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The Construction of the Image of Ukraine as the Other in Russian Media

Master Thesis

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I have written the Master's Thesis myself, independently. All of the other authors' texts, main viewpoints and all data from other resources have been referred to.

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Table of content

Table of Contents

Introduction	5
The Actuality of the topic	6
Literature review: the notion of Strategic Narrative in the context of analysis of Russian - Ukrainian informational war	7
The Novelty of the thesis	10
The structure of the thesis.....	11
1.1 Theory of Ernesto Laclau as an approach of analysis of Russian media discourse	13
The notion of Discourse in Laclau`s theoretical paradigm	13
The notions of Empty Signifiers, Hegemony and Limits	14
1.2 Analysis of the "Russian World" as an ideological background for construction image of Ukraine	16
National identity as floating signifier	17
Russian language as a nodal point.....	18
Compatriots` policy as a nodal point	20
An empty signifier 'Strong Russia' and resemiotisation of Russian folklore totem	24
2.2. Strategical narrative as a framework of analysis	29
Appraisal theory as a tool of deconstruction of Strategic Narrative	31
The framework of Attitude.....	32
The framework of engagement and graduation: Alignment, Solidarity, and the Construed Reader	36
Conceptual metaphor as an instrument of Strategic narrative.....	38
3. Analysis of strategical narrative 'Ukraine is a Failed State	41
Introduction to the Russian media discourse.....	41
Analysis of the narrative "Ukraine as a Failing State" on the example of T.Sergeitsev`s article	52
Section 1, Ukraine as a pity example.....	54
Section 2: Fail to make reasonable decision (the core value is incompetence).....	57
Section 3: Philosophical stance: democracy lies	58
Section 4: Ukrainian history is fantasy Rapid narrative shift from philosophy to downward realities.....	64
Section 5: Establishing real order of things, value of veracity	66
Section 7: Verdict to Ukrainian sovereignty, the value attitude Irrationality.....	69
Section 8: Developing the value orientation 'hatred'	72

Analytical summary of the narrative “Ukraine as a Failing State” on the example of T. Sergeitsev’s article.....	75
Analysis of strategical narrative ‘Ukraine is a Nazi State’	85
“Immortal Regiment” as reinforcement of a national identity of ‘fascist fighters’	87
Introduction of new terminology into populace common sense by media	89
The image of Ukraine as ‘the other’	91
Parade as a confluence of identities	95
The consequences of exploitation of the strategic narrative.....	99
The promotion of the strategic narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state” abroad.....	101
Conclusion.....	107
References	110
Appendix 1 The original of analyzed text in 2.1.4	120
Appendix 2: Table B: Articles conveying the strategic narrative "Ukraine is a Failed State".....	127
Resume.....	6

Introduction

Since the time of invasion of Georgia, a scientific discourse the phrase ‘Russian information activities against..’ became actual. For example, the topic of Russian informational enmity is a vital topic of researches and report of NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence^{1,2}. Formulations of research problems like this began to signify not just a propaganda in its negative term, but more sophisticated way and structured way of running an information warfare. This topic received significant attention in recent past, not only in such institutions as NATO, but also in civic organizations, like *Radio Liberty*³ or volunteering organizations, which set a goal to minimize the influence of these activities on mass perception. Among them we can count the Ukrainian journalist project *StopFakeOrg*⁴, *Information Resistance*⁵, and International Intelligence Community Inform Napalm. A rapid developing of these initiatives (the last three mentioned organizations were established around 2014 year) witness that Russian information activities moved from the status of the interpretation of facts to the usage of information as strategy for achievement of strategic (often military or geopolitical) goals.

¹ Lange-Ionatamishvili, E., Svetoka, S. and Geers, K., 2015. Strategic Communications and Social Media in the Russia Ukraine Conflict. *Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine*, Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications.

² Berzina, Ieva; Cepuritis Maris; Juurvee, Ivo; Kaljula, Diana, 2018. Russia`s footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment. Report 2016/2017. NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence: Riga.

³ Радіо Свобода. 2018. #Дезінформація. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/z/17296>. [Accessed 21 April 2018].

⁴ Stop Fake Org. 2018. *About us*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/>. [Accessed 21 April 2018]

⁵ Information Resistance. 2018. *About Us*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.harvardgenerator.com/references/website>. [Accessed 21 April 2018].

The author of this thesis could eyewitness the episode of the information war by herself in winter of 2013-2014, during the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. In winter of 2013/2014, Crimean population was intensively “intoxicated” by disinformation. It went up to the point where messages that disapproved civil protests in Kyiv were repeatedly (1 in 20 minutes) transmitted in buses and trolleys through TV and radio in the forms of ubiquitous advertisement.

Contemporary history of Ukraine shows, that such an organized informational activity as launched in Crimea prior to the annexation and during the process, not only builds a certain attitude or misleads citizens or builds a bad image of the state, but also constitutes a critical threat to national security. Such informational activities use persuasion in order to either justify military actions, eliminate resistance to intrusion of a foreign state (Crimea) or motivate citizens to act against their own state in the form of collaboration. This kind of communication always holds a certain strategy, that goes beyond a mere rhetoric and image making. Building of the image is just a tool of achievement of geopolitical goals (see Foxall 2017, Szostek, 2017b, Ferguson, 2017).

The Actuality of the topic

Attentive observation of geopolitical issues that happened since autumn of 2013, the time when Euromaidan started and frequent inspection of various information sources in Russia, Ukraine, and English-speaking sources put in me the question of how to inform recipients of Russian strategic communication about threat that they may face during Russian information warfare towards Ukraine. This question builds the actuality of this research.

The Ukrainian government responded on the problem by launching Ministry of Information Policy in the end of 2014. By the civic initiative there was started such NGOs as StopFake and Inform Napalm. They provide English-speaking public by adequate media content. In order to help to the recipients of Russian strategic communication not to be deceived, Ukrainian branch of Radio Liberty opened two new rubrics – “Деза Дня” and

“Крым. Реалии”⁶. In particular, “Крым. Реалии” is called to inform about changes in economic situation and situation with human rights after annexation of the peninsula.

However, fake information or nonrelevant interpretation of the facts will be always more in quantity and stronger in outreach than those efforts of democracy present in media discourse. Consequently, we need to find a more universal algorithm that would allow the people to understand when they face propaganda without the requirement of precise fact-check. We need a tool that would help to recognize, measure and to show informational ‘footprint’ of ideology. Here humanities come in use, precisely semiotics that is focused on showing of phenomena in systematicity and models (sign system studies).

What is mentioned above motivated me to write this research. I faced several research questions that I am going to answer in this work. Firstly, what kind of scientific tool can Semiotics of Power propose to measure strategic communication? Can semiotics help create a graspable model in order to show how strategical narrative is constructed and deconstructed? Secondly, can we bind several theories from philosophic, literary and linguistic domain in one research effectively in order to overcome their limits when they are separated? Thirdly, with the help of semiotics, can we describe a transmitted propaganda in systematicity? What discourse is the source of the articulation of Russian strategic communication towards Ukraine? What devices are used to present Ukraine as the Other in Russia?

Literature review: the notion of Strategic Narrative in the context of analysis of Russian – Ukrainian informational war

The field of Strategic Communication was developed by Lawrence Freedman in the book “The Transformation of the Strategic Affairs” (Freedman, 2006). The author gives analysis phenomenon of strategic narrative. Taking in account that the war, in its classical form, involving set-piece battles between regular armies does not have future, the author develops on the notion of asymmetric war. The paper concludes that irregular war brings bigger

⁶ Радіо Свобода. 2014. *Крым. Реалии*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ru.krymr.com/>. [Accessed 17 May 2018].

problems for security policy, than regular one (Freedman, L., 2006). Strategic narrative often is viewed as a part of soft power strategy. This concept is in accordance with the one that Joseph S. Nye describes in the work “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” (2008). The author distinguishes soft power from hard power. The term “soft power” designated the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion, that can be attributed to strategic narrative. A countries’ soft power is based on its resources of culture, values, and policies. So, in the warfare space, a battle happens, first of all, in heart and minds (Nye Jr, J.S., 2008). Narrative as a part of soft power functions as the bridge between images of other states and foreign policy behavior. Laura Roselle focuses her research on the depiction of strategic narratives during a war (Roselle, 2010). Antoniadis et al., observes strategic narrative as an instrument through which great powers can articulate their interests, values and ambitions in the situation that open possibility of power transitions, avoiding violent struggle. The authors highlight the importance of strategic narrative as a tool, alongside the material resources, that serves as a determinant of whether emerging great powers are able to produce a new systematic alignment (Antoniades et al., 2010). The importance of the strategic narrative is in its ability to form the desired view of past, present, and future. Miskimmon et al. provides theoretical background to strategic narrative phenomenon. Analyzing emerging media ecologies of the 21st century, the authors develop on formation, projection, and reception of Strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2014). Established research on strategic narrative, able to explain the way of winning domestic support for the war, became a part of contemporary security studies (De Graaf, 2015).

In 2014, Dr. Jolanta Darczewska publishes the paper “The Information War on Ukraine. New Challenges”, where she discusses military destabilisation of Ukraine (including the conflict over “Novorossiya”) as the field of Russia’s experimentation with multidimensional organised top-down information operations. Borrowing Soviet Cold War approaches, Russia achieves to transform the real Ukrainian – Russian conflict into a virtual conflict between Russia and the West. Renovating geopolitical thinking from the times of Cold War, i.e., thinking by geopolitical blocks, Russia forcibly demarcated the line between

“Russian World” Civilisation and the West, making Ukraine an involuntary hostage in a geopolitical game (Darczewska, 2014). In the same year was held study of Tymchuk et al., where non-governmental Center for Military and Political Studies described the Russian military and information operations. The book is concentrated not only on military, but also on psychological and information operations that constitutes interest for propaganda analysts (Tymchuk et al., 2016).

In 2015th was published a collection of articles “Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives”. The work attempts to analyses Russian-Ukrainian crisis from the point of view of psychographic factor of various groups involved. In particular, Russophone group of Ukrainians, modern Ukrainian national identity, mutual myths of Russian and Ukrainian people towards each other. Moreover, the work observes dominant narratives in Russian Political and media Discourse during the Ukraine crisis (Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa eds., 2015). Furthermore, in 2015 The Center for East European Policy Studies published the anthology “The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe”, where are discussed the questions of security, economics, and politics in the frame of the Ukrainian experience of non-linear war. In particular, the relevance of widely used term “information warfare”, that is used referring to Ukraine, is questioned. Particular attention is paid to the questions of Baltic security in the context of Ukraine’s war (Pabriks and Kudors eds., 2015).

In 2016, the Journal on Baltic Security published the paper, dedicated to Russian information operations against the Ukrainian state and defense forces. The purpose of the work was to present analysis of information operations in the of 2014th, the year of the beginning of military aggression of Russia to Ukraine. The paper discusses ideological and political narratives that Russian Federation uses in order to advocate military, economic and political campaigns on the Ukrainian territory (Müür et. al., 2016).

In 2017, the NGO *Internews Ukraine* released the analytical publication “Words and Wars”, compiled out of works by different authors. The research touches the various strategic narratives, applied towards Ukraine and the methods of Russian information warfare. The study explains online geography of propaganda spreading, the nature of its influence and how Ukraine is resisting to Kremlin’s Information attacks (Babak et. al., 2017).

Some of the mentioned researches investigate the media picture on a bigger scale, noting the main tendencies. The other ones, concentrate on quantitative methods, contributing statistics for the better understanding of the situation. The purpose of my research is to analyse the problem of strategic communication and information campaign of Russia towards Ukraine from qualitative research perspective, proposing Semiotic instruments as a tool to measure the propaganda in support to quantities ones.

The Novelty of the thesis

The construction of the image of Ukraine as the Other currently experiences a splash of an interest, that we can see from appearance of the book “Words and Wars. Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda”, Kyiv, 2017. However, despite the researches, Russian strategic narratives in EU and Ukraine are presented in abundance (for example, in the articles of Krickovic and Bratersky (2016), Watanabe, K. (2017), Szostek, J., (2017)), it puts the emphasis either on the characteristic of these narratives or on their geopolitical context. The investigation of the construction of a negative image of Ukraine in a proper cultural context is relatively new for international scientific society. The novelty of this work is in implication of classical scientific tools of Western humanities tradition (Laclau, Martin and White, Lakoff and Johnson) to the discourse of Eastern European affairs in its cultural and historical complexity. It will allow to Western scholars, who are not proficient in Russian and Ukrainian languages, to encounter this discourse through the lens of a native speaker of Russian and Ukrainian languages. The background knowledge of cultural and historical roots of these two states as well as preceding drilling in Slavic humanities will help to expose and explain tiny nuances of differences in the common senses of these two countries and in the interpretation of common mythologemes, imposed by the occupational regime of Soviet Union.

The structure of the thesis

In the chapter 1.1 we present Ernesto Laclau's theory discourse as a semiotic tool. In the chapter 1.2 Laclau's discourse analysis analyzes the Russian media discourse on a more global scale. The purpose of it is to present a discourse that is an origin of Russian propaganda against Ukraine. It will be especially beneficial for those researchers and audiences, who did not encounter Eastern European cultural and geopolitical discourse before. The chapter 2.1 and 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 develops on theoretical tools of semiotics that would allow to perform a more precise analysis of Russian propaganda towards Ukraine. The chapter 2.1 introduces the theory of Strategic Narrative (Miskimmon et al., 2017) that helps us to narrow down a wide field of strategic communication to analysis of narrower aspect of written narratives. The chapter 2.1.2 introduces linguistic tool of discourse analysis, i.e. Appraisal Theory (Martin and White, 2003) that proposes some instruments of close reading, a set of indicators which allows us to measure Russian strategic narrative and categorize it in order to deconstruct it and to answer to the question: How exactly the image of Ukraine as the Other is constructed? The chapter 2.1.3 presents a theory of Conceptual Metaphor of Lakoff and Johnson (1989) that binds social and literary fields of humanities in analysis of common sense and social imagery. In this way, Strategic Narrative, theories of Appraisal and Conceptual Metaphor are binded into interdisciplinary semiotic instrument kit that help not only to deconstruct the image of Ukraine as the other, presented in written media, but also to show it in the model that is inbuilt in the imagery system 'Russkiy Mir' hegemony, that was analyzed through the theory of discourse of Ernesto Laclau.

This combination of theories makes the analysis of media that we perform in chapters 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 flexible and allow us to make unexpected but crucial conclusions about the origins of the attempt to create an image of Ukraine as a hostile and undesired Other. In the chapter 2.1.4 we analyze the strategic narrative 'Ukraine as a failed State' and the source of it. We consciously put limit of the analyzed media in order to avoid nonsystematic results that could not lead to verifiable conclusion. This is why we take materials produced only by the branches of the media holding funded by the government: 'Rossiya Segodnya'. The same limit

we implied in the analysis of strategic narrative 'Ukraine is a Nazi state' in the chapter 2.1.5. Analyzing present and past activities of the authors (opinion makers) of the material, we went to unexpected finding of systematicity in the production of these narratives. In fact, the intensification of these narratives coincides in time and place of the appearance of the think-tank of 'Russkiy Mir' ideology, so called 'Zinoview Club' ('Зиновьевский Клуб'). Bringing in correlation the features of analysed materials and the conditions of their production (the source, its history, and the authorship) led me to opinion that analyzed narratives did appear systematically. They have purposes of justification of aggression and destabilization of the neighboring state. In this work I strive to explicit this systematicity.

1.1 Theory of Ernesto Laclau as an approach of analysis of Russian media discourse

The notion of Discourse in Laclau`s theoretical paradigm

Discourse is a main space for building objectivity as such. This category is not narrowed down only to written or spoken practices. It can be seen as complex elements, in which relations play the constitutive role. In such a way, ‘relation’ and ‘objectivity’ might be seen as synonyms. We can understand through binary oppositions of Saussure: there are no positive terms in language, only differences – something is what it is only through its differential relations to something else. Any signifying (i.e. objective) element might be perceived in the same way: an action is only that it is in difference from possible actions and other signifying elements (words or actions), which may be successive or simultaneous (Laclau, 2005: 68).

It is beyond the bounds of possibility to fix a meaning ultimately, that allows only partial fixations, otherwise the very flow of differences would be unimaginable. Even in order to change or subvert the meaning there has to be a meaning first of all. Every discourse has a purpose to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre, according to Laclau. He calls the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation as *nodal points* (Laclau, 1985: 112).

The process of *articulation* comprises the construction of nodal points which partially fix the meaning; a partial character of this fixation derives from the openness of the social, it is a result of a constant inundation of every discourse by the endlessness of the

field of discursivity (Laclau, 1985: 112). Thereupon, discourse is a restraint of possibilities. It is a try to cease invisible 'glid' of the signs in relation to each other, therefore, it is an endeavor to create a unified system of meanings. In other words, the discourse 'tries' to transshape *elements* to *moments* (in Laclau's terms), reducing their polysemy to entirely fixed meaning (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2004: 57-59). The discourse is formed through a partial fixation of the meaning around certain nodal points, where a nodal point is a privileged sign, that brings in order and gives a meaning to other signs (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2004: 57).

The notions of Empty Signifiers, Hegemony and Limits

When it comes to '*empty signifiers*', it means that in the system of signification there exist a place, that is impossible to represent. To this extend, it remains empty, however, this emptiness is of that kind that is possible to signify, because we deal with vacuum within signification (Laclau, 2005: 105). Empty signifier is understood as a signifier of absence, the image without clear signified. The process of 'liberation' from signified, 'emptying' and further 'filling' of signifier by a certain sense (articulation), that activate a certain system of sense production and is a fundamental discursive practice (Gololobov, 2003: 131). Each signifier constitutes a sign by attaching itself to a particular signified, inscribing itself as a difference within the signifying process (Laclau, 2007: 39). The presence of empty signifiers is the very condition of hegemony. To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function. Any term which, in certain political context becomes the signifier of the lack, has the function alike. Politics exists because the constitutive impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of empty signifiers (Laclau, 2007: 44).

If usual perception of hegemony is as designation of generally not fair domination of an already existing ruling power either within a given nation (imperialism) or as practiced

outside the country (colonialism), thus hegemony is understood as sovereignty. But Laclau exploits this term in different way. Under hegemony he means the way a contingent group within a given society (working class or particular group) that take upon itself the task of political emancipation from unjust ruling powers (Miller, 2004: 218). A class or group is considered to be hegemonic when it is not closed in a narrow corporatist perspective but presents itself as realizing the broader aims either of emancipating or ensuring order for wider masses of the population (Laclau, 2007: 43).

In a diversified group its wholeness should be represented in every individual act of signification. To grasp this wholeness or totality, we should comprehend its limits, that happens through differentiation from something else than it itself. Thus, the only possible for this other element is not being neutral, but excluded (Laclau, 2005: 70). If to talk about limits, true limits are always antagonistic. The operation of the logic of exclusionary limits has a series of necessary consequences which disseminate to both sides of the limits and which will lead straight into emergence of empty signifiers:

1. An exclusionary limit produces an essential ambivalence within the system of differences built by those limits. Those elements, excluded from the system do not have positive characteristics. This already announces the possibility of an empty signifier – that is a signifier of the pure cancellation of all difference.
2. The requirement for this to happen is that those elements beyond the frontier of exclusion are reduced to pure negativity, which is a pure threat that what is beyond the limits actually belongs to the system, building it that way (Laclau, 2007: 38).

We argue that the discourse of the “Russkiy Mir” is an integral ideology, that can be described through the mentioned terms. The integrity of the “Russkiy Mir” is in its complexity. It is a sophisticated combination of the fields of history, geopolitical studies, axiology, and religion. It is sufficient to cover a significant part of human`s needs and questions. Aware of its multiplicity, I am going to investigate only several its elements, which correspond with the topic of this research. Among these elements - nodal points, are language and rehabilitated folklore parts. They allow us to see how the nodal points build a

coherent ideological fishnet.

The discourse of the “Russian World” can be seen as an example of soft power strategy. It is important to note, that “Russkiy Mir” is not completely soft power. In Moscow`s use, soft power is developed in order to avoid exploitation of hard power, but it can also be articulated along with it, precede it, or justify it (Laruelle, 2015: 24). In the Ukrainian case, unfortunately, soft power is used in a tight combination with hard power (the cases of annexation of Crimea and appearance of proto-states Donetsk (and Lugansk) People`s republics). However, restrained by semiotic aspect of the reseach, I analyze only a soft power aspect of “Russkiy Mir”.

A soft power, comprehended by Vladimir Putin as a set of instruments exploited in order to reach foreign policy goals without resorting to military means, but with help of information and other instruments on influence (Feclyunina, 782). This soft power is based on historical and cultural resemblance, such as presence of minorities in neighbor countries, Russian language as lingua franca, post-Soviet nostalgia, power of Russian Orthodox church. Moreover, a shared Russian and Soviet cultural heritage, such as Russian classic literature and Soviet cinematography. The concept of “Russian world” can be viewed as an answer of Russian elites to the dominant position of the West in international discourse. The signifier “West” can be seen here as a mythical ‘Big Other’ for a creation of Russian identity (Polegkyi, 2011: 14).

1.2 Analysis of the "Russian World" as an ideological background for construction image of Ukraine

National identity as floating signifier

After the downfall of the Soviet Union emerged the question of the reconsideration of the national identity. One of the reasons was a desire to continue Russian influence on neighbor countries, but also because a great number of Russians experienced sudden change of civic status the day after the Soviet Union`s collapse. Despite the Russian government never put emphasis on ethnical belonging due to historical circumstances, this particular situation, where millions of its people found themselves scattered across the post-Soviet region, gave an opportunity to articulate a new national narrative. In such a way, a new totality emerged out of a chain of diverse groups who would refer themselves as ‘Russians’. Thus, the core of it is an inner circle shaped out of ethnic Russians living inside the country, for whom their identity is clear. Wider circles surrounding the core one includes the nonethnic Russians of Russian Federation. Among them might be counted non-Russians by ethnicity or citizenship, who identify themselves as Russians. Moreover, those, whose parents moved from Russia to other countries in the period of the Soviet Union. Along with the core Russians, they form a new civic identity, i.e. *rossiyane*).

The other element of the chain is formed by Russians of the nearest abroad, who might combine the core ethnic identity with another, civic one (in instance, the descendance of Russian immigrant parents, who went to Ukraine or other countries to work according to the rules of Soviet young professionals program). One more group would consist of Russian-speakers of the near abroad, who may share a Russian cultural identity in combination with several others (a Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainian who is a citizen of Latvia, for example). Furthermore, such complete national relations are even more puzzled by the practice of intermarriage that took place over decades (Zevelev, 2001: 32-35).

