Institute of Social and Political Sciences

Kin State (Non) Interventions: Hungary and Uzbekistan compared

CEERES Master's Thesis

Niginakhon Uralova
74068417600

Supervisors:
Dr. David Smith, Professor, University of Glasgow
Dr. Dobos Balázs, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest

August, 2023
Budapest, Hungary

Field of Studies:

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of:

Master of Arts in Political Science (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

International Master's (IntM) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Glasgow, UK

Master of Arts in Social Sciences (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Tartu, Estonia

Word count of the thesis: 22,283

Authorship Declaration: I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Niginakhon Uralova, July 28, 2023

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Niginakhon Uralova, (74068417600/18/121991) herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to the work created by me Kin State (Non) Interventions: Hungary and Uzbekistan compared, supervisors Dr. David Smith and Dr. Dobos Balázs,

- reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1;

I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation

To my mother Saida who did everything so her child could run after her dreams.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Years ago, my dear professor taught me that no matter how hard you try, you do not marry your thesis. It is easier to get it done and move on. There is no Nobel prize for my thesis either, he taught me. And the best thesis is always a finished thesis. So, here it goes.

I thank my supervisors Dr. David Smith and Dr. Dobos Balázs for their guidance and support. I also thank all 14 experts who took time to sit down with me and discuss kin-state politics of Hungary and Uzbekistan.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS *1*

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION *3*

Kin State (Non) Interventions: Hungary and Uzbekistan compared 3

CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND *8*

Kin-state politics as transborder nationalism 8

Hungary Actively Seeks Positive Kin-State Relationship with Magyars Abroad 15

Uzbekistan ignores its ethnic minorities 22

Chapter conclusions 31

CHAPTER III. HUNGARY PURSUES DYNAMIC TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM WHILE UZBEKISTAN IGNORES ITS ETHNIC KINS *32*

Hungary's Kin-State Activism 33

Hungary's Kin-State Activism 48

Uzbekistan's Kin-State Non-Involvement 60

Conclusion 72

CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS *73*

References 81

ANNEX I. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES *86*

ANNEX II. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS *87*

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Kin State (Non) Interventions: Hungary and Uzbekistan compared

Following the fall of communism, kin-state politics scholarship started gaining importance among nationalism, ethnicity, and conflict studies (Waterbury 2020). The scholarship of the field, in general, studies states taking a role of "protection and preservation" of their external minorities in neighboring countries based on shared ethnicity and history (Ibid.).

Kin-state studies usually examine ethnic minority groups' secession movements supported by kin-states, promotion of minority languages by kin-states in neighboring countries, and/or citizenship and identity questions (Ibid.).

Many external minority groups emerged upon the fall of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire, disintegration of the Soviet Union, and as a result of the First and Second World Wars as many borders were redrawn and many ethnic groups found themselves in states as minority. Examples can include Russians across post-soviet states, Hungarians in the neighboring countries, "Greeks in Albania, Turks in Bulgaria and Greece, Norwegians in Sweden and Finns in Russia" (Udrea 2014, 324 – 25).

Oftentimes, kin-states develop ties with their external co-ethnics. In Europe, most kin-minorities receive a positive response to their needs from their kin-states. Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Russia, Hungary, and Poland, for example, have a more active kin-politics towards their external minorities, cementing the aid on a legal basis. Hungary and Greece even offered socio-economic support, while Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary offered citizenship to their respective kin-minorities (Udrea 2014). Central Asia, however, presents a mixed advance. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan invited their ethnic kins from neighboring countries after the disintegration of the Soviet Union via *Oralman* (tr. returnee) and *Kairylyman* (tr. returnee)

programs, they do not extend the help towards their external minorities (Uralova and Bober 2020). Uzbekistan, on the other hand, shut its doors for millions of ethnic Uzbeks, sometimes amid the crisis of ethnic conflicts in neighboring countries (Ibid. 2021). So, *why do some states take a positive activism in support of their co-ethnics, while others do not*?

Study Focus, Aim and Conceptualization

This research work aims to examine *why some kin-states actively engage in kin-state politics in support of their co-ethnics, while others do not.*

Kin-state, by definition, is "a state that represents the majority nation of a transborder ethnic group whose members reside in neighboring territories" (Waterbury 2020, 799). While titular nations or state forming nations are those who make "the single dominant ethnic group in the state, typically after which the state was named," kin-minority groups or external minorities are those who live in the neighboring states due to "arbitrary drawing of borders" and identify with the titular group by ethnic ties, such as shared history, language, traditions, religion, etc. (Kudaibergenova 2018, 131; Udrea 2014, 324).

The research focuses on two case studies – Hungary and Uzbekistan. The two countries present two different approaches in terms of kin-state politics, but their kin-minorities emerged as a result of geo-politics of the nineteenth century. Today, both states have millions of kin-minorities in neighboring countries. There are around over two million Hungarians in the neighboring countries (Kovács 2020). Meanwhile, in the neighboring countries to Uzbekistan, around 3,5 million ethnic Uzbeks live while Uzbekistan's population is at 35 million (Uralova 2021). Hungary has developed a positive activism towards its kin-minorities, sometimes "at the expense of domestic ones" (Sansum and Dobos 2020). At times, it even brings transboundary conflicts such as diplomatic tensions (Vock 2020). Uzbekistan, on the other hand, chose indifference and minimal

support in the form of school supplies (Uralova 2021). What is common with these two states is their external minorities across borders who emerged as a result of twentieth century geopolitics and border re-drawing.

Research Questions or Hypothese*s*

This research work aims to examine *why kin-states have different kin-state politics in Central Europe and Central Asia?* To this end, it pursues following research questions with a focus on two countries – Hungary and Uzbekistan as both of them present a different, yet unique kin-state policies in their respective regions. Both ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries expect some form of support from the kin-states. In both cases, the external minorities happen to be in neighboring countries not because they migrated on their own will, but because of the border drawing processes – ethnic Hungarians after World War I and Uzbeks in the 1920s, under the Soviet regime, when borders were drawn. Yet, the two kin-states have developed different approaches since early 1990s towards their ethnic kins.

The question that are central for this research are:

1) What are the main reasons for Hungary to pursue active transborder nationalism?
2) What are the main reasons for Uzbekistan to refrain from transborder nationalism?

Research Design

It is a few-N comparison – MDSD. The study is designed to scrutinize political, economic, and cultural factors playing out differently in two countries kin-politics or lack of it thereof.

Operationalisation and Research Methods

To conduct this research, I employed two basic research methods – analysis of a data collection and analysis of semi-structured interviews with experts. First, I collected scholarship and news materials on Hungary and Uzbekistan's kin-politics, or absence of it. Then I conducted 14 semi

structured interviews with area experts of kin-studies, Central Europe and Central Asia scholars and journalists. The interviewees were selected based on their research expertise on the relevant fields. All respondents who study Hungary and Budapest's kin-state politics are from academia with a proven record of contribution in the field with publications, conference presentations and academic institution affiliation. To contact them, I relied on my academic supervisor's help. All respondents for Uzbekistan are academics, journalists, and researchers. They are known for studies in politics, security, economics, social and other aspects of Central Asia and Uzbekistan in particular. They have a proven record of relevant publications and are affiliated with academic institutions and independent research organizations as well as media. All interviews were conducted online, via zoom platforms and recorded with respondent's consent. Collected data was analyzed based on factors of moral and historical responsibility, relevance of regime type, soft power, economy, demography, as well as the role of international actors. Afterwards, I compared Budapest's motives to pursue an active kin-state politics vis-a-vis Tashkent's indifferent policy towards its kin-minorities based on above mentioned factors.

Limitations of the study

Because it is a small master's thesis, there are only two case studies – Hungary and Uzbekistan. In each region, there are other states with similar or different kin-state policies. Further research is needed to compare those as well.

While there might be public opinion polls whether they support their co-ethnics in neighboring countries in the case of Hungary (this is studied in further steps of the research), there has not been such a poll conducted in Uzbekistan. This limits the study to focus on only expert opinions and general literature review in the case of Uzbekistan.

Regarding the interviews, as I am not fluent in any Central Asian language except for Uzbek or speak any Central European language, only those experts who can communicate in English, Uzbek, or Russian are interviewed.

Structure of the dissertation

The overall structure of the study takes the following form:

- Abstract, which gives a short overview of the thesis;
- Introduction (CHAPTER I), which presents the outline of the study, describing the general ideas, research questions, research methodology and its significance, and limitations;
- Main body, which is built of four chapters:
    1. Chapter II gives literature analysis of overall kin-state politics aspects with a focus on two countries under the study – Hungary and Uzbekistan and their relationship with their kin-minorities particularly since the early 1990s. Hungary pursued more dynamic kin-state politics after the democratic transition years (1989-1990), so I focused on the last three decades. Uzbekistan became independent only in 1991. Before that, Uzbekistan was colonized by the Soviet Union and its borders were not considered international. So I focused on Uzbekistan's independent history only.
    2. CHAPTER III provides analysis of conducted interviews with 14 experts of the different fields that closely study minority issues in Europe and Central Asia from political, economic, human rights, journalistic, and legal perspectives.
- Overall findings of the research are given in CHAPTER IV with concluding remarks;
- References section lists all the sources that were used;
- ANNEX I lists the interviewed scholars and journalists and their area of expertise;

- ANNEX II provides list of interview questions

CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter is built around two objectives – a) to review literature on kin-state politics with a focus on conceptualization of the term and the scholarly debate on its multilayered causes and consequences and b) to establish a historical overview of development of kin-state policies in Hungary and Uzbekistan. To this end, the chapter is divided into three smaller sections. First, it discusses a scholarship debate on transborder nationalism politics in general. In the second part, the chapter studies kin-state politics in Hungary. Lastly, section three overviews Tashkent's kin-state politics from historical perspectives.

Kin-state politics as transborder nationalism

Although building a homogeneous nation has been a dream for many governments across centuries since it is easier to command over and please a homogeneous nation, the majority of modern states have multi-ethnic population. Minority nations are oftentimes represented by their kin-states (there are some exceptions, Uyghurs being one of the examples) and those states oftentimes actively pursue policies to include their diaspora or external minorities in their nation building process relying on shared feeling of belonging together to the same historic homeland and shared culture. The process is known as "trans-border nationalism," "transsovereign nationalism," "long-distance nationalism" as well as political incorporation (Lesińska & Héjj, 2021, p. 53; Csergo & Goldgeier 2004). The major roles, in this process, are played by kin-states and kin-minorities, but the role of home-states and external actors is also important. I start with conceptualizing those and other relevant terms.

Waterbury defines a kin-state as "a state that represents the majority nation of a transborder ethnic group whose members reside in neighboring territories" (Waterbury, 2020, p. 799). Kin-minorities or national-minorities are groups that share national culture with a majority group that a kin-state

represents. They are also called "external minorities" and they usually receive preferential treatment by their kin-states compared to non-kin migrants (Csergo, n.d.; Lesińska & Héjj, 2021).

Kin-states usually try to establish close ties with their ethnic minorities abroad and this activism may target two groups. The first group, often labeled as 'minorities by will,' is made of ethnic diasporas which are formed through migration. Those usually live far from their homeland, for example, Armenians, or Turks in Germany. The second group, known as 'minorities by force,' constitutes transborder ethnic communities. They are groups that found themselves across newly formed international borders due to geopolitical changes or demarcation processes. For example, ethnic Hungarians who now live in Romania, Slovakia and other neighboring countries of Hungary (Tátrai et al., 2017). Brubaker (2000) calls those minorities "accidental diaspora" as they accidentally became minority groups following the disintegration of Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires and later Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Those groups used to be part of "multinational political structures" and suddenly found themselves separated from groups they feel they share common culture and identity with (p. 1). Countries where kin-minorities reside in and/or are citizens of are referred to as "home-states" (Hatvany, 2006). For example, Slovakia is a home-state for 422,000 ethnic Hungarians (Hungary Today, 2022).

Kin-state politics is a set of state activities that involve engagement with and protection of kin-minorities in the latter's home-states, whether those are in neighboring or nearby countries (Waterbury, 2024). Hatvany (2006) notes that the relationship between kin-state and its ethnic minorities abroad is the only "defining feature" of kin-state politics and the shared culture is its "the basic foundation" (pp. 48–49).

Brubaker's "triadic relational nexus" explains that interests and preferences of three main actors – a kin-state, its transborder ethnic minority community, and home-state where those ethnic minorities reside - usually shape kin-state politics (Brubaker, 1996). The triadic relational nexus, however, does not take into account role of external factors, for example, international organizations such as the European Union, United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and others that influence on the claims made in kin-state politics (Waterbury, 2020). Addressing this point, Smith (2002) develops a quadratic nexus that links "nationalizing states, national minorities and external national homelands to the institutions of an ascendant and expansive 'Euro-Atlantic space'" (p. 3). I use Smith's quadratic nexus as a conceptual framework in this work (more detailed use comes in the next chapter to analyze Hungary and Uzbekistan's kin-state politics).

The development of contemporary kin-state politics can be traced back to the 1980s – 1990s, arguably due to two major changes. First, as minority protection became one of the essential conditions into admission to the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ethnic minority issues were now a "transnational—or more accurately a transstate—issue" (King & Melvin, 2000, pp. 112–113, p. 112). Countries were now allowing, for pragmatic reasons, interference of other states and/or international institutions such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Second, the emergence of new states "has called into question the relationship between the political boundaries of states and the amorphous and ascriptive cultural boundaries of nations" (Ibid. p. 113).

The kin-states and their ethnic-community are bound together based on three shared membership types. First and the most important one is shared culture and language, and even religion. This element mostly drives states to engage in kin politics. Another one is shared resources such as

“formal and informal networks and institutions built upon cross-border economic, political, cultural, and personal ties” (Waterbury, 2021, p. 43). These networks and institutions might or might not be open or formally institutionalized and they can be initiated by non-state actors as much as they are initiated by a state. Third one is a formal membership where political and legal rights are shared as kin-minorities are granted citizenship and “other forms of preferential access to the kin-state.” Kin-minorities have access to participation in elections in their kin-state, claim for legal protection and mobility, if necessary or wanted (Ibid. p. 43).

In this regard, multiple membership can give a couple of benefits to kin-minorities. “Mobility and fluidity of identity at the level of individual choice” that can be found in double citizenship, for example, allows members of the transborder ethnic community to cross borders easily, to find better economic opportunities, etc. It also offers different institutional resource-support and opportunities. And lastly, multiple membership gives “claims-making, representation, and voice” on a political level since at least two states are willing to listen to and meet their demands (Waterbury, 2021, p. 42).

