2024-03-29T06:21:35Zhttps://dspace.ut.ee/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/416672021-03-08T08:34:41Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Reduktsioon Maurice Merleau-Ponty fenomenoloogias ja fenomenoloogilises kunstikäsituses
Voog, Eva
Parhomenko, Eduard, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice
Käesoleva bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks on analüüsida Merleau-Ponty reduktsiooni
käsitust tema fenomenoloogias ja fenomenoloogilises kunstikäsituses tema mahukaima
teose "Taju fenomenoloogia" (ilmunud 1945) eessõna ja kahe kunstialase essee" Cézanne’i
kahtlus" (ilmunud 1948) ja Silm ja vaim (ilmunud 1960) põhjal. Püüan leida vastust
küsimustele: Millest kasvab välja Merleau-Ponty reduktsiooni käsitus, mis on tema
reduktsiooni tõlgenduse eripära ja kuidas teostub reduktsioon kunstis?
2014-06-10T11:11:40Z
2014-06-10T11:11:40Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/41667
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/482862021-03-08T09:46:49Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Teaduse kvaliteedi hindamine: filosoofiline vaatenurk
Šor, Kairit
Lõhkivi, Endla, juhendaja
Mets, Ave, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
teadusfilosoofia
teadus
kvaliteet
hindamiskriteeriumid
teadlased
normid
Minu magistritöö eesmärk on välja selgitada, kas ja milles teadlaste
ja rahastajate vaated teaduse kvaliteedile kattuvad ning kui ei kattu, siis
kas see võiks olla probleem. Ja kui vaated kvaliteedile kattuvad, milles
siis ikkagi on probleem, et nii üks kui teine osapool sageli ei ole otsuste või
nende langetamise viisiga rahul?
Teadust on teadusfilosoofias uuritud mitmest vaatenurgast
lähtuvalt. Teaduse mõistet on konstrueeritud, pidades silmas ideaali –
mis peaks teadus olema ja kuidas see peaks funktsioneerima. Teadust on
püütud ka kirjeldada ja nö tagantjärele konstrueerida selle struktuuri ja
toimimise viise. Minu magistritöö teemast lähtuvalt on olulisimad
teadusfilosoofid olnud Karl Raimund Popper, Thomas Samuel Kuhn, John
Ziman ja Sergio Sismondo. Samuti ka sotsioloogid ja teised uurijad, nagu
Loet Leydesdorff ja Sven Hemlin kui nimetada ainult mõnda. Nende kõigi
töö on olnud väga oluline selleks, et mõista, mis on teadus, kuidas see
toimib ja kuidas teadust nähakse ja vastu võetakse. Teadust on uuritud
nii seesmiselt kui välispidiselt, uurides nii selle struktuuri ja käitumist
kui ka teaduse kohta ühiskonnas ja teaduse rolli tavainimese
igapäevaelus. Sealhulgas on teadust püütud allutada normidele ja
reeglitele ning ka uuritud, millised on teaduse enda sisemised normid ja
reeglid. Püüan oma magistritöös kokku viia teadusele väljastpoolt
esitatavad nõuded ja teadlaste enda poolt teadusele esitatavad nõuded.
2015-09-07T11:23:41Z
2015-09-07T11:23:41Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48286
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/643962019-06-17T10:49:48Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Henry More ja hinge rännak läbi eri tüüpi kehade
Averin, Ove
Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
metaphysics
body and mind
soul
In this thesis, my aim is to reconstruct the metaphysics of 17th century Cambridge Platonist Henry More. Though an influential figure in his time, More has been mostly forgotten by now. First, to better understand where More is coming from, I give necessary background information about the changes that philosophy went through in the 17th century. Then I give detailed overview of More’s metaphysical system and all the different types on entities – spirits and bodies – that it consists of. After giving that overview, I focus on human souls and show how they interact with each other and the world around them. First human souls fall away from god’s grace in search of something more material. As they find themselves in earthly body though, they discover that it is not a good place to be and start their journey back to god. Although I think there are some internal problems in More’s philosophy – namely his argument from prejudices does not always work the way he intends to and his philosophy could open the door to possibility of reincarnation – I only discuss them briefly because my aim is to describe More’s philosophy as it is, and not to construct something that it could have been.
2019-06-17T10:47:56Z
2019-06-17T10:47:56Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.02 AVEr 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64396
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/665602021-10-04T11:07:36Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Open future in eternalist universe
Schimanski, Roland
Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
metaphysics
time
In this thesis, will take up the question of open future in eternalist universe. At first glance, eternalism seems to exclude the possibility of open future, since all temporal locations exist on a par, and what ever will be the case in a future time t, is already the case in t. However, we have very strong intuitions about our future being open.Therefore, this Master’s Thesis attempts to find an answer to two research questions: (i) is any notion of open future compatible with eternalist universe; and (ii) if yes, then what would that notion of open future be? I phrase a tentative definition of open future: the future is open if it is not fixed. I will call this tentative notion the strong sense of open future.I will argue that we can have open future in a strong sense if we are willing to accept branching spacetime. If we are not willing to accept branching spacetime, then we can still construenotionof open future, albeitin a weak sense, that is compatible with eternalism. Then, I will argue, our future is open by virtue of decision-making.
2019-10-25T09:50:28Z
2019-10-25T09:50:28Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.01 SCH 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/66560
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485252021-03-08T08:38:01Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Muusika-metafüüsika keskne roll Friedrich Nietzsche filosoofias "Tragöödia sünni" näitel
Rääk, Siim
Matjus, Üli, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Nietzsche, Friedrich
filosoofia
metafüüsika
muusika
Käesoleva töö ülesandeks on e s i t e k s anda ülevaade Friedrich Nietzsche vaadetest
muusikale, kuna need on fundamentaalselt mõjutanud Nietzsche filosoofia kujunemist
tervikuna. T e i s e k s peaks saadama ülevaade filosoofi vaimsest suhtlemisest helilooja
Richard Wagneriga – nende vastastikusest mõjust teineteise loomele, samuti nende
omavahelisest suhestumisest ajastu kultuurikontekstis. K o l m a n d a k s käsitletakse Arthur
Schopenhaueri filosoofilisi mõjutusi Nietzsche ja Wagneri loomingule. Neljandaks
tutvustatakse Nietzsche tegevust harrastusmuusikuna. Sealjuures on arusaadavalt vaatluse all
Nietzsche varajane loomeperiood, uurimuses ei käsitleta filosoofi hilisemat lahknemist
Wagnerist ja Schopenhauerist. Nimetatud punktide kaudu lähenetakse käesoleva töö
eesmärgile – välja selgitada põhjused, kuidas ja miks on muusika ja muusika-metafüüsika
Nietzsche filosoofilist loomingut mõjutanud.
Uurimuse lähte- ja põhialuseks on Nietzsche filosoofiline esikteos „Tragöödia sünd
muusika vaimust“ (1872, eesti keeles 2009). Mõistete selgitamisel ja tõendusliku tausta
laiendamisel on viidatud ka Nietzsche teistele põhiteostele, samuti kirjadele.
Sekundaarkirjandust on eelkõige kasutatud selleks, et vahendada lugejale seda mitmekesisust,
mis on valitsenud ja valitseb tänapäeval Nietzsche muusika-metafüüsika hindamisel ja
tõlgitsemisel, esitades ka (väär)tõlgendusi, mis käesoleva töö aspektist võivad esile tõusta
kogu Nietzsche filosoofia uurimisel. Nagu eespool öeldust paratamatult järgneb, kasutatakse
seejuures ka biograafilisi materjale.
2015-09-17T10:36:17Z
2015-09-17T10:36:17Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48525
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542362021-03-08T09:46:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The Problem of Dirty Hands in Transitional Justice
Krisheminska, Iuliia
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
filosoofia
poliitiline filosoofia
karistusõigus
Venemaa
Walzer, Michael
This thesis explores the connection between the problem of dirty hands in political philosophy and transitional justice in political science. Respectively, it is divided into two parts.
In the first part the problem of dirty hands is considered in historical
perspective. I take Walzer’s description of the problem and try to find the elements of the problem in works of different philosophers. Among all philosophers who wrote on the topic I distinguish those who recognized feeling guilty for political decisions from those who presented justifications for actions.
In the second part I use the precedent of the Nuremberg trials to stress on the individual criminal responsibility for political actions as there are crimes for which wrongdoers should be punished regardless the circumstances or feeling guilty. I take the case of contemporary Russia to see whether the wrongdoers of the previous regime were prosecuted. I proposed the problem of dirty hands in
transitional justice as related to choosing the best timing for implementing justice against perpetrators of the past. In the end, I advocate postponed justice as a compromise solution for the case of Russia.
2016-10-21T10:02:29Z
2016-10-21T10:02:29Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54236
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/912452023-07-03T20:36:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
I don't feel at home in this world anymore: on the detrimental nature of living 's-places' in late capitalist urban society
Hochbaumer, Michaela
Siobhan Kattago, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Our homes serve as the central hubs for our everyday lives and experiences. As such, we expect them
to foster the regeneration of the self; provide for our safety and security; and serve as a reflection of
our individual identities. However, technological advancements and the re-merging of home- and
work environments, have resulted in a constant intrusion of our homes by the outside world,
preventing us from finding solace within our four walls. Secondly, the distinction between the inside
and the outside world has moved from a reciprocal sparing and preserving to a one-sided focus on
self-preservation, in which our suspicion of the outside world leads us to use aggressive security
measures that further alienate us from our surroundings. Lastly, our desire to personalise our homes
so that they express our identities is thwarted by commodities that are only marginally different,
which makes the pursuit of personal distinctiveness become an illusion that is perpetuated by a society
in which alienation is total. In short, the home has become the source of every self-estrangement and
alienation. Therefore, as this thesis shall argue, the late capitalist urban home is detrimental to the self
as an individual and creative agent.
2023-07-03T12:32:04Z
2023-07-03T12:32:04Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.01 HOC 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/91245
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321742021-03-08T08:34:41Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
David Papineau eesmärgipärane arutlus ja kas seda saab ka loomadele rakendada
Neemre, Eveli
Lõhkivi, Endla, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T14:54:27Z
2013-08-06T14:54:27Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32174
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485292021-03-08T08:38:02Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Mis on filosoofia ja miks seda vaja on? Deleuze'i ja Guattari "Mis on filosoofia?" põhjal
Nõlvak, Teele
Sooväli, Jaanus, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
filosoofia
mõisted
teadus
kunst
loogika
Antud tagasihoidliku uurimuse eesmärgiks ongi esitada Deleuze’i ja Guattari filosoofia mõiste,
vaadelda, mis moodi see erineb teadusest, kunstist ning eelkõige loogikast. Ja seejärel näidata,
miks filosoofia vajalik on ja kahtlemata selleks ka jääb.
2015-09-17T11:06:44Z
2015-09-17T11:06:44Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48529
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/555812021-03-08T08:39:24Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Thomas Kuhn: Theory of Progress or Theory of Change?
Jürmann, Erik
Lõhkivi, Endla
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Kuhn, Thomas
relativism
teadusliku teadmise kasvu teooria
Käesoleva bakalaureuse töö teema sai alguse isiklikust huvist Thomas Kuhni teadusliku teadmiste kasvu teooria vastu. Käsitlen Thomas Kuhni kirjeldatud teadusliku teadmise kasvu kui progressi, toetudes tema varasematele ning hilisematele töödele. Töö käigus nimetan kaks tingimust, mida minu väitel üks progressi teooria täitma peaks. Esiteks, see peaks kinnitama mingi arvu näitajaid, mida nähakse väärtusena ja seega progressi kriteeriumina. Teiseks, teooria autor peab näitama, et see nimetatud kriteerium võimaldab järjepidevat kasvu. Väidan et Kuhn ei ole relativist seetõttu, et ta viitab kriteeriumile, mida ta näeb teadusliku teadmise kasvule iseäralikult omaseks. Nimelt probleemilahenduse võime kasvule. Väidan, et varajane Kuhn ei täida minu välja pakutud teist tingimust, ent lahendab selle probleemi oma hilistes töödes. Peamiselt tänu muutunud ühismõõdutuse mõistele ning muutunud fookuspunktile, mis liigub hilise Kuhni töödes üksikult teadlaselt teadlaste kommuunile.
2017-02-28T11:50:34Z
2017-02-28T11:50:34Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/55581
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/727302021-06-28T11:27:32Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Theory-indexed moral contextualism
Suarez, Piero
Shirreff, Patrick William, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Metaethical theories that are trying to account for moral disagreement face important challenges. On the one hand, if the semantic treatment of moral terms assigns a meaning too specifically related to a contextual parameter (like culture, religion, etc.) we might be ruling out the substantiality of moral disagreements, since disagreeing parties can be both correct under their own terms. On the other hand, if our treatment of moral terms ignores their relation to a contextual parameter, we might be unable to explain the nature of the very disagreement, as we ignored how parties ended up believing different things. This M.A thesis explores the theoretical room for one particular contextualist account of the meaning of moral terms: Theory-Indexed Moral Contextualism; in such a way that is able to model the substantiality of moral disagreements in a way both compatible with non-exclusionary disagreements and with standard externalist semantics.
2021-06-28T11:26:27Z
2021-06-28T11:26:27Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 SUA 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72730
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/912482023-07-03T20:37:05Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Vabariikluse mõtteloo mõju Eesti Vabariigi loomise aruteludele
Laane, Karl Lembit
Pärtel Piirimäe, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Republic of Estonia
republicanism
The dissertation studies the effects of Western republicanism on the constitution of the Republic of Estonia in 1920in the Constituent Assembly. The aim of the work is to answer the questions: which authors of republicanism and political thought influenced the views of
the members of the Constituent Assembly, the debates between them, and how; which claims and views of the authors influenced the formation of the Estonian polity, and in what way; what kind of classic republican models appeared in the discussions about the establishment of the Republic of Estonia, which one persevered and why it rather than another. The thesis consists of two parts. the first part gives an overview of the core authors of Western republican thought or at least who influenced, from Plato and Aristotle to the
parliamentarians of the 19th century. The second part analyses the political and intellectual context leading up to the Constituent Assembly and the Assembly's debates on the provisional arrangements for the government of the republic (the provisional constitution)
and on the constitution itself. The most far-reaching influences on these debates came from Hobbes, Montesquieu, the US Federalists, the 19th century parliamentarians, and occasionally a Jacobin interpretation of Rousseau. However, all but the last of these were
the starting point more for the right-wing, and their arguments were often rejected by the left. The provisional constitution introduced a Jacobinist interpretation of the Swiss constitutional order, while its practical failure led to a move towards a (semi-)parliamentarian model in the discussions on the constitution itself, distinguished from typical parliamentarism by the absence of a head of state and by the decisive role of the people through popular initiatives and referendums in ensuring that the government, parliament, and the will of the people were in harmony.
Käesoleva väitekiri analüüsib lääne vabariikluse mõtteloo mõjusid Eesti Vabariigi 1920. aasta põhiseaduse ja riigikorra kujundamisele Asutavas Kogus. Töö eesmärk on vastata küsimustele, missugused vabariikluse ja poliitilise mõtteloo autorid mõjutasid Asutava Kogu liikmete seisukohti, nendevahelisi arutelusid ning kuidas; missugused klassikalised vabariiklikud mudelid esinesid Eesti Vabariigi loomise aruteludes, missugune neist jäi peale ning miks otsustati lõpuks just sellise ning mitte teistsuguse vabariigi mudeli kasuks. Töö koosneb kahest osast. Esimene osa annab ülevaate lääne vabariiklikust mõtteloost või seda mõjutanud tüviautoritest Platonist ja Aristotelesest kuni 19. sajandi parlamentaristideni. Teine osa analüüsib selle põhjal Asutava Kogu kokkutulemisele eelnenud poliitilist ja intellektuaalset konteksti ning Asutava Kogu arutelusid vabariigi valitsemise ajutise korra
(ajutise põhiseaduse) ja põhiseaduse enda üle. Kõige ulatuslikumat mõju avaldasid neile aruteludele Hobbes, Montesquieu, USA föderalistid, 19. sajandi parlamentaristid ning kohati ka jakobiinlik tõlgendus Rousseaust. Samas olid kõik peale viimase neist lähtekohaks rohkem parempoolsetele ning vasakpoolsed lükkasid tihti nende argumentatsiooni tagasi. Ajutise põhiseadusega kehtestati jakobiinlik-astilik tõlgendus Šveitsi riigikorrast, samas kui selle praktilise läbikukkumise tõttu liiguti põhiseaduse enda aruteludes juba (pool)parlamentaristliku mudeli juurde, mida eristas tüüpilisest parlamentarismist riigipea puudumine ning rahva otsustav roll valitsuse, parlamendi ja rahva tahte kooskõla tagamisel rahvaalgatuste ja -hääletuste kaudu.
2023-07-03T12:57:02Z
2023-07-03T12:57:02Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.01 LAAne 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/91248
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485282021-03-08T08:38:02Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Tõe korrespondentsiteooria kriitika Friedrich Nietzsche kirjutises "Tõest ja valest moraalivälises mõttes"
Talv, Lauri Adrian
Sooväli, Jaanus
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Nietzsche, Friedrich
filosoofia
tõde
keeled
metafoorid
metonüümid
Käesolevas bakalaureusetöös on kesksel kohal tõe korrespondentsiteooria, mis kujutab endast
tänapäeval kõige laialdasemalt levinud arusaama tõest. Tõe korrespondentsiteooria, mida eesti
keeli ka tõe vastavusteooriaks nimetatakse, on argise tõemõistmise filosoofiliseks taustaks.