If the self-identification of ethnic Russians living inside of the country is clear, the other mentioned above groups are not as univocal. Ethnic Russians who are Latvian citizens are the subject of fighting of Latvian geopolitical discourse as well, because alien elements

(owners of so called ‘alien passport’) would constitute a threat for national security. Thus, two countries compete for favor and alliance of citizens with ambivalent national belonging, because they might create either stronger Latvian discourse as ‘faithful citizens of their Motherland’ or to become ‘foreign agents of the “Russian world”’. Therefore, we can designate their national belonging as floating signifier, that different discourses strive to fill by their special meaning (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2004: 60).

Republic of Latvia appeals to national unity with the help of unifying practices during national holidays (like wide spread marathons dedicated to Independence Day) and new-backed fashion to wear national symbolic as elements of costume, showing belonging to the nation in such a way. The ways of inclusion of such ‘aliens’ in the bigger picture of Latvian society are various, often they are performed physically (sport events, parades, celebration of national holidays with local communities). Russian Federation does not have such a privilege to care about Russian-speaking Latvians directly in the field, thus the biggest effort is put on mass media and policy. In 2002 was launched the First Baltic TV Channel, that highlights topics related to the interests of Russian speakers, in a specific way interprets governmental processes and provide Latvian audience with Russian cultural content. In terms of policy, Russia supports loyalty and highlights national belonging by offering the second pension to ethnic Russians who live in Latvia⁷.

Russian language as a nodal point

Russian political technologist and consulter in issues regarding spatial development and regional politics Petr Schedrovitskiy defines the “Russian World” as a network structure of large and small communities, thinking and speaking in Russian language (Schedrovitskiy,

⁷ Shkola Zhizni. Pensionnoe i finansovoe planirovanie zhizni. 2017. Urok 26: Naznachenie i vyplata pensii dlja rossijan, prozhivajushhih v Latvii. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://kolesovgb.ru/index.php/planirovanie-pensii/naznachenie-oformlenie-vyplata-i-dostavka-pensii/1198-naznachenie-i-vyplata-pensii-dlya-rossiyan-prozhivayushchikh-v-latvii>. [Accessed 15 January 2018].

2000). A **wider** acknowledgment the ideologeme received in 2006-2007, officially introduced by Putin`s ideologues as a part of state`s philosophy. The connection between “Russkiy Mir” and Russian language was articulated by Russian president Vladimir Putin during Address to the Federal Assembly in April 2007:

The Russian language not only preserves an entire layer of truly global achievements but is also the living space for the many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world, a community that goes far beyond Russia itself. As the common heritage of many peoples, the Russian language will never become the language of hatred or enmity, xenophobia or isolationism. /.../ In my view, we need to support the initiative put forward by Russian linguists to create a National Russian Language Foundation, the main aim of which will be to develop the Russian language at home, support Russian language study programmes abroad, and to generally promote Russian language and literature around the world⁸

In such a way, the language (through mediation of elements of culture, such as history of the post-Soviet region) in invisible way is linked to the ideology of ‘Russianness’ and its agenda. In Laclau`s terms, the totality ‘the Russian World’ is forming by equivalency on the basis of the linguistic factor. All other differences are suppressed in unprecedented way. Alike narrative suppresses tragic facts of the russification of ‘small nations’ and post-Soviet countries. The policy of russification in Ukraine was led compulsory during the Soviet Union period. In particular, in 1930th there happened a series of political massacres, that aimed liquidation of intelligence, that formed cultural environment on national level, but also political actors. In the consequence, in the party happened a change of non-Russian political actors by Russian one or “rusified” elements. This cleansing completely changed the composition of government and secretaries of regional committees of the party, where Ukrainian actors were substituted. The same sad fate followed Ukrainian scientists, journalists, writers, and teachers. As result, big cities became as “rusified”, as before the

⁸ Russkij Mir. 2007. About Russkiy Mir Foundation. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ruskiymir.ru/en/fund/>. [Accessed 18 May 2018].

revolution⁹. In these countries russification is perceived more as a consequence of colonization, rather than as the trace of modernization. For a number of reasons, Russian language remained to function on the level with governmental languages, in some countries even have obtained the status of the state language.

However, it is not correct to say that the Russian language forms the Russian identity. According to statistical survey of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology¹⁰, ethnolinguistic structure of Ukraine looks as the next: 77.8% of inhabitants of Ukraine consider them as Ukrainian (as representor of Ukrainian ethnos). 71.3 % of ethnic Ukrainian adults consider Ukrainian language as mother tongue, nonetheless, only 51.1% of adult Ukrainians acknowledge Ukrainian as language easier to communicate, 33% - Russian, and 15% - Ukrainian and Russian. Considering these statistical facts, we can assume that a significant part of population, using Russian as a main language, do not associate themselves with Russian ethno-cultural entity.

Moreover, when it comes to bilingual respondents, while choosing only one from both languages as mother tongue, they were value-oriented making the choice. In other words, they were forced to choose which language is 'the dearest' to them (Khmelko, 2004). Thus, Russian language is perceived more like a tool of communication, rather than a cultural driver. Practically, according to data, the chain of equivalence of Russian language with Russian culture does not succeed in formation of Ukrainian national identification, so it mostly remains as far-fetched idea, articulated by the ideology.

Compatriots` policy as a nodal point

⁹ Ogienko, Ivan. 2001. Impers'ka Spadshhina ta Nacional'ne Pitannja. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://litopys.org.ua/sporl/sh03.htm>. [Accessed 18 May 2018].

¹⁰ Khmelko V., 2004. Lingvo-etnichna Struktura Ukrayiny: Regionalni Osoblivosti ta tendencyi Zmin za Roky Nezalezhnosti. Naukovi Zapysky NaUKMA, 32, pp.3-15.

During its history, Soviet Union, as before Russian Empire, never put an emphasis on growing specifically national identification, the main of its focus was to expend on its physical borders, not on national self-awareness. Contemporary national identity is somehow related with the concept of a ‘Soviet man’, where national component is tightly related to the element of Russian, i.e. Russian Language and Russian heritage in art, for example. The signifier ‘soviet’, despite initially was invented as internationalism, begins to be associated with signifier ‘Russianness’. On this level, paradoxically, expansionistic tendency and the notion of ‘Russianness’ connect in one logic of equivalence: ethnic Russians through the prism of concept ‘the Soviet people’ begin to recognize all the space of post-Soviet region as a native land. In the same time, when the other ethnoses associate only their homeland with what they lawfully possess (Polegkyi, 2011: 14).

This cultural sentiment in 2003 gained a geopolitical dimension, when the member of Communist party Georgii Tikhonov introduced an amendment to the citizenship law which proposes extending Russian citizenship to ‘compatriots’ whom he defined as ‘members of ethnic groups indigenous to Russia who do not have territorial homelands outside the Russian Federation’ (Shevel, 2011: 183). The intellectual construction of the civic *rossiiskaya* nation took its development in the first decade of 2000th. The rhetoric of compatriot’s policy took a new breath from 1995, when the Yeltsin administration decided to raise the diaspora question. The government created the financial aid for diaspora and special federal funds for compatriot policies (Laruelle, 2015: 92). This intention of implied in “Declaration of Support for the Russian Diaspora and for the Protection of Russian Compatriots”¹¹. The new turn compatriot police took when soon enough after taking presidency by V. Putin. The president attended the first World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad, where he emphasised that “the most important instrument of interaction of the government with compatriots is the development of common cultural and information space”. Moreover, he expressed the interest of Russia in

¹¹ BusinessPravo.Ru. 2018. O Deklaracii o Podderzhke Rossijskoj Diaspory i o Pokrovitel'stve Rossijskim sootchestvennikam. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_35720.html. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

return of compatriots from the abroad¹². Also, the proposed program is “directed to compatriots` adaptation and integration in the life of the country of dwelling with voluntary keeping of ethnocultural authenticity...” (ibid., 13). In June 2006, there was published the law “State Assistance Program for Voluntary Repatriation of Compatriots to Russia.”¹³ In the frame of this program, there were made amendments to the set of laws related to the freedom of movement in the post-Soviet region and to those related to the acquisition of Russian citizenship, with the purpose to offer to former Soviet citizens privileged access to a Russian passport (Laruelle, 2015: 93).

Special attention was dedicated to those Russian communities that do not want to come back to their kinstate. It was implied through “compatriot” project “Russkiy Mir”, that promotes Russian culture in the world and hopes to reinforce the Russian diaspora`s identification with Russia through supporting Russian associations and the Orthodox Church abroad as well as inviting diasporas to invest in Russia (Ibid., 93). In 2006 there was held the World Compatriot Congress in Saint Petersburg, where was expressed the claim to “encourage the tendency of consolidation of compatriot organizations, their public positions with the aim of maximal expanding of political, legal, social-economic and humanitarian fields, which would guarantee the rights and interests of foreign Russians”¹⁴

In such a way, the state expands the chain of equivalence, making those, who live outside Russia, their citizens, and forming wider hegemony. This policy has turned into a top-priority instrument for delineating the target of its policies in post-Soviet region. The history of the evolution of the term also contributes to the understanding of the tendencies. If the 1999 law described compatriots as ‘who were born in one state’ and who ‘share common language, religion, cultural heritage, customs, and traditions’, including their direct heirs (Shevel, 2011:193).

¹² Kongress Sootechestvennikov, Prozhivajushhiih za Rubezhom. 11-12 oktjabrja 2001 goda. Moskva: Drofa, 2001. p.6

¹³ Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii O merah po okazaniju sodejstvija dobrovol'nomu pereseleniju v Rossijskuju Federaciju Sootechestvennikov, Prozhivajushhiih za Rubezhom, 2006. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102107419>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

¹⁴ Materialy Vsemirnogo kongressa sootechestvennikov: itogovyj stenograficheskij sbornik. — SPb.: Izd-vo «Chelovek i zdorov'e», 2006, p.256.

In 2010 the amendment to the definition made it vaguer. From that time ‘compatriots’ started to include those who live outside of the border of the Russian Federation, who made a willing choice in favor of spiritual, cultural and legal connection with Russian Federation, whose relative of the first line previously used to live on the territory of RF, including persons belonging to USSR citizenship or those who live in ex-USSR, who received the citizenship of these countries.¹⁵

A more insistent policy in neighbor countries could be observed from the second decade of 2000th due to the deprivation of the relations with the West. The goal of the policy was to prevent further erosion of the Russian influence on the neighborhood and preventing other actors like US, NATO and the EU from invasion into the sphere of [its] privileged interests’¹⁶. Establishment of loyal interest groups includes uniting allied decision-makers in the target countries through financing, valuable connections, and contacts. The maintenance of existing networks implies organizational assistance, professional links and media strategies for Russian minorities and pro-Russian interest groups. So, cultural aspects are tightly interconnected with business issues, that makes the influence of pro-Russian agenda on post-Soviet regions extremely strong (Grigas, 2012: 9).

The policy of ‘Sootechestviniky’ (‘Compatriots’) organically fits into the project of *Eurasian* unit’s purpose, i.e. “maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world¹⁷”. In such a way, be policy alike and relentless efforts to influence the attitudes of ex-Soviet inhabitants of neighbor countries by cultural products, the discourse not only expands its borders, but also protects them from outsider influence. If to take the mentioned above countries – Latvia and Ukraine, both appeared to be exposed to cultural influence of Western discourse due to the participation of the European Union (in case of Latvia) and partnership with the union in case of Ukraine. Here, the Western culture with its attributes and values is perceived not as a neutral or simply the

¹⁵ Federal Law No. 179-FZ, 23 July 2010. Rossiiskaya Gazeta.

¹⁶ Medvedev D., 2008. Interview to television channels. Channel One, Rossia, NTV. 31 August.

¹⁷ Putin V (2013a) Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Available at: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6007> [accessed 18 October 2013]

other, foreign discourse, but as anti-discourse, pure negative and antagonistic. The fighting happens for people, who are in liminal space – has citizenship of one state, but exploit language (or ethnos) of the other. In such a way there happens a broadening of the project, the ‘Russian World’ is an antidote to ‘Westernization’ of the regions who have been for a long time under direct influence of Russian Federation. It is the launch of the “Eurasian heartland” that strives to come forward as anti-Western movement (Clover, 1999: 9)

An empty signifier ‘Strong Russia’ and resemiotisation of Russian folklore totem

One of the aspects of the attractiveness of the discourse of the “Russian World” is the development of an empty signifier ‘Strong Russia’. This idea, despite does not have any intrinsic meaning, is produced by the demand of it. In this concept, Russia is considered as a great power that is distinctive from the West. The Near abroad appears situation of belonging to one community with Russia and plays a vital role to Russian geopolitical interests and its re-assertion as a great power (Muller, 2009: 335-336). This idea, despite of its ambiguity, refers to intangible matters of national pride and is reinforced by reminiscences to diverse cultural layers (classic literature, participation in World War II depicted in the mass culture products) and supported in mass production on symbolic and visual level.

As a symbol of Russian strength is used a visual metaphor of a bear. One of the first mentions of it as a power holder can be found in Francesco Algarotti`s “Lettere sulla Russia,” where the philosopher compares Russia with a tremendous white bear, who stands by its hindpaws on the bank of Arctic Ocean, with the tail, immersed in the water, by face turned to Turkey and Persia, simultaneously stretching out forepaws on West and East. This metaphor forewarns about danger to trigger or annoy Russia. Alike associations have remained up to today in Western discourse, that associates the “Russian Bear” with a settlement of military dictatorship (Francesco Algarotti and Dédéyan, cited in Ryabov,

2009).

In the western common sense, the strength of Russia is unpredictable and irrational. During times of Cold War its significance became so obvious for Americans, for example, that a short video 'There is a bear in the woods' as a part of electoral campaign of Ronald Reagan, even without mentioning a word 'Russia', was correctly read by the audience. In a 30 second video there appears a bear, "visible for one, invisible for the others, and nobody can say for sure if the bear is tamed or vicious," thus the only solution is to be as strong as the bear. Therefore, the image of a human appears towards the bear, which symbolizes a candidate who has potential to be such a strong leader and to protect his country. In the last cadre appears Reagan in the role of the peacemaker who mitigates danger from the Bear. The video is made in during a Cold war between USA and Russia, so the image of a bear logically indicates on Russia, with whom there was the most disastrous relationship in USA in that time.¹⁸ This video is an example of an articulation that put the element (the image of the bear as representation of Russia) into relation of a bear to Russia as a symbol of a threat that cannot be calculated by a cold rationality.

This connotation of a strong Russia so tightly have stuck to the bear metaphor, that the image of the bear started to be used in titles of foreign newspapers regarding to Russian-Georgian wars constantly (Lazari A., Ryabov O., 2008), like in the article "The Bear is back from hibernation" published in *The Weekend Australian*¹⁹ or publication of Le Figaro in 2008, where the Georgia is depicted as a little country of Southern Caucasus, that desperately tries to liberate itself from the claws of a Russian Bear²⁰. The bear on the logo of ruling country appeared in 2003 and is used up to now. One of the reasons is to keep

¹⁸ YouTube. (2006). Ronald Reagan TV Ad: "The Bear". [Online Video]. 12 November 2006. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpwdcmjBgNA>. [Accessed: 15 January 2018].

¹⁹ Dibb Paul. 2008. The Bear is back from hibernation. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/news/the-bear-is-back-from-hibernation/news-story/59b0c81a51301fe86ae13c537086f59b>. [Accessed 15 January 2018].

²⁰ "Ce petit pays du sud du Caucase, qui n'avait eu de cesse, depuis 1991, de sortir de la patte griffue du grand ours russe, vient de subir en quelques jours une véritable dérouté politique, militaire, morale, économique et stratégique" <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/08/14/01003-20080814ARTFIG00021-saakachvili-a-mis-en-peril-les-reves-d-occident-des-georgiens.php>

association of 'United Russia' with bear is an archetype from Russian old fairy tales, where the bear is frequently depicted as the tsar of animals: not every time kind, but always just, thus everybody obeys to him. The party paid efforts to cultivate this image in the common sense of the citizens by organizing events for children like "Mama, Papa, Mishka, Ja" (Ryabov, 2009) or alike. A bright example of combination in mythological usage and political connotations of the archetype have happened when a youth organization "Mishki" ('The Bears'), focused on children and young adults from 8 to 15 years asked the president of Russia V. Putin to become the leader of their movement "Bears", because he is the main "bear" of Russia". Thus, rehabilitated from fairy tales and subcortex of mass consciousness image became a symbol of national self-identification. The brand of power-holders, that was reactualised from Russian folklore through allegory, connects the nation as signified with imaginary signifier. By this it conveys to the nation the necessary attributes and characteristics. As O. Ryabov notices, from the political narrative it seems that all the citizens become not more than emanations of a big 'Russian bear' (Ryabov, 2009). Since the first decade of the millennium the symbol became reproduced more frequently, not only in political context, but also in cultural field (used by youth centers), in mass media^{21 22}. In such a way, it was handy to express national cultural unity and articulate hegemony.

The image of a bear together with frost, Siberia, caviar, and vodka are related as stable symbols of Russia and 'Russianness' (Mikhailova, 2015). It is interesting to note, that despite the image of the bear always was present in Russian archetype map as a 'tsar' of animals, it was not actively exploited as a tool of national self-identification inside the nation. Mostly, such relation of 'Russianness' to a bear happened through the perception of foreigners (Ul'janov and Chernyshov, 2015; Rossomahin and Hrustal'jov, 2008).

The formation of this symbol was also supported and promoted by the president of

²¹ Евгений Джим. 2016. Почему медведь - символ России. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://statehistory.ru/5564/Pochemu-medved---simvol-Rossii/>. [Accessed 15 January 2018].

²² Fishki.Net. 2016. Почему медведь символ России?. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://fishki.net/2176582-pochemu-medvedy-simvol-rossii.html>. [Accessed 15 January 2018]

the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. In particular, he appealed to the image of a bear on the annual meeting of ‘International Discussion Club “Valday.”’ Putin called the bear as a ‘landlord of Taiga,’ extrapolating on this image Russian perspective of international politics²³. Putin says, ‘The bear will not ask anybody permission.’ During his press-conference on December 18, 2014. He called the image of bear as the most recognizable. On the example of the image of the bear in Taiga, he talked about Russia. Putin said, ‘Would it be better for our bear to sit calmly, not to hunt pigs across Taiga, and rather to eat berries and honey? Probably, then they will leave him alone? No, they will not, because they will always tend to put a chain on him. After they do it, they will take his teeth and claws²⁴. These and alike elocutions relate the image of the bear to connotations of strength and autocracy. The metaphorical nature of the image helps to describe to Putin how he sees the image of Russia (bear as strong, as landlord, as independent, etc.).

Exploiting the image of the bear in the political branding, the connotation ‘strength’ would be extrapolated on the image of the political party. Also, as the image of the bear contains direct reminiscences from Russian folklore fairy tales and ‘Russianness’, the party-exploiter of the image would acquire the same attributes. In such a way, we can observe that with the help of this symbol, the discourse could build the chain of equivalence among power, ruling party and authentic ‘Russianness’. The bear is proclaimed as genuine symbol of the nation, because its cult differentiates Russians among other nations from centuries ago (Ryabov, 2011) and serves as a marker of the border (Ulianov and Chernishov, 2015).

Frequently, the symbol contained the connotations of inability to grasp Russian *modus operandi* by rational Western logic, consequently, often an additional connotation in depiction was danger, therefore the image of the bear as symbol of Russia conveyed mostly either irrationality or threat. But the ruling party succeeded to change the connotation of the

²³ Prezident Rossii. 2014. Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba “Valdaj”. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860>. [Accessed 15 January 2018].

²⁴ Prezident Rossii. 2014. Bol'shaja press-konferencija Vladimira Putina. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47250>. [Accessed 15 January 2018].

brand, and keeping its strong relation to ‘Russianness’, to substitute negative connotations in perception with old-school mythological ones, borrowed from folklore and fairy tales. For example, what in foreign perception the Russian bear would symbolize ‘irrationality’, in Russian perception it would mean ‘strength’. In instance, in the folklore a bear was perceived as “Tsar of animals”²⁵. This image also was present in the rituals of “Sviatki” and “Maslianitsa” celebrations, where alive bear or dressed up as bear man was led from a yard to the yard, participating in the traditional rituals inscribed to these holidays²⁶. Therefore, the image of the bear became as an object of competition between Russian and Western discourses in filling it with a certain meaning. In such a way, the Russian federation has transformed the discourse about Russia, produced by Western discourse, overpassing the image of a bear as a symbol of the irrationality and aggression of Russia. If it happened not in international space (because the image of bear is still frequently used in political caricature, for example, in *New York Times*²⁷), at least for inner-Russian audience. In Russian media-discourse it has shifted meaning from aggression and anti-progress to the symbol of power and autocracy.

²⁵ Fol'klor i jetnografija: U jetnograficheskikh istokov fol'klornyh sjuzhetov i obrazov. Sbornik nauchnyh trudov / Pod red. B.N.Putilova. — L.: Nauka, 1984, p.194.

²⁶ Bolonev F. F., Fursova E. F. Kul't medvedja v verovanijah krest'jan Sibiri v proshlom i nastojashhem // *Narody Sibiri: istorija i kul'tura. Medved' v drevnih i sovremennyh kul'turah Sibiri.* — Novosibirsk: Institut arheologii i jetnografii, 2000. — S. 31–38.

²⁷ G8 Selfie. 2014. *New York Times Syndicate*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.nytsyn.com/cartoons/cartoons/1119661>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

2.2. Strategic narrative as a framework of analysis

In the foundation of discourses there are social practices. Understanding of things is inseparable from what and how does a subject performs. However, the purpose of the discourse is to transform these practices in accordance to a given social context (Van Leeuwen, T., 2005: 104). A significant role in this task belongs to the language as one of the semiotic systems. At this point it is worthy to note the difference between semiotic and material (Halliday et al., 2009: 60), where the language creates a certain version of reality, taking the material world as a prototype. The mean of linguistic construction of the version of reality can be called *Strategic narrative*. Hellman offers a definition of what is strategic narrative:

Strategic narratives are representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through which political elites attempt to give determined meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives. Examples include the justification of policy objectives or policy responses to economic or security crises, the formation of international alliances, or the rallying of domestic public opinion. (Antoniades et al., cited in Hellman, 2016: 44).