To study the issue of the source of legitimacy of kin-state politics, Hatvany divides kin-politics into three types – “politics of responsibility,” “politics of integration,” and “politics of incorporation.” The first one, as Hatvany maintains, is based on the ideology of “national responsibility” where a kin-state acknowledges responsibility for the well-being of its ethnic kins abroad in the name of shared cultural values the two have. Although the national constitution might include a clause about this responsibility, it still does not involve any legal or political instruments in use to support the kin-nation abroad, but rather is limited to providing support for kin-minorities to maintain shared cultural heritage. It is a mere “symbolic” kin-politics (2006, p. 49). The second type of kin-politics uses “national integration” to operate and looks at “kin-minority as part of the

kin- state's majority nation that has simply separated by state borders." In this type of kin-politics, the national minority is given an opportunity to "participate in the national structures" despite them being citizens of another country. To provide a platform for an active integration, kin-state develops legal bases for the national-minority to gain "a special status within the state structure" so to have an access, for example, to education and financial assistance. The third type of kin-politics – "national incorporation" – envisions granting citizenship to the members of the national minority regardless of the latter's residence or citizenship with another country. This third type of kin-politics sees national majority in kin-state and national minority abroad as one, united nation and does not discriminate against the latter even though "the kin minority is situated between two loyalties" (Ibid., p. 50).

In this pattern, legitimacy of kin-state politics, according to Hatvany (2006), is established on three consecutive levels. The first is a theoretical one, where the justification for kin-state policies derives from "cultural bond between kin-state and kin-minority." The second is a legal one – relying on this moral responsibility, legal ground might be established to support and keep that cultural bond with kin-minorities in neighboring countries (p. 48). Yet, it is also necessary to keep in mind that national integration is "justifiable only when the content is limited to culture and both kin-minority and the home-state agree to it" (Ibid., p. 64). In this sense, the home-state's objection can limit kin-state politics in its efforts. The agreement, on the other hand, is useful for a home-state too since it helps to improve minority rights within the home-state's territory. Political efforts occur lastly, "within the structures of power and negotiation between the involved actors." Yet, even in the absence of moral and legal justifications, "there might be other politically motivated reasons that could provide a comprehensible ground as legitimacy" (Ibid., 2006, 48).

Although kin-state politics is always played behind shared culture and identity, fundamentally it serves two purposes – one is indeed to build a common identity, while the other is to attain more pragmatic goals such as "support at election time or encouraging settlement in the country of origin to fill economic and demographic gaps." For example, for Poland, welcoming Polish external-minorities was to meet the demand for labor force within the country and fill the demographic gap (Lesińska & Héjj, 2021, p. 54).

Regardless of the type of justification states use to engage in kin-state activism, the impact of it can be domestic, inter-state, regional and even international. Kin-state studies pursue studies of the relationship between kin-state and kin-minorities, the reasons behind those relationships and their consequences and more. It emerged amid the collapse of the Soviet Union as new independent countries arose in post-communist Eastern Europe and in territories formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. It was soon clear that ethnic bonds that stretch across borders could be a driving force for inter-state or regional conflicts (Waterbury, 2020). Mainly because it "raises fundamental questions of loyalty and identity, and in many cases perceived as threats by the state on which territory the co-ethnic group resides" (Waterbury quoted in Tátrai et al., 2017, p. 504). The Macedonian syndrome model, developed by Myron Weiner based on studies of the Balkans (Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) suggests that the combination of three elements – ethnic (religious, linguistic, etc.) minority group who feel different from a majority nation in a country they reside but share common culture with a neighboring state, a kin-state and a home-state one of which aims to redraw borders – can be a source of conflicts (Weiner, 1971). In a similar manner, Davis and Moore (1997) also argue that when two states share the same ethnic groups, in two cases, conflicts might arise:

> (1) those where an advantaged minority in state A has an ethnic tie to a non-advantaged minority in state B, and (2) those with a transnational ethnic alliance where the group in one of the states is politically mobilized (p. 171).

Rajat Ganguly's studies found that non-intervention by a kin-state is the least likely response to secessionist movements by their co-ethnics in home-states. Otherwise, kin-states usually involve in four ways:

> (1) diffusion and encouragement (the kin state allies itself with the kin group); (2) isolation and suppression (the kin state allies itself with the government of the host state); (3) reconciliation (the kin state becomes a third-party mediator between the kin group and its host state); and (4) diffusion or isolation through inaction or nonintervention (Kocadal, 2016, p. 174).

However, assuming kin-state politics always cause conflicts is wrong. In Eastern Europe, for example, against all speculations of possibility of war and conflicts to occur on the basis of ethnic conflicts and kin-state involvements, kin-statesmanship has not instigated any "direct conflicts with neighboring countries" (Waterbury, 2010, p. 2). This argument however, is no longer valid given Russia's attack on Ukraine, though it should be recognised that Russia's policies do not amount to 'engagement with kin' (in the usually-understood sense of trying to promote the welfare of minorities abroad) but are rather about instrumentalization and weaponization of minority issues, using these as a pretext for pursuing other objectives. Having said this, Russia does pursue a policy of incorporation. Waterbury (2020) observes that seeing kin-minority as a group who is attempting to preserve their cultural identity and recognition in their home-states allow to shift attention from a potential irredentism to a thorough study of kin-state policies that evolve through "diplomatic advocacy, cross-border political, economic, and cultural networks and institutions, and various forms of citizenship to protect, promote, and engage with ethnic kin communities" (p. 801).

Kin-states can also be an important third-party that act for the benefit of their kin-communities in international peace-making processes. Kocadal (2016) categorizes four types of roles kin-states assume in this process – 1) a promoter (how Greece, for example, supported Cyprus's efforts to become the European Union member for the benefit of Greek Cypriots and against the will of Turkish Cypriots who in turn were supported by their own kin-state – Turkey); 2) a quasi-mediator (how, for example, Federal Yugoslavia involved in the 1993 Vance-Owen Plan negotiations "to resolve the Bosnia conflict"); 3) a powerbroker (in the 1958–1960 Cyprus negotiations, for example, Greece and Turkey were power brokering kin-states representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities); and 4) an enforcer (presidents of Federal Yugoslavia and Croatia participating in negotiations that took place in 1995 to end the war in Bosnia could be an example).

Although kin-state interventions are welcomed by many transborder national minorities, the outcome of those interventions cannot always be viewed as positive. For example, Hungary's kin-state activism weakened mobilization and political lobbying of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. Double-citizenship introduced by Budapest that allowed ethnic Hungarians to obtain Hungarian citizenship easily also divided ethnic Hungarians into those who applied for it and those who did not. The latter group found themselves alienated from the majority group with Hungarian residence and citizenships at least legally (see the next section for more details). Tátrai et al. (2017) also looks at how kin-state politics might trigger competition between states. By looking at the case of Ukraine where V4 countries (Hungary, Poland and the Czechia) compete for human resources as a labor force, Hungary's "accessible Hungarian citizenship" positioned Hungary in a very advantageous position in this race (p. 216). However, this argument can not be valid after 2022, since a large number of Ukrainian refugees have settled in V4 countries, notably in Poland.

Hungary Actively Seeks Positive Kin-State Relationship with Magyars Abroad

This section is built to overview Hungary's efforts to develop an active kin-state policy towards its ethnic minorities in neighboring countries (Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Ukraine) and, to some extent, in the West. Its main focus is on the period following the democratic transition of Hungary in the 1990s since Budapest started more vigorous kin-state policy after its transition years.

Hungary is a Central European country and currently is home to circa ten million people. Reportedly 97% of them are Hungarians (European Commission, n.d.). Some recent studies indicate a lower rate - at around 80% (Wanzala-Silva 2022). Ethnic Hungarians abroad can be divided into two groups – transborder ethnic communities who happen to be in neighboring countries because of the geopolitical changes and/or border changes and ethnic diaspora who left the kin-state (usually to a far country) due to many reasons including, work, study, fleeing the war, etc. (Tátrai et al., 2017). There are over two million ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries following the aftermath of Treaty of Trianon and they comprise the first, larger group – kin-minorities. Immigrants who left Hungary to escape communism, or even before Communism, in the times of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the interwar period, and who immigrated to other countries (mostly to the West) much recently in search of a job make the second group (Rutai 2022). Although their exact number is hard to determine, Kovács (2020) estimates around two million of them in the West. This, however, is the "classic" historical diaspora. Since the EU accession, significant number of people have left the country – there are different estimations about their numbers and there has been also a recent debate whether the rise of a 'new diaspora' in the contemporary Western Europe (UK, Germany, Austria, etc.) can be witnessed.

Kovács points out that the Hungarian government paid barely any attention to the Hungarian diaspora in the West until the 2010s. There could be a couple of explanations for that. First of all, historic perspective plays a role here. Kin-minorities became part of other states unwillingly due to geo-political shifts. As Magyar kin-minorities were minority groups in those neighboring countries and faced certain forms of discrimination, they needed protection of their kin-state. Hungarian immigrants, on the other hand, were seen as "enemies and traitors" before the 1990s. Even after the democratic transition, they were not "explicitly considered as co-ethnics" (2020, p. 1161). Secondly, Kovács also argues that

> the engagement of the historic Hungarian minorities represents direct political remittances for the state. These communities are politically active and organised, with strong and effective ties to Hungary, and can easily be mobilised through their ethnic parties. For this reason, their votes at Hungarian elections have a great potential, which constitute the direct political remittances for the state. On the other hand, the direct political remittance potential of Hungarian diaspora communities is less obvious. They exhibit rather symbolic and cultural ties to Hungary; they are less organised, and their organisations are of civil, not of political nature. Therefore, their votes at Hungarian elections have less potential; they have a much weaker direct political potential for the state (2020, p. 1147).

However, after 20 years of negligence towards the Hungarian diaspora in the West, Budapest's kin-state politics has been targeting both groups since 2010. Budapest argues that ethnic Hungarians were forced to be out of their homelands due to historical circumstances and challenges and that there is moral and historic responsibility for the government to connect with them.

The Treaty of Trianon's border redrawing had Hungary lose two thirds of its land and, together with it, one-third of its population to neighboring countries, now Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Since then, the "national populists have kept alive the idea of the Hungarian nation as one 'body,' artificially separated by borders" (Waterbury 2010, p. 4). Kántor defines Budapest's efforts as a "society-building" in a short run defining its institutionalization as "a key concept of the strategy for Hungarians abroad" (2014, p. 25).

From the late 1980s, the question of Hungarians in neighboring countries has become central in the domestic politics of Hungary. Budapest signed bilateral treaties with six neighbor countries in 1991-1996 – "with Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, and Ukraine in 1991–92, and Romania and Slovakia in 1995 and 1996, respectively" (Liebich, 2019, p. 672). Pogonyi notes that "[b]efore the 1989/1990 democratic turn, the democratic opposition used the plight of Hungarians discriminated against in the neighboring countries to contest Communist rule" (2017c, p. 111). Following the democratic transition years (1989-1990), Budapest pursued more institutionalized means to connect with its kin-minorities abroad, especially with those who are in neighboring countries. The first democratically elected prime-minister of Hungary József Antall claimed that he would be the leader of not only to Hungarians in Hungary but also to other five million ethnic Hungarians abroad, but his leadership was presumed to be "in spirit" (Körtvélyesi, 2020, p. 792).

This manifested itself first in the amended constitution in 1989. Article D of the law in the recent text states that

> Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities, shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the effective use of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary (Fundamental Law of Hungary n.d.).

Measures in the form of other state legislations came later. In 2001, the infamous "Status Law" was adopted under the first Fidesz government. It gave ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries certain preferential treatments in means of cultural and economic benefits such as short work permits, public transport discounts in Hungary, medical care, scholarship, and pension benefits. Not only this, the law provisioned to facilitate that

> Hungarian teachers living in neighboring countries will be able to receive free training in Hungary. Budapest will also support the development of Hungarian higher-education facilities and cultural and media organizations abroad.
>
> The law likewise entitles ethnic Hungarian families living outside Hungary to an $80 annual allowance if they have at least two children who attend a Hungarian-language school (Tomiuc 2001).

Waterbury (2010) mentions that "[t]the law provided ethnic identity cards to Hungarian-identifying citizens of neighboring states, and gave them privileged access to the Hungarian labor market and social-welfare system" (p. 5). This was especially appealing in the wake of Hungary's accession to the European Union. A poll conducted in the early 2000s showed that one-fourth of ethnic Hungarians expressed their interest in moving to Hungary after it joins the EU (Tomiuc, 2001).

While it sounded a positive measure and Hungarian officials insisted it was to help their kin minorities to preserve their ethnic and cultural identity, the law still caused some tension in Slovakia and Romania. They both claimed the law was against EU regulations. It was especially unpleasant for Romania which was already trying to join the EU and was struggling to improve its economic condition for it. Romanian government spokesman Lucaci told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that "Romania wants the work rights scrapped from the law and has complained to the Venice Commission – the Council of Europe's chief legal consultative body" (Tomiuc, 2001). However, as Pogonyi notes, those were "minor diplomatic disputes and repercussions" and cannot be a reason for bigger tensions in the future. Hungary has more important geopolitical interests that cannot be risked in the name of kin-state transborder activism (2017a, pp. 3-4).

Pogonyi (2017b) and Waterbury (2008) argue that it was Hungary's accession to the European Union that enabled the state to introduce preferential citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad.

Hungarian kin-minorities in neighboring countries "pushed" Hungary to grant citizenship for them too. When Orban's right-wing Fidesz party came to power in 1998, Budapest actively pursued means to support its kin-minorities abroad. In 1999, for example, just in a year, the state budget for programs dedicated to support kin-minorities abroad increased from 13% to 26% (Liebich, 2019). However, when Fidesz, after an eight-year break, won elections again in 2010, Hungary's kin-state activism took more diverse and more straight-forward form, entering its "intensified phase" (Liebich, 2019; Tátrai et al. 2017; Kovács, 2020, p. 1146). Both the Act on Hungarian Citizenship and "the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries" (known as the status law) amendments were adopted in 2010 stating that "one can acquire Hungarian citizenship without permanent residence status in Hungary and taking a citizenship test; it is enough to have a command of the Hungarian language and to have one ancestor who was a Hungarian citizen" (Kántor 2014). Two years later, ethnic Hungarians abroad were also granted a voting right.

In domestic politics, the kin-state policy became "one of the main fault lines between Left and Right" political parties. The left-wing parties accused Fidesz of playing the nationalist card and worried that the costs of these policies would be a burden for taxpayers. Fidesz party, on the other hand, claimed the measures in their transborder politics were taken in a good faith, due to historic and moral responsibility of Hungary in front of millions of Magyars who lost their citizenship because of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon (Pogonyi, 2017a, p. 2). Nevertheless, aggressive transborder nationalism gave Fidesz "symbolically charged ideological content, important organizational resources, and the basis of a longer-term strategy for governance and institutional embeddedness" (Waterbury, 2006, p. 482).