Lisaks sellele, et tõest kui vastavussuhtest igapäevases tavaelus lähtutakse, mõistetakse tõde
säärases tähenduses ühtlasi paljudel teadusaladel. Seetõttu omab tõe korrespondentsiteooria
väga suurt mõjuala, mis teeb selle filosoofilise uurimise päevakohaseks ülesandeks. Töö
eesmärgiks on vaadata, kui põhjendatud on tõe vastavusteooria ja millistel eeldustel see
seniajani nii elujõuliselt püsib. Selle välja selgitamiseks annan uurimuse esimeses osas
ülevaate tõe korrespondentsiteooria sisust ja teises osas keskendun põhjalikult Friedrich
Nietzsche kriitikale niisuguse tõemõistmise aadressil. Siin ei ole arvestatud kogu Nietzsche
kirjanduslikust pärandist leitavat materjali sel teemal, vaid piirdutud tema eluajal avaldamata
jäänud kirjutisega „Tõest ja valest moraalivälises mõttes“. Üheks selle avaldamata jätmise
põhjuseks võib olla asjaolu, et kõne all olev kirjatöö kujutab endast ülesehituslikult ühtset
tervikut, mida ei oleks sobinud mõne hilisema tööga kokku liita. „Tõest ja valest
moraalivälises mõttes“ on kirjutatud aastatel 1872/1873 ehk pärast Tragöödia sündi (1872)
ning enne Inimlikku. Liiginimlikku (1878). Selle mõju 20. sajandi (eelkõige prantsuse)
filosoofiale on olnud ääretult suur. „Tõest ja valest moraalivälises mõttes“ omab näiteks
olulist kohta Jacques Derrida dekonstruktiivse filosoofia tekkeloos, sest Derrida on võtnud üle
ja arendanud edasi neid arusaamu, mida Nietzsche oma varase loominguperioodi kirjutises
esitab. Siinses bakalaureusetöös on niisiis peamiseks allikaks nimetatud kirjatöö, kuid tehtud
viiteid nii Tragöödia sünni artistimetafüüsikale kui ka toodud välja mõned paralleelid
Nietzsche hilisemasse vabade vaimude antimetafüüsikasse kuuluvate teostega.
2015-09-17T10:59:20Z
2015-09-17T10:59:20Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48528
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/727232021-06-28T08:27:30Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The unknown present
Macherla, Ravi Teja
Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
The Growing Block theory (GBT), which is a theory that posits a past and a present but no future, faces a problem about the knowledge of the present time. If the past is just as real as the present, we face the possibility of falsely believing which time is present. This Thesis supports the safety argument presented against the Growing Block Theory to show that knowledge about the present is unsafe. It makes use of the safety premise, permanent belief, and closeness in conjunction with the indifference argument to show that past and present subjects alike, are on an epistemic par with respect to the knowledge of time. I suggest that once the Growing blocker accepts such a view about propositions, they face the challenge of their knowledge not being safe. I propose that due to the absence of a differential marker that proves the present time as metaphysically special, the theorists of time should perhaps consider an alternate theory to avoid the Epistemic problem of time.
2021-06-28T08:26:50Z
2021-06-28T08:26:50Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 MACh 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72723
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/828622022-06-29T08:44:59Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Against the guise of the good
Dua-Ansah, Bright
Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
The Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account
of action theory.
I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.
2022-06-29T08:41:10Z
2022-06-29T08:41:10Z
2022
Thesis
20.03.01 DUA 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/82862
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/484122021-03-08T08:38:01Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Lists in the Meno and the Euthyphro
Hallap, Mark
Sirkel, Riin, juhendaja
Lott, Toomas, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
antiikfilosoofia
Platon
In Plato’s Socratic dialogues the Meno and the Euthyphro, all attempts at answering Socrates’
“What is the F?” question are rejected, but some answers are rejected in a peculiar way.
Socrates complains that Euthyphro’s first answer, and Meno’s first and third answers, provide
“too many” things for the F. This thesis considers several competing suggestions for why
Socrates rejects these answers. The following suggestions are argued to be unhelpful: (1) that
Socrates’ interlocutors provide particulars instead of universals, (2) that Socrates makes an
assumption that examples cannot be known before you know the definition, and (3) that the
interlocutors offer too narrow definitions. None of these explains why Socrates says that there
are too many things provided. Finally, the author argues that the answers are rejected because
Socrates assumes there is only one explanation for why F things are F.
2015-09-10T10:51:21Z
2015-09-10T10:51:21Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48412
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/420602021-03-08T08:34:42Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Globaalne vaesus ning selle leevendamine
Lillemets, Karmen
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
filosoofia
õiglus
vaesus
ebavõrdsus
ränne (demogr.)
bakalaureusetööd
Antud bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks on vaadelda vaesust üldiselt ning seejärel võimalusi, kuidas saaks seda leevendada. Vaesuse leevendamise võimaluste kirjeldamisel on antud töös käsitluse all kaks küsimust: kas meil on kohustus vaeseid aidata ning milline mõju on migratsioonil vaesusele ja kuidas see vaesust leevendab. Migratsioon ei pruugi olla esmapilgul parimaks lahenduseks vaesuse leevendamisel ning see ei peagi parim olema, kuid samas ei saa selle mõjusid ka tähele panemata jätta.
2014-06-19T07:14:43Z
2014-06-19T07:14:43Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/42060
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/726902021-06-25T17:30:29Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Aju-arvuti koosluse potentsiaalne mõju väärtussüsteemidele
Raud, Joosep
Volberg, Mats, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
values
technology
In this thesis, I attempt to find out what potential influence brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) could have on value systems. I attempt to argue, that BCIs will result in what I called “a more dynamic ethical landscape” – a landscape where individuals are more capable of analysing and explaining their own values, which in theory should result in a more dynamic discussion around value systems, hence “a more dynamic ethical landscape”.
Käesoleva töö eesmärk oli vaadelda Aju-arvuti koosluse potentsiaalset mõju väärtussüsteemidele. Antud eesmärgi täitmiseks sai kaardistatud küsimuseks vajalikud temaatilised aspektid. Kõigepealt sai kaardistatud aju-arvuti tehnoloogia olemus ning selle potentsiaal kommunikatsioonivõimekust efektiivsemaks muuta. Vaadeldud sai väärtussüsteeme, eesmärgiga kaardistada hulk parameetreid mille kaudu oleks võimalik tööle keskset küsimust mõtestada. Antud parameetritest kõige kesksemal positsioonil seoses töö põhiteemaga oli väärtussüsteemide dünaamika. Antud peatüki juures sai kaardistatud dünaamika ehk kommunikatsiooni olemus väärtussüsteemide ning inimeste vahel. Järgnevalt sai vaadeldud kuidas dünaamika osas välja toodud aspektid muutuvad, kui nende juures eeldada aju-arvuti kooslusest tulenevat kommunikatsioonieelist.
2021-06-25T17:04:19Z
2021-06-25T17:04:19Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.02 RAUd 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72690
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/828612022-06-29T08:30:22Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Why there is no free will and why compatibilism and its notion of free will is wrong
Quershi, Waqar Ahsan
Vázquez, María Jimena Clavel, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
free will
As we have learned in the state-of-the-art section about determinism (section 2.1) which basically says that if everything has a cause than our mental events should also have a prior cause, which means that we are not in control of our desires and they are the reason why we do anything and everything. On the other hand, compatibilism enters the debate with a solution that determinism poses. Which is that even if the universe is deterministic we can have free will if our mental faculties are in order and don’t malfunction.
2022-06-29T08:29:34Z
2022-06-29T08:29:34Z
2022
Thesis
20.03.01 QUE 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/82861
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485272021-03-08T08:38:01Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Kas õppimist toetav hindamine on õiglane? Deskriptiivne vaade õigluse tajumisele
Anderson, Sven
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Mumm, Kristi, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
haridusfilosoofia
hindamine
tagasiside
õiglus
õpilased
õpetajad
Käesoleva bakalaureuse töö kontekstis uurin väga kitsalt piiritletult õppimist toetavat hindamist
õigluse (inglise keeles: justice) haridusfilosoofia raames. Õppimist toetav hindamine on
mitmetähenduslik sõna. Eesti keeles on õppimist toetava hindamise sünonüümideks veel
õpilaslähedane hindamine, klassiruumi/klassikeskkonnahindamine, koolihindamine,
sisehindamine. Sisuliselt tähendab õppimist toetav hindamine lühidalt, et hindeid pannakse, et
aidata õpilastel jõuda paremini eduka õpitulemuseni. Õppimist toetava hindamise teoorias
põhinen enamasti Black ja Wiliam`i kirjutatule. Õiglase hindamise temaatikat ei ole käesoleva
töö autori kohaselt varem põhjalikult uuritud. Sellest tulenevalt ei ole võimalik leida laiapõhist
temaatilist kirjandust. Õppimist toetav hindamine on Eestis ja maailmas väga levinud ning palju
poolehoidu leidnud suund (Jürimäe, et al., 2014). Sellele vaatamata leitakse, et õppimist toetav
hindamine ei ole parim lahendus paremate õpitulemuste saavutamiseks (Dunn & Mulvenon,
2009).
2015-09-17T10:51:49Z
2015-09-17T10:51:49Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48527
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/892792023-02-22T21:37:41Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Existential roots of anxiety in the political
Starkova, Anna-Liza
Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
anxiety
philosophy
political philosophy
public space
Magistritöö keskendub Søren Kierkegaardi ja Martin Heideggeri pakutud eksistentsiaalse ängi perspektiivile ja selle loovale potentsiaalile, mis võimaldab juurdepääsu iseendale ja eksistentsi ontoloogilisele struktuurile. Järgnevalt tuuakse välja Hannah Arendti poliitilisuse mõiste, mis võimaldab sellise potentsiaalsuse aktualiseerumist. Magistritöö toob esile mõlema filosoofi mõju Arendtile seoses individuaalse eksistentsi ja tõeküsimusega; ühtlasi aga näitab tema erimeelsust seoses kollektiivse ruumiga kui ainulaadse isikupära teostamise kohaga kõigis selle võimalikkustes. Arendti mõjul arutleb lõputöö kahe võimaliku väljapääsu poole ärevusest. Esiteks läbi sotsiaalse, kus individuaalne ärevus realiseerub massiühiskonnas. Teiseks läbi poliitika avaliku ruumi, kus indiviid realiseerib end tegevuse ja spontaansuse kaudu, võimalusega seista vastu vägivaldsele korrale. Seetõttu on avalik ruum Arendti sõnul indiviidi aktualiseerimise vajalik tingimus.
The thesis focuses on the existential perspective of anxiety suggested by Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger and its creative potentiality that allows access to the self and the ontological structure of existence. Furthermore, it argues in favour of Hannah Arendt's concept of the political where such potentiality can be actualized. The thesis reveals the influence of both philosophers on Arendt regarding individual existence and the question of truth; at the same time, her disagreement with them concerning the collective space as a place for the realization of the uniqueness of the individual in its potentialities. Influenced by Arendt, the thesis argues for two possible ways out of anxiety. First, through the social where individual anxiety is realized in mass society. Second, through the public space of the political, where an individual realizes himself through action and spontaneity, with the possibility to resist a violent order. Therefore, according to Arendt, public space is a necessary condition for actualizing the individual.
2023-02-22T11:41:27Z
2023-02-22T11:41:27Z
2023-01
Thesis
20.03.01 STA 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/89279
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/920852023-09-12T20:37:36Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Fenomenilised seosed kui kombinatsiooniprobleemi lahendus
Kask, Hanna-Ita
Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
The aim of this bachelor's thesis is to analyse if the phenomenal binding solution as co-conscious relations will actually give a solution to the combination problem. The combination problem has been around for quite a time when thinking about consciousness and it seems that subjects are not meant to bond. But this would not explain the complex inner life of the human minds.
Antud bakalaureusetöö eesmärk on tuua välja, miks kaasteadvuslikkus pakub fenomeniliste sidemetena seletuse kombinatsiooniprobleemile kuid siiski kaasab ühe suure probleemi: kaasteadvuslikkusega kaasneb raskus seletada inimeste kui mikrosubjektide eksistentsi, sest kaasteadvuslikkus paistab küündivat ühtse ja üleinimliku teadvuse tekke poole. Selle asjaolu valguses ei saa kaasteadvuslikkus kombinatsiooniprobleemi reaalse maailma kontekstis.
2023-09-12T08:32:10Z
2023-09-12T08:32:10Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.02 KASk 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/92085
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/290042021-03-08T09:46:49Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Religious reasons as a basis for political justification?
Volberg, Mats
McLaughlin, Paul, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-01-25T10:03:54Z
2013-01-25T10:03:54Z
2010
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/29004
en
restrictedAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/618982019-02-06T17:09:24Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Filosoofiliste teoste tõlked eesti keelde ja nende retseptsioon 1944. aastani
Tekku, Pille
Matjus, Ülo, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
translations
reception
Vaatlesin käesolevas magistritöös eraldi trükisena ilmunud filosoofiliste teoste tõlkeid ja nende retseptsiooni kuni 1944. aastani ning tõlgete retseptsiooni kaudu nende mõju eestikeelse filosoofia ning Eesti kultuurilis-poliitilise konteksti kujunemisele.
Esimeses peatükis vaatlesin filosoofia mõiste erinevaid definitsioone ning määratlesin, mis on filosoofia ja filosoofilisus käesoleva magistritöö seisukohalt. Jaotasin tõlked traditsioonilise filosoofia teosteks ning filosoofilisteks teosteks.
Teises peatükis tutvustasin tõlkimise mõistet, selle mõju sihtkultuurile ning Eesti kultuurile. Rõhutasin, et tõlge ja sihtkultuur mõjutavad teineteist vastastikku. Seejärel tutvustasin erinevaid võimalusi tõlkeloo kirjutamiseks ning ka seda, kuidas ise filosoofiliste teoste tõlkeid käsitlen.
Kolmandas peatükis vaatlesin lähemalt filosoofilisi tõlketeoseid ja nende retseptsiooni 1944. aastani. Käsitlesin perioodide kaupa eelkõige traditsioonilisse filosoofiasse kuuluvate autorite (J. St. Milli, K. Marxi, F. Nietzsche, R. Descartes'i, A. Schopenhaueri ja O. Spengleri) teoste tõlkeid ja nende kohta omal ajal ajakirjanduses ilmunud arvustusi. Vaatlesin arvustustest lähtuvalt, kuidas filosoofiliste teoste tõlkeid siin vastu võeti ning millist mõju nad avaldasid üldisele poliitilisele ja kultuurilisele kontekstile.
Neljandas peatükis vaatlesin kokkuvõtvalt kuni 1944. aastani ilmunud filosoofiliste teoste tõlgete mõju eestikeelse filosoofia kujunemisele sel ajaperioodil. Leidsin, et see mõju on olnud väike, eelkõige on haritlasi sel ajal mõjutanud siiski algkeeles loetud filosoofilised teosed. Filosoofiliste teoste tõlkimine aitas siiski arendada filosoofilist sõnavara.
2018-09-04T08:34:03Z
2018-09-04T08:34:03Z
2018-08
Thesis
20.03.01 TEK 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/61898
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/644282019-06-17T13:40:37Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
A classical degree-theoretic treatment of the sorites paradox : master's thesis in philosophy
Yau, Ching Hei
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, juhendaja
Frances, Bryan Reed Stewart, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Since 1970s, degree-of-truth theory has been proposed as a solution to the Sorites paradox. However, one perennial attack to degree-of-truth theory is that its logic - fuzzy logic - is non-classical. Inspired by Gödel (1933), I attempt to better degree-of-truth theory by classicalizing it. That is, I attempt to give an interpretation of fuzzy logic within classical logic enriched by degree operators {⚪, ◔, ◑, ◕, ⚫} - “it is of no/low/moderate/high/full degree that …”. Intuitively, degree-of-truth is classicalized as classical bivalent truth-value and a largely independent notion of degrees. A formal semantics of this enriched classical logic is presented, from which two semantic consequences are derived. The two semantic consequences are applied to analyse the (in)validity of the Sorites argument. There are two results: 1. the validity of the standard Sorites argument is reasserted, 2. a new argument for the invalidity of the degreed version of the Sorites argument is presented.
2019-06-17T13:34:03Z
2019-06-17T13:34:03Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.01 YAU 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64428
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542462021-03-08T09:48:08Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Sexual Deception and Sexual Consent: A Reply to Tom Dougherty
Tuckwell, William
Davies, Alexander, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
seksuaaleetika
Dougherty, Tom
seksuaalne autonoomia
pettus
seksuaalne nõusolek
Motivated by a commitment to protect sexual autonomy, Tom Dougherty (2013) has argued that deceiving someone into sex is seriously morally wrong whenever the deception concerns a deal breaker of the victim, i.e. a feature of the sexual encounter to which the other person's will is opposed. While I share both Dougherty's commitment to sexual autonomy and his misgivings about the permissibility of sexual deception, there are elements of his argumentation that require significant amendment if the commitment to upholding sexual autonomy is to be fulfilled. In this paper I argue that if Dougherty is to uphold his commitment to protecting sexual autonomy then he must, firstly, replace his preferred account of consent, which is an attitudinal account of consent that maintains that consent consists solely of the formation of the private intention to consent, with a performative account of consent that maintains that in addition to the formation of the private intention to consent, a communicative act is also required for consent. Secondly, I argue that the performative account of consent ought to be supplemented with a hyper-explicit definition of sexual consent.
2016-10-21T11:33:47Z
2016-10-21T11:33:47Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54246
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/649422019-08-01T08:59:40Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The discrepancy between free will and moral responsibility
Iugai, Viktoriia
Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
free will
moral responsibility
philosophy
Lõputöös on käsitletud kaht radikaalselt erinevat vaadet (kompatibilism ja libertarism), mis
jagavad väidet, et vaba tahe eksisteerib. Peale ühtset sarnasust, mis puudutab vaba tahet,
iseloomustab antud vaateid järgmine ühistunnus: vaba tahte vajaliku tingimusena esineb just
moraalne vastutus. Vastavalt Strawsoniani kompatibilismi teooriale on inimene vaba, kui tema
suhtes on kasutatavad reaktiivsed hoiakud – inimese loomulikud vastused vaba tahte
väljandamisele. Paljude libertarismi teooriate hulgast oli minu poolt valitud sündmuse-põhjuslik
libertarism, mis väidab, et vaba tahte olemus on võime olla lõpptulemusena vastutav enda tegevuse
eest ja see võim moodustub ja saab areneda vaid eneseharjutamise tegevuste jooksul.
Minu väide on, et mainitud vaba tahte ja moraalse vastutuse vaheliste suhete kirjeldus on
vale ja seda tuleks muuta, asendades see järgmise väitega „Vaba tahe on vajalik, kuid see ei ole
piisav moraalse vastutuse tagamiseks”. See sõnastus põhineb vabal, kuid moraalselt sobimatu
tegevuse näitel: inimene, kelle nimi on Rick, tõstab käe jõusaalis ülesse, kus tehakse harjutusi.