In this sense, strategic narrative is not a cause, but the effect of strategic choice of what to present and in which way, taking into account constraining factors of military or social-political processes (Hellman, 2016: 45). Thus, strategic narrative is a mean of belonging to the actors of the political arena, that helps to concentrate universally adopted senses of international politics in order to form the behavior of actors inside the country as well as outside. In other words, the narratives could be understood as frames, which helps to recipients to connect phenomena, which do not have logical connection, explaining it by the cause-and-effect relationship. They articulate interests and purposes, showing the ultimate

goal and how to achieve it (Miskimmon et al., 2017: 4). Miskimmon et al. identifies such components of strategic narrative as the main:

1. Focusing on future. Of course, strategic narrative takes its roots in the past and present, however they are used only as means of formation of politics in the future.
2. The narrative always proclaims a certain identity: it articulates either a certain (national or regional) position on a certain question, political decision or in general about certain place or country, that is reviewed in the context of the world politics or international policy system.
3. Its content is not fixed: it is a dynamic product, the subject of continuous discussions, based on interaction of governments with their inner societies as well as outer significant others.
4. The dimensions of strategic narrative are delineated by prevailing (domestic and international) understanding and expectations of the state. Specific interpretations appear on the basis of a certain interpretation of a historical narrative of a country, taking into account its reputation from the past.
5. The audience can be both inner or outer. Strategic narratives can be used for uniting the public (inner audience) through suggesting the identity, and communicating it to international arena as well (Miskimmon et al., 2017: 5).

Narratives are vital not only because they provide communicative-informational environment, but also because they often become simplified and sloganized (Bennet et al., 2011: 224) that fortify their positions. Simplified form of narratives because of economy of time, energy, and cognitive energy, uses that phenomenon that Halliday calls ‘the system of polarity’. It is a set of characteristics that contrast in relation to one another in a specific environment, depending on what the conditions will be formed in the environment. The system of polarity, that might be compared to grammatical systems is a set of functions “positive/negative”; it is the name of choice between this both (Halliday et al., 2009: 65). In other words, when we analyze glorification or demonizing, the system we are dealing with is polarity, that performs an assemble of syntagmatic and lexical choices (Jantunen, 2013: 63). Here it is worthy to note

that the analysis is performed in paradigmatic axis: polar features are examined not separately from their context (Halliday et al., 2009: 66), but as element that represents a system.

In some sense, strategic narrative can be called as a war of narratives, because it delegitimizes discourses, mythologizes the enemy. As well as mass media. Strategic narrative acts in the domain of symbolic, because it cannot function without “official history,” strategic communication needs media to produce new rituals, and, consequently, new narratives (Jantunen, 2013: 72).

Appraisal theory as a tool of deconstruction of Strategic Narrative

Under Appraisal theory it is accepted to understand a set of semantic resources for negotiating emotions, judgments, and valuations. These engage means for estimating people, places and things in our experience (Attitude), for adjusting our commitment to what we evaluate (Engagement) and for changing the volume of this (Graduation).

Appraisal is one of three major discourse semantic resources construing interpersonal meaning (Martin and White, 2003: 34). The theory tightly leans social experience to language. It focuses on interpersonal functioning of the discourse and arranges social relations. In the analysis stress is put on the subjective opinions of the addresser in the relation to the outer world. In such a way, the theory is concerned with how the speaker/writer approves and disapproves, galvanizes, loathes, praises or condemns, and with how they position their readers/listeners to do likewise. In detail, it investigates the system of sharing emotions and assessments, formation of personae and arranging or separating oneself from the respondents (Jantunen, 2013: 63).

Texts are simultaneously ideological and axiological, the sense is vigorously combined with sensuality. Ideologically speaking a text unfolds as rationality – a quest for ‘truth’; axiologically it unfolds rhetorically – an invitation to a community (Martin and White, 2003: 211). So, the text becomes a constitutive factor in formation of communities out of society, the factor of social stratification on ideological level. This theory analyzes the emotional

component of communication. It acts as a driver in the process of the formation or the adoption of a political worldview through an instant effect of emotions, which overcomes rationality. Because of sensuality they are accessible and more understandable for much wider audience.

Appraisal theory describes three resources of evaluation: Attitude, that serves as a framework for delineating of feelings and emotions in text/speech; Engagement, that sketches out the social perspective of stance-taking; and Graduation, which focuses on bringing into agreement or temper intensity and degree of “force” (Jantunen, 2013: 63).

The framework of Attitude

Attitude is concentrated upon feelings, among others, with emotional reactions, assessment of behavior and estimation of things, thus, itself it is divided into three regions of feeling, ‘affect’, ‘judgment’ and ‘appreciation’ (Martin and White, 2003: 35). Because Attitude is a discourse semantic system, it varies across a range of grammatical structures (Martin and White, 2003: 45). Attitude is concerned with both – ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience, including aspects of personal and social behavior. The categorization of the evaluations happens through the meaning-making option of polarity in that sense that generally evaluations are either positive or critical. The obvious way of evaluating, assigning attributes to Participants (wonderful men and women), is an element of Attitude. Affect, Judgment and Appreciation, which appraise being, doing and behavior are covered by Attitude as a primary evaluative category in the methodological framework (Jantunen, 2013: 64).

Affect handles resources for constructing of emotional reactions like feeling in shock with (Martin and White, 2003: 35). For example,

*The death of Okueva caused **fear** and **ennui** in the rows of Ukrainian radicals* (Eurasia Daily, 2017)²⁸ [my translation]

Thus, in the control zone of Affect are emotions and reacting to behavior, text/process, phenomena (Martin and White, 2003: 43). It includes modification of participants and processes, affective mental and behavioral processes, and modal Adjuncts (Martin and White, 2003: 46). The components of category of affect include:

1. IN/SECURITY: emotions to do with well-being (anxiety, fear, confidence and trust, etc.);
2. DIS/SATISFACTION: emotions to do with the pursuit of goals (ennui, dis/pleasure, curiosity, respect, dis/comfort, etc.);
3. UN/HAPPINESS: emotions to do with ‘affairs of the heart’ (sadness, anger, happiness, love, etc.)” (Macken-Horarik, 2003: 297)

Therefore, Affect is concentrated on feelings and the emotional inclination of people. It is worthy to note that they are especially significant in ensuring of empathy. They tend to correspond with characters’ internal evaluations of events (Macken-Horarik, 2003: 297).

Judgment examines attitudes towards behavior on the basis of ethics (Martin and White, 2003: 4). FOR EXAMPLE:

The Counsel of Ministers of Foreign Affairs OSCE did not accept the declaration regarding Ukraine because of the destructive position of Kyiv (Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov, TACC, 2017)²⁹ [my translation]

²⁸ EurAsia Daily. 2017. Smert' Okuevoj vyzvala strah i unynie v rjadah ukrainskih radikalov Podrobnnee: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2017/11/03/smert-okuevoy-vyzvala-strah-i-unynie-v-ryadah-ukrainskih-radikalov>. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2017/11/03/smert-okuevoy-vyzvala-strah-i-unynie-v-ryadah-ukrainskih-radikalov>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

²⁹ TASS. 2017. Lavrov: SMID OBSE ne prinjal deklaraciju po Ukraine iz-za destruktivnoj pozicii Kieva Podrobnnee na TASS: <http://tass.ru/politika/4795975>. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://tass.ru/politika/4795975>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

Martin and White proposes to grasp judgement and appreciation as ‘institutionalized feelings’ which snatch subject away from their habitual common sense world into uncommon sense space of shared community values. In such a way, judgement redraws feelings in the way of ‘right’ behavioral patterns, i.e. how we should behave or not (Martin and White, 2003: 45).

The category of judgement could be divided on two groups: Social Esteem and Social Sanction. Judgements of Social Esteem have to do with:

1. NORMALITY: how unusual someone is;
2. CAPACITY: how capable they are;
3. TENACITY: how resolute they are.

Judgement of Social Sanction have to do with:

1. VERACITY: how truthful or ‘real’ someone is;
2. PROPRIETY: how ethical someone is.

In this manner, because Judgement is concentrated on ethical evaluation of behavior, it is important for ethical discernment in narrative. It is inclined to correspond with characters’ external evaluations (Macken-Horarik, 2003: 298).

Macken-Horarik also highlights such tool as Loading in Appraisal analysis. As we could see from Affect sub-system, Appraisal values are either positive or negative, satisfying or dissatisfying, etc. The Loading system allows to show whether a word or even a whole phrase carries a positive or negative bias for the appraiser. Moreover, it gives interpersonal coherence to spans of text – committing a positive or negative gloss to one phase in relation to another. Loading might be communicated through features as negation or over the way of connotation which selects lexemes that convey positive or negative associations (Macken-Horarik, 2003: 298).

A related point to consider is that utterances are not limited by showing exposed attitude. In many cases it is not easy to identify the nature of the utterance due to its ambivalence. In Appraisal theory this can be articulated through the notions of Inscribed and Evoked Appraisal.

Inscribed Appraisal shows attitude explicitly using evaluative lexemes or syntax. It penetrates to the text with the help of attitudinal epithets (*'The dynamic of death accelerates in Nezalezhna* [a pejorative way to signify Ukraine, my translation]³⁰) or relational attributes (*'his smile seemed fake'*,) or comment adjuncts such as

"During Maidan there was born "Hromadske", however, it did not grow up to the level of BBC" [my translation]

Evoked Appraisal, on the other hand, accomplishes its goal by lexical enrichment of certain kind, for example, by subtle immersion of feeling-tokens into event sequence. Moreover, it can exploit figurative language, as in *"A short episode from Ukrainian news stuck in the memory [my translation]^{31 32}."* It is accepted to think that they are more difficult to grasp because their signification is not literal (Macken-Horarik, 2003: 300).

Appreciation searches for possibilities to interpret the value of things, either it is a natural phenomenon (what such things are worth and how we value them), product (things we make) or processes (performances we give), exploiting semiosis (Martin and White, 2003: 36). Thus, it appeals to the categories of aesthetics (*"Ramshackle buildings and dirty streets: what Rostov will show to tourists during World Cup"*³³). With the meaning-making option of appreciation some of the aesthetic valuations are rethought in systems of awards (prices, grades, grants, prizes, etc.) (Martin and White, 2003: 45).

³⁰ Utro.ru. 2017. V Nezaleznoji nevidannymi tempami rastet smertnost'. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://utro.ru/politics/2017/11/21/1345254.shtml>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

³¹ Snob. 2014. Korotkij sjuzhet ukrainskih novostej nadolgo vrezalsja v pamjat'. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://snob.ru/profile/9972/print/77858?v=1469197253>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

³³ Frolova Elizaveta, 2018. Obvetshalye zdaniya i grjaznye ulicy: chto Rostov pokazhet turistam vo vremja chempionata mira. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://161.ru/text/gorod/403651873284099.html>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

The framework of engagement and graduation: Alignment, Solidarity, and the Construed Reader

Engagement is a cover-all term for resources of intersubjective positioning (Martin and White, 2003: 95). It deals with the ways in which resources (such as projection (reported speech), modality, polarity, concession (countering) and various comment adverbials) position the addresser in accordance to the value position being advanced and with respect to potential responses to that value position (by quoting or reporting, acknowledging a possibility, denying, countering, affirming and so on (Martin and White, 2003: 36)

Engagement deals with sourcing attitudes and the play of voices around opinions in discourse (Martin and White, 2003: 35). Authors construe their point of view and the resources used to adopt stances towards other authors' perspectives. This assumes that all text conveys opinion to some degree and that all writing represents both explicit and implicit responses to other opinions (Read and Carroll, 2012: 427).

When it comes to the category of '**alignment/disalignment,**' it designates agreement/disagreement regarding both attitudinal assessments and beliefs or assumptions about nature of things, their past and how it shall be. It is important to note that when the addresser opens their attitudinal positions, they not only express their own position, but in the same moment invites others to support and to share with them feelings, tastes, or normative assessments they proclaim. Therefore, the texts of mass communication of this type construct for themselves an 'envisaged', 'imagined' or 'ideal' reader (Martin and White, 2003: 95), in other words, **Construed Reader**.

It leads us to the question of how attitude that can be defined as 'solidarity' is built in the texts of this type. Solidarity not necessarily should be directly attached to agreement/disagreement. It might reveal in form of tolerance to alternative viewpoints or in the feeling of belonging to a certain community, togetherness in which the addresser engages the reader and might seem as one of the legitimate viewpoints (Martin and White, 2003: 96).

In the domain of 'alignment/disalignment' Martin and White point out such narrative operations as:

Disclaim: the textual voice positions itself as at odds with, or rejecting, some contrary position (deny, counter);

Proclaim: representation of the position that is highly rightful (compelling, valid, plausible, well-founded, generally agreed, reliable, etc.).

The textual voice positions itself as in opposition to alternative positions:

- (concur) naturally ..., of course ..., obviously ..., admittedly ... etc.; some types of 'rhetorical' or 'leading' question
- (pronounce) I contend ..., the truth of the matter is ..., there can be no doubt that ... etc.
- (endorse) X has demonstrated that ...; As X has shown ... etc. (Martin and White, 2003: 98).

Entertain: in the way that the author evidently represents position as based on individual subjectivity, the authorial voice represents proposition as one of possible positions and in this way it appeals to these dialogic rightful alternatives (*it seems, perhaps, probably, in my view, I suspect that; some types of 'rhetorical' or 'expository' question*).

When it comes to intertextuality and general openness of the text to giving the place to other worldviews, Martin and White point distinguish such characteristics as Heteroglossia and Monoglossia.

Heteroglossia: heteroglossia generally is divided on two sub options: dialogic expansion and dialogic contraction. The distinction is based upon a level to which the accretion actively offers a place for dialogically alternative positions and voices (dialogic expansion). Such 'endorsing' phrases, the authorial voice introduces them as 'true' or 'valid', and in such a way aligns itself with the external voice that was announces as the source of that proposition. Heterogloss (reference dialogism) shows phenomena in various ways: through modalization, projection and negation, counter-expectation and restricted provenance (Martin and White, 2003: 103, 324).

Or, vice versa, confronts, rebuts or restricts them (dialogic contraction) (Martin and White, 2003: 98).

Monoglossia: (suppresses dialogism) explicates a proposition or a claim poorly – without referencing sources or alternative positions (Martin, 2004: 324). In other words, Engagement considers the positioning of oneself with respect to the opinions of others (heterogloss) and with respect to one's own opinions (monogloss) (Read and Carroll, 2012: 424).

Graduation is focused on gradeability. Gradeability is a general property of both attitude and engagement. Graduation in attitude enables the authors to convey greater or lesser degrees of positivity or negativity (Read and Carroll, 2012: 429).

It defines the degree of evaluation – how strong or weak the feeling is. This kind of graduation is called '**force**' (Martin and White, 2003: 40). *Force* is about grading (raise or lower) the interpersonal impact (slightly, very, completely) (Korenek and Šimko, 2014: 853). By 'force' meanings of propositions are strengthened or mitigated (White, 2015: 4). In that time when the *focus* is graduating (blur or sharpen) the focus of term's semantic categorizations (true friend, pure folly) (Korenek and Šimko, 2014: 853).

That is to say, the theory describes a typology of words that not only covers emotions and opinions but also the manner in which the authors engage with their audience and other authors, and how authors modify the strength of opinions expressed.

Conceptual metaphor as an instrument of Strategic narrative

In the opinion of Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff, Johnson 2003), so called Objectivist myth, that represents common scientific views, is incapable of managing such phenomena of human life as a human conceptual system, axiological system, and the logic of such humanitarian fields as psychology or anthropology (Navarro, Acevedo 1994: 14). Such a worldview believes that the outside world, i.e. things around us, exist regardless of humans, being not in contact with

mankind. As an alternative to Objectivism, Lakoff and Johnson introduce another term - Experientialism, that considers human thinking and action as based on their own belief of what is truth. The absence of universal approach leads to an impossibility to catch an "absolute truth". In contrast to Objectivism, Experientialism offers the view of people as a part of their surroundings. Humans perceive an experience metaphorically, using a gestalt from one domain of experience to build experience in another domain (Navarro, Acevedo 1994: 15) Even if metaphor is one of the most exploited tools for encoding and delivering messages in the act of communication, it is scarcely possible to unify the definition of the term.

While Cohen understands metaphor as mapping the elements of one set on those of another, Gallagher sees it in a wider way, defining it as a move from central meaning to marginal meaning (Navarro, Acevedo 1994: 15). In the act of communication it is scarcely possible to receive the thoughts of an addresser directly, that is why Michael Reddy in his work of 1979 referred to metaphor as a conduit. Figuratively speaking, language transmits human thoughts and feelings, words, phrases, and sentences; that is why they appear as containers. Even if language is significantly metaphorical, it is worthy to note that metaphor is not only the matter of language, it is also the matter of thought. According to Lakoff, the human thinking process is broadly metaphorical, a conceptual system that appears metaphorically structured. Lakoff defines the conceptual metaphor as “a correspondence between concepts across conceptual domains, allowing forms of reasoning and words from one domain to be used in the other“, that often happens unconsciously (Lakoff, 2002: 63). But here unconsciousness is meant not in the Freudian sense, but rather it describes the fact that the metaphorical structure of thought is so natural that it is mostly not reflected by consciousness. Since unreflective unconsciousness, which can also be called common sense, is structured, we deal with conceptualized common sense that significantly determines our worldview. In Lakoff's view, the notion of morality is also metaphorical, because a moral thinking is imaginative. The core of moral thinking rests on a metaphorical understanding (Lakoff, 2002: 42). In his book “Moral politics” the author draws a link between family morality and politics, pointing out that in some cases morality can serve as a conceptual model

for political views. The conceptual model operates on the basis of a certain value system that is encoded in metaphors.

3. Analysis of strategical narrative ‘Ukraine is a Failed State

Introduction to the Russian media discourse

In contrary to English-speaking style of political journalism, where the material is written by journalists themselves, in the media, produced by Russian Federation there is a tradition to run political journalism by so called ‘experts,’ who are either attached to political science or to an adjacent fields (philosophy, history, etc.), whose the main field of endeavor is not journalism. For example, Iskander Valitov, the candidate of medical science and neurophysiologist, is the expert of the show “Time Will Show” on Channel One Russia. In this journalistic role they appear as opinion makers. The author of the article hosted on *RIA Novosti* Tymofey Sergeitsev is not presented as a journalist, but as columnist, ‘methodologist, philosopher, the member of Zinoviev Club’.³⁴ From this description two attributes are the most interesting – ‘the member of Zinoviev club’ and ‘the methodologist’, which are interconnected. In this sub-chapter our the main claim is that there is a systematicity in production of strategical narrative ‘Ukraine is a failing state’. The claim that this narrative is built systematically gives us the ground to prove that this action is intentional, structured, and designed by a certain group. It is vital to articulate in order to prevent extrapolation of anti-Ukrainian intention on all the media in Russia in the common sense, first of all, of Ukrainians. In future, this argument could be developed and used in the peace-making projects and in rehabilitation of the international relationships between two countries.

³⁴ RIA Novosti. Timofej Sergejcev. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/authors/sergeytsev/>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

To show this systematicity, we will need to investigate more the past and present activities of the authors, whose writing or performance we quote in this research. Moreover, by showing origins of the sources, where these informational products are published, we support the argument of link these resources with Russian governmental structures. Analyzing personal past activities of the authors, we strive to show their attachment to anti-Ukrainian activity in the form of production of anti-Ukrainian strategic narrative. In this subchapter, I will attempt to explain how the activity of the Zinoviev Club is related to the formation of the narrative of Ukraine as a failing state. It is important to know that it is not the only think-tank, whose activity is directed to the creation of the narrative. There exists also Izborskiy Club, created in 2012 by politicians, thinkers, and activists of governmental-patriotic orientation. This Club aims, formation of a new agenda in Russian media, support of the formation of political-ideological coalition of patriots-statists, imperial front, opposed to manipulations, made in Russian politics by foreign centers of influence and ‘a fifth column’ from the inside of the country”³⁵ This think-tank is worthy of separate research. Restricted by the size of the work, we will concentrate on Zinoviev Club, due to its direct relation to analyzed in this research media.

Zinoviev Club is a part of a media holding *Rossiya Segodnya* (*Russia Today* or RT) ostracized in France and USA as a threat to a national security.³⁶ Russia Today was created by an Executive Order of president of Russia in 2013. It is wholly owned and operated by Russian government. RIA Novosti is owned by *Rossiya Segodnya* since 2014. This media channel is the source, where the analyzed article has appeared in 2015.

Zinoviev Club is a project of RIA Novosti, that hosts articles, discussions, and conferences on geopolitical topics. Timofey Sergeitsev is a member of Zinoviev Club. This club is called as such in the honor of Soviet philosopher Alexandr Zinoviev, who developed the theoretical background of ‘Methodologists circle,’^{37 38} to what Timofey Sergeitsev calls

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³⁶ Sputnik. 2017. *French Public Activists Demand RT France’s Broadcasting License Be Revoked*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201712211060185453-france-rt-licence-broadcasting-critics/>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

³⁷ Zinov'ev, Aleksandr, 2002. *Logicheskaja Sociologija*. Moskva: Socium. 260 p.

himself to belong³⁹. We have already mentioned this organization in the first chapter of the work but developing it here would shed a light on the link between the author, the media source, 'Methodologists circle,' in production of the narratives, which create the image of Ukraine as the other.

On 2nd of February of 2014 there in *RIA Novosti* was announced a beginning of work of Zinoviev Club. It was positioned as 'in opposition to liberal and neoliberal pseudo democratic propaganda'. The team of Zinoviev Club was called as 'expert researcher pool of MIA "Russia Today" that helps 'to form not 'clumsy political discourse,' but 'fair image of Russia, according its real weight, power and self-efficiency in the 21st century. In the this article about opening of the club there quoted the words of its member A.Pilko:

*There is no society without ideology. Ideology is a system of values, it might be literature, philosophy, and culture. If there exists society, there exists ideology. Propaganda is informational support of ideology, informational support of values of society*⁴⁰[my translation]

23 of March 2017 on the site of Zinoviev Club appears the news on holding of a conference, dedicated to Alexandr Zinoviev, organized in Donetsk in cooperation with Zinoviev Club of Novorossia (Donetsk and Lugansk self-proclaimed republics), announced in the next way:

*Miroslav Rudenko, the deputy of the National Council of DPR, the representor of the Education Committee, Science, and Culture highlighted the importance of such think centers as the Zinoviev Club of Novorossiia (ZCN) and the Izborskiy Club of Novorossiia, and cooperation in the producing of ideology [my translation].*⁴¹ .

³⁸ Zinov'ev, Aleksandr, 1997. *Global'nyj chelovejnik*. Moskva: Jeksmo. 448p.

