is remarkable. The Central power has strengthened, therefore there was no need to create counterhegemonies through the promotion of minority languages (cf. the case with the languages with Islamic speakers!). Most of the tasks of government could be performed in Russian language, and consequently the state interest in these matters dropped. Therefore, the promotion of minority languages was stopped abruptly and changed to rationalization policies by the state (cf. Laitin 1996: 56-57). The standard tasks of government and communication were performed in Russian, enlarging these functional domains to a significant extent. In order to avoid any possible resistance to these shifts by local bureaucracies, a substantial share of these were rearranged by executing, imprisoning and deporting their staff. Stalin terminated Lenin's indigenization policies and switched back to Tzarist policies of recruiting elites to minority areas from Russia. Ethnonym was made socialist in content, only ethnic form was allowed. Russian was elevated to Soviet lingua franca and harnessed for the purpose of modernist colonial language spread. Linguonym was accommodated in order to fit to new situation by introducing Russian as the compulsory language in educational system. Toponymic component was usually left intact (if the ethnic group was not deported or discriminated against).

11. Persons without ethnicity: 1950s - mid-1970s

1. Theory.

In this post-Stalin period, less violence was used in ethnic and linguistic policies (prisons and psychiatric hospitals only in extreme cases), and new theoretical concepts were introduced in the Soviet nationality theory. A great leap forward was made from Academician N.Marr's Stalinist theory of stages, which linked languages to appropriate socio-economic formations. Some constraints in applying the advantages of socialism to language still existed, as pointed out by Desheriyev (1982: 95): *Though language in Soviet society carries an important ideological function, in the Soviet philosophical and linguistic literature it has been proven that language by its nature is a non-class--based phenomenon.*

As according to the prevailing ideology the ethnic element restricts free development (the second principle!), one can exterminate the factors which maintain a person's nation and language, rather than eliminating the person oneself. Two phases of language development exclusively for socialist conditions were posited: besides *sblizhenie* [convergence, rapprochement] *slijanie* [assimilation] was introduced. An initial period of flourishing (*rastsvet*) where the national cultures develop independently is followed by rapprochement (*sblizhenie*), a process that integrates people without ethnic differences being eliminated. Development of nationalities would lead to complete fusion (*slijanie*). During the Khrushchev period another concept (*edinstvo*) was introduced indicating that although a future unitary culture should be constructed, ethnic differences would remain for a considerable time. As a whole more sophisticated methods of language planning and control were introduced. This represents the replacement of physical violence by psychological or symbolic violence, a progression from the use of sticks to carrots and ideas (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988b).

Several processes that were started during Stalin's time continued without interference. In the process of "denationalization of the ethnic environment", the concept of Russian as "the older brother" was introduced. According to Stalin's formula a new, international non-ethnic culture was created, national in form, but socialist in content. This socialist realism-based Soviet culture was directly controlled by the Communist Party (ref. XXX). Being a subculture, predominantly based on Russian culture, it was a suitable channel for unifying various national traditions by enriching them with socialist ideological framework (see further XXX).

1. Lingua franca

In the summer of 1950 an article signed by Stalin, criticizing the theories of N. Ia. Marr, gave a major impulse to the more unrestrained development that continued after Stalin's death soon afterwards (1953). This change allowed the use of more scientific methods in linguistics and development of the whole discipline. However, the ideological postulates did change their structure, but not content. Goodman notes (1970: 733) that the prospect of a single world language by altering non-Russian languages so as to draw them closer to Russian, was still upheld. Chikobava (1950) stated about this position in Pravda: *Marr expressed himself in favour of a single common language for future mankind. This is the only matter of principle on which, it would seem, Academician N. Ia. Marr's views are in accord with the theses of Marxism-Leninism.* The principle of fusion of languages, Marxist in origin, was left intact. According to the ideology the laws directing the development and fate of languages

were different in the capitalist and socialist system. While in the capitalist system it meant open combat with other languages in the arena of national oppression and inequality, then within the Soviet world the struggle for the domination of one language over others was replaced by the mutual enrichment of one language by another (i.e. Russian). *With the appearance of new socialist nations the world historic role and influence of the Russian will steadily increase* (Lomtev 1949, quoted in Goodman 1970: 734). These statements were hailed and applauded within the borders of the Soviet Union as well as outside, in the socialist bloc. Goodman (Goodman 1970:735) characterized sarcastically this behaviour as *bowing and scraping by provincial satraps before the mother tongue of Moscow*.

2. Practice

1. Russification

Zamascikov (1990:94) has defined the term russification as forcible imposition of the Russian language and culture at the expense of the native language and Moscow-encouraged immigration of Russians into non-Russian areas. Thus, the concept of russification has three dimensions: it is related to that of linguistic integration, it also denotes an all-embracing Russian influence on the culture of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union and, the concept is also used to describe the level of Russian immigration into the non-Russian republics (Dellenbrant 1990). The following characteristics of russification may be outlined:

- **Advance of Russian language to non-Russian areas** by language shift, together with migrational shift.
- **Shift to Russian of non-Russians in higher status functional areas.** These pull factors for upward mobility demanded the knowledge of Russian from those who belonged to the higher ranks of the Communist Party and management, or were engaged in intellectual activities.
- **Protection of Russian monolingualism** by creating Russian language services.
- **Rotation principle** based on Russian-language environment. Compulsory Army service for men conducted in Russian and usually in a place far from native language environment (Russian excluded) lasting for 2 (in the Navy for 3) years, before the military reform 3(5) years. Rotation of prison inmates took place in the Russian language environment like in the Army.
- **Demolition of the non-Russian native language maintenance system**, starting in introduction of transitional or submersion models in education, causing obligatory language shift for higher status functional areas.
- Emphasis was laid on the **instrumental function of language**. The status of Russian was seen mostly in instrumental terms, as the natural medium of higher communication, and cross-national communication (Isaev 1977, referred to in Ozolins 1994).
- **The connection between ethnicity and native language was terminated.** Thus, one could be monolingual in Russian with whatever ethnicity marked in one's passport (cf. Haarmann and Holman 1997).

The process of Russification can be measured by using the statistical data about linguistic preference provided by censuses. This shows that a growing number of non-Russians claimed Russian as their mother tongue. The number of those who no longer spoke their native language (according to the official ethnic affiliation) was slightly less. In addition, at least 45 million non-Russians considered Russian to be their second language. Thus, language shift in the context of Soviet language policy is expressed through the preference for the Russian language, bilingualism and the loss of one's native language.

Medish (1980: 194) has noted that most vulnerable to Russification were members of ethnic groups who lived outside their territories (10 million Ukrainians and Belorussians) or belonged to groups who did not possess eponymous territories within the USSR (Poles, Germans).

Mixed marriages contributed further to Russification. Children brought up in interethnic marriages usually went to Russian school and claimed Russian to be their first language.

2. Minority languages

In 1959 the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics of the Soviet Union passed laws on educational reforms which gave parents the right to send their children to a school where the language of their choice was used; moreover parents who had decided to send their children to Russian schools were also given the right to choose whether or not they wanted their children to be taught the autochthonous language of the Republic as a subject (Bilinsky 1962: 150, referred to in Maurais 1991: 122). As Russian enjoyed higher status than most local languages, it resulted in an overall gradual shift

to Russian as the medium of education. Several languages were not used any more as the medium of education. Thus, these laws resulted in *a decrease in the 1960s and 1970s in the number of languages used as the primary medium of instruction* (Anderson and Silver 1990: 109, quoted in Marshall 1996: 21). Silver (1974: 29, quoted in Maurais 1991: 122) noted: *highly reliable and convincing data have now accumulated indicating that enrolment in non-Russian schools has... significantly declined during the 1960s*. Crisp (1989) notes that as the reform of 1958/59 moved away from the principle that children should be taught in their native language, as a result all Karelian schools shifted to Russian at once. Dzhandildin (1959: 36, quoted in Goodman 1970: 732) quoted a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan who stated that Russian had become a second native language for the Kazakh people. He berated those parents who *think it necessary to establish a system under which the children of Kazakhs could attend only Kazakh schools. This view is nothing but a manifestation of bourgeois nationalism*.

In discussing the situation, Maurais (1991:122-123) provides a parallel from Quebec with the adoption of the Bill 63, the effects of which were highly detrimental to French. A conclusion may be drawn that the right to choose the language of education is not absolute and the state has the right to restrict it. Maurais (1991: 123) concludes: *As can be judged from both the Québec and the Soviet Union experiences, freedom of choice in the matter of language education paves the way to assimilation to the dominant language*.

Khrushchev's education laws of 1958-59 restored the legal equality of all languages by offering parents the right to choose the language of education. It made the weaker non-Russian language optional and in this way terminated or constrained intergenerational language transmission through education. It had a strong impact on languages with low status (for example, in Central Asia), where non-Russian parents opted for Russian-medium education for their children, leading to massive close-down of national language-medium schools. Sometimes no parents were needed and bureaucrats solved this issue in favour of Russian without any parental help, according to Kreindler (1985). Altogether, during the post-WWII period most of the schools in autonomous republics shifted to Russian-medium teaching (Guboglo 1984:140). During this period linguonymic component was attacked. First, maintenance of it through intergenerational transmission was handicapped by introducing the "choice" of language as the medium of education, resulting in a significant decrease in the number of minority schools, which were just tolerated.

Goodman concludes (1970: 731): *The subsequent denigration of Stalin left the Russifying impact of Stalin's linguistic policy intact, for the post-Stalinist period has seen a continuation, and even an intensification, of attempts to step up the teaching of Russian in non-Russian schools*.

No more drastic macro-political forms of ethnic cleansing took place, like the Stalinist genocide and forced mass-population transfers. Hegemonic control was maintained, with softer and more sophisticated methods. The functional domains of the minority languages diminished, especially in education. However, the goal of the deliberate disruption of the intergenerational transmission of language was instrumental, attempting to ensure the knowledge of Russian among the new generation for the success of the rationalization policies of the state.

12. Ideologisation of language use in the 1970s.

1. Theory

This period can be characterised by two features. The first concerned the neutrality of language. While in the West, languages of wider communication were presented as neutral linguistic tools, enabling larger and unrestricted communication, the Soviet language planners chose the opposite way, emphasising the **connection of ideology and language**. Though not admitted in the Soviet language planning literature, thrust moved gradually away from the instrumental motivation and was substituted by ideological motivation, related to identity.

The second feature concerned the timetable. The estimated deadline for the **total ethnic fusion** of Soviet nationalities was put **into the more distant future** with every ascending new Communist Party leader. Brezhnev made it clear in a speech in 1977 that the *socioeconomic unity of the Soviet people in no way means the disappearance of national differences* (Brezhnev 1978:625, quoted in Dellenbrant 1990). By the mid-70s the goal of *sliyanie* was dropped from major political speeches. Brezhnev emphasized that the Party was against forcing such integration (Pravda, 22 December 1972, quoted in Smith 1994:124). This new balance of direct pressure was reflected in the new Soviet Constitution that preserved the nationality-based federal structure. Besides, several other rights were mentioned. According to Article 36 of the Constitution *the implementation of rights of nationalities of the USSR are guaranteed through the policy of development and convergence of all nations and nationalities, and*

also by the possibility to use the native language and other languages of nationalities of the USSR.. The same applied to criminal and civil procedures in Court which followed the right to translation to native language (Constitution, Article 159).

Sciences, sociolinguistics included, were harshly **ideologised**. For example, one of the most quoted Estonians in literature on bilingualism was Endel Paap, a miner who wrote an article about internationalist friendship in an oil-shale mine *Estonia* in the journal *Kommunist* (1983).

According to the official ideology, the Soviet Union entered a new phase of development - **developed socialism** (*razvitoi sotsializm*). This new notion contained the requirement of fluency in Russian of non-Russian nationalities. Thus, any feature of language shift towards Russian was considered not only positive, but it had an additional ideological weight. According to the census data, the fluency in Russian among non-Russians increased from 76% in 1970 to 81.9% in 1979, while the number of those who had shifted to Russian, from 13 million to 16.3 million (Guboglo 1984:66).

Bilingualism became one of the most popular terms in the Soviet language planning. The term had several deviations from the standard meaning:

- 1 □ it concerned non-Russians only;
- 2 □ it was seen as a transitional phase to Russian monolingualism;
- 3 □ it was limited to Russian - non-Russian bilingualism;
- 4 □ bilingual speakers tended always to be more cultural and intelligent than non-Russian speakers without the knowledge of Russian.
- 5 □ even a minimal knowledge of Russian qualified a person to be a bilingual.

Usually the knowledge of the Russian language among non-Russian population was counted. As the non-Russian ethnicity was based on the passport data based on descent, a monolingual Russian-speaking non-Russian was categorised as bilingual. There were some other regional peculiarities in the interpretation of this term, as in the Central Asian republics (cf. Uzbeks!) the rate of bilingualism was extremely high and the knowledge of Russian extremely scarce.

Among other ideological tasks in this domain one should mention creating national fund of spiritual values and unification of national cultures as a further development of the theory of convergence.

What emerged was, according to Medvedyev (1986: 95), the following:

- 1) the convergence of languages and the mutual enrichment of cultures,
- 2) languages became stylistically diverse,
- 3) several writers published their works in Russian instead of in their native languages,
- 4) phoneme inventories of languages were enriched by new phonemes.

The second achievement was based on the comparison with the period of illiteracy. The fourth result was explained through the case of Kyrgyz (Kirgiz) language, which added /f/ to its phoneme inventory when the capital of Kirgizia was named "Frunze" in honour of a famous Russian revolutionary.

To strengthen the positive tendencies in society, the Communist Party-led ethnolinguistic policy assumed the following (Desheriyevev 1982: 12):

- 1) the equality of languages;
- 2) the creation of necessary conditions for the evolution and mutual enrichment of languages;
- 3) an unlimited usage of national languages in all spheres;
- 4) a guarantee of bilingualism - one's native language and the use of Russian as an instrument of brotherly cooperation between the nations of the SU;
- 5) the consistent implementation of national-international cross-fertilization, enrichment and convergence, as well as the development of a common Soviet culture;
- 6) the replenishment of the lexical fund of the languages of the SU nations (cf. Academician Y.Trubatchov's theory in Hint 1990).

All the aforementioned assumptions lead to the **internationalization** of all spheres of society.

Internationalization (*internacionalizatsija*) (*inter nationes Sovietici* and not among any randomly chosen nations in the world) was a directed and controlled process, influenced by political, economic and ideological, as well as by purely propagandist means. The goal, according to the program of the CPSU of 1961, was to unify the nations - a common economy, common communist features, and a common international culture. This was implemented by means of "**international**" education (*internacional'noe vospitanie*), program of which included the following subjects: the theory of the national question and propaganda for the cooperation of Soviet Union nations, the inculcation of new international traditions, explanations of the nature of the internationalism of the proletariat, propaganda concerning the importance of the Russian language, sharing the (positive) experience of multinational working parties, the creation of the feeling of belonging to the family of the Soviet peoples, and the struggle against the phenomena of (linguistic) chauvinism and nationalism (Metelitsa 1982). Other researchers, referred to in Kandimaa (1989) added the following topics: scientific and class-based interpretation of the history of nations, the advantages of socialism in solving national

problem, the exposition of the bourgeois falsifications of the national policy of the CPSU, and history of the USSR. Providing his opinion, Szepe (1995: 22) has depicted internationalism of the former Soviet Union as a covert way of Russification.

1. The linguistic ideal

Ideology provided a suitable disguise for assimilationist and linguistic policies.