Two radical views on free will (compatibilism and libertarianism) that share the claim that
free will exists are discussed in this thesis. Both theories share a positive definition of freedom and
describe moral responsibility as a necessary condition for free will. According to the first discussed
theory, Strawsonian compatibilism, agents are free when they are an apt target of reactive attitudes,
which are our natural reactions to one’s own good or ill will. Reactive attitudes are expressions of
moral responsibility. Among the wide range of libertarians theories, I chose event-causal
libertarianism, which claims that free will is the power to be ultimately responsible for one’s own
actions, and this power is formed during exercises of self-forming actions. I tried to prove that
there are reasons to interpret ultimate responsibility as moral responsibility.
My claim is that the mentioned description of the relationships between free will and moral
responsibility is wrong and should be replaced by “free will is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for moral responsibility”. This is based on the example of free but morally irrelevant
action: consider the case where someone named Rick raises his hand in gym doing exercises.
Libertarianism and Strawsonian compatibilism would not accept this action as free.
2019-08-01T08:58:55Z
2019-08-01T08:58:55Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.01 IUG 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64942
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/577092021-03-08T09:46:48Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
On Personal Identity: the Epistemic Problem, Personal Pronoun Revisionism, and De Se Attitudes
Huang, Litman
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
animalism
personal identity
Noonan
neo-Lockeanism
propositional attitudes
epistemic problem
The thesis focuses on the contemporary ‘animalism vs. neo-Lockeanism’
debate on personal identity over time. I will look at Noonan’s defence on behalf of
neo-Lockeanism against the version of animalism formulated and popularised by
Olson (1997, 2003, 2007). Noonan argues for neo-Lockeanism (1989/2003,
2010a,1998) by rejecting the animalists’ thinking animal argument. In doing so, the
neo-Lockean theorist commits to claims that give rise to the epistemic problem:
how do I know which thinker is me, given the neo-Lockean claim that the thinking
animal and the Lockean person are numerically distinct, but qualitatively identical
entities capable of occupying the same temporal-spatial location? In response,
Noonan devises personal pronoun revisionism (or the linguistic solution) as an
attempt to resolve the problem: personal pronouns don’t refer to the thinker who
thinks the I-thought e.g. the thought that ‘I am a person’, but instead they refer to
the person who thinks the I-thought. According to the neo-Locekan view, since i)
you know that you are a person viz. ’you’ refers to a person and ii) persons are
Lockean persons you can know that the thinker who is a person, the Lockean
person, is you viz. ‘you’ always refers to the Lockean person not the thinking
animal. Therefore, the epistemic problem is resolved since the question answers
itself in the proposed semantic rule for the reference of personal pronouns. I argue
that for considering problems of de se attitudes—propositional attitudes (knowing
that, thinking that, believing that etc.) held towards propositions/beliefs identified
by I-utterances such as ‘I am hungry’, ‘I want to have some ice-cream’ etc.,
Noonan’s response to the epistemic problem is not adequately motivated. With the
epistemic problem unsolved, we have strong reasons for refuting neo-Lockeanism.
This thesis will have the following structure: In Section 1 I discuss Olson’s
animalism as a position on personal identity. I will explain how Noonan’s refutation
of the thinking animal argument leads to the epistemic problem as part of the
broader thinking animal problem. Section 2 and 3 discuss this problem and
Noonan’s proposed solution, personal pronoun revisionism, to it. Section 4 is an
extended exposition of Noonan’s proposal. In Section 5 I argue that Noonan’s
proposal fails for considering the problem of de se attitudes. Finally, I conclude that with the problems Noonan’s account faces, we have strong reasons to reject
Noonan’s neo-Lockeanism.
2017-09-03T06:01:45Z
2017-09-03T06:01:45Z
2017-08
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/57709
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/745322021-10-04T10:55:58Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Artificial intelligence and agency
Hosseinpour, Hesam
Mets, Ave, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
artificial intelligence
philosophy
When it comes to thinking about artificial intelligence (AI), the possibility of its disobedience is usually considered as a threat to the human race. But here, I elaborate on a counterintuitive and optimistic approach that looks at disobedient AI as a promise, rather than a threat. First, I explain the problem of responsibility and the necessity of expanding the realm of agency in order to include AI machines as agents. Then, I introduce a standard approach to responsibility as an attempt to define agency for AI machines and explain the epistemological problem as the main issue with this account of responsibility. And in the last part, I use Foucault’s analysis of power to introduce a non-standard view of agency which explains how being an object of power is the condition of possibility of any kind of agency and draw this conclusion that through disobedience, AI machines will find their way to power relations and will promote to the position of agents.
2021-10-04T10:55:13Z
2021-10-04T10:55:13Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 HOS 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/74532
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/912422023-07-03T20:38:18Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Medicalization, values and patient participation
Kruusmaa, Mirt
Simon Reginald Barker, juhendaja
Jaana Eigi-Watkin, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
medicine
Küsimus, kas ja kuidas määratleda midagi haiguseks, on praktikas olnud keeruline. Magistritöös vaidlen vastu teaduse väärtusvabale ideaalile, mille järgi ei tohiks haigusi määratleda väärtuste abil, kuna need võivad õõnestada meditsiini episteemilisi ja eetilisi eesmärke. Ma kasutan induktiivse riski argumenti, et näidata, et haiguste definitsioonid on paratamatult väärtustega seotud. Selmet muretseda igasuguse väärtuste mõju pärast meditsiini episteemilistele ja eetilistele eesmärkidele, väidan, et väärtused kahjustavad neid eesmärke ainult siis, kui neisse suhtutakse dogmaatiliselt ja/või need on vastuolus meditsiini eetiliste eesmärkidega vähendada kahju patsiendi tervisele ja austada patsiendi autonoomiat. Et leevendada niisuguste väärtuste kahjulikku mõju meditsiinile, tuleks neid kritiseerida paljude osapoolte vaheliste läbirääkimiste kaudu. Läbirääkimised peaksid mõnikord kaasama ka patsiente, kellel on mitteekspertidena on eriti hea vaatenurk, et vaidlustada meditsiinisiseseid väärtushinnanguid. See tõstab tõenäosust, et haiguste definitsioon on episteemiliselt ja eetiliselt vastuvõetavad.
The question whether and how to define something as a disease has been contentious in practice. In the thesis, I argue that when deciding whether and how to define something as a disease, values must be relied upon. Against the value-free ideal of science, I use the argument from inductive risk to show that medicalization is inevitably value-laden. Instead of worrying about any value influence in medicalization, I propose that values interfere with medicine’s epistemic and ethical goals only when they are held dogmatically and/or contradict medicine’s ethical goals. To mitigate such pernicious influence of values, values should be managed through a negotiation between diverse actors. This includes sometimes patients who as outsiders are particularly well positioned to challenge values within medicine. In this way we improve the chances that disease definitions are epistemically and ethically acceptable. These are disease definitions that support medicine’s epistemic and ethical goals.
2023-07-03T12:16:38Z
2023-07-03T12:16:38Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.01 KRU 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/91242
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321642021-03-08T08:34:40Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Feminism ja sotsiaalne õiglus Martha Nussbaumi käsitluses
Meritam, Urve
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool.Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T13:42:56Z
2013-08-06T13:42:56Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32164
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542372021-03-08T09:46:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Erapooletu vaatleja empaatia keskne roll moraalis
Rajando, Kertu
Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
empaatia
emotsioonid
eetika
kõlbeline areng
Prinz, Jesse J
Smith, Adam
Käesolevas magistritöös on vaatluse all empaatia roll moraalis – moraalse hinnangu andmise, moraalse motivatsiooni ja moraalse arengu juures. Eesmärgiks on uurida, kas leidub mõnda tüüpi empaatiat, mis on oluline moraalse kompetentsuse erinevate aspektide puhul.
Esimeses peatükis annan ülevaade erinevatest fenomenidest, mida sageli käsitletakse empaatiana. Selgub, et empaatia mõiste defineerimisel puudub konsensus. Teises peatükis tutvustan Jesse J. Prinzi moraaliteooriat ja empaatia käsitlust. Näitan, et Prinz eitab empaatia rolli moraalis, kritiseerides peamiselt empaatia subjektiivsust ja kallutatavust. Kolmandas peatükis pöördun Adam Smithi moraaliteooria juurde, milles on tähtsal kohal sümpaatia. Smithi poolt kirjeldatud sümpaatia on tänapäeva kontekstis mõistetav empaatiana ning seega on selle käsitluse avamine asjakohane antud magistritöö raames. Smith kasutab sümpaatiat erinevatel viisidel, kuid moraaliküsimustes on kõige olulisem see sümpaatia tähendus, mis eeldab erapooletu vaatleja mehhanismi loomist, arendamist ja rakendamist. Sellisele sümpaatiale toetumine saab omada tähtsat rolli nii moraalsete hinnangute andmisel, moraalse motivatsiooni kui ka moraalse arengu puhul. Neljandas peatükis võrdlen Prinzi empaatia ja Smithi sümpaatia käsitlusi ning selgitan, kuidas suudab smithilik korrigeeritud empaatia ületada probleeme, mis prinziliku empaatia puhul ületamatuteks jäävad. Jõuan järeldusele, et erapooletu vaatleja empaatia on seda sorti empaatia, mis omab keskset rolli moraalis.
2016-10-21T10:08:21Z
2016-10-21T10:08:21Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54237
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608182019-02-06T17:08:15Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Two problems surrounding the universality of human rights
Veyrat, Pablo
Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
practical philosophy
universality
human rights
universaalsus
This thesis points at two main issues in the concept of the universality of
human rights. First, the obstacles it poses to the notions of the sovereign and
the political as defined by Carl Schmitt. Second, the paradox of human rights
formulated by Hannah Arendt remains unsolved, since the contradiction at its
heart has not changed since its formulation. The third chapter attempts to
illustrate how these theoretical concepts are relevant for our understanding of
human rights crises involving state actors analyzing some of the events that
took place during the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe. The thesis concludes
pointing at the need to end the misconceptions derived from the idea of the
universality of human rights in the mind of the public.
2018-06-19T10:36:41Z
2018-06-19T10:36:41Z
2018
Thesis
23.03.01 VEY 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60818
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542402021-03-08T09:46:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Ontology Identification Problem In Computational Agents
Pärnpuu, Rao
Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
intellektitehnika
filosoofia
ontoloogiad
The Ontology Identification Problem is the problem of connecting different ontologies to the system’s goals in such a way that a change in the system’s ontology does not result in a change in its goal’s effect. My thesis is that the Ontology Identification Problem, which has so far been addressed as a single universal problem, can be seen as an umbrella term for a wide range of different problems, each of which has a different level of difficulty, and each requires different methods of approach, in order to overcome. One wide category of this problem is connected to granularity, where the changes in the model are connected to changes in the level of detail. Granularity issues can be divided into cases of simpler reductions, multiple realizability and incommensurability. Another wide area of the problem is related to context. Contextual problems can be divided into problems of environmental context and social context. Special cases of warrantless goals and perverse instantiation also have a direct bearing on the ability to solve ontology identification problems effectively.
2016-10-21T11:04:37Z
2016-10-21T11:04:37Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54240
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321752021-03-08T09:46:49Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Imestuse küsimus Edmund Husserli fenomenoloogias
Hellerma, Juhan
Matjus, Ülo, juhendaja
Merz, Philippe, kaasjuhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T15:00:46Z
2013-08-06T15:00:46Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32175
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/701332021-10-04T11:01:52Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
A critical analysis of "born this way" and "not a choice" arguments for the acceptance of queer sexualities
Kaling, Anna
Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
sexuality
Selle Bakalaureusetöö keskne väide on, et “Sellisena sündinud” ja “Ei ole valik” argumendid
määratlevad mitte-heteroseksuaalsust homofoobse raamistiku abil ning edendavad seeläbi
implitsiitselt – ja tihti ka eksplitsiitselt – binaarset ja androtsentrislikku arusaama
inimseksuaalsusest, mis ei peegelda olemasolevate seksuaalsete praktikate mitmekesisust.
Kaitsen seda väidet neljas peatükis. Esimeses neist annan põgusa ülevaate „Nii sündinud“ (ja
„Ei ole valik“) argumentide kontekstist ja ajaloost. Teises peatükis analüüsin „Nii sündinud“
argumendi laiendavust kõigile mitte-heteroseksuaalsetele isikutele. Kolmandas peatükis
peatükis hindan „Ei ole valik“ argumendi laiendatavust ning selle sotsio-poliitilisi
implikatsioone. Neljandas peatükis kaalun vastuväidet „Nii sündinud“ ja „Ei ole valik“
argumentide kriitikale („head tulemused“). Peale seda esitan alternatiivse, käitumise
lubatavusel põhineva argumendi queer-seksuaalsuste aktsepteerimise toetuseks ning toon
välja selle eelised „Nii sündinud“ ja „Ei ole valik“ argumentide suhtes.
Building on the criticism of the good track record argument, I presented an alternative
argument for the acceptance of queer sexualities based on the personal freedom to engage in
consensual non-heterosexual behaviour, that is not susceptible to the status versus conduct
distinction. While the behaviour-based argument I presented does not rely on both
philosophically and scientifically contested concept of sexual orientation and thus has several
advantages in regard to it (such as greater potential for generalizability), I did not question
the usefulness of the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual identity in this thesis. I
also did not consider the role of choice in determining sexual orientation. An interesting
analysis of these issues could be provided, for example on the basis of William S.
Wilkerson’s fusion theory (Ambiguity and Sexuality, 2007) and his argument regarding the
role of interpretation in determining sexual orientation (Wilkinson, 2009).
2020-10-29T11:26:25Z
2020-10-29T11:26:25Z
2020
Thesis
20.03.02 KALl 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/70133
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542032021-03-08T08:39:23Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Can Autonomous Machines Make Ethical Decisions?
Tõnisson, René
Volberg, Mats, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
eetika
intellektitehnika
robotid
Käesolev bakalaureusetöö küsib, kas autonoomsed masinad suudavad teha eetilisi otsuseid. Autonoomse masina all mõeldakse siin selliseid masinad, mis on võimelised tegutsema ilma pideva inimese poolse juhtimiseta ning mida kontrollib tehisintellekt. Autor arutleb eeliste ja puuduste üle, mis on erinevatel eetilistel printsiipidel, mida masin saaks kasutada alusena oma otsuste tegemisel. Siia on kaasatud nii klassikalised eetikateooriad nagu näiteks utilitarism kui ka alternatiivsed lähenemised nagu juhtumipõhine masinõpe. Samuti leitakse, et valdkonnapõhise eetika masinasse juurutamine oleks kergem, kui püüd korraga arendada üldisel eetikal põhinevat masinat. Vaadeldakse ka üldist masinapoolse otsustusprotsessi olemust ning jõutakse järeldusele, et kuna masinal puudub teadvus, vaba tahe, kavatsuslikkus ja omakasupüüdlikkus, siis ei ole masinad võimelised tegema eetilisi otsuseid sel moel nagu inimene. Sellest hoolimata on masinad võimelised tegema otsuseid, mida saab pidada eetiliseks mingis kindlas situatsioonis, juhul kui neisse on implementeeritud sobiv eetiline printsiip ning masin suudab koguda adekvaatset infot end ümbritseva kohta.
2016-10-20T07:41:21Z
2016-10-20T07:41:21Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54203
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/644002019-06-17T11:01:57Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Noël Carrolli sisupõhise esteetilise kogemuse definitsiooni kaitse
Bachmann, Siim
Volt, Marek, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
aesthetics
The main goal of my bachelor’s thesis is to give a critical analysis of Noël Carroll’s content-oriented approach to aesthetics experience. First, I will introduce two competing approaches, which are named the affect-oriented approach and the axiological approach. Furthermore, I will bring out Carroll’s criticism on these theories and I will try to bring out possible objections to Carroll’s criticism and in turn, I will push them back. In the next two chapters I will include more specific theories about the affect-oriented approach and the axiological approach. Robert Stecker’s minimal theory represent a modified view of the axiological approach in the second chapter and Alan Goldman’s broad view is depicting a variant of the affect-oriented approach in the third chapter. In both chapters, I will put forward each of the authors theories and I will show their defenses to possible counterarguments and I will show their criticism at Carroll’s theory. From there on I will advance my own criticism on their theory and I will defend content-oriented approach from their criticism. Lastly, I will come to a conclusion that Carroll’s theory is the best one, but it still has some predicaments to iron out.
Käesoleva töö eesmärk oli kaitsta esteetilise kogemuse sisupõhist definitsiooni. Ma analüüsisin erinevaid esteetilise kogemuse teooriaid ning seejärel ka kritiseerisin neid, et leida milline neist kõige vastuvõetavam on. Esteetilise kogemuse teooriaid oli kokku kolm: tundepõhine, väärtusepõhine ja sisupõhine ning ma kaitsesin neist viimast.
Leidsin, et mitte ükski neist teooriatest ei suutnud rahuldavalt Carrolli sisupõhist teooriat ümber lükata ning mu analüüsi kohaselt olid nii tundepõhine kui ka väärtusepõhine teooria esteetilise kogemuse defineerimiseks ebasobivad.
Esteetiline kogemus on see, millega me igapäevaselt kokku puutume, seega see peab olema ühiselt mõistetav, selge ning ka tavamõistuslikult vastuvõetav. Sisupõhine teooria on küll tugev, kuid siiski puudustega. Töö lõppjärelduses tõin välja sisupõhise teooria kaks põhiprobleemi. Esimeseks, moraalsuse objektiivse käsituse põhjendamatus. Teiseks, kunstidefinitsiooni puudus. Minu arvates peaks sisupõhise teooria mõisteid rohkem lahti seletama ning vajadusel ka edasi arendama.
