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dc.contributor.advisorVázquez, María Jimena Clavel, juhendajaen
dc.contributor.authorQuershi, Waqar Ahsan
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkondet
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondet
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-29T08:29:34Z
dc.date.available2022-06-29T08:29:34Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.other20.03.01 QUE 01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10062/82861
dc.description.abstractAs we have learned in the state-of-the-art section about determinism (section 2.1) which basically says that if everything has a cause than our mental events should also have a prior cause, which means that we are not in control of our desires and they are the reason why we do anything and everything. On the other hand, compatibilism enters the debate with a solution that determinism poses. Which is that even if the universe is deterministic we can have free will if our mental faculties are in order and don’t malfunction.en
dc.description.urihttps://www.ester.ee/record=b5507743et
dc.language.isoenget
dc.publisherTartu Ülikoolet
dc.rightsopenAccesset
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectphilosophyen
dc.subjectfree willen
dc.subject.othermagistritöödet
dc.subject.otherfilosoofiaet
dc.subject.othertahtevabaduset
dc.titleWhy there is no free will and why compatibilism and its notion of free will is wrongen
dc.typeThesiset


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