The objective of international education was to produce people with no ethnic affiliation and preferences. For further clarification and illustration a new pattern for the Soviet ethnic and linguistic ideal was introduced. At the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971, Brezhnev (1971) announced the birth of a new historic community of peoples: the Soviet people, having three characteristic features: 1) embodying Marxist-Leninist ideology, 2) having the goal of building Communism, hence 3) supporting non-ethnicity (see Nutt 1989). Rashidov (1981: 34-35) depicted this community as follows:

The Soviet people have a common homeland - the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and a common goal - Communism building. They have a common ideology - Marxism-Leninism, a common chief and leader - the Party of Great Lenin. They are united by a common political basis - the Soviets of People's Deputies, and a common economic basis - the socialist economic system. They have a common societal awareness XXX - all-national honour of a Soviet person, feeling of belongingness of everybody, regardless of nationality, to the Soviet people. They have a common for all nations and nationalities the socialist mood of life.

The main means of communication of the new historical community is the Russian language. It is the most important factor of communication for all nations and nationalities, accelerator of their convergence.

Other significant qualities were provided: residence in the Soviet Union, in lieu of democracy, struggling for the socialist democracy, collective thinking and decision-making, knowledge of the language of the future (Communist) society, Russian, the **interethnic language** (*yazyk mezhnatsional-nogo obshchenija*) (cf. Kreindler 1989).

Afterwards the scientific literature has been using the name *homo soveticus* for representatives of these qualities. Galtung (1996: 244) emphasises the Russian identity as a base by describing this phenomenon with the formula:

homo soveticus - Marxism = homo russicus

Fedyshyn (1980: 151-152) draws attention to the fact that the term Soviet People was presented as a union (*ob'edinenie*) of the ethnic groups of the USSR, thus not yet a fully developed new political identity.

2. The Russian language

Beginning with the 1970s ideological impact was laid on the rearrangement of language domains, with Russian claiming new ones, as being the most progressive and developed, while for other languages were left less prestigious domains. This was supported by a massive campaign and the allocation of generous financial resources for Russian-language teaching. The candidate to the member of the Politburo Rashidov (1981:42-43) stated: *Knowledge of the Russian language is an inherent aspect of not only professional and general training of specialists for all branches of national economy, but also an important condition for international education of all layers of society...Growth of the social significance of the Russian language as the interethnic language, the language of friendship and cooperation of the nationalities of the USSR, as an important factor of comprehensive development of the personality, the upbringing of the new generation in the spirit of internationalism, Soviet patriotism and indestructible friendship between our nations requires urgently further improvement of the organisation of all activities concerning the study of the Russian language.*

The Russian language was the unwritten precondition for most positions upwards from intermediate management levels. Intellectual work was modified to the needs of Russian monolinguals, with all the developments and progress channeled through Russian translations. Ideologization enabled to affect also non-intellectual groups of the Soviet society, according language knowledge, choice and use to the "Party line". For the language planning activities the campaign started with an all-Union conference with the title *The Russian Language - the Language of Friendship and Cooperation Among the Nations of the USSR* that took place in Tashkent in May 1979. The conference recommended that teaching of Russian be started in preschool institutions from the age of five and that all available resources be used to achieve effective results. The recommendations also covered the general and technical schools and the institutions of higher education (Zamascikov 1990:95).

The reasons advanced for this, developed in the course of time, were the following: Russian is spoken by Russians, who form approximately one half of the population of the USSR; fraternal cooperation

takes place via this language; the Russian people have liberated other peoples and have provided them with fraternal help, common historical traditions, as well as a major part of the Russian culture and science with which to develop the culture of these other nations; Russian is one of the most developed world languages, as it is the language of current scientific, cultural and technological cooperation, and international communication (Desheriyev 1982: 44). In addition, Russian has several unique functions, being the native language of Russians, and it is the freely chosen international language for the peoples of the USSR, as well of the countries of the socialist friendship union. This language contains the richest literature on Marxism-Leninism, as well as socialist economic, cultural, and linguistic construction experiences of the USSR, which are of direct concern to the countries of the Third World (Desheriyev 1982: 47). To reach Communism, Russians must keep their language alive and thriving. For non-Russians, the only remaining option was the exchange of their native languages for Russian through voluntary self-assimilation (Khanazarov 1982). Interests in building Communism require deep knowledge of Russian by Soviet people of various nationalities, according to Sh. R. Rashidov (1981:18), the Politburo candidate and the organiser of the Russian promotion campaign, launched in Tashkent in 1979. The Minister of Education of the USSR Prokofyev demanded in Tashkent that learning Russian should start in kindergarten at the age of 4, Russian teaching at school from the first grade. For the effective teaching of Russian the increase of resources, technical facilities and smaller study groups were required.

Academician Bromley, a leading Soviet expert in the nationality issues, stated (1973: 175): *The most important factor of formation and component of All-Union culture is the Russian language.*

According to Desheriev (1976:10) this status was based on the following criteria:

- superior number of native speakers (approximately half of the population),
- availability of ca 50 million speakers of Ukrainian and Belarussian as speakers of kin languages, who speak Russian with no difficulty,
- a substantial share of the remaining part of the population knows Russian,
- Russian is the language of Soviet intellectuals,
- Russian was empowered by its ideological role as the liberator from Tsarism and local exploiters, and as the channel of friendly aid of the Russian nation in the political, economic and cultural development of other republics.
- Russian as the channel of enrichment of other languages (Desheriev 1976:17, Trubachev 19XXX, cf. critique in Hint 1990)

The expansion of social functions of Russian in non-Russian territories occurs in two ways (Desheriev 1976:409):

1□ as the mother tongue Russians use it in societal life;

2□ as the interethnic language Russians use it in communicating with other ethnicities.

Presence of the Russian population in non-Russian areas was viewed positively by Desheriev (1976:417) as a promoter of mastering the Russian language. Venclova (1980: 250) observed: *Russian to a growing degree is seen not as Russian, but as "Soviet", and large groups of Russians themselves perceive it in just this way. The fact is that Russian is more connected with the official ideology than the non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union.*

This provided the way out from Lenin's principle of the equality of languages. Thus, preference was given more to the carrier of the Soviet ideology than language. Expansion of Russian was supported by significant financial and administrative resources. Special all-Union programs allocated money for the preferential teaching of Russian, books were published in Russian in non-Russian republics, the lack of demand did not matter. Media and infrastructure were available in Russian even in the localities without any or with marginal number of Russian residents (e.g. Caucasus). Russian was the common language of courts and enjoyed the network of extensive cultural and educational institutions outside Russia. Information agencies operating in Russian had the monopoly of information, as all others (on the republic level, for example) had to coordinate even the local news with them, previously translating all the texts to Russian (Note: Vladimir Beekman, an Estonian writer, got an award for his book *Leaves falling*, according to the news, while the title of the book concerned was *October*. The reason for this is the Russian word *Listopad*, having two different meanings.) Punitive organs, politics, diplomacy, administration and to a large extent, science operated in Russian. From the number of publications on cultural issues 74.2% published in the USSR in 1980 were in Russian. The percentage of Russian-language publications for industrial matters was 99.3% (Guboglo 1984:187).

The campaign for promoting the Russian language at the cost of other languages was carried out throughout the whole period. At the CPSU Politburo meeting in May 1983, in order to ensure that all Soviet citizens be fluent in Russian it was decided that the Russian language should be given wider use in the educational system and the methods of teaching Russian should also be improved (Pravda, May 27, 1983, quoted in Dellenbrant 1990).

3. Kin languages

The share of Belarussians and Ukrainians, using non-titular language (i.e. Russian) as their mother tongue from the total number of these ethnicities in these republics rose from 15.8 to 25.8% and 12.3 to 17.2% correspondingly (Guboglo 1984:265). The shift among non-titular nationalities was even bigger. The number of pupils learning in Ukrainian and in Belorussian in the Ukraine and Belarus decreased during the period of 1965-1972, correspondingly 93.8 and 85.8% (1965 taken as 100%, referred to in Guboglo 1984:140).

4. Minority languages

The fate of other languages in the Soviet Union corresponded to the formula: *blossoming through convergence, convergence through blossoming* (Rashidov 1981:32). However, the process was limited by the borders of the Soviet Union. Thus, in order to avoid outside interference to these developments, language contact over state borders was abolished. Moldavian language, which in reality is a dialect of Romanian spoken in Moldavia (Moldova) was an explicit case of linguistic imperialism with all signs of approaching language murder, where contacts and communication with Romania, where the same language was used, were terminated, receipt of broadcasts of Romanian mass media abolished. The same restrictions applied to the speakers of Finnish, German and other languages with speakers outside the USSR.

Affiliation of the members of ethnic groups to the native languages of those groups diminished considerably (see TABLE 4.5). During the period observed the number of persons shifting to another language increased by 53.1%. Such a decrease had a progressive character according to Guboglo (1984:264).

TABLE
Language maintenance in the USSR:

YEAR	non-Russians using language different from their ethnic group % from the USSR population	group size	% from the minority population
1959	94.3%	11.7 mill.	12.4%
1970	93.9%	14.6 mill.	13.0%
1979	93.1%	18 mill.	14.4%

The entire education system was oriented toward the empire-minded Moscow-centered view (e.g. in history, literature). Education in Russian was gradually replacing native language instruction. "National" schools were gradually replaced by Russian-medium ones: in the early sixties 47 languages beside Russian were used as a medium of instruction, by 1982 the number had dropped to 16. Since the end of the 1960s higher education was gradually shifted to Russian language (Desheriev 1976:12).

To raise the status of Russian in everyday life, non-Russian territories were colonized internally by nominating Russians to top positions in non-Russian areas (for example, in 1988 in Moldova 85% of directors and senior managers were non-Moldavians, according to the data from the Moldavian Language Institute).

Consequently, the drift for upward mobility did not require the knowledge of local language. According to the 1979 census, the rate of bilingualism among Russians was 3.5%. However, no attention was paid on this fact. Zamancikov (1990) recalls that during his time of employment in the Komsomol apparatus in Riga, Latvia, there was never any need for the local, Latvian language, even a typewriter with Latvian-Latin alphabet was missing.

5. National-Russian bilingualism

Though the campaign for unbalanced national-Russian bilingualism was started during Khrushchev, it was really put to rails from the beginning of the 1970s, during Brezhnev's reign. According to Kreindler (1989), Khrushchev personally introduced the concept of Russian as a "second native language" at the 22nd Party Congress. In June 1958 a special session of the social sciences section of the USSR Academy of Sciences questioned the role of languages (some die) and the language of international communication. It was the first time when bilingualism was discussed in the Soviet Union seriously (Desheriyev 1958). However, the campaign did not gather momentum at that time, presumably due to the change of leadership.

As Russian monolingualism was still not achieved, the temporary solution proposed was Russian-national bilingualism (*nacional'no-russkoje dvujazychie*) during Leonid Brezhnev's reign, now referred to as *zastoj* (stagnation). According to this doctrine, Russian operated as "the second native

language" for those Soviet citizens for whom it was not their first language (cf. Bertel Haarder on English for Danes). The "national" native language, unsuitable for scientific and technological purposes, as well as being an obstacle to the scientific progress of the USSR (Kulichenko 1981: 425), was ascribed the functions that Russian could not fulfill (e.g. national folklore). As a result, a two-level linguistic empire was formed, where all the languages were equal, and knowledge of Russian as a lingua franca was necessary. This was achieved through teaching as well as language-related employment policy. In reality, this meant diglossia, as the Soviet top administration and diplomacy, as well as the compulsory military service and optional detention in prison required the exclusive use of Russian. The use of local languages in the media was restricted (Ozolins 1994:164). The Soviet language principles were promoted by migration, encouraged through various industrial plans of erecting new industrial sites.

Soviet language policy placed greater stress on the spread of Russian and the development of bilingualism, which meant in all cases that non-Russian speakers should achieve bilingualism by adding Russian to their repertoire (Ozolins 1994:163). Bilingualism as the transitional step towards Russian monolingualism was promoted and conditions created for it. Fluent command of Russian as the second (native) language can be traced through censuses starting from 1970, when 37.1 per cent of non-Russians claimed to have achieved this level. In 1979 this level was claimed to have been achieved by 49.1 per cent of all non-Russians (Haarmann and Holman 1997: 122) and 48.1% in 1989. The powerful factor was the Russian-language medium working environment (Guboglo 1984:198). For example, bilingualism in institutions of Moldavia was 70%, in industry 80%. It meant that this percentage of ethnic Moldavians used Russian or code-switched between Russian and Moldavian (Romanian) in their **working places**. What concerns ethnic Russians, can be traced from the following data: in the service sector of Moldavia, only 6.8% of Russians used Moldavian (Guboglo 1984:186), meaning that in most cases the customer had to switch to the language of the employee.

Another criterion for convergence was the share of **mixed marriages** between persons of different ethnic origin. This promoted the formation of language competence and bilingualism. While in 1959 the share of these from all marriages was 10.2%, then in 1970 it had risen to 13.5%. The share of these in urban areas of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova was 30-40% (Guboglo 1984:199). However, the same survey showed that in Moldavian-Russian mixed marriages 2/3 of Russian husbands and 4/5 of Russian wives did not use other language than Russian at home, showing the transitional role of mixed marriages between a Russian speaker and a minority-language speaker in the process of shifting to Russian.

Social mobility was considered one of the factors of linguistic convergence, as this contributed to the common value system and to the establishment of the interethnic language.

Development of ethnic culture through the medium of another (i.e. Russian) language was seen a positive development in language policy: the fact that approximately half of urban Kabardins and Balkars read their own writers in Russian translations (Guboglo 1984:237) was worth of praise. Another positive phenomenon concerning these ethnic groups was that more than 90% of them preferred to read newspapers in Russian (Guboglo 1984:243). This shows explicitly the planned transitional and submersive character of the Soviet bilingualism.

Soviet surveys showed, for example that bilinguals used their **free time** more progressively and actively (surveys on Tartars and Moldavians referred to in Guboglo 1984:244). No comparison of monolingual and bilingual Russians on this aspect can be found.

6. The language situation in the 1980s

During this period, three simultaneous processes - maintenance of Russian, gradual decay of autochthonous languages and assimilation of speakers of other languages - may be observed in non-Russian areas.

The process of **maintenance of Russian** was based on the societal system introduced in every non-Russian territorial unit. As Russian was regarded the interethnic language irrelevant of the number of Russian speakers, a full scale society Russian-language medium infrastructure was created, taking into account all the possible needs of a language community. Thus, the Russian-language medium educational system started from kindergarten and extended to institutions of higher education. Russian-medium working places were an inherent part of the system. In addition various cultural clubs, theatres, cinemas, newspapers etc. operated in Russian. It was quite natural that in some Russian-language medium educational institution none of the pupils of a school or a kindergarten was of Russian origin.

Entirely different tactics was used in the functional domain of non-Russian autochthonous languages where **the gradual decay of languages and shift to Russian of their speakers** was expected. It was based on the demolition of the most sophisticated and cost-consuming functional domains of the upper echelons of non-Russian languages. During Stalin, it was done by changing

cadres, with local ones executed, imprisoned or exiled, and switching these domains to Russian by recruiting in-migrated Russian speakers. As we have noted, the post-Stalin period used more sophisticated instruments for the same goals. Agriculture and elementary education as the most "autochthonous" and inertial domains were often left intact or tackled in the last turn. In most Soviet republics, higher education was available in Russian only, even terminology in local languages did not exist. Also, all positions in the power structures required oral and written skills in Russian. Thus, the drift for upward mobility for locals meant bilingualism with increasing restrictions for the use of the minority language concerned (cf. Sinilind 1985).