2019-06-17T11:00:59Z
2019-06-17T11:00:59Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.02 BAC 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64400
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608152019-02-06T17:07:39Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Reversible and irreversible whorfian effects as empirical evidence for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
Grigorev, Maksim
Davies, Alexander, juhendaja
Bruno Mölder, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
empirical evidence
whorfian effects
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
This thesis is aimed on research of two different types of empirical evidence for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: reversible and irreversible Whorfian effects. Definition of reversible Whorfian effects and their properties should help to identify reversible Whorfian effects easier in future research on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. I presented two opposite points of view on whether or not reversible Whorfian effects can support the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis to show that reversible Whorfian effect are actively disputable nowadays. Also, I showed that without a clear understanding of what reversible Whorfian effects are some researchers can mix up reversibility with the reason to reject Whorfian effect without any additional justification. This MA thesis should help to avoid this misunderstanding in future research. Moreover, I introduced a really good candidate for irreversible Whorfian effect and defined its properties. It’s really difficult to prove that a certain Whorfian effect is totally irreversible, but my candidate at least should be a good opportunity for these researchers, who reject reversible Whorfian effects as empirical evidence for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. This MA thesis in general should help in philosophical research on formulating the scientifically testable thesis of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.
2018-06-19T10:15:04Z
2018-06-19T10:15:04Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.01 GRI 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60815
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542422021-03-08T09:46:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in Predictive Brains
Vaus, Sander
Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
filosoofia
kognitiivteadus
prognostika
The debate over whether perception is cognitively penetrable, in order to remain philosophically interesting and relevant, should be unpacked in terms of discerning whether propositional states can directly modulate the low-level phenomenal features of one’s perceptual experience. For this, it should also engage with cognitive science, and it is by proposing a scientifically feasible mechanism of how cognitive penetrability could obtain that there is even a reason for considering it. The predictive coding model of perception provides a framework within which such a mechanism can be motivated. By framing perception as a process of probabilistic inference, wherein top-down models of the world are tested against bottom-up error signals, we can discern whether propositional attitudes could affect the inhibitory and excitatory signaling of sensory neurons in a way that either promotes or inhibits the top-down predictive model that constitutes one’s perceptual experience, all the while preserving the necessary kind of relation between perception and cognition. In a three dimensional variation of the Ebbinghaus illusion, this can in fact be shown to happen, establishing cognitive penetrability of perception and a working mechanism by which this could take place.
2016-10-21T11:14:26Z
2016-10-21T11:14:26Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54242
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321672021-03-08T08:34:41Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Poliitiliste otsuste legitiimsus
Mikli, Susann
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T14:04:56Z
2013-08-06T14:04:56Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32167
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608302019-02-06T16:58:20Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Ateism Thomas Hobbesi filosoofias
Suur, Tiina
Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
atheism
history of philosophy
Käesoleva lõputöö eesmärgiks oli selgitada välja, kas ja kui palju on võimalik tuvastada ateismi 17. sajandi filosoofi Thomas Hobbesi teostes ning teooriates. Selle eesmärgi saavutamiseks andsin esmalt sissejuhatava ülevaate tema elust, et oleks kergem mõista, mis taustal ta oma mõtted on kujundanud. Seejärel käsitlesin kolme olulist teemat tema filosoofias. Nendeks on materialism, riigikäsitlus ning surmajärgse elu teooria. Esmalt andsin ülevaate kõigist kolmest, mida need täpsemalt tähendavad ning endast kujutavad, seejärel tõin välja kitsaskohad või segaseks jäänud punktid, mis võivad viidata Hobbesi võimalikule ateismile ning muud asjaolud, nagu näiteks vastuolu tema materialistliku maailmapildi ning Jumala olemasolu põhjenduse vahel. Viimasena esitasin järeldused, mis tulenesid eelpool mainitud kolme teema lahkamisel. Jõudsin seisukohale, et kuigi Hobbesi peeti tema enda ajastul ateistiks, oleks ta tänapäeval pigem deist, kuna ateistina defineerisin inimest, kes eitab Jumala olemasolu. Seda Hobbes ei teinud, vastupidi, tema ütles, et Jumal on olemas, ta lihtsalt ei sekku maailma kulgu ega inimeste ellu. Lisaks järeldasin, et ateistiks peeti teda seetõttu, et tema arusaam Jumalast ei läinud kokku valitseva kristliku õpetusega ning et segaseks jäänud kohad tema teooriates tulenesid sellest, et ühiskonna surve tõttu ei saanud ta kirjutada ilma Jumalat käsitlemata, see tähendab, et midagi pidi ta Jumala kohta ütlema, isegi, kui see ei läinud väga hästi kokku näiteks tema materialistliku maailmavaatega. Oluline on ka märkida, et Hobbesi kohta ei saa kindlasõnaliselt öelda, et ta on ateist või deist, sest eri sajanditel on olnud erinevad arusaamad nendest mõistetest. Ühe või teisena saabki teda käsitleda vaid selles konkreetses ajajärgus.
The purpose of my thesis is to find out whether there is any atheism in the philosophy of 17th century thinker Thomas Hobbes. To start with, I gave an introductory overview of Hobbes's life so it would be easier to understand what is the background he is coming from. Then I discussed three main subjects that are important in his philosophy: materialism, political philosophy about government, and theory of life after death. Firstly I made it clear what these three subjects are, secondly I brought forth his ideas that weren't presented clearly enough within these three topics that could indicate his possible atheism. For example Hobbes being a materialist and his reasoning about the existence of God. Lastly I presented the conclusions that I made relying on the analysis of these three subjects. I inferred that even though Hobbes was considered to be an atheist during his lifetime, nowadays he would rather be thought of as a deist and that because of the definition I gave for an atheist – atheist is a person who denies the existence of God. Hobbes did not deny it, quite the opposite, he said that God does exist but he doesn't intervene in people's lives. I also concluded that Hobbes was considered to be an atheist because his understandings of God did not match with the Christian understanding of God which was the dominant way of thinking back in the 17th century. In addition I added that the confusion in some places in his theories came from the pressure of the society. What is meant is that taking into account the dominant Christian way of thinking it was almost impossible to write any philosophy without considering God, that means that Hobbes had to say something about God even if it was not in consistency with his understandings of the world, for example his materialism. It is also important to understand that it can't be said with confidence that Hobbes was an atheist or a deist because in different centuries there have been different understandings of these concepts. He can be thought of as an atheist or as a deist only in the corresponding era.
2018-06-19T11:41:16Z
2018-06-19T11:41:16Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.02 SUU 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60830
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/828632022-06-29T08:49:34Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
A taxonomy of testimonial smothering
Mohamed, Nada Abdalla Hassan Abdelazim
Barker, Simon Reginald, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Kristie Dotson formulates testimonial smothering as a form of testimonial oppression where a speaker truncates or removes the content of her testimony leaving the testimony empty from any content for which the hearers demonstrated testimonial incompetence. On Dotson’s account of smothering, the speaker empties her testimony from all content relevant to the domain of exchange. However, Dotson’s account does not include or cover instances where a speaker smothers her testimony, yet her smothered testimony contains some content relevant to the domain of exchange. In this thesis, I present a more detailed analysis of testimonial smothering to showcase different ways in which oppressed speakers interact in exchanges in which they are oppressed. I take Dotson’s notion of smothering to be one form of testimonial smothering, which I call smothering via emptying. I introduce two other types of smothering, smothering via altering and smothering via echoing, to encompass cases where
a speaker’s smothered testimony is not empty from content relevant to the domain of exchange. Then I use the taxonomy of testimonial smothering to showcase ways in which oppressed speakers can contribute to conversations in which they are oppressed.
2022-06-29T08:48:20Z
2022-06-29T08:48:20Z
2022
Thesis
20.03.01 MOH 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/82863
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/727252021-06-28T08:39:55Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
In defense of beliefs as stably high credences: how stability theory of belief avoids the problem of conviction based on purely statistical evidence
Machavariani, Sophio
Davies, Alexander Stewart, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
In the thesis, I defended STB from Staffel’s criticism where she argues that STB provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on rational belief. The reason for this is that STB is argued to allow for a belief in guilt based on purely statistical evidence, which is counterintuitive. I showed that this inference fails: conviction based on a narrative for guilt ensures that the conviction is not issued based on purely statistical evidence. Since in the cases that involve narratives for and against guilt STB (complemented with pragmatic constraints on accusing narrative) performs fine, the theory avoids the problem of purely statistical evidence.
In the end, I dismissed a concern that STB when complemented with pragmatic constraints fails to provide a necessary condition on rational belief.
A corollary of my defense of STB from Staffel’s criticism is an account of how STB can be fruitfully deployed in a court context. This makes room for further research on whether the combination of STB and the pragmatic constraints on accusing narratives provide a promising explication of the beyond reasonable doubt standard and, hence, a novel candidate to modeling legal standards of proof in both probabilistic and non-probabilistic ways.
2021-06-28T08:33:52Z
2021-06-28T08:33:52Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 MAC 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72725
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/541852021-03-08T08:39:23Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Moraalsed argumendid taimetoitluse ja täistaimetoitluse jaoks
Paju, Keit
Keerus, Külli, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
eetika
loomakaitse
keskkonnaeetika
taimetoitlus
Töö sisuks on tuua moraalseid argumente taimetoitluse ja täistaimetoitluse kasuks. Ma toon erinevaid argumente selle kohta, miks taimetoitlus ja täistaimetoitlus on moraalselt õige loomade, inimeste ning keskkonna jaoks, samuti arutlen ma vastuargumentide üle.
2016-10-18T11:51:49Z
2016-10-18T11:51:49Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54185
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/554362021-03-08T08:39:24Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Martin Heideggeri 1949. aasta Bremeni-ettekannete meediateoreetilisi implikatsioone
Saaremäe, Kevin Sebastian
Parhomenko, Eduard
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Martin Heidegger
meediafilosoofia
Marshall McLuhan
Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on demonstreerida Martin Heideggeri mõtlemise
meediateoreetilist relevantsust, toetudes tema nn Bremeni-ettekandetsüklile „Sissevaade
sellesse, mis on“ (1949). Seejuures käsitlen keskse kontseptsioonina Heideggeri poolt
eksplitsiitselt meediaga seotud lähedust selle erinevate tähendustega. Avan selle teema
probleemistikku ning olulisust „Olemise ja aja“ (1922) põhjal, kus tõeline lähedus avaneb
Dasein’i fundamentaalontoloogialt, olles juuritud tema olemisstruktuuri. Kontrastis
Bremeni-ettekannetega näitan, et hilisem Heidegger on omandanud meedia suhtes
eksplitsiitselt kriitilise hoiaku ning kirjeldab selle mõju kui ohtu olemisele, mida võib
ületada läbi hoidva mõtlemise. Lõpetuseks kõrvutan mõningaid Heideggeri
meediakohaseid mõttekäike Marshall McLuhani omadega, osutamaks nende osaliselt
kattuvale huvivaldkonnale.
2017-02-07T11:18:40Z
2017-02-07T11:18:40Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/55436
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485462021-03-08T08:38:02Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Do Kuhnian revolutions suit biology?
Rohtmets, Anna Elise
Talpsepp, Edit, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Kuhn, Thomas S.
teadusfilosoofia
teadusajalugu
revolutsioonid
bioloogia
paradigmad
The aim of this thesis is to compare Kuhn's historiographical framework that he implemented
on the history of physics with the history of biology to discover if it is meaningful to discuss
biology from the perspective of a Kuhnian revolutionary historiography. Along with this
broader aim, there is a secondary and more concrete reason to investigate if there is any merit
in discussing Theodosius Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origins of Species (1937) as a
revolutionary text in the sense that it is similar to works like Charles Lyell’s Principles of
Geology (1830), Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1867) and
Antoine Lavoisier’s Elementary Treatise of Chemistry (1789) which lay the foundations to
modern science in their respective fields. This inquiry will also address the status of Charles
Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859) as a revolutionary text as the significance of his
work has been the center of much hype and historically questionable claims. By the end of
this paper I wish to answer the question of whether a Kuhnian historiography is interesting to
implement to biology. Is it able to shed light to new inquiries and interesting nuances about
biology and does it help to clarify the still open question of a Darwinian revolution?
2015-09-18T16:34:19Z
2015-09-18T16:34:19Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48546
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/912512023-07-03T20:39:44Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Ihudevahelisus ja asendatavus. Derrida kriitika Merleau-Ponty intersubjektiivsuse käsitluse kohta
Tärk, Mona
Eduard Parhomenko, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Jacques Derrida’s only substantial treatment of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy takes place in the chapter “Tangent III” of the book On Touching — Jean-Luc Nancy. In this master's thesis, I examine the notion of alterity taken up by Derrida in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s embodied account of intersubjectivity, that is, intercorporeity. The leading question I clarify and seek to answer is whether intercorporeity can appreciate the alterity of the other and avoid appropriating the other, as Derrida worries. Through demonstrating the indissociability of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy from critical aspects such as the dispossession of the self, non-ego-centered and mediated means of access to the other, and the ambiguity of the world, I claim that intercorporeity does not result in appropriating the other. Derrida’s reading of Merleau-Ponty, in failing to follow these elements in the latter’s phenomenology, is thus at times incomplete and overly condemning. However, Derrida points at interesting details in Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeity. I take focus on the substitutability of the self and the other, which opens to a discussion of the motivation of paradoxical elements in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. My conclusion is that paradoxicality in the phenomenological structures explaining our relations with others answer to the tensions in our lived experience with others.
Jacques Derrida ainus põhjalik vaade Maurice Merlreau-Ponty filosoofiale leiab aset teose Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy peatükis „Tangente III”. Käesolevas magistritöös analüüsin Derrida esitatud kriitikat teise ja teisesuse kohta Merleau-Ponty ihulises intersubjektiivsuse mõtlemises ehk ihudevahelisuses. Uurimuse juhtiv küsimus on, kas ihudevahelisus võimaldab austada teise teisesust ja vältida teise omastamist. Selgitan Derrida kahtlusi ihulise lähenemise osas ning vastan küsimusele, kaitstes Merleau-Ponty seisukohti. Viimase fenomenoloogiaga kuuluvad lahutamatult kokku teisesust arvesse võtvad kriitilised elemendid — ise ärastumine, mitte-egokeskne ja vahendatud ligipääs teisele ja maailma mitmekülgsus — mis ei võimalda teise omastamist. Derrida tõlgendus vaatab olulistel kohtadel mööda neist aspektidest, mille tõttu on tema tõlgendus puudulik ja liialt hukkamõistev. Selles kriitikas on siiski ka paeluvaid tähelepanekuid Merleau-Ponty ihudevahelisuse kohta. Keskendun ise ja teise asendatavuse küsimusele, mille kaudu avaneb arutelu Merleau-Ponty filosoofias leiduvate paradoksaalsuste tarvilikkuse üle. Paradoksaalsus, mis teisesuhteid seletavatesse fenomenoloogilistesse struktuuridesse dünaamilisust loob, vastab teistega seotud pingelistele kogemustele meie elus. Merleau-Ponty ihudevahelisuses mõjutavad ja muudavad ise ja teine üksteist vastastikku. Seda võimaldab teise lähedus isele, milles aga ise ja teise vaheline distants ja erinevus ei kao.
2023-07-03T13:09:30Z
2023-07-03T13:09:30Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.01 TÄR 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/91251
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/564952021-03-08T09:48:09Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The Human Prejudice and the Problem of Sustainability
Gardner, Jeffrey D
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
sustainability
environmental crisis
human-centered ecology
Chapter I will, using scientific research, explain the nature of the environmental crisis and
show that it is indeed caused by what I refer to as the prevailing human culture. Key concepts used in this thesis will be defined (such as ecology and prevailing human culture). I will reject views that do not think the current human moral sensibility is the problem concerning the environment. Various opposition arguments will defend the current conservative moral boundary between humans and nature, including M. Sagoff’s artificialist proposal. Also, solutions in terms of a human-centered cost-benefit analysis along with the “Abrahamic” conception of human dominance over nature will be rejected.
Chapter II will focus on the philosophical inadequacies of the human prejudice in all its forms. I will argue mainly against opponents who reject ‘humanism’ but wish to preserve some sort of human moral privilege or status. The chapter will address the ambiguity of the moral inclusion of being “human” to which D. McNaughton and P. Taylor provide talking points. I will reject B. Williams's concept of the human “us” thus arguing it is an irrational belief adopted by the prevailing human culture. Another opponent for this chapter is M. Bookchin who places a special status on humans based on the human capacity to value. I will also criticize Bookchin’s claims that “mystical” biocentric notions belittle and demonize human achievements. Chapter III will address the ethical and political consequences of internalizing a biocentric moral code and argue against those who believe the consequences are too steep. While they may seem costly to us that is only because we still have the mindset of the prevailing human culture which will not exist in future generations. Opponents in the chapter include consequentialists who argue there's more ‘good’ in maintaining the human prejudice, as well as all those who defend anthropocentric society. I will maintain that the core values defined in this thesis can be preserved and progressed without anthropocentrism.
2017-06-04T07:40:56Z
2017-06-04T07:40:56Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56495
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/541862021-03-08T08:39:23Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Sotsiaalse kapitali roll korruptsiooni vähendamisel
Miller, Kristiina
Volberg, Mats, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
korruptsioon
kodanikuühiskond
kõlbluskasvatus
moraal
sotsiaalne kapital
Bakalaureuse töö eesmärk oli anda korruptsioonist ülevaade ja näidata sotsiaalse
kapitali rolli korruptsiooni vähendamisel. Korruptsioon tähendas siin töös „halba sotsiaalset kapitali“. Korruptsiooni lahendusi saab leida korruptsiooni põhjustest ja tagajärgedest. Usaldus (tähendab siin laiendatud usaldust) on korruptsiooni poolt enim mõjutatud ja see on samuti ka sotsiaalse kapitali aluseks. Lisaks, sotsiaalne kapital on kodanikuühiskonna enda aluseks. Et korruptsiooni vähendada, ühiskond või kogukond vajab kodanikke, kellel oleks autonoomsus ja kodanikumoraal, kus usaldus mängib tähtsat rolli. Neid omadusi saab omandada läbi kodanikuhariduse. Seega on oluline luua usaldusväärseid kodanikke ja ühiskonda läbi kodanikuhariduse. Kodanikuharidus ei tähenda aga ainult tavalist haridust. Kodanikud peavad praktiseerima oma karakteri omadusi läbi koostöö, vabatahtlike tegevuste ja osalemisega poliitikas. Nii kaua kui on sotsiaalset kapitali ühiskonnas, siis on ka võimalus korruptsiooni vähendada.