³⁹ Nekommercheskij institut razvitija Nauchnyj Fond im. G.P. Shhedrovitskogo. 2018. *G.P. Shhedrovickij. Personalii. 1980-e gody*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.harvardgenerator.com/references/website>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁴⁰ RIA Novosti. 2014. "Zinov'evskij klub" sformiruet spravedlivyj obraz Rossii v mire. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/religion/20140702/1014473326.html>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁴¹ Pogorelaja, Anna. 2017. S «Global'nym chelovejnikom» Aleksandra Zinov'eva znakomilis' v Donecke. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://zinoviev.info/wps/archives/3046>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

The term ‘Novorossia’ has never been used in Ukraine as a reference to mentioned territories, rather it is a word from Russia-backed geopolitical project's vocabulary, the term is a copy from the name of Novorossiia Governorate of Tsarist period. In the past it was used in the ideology of Russian Empire, in the present it appeals to separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast of Ukraine and Russian territory. V. Putin first called Eastern part of Ukraine as “Novorossiia” on April 17, 2014, after the annexation of Crimea:

... the question is in providing rights and interests of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens of South-East of Ukraine – I will remind, using the terminology of Tsarist times, it is Novorossia⁴²

On 11th September Russian President visited the church in Vorbyovy Gory in Moscow to “light the candles for those fallen in the fight for Novorossiia” (Darczewska, 2014: 10). M. Laruelle considers it as Russian mythmaking project in Ukraine (Laruelle, 2016: 70). Using mentioned terminology in the media space by Zinoviev Club members witnesses accepting a given geopolitical discourse and inclination to produce of the narratives in the frame of ‘Russkiy Mir’. Regarding the place of Ukraine in this discourse, the other member of Zinoviev Club Alexei Lepekhin writes, ‘Ukraine is trying to obtain governmental integrity in the way of pulling out itself from the Russian World⁴³.’ Through conferences, held on this specific topic, like one that happened on 27th of April, 2015, where the concept was developed from many aspects, Zinoviev Club has become one of think tanks of ‘Russkiy Mir’(Nazarova and Fokina, 2015: 340). A significant number of the members of this organization attribute themselves as ‘Methodologists,’(Moscow Methodological Circle). Moreover, Alexandr Zinoviev (in whose name the Club was called) was one of co-founders of it (Makarevich, 1992: 52).

Firstly, Methodological Circle appeared in 1953, among founders were A. Zinoviev (the first leader of the circle) and G. Schedrovitskiy (the following leader up to 2004). The

⁴² Prezident Rossii. 2018. Prjamaja linija s Vladimirom Putinyim. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁴³ Lepehin, Vladimir. 2018. Rossija i Ukraina - v chem principial'naja raznica. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150721/1139996560.html. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

initial agenda of the Circle was to win back for logic the status of science. The project was supposed to combine the features of an exact science (Math, Physics, etc.) and empirical science respectively. So, the program evolved from pure concentration on logic to development of theory of action and system-activity approach. From that idea derived the aim to connect thinking with the tasks of social action. In other words, the aim was to think in the context of social action, to change the world *through* thinking (Maracha, 2003). In this context, Georgiy Schedrovitskiy has developed so called intellectual instruments of penetration in historical processes⁴⁴:

‘The practice of organizational activity games... as a concepts of substantial development of communication with the purpose of management of social processes gives competitive resource for creation of advanced Russian models of democracy, which can and ought to be more effective, that American or European’ (ibid.,) [translation and emphasis is mine].

The circle of methodologists has developed own baked notion of programming: ‘Programs are located beyond management... A human is a program. Genetic code (genome) is a program.’ (ibid., ...). In other words, thinking and communication is considered already as an action. This principle gave a birth to the Circle, which appeared in the form of *methodological* seminars of ‘actional’ thinking with multiple ‘players.’ During a long time of seminars functioning there was found an original sociocultural practice, that is ‘organizational-active games,’ that served as unique tool of analysis and development of any system – organization, intellectual directions, programs, projects, etc.⁴⁵ In a nutshell, the sense is to create a crisis, and then to resolve it in the form of the game.⁴⁶ As a result, there are produced specific skills of crisis management.

⁴⁴ Nekommercheskij institut razvitija Nauchnyj Fond im. G.P. Shhedrovitskogo. 2018. Sergejcev Timofej Nikolaevich. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.fondgp.ru/mmk/personalia/1980/98>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁴⁵ Ural'skoe KMD-soobshhestvo «Jekspertnyj klub razvitija «Navigacija». 2018. Istorija SMD dvizhenija. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.navigo.su/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57&Itemid=60. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁴⁶ Shkola JEFFektivnyh Liderov. 2008. Igrotehnika ot Shhedrovickogo do Hodorkovskogo. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://gilbo.ru/index.php?page=vokrugigr&art=2198>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

In 30 years of theoretical refinement and constant leading of seminars and games around USSR territories, as Sergeitsev writes, the exit from ‘methodological underground of Russian philosophy and Russian postmarxism’ could happen only in the field to management and politics. Since that time, the method crisis solving throughout Organizational activity games started to be exploited on a smaller political scale, for example, in elections of headquarters for different industrial factories around Soviet territories, like for election of chief at Baikal–Amur Mainline in autumn of 1987 (Sergeitsev, *ibid.*)

The influence of this approach step by step has reached social issues. In instance, methodologists and playing technologists started to train ideologists of ecological movement of Baikal lake in 1985 (*ibid.*). Further, there appeared the request from Russian governmental corpus with the aim to assist in holding on its positions in critical situation of an early 90th. Former methodologists, among whom Sergeitsev appeared, made a business on it.

The first independent order to manage communication of election campaign Sergeitsev undertook in 1995 (the client was Valeriy Galchenko, executive of Moscow region (*ibid.*, ...)). Moreover, Sergeitsev has applied developed concept of private TV channel in Ukraine (the channel ICTV) (*ibid.*). The first political campaign in Ukraine was held on behalf of Victor Pinchuk⁴⁷ in 1998. Since period of Yanukovich and after, Ukrainian politicum and society V. Pinchiuk is considered as a Russian power behind the Ukrainian throne. This attitude is supported by the recent ambiguous publication in Wall Street Journal with the title ‘*Ukraine Must Make Painful Compromises for Peace With Russia*’⁴⁸ and explosive public reaction that followed.^{49 50} Then he, accompanied by Iskander Valitov, worked in president campaign of Leonid Kuchma (the second president of Ukraine) in 1999. These 2 campaigns were accompanied by Igor Shuvalov (until May, 2017 he has worked as Russian polittechnologist

⁴⁷ HajVej. 2016. "Inter" Shuvalova - Ljovochkina nado perevospityvat'. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://h.ua/story/432220/>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁴⁸ The Wall Street Journal.. 2018. *Ukraine Must Make Painful Compromises for Peace With Russia*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-must-make-painful-compromises-for-peace-with-russia-1483053902>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁴⁹ Korrespondent.net. 2016. Zrada vid Pinchuka: reakcija ukraïns'kih socmerezkh. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3795020-zrada-vid-pinchuka-reaktsiia-ukrainskykh-sotsmerezkh>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁵⁰ Mir. 2017. Jurij Shherbak: Pozicija Pinchuka – ce akt derzhavnoi zradi. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://iamir.info/46250-jurij-scherbak-pozicija-pinchuka--ce-akt-derzhavnoi-zradi>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

and ideologist of infopolicy of TV-channel *Inter* in Ukraine). In May 2017 he was expelled from Ukraine and forbidden to enter the country for the next 5 years due to being a threat to national security of the state. Recently the channel itself has become an object of wrath of citizens for its pro-Russian⁵¹ and anti-Ukrainian⁵² activity. Several times activity of the TV-channel was investigated, suspected in funding of terrorism⁵³ and anti-state activities.⁵⁴

Sergeitsev witnesses that his activity in the next presidential campaign in Ukraine has become substantial cause of 'so called "Orange Revolution"' (ibid.) In such a way, T.Sergeitsev applied skills of strategical narrative in Ukrainian informational discourse, nurtured in methodologist circle.

The other significant partner of Sergeitsev in Ukrainian campaigns was Dmitriy Kulikov. About his attachment to Sergeitsev and Valitov, Kulikov witnesses, '...Sergeitsev has proposed me partnership, and I accepted it with thankfulness, it is developing up to now. In 2001 Iskander Valitov joined us. What connects three of us is our common belonging to philosophical School G. P. Schedrovitskiy (Moscow Methodological School)'⁵⁵. Sergeitsev, Valitov, and Kulikov worked on presidential campaign of Victor Yanukovich in 2004⁵⁶, who is accused in treason⁵⁷. In this and other campaigns in Ukraine (such as campaign of Leonid Kuchma 1999 and campaign of Arseniy Yatseniuk in 2010) Kulikov was responsible for

⁵¹ Moroz, Mila. 2016. U Kievi pid budivleju «Intera» choloviki vstanovljujut' nameti. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://hromadskeradio.org/news/2016/09/05/u-kyeivi-pid-budivleju-intera-choloviky-vstanovlyuyut-namety-foto-video>. [Accessed 7 May 2018].

⁵² Cenzor.Net. 2016. "Nu-ka, davajte zakanchivajte jetu h##nju", - shef-redaktor "Intera" Stoljarova v prjamom jefire o sjuzhete, posvjashhenom "Nebesnoj sotne".. [ONLINE] Available at: https://censor.net.ua/video_news/375725/nuka_davayite_zakanchivayite_etu_hnyu_shefredaktor_intera_stolyarova_v_pryamom_efire_o_syujete_posvyaschennom. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁵³ Cenzor.Net. 2017. Nacpolicija rozslidue spravu proti "Intera" za pidozroju u finansuvanni terorizmu. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ua.censor.net.ua/photo_news/452617/natspolitsiya_rozsliduye_spravu_proty_intera_za_pidozroyu_u_finansuvanni_teroryzmu_dokument. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁵⁴ Ukraïns'ka Pravda. 2016. Avakov hoche, shhob SBU zajnjalasja telekanalom "Inter". [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/08/31/7119182/>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁵⁵ Kulikov Dmitrij. 2018. G.P. Shhedrovickij. Personalii. 1980-e gody. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.fondgp.ru/gp/personalia/1990/15>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁵⁶ Mustafa Najem. 2009. Arsenij Jacenjuk: Odnoklasniki.RU. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2009/07/6/4071368/>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁵⁷ Zik. 2018. Sud Kieva s'ogodni prodovzhue rozglyad spravi pro derzhradu Janukovicha.. [ONLINE] Available at: https://zik.ua/news/2018/02/22/sud_kyieva_sogodni_prodovzhuie_rozglyad_spravy_pro_derzhradu_yanukovyh_a_1271417. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

development of messages and delivering them to electorate⁵⁸. Later Dmitriy Kulikov started to perform on Russian political TV-shows intensively in the role of ‘political expert in Ukrainian topic.’ One of them was TV show of Vladimir Soloviev “Poedinok”⁵⁹ where Kulikov forms attitudes mostly of Russian audience towards Ukrainian state. In 2015 Kulikov becomes a presenter of political show “Pravo znat’” on *TB – ЦЕНТР* channel. This channel, one of the most viral media in Russia since USSR, comment this fact in the next way,

*Appeared vacancy was filled by Dmitriy Kulikov - politologist, expert of Committee of State Duma in CIS and relation with compatriots, the expert in Ukrainian topic*⁶⁰[my translation]

The main purpose of the show is to give an interpretation (attribution of new meanings) to an event of the passing week. The ‘guest-pool’ embraces famous Russian politicians (like Sergey Kurginyan) or political scientist (like Dimitri Simes), i.e., influencers. They function as ‘*vox rei*’. These key persons must give answers to the questions of journalists, who play ‘*vox populi*.’ It is interesting to note, that while analyzing the show, I noticed that from episode to episode ‘journalists’ and ‘experts’ stay without change, these categories are presented by the same people. The topics such as ‘Ukraine’, ‘Europe’, ‘USA’ are presented considerably frequently.

The narrative regarding Ukraine, performed by Kulikov have noticeable similarities with those, made by Sergeitsev. It depicts Ukraine as a failing state. For example, in a relatively fresh episode of the program (from 10.02.18) already from the first minutes the head of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy Sergey Karaganov answers the question of Dmitriy Kulikov with the next allocution (2:51 – 3:09)⁶¹:

⁵⁸ Kommersant.Ru. 2018. "Pravoe delo" gotovit ukrainskij variant vyborov. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1681532>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁵⁹ YouTube. 2016. Kulikov otvechaet na voprosy ukrainskih jekspertov. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Y-631BRGBA>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁶⁰ Komsomol'skaja Pravda. 2015. V tok-shou «Pravo znat'!» na TVC novyj vedushhij. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26428/3300907/>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁶¹ YouTube. 2018. Pravo Znat'. Rossija i Ukraina. 10.02.18.god.. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyTZY3ALxOM>. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

Ukraine is getting weaker. There is a weak, crashing regime in Ukraine, severe economy, so it is natural that a part of inhabitants (by the way it is not primary outer demand, it is a desire of an inner population) [want] to run from Ukraine...

It is worthy to look at the sum of Kulikov`s published materials in order to conclude what the message regarding Ukraine the author attempts to convey. In the table there presented the headlines of articles of D. Kulikov or interview with him. To the signifier ‘Ukraine’ there attributed the next labels: degradation, project “Ukraine”, economic chaos. By such a specific linguistic choice there conveyed the sense of incapability of the state. Especially, if to look more precisely on the signifier ‘project “Ukraine”’. Double quotes undermine the notion of reality of the state, takes away its *status quo* as existing entity, and transfer its image to be just nominal project (*проект «Украина»*) of the third party (adversary).

We pay special attention to personality of D. Kulikov among other ‘methodologists’, presenters and ‘experts,’ not only because of his tight and visible relations to Ukrainian elites, either directly allied to pro-Kremlin political power or found to be under investigation of Security Service of Ukraine. What is more important for us in this research, Kulikov works as an opinion maker for more than 25 years in institutions, funded by Russian government. The news internet platform “Агентство Сайт Зиновьевского Клуба” claims to be funded by Federal Agency on Press and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation⁶². RIA Novosti (where Kulikov`s articles⁶³ are published) is Federal State Unitary Enterprise. Radio Vesti FM (Russia) where Kulikov hosts a radio-show ‘Formula of Meaning’ belongs to the same media holding unit. ‘TV-Center’ channel, where D. Kulikov is employed as a presenter⁶⁴ in political

⁶² ‘Функционирует при финансовой поддержке Федерального агентства по печати и массовым коммуникациям’ Aгенство SZK. Fond "Aleksandr Zinov'ev". 2018. Glavnaja. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://finecru.ru/>. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

⁶³ RIA Novosti. 2018. Dmitrij Kulikov. Vse Publikacii Avtora. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/authors/dmitry_kulikov/. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁶⁴ Komsomol'skaja Pravda. 2015. V tok-shou «Pravo znat'!» na TVC novyj vedushhij. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26428/3300907/>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

show “Pravo Znat”, is owned by Moscow administration⁶⁵. All of these channels are called by their concept to transmit pro-governmental agenda.

Starting his career from early 1990th, D. Kulikov achieved access to mentioned government funded media. All mentioned media create a united agenda or integral strategical narrative, oriented mostly on inner audience use. It embraces a large number of audience (see Table A). As we mentioned, the main characteristics of D. Kulikov`s works is attempt to give interpretation (or to produce the meanings and messages) regarding to various outer geopolitical events.

Name	Approximate Number of Viewers
RIA Novosti	4000 ⁶⁶
TV-Center	13400 ⁶⁷
Vesti FM (Russia)	12,4 ⁶⁸

Table A quantity of viewers, thousands per day.

Marketing data shows, that TV-Center channel holds diverse audience: 1,9 % of young audience from 100% of audience around the country, 2,6 % of people from 18 to 45, from whom 92% have middle or high education and 71% have middle consumption possibility. It shows that the perceivers of the message belong to different social and economic groups. In terms of Laclau, D. Kulikov, T.Sergeitsev, and other message makers meet the task to design a new agency, that Laclau calls ‘*people*’ out of plurality of heterogeneous elements (Laclau, 2002: 224).

⁶⁵ Kreml'. Moskva. 2018. Rasporjazhenie Mjera Moskvyy ot 15.01.1997 N 31-RM "O sozdanii OAO "TV Centr"". [ONLINE] Available at: <https://kremlin-moscow.com/711582>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁶⁶ LiveInternet.Ru. 2018. *Tuesday, 17 of April*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.liveinternet.ru/stat/RS_Total/Riaru_Total/index.html?date=2018-04-03. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁶⁷ Sostav.ru. 2018. *10 телеканалов-лидеров по рекламе*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.sostav.ru/publication/glavnnye-mediaploshchadki-rossii-tv-20406.html>. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁶⁸ Reklamnyj Centr Brjend Media. 2018. Auditorija Radio VestiFM. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.brand-radio.ru/serv__idP_52_idP1_84_idP2_2965_idP3_2967.html. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

In order to achieve this goal, there used a populist reason that includes a total revolutionary event, bringing about the full reconciliation of society with itself, that would make the political moment superfluous. Moreover, partial self-identification of society should be presented as universal (Laclau, 2002: 225). As we mentioned, the members of ‘Zinoviev Club’ highlight the task to build ‘a fair image of Russia’. It can be paraphrased as an aim to articulate in proper form a new governmental ideology. In the imaginary of a given ideology (‘Russkiy Mir’) we find imperialistic motifs (as it is seen from a close-reading analysis of T. Sergeitsev further). Thus, the narrative of rebirth, revenge of Russia (‘вставание России с колен’⁶⁹) is a part of this *revolutionary event*, the matter that imposes universality on heterogeneous group of perceivers. The other part of *consolidatory event*, that constantly is present, is danger anticipated from political adversaries, in particular, from Ukraine as an ally of the main adversaries (EU, USA), forecast that Ukrainian state will fail soon.

Imperialistic motif and reminiscences to almightiness of Russia in a pro-governmental ideological agenda require to fight against the equality and sovereignty of neighbor state, because it contradicts to what Sergeitsev in analyzed further material calls ‘*historical truth*,’ i.e. classical position of Ukraine as subordinate entity. The task of the message-makers is to impose an imperialistic attitude. It serves as a mean of *consolidation*, as a universal intention of a new-baked hegemony. In such a way, the narrative ‘Ukraine as a failed state’ is a factor of an outer danger that consolidates constructed ‘*people*’ around ‘a fair image of Russia’. The image of Russia functions as the last harbor of order worth of trust, surrounded by other failing entities.

In such a way, ‘methodologists’, who are members of ‘Russkiy Mir’ think tank ‘Zinoviev Club’ became a solid ground of political technologies and strategical communication. The act on the behalf of persons and channels, which are considered not only as supporting and promoting anti-Ukrainian view, but even more, as a national security threat. As such, Security Service of Ukraine has banned the journalist of RIA Novosti and the member of ‘Zinoviev Club’ Zakhar Vinogradov from entering Ukrainian territory for 5 years

⁶⁹ This phrase, that later became the narrative, belongs to B.Yeltsin. You can find it in his speech in 2011. RIA Novosti. 2011. Ja s optimizmom smotru v budushhee i gotov k jenergichnym dejstvijam. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/history_tochki/20110130/328536393.html. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

considering ‘presence of the fact of doing by the person socially dangerous action, regardless the territory of its performance, that contradict to the security interests of Ukraine, and its prevention’.

Our approach to analysis is based on presumption that the narrative “Ukraine is a failing state” is represented more homogeneously, and has similar components such as:

- The articles are written by so called ‘experts’, people, who either are attached to political corpus or belong (or claimed that belong) to scientific circles;
- The lexis is highly expressive;
- The titles often contain imbedded attitudinal assessment;
- This particular kind of articles is produces by government aligned media either inside or outside the country;
- Often the articles possess multi-modal features that amplify the message in nonverbal (framed images) or indirect (‘related’ articles) way;

Showing here the layer of such articles, we will concentrate on the analysis on one of them, that represents all mentioned features. In *Table B* we gathered a number of relevant articles from different sources, but mainly from RIA Novosti as the main informational source of examination. In the next subchapter we will analyze in detail how strategical narrative ‘Ukraine is a failed state’ is presented in one of the mentioned articles of this table.

Analysis of the narrative “Ukraine as a Failing State” on the example of T.Sergeitsev`s article

In this subchapter I will analyze the text, appeared on RIA Novosti article from August of 2015⁷⁰. This resource is worth to analyze from several reasons. First of all, it is established and

⁷⁰ Sergejcev, Timofej. 2015. Komu nuzhna edinaja Ukraina?. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150804/1162233356.html. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

funded by Russian government⁷¹. Highly probably, it allows us to expect to see an official position, not just personal⁷². Secondly, this resource hosts writing of the members of already mentioned 'Zinoviev Club', that is a think-tank of an official ideology of the country. Thirdly, the resource embraces a vast number of the readers (see statistics in the table in the Table A), that witnesses about its influence on attitudes of citizens of Russian Federation. I parceled this text into sections, which are divided or related thematically in order to show the flow of narration and highlight the main value orientations.

This text is an example of strategical narrative, performed in the genre of political journalism. However, as we mentioned before this tendency before, the role of journalist is binded with the role of expert. Comparing of media texts produced in the Western English-speaking societies such as UK and the US with the media texts in Russia lead to a conclusion of a significant impact of globalization on Russian media (Kornetzki, 2012: 6) Maslova V. highlights such features of Russian political discourse as mobility of semantic structure of the word, asperities in separation of connotations from the primary meanings, variation of these meanings and meaning of the same linguistic signs, unconstrained substituting of objective by subjective and vice versa, as well as stressing on synonymic association links between words, modality of expressions, appraisalment of semantics, etc. (Maslova, 2008: 47).

I divided the text of the article on 11 sections, that in my point of view represent different parts of the message. It is important to note, that restricted by the spacial limits of the master thesis, in analyze only some chosen sections of the the T.Sergeitsev article. I focus on those, which are the most connected by imagery and compliment the message of each other. The original of the text is attached in Appendix 1.

⁷¹ It was under the name 'Federal State Unitary Enterprise Russian Agency of International Information «RIA Novosti»', The enterprise's property was federally owned (because federal unitary enterprise) and was indivisible. See Федеральное агентство по печати и массовым коммуникациям. МИА «Россия сегодня». [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.fapmc.ru/rospechat/rospechat/lwr/unitar/item130.html>. [Accessed 19 May 2018] In such a way, RIA Novosti is governmental media

⁷² This academic article describes transformation of RIA Novosti itself and its agenda Dougherty, J., 2014. Everyone lies: The Ukraine conflict and Russia's media transformation. *Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy*.