Such well-organized Russification resulted in at least statistical death of approximately seventy languages during the existence of the USSR, according to the data of censuses. Their speakers "surpassed national isolation", and switched to Russian. While the census of 1926 recorded 194 distinct ethnic units, the 1989 census revealed that the current number was only 128. In 1989 in the Soviet Union, education (at least instruction of one's native language as a subject) was provided in 40 languages, and higher education was offered in 5 languages.

Due to ideological pressure, accompanied by measures restricting the functional use of "national" languages and lowering their status, languages in the Soviet Union operated within the society with differing levels of success (in terms of maintenance and spread). Politically, these languages enjoyed different privileges according to the political status of the ethnic territories of their speakers (cf. 4.1). However, several deviations should be mentioned. Firstly, the Russian language enjoyed a special position, being the compulsory interethnic language in all Republics. The federal ethnic structure provided niches for language maintenance, which were not implemented with equal success. Thus, the Belarussian language, though being a language of a republic was in a worse position than the titular languages of some autonomous republics. In the same way there was no sharp division between the autonomous republics and national or autonomous districts and regions. In the worst position happened to be the languages, whose speakers did not have any political status as an ethnic group, like small indigenous languages and migrant languages.

Consequently, all the languages of the Soviet Union could be grouped into four.

The first group, represented in the Soviet Union by only one language, Russian on the territory of Russia (territories of autonomous and national status excluded), is characterised by the situation where this language does not suffer under the functional pressure of another language, and where other languages operate marginally in the area concerned. According to the phase I in the Scheme 2.4.3 there are monolinguals and, possibly, bilinguals halfway in assimilation, corresponding to the situation of the Russian language. Russian performed another role for other languages, being the main evictor of other languages from their traditional territories.

All the other languages, being minority languages as compared to Russian, belonged to the next groups, showing marks of language decay under the offensive of Russian or, in the case of nearly extinct languages, also due to some other language (Livic under Latvian pressure, several languages in the Caucasus under Georgian influence). All other groups may be characterized by migrational processes, an abrupt increase in language contacts, ideological pressure, and by a lexical offensive that carries phonetic changes with it. The local language must give up the most prestigious functional areas.

As there was no sharp division of the rest of the languages in the Soviet Union according to their well-being, one has to group these conditionally. In accordance with the Scheme 2.4.3 the **second group** of languages is spoken in the situation with two different monolingual groups and a significant community of bilinguals, obtaining new members from one group and loosing them to the other. In the USSR, the titular languages of the republics, Belorussian excluded, belonged here. Reasons for belonging here varies for different languages. The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were annexed by the USSR only in 1940, when the campaign of massive ethnic cleansing, reaching its peak in 1937-38, was already receding. However still, "the national cadres" of the Baltic states were mostly deported to Siberia, either to the Far North, or just executed, and in their place, Russians were brought in, according to the program for boosting the economy of periphery areas. Thus the Russian-speaking population in the Baltics comprised from one-fifth to one-half of the population. Nevertheless, the local languages were preferred and functioned almost equally with Russian in the Baltic republics, as memory from the previous period was still alive.

In the Caucasian republics, local languages did not enjoy as high a status as in the Baltic States, but due to the demographic situation (the Russian-speaking population was represented marginally), the marginalised languages continued undeterred in areas where there were no resources for the alien language offensive.

The nearest kin language to Russian, the Ukrainian language, which had been almost under constant suppression since the tsarist times (Ukrainian was called small Russian then), experienced this situation, making use of the vast number of its speakers and the ethnic potential of the Western

Ukraine, occupied a generation later, according to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. However, the vernacular used in the capital of the Ukraine, was amalgamating quickly. A more difficult situation obtained in Moldova (Moldavia), according to Deletant (1989). On the 12 October 1924 the Kharkov Council of Commissioners of the People in the Ukrainian SSR created the Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Republic in order to provide a basis for unification of this unit with (a part of) Romania in the future. Cyrillic alphabet for writing Romanian was imposed, the result was called "national Moldavian language". After linking it with the territories of western Prut annexed from Romania in 1940, the new language was proclaimed throughout the whole territory of Moldavia. The Moldavians who speak Romanian (the Moldavian language was an ideological imperialist invention to justify the partial occupation of Romanian territory in 1940), lived mostly in the rural areas, whereas the towns were mainly russified. Nevertheless, thanks to demographic trends (Moldavians form three-fifths of the population), the linguistic situation was manageable for native speakers of Moldavian. With the loss of every function, the status of the language correspondingly decreases, though the decrease of it may be hindered by a high birth-rate, which was the case with the Central Asian republics.

The third group represents the languages in the situation with no more monolingual speakers of the language concerned. Though bilinguals might comprise the majority, the status of the language was lower than that of Russian. It usually meant no functional domain structure, handicapped mother tongue transmission via the insufficient education system and increasing traces of pidgin. Even if support for the alien language ends, extra vigilance is needed to counteract the dangerous tendencies. The local language is ousted by a step-by-step process from all functional areas, and finally from its home. Together with the degeneration of the language, passivity as regards ethnic consciousness appears, and cultural memory, traditional group relations based on language, culture and ethnicity decrease. If this trend is maintained, it leads to a language death. The third group of languages, having the features mentioned above, were maintained in ethnic territories that either (had) had a definite political status, which provided at least some legal or administrative protection, or had a substantial number of native speakers residing compactly. Usually these languages were numerically inferior concerning the number of speakers, though exceptions may be found (e.g. the Komy-Permyak language was the native language of three-fifths of the population of the autonomous district concerned, with no public usage at all). It also contained language pockets with the autochthonous vernacular functioning as the sole language, mostly in underdeveloped areas.

The fourth group consists of languages which have passed the diglossic period already, with the victim language having lost almost all functions (there might be some traces left in names and rituals), as well as the bilingual period, and remembered marginally, or by none at all, according to the SCHEME 2.4.3. In the Soviet Union, this stage was represented by around 70 languages operating peripherally, among them the Finno-Ugric languages Liv, Vot and Ingrian (less than 20 speakers) (cf. Kolga et al. 1993). For example the last speaker of Kamassi died in 1985. Language revival is extremely difficult at this stage, even if great resources were available (Fishman 1989).

7. Migrant policies

In addition to indigenous languages, the Soviet Union was rich in migrant languages defXXX, spoken by more than 40 million people, due to the strong encouragement and in some cases, enforcement of massive migration. Transformed into the *homines sovietici* of the future, migrants were often used as instruments against maintenance of autochthonous non-Russian languages, forcing others to shift to Russian. In order to promote such policies, migrants enjoyed special privileges (e.g. were awarded state-owned flats with minute rent without queueing). But as no ethnically-based organisation was allowed during the Soviet power, and no native language education outside one's ethnic area, except for Russians, most of the non-Russian migrants were linguistically and culturally assimilated to the Russian community in the second generation (Viikberg 1990). Russians, making up two-thirds of the migrant population, came to non-Russian areas in order to enforce socialist order. As Russian intellectuals were usually not engaged in these activities, the Russian-speaking migrant communities consist mostly of blue-collar workers who often may be uninterested in the local culture and language. In the absence of stimuli for contact with the local culture, strong imperial views prevail that suppose that the local people will forget their linguistic and cultural habits, and soon assimilate, and not vice versa.

2. Conclusions

This period was characterised by the most far-reaching Russification, with the highest number of bilinguals in Russian and in another language. The state structure promoted and coerced the knowledge

of Russian. Constraints for those not knowing Russian covered most domains within the Soviet society. The functions of Russian were gradually increased, affecting also the private domain. Simultaneously, due to the low birth rate the number of Russians was decreasing, approaching the 50% margin of the total population. According to the last census of the Soviet Union from 1989, Russians numbered 145.2 million, accounting for slightly more than half of the population with 50.9 percent. Thus, Russification was seen as an option to maintain linguistic majority. Knowles (1989) distinguishes between the political and linguistic purposes behind the Soviet language planning. The **political purposes** were, according to Knowles were the following: to relieve the logistic problems of the body politic, to counteract demographic pressures, to maximise the impact of Marxist-Leninist values, to consolidate ethnic communities in a socialist framework, to develop "Soviet patriotism", to foster "internationalism" inside the USSR, to develop Soviet cosmopolitanism, to realign the cultural realities of the minorities, to break up any non-Soviet cultural hegemonies, to connive at the retention of innocuous cultural pluralism, to emphasise superpower aspirations/achievements and to foster the Soviet image outside the USSR. Among the **linguistic purposes** he lists the following: to establish Russian as a second(ary) mother tongue, to marginalise ethnic languages, to widen the scope for linguistic interaction, to establish self-confident, but controlled language "ecologies", to standardise as many linguistic subsystems as possible (notably terminologies), to accelerate the development of functionally retarded languages, to maximise the effectiveness of information handling, to homogenise modes of thought and expression.

Not all of these purposes were openly promoted and discussed, as this was the domain of explicit "party lines" demanding the accord of dispute with these. Thus, several of the topics mentioned above were never researched and analysed in the Soviet Union. However, such activities of societal arrangement put non-Russians under pressure. Marshall (1996: 34) has listed the concerns of the non-Russian nationalities: intensive Russification, continuing immigration by Russians, a language policy requiring the expense of bilingualism to be paid by non-Russians and not by Russians, preferential treatment for Russians when jobs were in competition, the deterioration of the environment, lack of equal treatment in the military and in educational opportunities.

During this period hegemonic control (McGarry and O'Leary 1993, see 2.2.3) based on mental mechanisms reached its peak, the Centre-based Russian-speaking elite extracted what it needed and delivered what it saw fit. Ideology of the dominant group was put to use for achieving linguistic goals, beginning with the mastery of Russian prescribed for the whole population. Linguistic integration and assimilation was made a state top priority. The state apparatus acted as the administrative instrument of the Russian-speaking elite, providing necessary resources. No negotiations with other linguistic interest groups took place, even more, the idea of any negotiation was perceived as anti-state, nationalist activity, their proponents punished (Enn Tarto, Jüri Kukk, etc.).

In the educational domain methods of submersion were introduced more widely, domains for minority language usage limited. The apparatus in charge for minority cultures was neither responsible for nor interested in the maintenance of minority languages.

The term *Soviet people* represented common toponymic, ethnic, politonymic and semi-linguonymic identity, with semi deriving from a possible additional mother tongue and Russian as a must. Thus, a switch from colonial language spread to nation-building model covering the whole Soviet Union (instead of just Russia as previously) took place. In the case of nation-building versus minority protection this was efficient enough, but in the cases with nation-building model already based on another language, conflict was inevitable (see further in 4.2.4).

3. Gorbachov's perestroika

1. Theory

Moynahan (1994) has shown that the periods of stagnation and *perestroika* seem to be overlapping with the start of *perestroika* in 1981 by Andropov and the end of stagnation with the death of Chernenko in 1985. The reason for the longevity of the policy change was the so-called "living dead" (Yuri Andropov 1982-84, Konstantin Chernenko 1984-85) period.

By the end of the Brezhnev era at the end of the 1970s the signs of fatigue of the sagging economic system, inefficient agriculture requiring the state to import food, and the rise of *nomenklatura* - specially privileged officials of CP and government - were visible everywhere. Brezhnev's successor, Andropov, tried to stop the negative trends: one of his first regulations was to create a special governmental organ for the search of lost railway wagons. Afterwards he raised the issues of corruption, requirement of work and results. Andropov ended the Brezhnevite corporate structure, seemingly for economic, but also for personal reasons (he hated personal luxury and

affluence). Being fatally ill, he was not able to substitute the current order with any effective system. Thus, after his death the clan struggle in the Politburo continued and his initiatives were buried. His steps in language policy were modest. The terms *sblizhenie* and *slijanie* were also used by Andropov, emphasizing the latter as a current situation (Andropov 1983, referred to in Dellenbrant 1990).

Changes came with the election of Mikhail Gorbachov by the Politburo as the General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, after the death of Chernenko. He was characterised by chronic failures in deeds, but thanks to personal appeal, always one step ahead of responsibilities: when being Stavropol region party boss he introduced an agro-industrial mobile scheme that turned out a flop, but, being Andropov's favourite (Andropov spent his summer holidays in the Stavropol region), he was brought to Moscow to work as a Communist Party Central Committee Secretary responsible for agriculture in 1978, before the results of his devastating scheme came to be known. In 1980 he was elected to the Politburo, however, with no success for agriculture.

With the exhaustion of the potential of central planning, the arms race going on and the resulting economic crisis, the new leader of the Soviet Union began to realize that a radical political change was necessary. This in its turn required an enhancement of the role of individual judgement. The resultant policy, associated with Gorbachev and the watch-words *perestroika* and *glasnost* (cf. Moynahan 1994), created a democratic means for ending the totalitarian policy and providing tools to terminate linguistic discrimination of minorities. This process of democratization evolved from the acceleration of the all-Union economic crisis and further, went out of control of the elites who were seemingly too much concerned with the power struggle. One should keep in mind that the Politburo conservative opposition containing Yegor Ligachev, Mikhail Solomentsev and KGB chef Viktor Chebrikov were isolated from power as late as in 1989 (Solovei 1994:54, 56).

The main instruments for the modification of the Soviet society were *glasnost* and *perestroika*. *Perestroika* was the plan to raise the economy from the crisis. In order to reverse the economic course Gorbachev tried to bypass the party hierarchy. Out of dire necessity, in order to bypass the controlling Communist hierarchical apparatus and reach rank-and-file, thus strengthening the support for Gorbachov in his reforms, *perestroika* also reached humanitarian spheres (*glasnost*), though the original intention was to improve the economy only. *Glasnost* was used as a weapon against slackness, privileges, cronyism. *Glasnost* was the plan to increase power in the higher echelons of CP by appealing directly to the grassroot level and encouraging revealing compromising material about medium-level management, intended to reveal mishandling of economy and governing issues. One might draw here a parallel with the reforms of Den Xiao Ping in China. It did reveal large-scale corruption and inefficient management, but did not provide effective quick remedies for the recovery of the Socialist economy. Simultaneously, it spilt over to humanitarian issues. and to keep the status quo in other spheres (like in China). Due to the liberalization tendencies, political repressions diminished (The famous dissident Academician Andrei Sakharov was released from exile in Gorky in 1986, for example), enabling local nations to take measures to save their languages and cultures, and even to dream about possible independence.

2. Gorbachev's language policy

In language and nationalities policy Gorbachev was less experienced, having never confronted the issue in his career before. Thus, he chose the policy of ignoring the matter, costing him further the political career and terminating the Soviet Union of which he was the Head.

At the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986 Gorbachev in his speech showed no sign of departing from Brezhnevite line. He emphasized the role of the united Soviet people (*sovetskii narod*), *cemented by the same economic interests, ideology and political goals*. However, he indirectly admitted that there might be problems in the national processes, like national isolationism, localism and parasitism, although such behaviour did not warrant sufficient concern to be incorporated into the reform program (Gorbachev 1986:101, quoted in Smith 1994:139-140). Next year, Gorbachev admitted errors in past ethnic policy, without providing explicit solutions (Gorbachev 1987). Gorbachev's speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 27-28 January 1987 (quoted in Urdze 1990:359), called for creating opportunities for the development of each nationality and each people. Gorbachov opposed any form of nationalism, avoided presenting Russian as a model nation. He made also clear the Politburo's negative position toward secession and self-determination.