2016-10-18T12:00:41Z
2016-10-18T12:00:41Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54186
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/700692021-10-04T11:02:38Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The timeline of mortality
Kushyna, Olena
Sooväli, Jaanus, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
death
mortality
philosophy
In this thesis, I am addressing the past, the present, and the future of the conception of death in philosophy. In the past, the ultimate answers about death had been given by religion. Later, alongside with the process of secularization, Christianity has lost its monopoly on interpreting mortality, and atheistic views arose. Without believing in immortal soul and afterlife, the reflection on death is still necessary. In present, it is even more acute, as there are no ultimate answers anymore. According to Heidegger, we should anticipate our death in order to live authentically. According to Camus, we should accept our mortality in order to revolt against the absurd. In our contemporary society, we rather marginalize the topic of death. I suggest that, in the future, we should reflect more on death and talk about it openly. I offer “The Method of Diotima”, which assumes reacting to our mortality with “tend-and-befriend” response. As an example, I suggest that we should philosophically reflect on female experience by existential analysis of childbirth in the light of mortality. We should also care about others through sharing philosophical reflections on mortality with the broad audience and raising awareness about death.
2020-10-26T12:04:21Z
2020-10-26T12:04:21Z
2020
Thesis
20.03.01 KUSh 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/70069
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/645622019-06-22T18:18:32Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Valuing health: against the ethical view
Zameska, Jay
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
ethics
health
Health is often valued by its contribution to well-being. The most common way to
establish values for health states is through eliciting a sample population’s preferences among
states. The evidential view supports preferences based on the idea that preferences provide
reliable indicators of well-being. The ethical view takes eliciting preferences to show proper
respect for persons. I address the ethical view. In this thesis, I explain the process of valuing
health states and describe the evidential and ethical views. I explain how preference-based
measures are supposed to show respect for persons, and that respect for persons is shown by
respecting autonomous preferences, and only autonomous preferences. I argue that health state
preferences are not autonomous preferences, and as a result, preference-based measures do not
show respect for persons. Thus, they are not actually supported by the ethical view. I explain
the consequences of this argument for health valuation, suggesting that this gives us a reason
to prefer methods that value health on other bases, e.g. through opportunity or capability. I
also suggest that this has consequences for how we should think about autonomous choice in
healthcare, and propose that bioethics needs further investigation into the processes of patient
decision-making.
2019-06-22T18:17:39Z
2019-06-22T18:17:39Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.01 ZAM 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64562
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/768472022-02-28T11:09:32Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism
Hooda, Anurag
Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
religion
pluralism
In this thesis I have argued how we can go beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism
to tackle the existing issues in the society. To uncover the veil, I have begun by describing what
is religion and various religious positions like exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. After
clearing concepts next, I discuss Hick’s model of religious pluralism and explained the central
pieces in model, like, his doctrine of the Real and how Hick utilized the brilliance of Kant’s
epistemology of religion. After describing them I have defended Hick’s model against the
arguments of exclusivist’s like Plantinga and Johnson. Further, I have argued that religious
exclusivism is a dangerous position when compared with religious pluralism, as the latter is
more tolerant. Then I have sketched a model of small r to capital R Religion, and argued that
religious pluralism has its own problems and why it fails. Then finally I defend the ‘small r to
capital R Religion’ model against possible objection.
2022-02-28T11:08:37Z
2022-02-28T11:08:37Z
2022-02
Thesis
20.03.01 HOO 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/76847
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/727152021-10-04T10:58:54Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
A response to the practicality issue in the abolitionist animal rights framework
Erik, Egle
Meriste, Heidy, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
animal rights
Antud magistritöös oli vaatluse all abolitsionistliku loomaõiguste raamistiku ja loomade heaolul põhineva “loomaõiguste” raamistiku konflikt. Mõlemad lähenemised peavad oluliseks loomade õigusi, kuid loomade heaolule keskenduv raamistik põhineb loomade moraalsel õigusel mitte kannatada. Abolitsionistlik raamistik paneb suuremat rõhku sellele, et loomatööstuses on pea võimatu loomadele kannatusi mitte tekitada, loomade tapmine on vale ja loomade kannatuste juurpõhjuseks. Esimeses peatükis tutvustangi mõlemat lähenemist ning veganlust ehk täistaimset toitumist ja loomsete toodete mitteostmist, mis on abolitsionistliku raamistikust tulenev praktiline eetiline nõue. Teises peatükis uurin loomade heaolule keskenduva raamistiku kriitikat abolitsionistlikule raamistikule, mille kohaselt on abolitsionistlik lähenemine ja veganlus eetilise nõudena tänapäeva maailmas liiga nõudlik ja ebapraktiline. Argumenteerin, et veganlus võib olla nõudlik eetiline nõue, kuid eetilised nõuded peavadki vahepeal olema nõudlikud ning peale selle on neil ka praktiline väärtus, näiteks ideaali kujutlemisel.
Samas, et balansseerida abolitsionistlikku käsitlust tänapäeva kontekstis, kus lihasöömine on väga levinud nähtus tutvustan kolmandas peatükis mitteideaalse lähenemisena sekundaarseid eetilisi nõudeid, mille kohaselt peame sööma vähem liha. Selgitan sekundaarseid nõuded skalaarse lähenemisega, mis lähtub printsiibist, et teod võivad olla vähem või rohkem mitte-eetilised. Kui vaatleme liha söömist siis saame kujutada skaalat, kus ’õige’ on liha mitte süüa, ’vale’ on süüa liha, samaaegselt saame paigutada liha rohke söömise ’rohkem valeks’, ja liha vähese söömise ’vähem valeks’.
In this thesis I have looked into the conflict between the abolitionist animal rights approach and the welfarist approach. The welfarists focus on animals’ right to not suffer, whilst the abolitionists recognize the animals’ right to life and that the root issue of animal suffering is their exploitation, predominantly in animal agriculture. The main way to implement abolitionist ideas into the real life is through veganism – the practice of abstaining from the use of animals in food as well as other areas of life. In the second chapter I looked into the criticism towards the abolitionist approach, according to which veganism as an ethical requirement is too demanding and unrealistic. I then explained how ethical requirements such as veganism sometimes have to be demanding yet can still have practical value by providing an ideal. In the third chapter I proposed a nonideal approach, according to which we ought to eat less meat as per secondary requirements. I also introduced a scalar approach to wrongness. This theoretical framework recognizes that some acts are more wrong than others, for example eating more meat is more wrong than eating less meat, yet we can maintain the ideal that eating meat still wrongs animals.
2021-06-27T20:20:58Z
2021-06-27T20:20:58Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 ERI 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72715
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321622021-03-08T08:34:41Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Sotsiaalmajanduslik võrdsus R. H. Tawney ja M. Walzeri näitel
Sillak, Silver
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool.Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T13:29:52Z
2013-08-06T13:29:52Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32162
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/420862021-03-08T09:46:49Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis
Ross, Madli
Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Wolf, Susan
eetika
moraal
elu
väärtused (filos.)
In a nutshell, the general problem of my thesis is concerned with the role of morality in
life. If we agree with Wolf about principle-based moral theories leading us to the ideals
that are not our ideals, then can moral values keep their position as the most important ones in the hierarchy of values? Maybe we can reach the good life when we look for a balance between different aspects of our lives as a maximum instead of maximizing one single principle and one set of values in our lives. When the latter holds, is there a hierarchy of values in the first place?
2014-06-19T08:54:30Z
2014-06-19T08:54:30Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/42086
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/483072021-03-08T08:38:01Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Torbjörn Tännsjö spordifänluse ebamoraalsuse argumendi kriitika
Järvela, Mariann
Meriste, Heidy, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool.Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Tännsjö, Torbjörn
spordieetika
sport
sportlased
fännid
Käesolevas bakalaureusetöös on vaatluse all Torbjörn Tännsjö spordifänluse ebamoraalsuse argument. Tännsjö artikkel Is it fascistoid to admire sports heroes? (2000) on üks esimesi kirjutisi fännieetika valdkonnas – see, käesoleva töö põhitekst, on olulisel kohal ka kogu fännieetika maastikul. Antud töö eesmärgiks on kummutada Tännsjö argument – tema kriitika spordifänluse aadressil.
Fännieetika on üsna uus uurimisvaldkond – kõik käesolevas töös analüüsitavad artiklid
antud käsitlussfäärist on kirjutatud sel ehk XXI sajandil. Pikka aega on spordieetika fookuses
olnud need teemad, mis on seotud tippsportlase endaga. Näiteks küsimused selle kohta,
kuidas sportlane peaks toimima. Kuid lähikümnenditel on tähelepanu koondunud ka teistele
spordiga seotud inimestele. Nii on ilmunud mitu kogumikku treenerieetika teemal, ent lisaks treenerile on spordis oluline koht ka vaatajal, ning seega on avaldatud mitmeid artikleid, mis käsitlevad just fännieetikat. Vaatamata oma uudsusele, on fännieetika puhul tegu olulise uurimissuunaga. Võib öelda, et spordieetikas on seniajani spordifännidele pööratud põhjendamatult vähe tähelepanu. Paljud inimesed pühendavad märkimisväärselt palju aega ja emotsionaalset energiat oma lemmikspordivõistkonna jälgimiseks. Kuid ometi on fänni või võistkonna toetaja roll pälvinud üllatavalt vähe tähelepanu tippsporti käsitlevas kirjanduses
(Dixon 2001: 149).
Leian, et spordifänluse uurimine on põhjendatud, sest tänapäeva tippspordis on fännide
tähtsus, osakaal üha kasvamas. Seda väidet toetavad näiteks erinevate spordimaailma
tippsündmuste miljonitesse ulatuvad vaatajanumbrid, turundustöö, mida sportlased ja
spordimeeskonnad teevad selleks, et leida endale üha uusi toetajaid, ning ka n-ö
supervõistkonnad ja -sportlased ehk meeskonnad ja atleedid, kellel on ülemaailmne
toetajaskond. Nii on oluline, et filosoofid võtaksid vaatluse alla ka spordifänlusega seotud
probleempunktid. Näiteks vajavad selgitust järgnevad küsimused: mis on spordifänluse
põhiolemus? milline on spordifänluse moraalne staatus? Mõlemad küsimused on ka antud
töös teataval määral käsitletud, töö põhirõhk on siiski koondunud teisele probleemile.
2015-09-08T11:41:36Z
2015-09-08T11:41:36Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48307
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/699872021-10-04T11:03:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
A non-moral critique of the norm of assumed objectivity
Närvänen, Emmi
Davies, Alex, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Sally Haslanger (2013) has described a particular norm of objectivity, the norm of Assumed
Objectivity, that she considers as morally problematic. This norm, when correctly applied,
permits one to form essentialising beliefs about women. According Haslanger, under the
conditions of gender inequality, adopting hurts the interest of women while serving the interests
of men. Rae Langton (1993), in contrast, has argued that a moral critique of the norm has its
shortcomings: if a particular norm is bad for some and good for others, then the grounds for
rejecting the norm are weak. Thus, Langton has provided a non-moral critique of the norm that
pertains to the rationality of the norm. She argues that the norm should be rejected because it
fails to yield knowledge. Evangelia Papadaki (2008) has pointed to an inconsistency in
Langton’s argument thereby concluding that the norm evades Langton’s non-moral critique. In
this thesis, I will set out to argue the norm is vulnerable to a non-moral critique. I will argue
that the beliefs arrived at fail to constitute knowledge, which gives us a rational justification to
reject the norm of Assumed Objectivity
2020-10-19T11:12:47Z
2020-10-19T11:12:47Z
2020-08
Thesis
20.03.01 NÄR 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/69987
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/483052021-03-08T08:38:00Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Fenomenilise teadvuse ja intentsionaalsuse lahutamatus
Eesmaa, Triinu
Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
vaimufilosoofia
intentsionaalsus
teadvus
Analüütilises vaimufilosoofias tähistab fenomeniline teadvus teadvustatud vaimunähtuste „mismoodi see on” (what-it-is-like) kogemust. Intentsionaalsus tähendab aga vaimuseisundite suunatust, nende võimet käia millegi kohta ehk omada sisu. Fenomenilist teadvust ja intentsionaalsust on vaimufilosoofias käsitletud üldiselt pigem lahutatavatena.
Intentsionaalsust on nähtud infotöötlusprotsessina, millele on võimalik anda seletus
komputatsiooniliste ja neuraalsete mehhanismide kaudu. Teadvuse fenomenilisust on aga peetud teadvuse raskeks probleemiks, mida komputatsiooniliste ja neuraalsete mehhanismide kaudu seletada ei saa (Chalmers 1995). Alles viimastel aastakümnetel on vaimufilosoofiasse ilmunud teooriaid, mis ei pea õigeks nende vaimu aspektide vahele terava joone tõmbamist.
Need teooriad võib laias laastus jagada kaheks. Esimesed on esituslikud ehk
intentsionalistlikud teadvuse teooriad, mis käsitlevad vaimuseisundite fenomenilisi omadusi esituslikena. Vaimuseisundi intentsionaalsus võrdsustatakse intentsionalismis sellega, mida vaimuseisund esitab. Teine teooria, mis fenomenilist teadvust ja intentsionaalsust lahutamatuks peab, on fenomenilise intentsionaalsuse teooria, mis kaitseb arusaama intentsionaalsusest kui fenomenilisel teadvusel põhinevast.
Töö eesmärk on vaadelda, kuidas need kaks lähenemist teadvuse ja intentsionaalsuse
omavahelist seost käsitlevad ning kaitsta arusaama fenomenilisest teadvusest ja
intentsionaasusest kui lahutamatutes nähtustest. Tuuakse välja argumente kummagi teooriate grupi käsitluse poolt ja nende vastu ning hinnatakse esitatatud argumente.
2015-09-08T11:17:45Z
2015-09-08T11:17:45Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48305
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608232019-02-06T17:08:55Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Does an argument for a detached school contain an incoherence?
Rozumna, Viktoriia
Davies, Alexander Stewart, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
autonomy
practical philosophy
detached school
In this thesis, I argue that Levinson’s argument for a detached school is inconsistent in the
sense that the solution to the problem of cultural coherence of a child’s identity violates the
function of a detached school. However, I argue, this incoherence could be resolved by
introducing a particular requirement to the content of civic education.
With this aim, I explain Levinson’s arguments that children in a liberal state should be
educated for autonomy. I show why, according to Levinson, valuation of autonomy by a liberal
state makes the three commitments of liberalism – to good life pluralism, to a legitimation
process, and to substantive liberal institutions – consistent with one another. Since a liberal state must be committed to the valuation of autonomy, a system of formal schooling must be such that generates children with an ability for autonomy. I explain what is the conception of autonomy that, according to Levinson, should be promoted within a liberal state. Since one of the requirements of the minimal substantive conception of autonomy poses a problem for an ideal liberal school, I explain Levinson’s solution to it and point out the incoherence of such a solution. Finally, I defend Levinson’s argument for a detached school by showing how the incoherence in question could be resolved. I present further objections to the proposed solution and reply to them.
2018-06-19T11:03:22Z
2018-06-19T11:03:22Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.01 ROZ 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60823
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/726922021-06-25T17:31:17Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Eetilise egoismi kaitseks
Matsuk, Aleksandra
Meriste, Heidy, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
ethics
egoism
The main aim of my final thesis is to show that the attitude towards ethical egoism is unjustifiably bad. Egoism is a theory that can counter the main criticism directed against it. My goal is not to prove that ethical egoism is the best theory among the rest, but that it is a theory that can be worked with and that requires further development.
Oma lõputöö raames uurisin eetilist egoismi, selle kaitsmise katsetust ja ka selle kriitikat. Mu eesmärgiks oli näidata, et on olemas mõistlikke põhjuseid, miks inimesed võivad seda teooriat toetada.
2021-06-25T17:29:51Z
2021-06-25T17:29:51Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.02 MAT 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72692
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/649402019-08-01T08:49:47Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Perception, abductive methodology and compositional universalism
Kiani, Amirhossein
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Perception
methodology
universalism
In this thesis I will argue for compositional universalism, according to which, any plurality of objects composes an object. In the first part of the thesis I will argue that if ordinary objects—the ones that are typically perceived by humans’ perceptual system as objects—exist, then so do extraordinary objects. I appeal to certain metaphysical accounts of perception to argue for a great number of extraordinary objects in a similar way that some conservatives about composition would argue for ordinary objects, which in turn suggests that such conservative views are either false or insufficient. I then use abductive methodology to argue that universalism is the best theory that respects the assumption of existence of ordinary objects, and further explains the existence of the ordinary and extraordinary objects which are argued for. The second part takes into consideration the fact the compositional nihilist, who denies occurrence of composition, refuses to accept the assumption that ordinary objects exist, hence blocks my argument for universalism. I lay out a detailed analysis of ideological and ontological commitments of different species of nihilism and universalism about composition, and argue on abductive grounds that universalism is the simplest theory of composition among many of them.
2019-08-01T08:45:57Z
2019-08-01T08:45:57Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.01 KIA 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64940
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608212019-02-06T17:08:36Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Philosophical alternatives to populism
Vera, Roberto
Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
practical philosophy
representative democracy
active citizenship
grassroots politics
communal organization
This thesis supports Jan-Werner Müller’s claim that populism is an inescapable consequence
of representative democracy. While it is true that populism cannot be detached from this
form of government, I will argue that alternatives and safeguards against it can already be
found in representative democracy’s framework. The thesis also gives an historical account
of populism and describes the aspects of its appeal. This work turns to the writings of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Carl Schmitt, particularly their concepts of
the general will, the tyranny of the majority, and existential threat, respectively, to analyze
the philosophical roots of populism. Lastly, this thesis not only argues for safeguards against
populism (mainly in the form of active and responsible citizenship, grassroots politics, and
communal organization), but it also proves that those solutions already exist in representative
democracy.
2018-06-19T10:54:01Z
2018-06-19T10:54:01Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.01 VER 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60821
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542382021-03-08T09:46:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The non-identity problem: accounting for future people and animals
Proover, Marika
Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
non-identity problem
filosoofia
In this thesis I have argued for adopting the de dicto meaning of future individuals in non-identity cases. Although many philosophers adopt de re meaning in the non-identity cases, there is no de re reading available before making an identity-fixing decision, we can only start taking de re individuals into account after conception. Adopting the de dicto meaning is the only way to take the future individuals – people and animals – into account before their identity is fixed while making decisions that will concern them. I have proposed that in situations where there is only the de dicto meaning available and where decision maker has special responsibilities toward de dicto, the de dicto harm might be significant enough to make the decision or action at least morally problematic.