Section 1, Ukraine as a pity example

It is worthy to note, that the first two sections of the text serve rather as adjusting philosophical stances that communicate the author's view on geopolitical issues, his value position on nature of things. Here he introduces made with his own hands semiotic geopolitical model giving to phenomena specific terms, and by the act of nomination validates its existence. That is why these passages are worthy of special attention. A Construed Reader enters the space of imaginary of the author, gets to know *how it should be*, and only after it the focus turns to factual matter of *how it is now*. This passage is rich on metaphors and bright lexemes. It blurs the margin between analytics and creative writing, so that the analytics actually communicated in publicistic stances. This approach stimulates imagination to work. We will highlight some of the most bright constructions in order to deauthoratize the reading process and to show the instruments by which an impression is built.

As it mentioned before, in Russian-speaking political discourse it is more popular to broadcast from the point of view of experts, rather than to communicate only through journalistic writing. A. Pastukhov notes, that in actors of political informational environment are searching for new instruments of persuasive function for resolving their political problems. In causes a high demand of intellectual resources from their side. The society demands authoritative representors of the power, leaders of public opinion, who could articulate the most meaningful issues of daily agenda. Therefore, there is a need of professionals, capable to analyze and comment political issues, give independent evaluation also for journalists. Consequently, the need for such media figures as experts determines their key positions in political discourse. By their close collaboration with politicians, society, and media they won a title of 'creators of new reality' (Pastukhov, 2015: 108). The tone of the article might serve as a good example of this tendency. The author attributes to himself an authoritative voice over the issue of Ukraine. Diminutive tone toward the topic can be anticipated from the second word of the article – the adverb '*нова*' that communicates a common tiredness from the topic 'Ukraine,' but also the sense of previously gained expertise in the topic. In this informal way

to begin the text the author settles sense of confidence of a reader towards himself. This the first sentence contains what Macken-Horarik (Macken-Horarik, M., 2003: 298) calls as *Negative Loading* that convey to the reader negative associations with the subject.

From the beginning there is introduced corporal and existential conceptual metaphors, where *Politics Is A Body*: ‘all unattractive anatomy of contemporary world power’. By Judgement of Social Sanction the author shows how unethical contemporary global power is. Here we meet the first image from the authors semiotic model – signifier ‘contemporary global power,’ that does not have a signified. The image makes association with eschatological image of global evil (мировое зло), taking its roots from the book of the same name Nikolay Lossky⁷³ (1941). Since 2014 the anti-Western narrative received enormous attention of governmental channels, broadcasting lengthy anti-Western tirades night after night (Szostek, 2017c: 289). So, in Laclau terms, global power here functions as myth, as it organizes social space. What is more, from partial is made universal: from many states and institutions appears a single unit of a world power, that amplifies an eschatological senses. If to take into account that a Construed Reader is highly likely to be accustomed to Orthodoxy, we could read here reminiscences to the Book of Revelation of Apostol John, where the Beast is a symbol of the Worldly Power. In such a way, ‘a shamed anatomy of contemporary global power’ versus Russia creates a first opposition in this semiotic model. In the same category there appeared a signifier ‘contemporary democracy,’ to what description ‘unattractive democracy’ was also attributed. Introduction of this model happens without reference to any other source, it is one-sided presentation, that the reader is out to take for granted. In such a way, through the act of naming ‘global power’ or ‘contemporary democracy’ there happens grounding of unity between differences through the act of mythological naming, where name and the thing that is named become indistinguishable (Selg and Ventsel, 2008: 180)

In this metaphoric dimension lays also the image of Ukraine as an “inner” problem (“внутренняя” проблема), that already puts a negative appreciation, borns association with

⁷³ Losskij, Nikolaj, 1941. Bog i mirovoe zlo. Osnovy teodicej Pech. po izdaniju:Losskij N.Bog i mirovoe zlo. Osnovy teodicej. Praga.

sickness and destruction. Here is formed a metaform [UKRAINE IS LOW] that will gather a conglomerate of different metaphors around itself in order to support the narrative ‘Ukraine is a failing state.’ The next time Ukraine is mentioned in the construction ‘Український разлом’ (‘Ukrainian break’) through linguistic mean of *Affect* relates to the sense of *Insecurity*.

The chain of metaphors is gathered in a complex sentence:

Ukrainian break shows us all the unattractive anatomy of contemporary global power, contemporary democracy, it gives us idea about the problem of survival of cultural and civilized nation, that turns to historical death sentence, if the nation is not able to turn into affordable political culture and successive historical practice of preservation and development its nation [my translation and emphasis]

Existential aspects of a given imagery attributed to Ukraine are expressed in the sequence of constructions *the problem of survival* → *historical death sentence* that anticipates an end of a weak political body (a failing state). Using *Judgments of Social Esteem (Capacity)* through showing of incapability to survive the author gives apprehension of the main idea and conclusion of the article.

The next important figure in the model is ‘political culture.’ The author constitutes it as an object of discourse without referencing it either to real or even to symbolic (that could be act of heteroglossia – involving outer voices of theories or formed traditions). We even could say that in the space or semiotic model of this text, the entity of ‘political culture’ becomes a nodal point in the sense that it will become a cornerstone, a main criteria of existence of sovereign states and the key argument why Ukraine is a failing state. All in all, we can say, that the author is starting to build the chain of equivalence for image of Ukraine, from the first Section. Here Ukraine is associated with corporal ‘inner problem.’ Such linguistic choices as ‘problem’ and ‘break’ attributed to Ukraine are perceived only in non-literary sense and bear negative connotation of disorder, they are metaphors, which fill the metaphorm [UKRAINE IS LOW].

Section 2: Fail to make reasonable decision (the core value is incompetence)

The second section continues to settle '*how it should be*' order in this semiotic space, however, with the help of heteroglossia. The author engages outer sources, modifying them. The modified meaning allows to fill floating signifiers as 'politics':

It is said, politics is art of possible. I will add: historically possible [my translation]

By changing this saying that is a part of a political folklore (i.e., there applied heteroglossia), the author changes it and gives his own definition of what is *politics*. Because leitmotif of the article is challenging sovereignty of Ukraine, from the context we can deduce that there applied evoked appeal to Ukrainian history, that due to its colonized past does not reach the level of what the author calls 'political culture.' Consequently, Ukraine does not have precondition to sovereignty.

Then the author amplifies the fact that Ukraine in the past did not have its own government because of being conquered state. But Sergeitsev talks about it in a present tense:

It also concerns nations, who does not have a state [my translation]

Taking in consideration, that significant part of Ukrainian land has been occupied by Tsardom of Russia since 17th century, with a short break of independence in the format of Ukrainian People's Republic, got caught to USSR occupation, until a recent time on modern independence of 1991, it would fit to the a given frame of *nation, who does not have state*. However, the author uses present tense instead of the past. This 'logical mistake' shows neglecting recently acquired independence by the mean of grammar. The message is given in the form of a hint.

Overall, we can say, that in the first two sections there was built the main principles and logical framework of the introduced semiotic model, including redefinition of floating

signifier ‘*truth*,’ introducing new terminology like ‘*political culture*’, ‘*political competence*’, ‘*political literacy*’. Moreover, there was defined who is *adversary*. These are the pillars of the model, the operational criteria, which will be used to build a seemingly rational arguments which are called to promote a strategical narrative ‘*Ukraine is a failing state*’ among a wide audience.

Section 3: Philosophical stance: democracy lies

The *Section 3* continues introductory philosophical stances, which give attitudinal assessment, exposes the author's belief about the nature of things. It begins with the positioning of a theme line that will structure the passage:

there no friends in politics, but surely there are enemies (в политике нет друзей, но обязательно есть враги) [my translation]

The allocution is especially strong if to consider that it is a modification of the Russian idiom ‘there are no friends in politics, interests only,’ [my translation] that with the help of this allusion, allows to the author to enter a common sense or a present common discourse, and to build ‘dialog’ with the Construed Reader, creating space of ‘familiar language’ and showing that they share the same values, i.e. to align with the Reader. From the first passages building his semiotic model, the author develops the notion of ‘*political enemy*.’

To know your enemy, regardless their reassuring camouflage, means to be politically literate.
[my translation]

The evoked appreciation ‘reassuring camouflage’ indicates who the enemy is. The elocution is framed in the attitude of *Judgment of Social Sanction*, questioning veracity of the ‘political enemy’ subject, settling the attitude of untrust in the Reader. Ones the attitude of disbelief is

attributed to the ‘political enemy,’ the disqualification of the value system of the ‘political enemy’ (i.e., democracy) finds itself in the same chain of negative appreciation.

It is necessary to state that naming as a narrative device plays a vital role. Adversary value system is delineated as ‘modern universal democracy’. Here we see evoked appraisal: despite there used neutral words, the combination of them make it colored with a certain meaning nuance. The author appeals to the hegemony of the Other (i.e., hegemony that exists in Western Europe) in Laclau`s terms. Before intervention to Ukrainian inner affairs in 2014, Russia actively tried to play the role of gentle a benevolent regional hegemon,’ positioning itself as a provider not only security, access to markets, service of lender of last resort in times of crisis, but also a preserver of shared cultural legacies (Krikovic, 2016: 185) that would constitute hegemony on so called Eurasian space. Essentially, the Russian authority had a hope that most Ukrainians would follow its preferred narrative about their identity of people with historic, linguistic, and cultural ties to Russia that would construct a structure of regional alliance (Szostek, 2017b: 579). However, it did not happen as it was planned by Russian officials. So, the word ‘democracy’ here signifies a complexity of the other political paradigm, towards which Ukraine has expressed its political will, and resentments that is present in the discourse towards competitive narrative. Redefining of what is *democracy*, the author imbeds it to a presented in the textual space semiotic model. To define democracy is used the linguistic option of *Affect*:

is busy by maximum stupidying of every person [my translation]

The *Judgement of Social Sanction*: propriety is led to the ultimate stage by *Graduation* through the superlative adjective ‘*maximum*’. In this way, the author polarizes democracy as absolutely wrong modus operandi. The construction ‘*maximum stupefying*’ gives no possibility to judge about democracy critically, because the appraisal is already given, so the passage is monoglossic. After defining what is wrong and deceitful in this model, the author has a precedent to delineate what is true. Using *Judgement of Social Sanction: Veracity* there introduced the notion of truth:

But truth goes to outside anyway, this we call history [my translation]

The author equates the notion of ‘*truth*’ and ‘*history*’. From the first glance it looks like another philosophical stance, but in reality it gives the direction to the further flow of thought. In this logic, Ukraine as a state shall develop accordingly to historical circumstances of its sovereignty or its absence. We consider as necessary to make a historical remark in order to highlight details of Ukrainian sovereignty.

As a matter of fact, Ukrainian lands were taken under the rule of Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, that was fought by Cossacks since the 90th of XVI century in various uprisings by Cossack leaders (Krzysztof Kosiński, Severyn Nalyvaiko, Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny)⁷⁴. Bohdan Khmelnytsky was perceived among people as Ukrainian Moses⁷⁵, who freed the nation from Polish captivity. He was considered as the author of [principles of national governmental idea and proclaimed the idea of independence newly created state from the power of Polish monarch about what witness Zbarag – Zboriv campaign of 1649 – 1653 and Battle of Batih in 1652. Khmelnytsky tried to create autonomous entity within Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In order to protect Ukrainian governing and the interests of Ukrainians, Khmelnytsky made a treaty with Moscow government (so called “Khmelnytsky March articles”) called to solidify Ukrainian positions against Poland as interior threat to autonomy of the state. However, this act in Ukrainian historiography is considered as betrayal, since it put Ukraine into dependence from Russian empire and meant complete lost of sovereignty until 20th century. Only in 1917 Ukrainian sovereignty was renewed in the form of Ukrainian People's Republic within Russian Republic, and in 1918, after Ukrainian – Soviet was as sovereign state. 1921 it was annexed on the basis of Treaty of Riga, that caused partition of Ukrainian land between Poland and Soviet Union. The sovereignty returned in summer of 1991, where Ukrainian independent state was proclaimed as a successor of Ukrainian People's Republic.

⁷⁴ Lep'javko Serhiy, 1996. *Kozac'ki vijni kincja XVI st. v Ukraïni*. Chernigiv.

⁷⁵ Izbornik. 2018. *Litopis Samijla Velichka (Urivki)*. [ONLINE] Available at: http://litopys.org.ua/old18/old18_33.htm. [Accessed 19 May 2018].

Hence, absence of sovereignty during Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, after “Khmelnyskiy March articles”, during Soviet occupation is communicated as the only historically truthful condition of Ukrainian state, and vice versa, sovereignty is seen as historically untruthful, illegitimate. So, the equation of history and truth bears association that occupational regime under which Ukraine used to live since for a long time is a right vector of development. So, this equation is an attempt to apply historical approach into narrative “Ukraine is a failed state”. The text exposes several reminiscences to several of contemporary common sense idioms, among them is this:

There no friends in politics, enemies only [my translation]

A paraphrase of the idiom ‘*There no friends in politics, interests only*’ that the reader can easily reconstruct from background knowledge. This is a *common place linguistic item*, that allows to settle an area of alliance with the reader and to show that they find themselves in the same area of common sense. It is effectively composed in the beginning of the text, so from the beginning it builds a space of dialog with the reader. It is a rare example of heteroglossia in the text. It is important to consider that the modification of the idiom widens the definition of political enemy, attributing to any other political entity rather than ‘Russian world’ the position of an enemy. The understanding of who is enemy may derive from the notion of ‘sphere of influence’ that draws the boundaries of regional governance. Ukraine is situated on the coordinates of a ‘system of overlapping authorities’ between EU and Russia (Ferguson, 2017: 6). Russia by decades strived to create a united economic space with Ukraine in the economic form of CIS (D’Anieri, 1997: 18) or through geopolitical narrative of Russian-led Eurasian integration (Krickovic and Bratersky, 2016:181), that would imply the dimension of “Russian World” as the community, composed of a spiritually unified people (Ferguson, 2017: 17). The understanding of identity implied a peculiar view on common interests. For the ‘Russian World’ to stay alive and continue to uphold its values is vital that all of its constituent parts had to lean closer and to resist any attempts to leave the common space. In this fashion, membership in the EU and especially in NATO would be read as manifestation of

betrayal of the imagined community (Feklyunina, 2016: 785). In such a way, in this narrative we notice an ultimate notes, polarization, that sees Ukrainian choice either as coping either with friends or enemies ('Western civilization').

Further, the author introduces the other definition of 'political literacy.' The author utilizes attitudinal assessment, that judges on the nature of things and *how it should be*:

To know you enemy, regardless there calming disguise, is to have political literacy [my translation and emphasis]

Providing it with the attitudinal evaluation, it shows speaker's feelings and values, what is more, shows writer's authority as construed by the text (Martin and White, 2003: 2). Moreover, by applying *Judgment of Social Sanction (Veracity)* the author challenges honesty of the enemy. In this form of countering conjunction 'regardless' + the evaluative stance 'calming disguise' (*Affect, showing displeasure*) constructs disclaim, represents the current proposition by replacing that would have been expected in its place. In other words, even if 'contemporary democracy' looks as a positive phenomenon in the eyes of the reader, this assumption is beaten and a new position that challenges its veracity ('calming disguise') is established by the author. To make it obvious the author exploits *Inscribed Appreciation*:

Contemporary total democracy if busy by maximum getting stupider of every person who went under its influence [my translation]

The negative portray of democracy is made by engaging the linguistic option of *Affect* (stupider) in composition with *Graduation: Intensification* (maximal, every). G. Adamenko, comparing allocutions of German and Russian political actors concludes that for Russian politicians more aggressive manner of communication with the opponents is more innate. Often there used strategies of *discreditation* and *attacks* (Adamenko, 2014: 18). This direct negative appraisal does not live the place for an alternative view of this issue to the reader. Moreover, no arguments or facts are brought into the textual space, so the reader is ought to

take the attitude *for granted*. By filling floating signifier ‘democracy’ by this exact meaning, the author makes *moment* out of *element* in Laclau’s terms, and narrows down the space of the discourse regarding a given issue.

Immediately after, the author introduces the other element of the semiotic model, which will serve as a set of criteria for invalidating sovereignty of Ukraine in the symbolic space of the text. This element is a ‘political competency’:

... *it does not mean that political competency as such vanishes* [my translation and emphasis]

As follows, these three terms *political culture*, *political literacy*, and *political competency* form terminology of the system. It will serve as criteria of evaluation of Ukrainian state as failed. It is worthy to note, that no significant numbers or facts are given along with these terms. Mentioned definitions substitute tangible arguments like statistics or historical events, they make the reader feel as if they would bear informational value, however, they do not feet to principle of falsifiability. Such an informationally empty criteria as ‘political competency’ persuades the reader, building the logic: if Ukraine chooses ‘*contemporary total democracy*,’ then it is politically incompetent > If Ukraine is politically incompetent, then it is a failed state. Accordingly, this logical chain, built from these empty signifiers appears to be sufficient and satisfying of the reader’s heuristic need, avoiding any numbers or arguments based on historical events.

Moreover, mentioned empty signifiers, because they do not need by nature to be proved, allow the author to make a claim to possess truth. In a given grammatical surrounding the signifier ‘political position’ relates to the notion of truth that is hidden by adversaries:

... true political position is scrutinously camouflaged (... *подлинная политическая позиция тщательно маскируется*) [my translation and emphasis]

Using *Judgment of Social Sanction (Veracity)* the author challenges the truthfulness of ‘political position’ of the adversary. The factual information is replaced by coprological

elements, leaving to the reader an informational gap that they ought to fill with the help of imagination. Thus, imagined replaces factual.

To accomplish and validate a proposed model, the author redefines one of a pillar notions of every semiotic system – to the notion of *truth*. The act of logical misconception is applied:

But truth goes to outside anyway, this we call history [my translation and emphasis]

Accordingly, the author builds a chain of equivalence '*truth = history*,' making reference to a particular history, i.e. the history of Ukrainian state, we will see further in the text. However, it should be stated that this chain of equivalence allows to build the conclusion on Ukrainian sovereignty as next: failed (conquered) state in the past = failing state in the present

Section 4: Ukrainian history is fantasy Rapid narrative shift from philosophy to downward realities

From the 4th section we notice a shift from the introductory part that established the dimensions of the textual space, including terminology and appraisal of nature of the things. The text moves to development of reasoning on the given narrative. The metaform [UKRAINE IS LOW] will be fortified by introducing new metaphorical imagery in connection to signifier 'Ukraine'. Narration is enriched by using sarcasm as literary device:

Alas, but in contrary to dreams of ideologists of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism, focused solely to the past, Ukrainian political culture never has existed independently from the condition of how older than the Egyptian pyramids "Ukrs" will appear in just another reedition of Ukrainian historical fantasy [my translation]

The textual voice has undisguised sarcastic tone, which is seen in constructions: to dreams of ideologists, how older than the Egyptian pyramids "Ukrs", historical fantasy, etc. The main

value of the Section 4 is Disalignment. The narrator positions himself as an expert in geopolitical affairs. The mentioning of several ‘common places’ in history (as ‘Kievan Rus’ and ‘Zaporizhian Sich’) shall prove his expertise in history of Ukraine that gives him authority to talk about the future of the state. However, in the text we see enormous oversimplification referring to the past of the state, for example in:

Then arrived Mongol, which were alternated by Poles [my translation]

Monoglossia, the absence other voices in narration of history signals sharing with the reader established common intellectual background that does not need to be questioned or proved. It was formed by Soviet historiographic discourse (studied at schools in former Soviet republics) as an act of consolidation around a communicated discourse. So, it is possible to say that by this oversimplification the author sets the other point of Alignment with the reader.

One of the arguments of the narrative of ‘a failed state’ is disqualification of historiography of Ukraine as an ideological basis of independence intension. In the text we meet the linguistic construction ‘historical fantasy’ referring to contemporary historiography of Ukraine. The evoked appraisal reveals through metaphor. The word ‘fantasy’ refers to literary genre built on absence of any visible resemblance with reality. Ironic connotation of this word conveys the absence of link with reality of Ukrainian historiography.

One of the means of in political debates is mocking, where the addresser ‘conspires’ with the addressee, striving to exclude from the game his political opponent as someone not worthy of any positive appreciation (Dem`jankov, 2003: 130). Certainly, irony and even sarcasm is one of the most prominent characteristics of this discourse in general, and its layer that represents the narrative “Ukraine is a failing state” in particular. Employing irony in the text highlights a superior position of the narrator under the subject.

It is logically to think that Ukrainian state builds its legitimacy and sovereignty on communicating an own version of history of the state, rather than Russian`s one. Here happens a clash of narratives between Russian and Ukrainian historical narrative. It should be noted that strategic goal of Russian narrative was defined as ‘to help to preserve ethno-cultural

identity' and 'ties to the historic motherland' of Russian 'diasporas' and 'compatriots'. It was displayed in the Foreign Policy Concepts of 2008, 2013 and 2016. In these documents Ukraine was featured as a priority partner, which Russian authority had an intention to engage into 'deeper process of integration' (Szostek, 2017b: 578). A vital role in cultural identity plays unanimity in interpretation of the history. A particular interpretation of the history may either provide a ground for sovereignty of the state or blast it. In this case irony device towards Ukrainian version of history acts as undermining legitimacy not only of this version, but also demolishes validity of the Ukrainian state as based on 'historical fantasy' rather than historical facts. The author makes remarkable attribution:

in just another reedition of Ukrainian historical fantasy [my translation]

The word 'украинский' designates that this version of the history of the state is one of the versions. Use of irony amplifies the difference between the narratives to the point of polarity. From the context it can be deduced that it is contrasted to the other source in the position: fantasy versus truth = unreal versus real. The opposite to 'historical fantasy' consequently is Russian version of Ukrainian history. The metaphor 'fantasy' exclude possibility to find anything truthful or legitimate in Ukrainian version of history.

The word *очередной* reinforces distrust to Ukrainian historiography, that shows its inability to go out of erroneous thinking and to enter rightful understanding of the nature of things. Thus, invokes curiosity of construed reader in a rightful position. After criticizing the competitive narrative, the author establishes a 'legitimate' one in the Section 5.