The two drawbacks of Gorbachev that influenced language policy were his insensitivity in language matters and insufficient experience in cadre policies. Coming from the mainly monolingual region, he seemingly had never experienced any language problems. This seems to be the reason why he neglected these totally. For example, during his spring 1987 visit to the Baltic republics he spoke in Russian without using interpreters (Zamascikov 1990:91). Visiting Lithuania in January 1990, Gorbachev declared that the national question is not the most important issue in human affairs (Pravda

16 January 1990, referred to in Smith 1990:140).

Gorbachov's second handicap lied in cadre policies: the resolution of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee called for *the exchange and rotation of cadres among the different republics and regions, and between the local and central organs* (Zamascikov 1990:90), contrasting the longevity of postings during Brezhnev times as well as the language environment issue. In December 1986 Gorbachev appointed Gennady Kolbin, a monolingual Communist Party apparatchik and an ethnic Russian, to the post of the First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party that caused riots and demonstrations with fatal consequences in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan.

Gorbachev allowed the top of the CPSU to have a lower representation of nationalities, *making no effort to bring non-Russian elites into the central political leadership* (Burg 1990: 31, quoted in Marshall 1996: 22). This resulted in the need of *Republic elites to seek a rapprochement with the dominant nationality in their charge and to represent its concerns precisely because in most cases they (could) not apply the kind of coercion they regularly had applied in the past* (Goble 1989: 6, quoted in Marshall 1996: 22-23). This forced a choice between loyalty to Moscow or to one's nationality.

In conclusion, *perestroika* and *glasnost* allowed more political freedom to improve the linguistic situation. The official ideology stopped chanting the most unpopular slogans. Due to the inertia of the central scientific thought in Moscow, most of the linguistic postulates remained, with some cosmetic revision applied on them (Guboglo 1990):

- 1) language unity (i.e. monolingualism) would be established in the more distant future (rather than the more near future),
- 2) Stalin spoiled Lenin's correct national policy, which therefore had to be restored,
- 3) Russian as the interethnic language had to have the highest status in the Soviet Union, though local languages might be legally protected (balanced bilingualism instead of unbalanced diglossia),
- 4) the Soviet Union represented a multinational society with minor ethnic and linguistic conflicts that were solved easily by the SU leadership (a revision of the proclamation of of the USSR as a multinational country without ethnic and linguistic conflicts).

3. Centre-republics tension

The developments in the cadre and nationality policy disturbed the republic-level Communist Party leadership most, as they could not continue their role of being a neutral link between the republic and the Centre. Material grievance added to the tensions in the republics.

The alienation of the local Communist Party leaders was expressed in various forms. During the Gorbachev period the ruling elites in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia were hostile to *glasnost* and *perestroika* which were seen as another way of reimposing the Kremlin's control. For example, *in Uzbekistan the leadership blocked TV transmissions from Moscow and banned newspapers and books printed in Russia. The development of opposition movements and a free press was not allowed. The system of authority remained closed to public scrutiny, and society continued to function along the lines of stagnation* (Lemaitre 1993:124)

The developments were different from that in the Baltic states. The Baltic states used the chance to gain more autonomy in all spheres with the final aim of reestablishing sovereignty (though this was not advertised at all). There were three main areas of reforms:

- 1 **legal** (primacy of laws of republics over All-Union laws),
- 2 **economic** (self-management programs, like the Estonian *IME*), and
- 3 **cultural**, strengthening ethnic identities (language laws).

All these steps together increased the level of self-management, loosened the relationship with the Central organs of power and prepared the republics for sovereignty. Other republics followed this path with delay. Using the central government's loss of influence in economy (ruled by the Council of Ministers of the USSR) as well as in ideology (ruled by the CPSU), most of the republics took steps to gain more freedom in economic as well as in humanitarian policy. The following three factors were involved in influencing linguistic policy (XXXref):

- 1) the economic crash. As a reaction to this, the creation of an "everyone for himself" economic policy in the regions of the SU led to a more autonomous policy in various regions in the SU, thus breaking the economic power structure of the Soviet Union;
- 2) ideological chaos with the struggle between the "revisionism" in the form of *glasnost* and *perestroika* and the "Old Bolshevik" line. Here was an opportunity to use the moment to distance oneself from the Soviet Union's ideology and, in this way, gain additional political rights (in the case of indigenous peoples, e.g. Yakutia) or full sovereignty. It signalled the end of the ideological power structure;
- 3) with increased economic and ideological freedom that promoted a democratic movement, steps were

taken by local authorities to terminate the discrimination of languages and to protect the respective cultures. Such policies unavoidably led to conflict with the Russian-speaking population, who interpreted the legal acts restricting the privileges of Russian language usage as a discriminatory step. Economy continued to deteriorate. Though the Afghanistan military campaign was halted, oil prices dropped, leaving the Soviet Union without generous financial revenues. Political support was drying up, as leadership in republics and in oblasts was not receiving any economic and political aid, and satellite socialist countries in Europe spun out of orbit. Consequently, Gorbachev's own political support in the Politburo weakened. In order to regain it, he was ready for compromises: Yeltsin was dismissed as the Moscow Communist Party district boss and the Politburo member. Ligachev was provided more political space.

4. Language laws of the republics

Language laws were adopted in almost every Republic, the chronological order of adoption reflecting the prestige of the local language on one hand, and the power of pro-Union communities on the other: Estonia (18 January 1989), Lithuania (language decree, 25 January 1989), Latvia (5 May 1989), Tadjikistan (2 August 1989), Moldova (1 September 1989), Uzbekistan (21 September 1989), Kazakhstan (22 September 1989), Kirgizstan (23 September 1989), Ukraine (3 October 1989), Byelorussia (26 January 1990), Turkmenistan (24 May 1990). In Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan, the constitutional amendment declaring their respective languages to be official languages has existed since 1978, and the need for a special law was not deemed urgent. In Russia the drafting of the relevant law was completed only in 1991 due to the severe linguistic (as well as political) struggle between the Central power and its autonomous ethnic units. These language laws had the aim to fix the language situation to the level envisaged, providing language regime for various language groups (cf. 2.4.3). These laws promoted balanced bilingualism, demanding at least the basics of the knowledge of the local language from the governmental officials and employees engaged in the service sector. For Russians living in these non-Russian areas and having been used to previous privilege of monolingual way of life, this development sounded like a catastrophe. Though the deadline was postponed for several years, it caused irritation and consequent consolidation of the Russian-speaking population for the goal of holding linguistic *status quo*.

The main point in the legal acts was the rearrangement of functions between local and Russian languages. In most language laws, Russian was proclaimed to be the interethnic language, officially giving it the same legal rights as the local language had (except in the Baltic states). This meant that a private individual had to be educated, administered and served in his/her local language or in Russian, according to his/her choice. However, administrative and business institutions had to switch to the local language in their contacts with others inside the Republic.

Language laws were drafted on a lower political level too, for example in the autonomous republics (e.g. in Mordva, Yakutia). Several language acts produced in addition to the rearrangement of language domains and use, side-effects as well. Thus in Moldova the language law established that the Moldavian and Romanian languages were identical, because what mainly differentiated them---use of different alphabets---was eliminated while the enforced use of Cyrillic was annulled, and the Latin alphabet was re-introduced. Similarly, the identity of the Farsi (Persian) and Tadjik languages was established by the Language Law of Tadjikistan.

All the language laws have several common features. First of all, an increase in the language rights of minorities may be noted. Whereas minority languages had earlier been totally illegitimate, using a minority language is guaranteed in the cultural domain (i.e. cultural autonomy) and in education (the right to establish educational institutions in one's native language). Among the languages obtaining these rights are Modern Hebrew, Yiddish and Romani (cf. the language law of Moldova), each of which had long been marginalised as non-territorial languages.

Several functional spheres were not under the jurisdiction of the language laws, e.g. the Soviet Army, in some laws the KGB, and even the state railways and the monopolistic airline company Aeroflot, which were ruled directly from Moscow.

It is evident that these changes were a tremendous step toward the protection of dominated languages, but due to a total lack of enforcement of the laws (except in Estonia and Lithuania), the laws mobilised the linguistic community to focus attention to an increasing extent on the status of local languages.

As a reaction to the adoption of these language laws, the central government responded by confirming the status of Russian as the official language with the highest status in the Soviet Union in the **Law of the languages of the USSR**, adopted on 24 April 1990. This law re-established the old two-level hierarchy of languages, constraining the functional usage of other languages than Russian in the framework of Russian-national language bilingualism. However, due to the primacy of the laws of the Republics before All-Union ones, as well as ideological and economic chaos, this law had no

significant effect at all. Societal change was also induced by other, more directly political factors.

5. Disintegration

The collapse and disintegration took place due to the dysfunction of the power structure that the Soviet Union was built on. **Coercive power diminished.** From the four power grids ethnic federal structure had strengthened significantly, economic and ideological ones had collapsed, and the military (and the KGB) appeared to be undermanned and suffered from financial constraints. Thus, there seemed to be no solution for centrifugal break-up, but some Army units terrorizing most active republics. (Under Gorbachev the military conducted independent policy in relation to the Baltic states (Lemaitre et al. 1993:126)).

During perestroika, the pseudo-federation was transformed to real one, with the weakening of the control mechanisms, first of all the ideological control sustained by the Communist Party. With the significant strengthening of the democratic mechanisms (e.g. fair elections) the power monopoly began to disintegrate. As the newly elected representatives continued to be outnumbered in the decision-making bodies of the federal government, the resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundaries and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own federal unit, provided incentives to attempt secession.

The draft platform for the 28th Party Congress approved by the Central Committee Plenum in February 1990 entitled *Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism* identified the causes of ethnic conflict as lying in the distortion of Leninist nationalities policy, while the solution was seen in realising various economic and political reforms and the principle of federalism (Tishkov 1992: 55). The ideological basis remained the principle of self-determination in a revitalized Soviet federation. The proposed legal conditions for secession were felt to be unrealistic.

First step was taken by Russia, forming its own organs of government, thus **the balanced model** of the Centre+Russia represented by power concentrated in Moscow against 14 republics **was changed** to the Centre against 15 republics. This bold step was taken by Yeltsin, who managed a comeback in power through Russian parliament and was elected Russian president in 1990 with the goal of reducing Gorbachev's power. The other systems of power (Gosplan, military and ideological structures) were handicapped by economic crisis and consequent *perestroika* and *glasnost* and were not able to support the Centre. The schism in leadership made effective control impossible.

Various solutions were prepared to avoid impasse. There were two solutions. One was based on the new federation, with the republics enjoying sovereignty in several domains. The new federal agreement was ready and planned to be signed in September 1991. However, the strong hand solution based on dictatorship came first. As Gorbachev was not considered suitable for this type of government, he was intended to drop from the leadership. The planned coup of 19-21 August 1991 failed. Even worse, the event empowered the proponents of contrary solution: the Baltic states restituted independence, Yeltsin obtained the full power in Russia, ideological power structure was officially dismissed, economic one dysfunctioning. The competing solution - the disintegration of the Soviet Union - was proposed by Yeltsin and the leaders of the Ukraine and Belarus who promoted destructive populist policy as it was the step to gain ultimate political personal power and push Gorbachov overboard. The fate of the Soviet Union was sealed in the Belovezhye forests during the meeting of the Presidents of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine as the Slavyanskii Soyuz, the embryonic form of the CIS was created. Formally the Soviet Union ceased to exist by the end of 1991.

Zaslavsky (1997) has drawn attention to the fact that, due to the **structural isomorphism of the Soviet Union**, as a result of disintegration, exactly 15 states were formed, based on the ethnolinguistic structure with established governmental structures. Consequently, as Haarmann, Holman (1997) have noted, in the New Independent States the local languages have advanced to state languages, with Russian assuming the status of minority language, *de jure* or *de facto*.

Several problems were created with this epoch: the issue of legal successorship (now, the solution has been achieved: partly Russia, partly CIS), allocating and distributing the Soviet army and the nuclear weapons, the fate of the Russian population in other parts of the former Soviet Union, etc. But for many it was felt as a mental blow, as the empire - *derzhava* - was lost, causing the crisis of identity mostly among the Russian population, and those belonging to the Soviet people.

6. Conclusions

Russian linguistic hegemony as one channel of power distribution can be understood as referring to the explicit and implicit values, beliefs, purposes and activities which characterize the society and which contribute to the maintenance of Russian as a dominant language (cf. Phillipson 1992). The

legitimation of Russian was embodied in arguments used to justify the use of Russian or the learning of Russian in given contexts, grouped according to the intrinsic qualities of the language (what Russian is), its extrinsic qualities (what Russian has, i.e. material and personal resources), and the use to which Russian is put (what Russian does) (cf. Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1985, 1986b).

The main issue in analysing the Soviet Union as a societal system is the power distribution, based on two criteria: continuity and convertibility. Power has to be distributed constantly, as it loses value in time (cf. military power). Various forms of power have to be convertible into each other.

Attitude towards international law was definitely ambiguous. For the domestic purposes, this was not necessary, as the Soviet Union, being a totalitarian state, did not have much in common with the rule of law. Thus, The League Covenant, among other things, abolishing occupation was ratified by the Soviet Russia. The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1928. The right of secession was retained in article 72 of the Constitution of 1977. Both international norms were violated in a grand scale, through making their contents legally void and form propagandistic.

The main feature was the total **neglect of language issues** and incompetence on the top level of the Soviet Union. With the **diminishing importance of ideology** the goals of language planning changed from ideological to the maintenance of status quo. The steps of the Centre resulted to the language planning activities of periphery, and not vice versa, as before. The other deviation from the previous policy is in the methodology, as the central government in Moscow was not fighting against the cause or spread, but against these ideas directly. Haarmann and Holman (1997) have pointed out the **decline of the dominance of Russian** in the non-Russian territories during the *perestroika*. This accompanied the loss of power of the Centre, based on the totalitarian system. Together with strengthening federalist tendencies features of hegemonic control weakened: economic crisis was accompanied by the decline of economic discipline, resources were not given to the disposal of the Central power, thus harming its stick and carrot policy. Moscow had to negotiate in order to obtain what it needed, to ideology less attention was paid. The aim of the Central government to rearrange the totalitarian Soviet Union under hegemonic control into a federation was not achieved, instead, secession of the Baltic states and afterwards, partition of the rest took place. The potential advantage of promoting a concept of multiple identities, which seems to be the most advanced and most adequate means of avoiding ethnic frictions in modern industrialized societies (and possibly the basis for real federation), was rejected by Soviet ideologists (Haarmann 1986: 98, see also 1983: 31).

Breton (1996: 174-175) lists the drawbacks of the Soviet language experience:

- the entire structure was built in an authoritarian nondemocratic way (i.e. hegemonic control);
- certain terms (autonomy, free development, language choice and use, etc.) stayed purely formal and illusory;
- matters were decided without consultation and popular participation, in secrecy by the ruling layer;
- ideologically motivated artificial separate languages were created (Moldavian, Tadjik, Buryat);
- Russian language were given preference and priority;
- speakers of Russian were significantly overrepresented in all real power positions;
- the territorial delimitation of national areas was decided without any local poll, thus most territories did not correspond to linguistic areas;
- the access to mother-tongue schooling was limited to certain areas and always in competition with the Russian-medium network;
- peoples did not choose their alphabet;
- translations from Russian were given high priority;
- ethnic languages were cut off from their roots and larded with Russian words and expressions;
- the first generations of minority intellectuals were exterminated at the time of Stalin's great purges; minorities were represented marginally at the top of the state.

The Soviet Union is a textbook case for depicting unequal power distribution that results in disempowerment of all groups not being part of the dominant culture, not possessing what Bourdieu refers to as cultural capital. However, even a minor step in the redistribution of power may, as it appears in the Soviet case, bring along the disintegration of the whole system.