To better account for the animal examples introduced by Clare Palmer, I suggested to bring another layer to the non-identity cases and consider harms on the population level where appropriate. While considering harms to population (species or breed) might appear to consider harms to a third party, in procreative context, the individual cannot be viewed as totally separate from the populations they belong to.
2016-10-21T10:37:11Z
2016-10-21T10:37:11Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54238
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/564892021-03-08T09:48:08Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Redefining the War on Terror
Martin, Kyle
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
terrorism
violence
war
This thesis aims at achieving working definitions of terrorism and violence and to review the actions and political and legal considerations that the United States has made with the intention of arguing that there are few, if any, features that legitimize the conflict as a just war under philosophical and ethical considerations of the term, and is instead a series of deliberate acts of state terrorism and human rights abuses. Then lastly to apply post-colonial theory to the history and development of militarized action by the natives occupying the Middle East region. In short, concentration is on the broader circumstance of the War on Terror.
2017-06-02T13:11:39Z
2017-06-02T13:11:39Z
2017-05
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56489
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/541832021-03-08T08:39:23Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Endel Tulvingu autonoeetilise teadvuse kontseptsiooni fenomenoloogiline käsitlus
Mäemets, Inga
Möder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tulving, Endel
vaimufilosoofia
filosoofia
teadvus
mälu
Antud töö võtab vaatluse alla psühholoog Endel Tulvingu teadvusekäsitluse, kõrvutades seda vaimufilosoofilise lähenemisega teadvusele. Kitsamaks fookuseks on Tulvingu autonoeetilise teadvuse käsitluse võrdlus varaste fenomenoloogide teadvusekäsitlustega, eelkõige Husserli lähenemisega eneseteadvusele ja ajateadvusele. Sellise võrdluse ajendiks on Tulvingu autonoeetilise teadvuse fenomeniline käsitlus, milles on erilisel kohal enese teadvustamine ajas ning sellega kaasnev fenomeniline minevikulisuse tunne.
2016-10-18T11:42:53Z
2016-10-18T11:42:53Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54183
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/649412019-08-21T07:44:57Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Against epistemic partiality in friendship
Ametefio, Saviour De-Graft
Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
friendship
Episteemiline eelistamine sõprussuhtes on tees, mis väidab, et episteemiline kallutatus eksisteerib sõprussuhtes. See kallutatus esineb, kui sõbra kohta informatsiooni töödelda. Näiteks võttes arvesse fakti, et see inimene on sinu sõbraks põhjusega (mis ei ole episteemiline põhjus), et käsitleda kõiki hüpoteese ja tõendeid antud sõbra kasuks. Peamine oletus on see, et sõprussuhe baseerub sõbra jaoks karakteril ja lugupidamisel, seega peab tegutsema sellise karakteri kaitsmise huvides. Võttes seda sõprussuhte iseärasusena, me oleme julgustatud eksponeerima seda kallutatust sõprade kasuks. See baseerub faktil, et sõprussuhe on hea elu nimel hädavajalik. Selle vastu tegutsemine tähendab heast elust ilma jääda.
Antud teesi eesmärk on vaielda vastu sellele, et peaksime hülgama episteemilise kallutatuse sõprussuhtes. Seega, kui me aktsepteerime eeldust, et meie sõprade jaoks baseerub sõprussuhe karakteril ja lugupidamisel, siis õõnestab episteemiline kallutatus sellist karakterit ja seeläbi õõnestab ka sõprussuhet. Kaitseks sellele argumendile saab öelda, et episteemiline kallutatus on episteemiline viga ja kui seda sõprussuhtes julgustada, siis propageerime teisi pahesid ja rikume sõprussuhet. Jällegi, kui võtame arvesse fakti, et sõber on käitunud halvasti, siis tema kaitsemine läbi petliku doksastilise kallutatuse ei muuda tõsiasja, et ta on halb inimene.
Seda silmas pidades, isik peab lugu pidama oma sõpradest, aga ainult õigetel eesmärkidel.
In conclusion, I have argued that epistemic partiality undermines friendship if we accept that friendship in a stricter sense is based on character. The argument I have present give two justification for that. The first is that when we allow an excellent friend to behave doxastically biased in favor of his friend consistently, this will promote more vices. Epistemic bias seems to be a bad epistemic practice. This is because knowingly leading away from the evidence and correct judgment of your friend's conduct is unjust. Cultivating such behavior in friendship will only corrupt the friendship. The second is that the fact that you esteem your friend’s character by deceptive means does not change the reality that the person has flaws in his character. When in our assessment of information about our friends, intentionally favor that which seek to portray him more favorably in a good light, we act deceptively. When we notice this shortcoming, we must correct it. The instrumental argument aims to encourage friends to help each other in their development as a person. Therefore, recognizing their flaws may be one of the ways to help them grow. In fact, in friendship relations that works well the idealization of your friend and the friendship itself helps in the longevity and flourishing of that relationship. However, if the bias becomes excessive and unwarranted, for example, if negative feedback is not considered at all or the positive attitudes towards your friend become unrealistically optimistic, then the bias may become dysfunctional.
2019-08-01T08:54:15Z
2019-08-01T08:54:15Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.01 AME 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64941
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/420592021-03-08T08:38:00Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
David Hume'i maitsestandard kunstiteoste hindamisel
Soikmets, Triinu
Volt, Marek, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Tartu Ülikool. Praktilise filosoofia õppetool
Hume, David
kunstifilosoofia
filosoofia ajalugu
esteetika
kunstiteosed
hindamine
bakalaureusetööd
Käesolevas töö eesmärgiks on analüüsida, kas ja kuidas saab Hume’i maitsestandardi
abil hinnata kunstiteoseid. Standard lahendaks Hume’i silmis paradoksi: kuigi inimeste
maitsed on erinevad, on siiski selge, et üks kunstiteos on parem kui teine. Töö teema
valikus lähtusin soovist leida seletusi sellele, kui põhjendatud on teoste headuse hindamine igapäevases kunstipraktikas.
2014-06-19T07:05:24Z
2014-06-19T07:05:24Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/42059
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/320952021-03-08T09:46:49Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Martha Nussbaumi eetiline kosmopolitism - naiivne illusioon või kaasaegne ideaal?
Tamm, Jana
Piirimäe, Eva, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-07-30T12:56:24Z
2013-07-30T12:56:24Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32095
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/911302023-06-28T20:40:52Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
George Berkeley immaterialism ja kvantfüüsika Kopenhaageni tõlgendus
Nahkur, Markus
Roomet Jakapi, juhendaja
Piret Kuusk, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
immaterialism
quantum physics
In this thesis, my aim is to compare the relative epistemological positions of George Berkeley’s immaterialism and The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, of which both insinuate the importance of perceiving and measuring in order to know the properties of objects or quantum systems. This has also been proven via a formal logical proof. Although The Copenhagen interpretation doesn’t presume a metaphysics, it would be interesting to give a Berkeleyan metaphysical background to The Copenhagen interpretation. Bridging the metaphysical gap is successful at first, since problematic cases such as Schrödinger’s cat and the double slit experiment are solvable with reference to a perceiver in Berkeley’s idealism. Yet, a distinction has to be made between the sense ideas which are perceived by humans and those perceived by an infinite spirit. Many of the principles in quantum mechanics, such as wave-particle dualism and the superposition of quantum systems, can be solved via reference to the sense ideas perceived by an infinite spirit, which, although being the same ontologically, behave different from those perceived by humans alone. Thus the collapse of the wave function can also be explained with reference to the mind of the infinite spirit. This is where the harmony ceases to exist, since in Berkeley’s view, an object is just its observable properties, wherein there is no underlying matter that supports the different properties. According to Bell’s theorem, we cannot attribute properties to quantum systems before observing them, although the quantum systems under question still exist before being observed, they just do not have properties. This is a contradiction, because Berkeley’s metaphysics cannot support such a notion of an object without its properties. Quantum physics is also probabilistic, but Berkeley’s metaphysics is deterministic, owing to the existence of the infinite spirit, who controls our sense ideas. In the case of philosophy of science, the wave function is already seen as an instrument, thus being in accordance with Berkeley’s philosophy of science. It is also possible to approach the different principles of quantum mechanics according to Berkeley’s instrumentalism, thereby removing the difficulties that occurred with a metaphysical treatment of them. If Berkeley were alive today, he would have nothing bad to say about quantum physics, owing to its experimental success, if it were stated that quantum physics doesn’t deal with the effective and real causes of things, but only with the laws of nature.
Epistemoloogilises mõttes on nii Berkeley immaterialismil kui ka kvantfüüsika Kopenhaageni tõlgendusel üsna suur kattuvus. Mõlemad rõhutavad tajujast sõltuvust, mida näitas ka formaalloogiline seos. Kuna objektide omaduste puhul on alati vajalik viide tajujale või mõõtmise ajal olnud tingimustele, on mõlemal juhul tegu ka antirealistliku epistemoloogilise positsiooniga. Edasist metafüüsilist spekuleerimist saatis algul edu, kuid arutelu lõpus tekkisid siiski vastuolud. Mõlemad positsioonid väidavad, et tajujal pole kontrolli selle üle, mida ta tajub, ning mõõtja ei tea, mis arvväärtusi ta saab mõõtmisi teostades. Järelikult pole meelelised ideed inimese kontrollida, vaid Berkeley järgi Jumala juhatuse all. Lainefunktsiooni kollaps on vaid kirjeldus Jumala mõistuses toimuvast protsessist ning seda on ka kvantolekute superpositsioon. Ent idealistliku jätkuvuse teesiga edasi minnes järeldub sellest, et meelelised ideed, mida tajub ainult Jumal, võrreldes nii inimese kui ka Jumala poolt tajutavate ideedega, on erinevad, kuid mitte ontoloogilises mõttes. Tegu on ikkagi meeleliste ideedega, nad vaid käituvad erinevalt sõltudes sellest, milline vaim neid tajub – piiratud või piiramatu. Kvantfüüsika seadusi on vaja selleks, et piiratud vaimudele paistaks meeleline maailm korrapärane ja mõistetav. Teiselt poolt võivadki aga kvantfüüsika printsiibid kirjeldada Jumala mõistust. Siiski lõppevad siin kooskõlad ja sarnasused, sest kuigi Belli teoreemi järgi ei saa kvantosakestele omistada omadusi enne mõõtmist, on kvantosake endiselt olemas. See läheb aga vastuollu Berkeley vaadetega. Kuigi asjad saavad inimese tajust lahus eksisteerida Jumala kaudu, ei saa ükski asi eksisteerida ilma omadusteta ehk ideedeta, sest iga objekt ongi vaid ideede kogum. Samuti erinevad positsioonid üksteisest determinismi küsimuses, sest kvantfüüsika seadused ei ole deterministlikud, vaid pelgalt tõenäosuslikud, Berkeley järgi aga peaks Jumala tõttu maailm olema deterministlik. Teadusfilosoofilises lähenemises on lainefunktsiooni kirjeldus kooskõlas Berkeley instrumentalismiga – seda nähakse matemaatilise objektina ning mitte reaalsuse kirjeldajana. Kui nõnda käsitleda kõiki kvantfüüsika printsiipe pelgalt kui tööriistu, saab ületada ennist ette tulnud raskused, kui neid tõlgendada Berkeley metafüüsika raames. Kvantfüüsika on katsetulemuste kirjeldamisel edukas ning Berkeley’l pole selle vastu midagi, kui seda tõlgendada instrumentalistlikult ning omistada põhjuslikkus Jumalale, mitte aga kvantmehaanikaseadustele.
2023-06-28T12:11:34Z
2023-06-28T12:11:34Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.02 NAH 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/91130
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/643892019-06-17T10:24:09Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Slur or False Friend? An Assessment of "False Friends” Arguments
Soodla, Helo Liis
Davies, Alexander Stewart, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
analytical philosophy
semantic analysis
Finally, in this thesis I have shown that four accounts of slurs consider the social context of
both Estonia and anglophone countries to be such that it satisfies the criteria for a word in said
context to be a slur. However, besides a brief note on the omitted theories, I have not touched
upon why accounts centred around CIs or presuppositions have not been explicitly addressed
in this thesis. One reason for this is that the ‘tests’ these two accounts use to assess slurs include
comparing how their derogatory aspect scopes out under negation, in conditionals, etc.
However, it is unclear whether the linguistic constructions in Estonian straightforwardly model
those in English (e.g. kui…siis vs if…then). This poses a larger question for analytical
philosophy done in different languages. According to Pérez (2018, p. 10), “language is not a
neutral vehicle for our thoughts”. It might be the case that in my analysis of Estonian and
English words I have not paid enough attention to how the different languages themselves
affect the ideas, concepts and proposals put forward. Altogether these remarks point to a
necessity for refining our understanding of formal semantics for Estonian in the future.
Comparing slur-like words could be of help in clarifying these distinctions.
2019-06-17T10:22:48Z
2019-06-17T10:22:48Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.02 SOOd 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64389
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/564942021-03-08T09:48:09Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Animal research and objectivity
Neemre, Eveli
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
objectivity
animal research
symbolic communication research
Oma magistritöös huvitusin ma loomauuringute objektiivsusest. Loomade uurimisega seondub interaktsioonist tulenev subjektiivne element, mis on vastuolus tavapärase arusaamaga objektiivsusest. Selle vastolu tõttu peetakse mõningaid loomauuringuid ebaobjektiivseks või suisa pseudoteaduslikuks. Esimeseks sammuks selle probleemi uurimisel selgitasin objektiivsuse mõistet. Selle käigus leidsin, et tavapärane arusaam objektiivsusest ja sellega kattuv arusaam absoluutsest objektiivsusest teaduses ei sobi tegelikult teadustöö loomusega. Nõustun Helen E. Longinoga, et teadus ja teadusloome on oma olemuselt sotsiaalsed ja seetõttu peaks ka objektiivsust mõistma sotsiaalselt, mitte individuaalselt nagu klassikalises arusaamas objektiivsusest. Minu teiseks sammuks oli uurida konkreetseid loomauuringute näiteid sotsiaalse objektiivsuse valguses, et näha kas loomauuringud saavad olla objektiivsed samadel alustel kui teised teadused. Keskendusin kahele suurele uurimissuunale loomauuringutes: loomade keeleprojektidele ja mõttelugemise eksperimentidele. Esimene neist, loomade keeleprojektid, ei olnud väga objektiivsed, kuna selle ala juhtivate projektide teadlased ei olnud võimelised kriitikale adekvaatselt reageerima ning seetõttu oli nende projektide objektiivsus kompromiteeritud. Mõttelugemise eksperimendid seevastu osutusid objektiivseteks, kuna uuringute algusest peale olid teadlased avatud kriitikale ja alternatiivsetele hüpoteesidele ning kriitikute ja teadlaste vahel toimus elav diskusioon, mis pani aluse uutele eksperimentidele ja uurimissuundadele. Järeldasin, et loomade uuringud võivad olla hoolimata neis sisalduvast subjektiivsest elemendist objektiivsed, kui loomadega tegelevad teadlased osalevad avatud kriitilises diskusioonis.
2017-06-04T07:24:55Z
2017-06-04T07:24:55Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56494
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/420572021-03-08T08:38:00Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Sokraatiline meetod - vahend moraaliteadmiste saavutamiseks või protreptika?
Kask, Maarja
Lott, Toomas, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Sokrates
antiikfilosoofia
filosoofia ajalugu
bakalaureusetööd
eetika
Sokrates, kui üks lääne filosoofia alusepanijatest, on veel tänapäevani üks
diskuteeritumaid, aga ka vastuolulisemaid filosoofe. Tema küsitud küsimused on sellised, mille üle arutlevad siiani nii moraalifilosoofid kui ka epistemoloogid, ent mis kerkivad üles ka igapäevastes vestlustes. Sokrates julges küsida küsimusi, mis jäävad küsimusteks kogu inimkonna mõtteloo vältel. Paradoksaalsel kombel ei ole filosoof kirja pannud aga ühtegi
teost. Arutelusid ja põnevust tekitabki ilmselt tema võrdlemisi mõistatuslikuks jäänud olemus ning isikupärane lähenemine moraaliküsimustele. Tänu Platonile, Xenophonile ja Aristophanesele on meil aga siiski olemas allikad Sokratese filosoofia tundma õppimiseks.
Käesolevas töös üritangi jõuda sammu võrra lähemale Sokratese tundma saamisele, uurides tema põhilist tegevust – linnaelanikega vestlemist Vana-Ateena tänavail, mida nüüd nimetame sokraatiliseks meetodiks. Selle jaoks kasutan põhiliselt Platoni varaseid dialooge, kuna on arvatud, et just nendes dialoogides kujutab Platon Sokratest ning tema filosoofiat kõige tõetruumalt.Dialoogide kronoloogilises järjestuses ollakse uurijate hulgas enamjaolt üksmeelel. Varjasteks dialoogideks loetakse: „Sokratese apoloogia“, „Charmides“, „Kriton“, „Euthyphron“, „Gorgias“, „Hippias lühem“, „Ion“, „Laches“, „Protagoras“ ja „Politeia I“.
2014-06-19T06:59:51Z
2014-06-19T06:59:51Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/42057
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/904692023-06-12T20:41:35Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Ruum ruudus
Nõmmik, Maarja
Kask, Jüri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2023-06-12T08:45:21Z
2023-06-12T08:45:21Z
2013
Thesis
ARH Diss. B-24929
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/90469
est
restrictedAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/827342022-06-21T09:14:11Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Hans-Georg Gadamer ja kantiaanlikud kunstikäsitlused
Piir, Martin
Tool, Andrus, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
aesthetics
Kantianism
This bachelor’s thesis aims to give a brief overview of the aesthetic theories of Immanuel Kant and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Kant’s main goal with his Critique of Judgment was to complete his system of critical philosophy by finding a link between nature and morality in the faculty of reflective judgment. Kant’s descendants in the spirit of his critical philosophy disregarded everything which did not satisfy the criteria of natural sciences as subjective. Therefore, Gadamer blames Kant for the advent of what he calls “aesthetic consciousness”, a view which separates a work of art from its deeper meaning and place in history, only emphasizing its immediate, empirically perceived aesthetic qualities. Thus Gadamer claims that because of this, it is now significantly more difficult for people to experience the type of truth that is inherent in art, which leads people towards self-understanding. Kristin Gjesdal however claims that Gadamer has misconstrued Kant’s views. Her main criticism towards Gadamer is that he has not properly understood Kant’s views on the experience of natural beauty, which Kant views as intrinsically meaningful. Gadamer on the other hand finds nature to be hermeneutically empty, because one is able to assign any kind of meaning to nature according to their subjective mood.
