Delegation and efficiency: comparison of Telecom Single Market negotiations under the Italian and Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU
Date
2017
Authors
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Journal ISSN
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Publisher
Tartu Ülikool
Abstract
This thesis aims to study why some Member States are more efficient in mediating the
negotiations during the Presidency of the Council of the European Union than others. To
fill the gap in current academic research, the emphasis is put on how the model of
coordination between the presiding country’s capital and Permanent Representation in
Brussels affects the performance of the Presidency. Rational choice institutionalism
provides the opportunity to conceptualise efficiency of the Presidency as the advancement
of the negotiations on a priority initiative, rather than protection of national preferences
as defined conventionally. The principal-agent model offers the necessary analytical tools
to examine different models of coordination for European Union policies. This theoretical
approach provides also the adequate analytical tools to study the link between model of
coordination and efficiency of the Presidency, leading to the hypothesis that Brusselsbased
Presidencies are more efficient in leading the negotiations on a priority initiative
than the Presidencies that have adopted capital-based models.
In the empirical part of the study qualitative comparative method is used to compare the
performance of Italian and Latvian Presidencies in advancing the negotiations on
Telecom Single Market proposal. The analysis of written documents and input from
interviews indicate quite clearly that Latvian Presidency was much more efficient in its
role as the mediator of the negotiations on this dossier. The findings also demonstrate that
there is significant variation in the adopted model of coordination. Whereas Italy opted
for a capital-based Presidency, Latvian Presidency was Brussels-based. To large extent
the assumptions presented in the theoretical part of the thesis were confirmed. The
Latvian Brussels-based Presidency was able to make decisions much faster and on spot,
whereas Italian Permanent Representation had to endure extensive interventions from the
capital, which made the progress slower. The findings also indicate that Latvian
Presidency was able to act as an “honest broker” and go beyond its national preferences
in order to reach a compromise. Additionally, it was confirmed that Brussels-based model
enables better cooperation with other actors due to higher level of trust. However, the
premise that the Brussels-based Presidency is more efficient due to better cooperation
with the Council Secretariat was not proven. All in all the findings of the study show that
the main hypothesis is correct and Brussels-based Presidencies are more efficient in
advancing the negotiations on priority initiative.