13. Estonian linguistic development

1. Introduction

Estonians, a Finno-Ugric people, have lived in their present habitat from the times immemorial, at least since the 3rd millennium B.C., and even, according to the latest theories, 7th millenium B.C.

In the early 13th century the Estonian lands were subjugated by the State of the Teutonic Order, except for the Setu territory in South-East Estonia which was under the Principality of Pskov and where the language and culture bear traces of Russian and Orthodox influence. North Estonia was conquered by Denmark (according to a legend, Danes got their national flag from Estonia, as it fell down from the sky when Danes caught the future capital of Estonia Tallinn). In the middle of the 16th century the Estonian territory was divided between Poland, Denmark, Sweden and the Principality of Moscow. Since 1629 Estonia was ruled by the Swedish Kingdom. The Great Northern War left Estonia as the possession of the tsarist Russian Empire for almost two centuries: 1721 - 1918.

After the October Revolution in Russia the Estonian state was founded on 21 Feb. 1918. Estonia was an independent nation-state till the 16 June 1940. On the 17 June 1940 the Soviet Union annexed Estonia and on the 6 August 1940 Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Soviet occupation lasted till Estonia restituted sovereignty on 20 Aug. 1991.

The major immigration flows into Estonian lands have always accompanied and followed wars and arrivals of new conquerors: in the 13th century - mainly Germans and Danes; in the 16th -17th centuries - Swedes; in the 18th-19th centuries - Russians.

Up to the beginning of Soviet occupation in 1940 the population of the Estonian lands was quite homogeneous in its ethnic composition: with the predominance of Estonians, other ethnic groups made up no more than 7.11% altogether. It was only after the great wars, in the 17th century, that the proportion of non-Estonians reached the highest level of about 15% (representing about a dozen different ethnicities). During the high tide of Russification in 80s and 90s of the 19th century, Russians made up, according to respective censuses, 3.3% in 1881 and 4.0% in 1897.

2. Standardization of the Estonian language

The name Estonian (Est. *eesti*, Lat. *aesti*) was introduced into the Estonian literary language from German or Swedish in the 17th century. In popular usage, however, the words *eestlane* and *eesti keel* (Estonian for the ethnicity and the language, respectively) began to take root only in the second half of the 19th century. Before that Estonians had referred to themselves as the country people and to their language as the country language.

In medieval times the language used in the municipal administration was Baltic German, based on Low German (*Niederdeutsch*); the clergy used Latin for their sacred routines; the language of the land supervisor depended on the language of the conquerors, i.e. (Low) German, Swedish, Russian, and in places Danish and Polish.

The history of the Estonian literary language can be traced since the 16th century where the first longer texts date back. Those texts were produced using irregular Low German spelling. The 17th century saw the emergence of two literary languages: the North Estonian, or Tallinn, literary language and the South Estonian, or Tartu, literary language. In the early 17th century another irregular spelling system came into use, based on High German, which is represented, e.g., by the works of Heinrich Stahl. At the conferences on the Bible, held at the end of the 17th century, Bengt G. Forselius proposed to simplify spelling: to abandon the letters which are now called foreign, to give up the use of *h* as a sign of vowel length (thus *toon*, *tooma* instead of *tohn*, *tohma*). The so-called old spelling developed. The role of the South Estonian literary language began to wane in the 18th century in conjunction with the publication in 1739 of the Bible in North Estonian and with the introduction of compulsory reading skill in 1729.

In the first half of the 19th century the foreign-flavoured language of religious literature was gradually superseded by more popular usage, which also acquired secular functions. At the same time the North Estonian literary language became predominant. Attempts were made to regulate spelling, adjusting it to pronunciation (e.g. Otto Wilhelm Masing's recommendations). The second half of the 19th century was a time of unification in the national literature; textbooks and periodicals were also published.

At the end of the third quarter of the 19th century the new spelling was adopted, based on Finnish orthography. It had been recommended as early as 1822 by A. Arwidsson and 1834 by Edgar Ahrens in his Grammar. The literary language grew more regular in the late 19th century (a grammar by August Hermann in 1884). The first four decades of the 20th century may be identified as the era of normalization of the literary language (Johannes Aavik, Johannes Voldemar Veski, Elmar Muuk); it acquired some strong puristic features.

14. The Republic of Estonia 1918-1940.

1. Ethnic data

Between the two World Wars Estonia was an independent, mainly mononational state, whose minorities

(Russians, Germans, Swedes, Jews) enjoyed ample cultural autonomy, adopted in 1925, based on the Constitutional article 21. Already the first Constitution, dating from 9 August 1920, contained legal principles to guarantee the existence of national minorities in Estonia (Articles 6, 12, 20-23). It also provided several linguistic rights. For example, Estonian citizens of German, Russian and Swedish national origin were afforded the right to address state authorities in their own native languages. The law on public elementary schools of 7 May 1920 and the law on high schools of 7 December 1922 introduced elementary and high school instruction on the basis of the mother tongue. The principles of the law on cultural self-government of national minorities, that was enacted on 5 February 1925, were laid down in the conditions for admittance to the League of Nations, formulated by the Plenary Assembly of the League of Nations on 15 December 1920, and the recommendations of the League of Nations, to which Estonia was admitted on 22 September 1921 (Geistlinger 1994).

These guarantees provided conditions for minority culture and language maintenance. As a result, no major changes in numbers of minority population took place during that period. In 1922 census the percentage of Estonians was 87.6% and that of all other ethnic groups together 12.4%. The share of Russians was 8.2%, that of Germans 2%, of Swedes 0.7% and of Jews 0.4%. According to the 1934 census, the ethnic composition of the population of Estonia was as follows: 992,000 (88%) Estonians, 9,000 Russians (8%), 16,300 (1.5%) Germans, 7,600 (0.7%) Swedes, and 4,400 (0.4%) Jews plus several smaller ethnic groups (see Table 5.2.2). According to Parming (1978:54), inside the borders of Estonia today (without the areas annexed by Russia in 1944), in 1934 there lived 1,057,500 people, of which 977,200 were Estonians (92.4%) and 41,700 (3.9%) Russians. Most of the ethnic non-Estonians were bilingual in Estonian and native language. The majority of the largest minority group (Russians) lived in rural areas, the most "Russian" areas being the town of Narva, containing 29.7% of Russians, the territories East of Narva, and the Petseri region. In Tallinn the percentage of Russians was 5.7%. Other major ethnic groups, Germans and Jews, lived mostly in towns, Swedes in the Estonian coastal region and on the islands. In response to an appeal from Hitler, most Germans left Estonia in October 1939.

1. Language policy and status planning

The first task of the newborn Republic of Estonia was the solution for the common language. Before that, Estonian as the language of the main bulk of the population was used together with German, language of the Baltic German, the group of privileged *Herrenvolk*, thanks to the positions earned through special degrees of the Tzar concerning the Baltic provinces, and Russian, the official language of the Tzarist Empire. In the new situation, with Estonia formed according to the principle of self-determination of Estonian people, it was decided to rearrange the Estonian language as the national language for the needs of the independent Estonian state, with national minorities guaranteed cultural autonomy (Manifesto to Nations of Estonia from 24 February 1918).

This was further affirmed in several legal acts. According to the Temporary Administrative Law of the Temporary Government the official language had to be Estonian. Exceptions were Russian areas around Lake Peipsi and Swedish areas in Läänemaa, where the use of the corresponding language of the local population was foreseen.

Gaining their independence, the Baltic states were subject to the various provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the League of Nations relating to language. These provisions attempted to guarantee language and cultural rights and a measure of cultural autonomy to minorities in order to avoid ethnic and national conflicts that were seen to have led to the WWI. These provisions were eminently suitable for the Baltic states and reflected the view towards minorities that obtained there (Ozolins 1994: 163). Estonia developed a minority protection system, based on **territorial autonomy** (guaranteed by several Constitutional provisions), used widely by local Russians and Swedes, and **cultural autonomy** (adopted in the form of the law in 1925), enjoyed by dispersed and non-territorial minorities, like Germans and Jews.

Several Decrees and laws regulated official language use in Estonia. The last, most sophisticated **Language Law** was adopted by the Decree of the State Elder on October 29 1934. This law confirmed previous practices establishing Estonian as the national and official language. Exceptions were foreign relations and national minority domain that were regulated by the law in detail (see for details Ruutsoo 1993, Loeber 1989).

2. Corpus planning

The main goal of the corpus planning activities was the unity and integrity of the Estonian literary language. The language committee of the Estonian Literary Society organised 1908-1911 4 conferences, where a substantial number of decisions on the norm of the Estonian literary language were adopted. These and other decisions were published in the Estonian Orthographic dictionary (1918). As this was insufficient for the needs of the developing Estonian language, a three-volume Estonian Orthographic Dictionary by

Johannes Voldemar Veski and Elmar Muuk was published in 1925-1937. Muuk was very productive also in publishing several grammars.

The development of the Estonian language took place in the situation of two rivalling trends present. One, represented by Johannes Aavik (1880-1973) and also Villem Grünthal-Ridala drew heavily on the language patterns of Finnish, emphasizing the aesthetics of language. This trend was called the language innovation movement. Opposite to this was the language planning movement led by Johannes Voldemar Veski (1873-1968), which stressed practicality and regularity, trying to restrict the language to the resources inherent in the Estonian language. Common to other current language planning activities, both trends promoted language purism

3. Acquisition planning.

4. Legal basis

Owing to a long tradition of instruction at the home and a well-arranged network of public schools, the early 20th century witnessed a high standard of literacy among Estonians, even though the provision of Estonian-medium education was forbidden in public secondary schools in tsarist years. In the initial years of the Republic of Estonia (1918-1940), the effects of Russification and Germanisation were quickly overcome, and a system developed which made education through the medium of Estonian available from kindergarten up to higher education.

Acquisition planning was based on the Constitutional clauses that declared the Estonian language the national language, simultaneously providing the mother tongue education to the minorities. These principles were implemented in several legal and normative acts.

According to the law on public primary schools (RT 1920, 75/76, 208) primary schools (grades 1-6) were divided Estonian-, German-, Russian-, Swedish, or other-medium schools, based on the mother tongue of pupils. (Art. 4). In order to attend non-native language school one had to have a sufficient reason, the decision was made by local school board (Art. 7). This principle was further confirmed in the Law on Primary Schools adopted in 1931 (RT 1931, 46, 348). According to this law, non-native language medium education was allowed only if there was no corresponding school nearby. Exceptions were allowed only by permission of the Minister of Education (Kurvits 1938: 56, referred to in Vare 1997). The same principle was for public secondary schools (RT 155/156 – 1922, 91), however, teaching in Estonian for non-Estonian pupils was allowed (§ 3).

Education for minority language speakers

The Law on Cultural Autonomy, adopted in 1925, granted the right to establish (state-financed) schools with their own language as the medium of education to all minorities numbering over 3,000. This right was widely used by local minorities. According to regulations by the Ministry of Education (passed on 17.12.1918), the Estonian language was required to be a compulsory subject in minority schools, with 4 lessons per week. To found a state-financed, minority language-medium school, a minimum enrollment of 20 pupils was necessary. If the number of minority children was less than 20, minority pupils could study their native language as a subject for 3 hours a week in an Estonian-medium school (e.g. Russian in Paldiski and Mustvee).

In 1929, Germans had 19 primary schools, Jews 3, Latvians 7, Russians 100, Swedes 15 and Ingrians 3. The Germans operated 14 secondary schools, Russians 9, Latvians 1, Jews 2 and the Swedes opened theirs in 1931. Founding native language schools was most difficult for heterogenous or "illiterate" (= orate) minorities. Jews, who had populated Estonia from the beginning of the 19th century used Russian mostly (sometimes German or Estonian) as their native language. Thus, the Jewish (primary and secondary) schools that were founded used Russian as the medium, gradually shifting to Jiddish. On 21.06.1926, the Jewish Cultural Council decided to transfer to Modern Hebrew.

Orthodox Ingrians (*inkeroiset*) spoke Ingrian, a Balto-Finnic language like Estonian and Finnish, but without an established literary form. It caused great difficulty to find a common literary language for the education of the minority. The three primary schools east of the Narva river used Russian up to 1922, when 2 of them shifted to Estonian, a closely related language to Ingrian. According to the Ministry of Education decision dating back to 1926, the medium of instruction was changed to Finnish, as the closest language, but oral use of Ingrian was also encouraged. Due to a petition from Ingrian parents who demanded Estonian, Estonian as well as Finnish-medium departments were opened in both schools in 1933, thus allowing a choice of medium of instruction.

Those non-Estonians who did not have schools in their native languages placed their children in German-medium schools. Besides Estonian-medium kindergartens, German- and even French-medium kindergartens existed. Several minorities organised nursery schools, operating on a half-day basis. Higher

education was also available in minority languages. There was one German-medium institution for higher education: a private, theological-philosophical, Luther's Academy, and one Russian-medium institute: a private Polytechnic Institute.

5. Ethnic composition

The ethnic composition of pupils followed that of the whole population. Most of the educational institutions were Estonian-medium. Besides these, there were educational institutions in the minority languages, as well as in the more popular foreign languages. For example, the French-medium lycé and the English-medium college were popular among the elite.

The official minority policy resulted in the native language teaching for the main bulk of ethnic groups. For the primary school in 1922/23 schoolyear among Estonians— 99,7%, Russians – 95,1%, Germans 93,7%, Swedes – 89,7%, Latvians – 65,6%. The exceptions were Jews with 22,6%, with others learning in Russian or German (Eesti Demograafia, 1924: 139, referred to in Vare 1997). There were also mixed schools with several languages used.

Secondary education reflected the similar situation: in 1922/23 Estonian-medium schools were attended by 76,9%, Russian schools 9,5%, Estonian-Russian mixed schools 1,4% (in Petseri), German schools 11,8% and Latvian schools (in Valga) 0,4% (Eesti Demograafia 1924: 201, Vare 1997). This trend was stable throughout the following years.

Official language teaching

Official language teaching was complementary since 1 January 1919, according to the Decree of the Estonian Temporary Government from the 2 December 1918 (RT 1918, 5)

The Law on public primary schools (1922) prescribed the teaching of two foreign languages, with the requirement for minority language-medium schools to teach Estonian instead of the first foreign language (Kaiv – Kurvits, 1928: 32, Vare 1997). The same system was implemented in secondary schools. In 1923 the Ministry of Education distributed a circular, which stated that the geographical position of Estonia requires oral and written proficiency at least in one foreign language. The same requirement was applied to the teaching of the Estonian language.

The curriculum for the secondary schools (Keskkooli õppekavad 1930: 175 – 180, Vare 1997) contained a separate chapter on teaching Estonian as the national language. The goal was formulated with the emphasis laid on the integrative aspect:

The goal for the teaching of the Estonian language is the growth of an Estonian citizen, who is useful to the homeland as the educated member of the common family of nationalities.

The required level was formulated as follows: oral and written expression in Estonian without difficulties, understanding educated Estonian, read in Estonian and further learn in the institutions of higher education.

(S. Vare 1997, Keskkooli õppekavad 1930: 175).

The teaching of foreign languages

In the advent of the development of direct foreign relations with other western countries, the significance of Russian diminished, and the concept of the "three local languages" changed to some extent: instead of the Estonian, German and Russian combination at the beginning of the century, these were Estonian, German and English. German was replaced by English as the principal foreign language in 1934, but still remained the second most important foreign language.