Section 5: Establishing real order of things, value of veracity

The value position of this section is *Alignment*. The author aligns himself with signifier 'Cossacks,' who found out how disastrous the idea of their independence is and willingly

joined ‘*Russian political culture*’. Such rhetorical act of oversimplification seemingly solves the incompatibility of two historical narratives, particularly in the issue of enmity of Ukrainian and Russian nations, fruitfully depicted in the Ukrainian literature and folklore, where Russian nation was mostly designated by pejorative lexeme ‘Moskali’ as a presenters of alien Tsardom of Muscovy⁷⁶. This lexeme signified resentment towards Russian power that oppressed Ukrainian sovereignty for centuries. Its narrative of Ukraine as sub-state was never accepted among nation. Literature and folklore function as an evidence, psychographic data, that support this argument. The author shows a very particular, imperial interpretation of what ‘Cossacks’ is, and it is proved through analysis of imagery of Ukrainian culture (literature, folklore, painting) that this interpretation is not compatible with self-perception of Ukrainians. The function of this particular interpretation of ‘Cossacks’ is to project what is a rightful, legitimate attitude towards sovereignty of Ukraine from the point of view of the narrative. To reinforce how absurd the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty is, the author ones more employs overreduced statement that appeals to emotions rather than to rationality (*It is not enough to know how to wield the sword and to shoot from hand cannon for being a society* [my translation]). The use of the word ‘*not enough*’ functions as *Countering*, that presumes that for Ukrainians it was enough to make war in order to treat themselves as a society. It constructs an erroneous image of Ukrainians in the reader`s imagination.

Disqualification of modern history of Ukraine also is presented by usage of hyperbola ‘how older than the Egyptian pyramids “Ukrs” will appear in just another reedition of Ukrainian historical fantasy’. The author puts existence of empty signifier ‘*Ukrainian political culture*’, as a main precondition of legitimacy of the state, into dependence to fantastic circumstance of the age of Egyptian pyramids. The seemingly realistic criteria of ‘Ukrainian political culture’ is placed in relation to not realistic criteria that appeals rather to imagination than to logic. This dependence looks irrational, the literary device of hyperbola makes the

⁷⁶ Кохайтеся, чорнобриві,
Та не з москалями,
Бо москалі — чужі люде,
Роблять лихо з вами

Taras Shevchenko. *Zibrannja tvoriv*: U 6 t. — K., 2003. — Т. 1: Poezija 1837-1847. — S. 92-109; S. 612-617.

image of Ukrainian historians and political actors absurd, consequently, not reliable, showing them in unconcealed color, that has the characteristic of *polarization* used in strategical narrative.

The other example of *polarization* and highlighting of failure of Ukrainian state is an opposition, developed in the next passage. It is built on redefinition of ‘*Запорожская Сечь*’ *common place* in national memory:

Zaporizhian Sich *was a settlement of armed people without defined territorial borders* [my translation]

It builds the opposition to Poland as a “true state”. In this case there used *Inscribed Appraisal*, that shows evident, not hidden attitude of the author. To develop this idea, the author presents such intangible criteria as ‘*measures of XVII century*’. In such way, members of Zaporizhian Sich did not correspond to criteria of ‘the society of 17th century’. It is worth to note, that this passage is monoglossic in its features, it does not contain intertextuality - does not mention any other source as supportive to an arguments of the author. Neither it specifies what are those ‘criteria,’ who has developed them or where they are mentioned. As result, these criteria appear in the text as signifier without signified. They function as one of the pillar of built a presented semiotic model of. These criteria are called to give seemingly logical reasoning that Ukraine state could not measure up to them in the historical past, as result it cannot validate its sovereignty in the present.

Overall, these Sections 4 and 5 are semantically connected. The *Section 4* shows negative example, the objects of *disalignment* of the author. Sarcasm and negative appraisal are the main devices, which appeal to sensuality through vivid imagery (“Ukrs” “the Egyptian pyramids”). It provokes an impression of unrealness of the situation. The *Section 5* shows *alignment* of the author. Through *Evoked Appraisal* and Graduation the author continues to hang out the image of Ukraine as independent state. Through the image of Cossacks there is introduced the pattern that ought to be perceived as legitimate by the reader. Thus, there happens a collision of two narratives – Imperialistic (it rests on Soviet understanding of

‘Ukrainian question,’ that is inherited by Russian government as its successor) and Ukrainian version of Ukrainian history (‘historic fantasy’).

Section 7: Verdict to Ukrainian sovereignty, the value attitude Irrationality

There make sense to combine two these sections in analysis, because they communicate a common idea. The *section 7* proclaiming the main ideas, which are developed in the *section 8*.

In the *Section 7* the author, after development of philosophical and historiographical stances, arrives to the main point, that shows determination to communicated position through the use of the *Graduation: force – intensification*. The level of emotionality is increased, emotional splash happens on that level that reverberates through the surrounding discourse (Martin and White, 2003: 20). The superlative ‘absolutely’ brings the sense of an ultimate verdict:

The idea of independent Ukrainian political culture is absolutely utopian [my translation and emphasis]

An analysed word corresponds to adverb of probability ‘undoubtedly’. From the range of adverbs, the author choses semantically the strongest one, in the way that there would remain neither the place for an alternative view of the issue, nor for neutral attitude or dialog. The linguistic choice of superlative cuts any possibility to settle imaginary dialog with the audience. It is an example of Monoglossia. Therefore, the Construed Reader is built as a perceiver, not as potential actor. The right of interpretation is not shared with them, the horizon of interpretations is consciously ceased by the author.

The negative particle ‘not’ together with adverb ‘only’ used further fortifies a constructed appraisal:

And not only [judgement: counter expectation] *because this culture does not have historical source* [introduction of the second empty signifier]. [for granted]

This construction points out signals that the argument is supposed to be *taken for granted*. The linguistic option is *Judgement: counter expectation*, it seemingly breaks and widens the audience's assumptions about the subject.

Used further metaphors support the metaform [UKRAINE IS WEAK]. As an example we can take metaphor *historical source*. This linguistic construction is used in its secondary meaning. The first one is used when we are talking about primary historical sources (books, memoirs, etc.) to prove reliability this or that historical event. Highly unlikely the author uses it in a given meaning, because existence of "*Primary Chronicle*" (by Nestor the Chronicler) that recounts the history of Kievan Rus approximately from 850 to 1110th is a well known in academic discourse, moreover, is included to the reading canon in Slavistic studies.

Secondary (metaphorical) meaning of this construction rather invokes imagination, it does not have a signified (if not to take an account its primary meaning of historical literary meaning). 'Historical source' is a metaphor of origin. It builds up the argument that Ukraine does not have origin, proves historical extension of the subject (that gives a ground to developing the narrative 'Ukraine as a project'. The 'historical source' here is a metaphor of the 'cradle' of the state so to speak, that. It is intangible object that recipient can only anticipate, it is impossible to put in rigorous definition. Ukraine as the state lacks of signifier 'historical source' that is impossible to represent in the real (in Laclau term of 'real'). This metaphor is a vacuum in signification (Laclau, 2005: 105) in its nature, image without clear signified.

Further in the text the author develops a signifier '*political culture*,' attributing it to USA, EU, and Russia. With the help of physical metaphor '*will not allow*,' the author creates in image of *anthropomorphised entities* of the mentioned states. This exact linguistic choice ascribes to three of them the characteristic of superiority and paternalism over Ukraine. This metaphor fortifies the metaform [UKRAINE IS WEAK]. In developing of the statement there exploited natal metaphor of the birth:

For the birth of a new political culture there needed the processes of different scale and continuance [negative appreciation, dissatisfaction] from those Ukraine is experiencing now [my translation]

The natal imagery shows that Ukraine is a young state, opposite to EU, Russia, USA, that create the binary opposition ‘*State-child VS State-adult*’. Consequently, the previous metaphor ‘*will not allow*’, attributed to mentioned states, fits to the discourse of parental relation. It directly passes on the message that Ukraine is not ‘*old enough*’, therefore, cannot be independent. Instead of specification of the reasons why Ukraine is not a valid ‘political culture’ the author offers the not measurable criteria like ‘the processes of different scale and continuance. Formally, this allocution seems like criteria, however, when it comes to measurement, it is difficult to compute or apply, because the author does not explain what are these processes. This allocution is called not to explain, but to express *negative appreciation* and *dissatisfaction*.

A special role in this text plays the function of naming. The author choses an alternative way of signification to construct a negative attitude of the reader to Ukraine. The Western Ukraine is called as “‘passionary’ West of Ukraine’ and ‘its Catholic province’.

The lexeme ‘passionarity’ is introduced by Lev Gumilyov⁷⁷, Soviet ethnographer. The term is neutral if to take its primary, ethnogenetic sense (P. are the individuals, who have congenial ability to absorb more energy than is needed for personal and communal surviving and transform it to endeavour of change of their environment⁷⁸). According to the theory, the number of passionaries is extremely small in relation to majority. The image of ‘*catholic province*’ of Ukraine has similar connotations of an ostracised minority of passionary. This argument successfully appeals to the Construed Reader, a representor of Orthodox majority that leans towards the Russian direction of civilizational development. Engaging the device of

⁷⁷ Gumilev, L.N., Gumileva, N.V. and Kurkchi, A.I., 1990. *Jetnogenez i biosfera Zemli* (p. 260). Gidrometeoizdat.

⁷⁸ Gumilevica. *Gipotezy. Teorii. Mirovozzrenie. Slovar' ponjatij i terminov teorii jetnogeneza* L. N. Gumileva. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/works.html>. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

naming the author there is formed the attitude to Ukrainian strive to sovereignty as irrational minority that neglects surviving instinct. So, the main *value attitude* is **Irrationality**.

Section 8: Developing the value orientation 'hatred'

To reinforce the notion of ostracism, in *the Section 8* the author modifies the name '*Zapadnaya Ukraina*' as a reference of citizens of Western Ukraine to 'западенцы' that bears an offensive connotation. Despite sharing the same root '*zapad*' (West), referring to Western Ukrainians as to '*zapadentsy*,' the change of morphological characteristics of the word engages the signifier to the ideological discourse. This lexeme, besides referring to representors of Western Ukraine, brings the sense of belonging to alignment with Ukrainian National resistance movement, that is long-standing political enemy of Russian Federation.

The chain of equivalence between '*zapadentsy*' as citizens of Western Ukraine and '*zapadentsy*' as members of Ukrainian National resistance movement is built. They are placed in one ideological category of political enemy. In the imagery of the Construed Reader there is built association 'the representor of Western Ukraine = political enemy of Russia.' Thus, this example of naming witnesses on the value orientation '*hatred*.'

The author delineates the political accessory and introduces a new party in a given semiotic model, exploiting anthropomorphized entity of 'armed Donbass':

armed Donbass, political position of whom is realistic, simple, and comprehensible [my translation]

'Armed Donbass' here is the signified of Donetsk and Lugansk self-proclaimed republics. The collective noun for this territories Donbass is communicated through the warrior imagery via usage of *Positive Appreciation*. Danilova points out that in Russian political discourse there is *a wide usage of personifications* ('the victory was stolen from Kompartiya'), *exploiting of*

metaphors based on military of 'anatomic' vocabulary ('disbalance of all social-economic organism, information war'), and *extended metaphor* (Danilova, 2014). Here we see one of examples of military imagery, that the author attributes to Donbass. He presents it through the personified image of armed warrior, guerilla. *Positive appreciation* is built through assembling of a row of adjectives, which are closely related semantically and reinforced by *intensification* 'realistic, simple, and comprehensible'. They are attributed to the subject of 'political position' of 'Donbass'.

If to return to the previous passage, it is interesting to see the process of embedding of attitude through the mean of adjectives that build symmetrical opposition: *armed Donbass, political position of whom is realistic, simple, and comprehensible* versus *'Ukrainian propaganda... more utopian desire.'* From the range of lexical variation the author chooses those which build perfectly antonymic relations, which Halliday, Martin and White call as a device of *polarity*, where there is not in between, mild, half-way solution, only perfect opposition, that drives away the reader from searching for real state of things to mythological perception of reality where good and bad, strong and weak are separated and do not fuse to each other. In this way, 'Donbass' and 'zapadentsy' or 'Ukrainian political culture' do not refer to real subject anymore, but become mythological heroes in the sense that they join mythological pantheon of actors in the introduced semiotic model.

As follows, the author draws an opposition of images 'Zapadentsy' versus 'armed Donbass'. If the first one is ideological antipode, political enemy, who proclaim wrong messages, the second one is a representor of a 'right' view, thus through the image of Donbass the author communicates the key message of how things should be. In such a manner it is done indirectly, through supportive example, but this example receives an important affirmation:

political position of Donbass coincides with the political position of Russia [my translation]

With the rhetorical mean of *Engagement: Alignment* the author expresses positive appreciation and with its help associate the signified 'armed Donbass' and 'Russia.' Trough linguistic

option of *alignment* the author projects the main message. In the indirect speech of *anthropomorphized entity* ‘armed Donbass’ there appears the message in the form of ultimatum of Russia to Ukraine:

either sovereign state, based on Russian political culture, or no whatever [my translation]

From the first glance scandalous proposition, does not put dissonance in the Construed Reader’s perception of the text. In a common sense of the reader Ukraine and Russia appear as brother nations (Yekelchik, 2008: 49). This ideologeme was a part of Soviet mythological system and imagery of Soviet hegemony. During post-Soviet period of these two countries, the ideologeme still remains as a ‘cultural link’ between these two mindsets. However, it remains as an attitudinal norm for the most part, in older generation, who experienced Soviet schooling. From this we can consider that the oriented on the age of an audience is at least above 30.

The sense of superiority expressed in ‘based on Russian political culture’ also presumes readers background knowledge of imperialistic manner of relationship of Russia over Ukraine from the era of Bogdan Khmelnytsky. From that time and up to now Ukraine was perceived as periphery of Russia, this concept even obtained its own name, which makes acoustic similarity with the word Ukraine (‘Okraina,’ i.e. the margin) in Russian historiography. Returning to the ‘brother nations’ frame, Russia was (and still is) perceived as an ‘older brother,’ without whom Ukraine could not exist as a sovereign state in the common sense (Yekelchik, 2008: 76). Consequently, there is no wonder that such a direct and aggressive ultimative allocution appears as an organic part of the text. It is worth to note, that such a type of Construed Reader that would accept this claim as reasonable goes far beyond physical boundaries of Russian federation and reaches ‘compatriot’ subjects, whom we discussed in the first chapter.

The image of EU and USA is constructed by means of *Appraisal*, and *Graduation: force* that utilize repetition as tool for reinforcement is among them:

however, the basis of European interest is use, use, and use again [my translation]

In the semiotic model that the author builds, EU and USA appear as the main third party adversaries, polarised, but presented as political enemy in Schmitt's terms⁷⁹. It is important to make a remark on differences between the image of Ukraine and the image of EU, USA here. In Schmitt's theory, political enemy is absolutely wrong, not because it is weak, but because of its 'wrongness' *per se*. Consequently, wrong does not mean weak. In this text we can see a bright example of it: the author does not diminish capacities of EU, USA; with the help of *Graduation: quantification* he highlights the power of the political other: *the British (English) political culture has even five [graduation: quantification] such states, not taking into account the small stuff [Graduation: quantification]: United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand*

In such a way, the political enemy is presented as strong, but wrong. In the contrary, Ukraine is presented as weak and wrong. To reinforce the notion of incapability of Ukraine to be independent state, there was exploited literary device of metaphor and romantic marine imagery, where 'Ukrainian propaganda' is drifting between 'shores of hope' of EU and USA. The metaphor conveys existential meaning of indecisiveness, and play on diminutive relation of boat towards shores, that conveys paternal relationship of EU and USA towards Ukraine and by this order communicate incapability of Ukraine to be independent state, since indecisiveness is a feature of immaturity, i.e. dependence.

Analytical summary of the narrative "Ukraine as a Failing State" on the example of T. Sergeitsev's article

Formation of the texts of political discourse is structured in that way that every sign and symbol fixes a certain hierarchy of power, the system of authoritative interactions of subjects

⁷⁹ Schmitt, C., 2008. *The concept of the political: Expanded edition*. University of Chicago Press. pp.19-59

of politics. The primary goal of political speech is to change notion of addressee about political reality, in other words, *reconceptualization of political world* (Bazylev, 2005: 99). This text is both ideological and axiological. The axiological axis of the text is its suggesting the only right way, from imperialistic point of view, to its inherited colony. The criticism of wrong patterns of behaviour, unrealistic from historical aspect wishes (as wish of independence and belief in Ukrainian sovereignty) through wide use of irony and even sarcasm is called to cleanse the mistakes and to direct *protégé* or ‘prodigal son’ (Ukraine) to a right direction of a subordinated state. *Polarity* is one of the most used operations, its function is to show write and wrong, so Sections like 4 and 5 show this polarity in presenting ‘absolutely wrong’ versus ‘absolutely right’.

Ideological axis of the text conveys the position that the Construed reader is ought to adopt. In particular, it shows that Russian point of view of Ukrainian past is a correct one. Because this interpretation shows historical dependence of Ukraine from various occupational regimes, it proves consequential incapability to be sovereign in the present. Therefore, the only right solution is to return under control of empty signifier ‘*Russian political culture*’.

The imagery of EU and USA bear ideologically wrong side, for example, Britain is positioned as a racist political system; the aim of democracy is to stupefy; democracy is lie. In this way, the image of EU and USA become ideological opponent, in Martin and White’s term, a *third side*. From axiological viewpoint, USA is moral looser, because the purpose of USA is depicted by graduation ‘*exploit, exploit, and exploit.*’ Such an integrally bad image from moral point of view, shows ideologically right concept of ‘*Russian political culture*’ is morally opposite to USA, i.e. as an attentive to the behalf of Ukraine ‘parent.’ It leads to arrangement of the specific semiotic relations: ‘*Russian political culture*’ is depicted with to sense of ‘*parental care*’ against EU and USA as ‘betrayers’ over ‘incapable, political naive, subordinate’ Ukraine.

An analysed text exploits Monoglossia. i.e. providing only the author’s view on nature of things (like the question of truth or evaluation of historical events) without referring to alternative sources or opinions. In such a way, the presented point of view is subjective. Analysing in theoretical framework of Martin and White (Martin and White, 2003: 35), we

can say that the text is written in register of power. The evidence of it is exploiting by the author 'evaluative' lexis, polarity, and intensification almost in every of analysed sections. Register of power does not involve the reader into dialog, it rather dictates to the reader its own axiological point of view and conclusion on how things should work.

To build *alignment* with the reader, the author refers to several places from *common sense*, among them are rephrased sayings (for instance, 'There no friends in politics, only enemies') and historical entities ('Zaporizhian Sich'). Such a device is called to show that the author shares the common background with the reader, so he is worthy to be trusted. These common places, constructed, by mentioning of historical entities, represent the message of a belonging to common Soviet historiography, especially if to take into account that Ukrainian version of history is delineated by evaluative lexis 'fantasy.' In such a way, the message is that author's interpretation of history (based on Soviet and then Russian (Russia is meant to be a successor of Soviet Union) official history is a truthful one. Historical common places ('...Then arrived Mongol, which were alternated by Poles. Zaporizhian Sich was a settlement of armed people without defined territorial borders') provides a needed domain of symbolic, to organize a semiotic space of the proposed by the author model of universum.

The purpose of the text is to criticise the political choice of the neighbouring country (Ukraine) and to develop argument against its sovereignty. Moreover, the aim is to fill such floating signifiers as 'democracy' and 'truth' with the ideological doctrine of official Russian history in order to reduce ambiguity in the discourse, turning elements to moments through closure.

Value orientations (such as Pity, Condemnation, Hatred) interconnect the textual canva. In other words, these values draw coherent emotional picture of the text..The interpretative regimes compose strategically sequenced combination of attitudinal values that guides the reader in a certain experience of narrativised world. It starts with the value of **Pity**: It is not just about the fact that Ukraine is so dear to us that compose our 'inner' problem...(Section 1)

In this sample the attitudinal meanings are arranged to line up the reader to shared value of seeing Urkaine as an unfortunate dependent state of a bigger empire and to identify with it.

When it is achieved, the logic of the text presents adversary by a meaning complex of **Condemnation:**

Contemporary total democracy is busy by maximum getting stupider of every person... (Section 3)

The effect of polarization is to enact the reader to believe that democracy is an a priori mischievous phenomenon and the bearers of this value, consequently, are also harmful, i.e., *enemies*. In this light,

Ukrainian choice to join ‘western’ values is dullness of mind and enmity to Russian state, so, those Ukrainians who chosen it are not worthy of respect. The reader is encouraged to join this attitude by experience of evaluative language towards Ukrainians through meaning complex of **Contempt/anger, hatred:**

Besides the obvious political absurdity and nonsense of this act for Ukraine itself, “zapadentsy” created the other “passionary”, own antipode – armed Donbass – by their own hands... (Section 8)

As follows, two adversaries – ‘EU,USA’ and ‘Ukraine’ – are defined and described, value position toward them is given trough various tools of appraisal. The topic of political enemies construct a problem, in the term of narratology, a collision, that goes to the culmination with the use of meaning complex of **Contempt**. It is resolved by the value position of **Approval**, which is developed in the final sections 10 and 11:

*The Russian political culture is, in contrary, the most opened from existing ones (Section 10)
Russia holds Ukraine as united ... holding Ukrainian space from slipping into chaos, even if external, but stability, supporting political position of armed Donbass on keeping state Ukraine in the area of Russian political culture (Section 11)*

In this fashion, the reader is positioned to adopt an *Attitudinal Alignment* with Russia (*Russian political culture* and ‘political position’). The *Attitudinal Disalignment* shall be felt towards Ukraine as an ‘inner problem,’ towards ‘political absurdity and senselessness’ of its desire of Sovereignty. Moreover, disalignment shall be fostered towards holders of ‘democracy’ (EU, USA) as inciters of Ukraine to ‘wrong’ wish of Sovereignty. So, the sequenced combination of attitudinal values here is Pity – Condemnation – Contempt – Approval, that directs the reader to narrativized world of geopolitics. So, these four attitudinal values construct the next commonly accepted values:

- Russia is Upright
- EU, USA is Downright
- Democracy is Bad
- Ukraine is Weak

The character, with whom the reader is ought to empathise with, is *Russian political culture*. Along these lines, the reader is positioned to adopt disparagement of sovereignty of Ukraine, antipathy to democracy as EU-USA as its carriers, and sympathy to ‘Russian political position.’

The range allocutions presented as facts, which are presented in this article, is called to direct the reader to a particular value orientation that emerges from them. We will highlight several of so called facts:

1. ‘Russia holds Ukraine as united’
2. ‘*Holding united Ukraine, Russia leaves it chance to return in the area of Russian political culture and continue its state development*’
3. ‘Ukrainian state as dependent, nevertheless, as a state created Bolsheviks’

Given allocutions position Russia as a cornerstone of existence of Ukraine. Interestingly, signifiers “Russia” and “Bolsheviks” are creating the chain of equivalence. In such a way,

Russia continued its existence in ‘bolsheviki’ format (Soviet Union). It arises from the text that Soviet Union returned to “Russia” format:

Soviet (communist) period of development of Russian political culture... was “mere” the next step of historical development after a period of Orthodox empire.