Although cultural and economic support offered to Hungarian minorities abroad help them to sustain their cultural heritage and feel connected with Hungarians in Hungary, Budapest's kin-

state activism does not always result in positive outcomes for kin-ethnics. Pogonyi (2017b) shows that Budapest's kin-state politics did not cause any serious repercussions with home states, however, it compromised ethnic Hungarians' potential to mobilize in those home-states. According to his study:

> the more radical minority parties that were promoted by the Hungarian government failed to mobilize trans-border Hungarians, and that minority claim- making has not become more radical either in content or in terms of means… As the Hungarian state offers extensive symbolic and material support for trans-border communities, kin-minority actors are likely to lobby the Hungarian state, rather than the governments of the host states, to secure the resources necessary for the maintenance of the minority culture. (p. 247).

In Slovakia, Hungarian minorities make 7.9% of the overall population and in Romania – 8.5%. In 2010 parliamentary elections in Slovakia two parties – the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP) and the Slovak-Hungarian party Most–Híd (Bridge) – were competing for the votes of Hungarian minorities. MKP had a more radical platform and among others, pursued an autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. Most-Híd, on the other hand, "lays more emphasis on intercultural dialogue and Slovak–Hungarian reconciliation and is not interested in the dual citizenship offered for Hungarians living in Slovakia." While Most-Híd secured 8% vote, MKP, which was supported by Orbán's Fidesz, failed with a mere 4.3% votes and had to drop out of the elections. Pogonyi mentions it was because of "Fidesz's unwillingness to be more cautious in introducing non-resident citizenship without consulting the Slovak government" many Hungarian-minorities in Slovakia did not support MKP as a retaliation to the citizenship law (2017b). In the 2012 elections the same happened and MKP (supported by Fidesz) and Most-Híd failed again without securing any seat in the parliament. If those votes were not lost, "with the votes of the MKP, Most–Híd would have become the second largest party in the parliament" (Ibid. 249).

A similar situation was observed in Romania too. Fidesz helped to launch a nationalist Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) in Romania in 2008 and later another right-wing party – Hungarian People's Party in Transylvania (EMNP). In elections, however, those two parties supported by the Orbán government could not challenge the largest political party of Hungarians in Transylvania, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ). Fidesz also could not persuade RMDSZ to "elect the Fidesz-supported candidate" and subsequently be an ally to the Orban government. This polarization of parties that were supposed to represent interests of Hungarian minorities resulted in their competition which led to failure in elections (Ibid. 2017a, p. 250).

Moreover, Budapest's kin-state activism also "securitized kin-minorities" by compromising the positive image of Hungarians. Considering ethnic Hungarians as "a security risk" increased in home-countries. Constant interference in the name of kin-state activism and especially introduction of the citizenship law and subsequent amendments to it "heightened perceptions of Hungarians as belonging not to their states of residence, nor to the political community within these states, but rather to the Hungarian state" (Liebich, 2019, p. 674).

Apart from that, introduction of non-resident citizenship caused an identity dilemma among kin-minorities. According to Körtvélyesi (2020), in this case, Budapest initiated "overinclusion has given way to underinclusion" (p. 771). What does it mean? Hungarian term *nemzet* (nation) is usually used not only to refer to people who share culture and history within state borders, but beyond the borders too resonates this claim. This was manifested, for example, in Antall's famous claim of "in spirit, I consider myself to be the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians" that included not only ten million Magyars in Hungary, but others who are residents of different states, close or far away from Hungary (Waterbury 2010, p. 5). The notion of "us" included all Magyars. However, the citizenship law posed a dilemma. Are those Hungarians who did not opt for non-

residential citizenship still part of the Hungarian nation? Apparently, not exactly. László Kövér, a founding member of Fidesz in his speech of 2014 said "after the first elections with the non-resident voting rules that 'this is the first house of representatives that, based on general, secret and equal voting rights, represents the entire nation'" (Köver quoted in Körtvélyesi 2020, p. 792). The non-residential citizenship law divided Hungarians into "us" and "them," into "citizens" and "non-citizens."

Uzbekistan ignores its ethnic minorities

This section studies the development of the relationship between Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks in its neighboring countries from a historical perspective. For this, the section overviews the Russian and the Soviet occupation of Central Asia and state formation in the region under the Soviet rule on the alignment of core-nationalities and corresponding territories, including of Uzbekistan, and how this process shaped the absent kin-policy of Uzbekistan towards its kin-minorities in the region.

Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia with over 35 million people living within its borders (UzStatistics 2022). Uzbekistan is also a double land-locked country. It is surrounded by four countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, as well as Afghanistan, a nation that Soviet troops withdrew from in 1989 after the ten years of Soviet-Afghan war that ended with USSR's failure to support establishing pro-soviet government there (Reuveny & Prakash 1999).

In a similar fashion of how Magyars are spread in countries that share borders with Hungary, millions of Uzbeks also live in the four other Central Asian states and Afghanistan that surround Uzbekistan. Fumagali (2007) notes that

> Uzbeks have not been 'diasporised' by voluntary or forcible migration, but by the movement of borders across settlements or, more appropriately, by the fact that the demarcations between the national republics became borders. In most cases, Uzbeks never moved from places where they had been settled for centuries. Borders did (p. 107).

But unlike Hungary, in its over three-decade long independence period, Uzbekistan has not developed any foreign policy that specifically addresses its kin-minorities in neighboring countries. The ruling elites of Uzbekistan gave priority to its state-building efforts rather than connecting with ethnic Uzbeks abroad and, as a result, the "links between Uzbekistan and Uzbeks abroad have been progressively sidelined and no diaspora, let alone irredentist policy has been conceived by Uzbekistan" (Ibid. 2007, pp. 105-106). It is worth noting that Uzbekistan first became a fully sovereign state only following the collapse of the USSR, whereas in Hungary's case the kin had formed part of a (quasi-)sovereign Hungarian state during 1867-1920 that also drew on the longer-term historical legacies of the Kingdom of Hungary. I start with a general overview of the Soviet invasion of the region that led to eventual displacement of ethnic Uzbeks in five neighboring states.

Atabaki observes two waves of population dislocation and mass migration in the current Central Asian region and the Caucasus due to the establishment of the Soviet regime and its collapse seven decades later. The first wave occurred during the early rule of the Soviet occupation as many people fled to neighboring countries such as Iran, China, Afghanistan and Turkey (2005). For example, the majority of ethnic Uzbeks who now live in Northern Afghanistan settled there in 1920s and 1930s due to "Central Asia's 'Basmachi' Nationalist Movement and the Soviet Collectivization" (Khan 2005, p. 140). The second wave occurred after the Soviet occupation as Bolsheviks implemented what Atabaki refers as "engineered partition." Before the so-called *natsional'noe razmezhevanie* (national delimitation) process, political and social re-organization

of Soviet Central Asia which roughly took place in the years of 1924-1936, the Soviets categorized Central Asian population into six nations - the Kazakhs, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, the Kyrgyz people, and Karakalpaks (Uralova, 2021). Under the aforementioned engineered partition, Moscow intended to align ethnic nationalities with newly formed "national-territorial entities" (Atabaki 2005, p. 2). Central Asian states did not have their current borders until the invasion of the region by the Soviet troops. While the region enjoyed some forms of statehood (emirates, khanates, etc.) in the past, states in their modern forms as per Westphalian understanding were not formed until the "Soviet national delimitation process of the 1920s established them as distinct national territorial units" (Rico and Polese 2015, 372). This not only helped Moscow to have a more effective command over the region with many units, but it also was "a conscious design of weakening potential nationalist resistance in the region by deviating from ethnic boundaries and creating substantial minority populations" (Mellon, 2010, p. 138).

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, five Central Asian states were suddenly "catapulted" to freedom with Kazakhstan being the last to declare its independence in December, 1992 (Olcott 1992, 108). This formed two problems that are central to the discussion in this section. First of all, it formed international borders in the region – ethnic groups, Uzbeks included, of Central Asia who enjoyed a free movement around the Soviet Union suddenly found themselves across international borders and formed different ethnic minority groups in states in which they were not titular nations. By the early 1990s Kyrgyzstan had over 550,000 ethnic Uzbeks and most of them were living in the territory close to Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had over 300,000 ethnic Uzbeks living in their territories each, while in Tajikistan, the number of ethnic Uzbeks was highest in the region after Uzbekistan itself – 1,197,000. (Uralova 2021: Vielmeni 2021). In terms of population's proportion, ethnic Uzbeks

were the biggest minority groups. Ethnic Uzbeks also made up 15.3% of the population in Tajikistan, 13.8% in Kyrgyzstan, 2.4% in Kazakhstan and 9.2% Turkmenistan. But "[b]ecause they [Uzbeks] already enjoyed titular status in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), Kyrgyzstan's Uzbeks, or in fact all Uzbeks outside the Uzbek SSR, were not granted territorial autonomy" (Fumagalli, 2007, p. 571).

Second of all, Central Asian leaders now were facing nation-building problem based on their territorial organization. Neither former Soviet (now national) elites, nor political leaders of soviet Central Asia were prepared for this. As the freedom was not obtained by national movements or struggles for liberation and ethnic categories had been marked by the Soviet authorities in the 20s, the region was "vulnerable to internal fragmentation and disintegration" (Isaacs and Polese 2015; Kamrava 2020). States also faced what Mellon calls a "crisis of legitimacy." To handle the challenges, former communist party leaders of Central Asia kept the leadership in their newly independent states and rebranded communism as "nationalism" (Mellon 2010, p. 137).

Along with state building and reforms in politics and economy, the nation-building process became one of the biggest priorities for Central Asian republics. Each political system carried this task out in similar, yet in a unique way. The top-down nation building process in the region involved among others institution building, de-sovietization, rewriting the history, personality cult, language policies, and as such. The "revival of cultural heritages" started taking off as per reinforcement of the Soviet authorities as early as from 1980's (Kamrava 2020).

Like other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan developed its own nation-building process where the national identity was formed not based on ethnicity, but on territory, which eventually led to cutting ties off with co-ethnics across borders. The notion pushed forward by the first president of

Uzbekistan Islam Karimov's *O'zbekchilik* (Uzbekness) meant being born in the territories of Uzbekistan and identifying with the territorial element of belonging. "The official ideology is less about defining what the nation is and more about defining the (Uzbek) state's place in the world. It is more about defining Uzbekistan as a national state than establishing the parameters of Uzbekness" (Fumagali 2007, p. 111). Karimov's politics did not care about ethnic Uzbeks who were born during the soviet times and living in neighboring countries, or any ethnic Uzbek who were not born in Uzbek SSR or later in independent Uzbekistan. Although *O'zbekchilik* welcomed anyone who embraced Uzbek culture, language, and traditions (Djumaev, 2002), in practice, it was only reserved for citizens of Uzbekistan.

> Uzbek minorities [on the other hand] were almost completely cut off from their historic motherland due to Islam Karimov's notion of *O'zbekchilik* (Uzbekness) that he tried to construct in order to unite the nation. This was part of his endless efforts to keep a peaceful bilateral relationship with neighboring states, and it carried a territorial element, embracing those born on the current territory of Uzbekistan. The result was to unite the nation and promote national belonging within the borders of Uzbekistan, while leaving Uzbeks in other Central Asian countries without support or help from Uzbekistan (Uralova 2021).

This, however, does not mean Uzbeks across borders do not relate to each-other. Fumagali's small field research conducted in 2002-2003 reveals that although Uzbekistan developed non-interfering politics towards its neighbors who host Uzbek ethnic minorities, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan positively relate to their kin-ethnics abroad. "Uzbekistani Uzbeks do not regard Uzbeks living on the other side of the border as different. Ethnic ties extend across state boundaries, but this acknowledgement does not have political consequences" (Fumagali 2007, p. 111).

Fumagali (2007) also mentions that Tashkent employed non-interfering policy with neighboring states in affairs of ethnic politics for simple stability and security reasons. Islam Karimov's regime saw the "outside" countries a source of "ethnic, demographic, economic and other problems" and

prioritized avoiding any "spill-overs" (p. 112). On the other hand, Tashkent also did not want to be at odds with neighboring countries by interfering in their domestic politics on the ground of ethnic ties with kin-minorities living there. "Uzbek co-ethnics, Uzbekistan's President Karimov has often maintained, are citizens of other countries and therefore it is their responsibility, not Uzbekistan's to deal with their demands" (Ibid. p. 118).

Uralova (2021) notes another reason – unlike with some other Central Asian nations, Uzbeks never have had a problem with being the dominant ethnic community in either Soviet Uzbekistan or after gaining independence. Hence, Tashkent never sought after ethnic Uzbeks abroad, tried to build systematic contact with them or to invite them to settle in Uzbekistan. In 1979, Uzbeks made up 68.8% of the population in Uzbek SSR and in 1989 – 71,4%. Independent Uzbekistan has not conducted a nationwide census since the last soviet census of 1989, but it is estimated that around 79% of the country's population were Uzbeks in 2005 (Ferrando, 2008). Tashkent claims that Uzbeks make 84,4% of the population as of 2021 while there are other 130 nationalities and ethnicities within the territories of the country (Saida 2023). In the neighboring Kazakhstan, on the other hand, only 40% of the population were Kazakhs during the Soviet times. Hence, upon independence, Kazakhstan launched the *Oralman* (Returnee in Kazakh) program aiming at repatriating ethnic Kazakhs. According to official data, more than a million ethnic Kazakhs returned to Kazakhstan in three decades, mostly from Uzbekistan and China (Kumenov, 2018). In a similar fashion, Kyrgyzstan also launched a *Kairylman* (returnee in Kyrgyz) program in 2006 that aimed at assisting ethnic Kyrgyz people from abroad with "bureaucratic and material support" for them to resettle in Kyrgyzstan. Around 50,000 ethnic Kyrgyz people resettled in ten years following the start of the program (Wood 2018).

The number of ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries has been either increasing or decreasing. In Tajikistan, ethnic Uzbeks have always been the biggest ethnic minorities, even during the soviet times. Relying on Russia's Federal State Statistics Service, Ferrando (2008) notes that ethnic Uzbeks made up 22,9% of Tajik SSR in 1979 and 23,5% in 1989. By 2000, however, the figure went down to 15,3%, but Uzbeks still remained as the biggest ethnic community in independent Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, the trend went the other way around – ethnic Uzbeks became the major ethnic group after the independence. In the 1979 and 1989 census, Uzbeks constituted 12% of Kyrgyz SSR's population, while ethnic Russian there made over 20% of the population. However, during the independence years, Russian minorities decreased, making Uzbeks the biggest ethnic group in Tajikistan with an estimated 14,3% share of Tajikistan's overall population in 2006.