Estonian-medium secondary schools had two main streams of specialisation, a real and a humanitarian branch. In the real branch, a second foreign language (English in most cases) was added to German which was already taught as the first foreign language. In the humanitarian branch, Latin was also added. A classic branch also existed, featuring Latin and Greek in addition to the three local languages. The most frequently taught foreign language was German which was started in the 4th grade of primary school. Then came English, with French as the third language.

Russian was sometimes taught as a second or third foreign language, in some commerce schools and in German minority schools. This was due to the fact that German did not need to be taught as the first foreign language.

The required proficiency level demanded the mastery of at least one foreign language both in oral and written form.

Universities and other institutions of higher education

The Law on Universities (RT 1937, 78, 641) foresaw in the state universities Estonian as the medium

of education. The Minister of Education had the right to give permission for teaching some subject in the medium of some other language, in the interest of learning (Art. 5). However, this could not duplicate the teaching of the same subject in Estonian simultaneously. Private universities were free to choose the language of teaching.

By 1934, 85% of lectures in Estonian institutions of higher learning were in Estonian, even though higher education in the language did not exist before independence (Kreindler 1990:235). In 1927, 82 per cent of the 4651 students enrolled at Tartu University were Estonian, though just a decade before it had been a university training German and Russian students. Similarly, 86.4 per cent of students at the new Technical Institute founded in Tallinn in 1918 were Estonian (Hope 1994:54).

6. Estonian-Russian bilateral relations

Emergence of the Estonian state was based on self-determination of the Estonian people. The First World War brought the principle of self-determination to the fore of international politics and law. Consequently, through the increasing acceptance of this norm, the incompatible right of conquest was recognized ever less. As a reflection of the declaration by the Soviet government that all nationalities had the right to establish independent states, Estonia declared its independence on February 1924. Such steps in the former Czarist Empire found support outside. Among the **Fourteen Points** program announced by United States President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 there were demands for self-determination also for the peoples of Russian Empires. However, this was not the will of the new rulers of Russia, attempting to invade the territories pursuing sovereignty. Thus Estonia had to fight off invasions by the Soviet and German Armies, cope with massive displacements of its inhabitants, rearrange economy and create an effective domestic political and administrative apparatus. The turmoil ended with the Tartu Peace Treaty of February 2 1920 between Estonia and Soviet Russia that supported the principle of self-determination. Article 2 of the Treaty stated:

On the basis of the right of all peoples freely to decide their own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely from the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and autonomy of the State of Estonia, and renounces voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Estonian people and territory by virtue of the former legal situation, and by virtue of international treaties, which, in respect of such rights, shall henceforth lose their force.

In addition, article 7 prohibited the use of either nation's territory as a base for armed aggression against the other, and article 5 stated that Soviet Russia agreed to join in an international recognition of Estonia's neutrality.

Self-determination of peoples was respected by the Peace Conference at Versailles. Resulting in the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 twelve new states were created and nine plebiscites were held on the territories of the Central Powers. Together with fading hopes of collapse of the "Red" Soviet power and restoration of "White" power, the support for the independence of the Baltic states increased. On January 26 1921 the Council of the League of Nations recognized Estonia, the step followed by many other states within a year.

The revolutionary nature of the Soviet state and its professed claim of spreading revolution abroad affected the geopolitics. Consequent untrust reflected by the neighbours had a firm base in the form of attempted Communist coups in neighbouring countries, orchestrated by Moscow (1 December 1924 in Estonia). Thus, Estonia was initially unenthusiastic concerning commitments with Russia, restricting these initially to economic domains, like free transit, trade and railway agreements. However, by 1932 Estonian confidence in Soviet good faith was sufficient to sign the Treaty of Nonaggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in May 4 1932 and the Convention for Conciliation of Disputes on June 16, 1932. Estonia also signed the Convention for the Definition of Aggression (the so-called Litvinov Conventions) on July 1933. To some extent, these positive developments may be linked to the personality of the Head of the Soviet Foreign Policy in 1930-1939 Maxim Litvinov, who had worked in Estonia and other Baltic republics before.

7. Conclusion

Estonian ethnonym was created on the basis of conformity of Estonian toponym and linguonym. Together with the creation of Estonian state Estonian politonym was formed, enabling to switch in the development from minority protection to nation-building model. According to the aims of nation-building model, the chief aim was the building of civic society in Estonia, with Estonian as the national, official and common language introduced. Together with this linguistic human rights were introduced, through the system of cultural and territorial autonomy

The period witnessed nation-building efforts, starting with the rearrangement of the status of the Estonian language based on minority protection model to the needs of nation-building. The campaigns from the 1930s as well as statistics of educational system confirm that this result was achieved. The educational policy was guided by the principles of the considerably generous minority policy of the Estonian state, together with the building of a nation-state with Estonian as the national language. The sophisticated and everdeveloping legal system provided significant linguistic human rights for minorities as well as the financial support. The educational conditions enabled the mother tongue education for the recognised minorities up to the secondary level. At the same time, the national language status of Estonian was implemented through the achievements in corpus planning and acquisition planning. The requirement of the proficiency in the Estonian language in written and oral communication was based on the national curricula and was under the constant supervision of the Ministry of Education.

15. Soviet occupation

1. *Historical overview*

1. **Developments during World War II**

Following the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and its Secret Protocol (known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), the Soviet Union occupied the independent states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in June 1940 (see more Kirby 1994).

The situation changed to worse with the appointment of the new People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs V. Molotov, representative of expansionist Soviet policy, who gave green light to Nazi-Soviet talks, reaching climax in the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 with a confidential annex, establishing respective spheres of influence. With reference to the Baltic States, the first article stated (Hough 1985: 370):

In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR.

The protocol was put to use immediately, with the division of Poland, enforcing the Pact of Mutual Assistance on Estonia (September 28 1939) and afterwards on other Baltic States (with the main point of handing over several naval and air bases to Russia and garrisoning Soviet troops twice as numerous as local armies) and initiating the Winter War against Finland. On June 16 Russia demanded the replacement of the Estonian Cabinet and admission of additional troops to Estonia. As the resistance was considered futile, Estonia complied to Russia's demands. On June 17 the 51-year occupation of Estonia began. New government was installed according to the prescription from A. Zhdanov, conducting the occupation in Estonia. According to Hough (1985: 381), Chief of General Staff, ten of the eleven members of the Government, sixty-eight from the ninety-six members of Parliament were arrested and deported.

The annexation of Estonia by the USSR in 1940 entailed disastrous changes in the population, including its ethnic composition, resulting from mass deportation (over 10,000 people) and imprisonment (about 7,000) of the autochthonous inhabitants and from the first influx of colonists in the wake of the invading foreign troops. In June 1940, 90,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Estonia, in addition to the 25,000 already there, in accordance with the treaty on military bases that had been imposed on Estonia in October 1939. This made the forces occupying the territory 115,000 strong, as against the Estonian army of 14,000. Most Estonian military officers, senior police officers and top civil servants were imprisoned and executed. The President of Estonia was arrested, together with his family, and deported to Russia, where he eventually died in a hospital for mentally ill, while part of his family died of hunger.

Estonia was proclaimed a part of the Soviet Union (6 August 1940) and named the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, and fell under the rule of the Soviet governmental apparatus and Communist Party. The first phase, Stalinist linguistic policy, was introduced in Estonia, having a serious impact.

Firms were proclaimed to be Soviet property, the Soviet rouble became the only valid currency, and Soviet law and Stalinist terror ruled the country. On 14 June 1941, during a single campaign, more than 10,000 people were deported to Russia. Non-Communist parties and organizations were banned, all schools, societies and clubs of the ethnic minorities were closed, and the system of cultural autonomy was eliminated.

Most journals and newspapers were closed down. Those few that survived were made heralds

of Communist ideas. Access to information was channelled through the Soviet official information agency, TASS, and through Moscow Radio. The foreign press was prohibited, and foreign contacts were terminated. Individual arrests, the most common element in the sovietization policy, began from the first day of occupation, 17 June 1940. In the course of the first year of Soviet occupation (1940-41), the population of Estonia decreased by 104,000 (see Kala 1991).

World War II overrode Estonia twice. Germany conquered Estonia in 1941, and in 1944 the country was again occupied by the Soviet Union. At the end of 1941 Estonia was claimed to be *Judenfrei* by Nazis. Many factors contributed to a further decrease in the Estonian population, particularly war damage and losses, imprisonment and executions, as well as deportations and waves of refuge. The result was that by 1946 the Estonian population had decreased by one-fifth (200,000) to 854,000. A mere 23,000 (2,7%) of non-Estonians remained as minorities in Estonia (the percentage of 97.3 is disputed by Tiit (1993), who proposes the percentage of 95-96%).

2. First decade of occupation

During the first decade of occupation, oppressive methods were used to create favourable social and demographic conditions for the destruction of Estonians and their language as well as of the remnants of indigenous minorities, replacing them with Russian-speaking, imported, "trustworthy" personnel. To make conditions more acceptable for the non-Estonian newcomers, several functional areas were russified, and for the sake of keeping their jobs Estonians had to learn Russian language. Russian was made the second language in education (not a foreign language), and in several areas, the first. The knowledge of the local language in occupied Estonia was not found necessary by newcomers, hence the low percentage of the knowledge (13-20%) among non-Estonians (XXXref). No stimuli was left for newcomers to respect local language and culture.

3. Khrushchev period

When compared to other territories under Soviet jurisdiction, conditions in the Baltic republics were softer during the post-Stalin period, seemingly due to the non-recognition policy (Hough 1985, Liivak 1990) by the West. Thus attention-causing troubles were avoided, in order to put out remembrance of independence and the following occupation, resulting in a relatively milder version of totalitarianism. In addition to that, ethnic memory was not wiped out (Rannut 1993).

The relatively short mild period of the 1960s, usually associated with N. Khrushchev, brought about a revitalization of Estonian culture. Most of those who had stayed alive in remote deportee areas and prison camps, had returned by that time. The new generation that had appeared was socially immune, having acquired the skill of double-thinking and fighting for the Estonian cause under the guise of being devoted to building socialism. However, the eversinking share of Estonians in their homeland, due to massive immigration, made any resistance even in minor cases hopeless. In 1959 the proportion of Estonians in Estonia's general population fell to 74.6% and continued to decrease.

2. Instruments and structure of control

The methods used for establishing control on the occupied territory were the following:

A. genocide towards Estonian population and forced mass population transfers.

The losses of the Estonian population are listed in Tiit (1993, it also provides references for other studies). The ideological excuse for such inhuman action was the **elimination of non-proletarian classes**. This was implemented mostly during the first post-war decade in Estonia, when the Stalinist policy was in its height. According to the ruling ideology of the time, the "people's enemies" were to be crushed, brute force being used against persons of the "wrong" social background or class. During 1945-53 around 75,000 persons were imprisoned, from which a quarter was executed. The social basis of the "hostile" class was also constrained by means of industrialisation (preferential development of heavy industry, the closing down of small private firms), collectivization (creation of socialist agriculture, the ruining of private farms through the creation of collective farms), and the ideological Literacy Campaign - despite the fact that Lutheran Estonia had been over 90% literate since the 19th century.

Forced mass population transfers and resulting waves of seeking refuge. During the years 1939-1940 ca 22,000 Baltic Germans left Estonia for Germany. In 1943 Estonian Swedes (ca 7,500) left their homes in the Estonian coastal region and islands for Sweden, in conformity with a German-Swedish treaty, in order to get out of the war. In 1944, before the arrival of the Soviet army, around 75,000 Estonians left as refugees (mainly for Sweden and Germany), in fear of a return of the Soviet terror. Simultaneously, the oppression of Estonians continued, a reaction to which was the escape of Estonians to the woods (hence the guerilla movement comprising 16,000 men known as the *forest brothers*,

during 1944-1950, see further in Laar 1992, Shtromas 1990).

Several mass arrests and deportations of Estonians to far regions in the Soviet Union took place (altogether ca 50,000 between 1945 and 49). In March 1949, during one single campaign over 20,000 Estonians were deported to the Far East and Siberia, the majority being women and children. Many died en route (Tiit 1993). In an attempt to mechanically mix peoples, and to destroy their (non-Soviet!) ethnic and cultural environment, the Ingrians (already deported from their mother country in the 1930s) were driven from Estonia in 1947 (Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of May 7, 1947), from where they had just settled in 1944--1947, finding the new milieu relatively acceptable in terms of language and culture. In 1951, the final deportation took place, the victims being mostly active church-goers, who were no good at adopting the new ideology. During the same year most of the civil servants who had collaborated with the occupiers in 1940 were arrested, and their jobs taken by "trustworthy" workers with a Russian background.

B. partition.

The illegitimate transfer of Estonian territory (2,235 sq. kms, the town Petseri/Pechory and ten counties around it and beyond Narva river, with ethnically mixed population of 56,000, from which Estonians comprised 19,000) to Russia at the end of 1944. The area was linked to Pskov and Leningrad Region (Anderson 1990). These areas had mixed indigenous population of 56,000, consisting of ethnic Estonians (setud, 19,000), Russians and beyond the Narva river, Ingrians, living compactly in their villages. In Petseri, Estonians were in majority, according to the census from 1934.

C. assimilation of Estonian minorities to Russian. For non-Russian minorities in Estonia, no possibilities were left to promote and maintain their ethnic culture and language. All their institutions were abolished, including media, schools, clubs, etc. The same rules applied to Russian minority in Estonia, with the difference that the network of Russian-medium schools and clubs enlarged considerably, however, not promoting local ethnic culture, but the all-Union socialist culture with a heavy ideological component.

The third major shift concerned Estonians, who were made powerless minority in their homeland. This was achieved by

D. hegemonic control.

For this, the system of the Soviet power grids (cf. 4.1.3) was introduced. The new Soviet regime in the occupied territories was kept in order with massive violence and the transfer of power to loyal personnel brought in from Russia. Decision-making was taken away from Estonians and transferred to assimilated Estonians from Russia or directly to Russians. Russified Estonians, having twenty-year Soviet experience already, with no or minimal knowledge of the Estonian language were recruited from Russia and appointed to top positions together with ethnic Russians. The first secretaries of the Estonian Communist Party Nikolai Karotamm, Ivan (Johannes) Käbin and Karl Vaino (until May 1988) came from Russia. Several top positions were reserved for Russians. Appointment of Russians in the form of functionaries second in command in Party and government offices was a rule. Among such offices the most important one was that of the Second Secretary of the Central Committee, who supervised the activities of the cadre and administrative organs which manage the activities of all lower-level Party bodies as well as the militia and the KGB (Zamascikov 1990: 87-89). Thus the changes were as follows:

- Penetration of the local Party organisations by Russians and russified members of the respective nations
- Appointment of russified and "reliable" Balts to important positions of power
- Appointment of Russian functionaries as second in command at every party committee and local government body

These influenced the ideological power grid and provided direct subordination to Moscow. One should add the prohibition of all other ideologies that was maintained decisively.

From the military power grid one should point out the following:

- Direct subordination to Moscow of the Estonian Army;
- termination of Estonian officer corps;
- abolition of the national military units and the establishment of the extraterritorial principle of manning in the army.
- Establishment of local secret police offices (the KGB) with the personnel coming from Russia

The shifts in the economic situation were the following:

- nationalisation of most of the private property;
- introduction of the planned economy with decisions taken outside Estonia;
- change from kroon to rouble, with the latter having only partial functions of money;
- severe drop in income level of the population.

Estonia was rearranged as one ethnic unit (republic) in the Soviet Union, with no ethnically based

subunits. Consequently, all other minorities in Estonia, with the exception of Russia, had to give up their ethnic maintenance systems and linguistic human rights. However, as human rights were not respected political system functioned in the framework of totalitarian regime with no elements of democracy (there were no free elections, instead, the system of appointments by the Communist Party apparatus was used, the appointed political leadership represented the interests of Moscow instead of the Estonian people).

