The effectiveness of economic sanctions: the case of Russia’s sanctions against Turkey
Date
2018
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Publisher
Tartu Ülikool
Abstract
The effectiveness of economic sanctions is one of the key issues in current debates in the International Relations (IR) literature on sanctions. A key aspect for the effectiveness of economic sanctions is how to transfer economic pain to coercive power, in particular, how the “sender” might wring concessions from the “recipient” or target, making sanctions an effective foreign policy tool. This study contributes to this debate by demonstrating the relevance of target country vulnerability. This study engages in this debate and explores the factors behind Turkey’s decision to make foreign policy concessions to Russia in the aftermath of a sharp deterioration of relations between two countries. After shooting down Russian SU-24 jet, the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia de facto broke down. In regard to this incident, Russia imposed a package of sanctions against Turkey and presented demands, only in case of fulfillment of which Kremlin was ready to restart dialogue with Turkey. Over seven months Ankara rejected to give in any demand required by Moscow, but later Turkish foreign policy behavior towards Russia drastically changed, since Erdogan made substantive foreign policy concessions for the restoration of relations between two countries. For explaining this turnaround in Turkish foreign policy, the mediating role of a target’s susceptibility to coercion – its vulnerability - is brought into view. What explains turnaround of Turkish foreign policy towards Russia is domestic instability and international isolation which intensified Turkey’s “vulnerability” to a high level and made it more susceptible to Russia’s economic pressure. This study establishes that economic sanctions become effective under the condition of high vulnerability which is a function of domestic instability and international isolation. In this way, this study demonstrates that economic sanctions alone do not determine the effectiveness, but have to be matched with a context in which the economic pain they inflict can also translate into political pressure.