So, this chain of equivalence suggests a ‘developing empire’. Regardless changes it remains stable, provides stability to Ukraine, and assure existence of Ukrainian state. Consequently, gaining independence from Russian political influence, Ukraine will lose stability and fail. So, due to these facts in the readers response shall be born the value orientation towards Russia as *capable stability provider (Attitudinal Alignment)*. For many years Russian state has used various economic incentives and soft power to promote regional integration and to position itself as the main security provider for the neighbouring states (Krickovic and Bratersky, 2016: 195) In contrary, the positioning of Ukraine as a subordinated one associate the state with the ‘*incapability.*’ Therefore, rhetoric about Russia contains positive evaluation, and rhetoric about Ukraine contains mostly examples of negative evaluation.

In presenting mentioned factual stances no factual tokens were attached to these arguments. The narrative of this article constructs a specific semiotic model that reconceptualise a geopolitical order through logical operations of simplification, introducing new terms and anthropomorphising of political items. According to Jameson, the individual narrative, or the individual formal structure, is to be grasped as the imaginary resolution of a real contradiction (Jameson, 2013: 62). With the reordering signifiers *Russia, Ukraine, EU, USA* to an presented semiotic structure, the author creates mythological space in order to resolve an existing contradiction between the military acts of Russian Federation towards Ukrainian state, against Ukrainian`s sovereignty. By exploiting of strategical narrative the author creates a political myth.

Political myth can be defined as “ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social group” (Zhong, L. and Zhang, J., 2016.) Presented above ‘facts’ attempted to give a relevant interpretation of past and present in order to propose a

valid scenario of future of Ukraine and to engage the reader in this mindset. A given interpretation presents Russia, Ukraine, EU, USA as anthropomorphized entities. It helps to enter the narrativized world to the reader.

Miskimmon et al. note that narrative proclaims a certain identity. Taking in account constructed value positions towards adversaries and towards Russia as a guarantee of existence of Ukrainian state, we assume that the text sales the identity of belonging to a certain community. It is a community of supporters the narrative 'Russia as a "superpower" over the region', as it was during reign of Russian Empire and Soviet occupation.

This text is an organic part of a conceptual construct "The Russian World," that represents contemporary official value system of Russian government and corresponds to the essential strategical narrative of "natsiestroitelstvo" (in English it would refer to "Nation building"⁸⁰) inside of Russian Federation. Russian historian and political philosopher Sergey Kara-Murza notes that since 19th century under Russian nation was understood trinary formation out of 'vielokoross' (modern Russians), 'maloross' (modern Ukrainians), and 'belosuss' (modern Belorussians). That is why the fight against Ukrainian nationalism has had a different character, than towards other nations, - Ukrainian nationalism has threatened integrity of Russian nation (Kara-Murza, 2011: 65). Consequently, we can say that the concept of '*obshcherusskiy narod*' (triune Russian nation) is a pillar of the discourse of "the Russian Word," and promoted by government cultural conglomerate of "Soviet Civilization" (Krickovic and Bratersky, 2016: 195).

Ukrainian geopolitical independence, moreover, tighter association with EU is seen as a obvious threat to national security of Russia, that understands Ukraine not only in terms of Russian sphere of influence, but also as a grey zone between EU and Russia (Ferguson, 2017: 13). In this fashion, attempting to answer the question how this article as an element represents the integral system, we would define it as apology for integrity of "The Russian World". The decision of Ukraine to chose the other path the text presents as a foolish decision of incapable country.

⁸⁰ "natsiestroitelstvo" is a concept that presumes possibility to create a new nation or accelerate development of national self-awareness. See more at Kara-Murza, Sergey, 2007. Demontazh naroda / M.: Algoritm.

As we already noted, strategical narrative is a war of narratives. In this case, we observe the war of the narrative of Russia as a great power against ‘pro-western’ narrative that Ukraine upholds. The ‘Zapad’ narrative is delegitimised in this text. It is worth to note that Joanna Szostek distinguishes ‘Zapad’ and ‘Yevropa’ as signifiers filled with different meanings. “West” is an entity from which Russia is excluded (‘a community of states separate from Russia’), however “Europe” remains an entity that has cultural-historical connection to Russia (Szostek, 2017: 578). The political agenda connection to Europe was articulated in early 90th, even up to the second decade of the 2000th. Europe was perceived as Russia’s “civilizational home” (Foxall, A., 2017: 5). Thus, ‘Western’ here is understood as led by US and supported by EU. This delegitimised discourse, attributed both collectively and to individual states. The adversary is often mythologized as hypocritical, foolish, and immoral (Szostek, 2017: 580). The image of Ukraine, in this fashion, is constructed as hopeless, naive, self-insufficient. In the other text from the same source and by the other member of “methodologists circle” Dmitrij Kulikov, we can observe developing of motif ‘slipping to chaos Ukraine’:

We discussed a lot the fact that Ukraine is balancing on the brink of complete destruction and slipping in a large-scale conflict⁸¹ [emphasis is mine]

With the use of superlative forms and a high level of hyperbola (as ‘complete destruction’) as well as metaphors (as ‘slipping’) there is fostered the value of pity and lack of hope. It is actual to those readers, who might have had attitude of sympathy to Ukraine. In this way, Russian paternalist intension towards Ukraine is seen not as aggression, but as act of care. It fits to the narrative of Russia as a great power, whose is to protect historically self-insufficient Ukraine, that first, due to its uncapability to operate by its own, was submitted to Russian Empire and then to Soviet union. The dependence of political existence of Ukraine from

⁸¹ Kulikov, Dmitrij. 2017. Bez promyshlennosti, tepla i sveta: blizhajshie perspektivy Ukrainy. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20170406/1491632523.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

Russia is supported in the text by interpretation of Ukrainian history through Russian historiography, that claims:

Ukrainian state as dependent, nevertheless, as a state created Bolsheviks

This is an element of the bigger narrative of Russian culture and the common glorious past that constructed a Russia-centric community (Feklyunina, 2016: 791). It is appealing to 'compatriot' subjects. This narrative of Ukraine as self-insufficient (consequently, *failed*) country fortifies potential to grow to the narrative 'Ukraine on the brink of extinction'. The first sounds of it we can already see in the coda of the text:

Will Ukraine exist to this moment (Iraq does not exist de facto, as well as Afghanistan, Libya, Syria)?

As we have noted, strategical narratives produce new rituals. In a given case before the sharp stage of Russian intervention in the inner affairs of Ukraine, there was a deep-rooted mythologeme of '*bratskiye narody*' planted in the common sense of Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian nations since Tsarist Russia. In terms of Laclau, this mythologeme has built a chain of equivalence between Ukrainian and Russian nations, and as result, it achieved perception of them as a united nation and 'de facto' one country (USSR) with 'blurry' borders. The narrative 'Ukraine is a failed state' generates the narrative 'Проект Украина⁸²,' that prepares the reader to perceive Ukraine not as one entity, but as many different ones, artificially held together under the label 'Ukraine' for somebody's profit.

If to take into account the source of the article (it is one of the most successful Russian media that are oriented on wide inner audience) a construed reader is a bearer of imperialistic worldview (highly likely, recipient and supporter of Soviet school version of history), thus the irony does not risk to hurt the audience, rather it pleases the reader and fortifies alignment

⁸² Stepushkova, Ljubov'. 2016. Proekt "Ukraina" zakryvaetsja?. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.pravda.ru/world/formerussr/ukraine/01-02-2016/1290581-getsko-0/>. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

between the author and the construed reader. In such a way, the author aggregates supporters of Soviet historiographic narrative around ideologically ‘rightful’ version of history in order to point out the blame on Ukrainian ‘wrong’ version of history. By this separation of ideologically ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ versions of history also happens axiological judgement. English-speaking political media-discourse is characterized by smoother lexis that attempts to engage the reader in its point of view, avoiding sharpening the style and conveying the target message directly. In contrast, Russian political media discourse, uses that type of vocabulary that explicitly displays the attitude. There are several of other examples of use intense lexis to build the image of Ukraine as failing state:

*Will EU sponsor a poor Ukraine with 40 millions of citizens? No*⁸³ [my translation and emphasis]

*As predicted, the processes of degradation and collapse of Ukraine happens in the frame of the previously made forecast*⁸⁴ [my translation and emphasis]

*Not surprisingly, that Euro-scepticism results in distrust to Ukrainian politics, taken place at the open parasitical position towards Europe*⁸⁵ [my translation and emphasis]

Russian linguist Valeriy Demiankov in the classical university textbook “*Interpretation of Political Discourse in Media*” compares political discourse to military actions, where political discourse is focused on ‘military power’ of the opponent, their ‘equipment’ (which is opinions and arguments) and manpower (that means discreditation of the personality of the opponent) (Demiankov, 2003: 130). As we can see, enormous aggressiveness is one of the main features of the Russian political discourse, especially that one that touches geopolitical topics.

⁸³ RIA Novosti. 2016. Ukraina poluchit to, chto Moldavija uzhe poluchila. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20160127/1366008980.html. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

⁸⁴ Kulikov, Dmitrij. 2017. Degradacija Ukrainy. Stanovlenie Donbassa. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20170302/1489114892.html. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

⁸⁵ Sergejcev, Timofej. 2016. Neevropejskoe negosudarstvo: programma istoricheskoy degradacii. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20160408/1405196120.html. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

Analysing the narrative, that governmental media exploit intensively, I conclude, that with its help the government fails to form a specific behaviour in the perceivers. First of all, the attitudinal value of Pity forms the attitude of regret to Ukrainian political choice. One of the aims is to discourage supporters (actual or potential) of Euromaidan inside Russia itself. So, this narrative is a response to the question, discussed in the country. In such a perspective, any unfortunate event in Ukraine tends to be interpreted through the emotion of regret about the Ukrainian revolution of 2014. This attitudinal value is tightly interrelated with the value of Condemn. In such a way, pity for Ukrainian choice of disintegration from “Russkiy Mir” can transform in condemnation of supporters for any unfortunate even in Ukraine and Donbass in particular. It leads to formation of real actions among perceivers of the narrative, because the attitudinal value of Condemn is tightly related to Hatred. Condemnation provokes strong emotions in recipients of the narrative, that in many cases would be enough to call people to resolve the cause of the problem (i.e., to stand against new Ukrainian power) through various ways, and among them, fighting against the Ukrainian state in Donbass (this aspect is covered in the next subchapter) as an opponent to the new Ukrainian vector of development. The latter we can consider as the political aim that authors set in the texts exploiting this narrative. Therefore, it is possible to conclude, that this narrative build negative solidarity - solidarity against Ukrainian self-determination as European space.

This narrative is based on a completing interpretation of the past (with the help of Soviet and Russian historiography), present, and future (through exploitation of apocalyptic imagery) of Ukraine. Furthermore, this narrative, produced by governmental media, has potential to influence the attitude of significant others outside the country – “compatriot” subjects outside of Russia. Also, it forms the picture of Ukraine for Russian-speaking decision makers across post-Soviet countries, which are split in support and disapproval of Ukrainian political choice.

Analysis of strategical narrative ‘Ukraine is a Nazi State’

In his statement in 2005, Vladimir Putin expressed his disappointment regarding to the collapse of the Soviet Union, calling it ‘a large-scale geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’⁸⁶. Shortly after it happened the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War at high scale. In comparison with previous standard of celebration, the 60th anniversary has shown that it functioned as a vital element of the national identity formation. In this formation, Russia (and the USSR) is seen as the main player in the great victory over fascism. Moreover, Russia is presented as the guard of Orthodox and traditional values. These messages serve to unite society and protect elite`s authority (Kudors, 2015: 157. The articulation of identity ‘fighters over fascism’ has found its way in the form of “Immortal Regiment” movement. It boosted a common memory and imagery of Russian and “Compatriot” society. “Immortal Regiment” played a vital role in self-identification of participants as ‘descendants of glorious warriors’. Moreover, through speculation on common memory as well as through the practice of parading, the signification of Ukrainians as the Other, as supporters of the hostile Nazi regime of the past, was developed.

In the case of Russia, the self-identification is constructed on the image of the Other. Because of the existence of an enemy abroad, the nation is consolidated. Fluctuating self-identification of the Russian nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union stabilised in 2000-s, when the narrative of the “Great Patriotic War” started to be exploited more intensively. The tradition of parading became a fortifying factor through which the narrative became a significant component of national identity. This narrative, and paradigms, in particular, became a ground for building the image of Ukraine as the Other. The intension of enmity that the government wanted to convey, obtained a symbolic role invoked from the “Great Patriotic War” discourse. In this way, Ukrainian people, who expressed the wish to leave the “Russkiy Mir” discourse, became compared to “fascists”. It is a reference to the historical precedent of OUN members and supporters, at some point of historical events, collaborated with Hitler`s Germany in order to avoid Soviet occupation. In this work I consciously avoid debates on

⁸⁶ Regnum. 2005. *Владимир Путин: "Распад СССР - крупнейшая геополитическая катастрофа века"*
Подробности: <https://regnum.ru/news/444083.html> Любое использование материалов допускается только при наличии гиперссылки на ИА REGNUM.. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://regnum.ru/news/444083.html>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

historical issues. The aim of mentioning above information is to let to the reader to go deeper in the semiotic model of the Russian media war imagery that constantly appeals to the history of Ukraine and interprets the events violently. The culture of parading, that we will discuss in this essay, is important to answer the question of how the Russian media succeeds in building the image of Ukraine as a Nazi state.

“Immortal Regiment” as reinforcement of a national identity of ‘fascist fighters’

In 2012, dedicated to 9th of May celebration there appears a new action on the streets of Tomsk. “Immortal Regiment” was organized by journalists of independent TV company *TB2*. This action was proclaimed as voluntary and non-political⁸⁷. The aim was to preserve public memory around the war topic by efforts of relatives of war-participants. The way of doing it was collecting and presenting personal stories of the soldiers by their relatives. In 2013, the movement spreads to 15 more cities⁸⁸. In 2014, the movement already covers 30 Russian cities⁸⁹. In 2015, it was proclaimed that “Immortal Regiment” is organized and supported by *All-Russia People's Front*, founded by then-Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin. Journalists of *TB2* channel evaluated the situation as a ‘soft usurpation’ of their idea by official power. They witness that voluntary act turned to compulsory one, because people became forced to join the action. Instead of portrays and stories of their own predecessors, school children received portrays of USSR heroes, about whom they know nothing⁹⁰.

⁸⁷ Голос за честные выборы. 2018. *Дымовая завеса: Как псевдообщественники симулируют гражданское участие в выборах*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.golosinfo.org/ru/articles/142503>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

⁸⁸ Андреев, Яков. 2012. *Томская акция "Бессмертный полк" в 2013 г пройдет в 15 городах России*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/society/20121209/913995160.html#ixzz3XyO6YUAB>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

⁸⁹ Андреев, Яков. 2013. *Около 30 городов уже присоединились к томской акции "Бессмертный полк"*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/society/20130209/922058144.html>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

⁹⁰ Гордон. 2015. *Журналист Пряников: Акцию "Бессмертный полк" начал томский канал ТВ-2, закрытый в этом году за оппозиционность*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/zhurnalist-pryanikov-akciyu-bessmertnyy-polk-nachal-tomskiy-kanal-tv-2-zakrytyy-v-etom-godu-za-oppozicionnost-80164.html>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

In December of 2015, the *TB2* channel was shut down by governmental censorship institution “*Roskommadzor*”. The idea of the journalists “Immortal Regiment” was transformed into official organisation “Victory Volunteers”, who organises the action since 2015. It is financed by the “Federal Agency of Youth Affairs” (“Rosmolodiozh”) and “Russian Centre of Civic and Patriotic Training of Children and Youth” (“Rospatriotcenter”). Through constant presence of war memory in public sphere, war becomes not an abnormal incident of normal civil life (such connotations are present in the concept of “The Day of End of War” celebrated on 8th of May), but as a part of peaceful existence.

The connotation of grief in the celebration of 9th of May, in such actions as “Immortal Regiment”, is changed to connotation of pride. The evidence of it is seen in a recently emerged folklore element “Спасибо деду за победу” (“Thanks to Grandfather for the Victory”) that, among other sources, was expressed in a mass culture genre of cabaret songs⁹¹. Emerging of this slogan in mass culture shapes a military common sense, actualising warrior metaphors. The slogan, as a part of victorious strategical narrative, is interrelated with the other slogan “1941-1945: We Can Repeat” (“1941-1945: можем повторить”), that became well-known in 2014 as an expression of pride for victory⁹².

Reinforcement of this action and taking it under the governmental initiative, and even priority, coincides with the beginning of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine. This action can be seen as a form of a hybrid war. It serves as a sufficient mean of mobilisation of public opinion through an emphasis on emotions of Russian residents. It appeals to the need of recognition, because the essential emotion of this action is pride both of family (on a smaller scale) and the country (on the bigger scale). It is used as device to direct good and bad emotions to a desirable target. With the help of the imagery of this action (‘heroic grandfathers’, ‘fascists’) the government designates a new enemy (Ukrainians) and

⁹¹ Спасибо деду за победу,
За каждый отстоявший дом,
За небо чистое, за веру,
За то, что мы теперь живем.

YouTube. 2017. *Олег Пахомов Спасибо Деду за Победу! 2017*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAF_W62XJvw. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

⁹² Янковский, Александр. 2016. «*Можем повторить*». [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ru.krymr.com/a/27726867.html>. [Accessed 9 May 2018].

directs aimed emotions towards it. However, the other feature of this action, is its universality and visible detachment from politics. This fact gives it possibility to act as propaganda on the territories of target countries. Ukraine is one of them. The performance of it on 9th of May consolidates around it ‘compatriots’ beyond the borders of Russia. Despite, it is thematically related to the past, it serves as a forum of ‘Russkiy Mir’ ideology supporters, the place of their physical gathering. There is always the possibility that the similar movement outside of Russia will become a shelter for provocations. Such post-Soviet states as Uzbekistan and Belorussia cancelled the action and substituted it with a local alternative⁹³.

Introduction of new terminology into populace common sense by media

Russian writer and war correspondent Arkadiy Babchenko gives a brief description of the main metaphors and linguistic constructions that build military narrative of Victory Day:

*A foam on the lips, grandfathers fought, we can repeat, fascists, banderi, radioactive ashes, CrimeIsOurs, ObamaJerk. False field caps, false uniform, false medals, draped in false soldier's blouses children, false stickers, false George Ribbon. Why do you dress children in military uniform? Why do you put medals on children dressed in military uniforms ?*⁹⁴

In this passage is mentioned several strategical narratives, spread among recipients via TV mass products. For example, the construction ‘radioactive ashes’ refers to a TV show episode on the federal channel, where a presenter explains how Russia will lead a nuclear strike on

⁹³ Радио Аззатык. 2018. *В Душанбе и Минске не разрешили марш «Бессмертный полк»*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/29214690.html>. [Accessed 10 May 2018].

⁹⁴ *Пена на губах, деды воевали, можем повторить, фашисты, бандеры, ядерный пепел, Крымнаш, Абамачмо. Фальшивые пилотки, фальшивая форма, фальшивые ордена, наряженные в фальшивые гимнастерки дети, фальшивые наклейки, фальшивые гвардейские ленточки. Зачем вы детей в военную форму одеваете? Зачем вы на одетых в военную форму детей ордена вешаете?* Бабченко, Аркадий. 2016. «*Можем повторить*». *Превращение Дня Победы в свою противоположность*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://echo.msk.ru/blog/ababchenko/1761068-echo/>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

USA in case if USA will strike Russia⁹⁵. It is interesting to note, that there is a logically united sequence of constructions “grandfathers fought, we can repeat, fascists, banderi”. All of them refer to the military narrative, spread through the main Russian governmental information channels⁹⁶ ⁹⁷. They form the strategical narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state”. Constructions “grandfathers fought” and “we can repeat” refer to the topic of the “Great Patriotic War”. This discourse is different from the discourse of the World War II in frame of “Russkiy Mir”. In this article the fragment “fascists, banderi” indicates association of contemporary Ukrainians with the adversaries of the “Great Patriotic War”.

Application of given terminology in the products of governmental media changed associations of “Ukrainians” in relation to [Great Patriotic War]. Despite a huge number of Ukrainian people took part in the World War II as opposers of fascism, through the use of analysed constructions, notions “Ukrainians” and “fascism” ended up being interrelated in the governmental media of Russia. However, it is important to note, that not all the Ukrainian citizens are necessarily associated with “fascists”. In an analysed paradigm, those who seek for Ukrainian unique identity and fate, separated from Russian one, fit to the label ‘nationalists’ (and the following chain of equivalence with “fascists” and “Nazi”). The others, who do not seek for Ukrainian nation building separated from Russian influence, are treated as actual or potential “compatriot” subjects. The former ones are often related to participants of violent process that allowed to ‘junta’ obtain the power.

The “Great Patriotic War” became a common place in this strategic narrative. In Laclau`s terms, it becomes a nodal point, i.e., an empty signifier, that is filled by the chain of

⁹⁵ YouTube. 2014. *Russia is threatening to turn USA into radioactive ash: with English subtitles*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkMT_oLempE. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

⁹⁶ In the news of the main governmental channel the presenter says, ‘In 2015, Petr Poroshenko ratified a law, recognizing as fighters for independence Banderovtsi [emphasis is mine], which in the first half on 20th century killed, according to estimation, one million of people, including 30,000 of Jews and 200,000 of Poles during Volhynia Massacres.’

Первый канал. 2018. *На Украине националисты отметили очередную годовщину со дня рождения Степана Бандеры*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2018-01-02/338887-na-ukraine-natsionalisty-otmetili-ocherednuyu-godovschinu-so-dnya-rozhdeniya-stepana-bandery>. [Accessed 9 May 2018].

⁹⁷ Первый Канал. 2018. *По всей стране стартовала акция «Георгиевская ленточка»*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2018-04-24/344496-po-vsey-strane-startovala-aktsiya-georgievskaya-lentochka>. [Accessed 9 May 2018].

floating signifiers (“fascists”, “nationalists”, “banderovtsi”, etc.), which change their meaning depending on a context.