3. Ideological brainwash

Ideology was seemingly the second main component besides (threat of) violence in maintaining hegemonic control. There were two waves of ideological brainwash during the period of occupation in Estonia, one starting with the occupation, and the other at the end of 1970s, the last one to be discussed in 5.3.6 and 5.3.8.2.

In order to reform Estonian society in accordance with the new ideology an attempt was made to destroy societal integrity and continuity as well as collective ethnic memory, starting with this task from the very first days of the occupation. It covered most of the topics one encounters in everyday life. Even the past was rearranged, according to the needs of ideology. **Ideologically motivated modification of history** was based on two fundamental topics: the friendship of Russians and Estonians, and the class nature of every event in history. In spite of the fact that the Estonian population had witnessed the events, falsifications of the recent history comprised a part of it with any differing opinion prohibited. The occupation of Estonia was depicted as the admission of Estonia to the Soviet Union by its free will, preceded by a proletarian revolution. As a matter of fact, at the time of annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in June 1940 the Estonian Communist Party had 130 members, thus being totally incapable of any major violent act.

The purges concerning ethnic culture were a routine during the first decade of occupation. To alter the collective memory, material bearers of it were destroyed together with human ones. Approximately 30 million books (including childrens' books!) were burned. Thick volumes were fragmented with the help of an axe (see Meri 1991). At Tartu University library a special position of censor was created, a responsibility held by a monolingual Russian. Access to other materials published in independent Estonia and not used for heating purposes was severely restricted. To eliminate the blank spots in Estonian history a new version was written, describing Russians as Estonia's peace-loving neighbours, who help Estonians to re-establish their own native culture, and who liberated Estonia from German and Swedish occupation.

Destruction of the symbolic values of the Estonian ethnicity were another goal. Together with providing Estonians a new past, national symbols were either abolished or modified to the needs of the new governors. To make the new version of Estonian history more easily memorable, public places such as streets, squares and parks, as well as institutions and factories and even one town (Kuressaare) were renamed in honour of various revolutionaries and prominent Russian figures presiding over this new history. Simultaneously monuments and statues glorifying the past (among them the statue of the folk hero of the Estonian national epic Kalevipoeg) were demolished and replaced by statues that were to be important in this new past. An attempt was made to deprive Estonians of their literary roots, and to replace the Estonian (Latin) writing system by Cyrillic, but this failed because of lack of enthusiasm. Any protest against the prevailing ideology was labelled nationalistic and severely punished: protesters were often either shot or sent to Siberian prison camps for 25 years, while family members were deported to Siberia, and their relatives denied access to higher education and to certain jobs. Estonians who survived the GULAG were deprived of the right to live in their area of origin. As a result, despair and cynicism (the so-called social fatigue syndrome) became prevalent among Estonians, accompanied by a rapid fall in the birth rate, and an increase in the number of suicides. To this day the Estonians have not yet regained their pre-war population numbers.

4. Socioeconomic changes affecting ethnic composition

The new socioeconomic policy according to the principles of hegemonic control was introduced. In economy,

unequal and harmful to Estonia economic ties were established. This included rapid large-scale industrialisation based on nationalised property, collectivization of agriculture and implementation of centralised control up to the smallest detail (Zamascikov 1990:91). Thus, all resources, products and means of production were taken away from local people, and decisions concerning the well-being of them were transferred to Moscow. Sometimes large industrial projects for which neither labor nor adequate markets were available locally, thus Moscow exported mostly unskilled labor and imported commodities (Zamascikov 1990:92), contrary to colonialism. As a result 90% of economic integration

took place with the large Slavic republics, and not among themselves (Dellenbrant in the 1987 Kiel conference, referred to in Zamascikov 1990:92).

Oil shale industry in Estonia was transformed for the needs of providing gas to Leningrad in Russia. More than half of the projects was carried out by Glavpromstroi NKVD (former name of KGB) SSSR that used army personnel, prisoners-of-war and ordinary prisoners as its labour force (Hallik 1994:57).

The next major societal phenomenon was **unbalancing the local society through massive immigration**. In addition to the rooting of occupational army (it had 505 bases in Estonia, see Hallik 1994:57) Russian workers and collective farmers were sent to Estonia by USSR government through *orgnabor* system. To some areas (capital Tallinn, city and district of Kohtla-Järve) these people were recruited through a special agency *Orgnabor* all over the Soviet Union). Immigration was favoured as a means of producing loyal personnel with "clean papers". In the years 1945-50, the number of immigrants was 0.5 million, and that of emigrants was half that amount while natural increase was only 8,700. 170,000 non-Estonians settled permanently in Estonia, over 90 per cent of them in towns. They saw Estonia as part of the USSR, where a new way of life and the Russian language had still to be learned (Kala 1991). During Hrushchev's reign most of the imprisoned and deported persons returned and provided some stability in the ethnic processes. Together with the abolition of the former form of the socialist ideology, centered on the personal cult of Stalin, provided the ideological voidness with some more personal freedom. But this period did not last long. Even then, some Estonian factory managers, having in mind their material well-being, allowed their factories to grow extensively, and thus supported immigration (the so-called migration-pump effect). After the 1960s, migration diminished, but until the end of the 1980s, the number of newcomers exceeded those leaving by 8,000-9,000 per year, in a population of 1.5 million (data from ESA). As the number of Estonians did not rise to its pre-World War II level, remaining at less than a million, the proportion of Estonians in the overall population fell from 97.3% in 1945 to 61.5% in 1989.

Thanks to special position of Russian-medium factories and plants, subordinated directly to Moscow that employed most of the newcomers, their well-being surpassed that of local Estonians who, as usual, avoided Russian-medium working places. As an example, the newcomers attained a privileged position by getting flats (according to Drobizheva, 1984, 86% of the aliens and only 57% of the Estonians lived in flats with all modern conveniences, these were not bought, but instead, distributed), as well as enjoying other privileges in towns, mainly because 90% of the immigrants were townspeople. The result was a decrease in the percentage of Estonians, falling to 4% of the population in Narva, 3.2% in Sillamäe, 21% in Kohtla-Järve, 2% in Paldiski and 47% in Tallinn, the capital by 1989 (in 1970 Tallinn still had 55.7% Estonians among its residents). In 1989 Knowles (1989) predicted the number of Estonians and Russians to be equal by 2017, if trends would be stable.

5. Territorial and functional reallocation of languages.

Together with the influx of newcomers territorial and functional language shifts took place. In several **functional domains**, Estonian was replaced by Russian, due to Estonia's direct subordination to Moscow, for example in banking, statistics, the militia (Soviet police), railway, naval and air transport, mining, energy production, etc. Their reasons for moving to Estonia were a better standard of living (there was hunger in Russia); organized recruitment (construction work, oil shale industry); privileged positions in certain trades where Estonians were not trusted, e.g. navigation and aviation (an opportunity for Estonians to flee abroad), the railways (the risk of sabotage), communications (state secrets), etc.. Some functional activities were completely new in Estonia, having no corresponding Estonian terminology and were therefore carried out in Russian, e.g. Gosplan (state planning) and the KGB. Some were eliminated entirely in Estonian, and for this reason, recreated in Russian, e.g. everything connected with military purposes. An ancient Estonian profession, off-shore fishing, was forbidden, the boats broken up and burned. Instead, Russian-medium marine fishing and transport system was created, with special attention to ideological alert. As a result, at the beginning of 80s Estonians made up less than half of those employed in industry and transport.

From the late 1970s Moscow reinstated policies aimed at greater cultural standardisation, reflecting in several dissenting outbreaks, concerned with the russification. The Estonian Communist Party operated solely in Russian, the Government and several ministries shifted to Russian with the excuse that there was somebody in the collective who did not speak Estonian language (see more in Sinilind 1985).

Together with the functional reallocation of languages **territorial language shifts** took place. During the occupation immigrants (who might not have been aware of their status, but moved, according to their opinion, to another part of the Soviet Union) settled mainly in: 1) the town of Narva (North-East Estonia), which was bombed down by the SU air force and lay in ruins, and where, during the post-war years, resettlement by Estonians was restricted up to 1952; 2) Sillamäe, an area closed to Estonians as members of a "suspect" ethnic group, due to the uranium mining, and, later, uranium processing; 3) the Kohtla-Järve

oil-shale mines; 4) the country's capital, Tallinn (large Russian factories and Soviet bases), and 5) the submarine base Paldiski, where Estonians were turned away, and where all monuments reminiscent of Estonia, including cemetery squares, were demolished.

In connection with the building of large military airfields, the linguistic balance was violated and interethnic relations ruined in Tartu, Tapa, Haapsalu and Pärnu. The army took vast territories and Estonians were simply expelled from these lands without compensation. All road access was prohibited or restricted for military purposes to 15% of the Estonian territory.

Together with the decrease of functional as well as regional areas where Estonian language was used, the **rapid rise of the status of Russian** took place. It was caused by several factors, like Russian being compulsorily the sole language for several functional spheres, the construction of a parallel to the already operating Estonian-medium Russian-medium network of plants, factories, offices, institutions and service bureaus as well as entertainment facilities and residence areas, providing full-scale education (including higher education, vocational schools etc) and services in Russian. These structures were filled with the regular massive influx of immigrants. As a result a Russian-speaking environment was created in Estonia with no contacts with Estonians and the Estonian language, hindering effectively possible integration.

6. Linguistic situation

The main features of linguistic situation were:

- the maintenance of native language by ethnic Russians and Estonians,
- assimilation of third nationalities;
- diminishing share of Estonians due to the massive immigration of Russian speakers.

Language maintenance may be observed through the data provided by censuses. Its opposite, language incongruence refers to people who declare a main ("native") language different from their national language (nationality was entered in one's passport in the Soviet Union and indicated, as a rule, one's parents ethnic background, i.e. language of origin; Taagepera 1990: 142). This variable indicates that a person is in the middle of an assimilation process, and it also indicates the probable direction of the process. Concerning Estonians, Taagepera noted insignificant incongruence: *In Estonia, the difference is in favour of Russian and shows signs of widening. Still the cases sum up to only 1.1% of the republic population, and this share has increased very slowly... By this measure, assimilation is not proceeding in either direction at a significant rate...* (Taagepera 1990:143).

While language incongruence may look limited and stable, the preconditions for its future increase may be set by current changes in second language fluency. Members of one nationality must first become fluent in another language before that language can start competing with their native language.

Concerning the knowledge of Estonian among Russian-speakers, this was minimal. According to Taagepera (1990), the number of Russians fluent in Estonian was in 1970 12.5%, by 1979 it had decreased to 11.4%. These were mainly local Russians, the resident minority from before 1939 or children from Estonian-Russian bilingual families. This trend was accompanied by the low level of fluency in Russian (*svobodno vladeyet*) among ethnic Estonians: in 1970 it was 27.8%, in 1979 correspondingly 23.3% with decrease 4.5%, though Russian was a compulsory school subject (Itogi 1970:317, Vestnik statistiki 1980, 10:72, quoted in Dellenbrant 1990). This reflected the **ethnically polarised situation** in Estonia, which might have changed from passive separation to active confrontation if the balance of power changed.

Assimilation of third nationalities was one of the key elements in creating Russian language environment in Estonia. According to the 1989 census, the ethnic composition in Estonia was as follows: 963,000 Estonians, 475,000 Russians, 48,000 Ukrainians, 28,000 Belorussians, 16,600 Finns, 4,600 Jews, 4,000 Tartars, 3,500 Latvians and 3,000 Poles. The group of third nationalities (ethnic non-Estonians and non-Russians) was the most promising soil for growing real *homines sovietici* (see chapter 3.3). To here belonged mostly ethnic Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, Germans and Poles, in whose case the official de-ethnization policy had produced significant results: according to the 1989 census only a minority of 40% used their native languages as the first language, 52% were russified, approximately 8% had switched to Estonian. The percentage of those claiming Russian as their native language was 78,4% among Jews, 67,1% among Belorussians, 63,4% among Poles, 54,5% among Ukrainians, 56,5% among Germans. Assimilation was extremely prominent in the northeastern region of Estonia with Russian majority, where it affected Estonians also (Kõre 1997: 239). The lack of education in their native language seems to be reason for an underdeveloped sense of ethnic identity, which made the national aspirations of the Estonians difficult for them to accept. Although Jews, Germans and Swedes, owing to their cultural autonomy, successfully maintained themselves as ethnic groups in the years between the two World Wars, most left Estonia during World War II. As a result, only one fifth of Estonian Germans and Jews represented a minority of local origin. The rest came to Estonia seeking better opportunities for emigration to the West, as well as being in fear of pogroms in

Russia. The 300 coastal Swedes assimilated to Estonian, as were a third of ethnic Finns, who shifted from Finnish to Estonian.

7. **Language policy of russification**

1. **General**

Like in several other domains, language policy in official documents was discussed implicitly, under the disguise of ideology. The only exception seemed to be acquisition planning, to be discussed further. The goals of the Soviet language policy in Estonia seemed to be:

- 1 full-scale Russian monolingualism for Russians, with local titular language learning optional or formal, (with no lessons or even a teacher), backed by cadre rotation (for military personnel, Communist Party bureaucrats);
- 2 minority bilingualism for other titular nations, with Russian-medium functional domains in expansion
- 3 assimilation of “third nationalities”, mostly to Russian language.

The Soviet language policy in Estonia was implemented through favoured immigration. In order to consolidate immigrants on the basis of Russian language, three steps were implemented:

- Creation of a parallel Russian-medium environment, with no need to switch to Estonian;
- continuous transfer of territorial and functional domains from Estonian to Russian, and
- ideological incentives to prefer Russian before Estonian.

These steps threatened the integrity of Estonian, as Kreindler (1990:242) has remarked, causing:

- expanding usage of Russian in administration and mass communication,
- an extensive program of translations from Russian,
- massive program of Russian language teaching.

Though the Article 36 of the Constitution of the USSR stated:

Citizens of the USSR of various race and nationalities enjoy equal rights.

Implementation of these rights is guaranteed by politics of comprehensive development and convergence of all nations and nationalities of the USSR, cultivating citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and Socialist internationalism, option to use mother tongue and languages of other nationalities of the USSR. However, the implementation of these rights was out of consideration. The reason was the lack of rule of law: Constitution and international human rights instruments ratified by the Soviet Union were not regarded as legal documents, acceptable in court, interference in delivering justice by the KGB and Communist Party officials was common. Several documents affecting language policy were classified, thus there was no possibility to demand linguistic human rights in this situation.

2. **Implementation of language policy**

During the occupation two opposite trends may be observed in language policy:

- 1 ideological, directed by the Communist Party apparatus, with the task of creating Russian language environment and establishing Russian language as the second language for non-Russian;
- 2 scientific, directed and implemented by the Institute of Language and Literature, Tartu University, Tallinn Pedagogical Institute together with some semi-scientific bodies, like the Mother Tongue Society, with the task of the maintenance of Estonian.

Concerning the first trend, the first task of creating the **Russian language environment** was successful, backed by the continuous immigration flows. The second task of **making Russian the second language** for non-native speakers of it, was seemingly a flop, as shown above. In order to carry out this task, emphasis was laid on ideology and acquisition planning. Elsa Grechkina, the then Head of Section of Science and Educational Institutions of the Estonian Communist Party, stated in Tashkent Conference in 1979 that promotion of Russian was extremely important ideological component of the ideological work (Grechkina 1981:201). She emphasized the connection with the forming of Communist views with the instruments of language.