Country	**Year**	**Number**	**% of the total population**
Afghanistan	2021	up to 4,000,000	9-15%
Kazakhstan	2020	605, 000	3.2 %
Kyrgyzstan	2020	964,379	14.8%
Tajikistan	2010	1,460,647	13.8%
Turkmenistan	2012	275,564	5.8%

Number of Uzbek Minorities in Central Asia (Uralova, 2021).

The current picture is a little bit different in terms of numbers. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, there are almost a million ethnic Uzbeks as of 2020 – up from a mere 330,000 in 1989. They now constitute almost 15% of Kyrgyzstan's overall population. In Kazakhstan, Uzbek population has doubled since 1989, reaching 600,000 people and making 3.2% of the population. In

Turkmenistan, the trend is reversed. Number of Uzbeks went down from 317,000 to 275,000 in 2012. Tajikistan's case is contested. Although the census of 1989 shows 1,1 million ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan, latest data is not available. Uralova notes 1,4 million Tajiks while Vielmeni – slightly over a million. The largest ethnic Uzbek community lives in Afghanistan – there are up to 4 million Uzbeks and they make around 9-14 % of Afghanistan's overall population (Uralova 2021; Vielmeni 2021).

Regardless of the number of co-ethnics or the severity of difficulties those co-ethnics faced in neighboring countries, Tashkent ignored any calls for help or support for "Uzbek co-ethnics, Uzbekistan's President Karimov has often maintained, are citizens of other countries and therefore it is their responsibility, not Uzbekistan's to deal with their demands" (Fumagali 2007, p. 118). Uzbek minorities abroad called for help many times. The most significant call came from Kyrgyzstan during the Osh inter-ethnic conflict which claimed the lives of 400 people in 2010. But Tashkent only for a short period hosted ethnic Uzbeks and then sent them back to Kyrgyzstan. As recently as in 2017, "Begayim," a non-governmental literary fund of ethnic Uzbek youth in Kyrgyzstan sent an open letter to Uzbekistan's current President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reminding them of their ethnic ties. Tashkent ignored again. (Uralova 2021). Vielmeni (2021) also notes that because Uzbeks were alienated from the majority group, the Kyrgyz people, "a number of Kyrgystani Uzbeks radicalized adhering to extremist Islamism thus becoming target of recruitment for insurgencies abroad." At the same time, both in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, education in Uzbek language is less and less available. Uzbeks in Tajikistan change the nationality of their newborn to Tajik and send their kids to Tajik language schools to provide better opportunities for them in the future (Uralova 2021). Representation of Uzbek communities is not great either. Ergasheva (2014) notes that "Uzbeks held only 7.6 per cent of jobs in the civil service, far below their

representation in the population" in 2014. In Turkmenistan, after the attempted assassination of the president Niyazov, "ethnic Uzbeks were removed from high-ranking government positions, while all Uzbek-language schools were closed" (Uralova 2021).

The help from Uzbekistan to their co-ethnics is limited to occasional textbooks and other school supplies to them. However, New Uzbekistan under Mirziyoyev's regime has been trying to connect with another Uzbek diaspora abroad. Those Uzbeks are successful ones who left their homeland for various reasons pursuing better career and studies opportunities mostly. For example,

> [t]o this end, the "Buyuk Kelajak" (Great Future) Expert Council was founded by Uzbek compatriots with the support of Uzbek authorities in 2018 to connect Uzbeks overseas into an advisory network of professionals that aims to facilitate the reforms in Uzbekistan. With over 200 compatriots from 30 countries on its board, the council was tasked to develop "Strategy 2035" – a development strategy for Uzbekistan, which was presented in 2019.[2] In addition, there is El-Yurt Umidi Foundation that, among others, works for "establishment of relations with compatriots…" Last year [2020] a database on Uzbek citizens who work abroad, Oltin Daftar (Golden Book) was created. (Uralova 2021).

There is also the Uzbekistan's Club (*O'zbekistonlik klubi*) which is a "a global platform created to bring together successful Uzbekistanis" and the network, by showing stories of successful Uzbeks abroad try to challenge image of labor migrant Uzbeks (Uzbekistan's Club, n.d.).

However, all those efforts are to connect with Uzbeks who achieved something mostly in other developed countries, not the ones who might need Tashkent's help and support or at least formal recognition and ties with it in neighboring countries.

Chapter conclusions

In this chapter, I briefly overviewed kin-state politics and kin-state scholarship. Kin-states are those that represent a titular nation (major ethnic group within a political territorial unit), but also share history and culture with their kin-groups who reside in other countries. Those kin-groups

(ethnic-minorities, accidental-minorities) emerge by two means: 1) ethnic diaspora who move to other countries, usually far away from their home-lands; and 2) kin-minorities who emerge as ethnic minority group in the territories of other states because of geopolitical changes and border-redrawing. Kin-states try to establish amicable relationships with their co-ethnics abroad, especially with kin-minorities. Their help comes in the form of cultural and economic support as well as fast track citizenship and visa free regimes.

Not all states, however, develop kin-state policy. In this section, I reviewed scholarly debate built on the experiences of Hungary and Uzbekistan. For over three decades, since its democratic transition years, Hungary has actively pursued dynamic kin-state politics. It offered cultural and financial help to ethnic Hungarians abroad. Later, it granted dual-citizenship and voting rights for them. But the case of Hungary also shows that kin-state activism, although carried out in a good faith, might cause negative outcomes such as diplomatic disputes between a kin-state and host-states. It also weakens ethnic-minorities potential for mobilization in host-states and eventually could contribute to the decrease of their numbers in the host states. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, abstained from engaging in kin-state activism for a) it did not need more people in its territory – Uzbekistan is already the most populous country in the Central Asian region and Uzbeks are dominant ethnic group; b) it looked at ethnic Uzbeks abroad as security risk; and finally, c) Tashkent did not want to ruin its bilateral relations with its neighbors over ethnic-kin issues.

In the next chapter, I analyze expert interviews I conducted for this research.

CHAPTER III. HUNGARY PURSUES DYNAMIC TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM WHILE UZBEKISTAN IGNORES ITS ETHNIC KINS

In the previous chapter, I laid out the general overview of kin-state politics. I also summarized Hungary's kin-state activism and its results in brief. I also discussed the case of Uzbekistan where the state has ignored its kin-minorities for a little over three decades.

In this chapter, I will analyze the interview data. I conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with scholars whose research interests center around Eastern and Central European studies and with scholars of Central Asian studies. Interviews were focused on Hungary, Uzbekistan and kin-state politics in general. I managed to have balanced interview data – seven interviews with experts of Eastern and Central Europe and seven interviews with Central Asian scholars and journalists. List of interviewed scholars and their area of expertise are given in Annex I. Interview questions are provided in Annex II. Similarly, one expert of kin-state politics and one scholar of Central Asian studies asked to conceal their names. Eight interviewees asked to remain anonymous. They are cited as Interviewee #1, Interviewee # 2, Interviewee #3 etc. All interviews were conducted in English.

The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, I will present an analysis of interviews on Hungary's kin-state politics. In the next section, I will discuss Uzbekistan's indifferent position towards its kin-ethnics.

In my analysis, I look at a variety of reasons for kin-states' different position towards their kin-minorities by studying cases of Hungary and Uzbekistan. I start with the moral and historic responsibility of kin-states, and the changes in their kin-states politics (if any observed for the past three decades). I move on with the discussion on the role of the regime type and soft-power

ambitions as well as kin-states bilateral relationships in their respective regions. I also examine demographic aspects of the question, the position of respective titular nations, and the role of third-parties such as international organizations as well as religious entities and figures.

Before I dive into interview analysis, it is worth noting once again that Hungary and Uzbekistan have certain similarities when it comes to their kin-communities. Kin-minorities of both states emerged as a result of geopolitical changes and border moves in the early 1900s. In the case of Hungary, this happened earlier, in 1920 as a result of the Treaty of Trianon whereupon Hungary lost a significant part of its territory and a couple of millions of its population who now live in neighboring countries of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and Ukraine. Following the democratic transition, Budapest has been actively supporting ethnic Magyars abroad with socio-cultural, economic and even political aid. Although Budapest holds that those efforts are for its kin-minorities to be able to maintain their cultural heritage, scholars have observed the usefulness of those kin-policies for political gains of the ruling Fidesz party too.

At least 2,5 million Uzbeks live in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and reportedly up to four million ethnic Uzbeks reside in Afghanistan. Just like the case of ethnic Hungarians. Ethnic Uzbeks in those countries emerged as a result of border shifts. Uzbekistan's borders were drawn by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and the process was finalized in 1936 only. Uzbek SSR emerged encompassing the lands where there were most ethnic Uzbeks living, but a couple of million of ethnic Uzbeks found themselves in other soviet-Central Asian countries. However, the borders between those countries were not international and people could move freely and visit their families. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union which was completed only in 1992 Kazakhstan being the last, the borders took an international status and check-points were established soon after. Unlike Budapest, Tashkent kept a distance from its kin-minorities abroad.

Even during the times of crisis, such as the 2010 Osh ethnic riot where dozens of Uzbek minorities died and hundreds lost homes, the Uzbek government only allowed its kin-minorities to find a shelter in Uzbekistan for a short period and sent them back to Kyrgyzstan immediately. So far, scholarship explained Tashkent's position with its efforts to keep an amicable bilateral relationship with its neighbors. Tashkent does not grant any citizenship to ethnic Uzbeks abroad in a fear of security issues. Besides, Uzbeks have always been a dominant ethnic group in Uzbekistan and the country has always been the most populous in the region, so there was not any need for more ethnic Uzbeks resettling in Uzbekistan.

Following this brief summary of the previous chapters, I continue with a discussion of interview results relevant to Hungary's kin-state politics.

Hungary's Kin-State Activism

This section is set to analyze seven semi-structured interviews conducted in Spring, 2023. To have a more structured approach, the section is divided into ten sub-sections to discuss a specific aspect of Hungary's kin-state politics since the democratic transition years of 1989-1990. The section, in general, seeks to examine the factors that have contributed to shaping Hungary's kin-state activism since the 1990s.

Budapest vis-a-vis Historic and Moral Responsibility

Hungary's moral and historic responsibility is widely accepted in Hungary both on a public level as well as among the elite – the right and the left. It is also reflected in the constitution, the old one and in the new one (Fiala-Butora 2023). There are a couple of reasons. For one, Magyar kin-minorities were forcibly removed from Hungary as a result of the Treaty of Trianon.

> These people, these communities, did not choose to become minorities, but they were forced to become a minority because of the past policies, because of [the] past actions of the Hungarian state. So, in this sense, Hungary should have some kind of a moral or historical responsibility (Interviewee 3).

Historical argument "connects the emergence of these minority groups with the dissolution of Hungary, and in this sense, posits it as a responsibility to be under a political elite" (Egry 2023). There is also a question of preserving Hungarian "culture and scientific products" such as the language, traditions, literature, etc. 'Are literature produced by ethnic Hungarians represent Hungarian literature or are those part of the literature that belong with kin-minorities' home-states?' "There were debates whether the Hungarian literature in the neighboring countries, such as poems, could be part of the Hungarian literature. Does Hungarian literature stop at the border of Hungary?" (Ibid. 2023)

There are also pragmatic reasons. Studies show that one-third of Hungary's population have direct ties with ethnic minorities in neighboring countries be they family members or friends. Hungary has less than 10 million population right now and three million of them have ties with kin-minorities abroad. This also adds to the idea of the state's moral responsibility (Ibid. 2023).

Another pragmatic reason lies with easy integration of ethnic-Hungarians in Hungary – they already know the language, they share the same traditions etc. When they enter the Hungarian job market as a human resource, which the country needs, there would not be integration issues (Ibid. 2023).

On a social level, this issue is the least controversial. "Very small group of the politicians are perhaps less happy with this kind of obligation [but still] no one questions it publicly." Another aspect that is often overlooked is the argument of universal values and human rights concepts

whereupon "Hungary minorities, as all minorities are entitled to have certain rights," including to maintain their Hungarian identity (Egry 2023)

Equally it is important to note the demand or calls from those kin-minorities claiming Hungary as a nation-state bears some responsibility to help them sustain their cultural heritage (Egry 2023, Interviewee #4).

However, moral and historic responsibility for ethnic Hungarians abroad is not the only driving force for the local actors to push for more active kin-state politics. Pursuing national economic interests is one of the other reasons that is not publicly admitted enough openly.

> [B]asically, a lot of programs that are organized as support programs for Hungarians, most economic programs are also for an economic or a strengthening of economic influence, or making possibilities for the Hungarian actors too. For example, to become more active in Romania. So, I think that there are more issues… [and it is] becoming more evident. (Interviewee #1, 2023).

The narrative that the Hungarian government has been shaping is that as if the Trianon did not take place and ethnic Hungarians in the Carpathian basin are "part of a big Hungarian nation" (Interviewee #2, 2023). There was an alternative narration – a political project in the form of a national policy that was "totally ignored and eliminated" by the Orban government in the 2010s. The policy basically envisioned that

> Hungarian nation was [to be] imagined as a *federative nation*. That means that there is a nation in Hungary and there are partner nations or partner communities, the Hungarian communities in Romania, in Slovakia, in Ukraine, and in Serbia. And then this would be a kind of a federative arrangement in sense that each of these units have their self standing, internal autonomy, [and] they are organizing their life, and they have they have a [mutual] partnership (Interviewee #2, 2023, emphasis added).

But pretending that the Trianon did not happen and creating a virtual nation that legally does not share the same citizenship or residence, Budapest's kin-state policy has caused damages along

with the offered support. In particular, for the last decade, since 2010, Budapest’s transnational activism has been “more and more counterproductive, and it is not helping the Hungarian communities to consolidate [their] position in their homeland where they were born. The future of this consolidation is being undermined by this kin-state policies” (Interviewee #2, 2023).

This can be explained by a couple of arguments. For one, kin-state activism of Hungary is discouraging ethnic Hungarians living in the Carpathian basin from “organizing their internal life” and acting like “quasi political communities” in their home-states. Instead, they “individually are connected to the Hungarian State.” Essentially, Budapest is sending a signal that those communities do not need to form political organizations and that Budapest is going to mediate the community’s need between those communities and their home-states. For example, ethnic Hungarians in Romania, which make around one million people, are encouraged to expect everything to be done by Budapest, not by their own initiatives.

When political organizations are not formed and kin-communities feel they are facing discrimination in their home-states, they start leaving for Hungary. Not only this, people simply seek better life, and not necessarily in Hungary as you explain it below, which is again a paradox in Hun kin-states policies. Most of the time, it is young people who are leaving for Hungary, in search of better jobs and study opportunities. They do not necessarily stay in Hungary either. They can move to Germany, Italy or other western European countries in search of better life (Interviewee #4). “[I]f a community loses its youth, you can understand that it's chance for sustainability, for survival is diminished. They [Hungarian government] are getting minorities in neighboring countries as a demographic supply.” In this sense, practically, Hungary is “absorbing” young ethnic-Hungarians (Interviewee #2, 2023).