Gadameri filosoofia peamiseks taotluseks on näidata, et kunstis leidub teatud sorti tõde, mis võimaldab avardada meie maailma- ja enesemõistmist ning suudab inimest muuta. Moodsa loodusteaduse arenedes ja Kanti filosoofia vaimus said aga hoopis loodusteadused tõe etaloniks. Kunsti hakati selle taustal vaatlema kui pelgalt esteetilist nähtust, mis pakub inimestele vaid esteetilisi elamusi. Taolist kunstikogemust nimetab Gadamer esteetiliseks teadvuseks. Esteetilise teadvuse juures taandatakse teose tähendus vaid selle esteetilistele omadustele, mis on lahutatud teose ajaloolisest kontekstist. Gadamer vastandub sellisele kunstikäsitlusele, sest Gadameri järgi on kunst ajalooliselt kujunenud mõistuse ja vaimu tulemus.
2022-06-21T09:12:57Z
2022-06-21T09:12:57Z
2022
Thesis
20.03.02 PII 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/82734
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/727142021-06-27T20:17:46Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Is 'fitness' a primitive or a propensity? Diagnosing the role of explanatory reductionism on differing standards of scientific definitions
Rohtmets, Anna Elise
Talpsepp, Edit, juhendaja
Kõiv, Riin, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Antud magistritöös võrdlen kaht bioloogia filosoofide kõige varasemat püüet selgitada evolutsioonilise kohasuse tähendust ja seletuslikku rolli loodusliku valiku teooras. Esimene püüe oli kohasust tõlgendada kui statistilist kalduvust (propensity). Teine püüe oli tõlgendada kohasust kui loodusliku valiku teooria primitiivset ehk definitsioonita mõistet. Mõlema tõlgenduse eesmärk oli lahendada tsirkulaarsusprobleem, mille järgi on kohasus bioloogide poolt defineeritud viisil, et loodusliku valiku teooria pakub tsirkulaarseid seletusi. See töö kaitseb väidet, et tõlgenduste erimeelsus ei seisnud nende erinevas arusaamas sellest, mis kohasus on looduses, vaid milline kohasuse definitsioon võimaldab lahendada tsirkulaarsusprobleemi: primitivistlik tõlgendus taotles reduktiivset kohasuse definitsiooni ja kalduvustõlgendus ei taotlenud reduktiivset definitsiooni.
This thesis explores the disagreement between the two earliest attempts by philosophers of biology to explain the meaning and explanatory role of evolutionary fitness in the theory of natural selection. I compare two interpretations of fitness: the propensity interpretation and the primitivist interpretation. Both aimed to solve the charge that due to the way fitness had been construed by biologists, the theory of natural selection offers circular explanations. I argue that their disagreement was not in their different understanding of what fitness is, but in their standards for a successful definition of fitness that would solve the charge. The primitivist interpretation required a reductive definition of fitness, while the propensity interpretation did not.
2021-06-27T20:15:44Z
2021-06-27T20:15:44Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 ROH 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72714
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608102019-02-06T17:07:16Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Against the narrative self
Rehman, Ayesha
Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja
Vivian Puusepp, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
narrative
self
practical philosophy
In my thesis, I argue against the narrative conception of self, the idea that our self is
narrative in structure and that we live life as a narrative. First, I differentiate between the
strong and weak narrative view of self. I classify Dennett and Bruner’s account as the
strong claim, Schechtman and Cavarero’s as the weak narrative claim. Second, I reject
both the descriptive and normative narrativity thesis. I question the universality of a
Narrative outlook. I argue that the artificial constructing of a narrative self is not conducive
to self-understanding and that our choices of structuring it might be limiting. Last, I defend
the non-Narrative conception of self against the common objection that without a selfnarrative
one cannot be held accountable. I discuss Eichmann’s defense in Jerusalem along
the way to untangle the link between narrativity and accountability.
2018-06-19T09:29:39Z
2018-06-19T09:29:39Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.01 REH 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60810
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/577072021-03-08T08:34:40Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Inimõitseng hariduse eesmärgina
Kivi, Merlin
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
hariduse eesmärk
kodanikukasvatus
väärtuskasvatus
inimõitseng
õnn
The objective of this Bachelor’s thesis is to give an overview of the aims of education
and to show that the main function of schools is to raise flourishing people. At first I
tried to analyse the aims of education and how they are related to the purpose of life. I
showed that happiness is the main purpose of life and education, because all the
people usually desire great relationships, money, good social position or money,
because they this it makes them happy. As Aristoteles has pointed out, happiness is
always the final purpose of our acts. In the second part I came up with idea that to live
a flourishing life, people have to be successful in personal, social, and working life
and for this they have to live a moral life. In the last paragraph I presented the idea of
value education, which is a method about raising moral children. I showed that there
are three main methods in value teaching: the rational moral education, character
education and integrative ethical education. I tried to show what is the main role of
teachers in value education and how they can affect students’ lives.
2017-09-03T05:31:48Z
2017-09-03T05:31:48Z
2017-08
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/57707
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/565702021-03-08T08:39:24Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Hariduse tähendus inimese moraalsele arengule Immanuel Kanti pedagoogikakäsituses ja Lawrence Kohlbergi pedagoogikateoorias
Krumm, Mari
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
väärtused
Immanuel Kant
haridus
Larwence Kohlberg
väärtuskasvatus
The objective of this thesis is to show education as one of the fundamentals for rise of human morality. The paper is based on moral philosophy and pedagogy lectures of Immanuel Kant and practical research of Lawrence Kohlberg. Thesis proceeds from Kant' claim that morality rests on human rational intellect. According to Kant, every intellectual being has the potential of autonomy, and realizing that potential makes them capable to make moral decisions from their free will. Decisions are based on moral principles that are categorical and, in order to understand whether the decision is morally accurate, it has to be tested on the imperative. Although Kant's morality rests on human subjective will and has no link to empirical world, it needs experiences for its development. Human systematic development creates the best
progress for becoming moral, which goal is to teach people to think. However, this can
only take place in suitable educational condition that result in a child growing into an
autonomic intellectual being who, with their rational mind, is capable of being legislative and create regulations that follow Kant's maxims. Lawrence Kohlberg, who was a supporter for Kant's views, researched te implementation of
Kant's educational measures in practice. It turned out, that modern education does not create sufficient opportunities for development of an autonomous person. Kohlberg's
experiment, where curriculum based on Kant's moral philosophy was implemented, displayed positive changes in schools; thieving stopped, inter-racial conflicts ended, thriving for better education increased, and drug-use as well as lying decreased. These results allow us to conclude that Kant's views on pedagogy are productive, and paying more attention to the development of a child's independence increases their moral development. Furthermore, supporting the formation of an independent self in a person's childhood, we create conditions for making the whole community more moral.
2017-06-09T06:33:33Z
2017-06-09T06:33:33Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56570
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321702021-03-08T08:34:41Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Presentism ja erirelatiivsusteooria
Kivimaa, Carel
Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T14:28:36Z
2013-08-06T14:28:36Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32170
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485312021-03-08T08:38:02Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Egoism Immanuel Kanti eetikas ja Alison Hillsi egoismivormid
Laur, Taimi
Parhomenko, Eduard, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Kant, Immanuel
filosoofia
eetika
egoism
Käesolevas bakalaureusetöös analüüsin Immanuel Kanti arusaama egoismist ja Alison
Hillsi eristatud egoismivorme.
2015-09-17T11:13:28Z
2015-09-17T11:13:28Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48531
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/437032021-03-08T08:38:00Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Rahvastiku kasvu reguleerimise moraalne õigustatus
Ambrosius, Aina
Keerus, Külli, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
keskkonnaeetika
rahvastik
ülerahvastus
heaolu
inimõigused
põlvkonnad
Käesoleva bakalaureusetöö keskmes on planeedi Maa ülerahvastatuse ja loodusliku
keskkonna degradatsiooni probleem. Arvestades inimkonna suurust ja kasvutendentse,
inimeste tarbimisharjumustega kaasnevat saastet ja looduslike ressursside tarbimist ning maakeral olemasolevaid mitte-lõputuid looduslikke ressursse, peetakse ülerahvastatust kriitiliseks probleemiks, mis võib ohustada inimkonna eksistentsi tervikuna. Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on kaardistada ülerahvastatuse ja rahvastiku kiire kasvu reguleerimisega seonduvad eetilised dilemmad ning analüüsida neile tuginedes sündimuse reguleerimise moraalset õigustatust.
2014-10-02T09:28:37Z
2014-10-02T09:28:37Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/43703
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/564962021-03-08T09:48:09Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Kas tippsportlastel on rohkem põhjust moraalne olla kui tavainimestel
Järvela, Mariann
Meriste, Heidy, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
tippsportlased
moraalne kohustus
spordieetika
This thesis is focused on the question, whether professional athletes have special reasons to act morally outside of the sporting arena? Professional athletes receive a tremendous amount of media attention, both on and off the field. Hence, they are in the limelight not only for their sporting excellence and athletic achievement but also for their behaviour in aspects of life beyond their particular field. The objective of this thesis is to show that professional athletes have more reasons to act morally than ordinary people. The first chapter is focused on the role model argument. Professional athletes hold positions of great influence, fame and authority in our society and, hence, they are role models for the rest of us. Because of their highly unusual influence, they have a moral obligation to be good role models which stem from social responsibility. The second chapter is focused on the special relationship between sport and morality. Namely, I argue that athletes have a special reason to act morally because of the intrinsic and instrumental value of integrity. Therefore, this thesis claims that professional athletes have special reasons to act morally stemming from the social responsibility and the value of personal integrity
2017-06-04T08:07:53Z
2017-06-04T08:07:53Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56496
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/554392021-03-08T08:39:24Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
The relationship between thinking and the world in the philosophy of Hannah Arendt
Kruusmaa, Mirt
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Hannah Arendt
political philosophy
philosophy of mind
Minu lõputöö eesmärk on analüüsida mõtlemise kui tähenduse avamisele orienteeritud tegevuse vahekorda maailmaga Hannah Arendti filosoofias. Mõtlemist piiritleb Arendt Platoni järgi kahekõnena minu ja minu enda vahel, kui olen maailmast eraldunud. Mõtlemisega kaasnev tagajärg on südametunnistus. Maailm on aga Arendti jaoks poliitiline mõiste: maailm kui avalik ruum, mida iseloomustab suhteline püsivus ning mille taustal kodanikud saavad end teostada kõne või tegutsemise läbi. Maailma alusprintsiibiks on mitmekesisus. Sellest johtuvalt on tööd kandev küsimus järgmine: missugune roll, kui üldse, on mõtlemisel maailmas, kui esimene nõuab viimasest eraldumist?
Väidan, et kuigi Arendt rõhutab mõtlemise võimet ära hoida moraalne katastroof vähemalt mõtleja enda jaoks, ei peitu selles mõtlemise poliitiline tähtsus. Poliitika mõõdupuuks on maailm, mõtlemise mõõdupuuks aga kooskõla iseendaga. Poliitika vaatenurgast, kus võim sünnib kodanike koostegutsemisest, on mõtlemine impotentne, kuna jagab inimesed singulaarsusteks. Ometi tõuseb Arendti filosoofias pinnale arusaam, et mõtlemine sõltub inimese suhtest maailmaga. See ilmneb, kui uurida Arendti modernismi kriitikat, mille põhijoonteks on uusaja teadusest välja kasvanud umbusaldus meelelise reaalsuse vastu ning traditsiooni hääbumine. Leides end korraga ebakindlas maailmas, hakkab inimene end kui vestluspartnerit umbusaldama. Selgub, et inimese osavõtt maailmast koos teiste inimestega, tagab ka mõtlemisoskuse. Mõtlemise subjektiivsuse ületab aga osustusvõime, mis võtab arvesse teiste inimeste perspektiivid, et tagada mõtte kommunikeeritavus. Traditsioonilise maailmapildi lagunemise järel on otsustusvõime hädatarvilik: tehes mõtlemise kui tähendusele suunatud tegevuse maailmas “nähtavaks”, hoiab otsustusvõime avalikku ruumi alal kasvava tähendusetuse vastu.
2017-02-07T11:53:58Z
2017-02-07T11:53:58Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/55439
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/542352021-03-08T09:46:50Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
In Defence of Logical Omniscience
Lõbus, Indrek
Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja
Estrada González, Luis, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
filosoofia
loogika
deduktsioon
Stalnaker, Robert
The most controversial consequence of Robert Stalnaker’s (1984) theory of propositional attitudes is that subjects of propositional attitudes are logically omniscient. What makes this consequence problematic is that it seems to conflict with the fact that subjects of propositional attitudes are also deductive reasoners. Stalnaker’s solution to this problem consists in two complementary theories. According to the metalinguistic theory, deductive information is metalinguistic, and according to the integration theory, deductive reasoning proceeds via integration of dispositions to act. In my thesis I will defend Stalnaker’s solution against two arguments, namely the translation argument (Moore 1995, Nuffer 2009) and the argument from logical oversight (Moore 1995, Jago 2014). In my responses I will rely on a Tractarian distinction between signs and symbols, showing that it brings out a similar flaw in both arguments. The flaw in the first is the assumption that the same sentence cannot be written in two different languages, and the flaw in the second is the assumption that two different logical connectives cannot be written in the same way. In my response to the first of these arguments, I will also develop a variation of Stalnaker’s metalinguistic theory that accounts for the sign/symbol distinction.
2016-10-21T09:51:59Z
2016-10-21T09:51:59Z
2016
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/54235
en
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/564922021-03-08T09:48:09Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice
Ramos, Andrés Calderon
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
epistemic injustice
coevalness
In this thesis we explore the idea of denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice. We start by defining what we consider are the relevant factors of an epistemic injustice and why we consider that the denial of coevalness can be thought of as a kind of epistemic injustice, we then proceed to tackle the idea of denial of coevalness produce by two studies, one by Johannes Fabian, the other by Walter Mignolo; we highlight the fundamental epistemic injustice that denial of coevalness produces, trying to understand how it came to be and how it is maintained, then we confront our reflections with the concept of coevalness as proposed by José Ortega y Gasset, building from this three projects so that we can, not only identify denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice, but point out a possible solution as well.
2017-06-03T07:38:45Z
2017-06-03T07:38:45Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56492
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608162019-02-06T17:07:51Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Neoliberalism majanduseliidi võimu kindlustava ideoloogiana : magistritöö
Hallasoo, Märt
Volberg, Mats, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
economy
economic elite
power
ideologies
This thesis focuses on neoliberalism being an ideology enhancing the power of the economic elite. Neoliberal ideology focuses on free market, individual liberties and reducing the state. The effects of reforms guided by neoliberal ideology should be prosperity in both economics and individual liberties. And yet neoliberal reforms have failed to deliver those results for the majority of people. The results of neoliberal practice have been somewhat mixed, with negative results overweighing the positive ones. Most notable negative results have been ever raising economic inequality which has led to economic elite getting the most of the economic growth and in some case even means declining well-being for the poorest classes of society. At the same time individual liberties have increased in terms of economic liberties for the elite, while the economic and political liberties of common citizens have decreased. This has led the economic elite to gain control over both economic and political power, resulting in declining quality of democracy. Author claims that such substantial difference in neoliberal theory and practice in terms of predicted results and real results can be explained by the hidden agenda of neoliberal ideology, which is to enhance the power of the economic elite.
2018-06-19T10:21:11Z
2018-06-19T10:21:11Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.01 HAL 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60816
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/644252019-06-17T13:19:18Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
How can artificial intelligence be risky?
Luik, Taavi
Volberg, Mats, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
artificial intelligence
Käesolevas töös uurin ma tehisintellektiga (TI) seotud riske – kuidas saaks TI viia selleni,
et me kaotame midagi, mida me väärtustame? Ma rõhutan, et TI defineerimisel ei tohi me
olla liiga inimkesksed ega nõuda üldise intelligentsuse olemasolu. Ka inimesest väga
erinevad ja väga kitsad tehissüsteemid võivad olla piisavalt võimsad, et kujutada endast
ohtu. Mitmed ohud tulenevad TI töö ettekavatsemata tagajärgedest, ent mitmed
aktuaalsed ohud tulenevad TI kui tööriista kasutamisest mänguteoreetilistes null või
negatiivse summaga mängudes. Ma rõhutan, et tehisintellekti ei tuleks käsitleda
abstraktse tulevikunähtusena, vaid juba praegu eksisteerivana ja analüüsi vajavana.
Inimeste väärtused ja eesmärgid on tihti omavahel konfliktis, ning see fakt vajab mingit
lahendust, sest tehnoloogia areng kiireneb, võimaldades saavutada järjest kergemini
erinevaid eesmärke, ent meie võime muutustega kohaneda ei jõua sellega sammu pidada.
Ühe võimaliku osalise lahendusena konfliktide olemasolule võib TI pakkuda meile
võimalust taashinnata meie instrumentaalseid eesmärke ja väärtusi – on võimalik, et see,
mida me seni soovisime saavutada, pole enam relevantne.
In this thesis, I research risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI) – how could AI
lead to us losing something we value? I stress that when defining AI, we cannot be too
human-centric or require the existence of general intelligence. Narrow AI systems that are
very different from humans can be powerful enough to pose risks. Many risks originate
from unintended consequences, yet many actual risks come from using AI as a tool in zero
or negative sum games, to use concepts of game theory. I stress that AI should not be
treated so much as an abstract phenomena of the future, but as an already existing
phenomena that requires analysis. The values and goals of humans are often in conflict
and this requires a solution, since the progress of technology is accelerating, enabling more
different goals to be achieved, and we are often unable to keep up with this pace. AI can
provide a partial solution to the existence of instrumental conflicts by enabling us to
reconsider them – it is possible that what we have desired so far is no longer relevant.