Several decisions were made to improve the proficiency in Russian, at the cost of Estonian.

Corresponding documents were adopted by the Estonian Communist Party, reflecting the decisions of Tashkent conference, Elsa Gretchkina was appointed the new Minister of Education. These steps created popular resentment in Estonia (letter of 40), which was put down with harsh administrative methods (ref.Tarand XXX). To overcome this incident the Congress of the Estonian Communist Party launched strong attacks on “nationalistic tendencies” and the “identification of nationalism as the principal ideological problem facing the republic (Zamascikov 1990:95). Karl Vaino, the first secretary of the ECP, claimed at the Congress in January 1981 that the nationalist tendencies were the result of

activities of people who are “immature in the field of ideological and political relations” (*Sovetskaia Estonia*, 29 January 1981, quoted in Dellenbrant 1990:113)

The second trend focusing on the **Estonian language maintenance** was also successful, as the data above shows. In the domain of corpus planning researchers enjoyed relative freedom. The main constraints were insufficient financial and material resources and sophisticated and ineffective publishing.

An Orthological Dictionary was published in 1960 (second edition 1976). A number of terminological committees worked in various professional and technical fields. Several hundred dictionaries on special terminology were published. For many years a National Orthological Committee operated. Erelt et al. (1997) have described the situation with normative trend taking precedence in general corpus planning, thus obstructing the influx of Russian loanwords and other phenomena of language contact. Beginning with 1970s this has been gradually substituted by recommendations. Since 1955 *Emakeele Seltsi Aastaraamat* (Yearbook of the Mother Tongue Society) appeared, together with the Society’s scholarly publications series and monographs of the Institute of the Language and Literature. Kreindler (1990:242-243) designates these features of this second trend - different alphabet (Latin) from Russian (Cyrillic), advanced in terminology, large corps of linguists - as constraints to the Soviet language policy. This was noted also inside the Soviet Union: on February 26 1985 in the official all-republic newspaper *Sovetskaia Estonia* Mikhail Guboglo attacked “the artificial elevation of the importance” of the Estonian language. The article caused a fierce protest from the Estonian Writers’ Union.

3. Conclusion

Russification should be viewed as the implementation of an asymmetric, hegemonic position. The goal towards non-Russian groups was assimilation through obligatory submerging by Russian culture, murder of inherent non-Russian culture through modification of it as the carrier of Russian identity. Totalitarian regime was introduced. The economic basis for it was laid through state proprietorship, genocide of the human resources representing Estonian political culture, terminating the rule of law, exclusive rights for mass media to one political view, represented by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Belonging to the modernist category of imperialism, represented in industrial society, russification required territorial contact for success. This was achieved by the colonisation of ethnically non-Russian territories, providing:

- control of language environment, through hierarchisation of languages, with Russian on top (against linguonymic aspects of identity);
- pressure on cultural traits of ethnicity ;
- disintegration of territorial identity.

These were accompanied by rationalization policies (Skutnabb-Kangas 1997), based on hierarchisation and isolation from the cultures outside the Soviet Union.

Among the factors causing psychological resistance to Russification Ruutsoo (1998) mentions ethnic defence mechanisms collected in collective memory, low status of Russian-Soviet culture among Estonians and the boundary position between historical types of civilisation with Russia belonging to different type (cf. Galtung 1996). Other factors were the goal of nation-building achieved by the beginning of occupation in 1940, influence of Estonian emigré culture, broadcasting by Western mass media (esp. Finnish TV stations), resistance of Estonian-minded officials in implementing the policy, etc. Thus, homogenisation policies with Russian promoted as the common language, without the counterweight of linguistic human rights.

In Bourdieu’s (1970: 47) pedagogical framework in 1980s the shift may be observed from implicit pedagogy internalising the cultural capital of the dominating Russian culture unconsciously, to explicit pedagogy, articulating explicitly the principles of the new dominating culture. Education becomes thus a symbolic exercise of violence (ibid.: 15), as the main instrument in the transformation of power into legitimate authority. It can also be seen as an attempt to expand Russian linguistic market (cf. Bourdieu 1991: 37) to other territories and raise the value of the Russian language as capital.

Using the framework by Skutnabb-Kangas (1997), one may trace the pattern of colonising consciousness by the dominant groups via consciousness industries, containing education, mass media, ideology. In all these domains Estonian language was either pushed out or use cut to minimum.

Learning Russian as the dominant language at the cost of local languages may be explained in this framework through the goal to permit an increased exercise of control through the consciousness industry, and further, penetration of the minds of the dominated.

8. Acquisition planning

1. General

Estonia together with Lithuania remained for years the only two republics in the Soviet Union which did not begin Russian lessons in the first grade (Kreindler 1990:240), thanks to the then Minister of Education, Ferdinand Eisen (About these developments, see Eisen 1991). Thus, a different from other republics school structure was introduced in the Baltics, with one additional year of titular language-medium schooling, 11 instead of 10, and currently 12.

According to the law the pupils in Estonia had the right to study either through the medium of native language or of another language of the Soviet Union (cf. Law on Education of 1974). In reality, the choice was between Estonian and Russian. The children of immigrants in general attended Russian-medium schools, further strengthening assimilational tendencies. The number as well as the relative share of pupils attending Russian-medium increased continuously. In 1980/81 they comprised 32.5% of all schools of general education, by 1990/91 this number had increased to 36.8% (Vare 1997).

2. Russian language promotion

Rerrangement during Stalin

The summer of 1940 marked the beginning of a new period of Russification. This was resumed at the end of World War II as an overt campaign, under the pretext of acquainting Estonians with Soviet culture. Estonian, as a "language with no future", was discriminated against in the curriculum of Estonian educational institutions. The rearrangement of education was started from the very first days of occupation. On 2 September the decree on the curriculum of primary and secondary schools (ENSV Teataja 1940 nr. 3, art.26) established the compulsory teaching of Russian instead of the first foreign language from the 4th grade 5 times a week. Russian was not seen as a foreign language for Estonians, but was labelled "the second mother tongue" of Estonian-speakers. In order to make Estonians bilingual in their two "mother tongues", the Russian language was taught in over 60% of the time allotted to mother tongue instruction. The number of hours reserved for the first foreign language (e.g. German or English) was gradually reduced (from 27 weekly hours in the total curriculum in 1945 to 16 in 1983). In order to be able to retain the obligatory status of the Estonian language as a medium of education and the teaching of Estonian literature in Estonian schools, the Estonian Ministry of Education prolonged the duration of secondary education in Estonian-medium "national" schools by one year, as compared to Russian-medium schools. This was a bold step to take, and there were demands to remove the then Minister, Ferdinand Eisen.

The second wave of rearrangement in acquisition planning focused on the teaching of Russian in non-Russian-medium schools. For this purpose the powerful ideological system was implemented, as well as additional economic resources. The process was based on several top-level legal documents, like Decree No 835, issued by the USSR Council of Ministers on 13 October 1978. The document prescribed a considerable enhancement of the quantity as well as the quality of Russian taught in the "national schools" at the expense of other subjects to be implemented in the constituting republics of the Soviet Union (Rannut and Rannut 1995, Sinilind 1985: 167 – 169; Hint 1989). This decree was implemented according to a secret decree of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, of 19 December 1978 (Protocol 105, Article 1). It provided detailed tasks with deadlines and determined institutions responsible for implementation. That document legalised the priority of Russian over Estonian, declaring Russian the only means of active participation in social life, while teachers were obliged to "teach their pupils to love the Russian language" (Sinilind 1985: 170–171; Hint 1989: 60 – 61). This was followed by Decree No 3, issued by the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic Council of Ministers on 8 January 1979, and Orders 367-k (on the teaching of Russian at Kindergartens) and 713-k (on the further improvement of Russian teaching). According to these documents, the teaching of Russian received a considerable amount of additional material support, pilot programs were planned and the collected positive experience was to be distributed. This enabled the authorities to raise the salaries of Russian language teachers and, in order to increase efficiency, to reduce the number of students in Russian language classes, by dividing them into parallel groups. The plans foresaw the teaching of Russian at kindergarten level and Russian-medium teaching of subjects. Publications promoting Russian, such as the new Russian methods journal *Russkij jazyk v estonskoj shkole* ("The Russian Language in Estonian Schools" without the logical counterpart for balanced bilingualism, as Hint (1987) has remarked), as well as propagandist writings eulogising the Russian language (as Lenin's mother tongue and a language studied with great

interest by Marx and Engels), received considerable support. The new, corresponding curriculum was to be launched in 1983.

The decisions on the political level were reflected in the Law on Education, adopted in 1982, that foresaw the free mastery of Russian as the language of interethnic communication in the Estonian-medium educational institutions.

The new curriculum that was adopted by the Council of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Education on April 28, 1983 according to the plan, contained additional restrictions on the use and teaching of the Estonian language. This document presented a 5-year programme for preferential teaching of the Russian language in Estonian schools. The Estonian-medium schools were required to teach Russian as a "second native language" with the aim of producing totally bilingual graduates, whereas the curricula of the Russian-medium schools contained little practical Estonian and no Estonian history or geography whatsoever. The developments were analysed thoroughly and plans were made to discuss the situation with the Russian language teaching every second year.

During the time when the post of the Minister of Education was filled by Elsa Gretchkina, Estonian-medium schools began teaching Russian from the first grade and introduced Russian lessons in kindergarten (RIESh 1/1987). In national schools, more time was devoted to Russian than to the native tongue (*Pravda* 1 August 1984, quoted in Zamascikov 1990:95).

In the 1980s unidirectional bilingualism was promoted. Due to the unbalanced education system, two separate linguistic communities developed whose mutual understanding was deficient both linguistically and culturally.

Education for Russian-speakers

Estonian language proficiency did not belong to the priorities of the Russian-medium school system. Teaching of Estonian was never discussed by the government or Party circles. Estonian language lessons in the Russian-medium schools were lesser in number than foreign language lessons, or Estonian was made so optional that the 1956 curriculum lacked it as a subject altogether and from 1965 to 1972, no Estonian was taught at the secondary level. The number of lessons of Estonian was weekly two hours, usually it was regarded as optional with lessons used for other purposes and the marks not counted for, teaching posts vacant (Vare 1997). Estonian language lessons began in the third grade in Russian-medium schools (RIESh 3/1988, in Kreindler 1990:247). This kind of language policy was characteristic of the Estonian SSR education system until 1988.

This system, comparable to language shelter pattern (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995), avoiding assimilation in minority communities, produced together with the massive promotion of unilateral bilingualism focused on Estonians, the monolingual society of Russian speakers, separated from the rest of society (Rannut and Rannut 1995: 183)

Education for (other) minority language speakers

For other linguistic groups, using one's native language in education was not allowed. Their education was mostly in Russian (or, in exceptional cases, in Estonian).

Teaching of foreign languages

During the years of the Soviet occupation, foreign language teaching was considered unimportant, as non-knowledge of other languages was considered a virtue. Russian was regarded as the second mother tongue of Estonians, though basic knowledge of Russian, according to the census, was 33%. The official foreign languages in the curriculum were English and German (to a minor extent). French was taught in 2-3 schools. The number of foreign language lessons in Russian-medium schools of the Estonian SSR was smaller than in Estonian-medium schools. The topic has been dealt by Läänemets (1993).

3. Conclusions

In acquisition planning for Estonian one may monitor two different periods. The first one, based on language shelter model that ended with the powerful campaign of the Russian language promotion of the end of the 1970s, was substituted with the transition model, which, however was not implemented in full, due to the passive resistance of the population (and bureaucracy, of course). Thanks to the former model, high internal status of Estonian was maintained also among the next generation. Simultaneously, monolingual Russian-medium educational structure was created, which also maintained high language status, thus promoting the separation of these two linguistic groups. Sblizhenie - indigenous populations are asked to increase their understanding to the Russian language and culture. *It is obvious that the present school system, with separate schools for the indigenous and*

the Russian population groups, does not promote any integration among cultures. On the contrary, it tends to reinforce the separation of the two communities in the Baltic republics. This has been clearly noted by Maamägi (1981) and other scholars, especially from Estonia (Dellenbrant 1990:110).

9. Conclusions

The period of occupation ended officially on the 20 August 1991, when Estonia restituted its independence. However, this political declaration was one of the final steps towards sovereignty and new language policies. The crumbling of the Soviet Union started from the republics with the population still preserving high inherent self-value, making use of the principles of *perestroika*. As these were simultaneously the initial steps of restitution, these are analysed in the next chapter. When compared to other territories under Soviet jurisdiction, conditions in the Baltic republics were softer during post-Stalin period, seemingly due to the non-recognition policy (Hough 1985, Liivak 1990) by the West, thus attention-causing troubles were avoided, in order to put out remembrance of independence and the following occupation. Resulting in a relatively milder version of totalitarianism. In addition to that, ethnic memory was not wiped out (Rannut 1993).

In ideology one may observe two powerful state-financed and -directed waves of massive brainwash. The first, implemented during the reign of Stalin, was characterised by massive physical violence or threat of it, while the second of the turn of 1970s/1980s used more mentally-orientated means, providing better access to resources and privileged societal mobility to the faithful. Thus, during the second wave more emphasis was laid on carrots, instead of sticks.

The main societal change was the foundation of potential ethnolinguistic conflict by creating a new privileged linguistic elite based on preferential Russian language-biased status and acquisition planning, supported by the artificially created Russian language environment, while still the maintenance of the high inherent status local Estonian language was allowed, through ideological passivity in corpus planning, and for a long time, in acquisition planning (it may also interpreted as hidden resistance of prominent cultural figures). Acquisition planning changed its pattern from language shelter to transition model only at the end of 1970s, together with the increase of ideological component in language planning. Thus, two linguistic groups with high inherent native language status were maintained simultaneously: Russian and Estonian speakers, the last ones powerless at that time, due to the effective mechanisms of hegemonic control. The inevitable conflict was postponed by state violence or threat of it. Levits (1990:53) commented the situation: *Despite the formal equality of Soviet citizens, their division into two politically and socially uneven groups is an important domestic political factor which destabilizes the entire ruling system. The constantly growing need of the non-Russian part of the population for political emancipation is also increasing the significance of the national factor.*

Thus, the separation was maintained and active major linguistic conflict avoided by state violence, based on hegemonic control.

Occupation distorted common political identity, however leaving the basis for it - linguonymic, toponymic and ethnic identity intact. Ideologisation of language issues, bringing forth the switch from colonial modernist language spread model to nation-building, caused the collision of two incompatible nation-building models, one identified with Russian and the other with Estonian. Together with political detente, it produced ethnic mobilisation in Estonia, reflected in demonstrations and appeals (letter of the forty, pupils' demonstration in Tallinn 1980).

Following the subtractive rules of nation-building aiming at linguistic homogeneity together with minority consciousness the Centre promoted validation policies (Skutnabb-Kangas 1997). One side of it, invalidation of the non-material resources aimed at the subordinated non-Russian groups under the pressure to internalize the legitimacy of their subordination, reflecting colonised consciousness. This was attempted to achieve by the methods of creating invisibility and stigmatization. Resources were made invisible, as substantial share of the culture (for example, writers were banned and therefore, not published) and history denied (like Estonian-Russian conflicts, Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939), several norms and traditions abolished (cf. Christmas!) and organisations and institutions dismissed and prohibited. Resources were stigmatized also as handicaps and problems, with the Estonian language seen without future and as a vernacular of limited and decaying use, and its speakers having handicap in Russian. Simultaneously, glorification of Russian took place with intrinsic, extrinsic and functional arguments (Phillipson 1992) used.