The discrepancy between free will and moral responsibility

Date

2019

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Tartu Ülikool

Abstract

Two radical views on free will (compatibilism and libertarianism) that share the claim that free will exists are discussed in this thesis. Both theories share a positive definition of freedom and describe moral responsibility as a necessary condition for free will. According to the first discussed theory, Strawsonian compatibilism, agents are free when they are an apt target of reactive attitudes, which are our natural reactions to one’s own good or ill will. Reactive attitudes are expressions of moral responsibility. Among the wide range of libertarians theories, I chose event-causal libertarianism, which claims that free will is the power to be ultimately responsible for one’s own actions, and this power is formed during exercises of self-forming actions. I tried to prove that there are reasons to interpret ultimate responsibility as moral responsibility. My claim is that the mentioned description of the relationships between free will and moral responsibility is wrong and should be replaced by “free will is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral responsibility”. This is based on the example of free but morally irrelevant action: consider the case where someone named Rick raises his hand in gym doing exercises. Libertarianism and Strawsonian compatibilism would not accept this action as free.

Description

Lõputöös on käsitletud kaht radikaalselt erinevat vaadet (kompatibilism ja libertarism), mis jagavad väidet, et vaba tahe eksisteerib. Peale ühtset sarnasust, mis puudutab vaba tahet, iseloomustab antud vaateid järgmine ühistunnus: vaba tahte vajaliku tingimusena esineb just moraalne vastutus. Vastavalt Strawsoniani kompatibilismi teooriale on inimene vaba, kui tema suhtes on kasutatavad reaktiivsed hoiakud – inimese loomulikud vastused vaba tahte väljandamisele. Paljude libertarismi teooriate hulgast oli minu poolt valitud sündmuse-põhjuslik libertarism, mis väidab, et vaba tahte olemus on võime olla lõpptulemusena vastutav enda tegevuse eest ja see võim moodustub ja saab areneda vaid eneseharjutamise tegevuste jooksul. Minu väide on, et mainitud vaba tahte ja moraalse vastutuse vaheliste suhete kirjeldus on vale ja seda tuleks muuta, asendades see järgmise väitega „Vaba tahe on vajalik, kuid see ei ole piisav moraalse vastutuse tagamiseks”. See sõnastus põhineb vabal, kuid moraalselt sobimatu tegevuse näitel: inimene, kelle nimi on Rick, tõstab käe jõusaalis ülesse, kus tehakse harjutusi.

Keywords

free will, moral responsibility, philosophy

Citation