The transnational activism of Hungary, especially with the help of the media, also widened the gap between ethnic-Hungarians and communities of their home states. One can observe

> an extremely alarming reorientation of the Hungarian minority members in Romania from the Romanian mass media to the Hungarian mass media. There are other indicators based on which one can see that these kin-state policies which have intensified contacts of Hungarian minority members and the Hungarian State has created a gap – a deepening gap – between members of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Romanian societies and Romania state (Interviewee #2, 2023).

Those two counterproductive outcomes of Budapest's kin-state politics work hand-in-hand, like "push and pull" factors. The more Hungary absorbs ethnic Hungarians into their territory with political and legal inclusion measures, the more Romanian government and society pushes them too. This is welcomed by the Romanian government's side as well, because less ethnic Hungarians in the Romanian territory makes Romania more of a nation-state that Bucharest claims it is. Less ethnic Hungarians create more homogeneous Romania (Interviewee #2, 2023).

Another argument laid by Nagy (2023) is that Hungary is taking over the place of kin-minority organizations. Those kin-minority organizations are supposed to operate within the state of settlement. In this sense, Hungary's take-over might weaken those organizations' position in home states and this might result, in a long run, weakening the position of kin-minorities there in general.

Changes in Hungary's Transnational Activism

Kin-minority issues were always in the public debate, even before the 1990s. However, Budapest became more active in its kin-state politics after the transition years. This had, among others, a symbolic element, too, – a more proactive approach in kin-state politics symbolized the regime change in the country (Egry 2023). Yet, still between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, Budapest had milder kin-state activism. It took a more intensified approach after the 2010 elections when

the Orbán government came into power for the second time. Scholars explain with different, yet mutually non-exclusive reasons.

When leftist and liberal parties were in power in the 1990s and early 2000s, the main objective of Hungarian foreign policy was to join NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe. This, in turn, required to be in a good relationship with neighbors. So, the minority issues had to be "downplayed" (Interviewee #3, 2023, Interviewee #4, 2023).

Fiala-Butora (2023) defines "disillusionment" as a key element in policy changes of Hungary's kin-minorities. The argument rests on the fact that the human rights framework that was promised to solve minority issues in neighboring countries failed and hence, there is a clear departure from the 1990s narrative.

Even when Orban's right-wing government was in power during 1998-2002, they were still against extending citizenship to Hungarians beyond the country's borders, because they understood that it would create a migration influx. In fact, during that period, Fidesz introduced a legal basis which would facilitate kin-minorities abroad without granting them citizenship. Budapest introduced what is called an identity card and "according to the conventions of the Fidesz of that period that was meant to prevent the citizenship issue" (Interviewee #2, 2023).

When Orban lost the elections in 2002, it was a big blow for the party. The two consecutive lost mandates between 2002 and 2010 changed Fidesz's perception of citizenship law.

After the victory of 2010, Orbán was determined to stay in power. After joining those organizations, and once right-wing party came to power, kin-state politics of Hungary became more "confrontational" (Interviewee #3). Fidesz's competitor – Jobbik party was pushing hard for

citizenship law. If Jobbik succeeded in introducing citizenship law, it would have been a challenge for the Orbán government, so Orbán rushed adopting the citizenship law and later the voting act as well to secure his own position (Interviewee #2, 2023).

To this end, Fidesz pushed for more proactive kin-politics and rebranded its claim in the name of national unity and re-organizing the state. The perception of Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian basin changed from ethnic-kins to the part of a united Hungarian nation. (Egry 2023).

> That's the parallel process of re-organizing the state, and it was even part of the rhetoric in the early 2010 of Fidesz that they were *reorganizing the state*. It was claimed that the state wasn't functioning [and that] it was a failed state. They must reorganize the state and the reorganization was based on the idea of this *national unity*. [To create a] real national state instead of a state that is exposed to all kinds of external influences, and has [Sic.] no sovereignty. … [But] it's a uniquely Hungarian case that Hungarian minorities are included into this broader idea of some kind of Hungarian nest and Hungarian quasi-sovereignty (Egry 2023, emphasis added).

Another change worth noting is that lately, especially since 2015 is that Budapest has been paying more attention to a direct relationship between Hungary and ethnic Hungarians.

> they are no longer trying to change the neighboring countries to be more accommodating of minorities. They want to make a stronger connection between Hungary and those communities. And also at the same time they are counter intuitively having a better relationship with we've neighboring countries who are more in line with their general policies, so those who are more anti-West, anti-EU are better partners for for the Orbán governments than previously was the case (Fiala-Butora 2023).

The change is also observed on how money is channeled for transnational activism as well. During the first period, early 1990s and 2000s, it was a "decentralized financial support." For example, in Romania, local actors had to say how the money was channeled in and what it was spent on. In the current phase, however, it is more centralized. Budapest decides who will receive the financial support in question and how it will be spent on. It also "became more clientelistic than before, which means that the transparency is rather low."

What is also interesting is what it is spent on. Lately, it is more spent on infrastructural development (not only for educational purposes such as schools) or on sport. Meanwhile the relationship of the government with the local actors has become more “asymmetric”, meaning local actors are competing for loyalty and for the funds Budapest is offering. It is not a “symmetric partnership” anymore (interviewee #1, 2023).

Relevance of the Regime Type

Relevance of the government type for a state to have active or absent kin-state politics is not straightforward – “it's not such a direct or simplistic correlation. One would explain it with the votes relying on the goals and voters abroad to stay in power. It's not as simple in the case of Hungary.” Also, kin-minority voters are not many. Their votes are not always decisive. But some types of governments are more likely to use kin-politics rhetoric for their advantage than other types of government. For example, the previous governments before Fidesz, who were more “West oriented, more liberal, more in favor of cosmopolitan policy” could not use ideologies related to kin-minorities abroad for their advantage (Fiala-Butora 2023).

Orbán’s right-wing party, on the other hand, used the narrative to improve their image. “[C]itizenship policies introduced by the Orban government are in light of the illiberal political change taking place in Hungary. The regime itself created a very unique notion of citizenship – liberal citizenship” (Nagy 2023).

Before 2010 Fidesz was able to position itself as a champion of Hungarian national identity and Hungarians abroad as part of democratic competition. Post-2010 we can perhaps say that links to kin-minorities have been instrumentalised as part of the project of building an illiberal / hybrid / increasingly authoritarian regime

Are there Other Political Motives?

The argument that Orbán extended voting rights to get more votes is always debated (see the first subsection on Budapest vis-a-vis Historic and Moral Responsibility for more). One scholar interviewed, for example, notes that introducing voting rights was not only to gain kin-communities votes, it was just a continuation of what was already started. “[I]f you decide to give citizenship right then you should give voting rights as well. These two come together.” The issue here has to do with how it was done. There was not public debate about (Interviewee #1, 2023).

Fiala-Butora also argues that the Orbán government granted citizenship and voting rights for ethnic Hungarians to gain more votes is “exaggerated.” Because those communities are minor groups and cannot impact on the domestic politics of Hungary much. What is “underestimated” is how the Orbán government exploits kin-activism for ideological reasons – to undermine Western worldwide, to highlight Western hypocrisy or double-standards. For example, how “the West demands ... [for instance] anti corruption policies [from Hungary], yet the West is not doing anything to support Hungarians living abroad who are suffering” (2023).

Nagy, however, maintains that one of the key reasons for Hungary’s support for minority organization, in Transylvania for example, was an expected political support. As those organizations did not turn out to be as useful in this aspect as the Orbán government had hoped for, support for those organizations slowly decreased (2023).

Soft Power in Kin-Activism

Budapest’s kin-state activism is not part of its soft-power politics. But that does not mean it is not welcomed in the neighboring countries. For example, in Romania – Bucharest benefits from it.

For one, it serves for Budapest to create a more cohesive, homogenized nation as more ethnic-Hungarians are leaving the country. At the same time, Budapest's investment in infrastructure in Romania for ethnic Hungarians, such as restoration of churches, is to stay in Romania even after kin-minorities get citizenship in Hungary and leave. A scholar from Romania who is an ethnic Hungarian says:

> I always say that these kin-state policies which are happening are not about us. We are not the target. We are just instruments … We are used in order to secure power in Hungary. … They [Budapest] are creating an image in the public opinion in Hungary, saying that we are so good Hungarians, that nobody did as much as we did for Hungarians abroad, and by that they are particularly reinforcing their position in Hungary. And they are securing control over the resources of the state. But this is not soft power. No, it is hard power now (Interviewee #2, 2023).

Bilateral relationships

Kin-state policies can always be instrumentalized to cause a conflict between a kin-state and a home-state. But the souring relationships between Hungary and Romania, for example, is not directly because of Budapest's kin-activism. The same activism, for example, has not caused any serious problems with Slovakia or Slovenia either (Interviewee #1). Hungary's active kin-politics has not caused any substantial fallout between Hungary and any host countries.

In the past, to take attention from other issues and to generate public support, Budapest was engaged in "escalating tensions on a diplomatic level" with home-states on kin-minority issues. When there is a conflict, people have to take sides and they usually support their own governments

> there are genuine conflicts, but you can see how they are [Orbán government] doing that currently in the war in Ukraine where they are very much seen as supporting Russia. It's more complicated then and there is a genuine underlying issue. I've studied the Ukrainian Education Law. I think it is very negative towards minorities, so it's a very problematic act which is affecting Hungarians living in Ukraine very negatively. So the Orbán government has a point there. But then, again, they would use this conflict sometimes to

escalate, to get into a more tense situation with the Ukrainian Government, even seems unnecessarily (Fiala-Butora 2023).

Economic Reasons

Economic reasons also play a big role in shaping Hungary's kin-state politics. As earlier mentioned, Hungary was consistent in allocating money to support ethnic-Hungarians abroad. But the amount varied.

The budget cuts in Budapest's kin-state activism result in minimizing the support for NGO or other organizations, but it will not affect big projects. "Renovation of new buildings or buying new infrastructure is not that important to now." For a country, what is channeled for its kin-activism, it is not much money (Interviewee #1).

The economic aspect of Hungary's kin-state politics is not one-sided. Kin-minorities receive certain financial gains, but "Hungarian governments, or some people connected to the Hungarian government are benefiting by corruption" because of the lack of transparency. No one can precisely follow the money Hungarian government allocates for kin-politics. At the same time, what Hungary is channeling towards the support of its kin-minorities is not a big sum. But because Hungary does it voluntarily, it gets more credit and applause. Home-states, on the other hand, do not.

In terms of remittance, Hungary expects more from Hungarian diaspora while more political support is expected from ethnic-Hungarians in neighboring countries (Nagy 2023).

Hungary also benefits from its kin-politics in the form of human resources – for example, the best players of football and hockey come from neighboring states. (Ethnic-kins being used as a labor source was discussed in the previous sub-sections.)

Human/demographic reasons

In the earlier phases of Hungary's transnational activism, demographic reasons were not mentioned openly. But now it is more and more clear that kin-minorities are now seen as a "labor resource" (Interviewee #1).

Although for a long time it was publicly denied, "at least since 2000, it is a consensus view of the literature of the kin-state policy" that providing citizenship rights "is a means of handling labor shortage." Officials recently have announced there is a need for another half a million settlers and ethnic Hungarians will make a half of it. Hungary's kin-state effort "is also narrowing the potential pool of labor migrants" (Egry 2023). Integration here will not be a problem for kin minorities as they already have language and traditions (Nagy 2023). At the backdrop of how influx of immigrants and refugees from other places, particularly from outside Europe is securitized, ethnic-Hungarian minorities are more desired in Hungary, but that does not mean those kin-minorities "feel at home" either (Interviewee #4).

Hungarians inside the country

A majority of Hungarians in Hungary support Budapest's kin-state activism. Especially Orbán's electorate, which are "very low class, not well-educated" are happy with Budapest's kin-state activism. But since 2019, there has been less support for the citizenship law. It might be because of the fear that ethnic-Hungarians are taking jobs or that much money is being spent for them (Interviewee #1, 2023, interviewee #2, 2023).

> [O]ne thing is that there is a rising discomfort in Hungarian or public opinion regarding where the money comes from? And why is it going out when we have a lot of serious needs inside? The second problem is that it is becoming a problem which we hear more and more about. These young people who leave Transylvania, leave Slovakia and go to

> Hungary are regularly helped. Especially if they are clients, if they are people who have done services to Fidesz, they are propelled into important positions. … they are getting well and they are not liked[by Hungarian citizens]. This the Hungarians[in the country] are saying 'they are taking our job' (Interviewee #2, 2023).

Some studies have also shown that prejudice towards ethnic Hungarians who are moving into Hungary have always been present among Hungarians in the country. But the government has not done anything to tackle the issue (Nagy 2023).

EU Accession

Hungary always carried historical and moral responsibility towards its kin-minorities abroad, but how its kin-state policies are materialized depends on external and internal factors. Hungary had responsibility clause in its constitution before joining the EU and always discussed the minority issues in National Assembly, but

> no clear agenda could be set, because, on the one hand, they [Hungarian government] were afraid of losing their position within the European integration process, and then some other instances. They were afraid of losing their position towards the other political parties in the National Assembly towards the opposition or against the opposition (Aliz 2023).

Many expected that accession to the EU will largely improve kin-minorities' position in those home-states, but those expectations turned out to be a part of the disillusionment. The EU accession process can be used to influence home-states to improve minority rights, for example in Ukraine, but the EU has little power to do so once the state joins the EU. "The EU does not have any specific minority rights norms." And other international actors are not strong either in this aspect – the Council of Europe, for example, is weak. The OSCE and NATO are not interested in minority issues, they care more about security issues and cooperation (Fiala-Butora 2023).

Uzbekistan's Kin-State Non-Involvement

This section of the chapter discusses seven interviews conducted with Central Asia scholars and journalists on Uzbekistan's absent kin-state politics. Here I try to understand why Uzbekistan does not want to establish kin-relationships with Uzbeks in neighboring countries or support them in any structured way. The interviews are built on historic and moral responsibility, Uzbekistan's bilateral relationship with neighboring states, economic and demographic aspects of the question as well as other socio-cultural and political sides of it.

Tashkent vis-a-vis Historic and Moral Responsibility

Abstaining from claiming for ethnic kins abroad is not unique to Uzbekistan. Other Central Asian countries refrain from intervening in each-other's business in this regard.

> There's a norm that's prevailed within Central Asia about not engaging too rigorously with ethnic kin in neighboring countries. Of course, there are, as we know, largely Uzbek populations in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Tajik minority in Uzbekistan, Turkmen minority in Tajikistan. There are various ethnic populations that spill out the borders. … [F]or the most part, leadership in the region won't claim those individuals as part of their broader nation, and, instead, at least, formally, remain within the territorial boundaries of countries as they are today" (Lemon 2023).