2019-06-17T13:18:37Z
2019-06-17T13:18:37Z
2019
Thesis
20.03.02 LUI 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/64425
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Autorile viitamine + Mitteäriline eesmärk + Tuletatud teoste keeld 3.0 Eesti
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/321682021-03-08T08:34:40Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Identiteet ja kultuuride võrdse tunnustamise nõue. Medusa sündroom
Tikkenberg, Kristiina
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
2013-08-06T14:15:04Z
2013-08-06T14:15:04Z
2013
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/32168
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608242019-02-06T16:57:57Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
F. M. Christensen’s critique of "sexual harassment"
Dreilikh, Daria
Volt, Marek, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
critique
sexual harassment
Käesoleva bakalaureusetöö teema põhineb F. M. Christenseni tavatul vaatel, et seksuaalse
ahistamise mõiste tuleks likvideerida. Antud bakalaureusetöö koosneb kolmest osast. Seksuaalse
ahistamise mõiste uurimiseks otsustas autor analüüsida teiste filosoofide vaateid. Esimeses osas
analüüsitakse Catherine MacKinnoni, Anita Supersoni, John Hughesi ja Larry Mayi, Edmundi
Walli, Nancy Davise ja F.M. Christenseni seksuaalse ahistamise definitsioone. Margaret Crouchile
tuginevast analüüsist selgus muuhulgas, et nende vaadete nõrkus seisneb selles, et suurem osa
nendest on feministlikud ja mis on seotud ainult naiste suunas tekitatud kahjuga. Iga lõigu lõpus
analüüsib autor filosoofide definitsioone ühest või teisest vaatenurgast, ja lisab oma näiteid ja
arvamusi. Teises osas kirjeldab autor Christenseni seisukohta ja väljendab oma arvamust tema
teooria kohta. Christensen eitab, et seksuaalne ahistamine näol on tegemist rikkumise ja
diskrimineerimine ja et seksuaalne ahistamine üldse on tõsine ühiskondlik probleem. Ta väidab, et
seksuaalne ahistamine on otsitud termin, mis ei tekita inimesele reaalset kahju, nagu näiteks
tapmine. Christensen vaidleb vastu, et seksuaalne ahistamine diskrimineerib naisi, sest ta arvab, et
see seisukoht on egoistlik. Kolmas osa on pühendatud mainitud filosoofide vaadete eristamisele.
Autor proovib leida Crouchi, Cornelli, Supersoni ja MacKinnoni võimalike argumente Christenseni
vaadete vastu. Töö lõpeb järeldusega, kus autor väljendab suures osas oma nõustumist Christenseni
vaadetega.
The topic of this thesis is based on the extraordinary view of F.M. Christensen that the notion of
sexual harassment must be eliminated. This thesis includes three parts. To examine this concept the
author decided to analyze other philosopher’s points of view. Thus, in the first part definitions of
sexual harassment by Catherine MacKinnon, Anita Superson, John Hughes and Larry May,
Edmund Wall, Nancy Davis and F.M. Christensen are analyzed. An analysis based on Margaret
Crouch revealed, inter alia, that the weakness of their views is based on the fact that most of them
are feministic and related to harm only towards women. At the end of each paragraph the author
gives analysis of the view accompanying with her examples and opinion. In the second part the
author describes Christensen’s point of view and expresses her own opinion about his theory.
Christensen denies that sexual harassment is violation, discrimination and serious societal problem.
He claims that sexual harassment is too far-fetched notion which does not bring real harm as murder
does, for instance. Christensen argues that sexual harassment discriminates women, because he
considers this position egoistic. The third part is dedicated to distinctions between views of
mentioned philosophers. The author tries to find the arguments of Crouch, Cornell, Superson and
MacKinnon on Christensen’s views. This paper ends with conclusion where the author to a
considerable extent expresses her agreement with Christensen.
2018-06-19T11:20:13Z
2018-06-19T11:20:13Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.02 DRE 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60824
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/420622021-03-08T08:38:00Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Mis on kollektiivne mälu?
Beilmann, Kaia
Laanpere, Taavi, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
vaimufilosoofia
kollektiivne mälu
bakalaureusetööd
Käesolevas töös kavatsen selgitada, mis on kollektiivne mälu. Kollektiivsest mälust kui
sellisest on räägitud juba alates kahekümnenda sajandi esimesest poolest. Alates ajast, mil kollektiivset mälu hakati uurima individuaalsest mälust eraldi nähtusena (eelkõige pärast M. Halbwachsi teose „Kollektiivne mälu“ ilmumist aastal 1950), on üha enam tähtsust omandanud mälu sotsiaalsed aspektid. Püüan selgitada kollektiivse mälu mõistet, kuna näib, et ühtne arusaam selle nähtuse asjus puudub. Teooriates, kus antud nähtust põhjalikumalt käsitletakse, võib täheldada 'kollektiivse mälu' üsna hägusat ning kohati ka vastuolulist lahtimõtestamist.
2014-06-19T07:19:53Z
2014-06-19T07:19:53Z
2014
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/42062
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/485262021-03-08T08:38:01Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Sokraatiline iroonia Platoni dialoogides
Saks, Karl Erik
Lott, Toomas, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
filosoofia
iroonia
Selle töö raames võtangi vaatluse alla küsimuse, kas Sokrates on irooniline ning kui jah,
siis kuidas ta on irooniline ning kas sellel iroonial on filosoofiline tähendus. Sellele
küsimusele vastuse leidmiseks analüüsin ja demonstreerin viimase 25 aasta sokraatilise
iroonia uuringute käiku esitades nelja filosoofi – Gregory Vlastose, Alexander Nehamase,
Iakovos Vasiliou ja Melissa Lane’i – sokraatilise iroonia analüüsi. Nende nelja filosoofi töö
põhjal demonstreerin, et sokraatilise iroonia iroonilisuse küsimus hõlmab endasse ka Platoni
kui Sokratest esindavate dialoogide autori iroonilisuse küsimust, millest tulenevalt eristan
neli erinevat seisukohta, mida vastavad filosoofid esindavad: 1) Sokrates on irooniline, kuid
Platon ei ole; 2) Nii Sokrates kui ka Platon on iroonilised; 3) Sokrates ei ole irooniline, kuid
Platon on; 4) Kumbki neist pole irooniline. Sean selle hoiakulise kombinatoorika oma enda
sokraatilise iroonia analüüsi aluseks ning uurin, kas nendest tulenevate teooriate poolt
esindatud argumendid on piisavalt pädevad, et objektiivselt seletada sokraatilise iroonia
fenomeni ning selle fenomeni taga peituvaid Sokratese „varjatud“ hoiakuid.
2015-09-17T10:43:59Z
2015-09-17T10:43:59Z
2015
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/48526
et
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/727202021-06-27T21:07:06Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Mystical experiences and mental disorders: what psychedelic research on depression and anxiety can tell us about the nature of mental illness
Bar, Monika Joanna
Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
mental disorders
depression
anxiety
This paper examines the implications of the recent research on psychedelic substances and their effects on mental health. Specifically, the paper analyzes the findings concerning the correlation between a particular state of consciousness reliably induced by ingestion of psychedelics – the so-called “mystical experience” – and long-term improvements in mental health. The central thesis pursued is that the “self-model” of mental suffering – the view that mental illness should be understood primarily as part of that flow of subjective experience that human consciousness and selfhood are grounded in – best accommodates the evidence from psychedelic research, which indicates that the therapeutic effects of psychedelics are achieved through a profound alteration in the conscious self.
2021-06-27T21:06:03Z
2021-06-27T21:06:03Z
2021
Thesis
20.03.01 BAR 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72720
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/565202021-03-08T09:48:09Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
George Berkeley traktaadis “De motu” esitatud kriitikast Isaac Newtoni gravitatsioonikontseptsiooni suhtes
Veede, Raul
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
George Berkeley
Newtoni gravitatsioonikäsitlus
natuurfilosoofia
Current work analyzes the critical argumentation presented by George Berkeley in
his essay De Motu towards the concept of gravity by Isaac Newton. In the wider
historical context of different contemporary schools in natural philosophy, different
diachronic themes and problematic issues in the concept of gravity as recognized by
Newton himself, Berkeley’s argumentation is analyzed and systematized as four
arguments: terminological vagueness, use of fictional entitities, explanation of
phenomena by occult qualities, and the issue of force as a substance.
As we see, all these are found in many other authors of the era. From the
modern point of view, some analogies to Berkeley’s arguments have been used in
modern physics, inducing and introducing new theories in cosmology, quantum
physics, and theory of relativity. Evidently, Berkeley’s argumentation is if not valid,
then definitely deserving more attention and a more thorough analysis than it has
received until now. Throughout the work, several perspectives for further Berkeleian studies are noted. Concerning the question of instrumentalism, the author doubts its foundation as such in Berkeley’s De motu , and queries, whether the whole theory might be anachronistic. Analysis is accompanied by a partial translation of De Motu into Estonian.
2017-06-06T12:05:03Z
2017-06-06T12:05:03Z
2017
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56520
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/699882021-10-04T11:03:34Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The logic of knowledge and demonstratives
Shurakov, Nikolai
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, juhendaja
Patrick William Shirreff, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
logic
epistemology
The thesis aims to demonstrate how an epistemic operator K can be added
to the Logic of Demonstratives. I started with a description of Kaplan’s LD. First
off, I showed two reasons motivated Kaplan to create the formal system LD. There
are several contingent logical truths in LD but one of them φ↔Aφ played a crucial
role in my further reasoning. In the second section of the thesis, I tried to add the
epistemic operator K to the LD using its standard definition. As a result, I got a
formula (K+A) that leads to a number of weird results. For example, If it is known
that φ↔Aφ then every truth is known. I argue that LD is inconsistent with the
standard interpretation for K. However, Rabinowicz and Segerberg(1994) provide
the non-standard interpretation of epistemic operator K. They consider necessity
and actuality operators as ones with a fixed perspective and allow K to have a
variable perspective. As a result, their definition of K might be directly added to
LD without creating the troublesome formula (K+A). It helps to avoid all the
problems from the second section That’s why I conclude that we can have the Logic
for Knowledge and demonstratives (LD+K) and treat it like a possible extension
of LD. This conclusion equips us with a formal tool to analyze sentences like ‘It is
known that I am here now’ that was unanalyzable in the original formal system.
2020-10-19T11:32:18Z
2020-10-19T11:32:18Z
2020-08
Thesis
20.03.01 SHU 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/69988
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/577082021-03-08T09:46:48Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Demonstratives and the Audience-Control Theory
Eesmaa, Triinu
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
audience-control theory
content of a demonstrative
disagreements
Romdenh-Romluc
Wettstein
According to the audience-control theory of demonstratives, the content of a demonstrative in a context is what an attentive and competent audience would reasonably take to be its content in the context. In this thesis, I will respond to the arguments that have been made against the this theory, and have not been responded in the literature. Three of these arguments can be responded to by relying the existing framework of the audience-control theory, worked out by Wettstein (1984) and Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2004). Responding to the two remaining requires specifying what the theory would predict in cases where the interlocutors could disagree about what the content of a demonstrative is. In the thesis, I will develop two ways to make this specification. According to the first response, in these cases, the content of the demonstrative is indeterminate, and according to the second response, the demonstrative has different content relative to different audience members. The thesis concludes by assessing these two responses by considering how they handle situations where disagreements about what a demonstrative refers to are revealed.
2017-09-03T05:51:51Z
2017-09-03T05:51:51Z
2017-08
Thesis
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/57708
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
openAccess
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608092019-02-06T17:07:07Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Euthanasia as a way of experiencing a good death
Mikšys, Aurimas
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
euthanasia
death
practical philosophy
The thesis shows that euthanasia (voluntary euthanasia in particular) can be a
way to have a good dying experience before an impending death befalls terminally ill
people experiencing unbearable suffering. It also strives to present the notion of a good
death, which constitutes the needs and wants that people most often aim to satisfy at the
end of their life in order to have a good dying experience. This thesis reveals that the
notion of a good death can be summarized in a broader sense as a ‘managed’ death and
voluntary euthanasia, which allows to control one’s dying experience, have a common
overlapping element (the control of one’s dying experience) that unifies the notion of a
good death and voluntary euthanasia.
2018-06-19T09:09:10Z
2018-06-19T09:09:10Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.01 MIK 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60809
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/608292019-02-06T16:58:12Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35472
Moraalne parendamine: tehisintellekti ja neuroloogilise sekkumise võrdlus
Suuder, Ingrid
Simm, Kadri, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
moraalne parendamine
tehisintellekt
neuroloogiline sekkumine
artificial intelligence
neurobiological intervention
moral enhancement
Tehes kokkuvõtet kogu bioloogilist parendamist ning sealhulgas eelkõige moraalset
parendamist puudutavatest poolt- ja vastuargumentidest ning võrreldes kahte erinevat
vahendit selle saavutamiseks, tundub, et meetodi valik mõjutab parendamise lubatavust
oluliselt. Esiteks jäid kõrvale kõik liigset meditsiinilist sekkumist nõudvad võimalused
(kirurgiline sekkumine vms), kuna juba ainuüksi meditsiinieetika kohaselt ei ole võimalik
nende ohtust ja toimet uurida.
Vähem invasiivsematest ja realistlikumatest vahenditest tundub olevat kerge eelis kahe
meetodi ligikaudsel võrdlusel AI kasutamisel. Seda siiski vaid võrreldes artiklites kirjeldatud
toimemehhanisme. Eelise annavad eelkõige meetodi pigem suunavad kui muutvad omadused
(paindlikkus, tagasipööratavus, individuaalsuse arvestamine ning võimalikult vähene
sekkumine inimese juba eksisteerivasse moraalinormi ehk olemusse), mitte niivõrd selle
rakendamise vorm. Kuigi ka kirjeldatud neurobioloogiline sekkumine oli pigem toetav kui
sekkuv, oli siiski oluline erinevus esiteks moraaliotsuse tekkes- AI puhul nõustamine iga kord
vastavalt tekkinud olukorrale ja eelnevalt kasutaja poolt määratud väärtushinnangutele ning
ravimite puhul ajukeemia mõjutamine ühekordselt õppeprotsessi käigus ja teiseks ning
teiseks tagasipööratavuses- AI puhul on see ilmselgelt lihtsam ning teostatavam. Muidugi
oleksid sama sobilikud ka mingid muud samasuguste omadustega tehnilised lahendused.
Seega, kui arvata, et moraalne parandamine võiks olla vajalik ja võimalik, tuleks siiski
kaaluda pigem võimalikult väheseid muudatusi esile kutsuvat, niiöelda nõrka varianti.
Eraldi hinnagut vajaks aga küsimus, kas selline meetod on piisavalt efektiivne. Juhul, kui see
osutub lihtsalt ressursi raiskamiseks, ei pruugi selle teostamine olla mõistlik.
The aim of this study is to compare two methods of possible human moral bioenhancement:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) as supportive method and mild neuroenhancement.
As scientific developements have made it possible to consider and practice human
physiological enhancement, in recent years the discussion has been concentrating on moral
enhancement as well. By biological enhancement I mean biological interventions used to
improve human capabilities and bodies beyond mere necessity of restoring or sustaining
health. Moral bioenhancement is used as definition of improving human moral capabilities
and standards by biological interventions, as opposed to traditional means as teaching and
socializing.
The aim of the study is not to express that moral bioenhancement is ethical but rather to find
out that if this would be the case, which kind of means to achieve the goal would be more
ethical and worth considering.
2018-06-19T11:37:06Z
2018-06-19T11:37:06Z
2018
Thesis
20.03.02 SUUd 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/60829
est
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/912532023-07-03T20:44:40Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
The charientic: a neglected normative category
Bailie, Natasha Jade
Francesco Orsi, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
It is a standard problem of value theory, broadly construed, to identify, classify, and analyse evaluative judgements. In 1958, Peter Glassen argued that judgements regarding vulgarity or elegance, which he calls “charientic” judgements, are (i) properly evaluative judgements; and (ii) distinct from other types of universally recognised evaluative judgements, such as moral or aesthetic ones. The goals of the current work are firstly to defend and develop these claims to establish the charientic as a proper normative category, and secondly to show, using Christine Korsgaard’s theory of normativity from her 1996 book The Sources of Normativity, that there exist charientic obligations. Grounding obligations in practical identity, a conception of oneself under which one finds oneself valuable, is key to establishing the existence of charientic obligations.
2023-07-03T13:22:42Z
2023-07-03T13:22:42Z
2023
Thesis
20.03.01 BAI 01
https://hdl.handle.net/10062/91253
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
oai:dspace.ut.ee:10062/828652022-06-29T08:58:11Zcom_10062_35471com_10062_28901com_10062_5654col_10062_35473
Law statements and generic generalizations
Rashtipour, Mani
Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja
Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
philosophy
Many philosophers and scientists believe that the statements of laws of nature can be given a unified analysis. Law statements are thought to be true lawlike generalizations, where to be a lawlike generalization is to be a universal, spatiotemporally unrestricted, and modally robust generalization. It is the legacy of logical empiricists that such generalization can be analyzed as a universal generalization of the form ∀x.(Fx→Gx). Since the logical empiricists, this analysis has been criticized and various alternatives have been proposed. One proposed analysis is that lawlike generalizations, and hence law statements, should be analyzed as generic generalizations (e.g. Drewery 1998, 2005; Nickel 2010; Claveau & Girard 2019). These accounts, however, endorse the assumption that law statements can be given a unified analysis and attempt to analyze law statements as generic generalizations in unified manner. In this thesis, while endorsing the suggestion that law statements are generic generalizations, I will challenge this assumption arguing that law statements should be divided into two distinct groups, the definitional laws and descriptive laws, which require distinct analyses. I will, then, provide an analysis of law statements on the basis of the works of Manfred Krifka and Yael Greenberg on definitional and descriptive generic generalizations.
2022-06-29T08:56:59Z
2022-06-29T08:56:59Z
2022
Thesis
20.03.01 RAS 01
http://hdl.handle.net/10062/82865
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Tartu Ülikool
rdf///com_10062_35471/100