On the implausibility of slow-switching arguments in establishing incompatibility thesis
Date
2019
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Tartu Ülikool
Abstract
Philosophers who argue that content externalism is incompatible with authoritative
self-knowledge usually employ one of the two arguments namely the slow-switching
argument and the reductio ad absurdum. Of these I focus on only the former which in itself
has two variants namely the content-switch (main argument) and the memory argument (a
variant). I argue against both the variants thereby denying that slow-switching arguments
succeed in establishing the incompatibility thesis.
It is long held that if a slow-switched agent (Oscar) were to stay long enough on
twin earth, his thought contents change unbeknownst to him. And it was reasoned that,
since Oscar is unaware of the changes in his mental contents and cannot spot when the
changes occurred, he does not have access to his own thought contents at all times, which
thereby leads to the conclusion that authoritative self-knowledge is incompatible with
externalism. In this thesis, I argue that, in cases like these, mental contents do not change
unknown to Oscar. I appeal to theories of concept acquisition to achieve this end. This
forms my attack on the main argument. And, as against the memory argument, I use two
strategies the first one of which is an extension of the previous argument applied to this
case; and the second strategy is to argue that memorial recollection depends on the past,
and not the present, environment and, if Oscar does not forget any relevant past stimuli, his
memorial contents upon recollection will not change. Having thus argued against both the
variants of the slow-switching arguments, I conclude that slow-switching arguments do not
succeed in establishing the incompatibility thesis.
Description
Keywords
philosophy