One reason for that could be that Central Asian republics always view problems of other countries as "contagious" and fear spill-over into their own territory. Similarly, Uzbekistan also tries to avoid spill-over of different problems and hence keep distance from ethnic-kins (Pannier 2023).

There are conflicts between Central Asian states every now and then, but those are not based on kin-minority issues, but rather on border issues.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did launch programs to bring their kin-minorities back. But that was for pragmatic reasons. For example, President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Kazakh government

always presented Oralman program "as being a kind of moral stepping up to their moral and historical responsibility before ethnic Kazakhs who got scattered around the world by some tumultuous events, wars and revolutions and famine," but the program essential was to "gerrymander the demography" in the country. Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian country formerly occupied by the Soviet Union that had a minority titular nation. Kazakhs made up around 40% of the overall population in the early 1990s. "I think it felt that it was a question of national security. But it's not something that they openly voice, particularly the idea of changing the demographics." It also addressed another part of the population problem – Kazakhstan has a large landmass and a small population. By inviting Kazakhs back from China or Uzbekistan, Astana tried to curb the underpopulation problem as well. (Interviewee #7, 2023)

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has never experienced loss of a large land or population due to wars, revolutions or famine. The borders of the Uzbek SSR were not drawn by the Uzbek government or by its neighbors either. It was Moscow who left ethnic Uzbeks on the other side of the border which, at that time, was not an international border either.

At the same time, another thing to keep in mind is that the notion of nation is pretty young, in particular with the case of Uzbekistan. Fifty years ago, if you asked a person, they would identify with the places they were born such as Samarkandi, Burxari, etc., or with their father's name or with religion. Tashkent is continuing the USSR's policy of treating the nation based on the territory they are born in, not with ethnicity (Umarov 2023). Although, Uzbek passport still includes the nationality of passport holders.

Uzbekistan has a number of reasons to not play the nationality card. From the early years of independence, Uzbekistan's first president Islam Karimov chose isolationism for the country.

Karimov had suspicion of others, especially those who lived in other countries and were exposed to different lifestyles or opinions. (Interviewee #7). Karimov actually feared Uzbek-kins abroad, especially of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. Those Uzbeks have different values and they are more exposed to open society (Interviewee #6). There are hundreds of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, the country which was referred to as an island of democracy. "Throughout the period of independence Kyrgyzstan has been a lot more democratically leaning than Uzbekistan, and … Karimov might well have been wary of any kind of like program that would bring in more people with a different way of thinking, more people who would be less willing to conform politically to his kind of very stringent authoritarianism" (Interviewee #7).

Even in a dire situation where ethnic-Uzbeks were mass-murdered in the Osh conflict of 2010, Uzbekistan allowed ethnic Uzbeks to flee into Uzbekistan for some time and sent them back to Kyrgyzstan right away. "When the conflict broke out in Southern Kyrgyzstan, I was in Uzbekistan, I saw how Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan were mostly isolated. … [Tashkent] did not allow them to contact much with the locals" (Interviewee #6).

When Uzbekistan shows any interest to ethnic-Uzbeks abroad, that is due to pragmatic reasons. For example, Karimov had interest in the Uzbek community in Afghanistan when they were fighting against the Taliban under General Abdul Rashid Dostum's command (Pannier, 2023). During the early and mid-1990s, Karimov provided certain support to Dostum, an Uzbek-Afghan warlord and politician. Dostum's soldiers could even withdraw to Uzbekistan and "recuperate" after the fights with the Taliban. His family also lived in Tashkent by the early 2000s (Rotar, 2014). Tashkent extended its support by providing free-electricity to Mazar-e-Sharif, the fourth largest city in Afghanistan that was under the control of Dostum till late 1990s. Reportedly, there was more aid offered by Uzbekistan than just electricity supply. "Tashkent saw Dostum as the guardian

of the gates to Uzbekistan" (Pannier, 2016), but not because he was an ethnic Uzbek. Tashkent supported Dostum because he was a "buffer" between Uzbekistan and Taliban (Pannier, 2023).

Changes in Tashkent's Attitude towards Ethnic Uzbeks in Neighboring countries

Uzbekistan's independence history can be divided into two periods – Islam Karimov's era when he ruled the country from before 1991 independence to 2016 and current president Shavkat Mirziyoyev's era since 2016. Both presidents did not offer sustained help to ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries, even when Uzbek communities suffered from a natural disaster or were murdered by the Kyrgyz people during an ethnic clash in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (Pannier, 2023; (Interviewee #5, 2023). The situation was especially tight during the Karimov era. Although Karimov briefly supported ethnic Uzbek warlords in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, this support was not based on kinship relations.

> [T]his was for reasons of temporary strategic use. Once [Abdul] Rashid Dostum was defeated in Afghanistan, the Uzbek government disregarded him and never thought to work to secure the rights of ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan.
>
> In Tajikistan in the early phase of the civil war, the Uzbek government supported an ethnic Tajik (Safarali Kenjaev) as he was far more powerful and useful for the strategic needs of the Uzbek government than would be any ethnic Uzbek. The Uzbek government briefly later supported two ethnic Uzbek commanders named Mahmud Khudoyberiev and Ibod Boymatov in order to pressure the Tajik government. But once this failed the government of Uzbekistan never sought relations of any sort with Uzbeks in Tajikistan. Since then, Tashkent has been very cautious and sought to work with whoever is in power in foreign states, at the national or local level – regardless of ethnicity (Interviewee #5, 2023).

When Mirziyoyev came into power, he opened up borders and by this "allowed Uzbeks in Uzbekistan to associate more regularly with Uzbeks in neighboring countries, Turkmenistan excluded." During the Karimov era, due to his isolation policy, it was difficult for people to travel to Uzbekistan or from it to neighboring countries.

> I wrote a story years ago, when they [Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan] demarcated the Turkmen border, and an extended family owned property on both sides of the border. They put a fence right in the middle of the property and a border guard post just outside their property, too. … they [the said family members] couldn't go over to each other and see each other. So they [would] go to the fence and talk to each other. But if they wanted to visit, they had to go all the way to the capital and apply for a visa (Pannier 2023).

Now, ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan can more easily visit their family and friends in Uzbekistan and vice-versa.

Under Mirziyoyev's regime, government rhetoric has also been changing towards the Uzbek diaspora. Whenever Mirziyoyev travels to Russia or the US, he meets with Uzbek immigrants, for example. But Tashkent still sees ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries as citizens of those countries and does not want to get involved in their business. (Umarov 2023). Tashkent's policies towards diaspora also does not go beyond organizing conferences and meeting with them (Interviewee #6).

Uzbekistan's appeasing approach towards diaspora can be described as a pragmatic "wooing." Government is trying to appeal to the successful diaspora in the western countries who "built successful careers in the West say, or has had experience in Western countries … [and asked to] share their expertise, and that that was clearly a goal and a successful one in many ways" (interviewee #7).

Relevance of the Regime Type

An authoritarian regime closed to the outside world is unlikely to cultivate ties to a diaspora. Indeed, as is said above regarding president Karimov's rule, an authoritarian regime often securitizes such diaspora as a dangerous source of opposition ideas.

However, when it comes to the question of ethnic policies, there is not a big difference between democracies and autocracies. There are democracies with harsh migration policies, or vice-versa (Umarov 2023). What is more important is historical determinants. Current territory of Uzbekistan was formed in 1920s and, unlike Hungary, Uzbekistan never lost big territory to neighboring country (Interviewee #6). In fact, Karakalpak Republic, which now makes 1/5th of Uzbekistan's territory was added to Uzbekistan in 1936 (Solod 2022). At the same time, diaspora and kin-minorities are important for Hungary's internal politics while in the case of Uzbekistan, the government – be it Karimov's government or Mirziyoyev's – do not need support from them for (re) elections (Interviewee #6)

> An authoritarian regime that feels secure in its power will not resort to ethno-nationalist policies beyond its own borders. As long as it has stable and beneficial relations with its neighbors, it has no use for supporting ethnic Uzbeks in those states. This may also be due to the fear of those states supporting ethnic minorities within Uzbekistan.
>
> It may be that a state that (a) more openly tolerated public debates about ethnicity and neighboring states, and (b) felt insecure in its authority, would adopt a more aggressive policy regarding ethnic Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan in order to gain more support from its population. But Uzbekistan is not presently in this situation (Interviewee #5, 2023)

If a nationalistic government comes to power in the future, Tashkent's position towards its kin-ethnics might change. But it is important to keep in mind that when authoritarian regimes use nationalistic rhetoric to gain more support, their promises are not always translated into state policy. For example, neighboring Tajikistan's president Emomali Rahmon resorts to nationalistic rhetoric a lot and he is even called "savior of all Tajiks in the world." He talks a lot about sufferings of ethnic Tajiks, but in reality, he allowed very few Tajiks from Afghanistan to move into Tajikistan "Many nationalistic political regimes tend to say a lot but don't really transform it into real action. Because they understand that at the end of the day it will be them who would be coping

with all the problems of integration of those people into their society, providing them with the subsidies. It will be a very big problem” (Umarov 2023).

Soft Power

Uzbekistan will not raise nationality issue in regard to soft power any time soon (Interviewee #6).

> The leadership in Tashkent has nothing to gain – only risk – from a closer relationship with Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan as a secure and semi-isolationist state, does not need soft power (Interviewee #5, 2023).

Bilateral Relationship

One of the strongest imperatives for Tashkent not to develop and employ kin-minority policies is that it might compromise Uzbekistan’s relationship with its neighbors. Uzbekistan is a double-landlocked country and having good relationships with neighbors is essential, especially for trade. It is difficult to trade via air-routes all-the time. Although Uzbekistan is very self-sufficient in production of goods and services, having access to the outer world presents more opportunities and a variety of goods and services. Playing a nationality card and offering help and support to Uzbek communities in neighboring countries might alter Uzbekistan’s amicable relationship with those home-states of Uzbek communities (Pannier 2023).

Central Asian countries are already “nervous” about Uzbeks and Uzbekistan. Uzbeks are the most populous ethnicity in the region and Uzbekistan commands over the biggest military power in the region. If Tashkent wants to establish kin-relations with ethnic Uzbeks abroad it has to “make sure to do it in a way that doesn't make the governments of the neighboring countries nervous (Pannier, 2023).

> [T]his would make the Taliban paranoid and angry, as they are at their core a racist movement that privileges ethnic Pashtuns in every possible way. The leadership in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would also become very, very paranoid as Uzbekistan could easily take large parts of their territory based on the power imbalance and large areas where ethnic Uzbeks live. Every neighbor would become angry, annoyed and paranoid, and this would affect a range of bilateral relations. (Interviewee #5, 2023)

Since Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016, Uzbekistan has opened up to the world to a certain extent and has made an effort to be on good terms with its neighbors. When the relationships among titular states are good, treatment of their minorities are also better. When Karimov was hostile to the Kyrgyzs government and when the Osh ethnic clash happened, Karimov did not care about ethnic Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz government did not help the Uzbek community enough either. Over a decade has passed since then but "the Kyrgyz government still has not provided accountability for most of the crimes committed during the conflict" (Uralova 2021). But now, under Mirziyoyev's rule, Uzbek-Kyrgyz relationships are good, and "the last thing in the world the Kyrgyz government wants to see is another problem like Osh, because then its relations with Uzbekistan immediately plummet." This time the Uzbek government might stand behind ethnic Uzbeks, so now the Uzbek community has better protection than before. Uzbeks in Tajikistan also feel more comfortable there since Mirziyoyev came to power given Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relationships are now better than it was during the Karimov era (Pannier 2023).

Mirziyoyev's government has also, to a certain extent, been supporting ethnic minorities in Uzbekistan better than the Karimov regime. He is especially famous in Kyrgyzstan because he is supporting ethnic Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan (Interviewee #8) and this also warms Kyrgyz population's attitude to Uzbek minorities there.

Economic Factors

Another reason for Uzbekistan not to get involved in kin-minority support and especially not to allow ethnic-Uzbeks to resettle in Uzbekistan or to extend citizenship to them has to do with the state-economy. Uzbekistan already has problems of creating jobs inside Uzbekistan, for its own citizens (Umarov, 2023; interviewee #7, 2023). Uzbekistan's economy in the 1990s was not good. They for sure did not want another three million ethnic Uzbeks moving into the country and burdening the government even further (Pannier 2023). Currently, the official unemployment rate is 9.6% in general, unofficially it is reported to be higher (Uzstats 2023). The programs of integration also would cost greatly. Tashkent does not need additional expenses.

At the same time, there is no incentive for the government, in terms of finances, from helping kin-minorities. Mirziyoyev has been trying to connect with a successful diaspora in the west, because those bring benefits.

> I do not think ethnic Uzbeks abroad have anything to offer the government of Uzbekistan economically. They are too marginalized economically in their own countries. (Interviewee #5, 2023)

The Uzbek government does not see any interest in supporting ethnic-kins abroad. It is not a matter of finances. Even poor countries can provide some support to their kin-minorities if they want. Uzbekistan has enough money and it does not even need to spend much money (Interviewee #6).

Demography

After the USSR disintegrated, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan sought to invite their respective kin-minorities to resettle. Kazakhstan, for example, launched the Oralman program and at least a million ethnic Kazakhs from China, Uzbekistan and other places moved to Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan, however, did not follow the suit. There are pragmatic reasons for that. Kazakhstan used to be part of the communist regime, so was Uzbekistan and China where majority of those ethnic Kazakhs moved from. Integration in Kazakhstan was not impossible for them. But if Uzbekistan allows ethnic Uzbeks from Afghanistan to resettle in Uzbekistan, that would create integration problems to say the least. Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan are exposed to different ideologies. Even Oralmans find it hard to integrate with locals in Kazakhstan (Umarov 2023). "What Kazakhstan has found is that people who came from post-Soviet countries with similar cultures have integrated quite easily. And people who didn't have some kind [of similarities] sometimes integrated with a lot more difficulty or not integrated, and and that's a cultural factor, but also linguistic" (Interviewee #7, 2023).

At the same time, unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan does not have a problem of lack of population, in particular, lack of Uzbek population. There is also no gender imbalance either (China, for example, huge problem with the lack of young women due to Beijing's One-Child policy which was only recently abolished). That is why Tashkent does not look at the outside world and instead tries to stabilize the citizens inside (Umarov 2023). At the same time, in early 1990s and partially in 2000s, "Uzbekistan was able to convince ethnic minorities [Uzbekistan] to become Uzbeks." In Samarkand and Bukhara region where there are many Tajiks and in other Tajik cities, Tajiks choose to be identified as Uzbek in their passports (Interviewee #6).

