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dc.contributor.advisorDavies, Alexander, juhendaja
dc.contributor.authorTuckwell, William
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskondet
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondet
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-21T11:33:47Z
dc.date.available2016-10-21T11:33:47Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10062/54246
dc.description.abstractMotivated by a commitment to protect sexual autonomy, Tom Dougherty (2013) has argued that deceiving someone into sex is seriously morally wrong whenever the deception concerns a deal breaker of the victim, i.e. a feature of the sexual encounter to which the other person's will is opposed. While I share both Dougherty's commitment to sexual autonomy and his misgivings about the permissibility of sexual deception, there are elements of his argumentation that require significant amendment if the commitment to upholding sexual autonomy is to be fulfilled. In this paper I argue that if Dougherty is to uphold his commitment to protecting sexual autonomy then he must, firstly, replace his preferred account of consent, which is an attitudinal account of consent that maintains that consent consists solely of the formation of the private intention to consent, with a performative account of consent that maintains that in addition to the formation of the private intention to consent, a communicative act is also required for consent. Secondly, I argue that the performative account of consent ought to be supplemented with a hyper-explicit definition of sexual consent.en
dc.description.urihttps://www.ester.ee/record=b5179175
dc.language.isoenet
dc.publisherTartu Ülikoolet
dc.subjectseksuaaleetikaet
dc.subjectDougherty, Tomet
dc.subjectseksuaalne autonoomiaet
dc.subjectpettuset
dc.subjectseksuaalne nõusoleket
dc.subject.othermagistritöödet
dc.titleSexual Deception and Sexual Consent: A Reply to Tom Doughertyen
dc.typeThesiset


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