> I remember when I was in Uzbekistan in the 2000s several times - in Bukhara even – [and I was] speaking with the people. … [And I would speak in] Persian with them. They were like cool, quite okay with that. And they were happy with all that and secretly said, 'yeah, we are Iranians, but in the passport we are Uzbeks because it's more secure for us.
>
> The only nationality that Uzbek Government admitted or recognized more with Karakalpak national minority, but it was controlled by other means (Interviewee #6).

Uzbeks in Uzbekistan

To what degree Uzbeks in Uzbekistan want to support ethnic Uzbeks abroad or want the government to invite them to resettle is unknown. There are no wide-scale polls or surveys conducted on the topic.

Uzbeks in Uzbekistan are in touch with ethnic-Uzbeks abroad on a family-level, if they have relatives in neighboring countries – this is especially true for Ferghana Valley, for example, or on business or friendship level. The proper research on it is yet to be conducted, but the contact of Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks abroad is based on business and family ties (Interviewee #6).

> We don't know whether it would be popular among the public to have Uzbekistan taking major responsibility or paying greater attention to the Uzbek diaspora abroad. We don't know how the public would relate to that, because we have often very little information about what the public thinks about so many things, but precisely because of the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan.
>
> In this kind of regime, the policies are top down driven. It's the government that sets the policies, and it's not in consultation with the people, so we don't know what the people would want in terms of Uzbeks abroad.
>
> … [W]e don't know what the public would think, and it's definitely the case when it comes to deciding those policies. I don't think we have enough information on decision making about that. On what basis the government makes such decisions, you know, is completely basically unknown (Interviewee #7, 2023).

Apart from familial ties, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan might become sympathetic towards ethnic Uzbeks if something tumultuous, such as ethnic violence, happens to them (Lemon 2023). For example, when the ethnic clash took place in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, there was overwhelming support from Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, whether they had a relative in Kyrgyzstan or not. Military commanders were even ready to go to Osh and protect ethnic Uzbeks. But Tashkent did not give such an order (Pannier, 2023)

The Uzbek government can suppress any sentiments towards ethnic Uzbeks abroad if it does not fit the regime's interest. But that sentiment is very rare, unless it is based on family or friendship ties. For example, "[t]here hasn't been, as far as I can see, too much sympathy towards the plight of ethnic Uzbeks in the southern border in Afghanistan." Tashkent is building an amicable relationship with the Taliban, but not because it is worried about two to four million ethnic Uzbeks there. Tashkent wants a stable border (Lemon 2023).

> I think the public would accept whatever the government decides. But unlike Kazakhstan with its oralman project to bring in ethnic Kazakhs, Uzbekistan has no need to increase the ethnic Uzbeks population as Kazakhstan did at independence when ethnic Kazakhs did not form a majority. (Interviewee #5, 2023).

General population of Central Asia are afraid of Uzbeks – Uzbeks are everywhere. "I was talking to a Kazakh guy about 100 kilometers outside of Almaty … and he said they were going to give up their nuclear arsenal, and I said, 'that's good.' And he said, 'No, no, it's really bad,' I said 'Why, why do you think it's a good idea to keep nuclear weapons. Are you afraid of Russia? Are you afraid of China?' And he said, 'We have a millions of Uzbeks in the south of our border" (Pannier 2023)

Support for ethnic Uzbeks abroad could be popular among some Uzbeks, especially those who have relatives abroad. But it could also anger others. For example, some Kazakhs in Kazakhstan resent that the government provides material support to ethnic Kazakhs who resettled in Kazakhstan (Interviewee #7, 2023). Uzbeks already suspect each other, abroad or at home. (Interviewee #8).

> I did my research among Kyrgyz migrants in Moscow, but I also had a chance to talk to Uzbeks working … This situation with the Uzbek's, even among their own citizens, was the worst compared to Kyrgyzs and Kazakhs, even Tajiks. Uzbek citizens would complain in Russia that their embassy would never help them if they had any issues related to, even with passport or other things; and I was so surprised because one migrant

> lost his hand … and he was so afraid of going to Embassy because he was afraid of getting support from embassy, saying that 'our government ask even more money from us, and then throw us away.' So then I, at least our government [Kyrgyz government], which is a little bit poor and not reliable, at least they can provide some support in terms of providing lawyers. But he was so afraid (Interviewee #8).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented a discussion with area experts of kin-state politics, Hungary and Central Asia scholars as well as two journalists of the Central Asian region, based on 14 interviews I conducted in Spring 2023. The discussions were divided into thematic subsections – there I discussed what factors impact on Hungary's active transborder nationalism and what factors play a role in Uzbekistan's restraint from playing nationalism and ethnic-brotherhood card although in both cases, kin minorities of each state emerged as a result of border-redrawing of the twentieth century.

In the next chapter, based on literature review provided in the second chapter and expert interview-discussions given in the third chapter, I will present the research findings and draw conclusions.

CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Interest in kin-state politics gained a particular interest in the second half of the twentieth century, in particular because it touched upon nationalism, ethnicity, conflict studies and irredentism. Many kin-minorities emerged in that era as a result of the demise of the Ottoman empire, Austro-Hungarian empire, collapse of the Soviet Union and as a result of the World Wars – borders were redrawn and many ethnic groups found themselves in the territory of other states. Following the Treaty of Trianon signed after the end of World War I, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and one-third of its population to neighboring states – millions of Hungarian kin-minorities now live in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Ukraine. With the collapse of the

Soviet Union, Uzbekistan became independent and gained international borders and state sovereignty. But 2,5 million ethnic Uzbeks became minority groups in newly independent Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Another two to four million ethnic Uzbeks live in Afghanistan and the border between Afghanistan and Uzbek SSR was drawn even earlier.

Although in both cases Hungarian and Uzbek kin-minorities emerged in other countries as minority groups against their will, the two states developed different kin-state politics. Hungary has been actively building ties with ethnic Magyars abroad and providing financial and socio-cultural support, especially following the democratic transition years. In 2010 Budapest issued a Citizenship Law which allowed ethnic Hungarians abroad to obtain Hungarian citizenship easily, and soon after, granted them non-residential voting rights. It is significant that this can be framed as restoring a Hungarian citizenship / right to citizenship that previously existed before 1920, whereas there was no Uzbek citizenship until 1991. Uzbekistan closed its borders tightly to everyone under Karimov's regime, including to ethnic Uzbeks. Tashkent did not support ethnic Uzbeks even when they were mass-murdered in the Osh ethnic clash in 2010. With the new government in charge since 2016, Tashkent absent kin-state politics has not changed much.

This research was set to study why two states have different approaches to their kin-minorities although in both cases, kin-minority groups emerged as a result of geopolitics of the twentieth century. The findings and conclusion are presented in several thematic sub-sections below.

Historic and moral responsibility

There is an overwhelming consensus both among the Hungarian population and among the ruling parties in Hungary that Hungary has historic and moral responsibility to ethnic minorities. All the experts interviewed for this research agree on that. However, there is a difference of opinions on how Budapest's kin-politics should be carried out.

At the same time, Budapest's dynamic transnational activism is not only because of the moral obligation. There are certain pragmatic reasons. Experts agree that Budapest seeks to fill the labor shortage in Hungary with the help of extending non-resident citizenship rights. Most scholars I interviewed also maintain that extension of non-resident voting rights given to ethnic Hungarians serves the right wing party to gain more votes. Only one scholar disagreed – he informs that votes from non-resident voters are minimal and not decisive. What is more important to look at here is how Budapest utilizes kin-state rhetoric to appeal to domestic voters. Fidesz party's promises to bring ethnic Hungarians closer to the homeland and support them to maintain the cultural and historic heritage generate great support inside Hungary.

Tashkent, on the other hand, does not feel responsible in front of ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries. The borders were drawn by the Soviet regime, not by Tashkent. Also, Uzbekistan never lost a big territory due to war or other tumultuous events of the past (In the case of Hungary, the traumatic collective memory of Trianon is a factor in nation-building and kin-state engagement). Moscow drew borders in the 1920s and gave the territory where there are mostly Uzbeks to the Uzbek SSR. It took seven more decades for Uzbekistan to emerge as an independent state. After independence, first president Islam Karimov built the notion of nationhood based on territory, continuing the Soviet legacy. His *o'zbekchilik*, Uzbekness included only those who were residents of Uzbekistan. Uzbek kin-minorities were citizens of neighboring states and were treated by Uzbekistan as such.

Demographic reasons

Hungary has around ten million citizens and there is a labor shortage. As mentioned above, experts interviewed agree that the citizenship law of Budapest seeks to use ethnic Hungarians as a labor

source. Unlike migrants from other countries and especially from other continents, ethnic-Hungarians share common culture and the language and can easily integrate with the population of Hungary.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, never experienced shortage of human resources. Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia with its citizens being more than 35 million people. At the same time, Uzbeks have always been the dominant ethnic group. Neighboring Kazakhstan for example introduced the Oralman program to support ethnic Kazakhs to resettle in Kazakhstan after the Soviet Union's disintegration. Back then, Kazakhs made up merely half of the nation. Uzbeks, on the other hand, were always the majority group.

Besides, Hungary's homogeneous character is one factor enabling it to pursue an assertive kin-state policy, since it does not face domestic constraints arising from internal diversity. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is not homogeneous. As mentioned above, Uzbekistan is home to over 100 ethnicities and nationalities. Tashkent mostly focuses on keeping peace inside the country and building the notion of Uzbekness based on territorial marks.

Economic factors

Financial support offered by Budapest to kin-minorities has always been persistent, although the amount varies. In the earlier decades after the democratic transition, how the money is spent was decided more or less in home states. Now, Hungary's economic support is centralized with everything being decided in Budapest. It is also hard to follow where the money comes from and where it goes. Some experts interviewed claim that Budapest has built a clientelist approach where organizations that support Fidesz get support from Budapest and, to a certain degree, remain loyal. People connected to the Hungarian government, at the same time, benefit from corruption.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, prefers not to spend any amount on its kin-minorities. There is occasional support in the form of school textbooks in Uzbek and other school supplies sent to neighboring countries, but nothing beyond. Tashkent does not see any benefit from establishing contact with kin-minorities. Extending citizenship to ethnic minorities and allowing them to resettle in Uzbekistan is not feasible since Tashkent already struggles with creating jobs for its citizens. Integration programs will also cost an arm and a leg.

Tashkent's recent attempts to reconnect with the Uzbek diaspora, on the other hand, has to do with Mirziyoyev's government trying to bring western expertise and experience into Uzbekistan.

Titular nation and domestic support

There is overwhelming support in Hungary towards ethnic Magyars abroad. Partly because around three million Hungarians have family or friendship ties with ethnic-Hungarians abroad. But also, the majority of them believe in Budapest's moral and historic responsibility.

There is, however, resentment and prejudice towards those kin-ethnics who move to Hungary. They resent the government support kin-ethnics are getting in terms of finding jobs and receiving financial support from the government.

It is hard to tell how Uzbeks in Uzbekistan feel about kin-minority abroad – there have not been conducted any wide-scale polls. Experts interviewed maintain that some Uzbek citizens might support the idea of connecting with ethnic kins and opening borders for them, especially in the time of crisis – like the Osh ethnic clash of 2010. However, the majority of citizens mostly do not care. They have their own problems.

International organizations

Budapest took a more dynamic approach in its kin-politics after Hungary's accession to the EU. But this change is also connected with disillusionment. Many believed that joining the EU would

help with kin-minority issues. But it did not. Fidesz government, on the other hand, using this moment as a pigeonhole – to highlight EU's hypocrisy – how international bodies demand certain changes in Hungary in the name of development in democracy and human rights but still let Hungarian kin-minorities be subject to ill-treatment and discrimination in their home-states.

None of the scholars and journalists interviewed has anything to say about the role of international organizations such as OSCE or others in Tashkent's absent kin-state politics. International organizations, most probably, focus on Uzbekistan's domestic and foreign policy, but not kin-politics.

Conclusions

This research started with an aim to study why some kin-states develop positive kin-state politics while other kin-states do not. To this end, two countries – Hungary and Uzbekistan – were chosen as a case study. The research questions were :

1. What are the main reasons for Hungary to pursue active transborder nationalism?
2. What are the main reasons for Uzbekistan to restrain from transborder nationalism?

Kin-minorities of both states emerged as a result of geopolitical changes and border moves in the early 1900s. In the case of Hungary, this happened earlier, in 1920 as a result of the Treaty of Trianon whereupon Hungary lost a significant part of its territory and a couple of millions of its population who now live in neighboring countries of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Ukraine. Following the democratic transition, Budapest has been actively supporting ethnic Magyars abroad with socio-cultural, economic and even political aid. Although Budapest holds those efforts for its kin-minorities to be able to maintain their cultural heritage, scholars have observed the usefulness of those kin-policies for political gains of the ruling Fidesz party too.

At least 2,5 – 3 million Uzbeks live in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and reportedly two to four million ethnic Uzbeks reside in Afghanistan. Just like the case of ethnic Hungarians. Ethnic Uzbeks in those countries emerged as a result of border shifts. Uzbekistan's borders were drawn by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and the process was finalized in 1936 only. Uzbek SSR emerged encompassing the lands where there were most ethnic Uzbeks living, but a couple of millions of ethnic Uzbeks found themselves in other soviet-Central Asian countries. However, the borders between those countries were not international and people could move freely and visit their families. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union which was completed only in 1992 Kazakhstan being the last, the borders took an international status and check-points were established soon after. Unlike Budapest, Tashkent kept a distance from its kin-minorities abroad. Even during the times of crisis, such as the 2010 Osh ethnic riot where dozens of Uzbek minorities died and hundreds lost homes, the Uzbek government only allowed its kin-minorities to find a shelter in Uzbekistan for a short period and sent them back to Kyrgyzstan immediately. So far, scholarship explained Tashkent's position with its efforts to keep an amicable bilateral relationship with its neighbors. Tashkent does not grant any citizenship to ethnic Uzbeks abroad in a fear of security issues. It is also worth noting that Central Asia is a highly securitized region compared to the one that exists in the EU and its neighborhood. Besides, Uzbeks have always been a dominant ethnic group in Uzbekistan and the country has always been the most populous in the region, so there was not any need for more ethnic Uzbeks resettling in Uzbekistan. Besides, Uzbeks have always been a dominant ethnic group in Uzbekistan and the country has always been the most populous in the region, so there was not any need for more ethnic Uzbeks resettling in Uzbekistan.

Budapest and Hungarian citizens believe in Hungary's moral and historic responsibility to help ethnic-Hungarians abroad. Main reason for that is the (previous) state's role in the Treaty of

Trianon. Tashkent and Uzbekistanis do not look at the historical events that lead to the emergence of ethnic-Uzbeks in neighboring countries. When the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union occupied the region, Uzbekistan did not even exist in its form of today. There were Khanates. The borders were drawn by the Bolsheviks and it took another seven decades after the formation of Uzbek SSR that Uzbekistan became independent and its borders became international. Budapest envisioned certain benefits from its positive transnational activism – its kin-politics help to fill labor shortage in Hungary and it also boosts Fidesz's popularity. Tashkent, on the other hand, would gain nothing – Uzbekistan already has more than enough population. Tashkent needs to create jobs for them first. If Tashkent starts a nationalism card, its neighbors get suspicious about it and the stability in the region might be compromised. There was a time when Karimov supported ethnic Afghan-Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan, but not because of the kin ties. Tahskent saw Dostum and his militia as a buffer between Uzbekistan and the Taliban. After general Dostum lost, Tashkent discarded him and now is trying to build an amicable relationship with Taliban to keep the border safe. Although Budapest's kin-state politics caused some tensions with Slovakia and Romania, and recently with Romania, it did not go beyond diplomatic tensions. Integration of ethnic-Hungarians who moved to Hungary is also easy. However, for Tashkent it could be different, especially with the case of ethnic-Uzbeks from Afghanistan.

In regard to the conceptual framework developed by Smith – the quadratic nexus of kin state politics, which in simple terms explain kin politics as a relationship which involves four sides – kin-state, kin-minorities, home state and international actors. With the case of Hungary, Smith's framework works. This cannot be said about Tashkent's absent kin-state politics. Not only because Tashkent is passive in this matter, but also, there is no role of international actors in any way.

Hungary's transnational activism has been well-studied by scholars. However, the Central Asian region has received little to no attention. Further research needs to be done on Central Asian states' kin-state activism (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and absent kin-state politics of Uzbekistan and to some extent, Turkmenistan.

References

'Global Democracy Has a Very Bad Year'. The Economist, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/02/02/global-democracy-has-a-very-bad-year.

Atabaki, T. (2005). "Transnationalism and diaspora in Central Asia and the Caucasus." In *Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora*, edited by Touraj Atabaki, and Sanjyot Mehendale, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=182719.

Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R. (2000). Accidental Diasporas and External "Homelands" in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present. IHS Political Science Series 71, October 2000. [Working Paper]. http://aei.pitt.edu/32402/.

Created from gla on 2023-05-21 14:27:35.

Csergo, Z. (n.d.). Kin-State Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Hungary. In Wilson center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/315-kin-state-politics-central-and-eastern-europe-the-case-hungary.

Davis, D. R., & Moore, W. H. (1997). Ethnicity matters: Transnational ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior. International Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 171–184. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00037.

Djumaev, A. (2002). "Nation-Building, Culture, and Problems of Ethnocultural Identity in Central Asia: The Case of Uzbekistan." In Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, edited by Kymlicka, W. and Magda Opalski, Oxford University Press.

Ergasheva, Z.(2014). "Uzbeks Face Obstacles in Increasingly Tajik State." Institute for War and Peace Reporting. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbeks-face-obstacles-increasingly-tajik-state.

European Comission. (n.d.). Euridice. Hungary. https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-education-systems/hungary/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions.

Ferrando, O. (2008). Manipulating the census: Ethnic minorities in the nationalizing states of central asia. Nationalities Papers, 36(3), 489–520. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905990802080737.

Fumagalli, M. (2007). Framing ethnic minority mobilisation in central asia: The cases of uzbeks in kyrgyzstan and tajikistan. Europe-Asia Studies, 59(4), 567–590. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701289869.

Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011). https://www.parlament.hu/documents/125505/138409/Fundamental+law/73811993-c377-428d-9808-ee03d6fb8178.

Hatvany, C. (2006). Legitimacy of kin-state politics: A theoretical approach. *Regio - Minorities, Politics, Society - English Edition*, *IX*(1), 47–64. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=79156.

Hungary Today. (2017). “One million new hungarian citizens in seven years – dual citizenship programme reaches milestone.” https://hungarytoday.hu/one-million-new-hungarian-citizens-less-seven-years-dual-citizenship-programme-reaches-milestone-57854/.

Hungary Today. (2022). “Slovak Census: Almost Half a Million People Declare Themselves to be Hungarians.” https://hungarytoday.hu/slovakian-census-almost-half-a-million-people-declare-to-be-hungarians/.

Kántor, Z. (2014). “Hungary’s Kin-State Politics, 2010–2014.” In Minority Research 17:23-32. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=516058.

Khan, N. (2005). “Afghan communities in Uzbekistan.” In *Central Asia and the Caucasus : Transnationalism and Diaspora*, edited by Touraj Atabaki, and Sanjyot Mehendale, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=182719.

King, C., & Melvin, N. J. (2000). Diaspora politics: Ethnic linkages, foreign policy, and security in eurasia. International Security, 24(3), 108–138. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560257.

Kocadal, Ö. (2016). A conceptual typology of kin-state mediation: Kin-state mediation. Negotiation Journal, 32(3), 171–189. https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12158.

Körtvélyesi, Z. (2020). Nation, nationality, and national identity: Uses, misuses, and the hungarian case of external ethnic citizenship. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique, 33(3), 771–798. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09731-8.

Kovács, E. (2020). Direct and indirect political remittances of the transnational engagement of Hungarian kin-minorities and diaspora communities. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(6), 1146–1165. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1554315

Kudaibergenova, D. T. (2018). Compartmentalized ideology and nation-building in non-democratic states. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 52(3), 247–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.07.002.

Kumenov, A. (2018). “Kazakhstan’s returnees frustrated by cold shoulders.” Eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-returnees-frustrated-by-cold-shoulders.

Lesińska, M., & Héjj, D. (2021). Pragmatic trans-border nationalism: A comparative analysis of Poland's and Hungary's policies towards kin-minorities in the twenty-first century. Ethnopolitics, 20(1), 53–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2020.1808324.

Liebich, A. (2019). The "boomerang effect" of kin-state activism: Cross-border ties and the securitization of kin minorities. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 34(5), 665–684. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1402202.

Mellon, J. G. (2010). Myth, legitimacy and nationalism in central asia. Ethnopolitics, 9(2), 137–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050902725660.

Pannier, B. (2016). "A Knock At Uzbekistan's Southern Door." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-taliban-afghanistan-termez-rocket-fire/27715404.html.

Pogonyi, Sz. (2017a). Extra-territorial ethnic politics, discourses and identities in Hungary. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52467-2.

Pogonyi, Sz. (2017b). Europeanization of kin-citizenship and the dynamics of kin-minority claim-making: The case of hungary. Problems of Post-Communism, 64(5), 242–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2017.1329630.

Pogonyi, Sz. (2017c). Extra-territorial ethnic politics, discourses and identities in hungary. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52467-2.

Reuveny, R., & Prakash, A. (1999). The afghanistan war and the breakdown of the soviet union. Review of International Studies, 25(4), 693–708. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599006932.

Rotar, I. (2014). "Will 'Dostumistan' Be Established Near Afghanistan's Border With Uzbekistan?" The Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/program/will-dostumistan-be-established-near-afghanistans-border-with-uzbekistan/.

Rutai, L. (2022). "A Tale of Two Diasporas: The Battle for Hungarian Voters Abroad." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-election-diaspora-orban-marki-zay/31712662.html.

Saida, N. (2023). "Online Bride and Prejudice in Uzbek Society." The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/online-bride-and-prejudice-in-uzbek-society/.

Sansum, J. M., & Dobos, B. (2020). Cultural autonomy in hungary: Inward or outward looking? Nationalities Papers, 48(2), 251–266. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.80.

Smith, D. J. (2002). Framing the national question in Central and Eastern Europe: A quadratic nexus? Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2(1), 3–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/14718800208405119.

Solod, D. (2022). "A guide to the violent unrest in Uzbekistan's Karakalpakstan region." Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/protests-karakalpakstan-uzbekistan-former-soviet/.

Tátrai, P., Erőss, Á., & Kovály, K. (2017). Kin-state politics stirred by a geopolitical conflict: Hungary's growing activity in post-Euromaidan Transcarpathia, Ukraine. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin, 66(3), 203–218. https://doi.org/10.15201/hungeobull.66.3.2.

Tomiuc, E. (2001). "Hungary: Status Law Causing Dispute with Neighbors." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/1097612.html.

Udrea, A. (2014). A kin-state's responsibility: Cultural identity, recognition, and the Hungarian status law. Ethnicities, 14(2), 324–346. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812472145

Uralova, N. (2021). Uzbeks Behind Borders: Improving Connections? Cabar Asia, https://cabar.asia/en/uzbeks-behind-borders-improving-connections#_ftnref8.

Uralova, N. and S. Bober. (2020). "ECMI Minorities Blog: A silent response from Central Asia about human- and minority rights violations in Xinjiang." ECMI, https://www.ecmi.de/infochannel/detail/ecmi-minorities-blog-a-silent-response-from-central-asia-about-human-and-minority-rights-violations-in-xinjiang.

Uzbekistan's Club. (n.d.). About Us. https://uzbekistans.club/about-us.

UzStatistics (O'zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidenti Huzuridagi Statistika Agentligi). (2022). Doimiy ahooli soni - Jami. https://stat.uz/uz/rasmiy-statistika/demography-2.

Vielmeni, F. (2021). Uzbek Communities in Central Asia as Human Connectivity Factor: Elements for a Kin-State Policy. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/uzbek-communities-central-asia-human-connectivity-factor-elements-kin-state-policy-29131.

Vock, I. (2020). "Why Fears of Hungarian Separatism Are Stirring in Western Ukraine." New Statesman, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2020/06/why-fears-hungarian-separatism-are-stirring-western-ukraine.

Wanzala-Silva, W. (2022). Hungary's Population & Ethnic Groups. Study.com. https://study.com/learn/lesson/hungary-population-ethnic-groups.html#:~:text=What%20are%20the%20major%20ethnic,the%20others%20by%20over%2080%25.

Waterbury, M. A. (2006). Internal exclusion, external inclusion: Diaspora politics and party-building strategies in post-communist hungary. East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures, 20(3), 483–515. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325405280897.

Waterbury, M. A. (2008). Uncertain Norms, Unintended Consequences: The Effects of European Union Integration on Kin-state Politics in Eastern Europe. Ethnopolitics, Vol. 7, Nos. 2–3, 217–238, June–September. DOI: 10.1080/17449050701413427.

Waterbury, M. A. (2010). Between state and nation: Diaspora politics and kin-state nationalism in Hungary (1st ed). Palgrave Macmillan.

Waterbury, M.A. (2014). Making Citizens Beyond the Borders Nonresident Ethnic Citizenship in Post-Communist Europe. Problems of Post-Communism, 61:4, 36-49, DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216610403.

Waterbury, M. A. (2020). Kin-state politics: Causes and consequences. Nationalities Papers, 48(5), 799–808. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.3.

Waterbury, M. A. (2021). Divided nationhood and multiple membership: A framework for assessing kin-state policies and their impact. Ethnopolitics, 20(1), 39–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2020.1808323.

Weiner, M. (1971). The Macedonian syndrome is an historical model of international relations and political development. World Politics, 23(4), 665–683. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009855.

Wood, C. (2018). “Back to Wakhan: Kyrgyz Returnees Head Back to Afghanistan.” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/back-to-wakhan-kyrgyz-returnees-head-back-to-afghanistan/.

ANNEX I. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

List of scholars interviewed for the case study of Hungary

Dr. Aliz Nagy, assistant professor, Institute of Political and International Studies lecturer. Department of Human Rights and Politics lecturer.

Dr. Gábor Egry, a historian, holding a PhD from ELTE, Budapest, senior research fellow and director general at the Institute of Political History, Budapest.

Interviewee #1, a university lecturer based in Europe.

Interviewee #2, a professor of political science based in Europe.

Interviewee #3, a university lecturer based in Europe.

Interviewee #4, a university lecturer based in the UK.

Dr. Janos Fiala-Butora, a lecturer in International Disability Law at the Centre for Disability Law and Policy, Human Rights Lawyer.

List of scholars and journalists interviewed for the case study Uzbekistan

Bruce Pannier, senior journalist based in Prague, the Czech Republic.

Dr. Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University based in Washington DC, US.

Interviewee #5, academic based in Canada.

Interviewee #6, a university professor based in Europe.

Interviewee #7, a journalist based in Kazakhstan.

Interviewee #8, a senior researcher at a research institution in Germany.

Temur Umarov, a fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Berlin and OSCE Academy in Bishkek.

ANNEX II. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview questions for the case study of Hungary

1. Do you think Hungary truly believes in the historical and moral responsibility of protecting and supporting ethnic Hungarians abroad, regardless of the latter's citizenship?

2. There have been changes in Budapest's kin-state policy over the years after the independence, especially in the last couple of decades. What do you think the main reasons were?

3. To what extent does the regime type play a role here? Do you think a regime or government change will alter the state's kin politics?

4. To what extent does Budapest benefit from closer relationships with ethnic Hungarians abroad? Does helping ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries increase Budapest's soft-power influence too?

5. Do you believe closer relationships with ethnic Hungarians will cost/is costing Budapest bilateral relationships with the neighboring states?

6. Do you think there are any economic factors that play a role in state's kin-politics?

7. To what extent, do you think, the size of the population (especially of ethnic-Hungarians) within the country play a role in the government's decision to support ethnic-kins abroad? Do you think there are demographic reasons?

8. Do you think the people of Hungary feel close to ethnic Hungarians abroad and want them to become Hungarian citizens?

9. Does Hungary's status in the EU play a role for ethnic Hungarians abroad to opt for Hungarian citizenship?

10. Do you think there are other political reasons for Hungary's decision to support kin-ethnics abroad?

Interview questions for the case study of Uzbekistan

1. Do you think Tashkent believes in the historical and moral responsibility of protecting and supporting ethnic Uzbeks abroad, regardless of the latter's citizenship?

2. Do you observe any changes for the past three decades in Tashkent's kin-state politics?

3. To what extent does the regime type play a role here? Do you think a regime change will alter the state's approach in its kin politics?

4. To what extent would Tashkent benefit from closer relationships with ethnic Uzbeks abroad? Would helping ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries increase Tashkent's soft-power influence?

5. Do you believe a closer relationship with ethnic Uzbeks would cost Tashkent bilateral relationships with the neighboring states?

6. Do you think there are any economic factors that do not allow Tashkent to build closer relationships with ethnic Uzbeks abroad?

7. To what extent, do you think, the size of the population within the country plays a role in the government's decision not to support ethnic-kins abroad? Do you think there are demographic reasons?

8. Do you think the people of Uzbekistan feel close to ethnic Uzbeks abroad?

9. To what extent do the public want closer relationships to be established with kin-ethnics abroad? Do you think the public would support accepting ethnic Uzbeks into the country and grating them citizenship solely because they are ethnic Uzbeks?

10. Do you think there are other political reasons for Uzbekistan's decision not to support kin-ethnics abroad?