The image of Ukraine as ‘the other’

Propaganda mechanism spread fake reports concerning mistreatment of WWII veterans in Ukraine through the topics of the repeal of their benefits, forbiddance of celebrations, prohibition to wear medals, and even more, the reports of veterans being beaten. These topics had the purpose to increase unrest and spread of hate speech (Fedchenko, 2016: 163). Military discourse is strongly present in the informational space through the culture of continuous commemoration (and celebration) of the war. From various forms of remembering, the most accessible for the mass are ‘Immortal Regiment’ and abundance of films and series dedicated to “Great Patriotic War” topic on TV (like “Zadaniya Osoboy Vazhnosti: Operatsiya “Taifun””, “Privet Katiushi” etc.) and fiction (Boris Vasiliev “A Zori Zdies Tihiye”, Vladimir Bogomolov “V Avguste Sorok Chetvertogo”, etc.). Moreover, constant discussions of the possibility of war with the ‘West’⁹⁸ on Russian TV actualises the topic.

Such informational environment unites different layers of society in mutual hatred towards ‘the other’ and readiness to fight an enemy. The slogan ‘1941-1945: We Can Repeat’ (‘1941-1945: можем повторить’) in this narrative serves as a response to threats constructed by military imagery of the mentioned sources of mass commemoration. Through a dense exploitation of military discourse in culture, takes place transfer of symbolic past into the present. It builds an association with the present generations of Russians as “grandchildren” of heroic “grandfathers”. The signifier “grandfathers” (“деды”) became the symbol of victory

⁹⁸ Tvzvezda.ru. 2017. *Политика Запада делает войну с Россией практически неизбежной - СМИ США*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201708201504-ia3a.htm. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

and glory. It is revealed through the culture of dressing children into military clothes^{99 100} resembling to “heroic grandfathers”.

In this glorious semiotic space Ukraine has the role of ‘the other’, ‘the enemy’. It is a predictable process if to take in account inevitability of identity clash, that war as phenomenon presumes. The reason of it is, firstly, longing to demarcate the enemy from the ‘self’, and, secondly, to enhance the effort for their annihilation. The role of mass consciousness in it is to produce stereotypes, suitable for the construction of the polar reality of “friend vs. foe” (Pakhomenko and Tryma, 2016: 49). Andis Kudors notes that the narrative ‘The Great Patriotic War continues, Ukrainian fascists have not been eliminated yet’ is one of the main, used in the Russian information campaigns against Ukraine in 2013 and 2014 years, according to researchers at the Centre for East European Policy Studies (Kudors, 2015: 165). This strategic narrative contains a myth in itself and appeals to social imagination. In the center of the myth as the space of ideal, is a time *after* “*Great Patriotic War*”, i.e. it is the world without fascism. It is an ideal discourse formation. Consequently, pointing out on fascism in Ukraine is violation of the given discourse formation. Therefore, the purpose of the myth is to repair a violated area through the construction of a new area of representation (Torfining 1999, cited in Slobodjanik, 2007), i.e. ‘descendants of heroic grandfathers’.

The signifier “fascist” refers to the idea of the persecution of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers (“compatriots” which belong to “*Russkiy Mir*”) by the new administration of Ukraine. Hence, Ukrainians who took part in the revolution and the government of the post-Yanukovich period are associated with the persecution of “compatriots”. Pakhomenko and Tryma note that this issue, at different extent, was constantly present in the rhetoric of the Russian propaganda machine. However, after the events of Euromaidan, it grew louder and was reinforced by deluding the depiction of far-right nationalists, “banderivtsi” and members of the “Right sector”. Such representation attempted to create a picture, of a fake revolution,

⁹⁹ NCRIM.RU. 2016. *Симферопольцы одели детей в военную форму*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://ncrim.ru/news/view/09-05-2016-simferopolcy-odeli-detey-v-voennuyu-formu-9-maya-2016>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

¹⁰⁰ Козырева, Марина. 2018. *«Пытаются детей на «нафталин» посадить» – из крымских сетей*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ru.krymr.com/a/29216995.html>. [Accessed 9 May 2018].

that has the only purpose to bring a “junta” to power. This is one of the main idea regarding to Ukraine in the Russian media (Pakhomenko and Tryma, 2016: 44).

Government media RIA Novosti uses variety of terms that fits to the narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state”. Among them is the term “karateli” that appeared to be in trend of propaganda with the usage of the image of identity (Ibid., 46):

In Ukrainian documentary “Captives” the murderer finally said before camera something that earlier bragged about in the circle of brothers-punishers¹⁰¹ [my translation]

This linguistic choice not only describes the participants of the Revolution of Dignity as members of occupational military formations, performing repressions, but also it contains some reminiscence to the Nazi regime. In this way, the lexeme “karateli” (“punishers”), applied to the participants of Maidan, builds a new metaphorical relation in the common sense of the reader. Furthermore, this association indicates the enemy of “heroic grandfathers”.

The branch of RIA Novosti in Ukraine in the article with the blatant title “SSU [Security Service of Ukraine, - my transcription] and Nazi: a muddy process of fusion and absorption” creates a chain of equivalence between a new administration after Yanukovich and right movements:

Only the laziest did not know about nexus of MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Ministry of Defence, and SSU [Security Service of Ukraine] with Ukrainian neo-Nazi¹⁰² [my translation]

¹⁰¹ В украинском документальном фильме “Пленные” убийца на камеру сказал наконец то, чем ранее хвастался в кругу побратимов-карателей.

Хисамов, Искандер. 2018. “Каратель” как зеркало “Миротворца”. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/analytics/20180407/1518116553.html>. [Accessed 9 May 2018].

¹⁰² О смычке украинского МВД, Минобороны и СБУ с украинскими неонацистами не знал только ленивый. Сухаревская Ольга. 2017. СБУ и нацисты: мутный процесс слияния и поглощения. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://rian.com.ua/columnist/20171121/1029629858/sbu-process-nacizm.html>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

The sentence is located in the beginning of the article. The idiomatic construction *‘не знал только ленивый’* (*‘Only the laziest did not know’*) establishes the reader’s solidarity and alignment to this text. The intension of taking for granted the argument, considering this statement as a matter of fact, suggests an axiological communality between the author and the construed reader, thus, there remains a little space for doubts in the unification of the government with neo-Nazi. This parallel establishes the mistrust between Ukrainian government and people, it is called to demoralise the soldiers (Müür, 2016: 28) and encourage people to act against their own state. In this way, it reached the objective of Russian non-linear war, i.e. “to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country” (Bērziņš, 2015: 44). In April 2014 this narrative reached its goal. The recipients of the propaganda could not differentiate the propaganda from reality anymore. The citizens of Kharkiv and Donetsk performed linguistic extremism through declamation of imperatives such as *‘Путин, введи войска’*, *‘Россия, Россия’* that abuse the norm of Penal code regarding usurpation of power and change of the state border (Azhnyuk, L.V., 2017: 7). Promptly answered on political crisis in these regions, the Ukrainian defence forces were compared to Nazis, killers, terrorists, bandits, servants of the Kyiv junta (Sazonov and Kopõtin, 2016: 73) by locals, that played a vital role in civic resistance to anti-terrorist campaign.

Vladimir Sazonov and Igor Kopõtin note that among other instruments of propaganda, Russian information campaigns use myths and narratives, related to contemporary Russian and Soviet history like the Second World War, Stepan Bandera and banderovitsi, but also Nazism and violence, genocide, Russophobia and Chauvinism (Sazonov and Kopõtin, 2016: 73). The signifiers “Stepan Bandera” and “banderovitsi” are polarized in relation to “Great Patriotic War” discourse. In this discourse, Soviet historiography as a common place in societal imagery (the locuses of the “Great Patriotic War” and the “Victory Day”) are placed in diametrical relation to violence and Russophobia related to Ukrainian nationalism:

Thousands of Ukrainians, regardless a threat to be beaten by right extremists [emphasis is mine], took part in demonstrations in order to celebrate the Victory Day on 9th of May, i.e. the victory over Hitler Germany in the Great Patriotic War¹⁰³.

Here the opposers of the “Great Patriotic War” discourse are related to the floating signifier “right extremists”, that might preclude any of opposers to the discourse. In such a way, all of them, regardless of the degree of tension (either they are OUN veterans or members of radical parties or just citizens, who do not support “Russkiy Mir” and lean to pro-Ukrainian political discourse) will be related to violence, moreover, to genocide. Through this relation to violence of the non-supporters of the “Great Patriotic War” discourse, the demonization of image of Ukraine happens.

It is worth to make an extra stress that in such polarized discourse there is no place for gradations: all kinds of opponents to “Great Patriotic War” narrative, as a part of Soviet historiography, gains a primary relation to the discourse of *Banderovtsi*, *Fascists*, *Russophobia*, and *violence* according to this narrative. Through taken for granted ‘facts’ of violence (‘regardless a threat to be beaten by right extremists’) the image of Fascists goes beyond the metaphor. In such a way, Ukrainians are perceived acting not ‘like Fascists’, but as ‘real Fascists’. That is why the slogan “1941-1945: We Can Repeat” gains actuality beyond sarcasm and calls for actions its recipients.

Parade as a confluence of identities

The images, proposed by this semiotic system, offer not only symbolical order, that satisfies the need in national self-identification. The efforts are made to offer to recipients the patterns

¹⁰³ Тысячи украинцев, несмотря на опасность быть избитыми правыми экстремистами, приняли участие в демонстрациях, чтобы отпраздновать День Победы 9 мая, то есть победу над гитлеровской Германией в Великой Отечественной.

Бьёрн Дитлеф Нистад. 2017. *Украина на пути к явному фашизму?*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20170515/239351093.html>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

of actions. The particular culture of parading, that grew significantly after the 60th anniversary of the Day of Victory, drew nearer to mass consciousness the military patterns of behaviour right in the midst of peaceful civic life. Latvian daily internet newspaper *Delfi* describes the celebration of Victory Day in Sevastopol` after 2 years of annexation of Crimea:

A corpulent young woman in sailor's striped T-shirt, two people in sport costumes, mother and son in field cap, a girl with white-blue-red balloons – all salute, wave, and smile. They will remember this Victory Day as such. A dog snoops around, it also is draped in black-orange strips, wears sailor's striped T-shirt, the owner attached to it a Russian flag, that falls off all the time. This day it was difficult to find somebody without 'patriotic' symbols¹⁰⁴(a)
[my translation]

Parading gives the opportunity to the participants to get physically closer to the imagery world of the “Great Patriotic War” discourse through tactile senses of clothes, that they wear, through the rituals that they perform. Through this physical, not only mental, encounters it becomes easier to imagine themselves in the image of “heroic grandfathers”. In the action of parading the patterns cross the borders of intentional world of mass culture, it appears in physical reality. This act of association makes people feel as if they were implicated in the destiny of “veterans” of the “Great Patriotic War”, that is, engaged to the task to fight against fascists. Linguistic choice of pronoun ‘we’ instead ‘they’ in the reference to “grandfathers”

¹⁰⁴Тучная девушка в тельняшке, двое в спортивных костюмах, мама и сын в пилотках, девочка с бело-сине-красными шарами — все отдают честь, машут руками и улыбаются. Они запомнят этот день Победы именно таким. Под ногами шныряет собака, она тоже увешена черно-оранжевыми лентами, одета в тельняшку, хозяин прикрепил к ней российский флаг, который постоянно отваливается. В этот день сложно было найти хоть кого-то без "патриотической" символики

— ...мы бились с фашистами. Только убили не всех — там кое-где ещё остались, — долетает со сцены. Пожилой ветеран морского флота многозначительно смотрит на северо-запад, где, если посмотреть на карту, находится Украина.

Моисеев Владислав. 2016. *День полной и безоговорочной Победы*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.delfi.lt/multimedija/krym/den-polnoj-i-bezogovorchoj-pobedy.d?id=71413192>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

serve as an evidence. Vladislav Moiseev, the participant of journalistic project dedicated to Crimea in 2016, describes the part of public speech from Sevastopol's Victory parade:

... we fought with fascists. However, we killed not all of them – there remained some of them, - you can hear from the scene. An old veteran of Navy meaningfully looks at North-West, where, if you look at the map, is situated Ukraine (Ibid., (b))

The strategic narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state” has constantly informed people who associate themselves with the symbolic role of the “descendants of winners over fascists” that fascists are present still. The ‘enemy’ is indicated through continuous accusation of Ukrainian history in irrelevance. Russian popular media profaned historical clusters of Ukrainian resistance movement in various forms through popularisation of the term “banderovtsi”¹⁰⁵. Moreover, equation of pro-Ukrainian policy emerging in post-Soviet Ukraine to anti-Russian or Russophobic one intensifies a hostile attitude to Ukraine. All of these factors draw intention to defence Russophobia and fascist “enemy” as a logical response to the events in Ukraine, interpreted negatively by Russian media. In the example above, the attitude can be described in terms of *Condemnation* and *Moral Outrage*. These values have capability to mobilize civilians to action, that we will see further in interview with former military volunteers from Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

It is important to note that the report “Putin War”, prepared by the Russian opposition from the end of 2015th reports the obvious intension to construct the strategic narrative “Ukraine as a Nazi state”:

The rhetoric of the war period appeared to be projected on current political news. Ukrainian power in the rhetoric of Kremlin propaganda became ‘banderovskaya’ and ‘Nazi’, and

¹⁰⁵ Lenta.ru. 2018. *Тысяча бандеровцев приняла участие в факельном шествии в Киеве*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://lenta.ru/news/2018/01/01/s_ogonkom/. [Accessed 11 May 2018].

*Russia ended up to be busy by the same as in 1941-45 years, i.e. by fighting with fascists*¹⁰⁶[my translation]

Developing the same thought, Timothy Thomas in his research on Russia`s asymmetric military strategy towards Ukraine writes:

In military art, analogy is a cognitive approach that helps one develop concepts and a new way to achieve specific results. One is reminded of the fascist and Nazi analogy Russia`s media used in reference to people fighting in Maidan Square against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, an analogy drawn to acquire support from the Russian population. Russians well remember the Nazi onslaught in World War II, and so this analogy touches a raw nerve. (Thomas, 2015: 456)

Reflecting on the reason why this exact narrative has such an importance for Russian government, I went to the conclusion that firstly, it neutralizes additional dissatisfaction of Russian domestic audience regarding the annexation of Ukrainian territory that is obviously improper action in the frame of international policy. Consequently, exploiting this narrative as a justification of improper military actions decreases the scale of protests inside the country. Secondly, the actualised military imagery, that emphasises the glory of Soviets over fascists constructs a hegemony, i.e. that kind of unity, that gathers diversified by race, economic, and social gaps Russian population. In other words, the indicated ‘enemy’ stops recipients of the narrative from reflecting of inequality they deal with and gives a sense of commonality over various issues of injustice. Thirdly, it resolves the problem of national self-identification, crisis of which has happened due to constantly changing paradigms in politics (transition from

¹⁰⁶ Риторика военных лет оказалась спроецирована на текущие политические новости. Украинская власть в риторике кремлевской пропаганды стала «бандеровской» и «нацистской», а Россия оказалась занята тем же, чем и в 1941-45 гг. — борьбой с фашистами “*Putin. War*”. 2015. Edited by Ilyya Yashyn and Olga Shorina *Report*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin-voina/>. [Accessed 4 May 2018].

Yeltsin`s to Putin`s style and priority of ruling), post-Soviet search of civic identity, financial crisis, two wars in Chechnya [Чекменёва, 2010].

The consequences of exploitation of the strategic narrative

During an anti-terrorist operation in the Eastern Ukraine, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty made several interviews with participants of the conflict in so called Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. The volunteer fighter from Kostroma oblast Ruslan Starodubov refers Ukraine in the next way:

*I regret that we take a weapon in our hands, because there is a negotiating table, there is a dialog. But Ukraine (Ukraine is a synonym of fascism for me now) does not hear us*¹⁰⁷[my translation]

The other participant, Andrei Dmitriev, a member of forbidden in Russia organisation ‘National Bolshevik Party’, tells about his reason to participate in the conflict:

Since May we have formed the movement “Interbrigades”. The reference to Spanish civic war is obvious, when volunteers from all the world and from Soviet Union went to support

¹⁰⁷ (a) Мне жалко, что мы берем в руки оружие, ведь есть стол переговоров, есть диалог. Но Украина (Украина – это для меня сейчас синоним фашизма) нас не слышит.

(b) С мая у нас сформировалось движение "Интербригады" – понятно, что это отсылка к испанской гражданской войне, когда добровольцы со всего мира и из Советского Союза ехали поддерживать испанскую республику против фашистов, франкистов, – аналогии с Киевом здесь, по-моему, прозрачны Tatjana Vol'tskaja. 2015. Ty zapisalsja v dobrovol'cy?. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.svoboda.org/a/26817464.html>. [Accessed 4 May 2018].

Spanish Republic against Fascists, Frankists, - the analogies with Kyiv here, in my opinion, are transparent (Ibid., (b))

Here we see the similarity with the mentioned in Russian opposition`s report of 2015th attempt to draw the parallels between military events of the past and present, reproducing the patterns of actions (formation people in the brigade). What is interesting, the name “International Brigade” is also borrowed from the past “International Brigades” of 1936 – 1938 years.

Kyrgyzian branch of Radio Liberty makes an interview with a volunteer fighter in Donbass region from Kyrgystan. He says:

I went in there in August of 2014th but signed the contract in November. I went in there voluntary. I watched TV – Channel One Russia, RTR, and others. It was important for me, that in 1941 my grandfather died in the war. In particular, my moral principles called me there. The channels spread information that fascists raise their heads, Nazis, they have shown swastika¹⁰⁸ [my translation]

In reflection on the reason what motivated this volunteer to participate in a military conflict of Russia against Ukraine, he mentions reminiscences from the World War II, recalling that his grandfather has died during war. This fact constructs his ethical codex of the warrior. On this example we see that the mass culture produces association between the image of grandparents` identity and the one of current generations. Moreover, through mass culture, that actively

¹⁰⁸ Я попал туда в августе 2014 года, но контракт заключил в ноябре. Попал туда я добровольно. Смотрел телевизор – Первый канал, РТР, другие. Для меня было важно, что в 1941 году на войне погиб мой дед. Именно мои моральные установки меня и позвали. Телеканалы передавали, что там фашисты поднимают голову, нацисты, показывали свастику.

Венера Сагындык кызы. 2015. *Кыргызстанец рассказал, как воевал в Украине*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/26905513.html>. [Accessed 4 May 2018].

exploits commemoration of the war, the patterns of behaviour are backed and are ready to use. In this example, the volunteer fighter receives the information through Channel One Russia. It is said that Ukrainians are contemporary fascists. This information motivates him to repeat the pattern of behaviour of his grandfather, i.e. to go to fight Ukrainians.

Through mentioned ways of propaganda people encounter the social myth created out of mythologised past. One of the features of myth is its cyclic nature, that implies repetition. In this example, as well as in the example of “International Brigades”, we can see that the myth (as a mode of existence) tends to be repeated through living it out in a personal life of those who go to fight in the Donbass region. It is worth to note that Kyrgystan does not have any military affair with Ukraine, so this citizen of Kyrgystan is not involved in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in any other way except through the products of Russian media. Strategic narrative “Ukraine is Nazi State” widely exploited in Russian media was enough for this person as for many others to abandon peaceful life and to join the war.

The promotion of the strategic narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state” abroad

It is worthy to pay attention to the depiction of Ukraine as Nazi state overseas. The aim of Russia was to broadcast abroad the image of itself as a generous and caring country that holds up a neighbour in chaos (Wetoszka, 2016: 63). Ukraine is frequently characterized through the lens of the term a *coup d'état*, in the sense that it is a Western-backed group (US-backed junta) that has taken power by force and carries out fascism as the main ideology of the emerging regime in Ukraine (Yebhen Fedchenko, 2016: 160) In this way, Russian “compatriot” subjects were placed in danger by Ukrainian ultranationalists. For Putin it served as self-proclaimed mandate of protecting Russian citizens or Russian-speakers (as members of ‘Russkiy Mir’ and justify intervention to Ukrainian territory (Thomas, 2015: 446). Kremlin`s

accusations on Ukraine significantly raised in 2014 (the year of beginning of Russian military aggression on Ukraine), and reached even such mainstream media as BBC:

*Ever since Ukraine's February revolution, the Kremlin has characterised the new leaders in Kiev as a "fascist junta" made up of neo-Nazis and anti-Semites, set on persecuting, if not eradicating, the Russian-speaking population*¹⁰⁹.

In the beginning of February 2014th, Russian governmental channel RT published Russian foreign minister`s Sergei Lavrov speech on Munich Security Conference, where he expressed moral outrage towards Ukrainian protestors on Maidan:

*Why do we not hear statements of condemnation toward those who seize government buildings, attack and burn police officers, and voice racist and anti-Semitic slogans?*¹¹⁰

Anti-Semitism is one of the obvious features of Nazism as a political ideology. The accusation of anti-Semitism towards the Ukrainian protestors communicates that they confess Nazis values, that should have constructed non-attractive image of Ukrainian revolution for European audience. Especially if to take into account that one of the primary goals of European Union is to eliminate any possibility of Nazism to repeat. In 2009 the European parliament appointed the Declaration of the European Parliament on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism¹¹¹. However, the head of the Ukrainian center of Holocaust studies witnesses that Ukrainian Jews shown sympathy to the Revolution of Dignity through their participation in the Maidan events,

¹⁰⁹ David Stern. 2014. *Ukraine underplays role of far right in conflict*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30414955>. [Accessed 4 May 2018].

¹¹⁰ RT. 2014. *West`s interpretation of freedom for Ukraine 'strange' – Lavrov*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/lavrov-munich-ukraine-freedom-515/>. [Accessed 4 May 2018].

¹¹¹ European Parliament. 2008. *Declaration of the European Parliament on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0439+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. [Accessed 5 May 2018].

through sending the letter by Jewish community to Russian President in March of 2014, and participation in anti-terrorist operation¹¹².

The development of the theme of anti-Semitism in Ukraine has special importance to the Kremlin communication strategists. It is a way to equate anti-Semitism with Russophobia (Darczewska and Żochowski, 2015: 5). In fact, on the 25-26 September 2015, was held the conference, organized by the CIS-EMO International Monitoring Organization, supported by the Russian government, called '*Russophobia and the information war against Russia*'. In the list of measures in opposing Russophobia was proposed to expand work with human rights organisations and European institutions, in order to spread the opinion that Russophobia is a specific variant of racism (Ibid., 22). Association of Russophobia to anti-Semitism prepares the path to claim about the threat of intolerance towards ethnic Russians, the Russian speaking ethnic group, and the Russian state inside Ukraine (Ibid.,7).

As a matter of fact, in 2012 was passed the law "On the principles of the state language policy", proposed by the opposition deputies of "Party of Regions" S. Kivalov and V. Kolesnichenko (the ideological pillars of the party are Russophilia and Euroscepticism). In a nutshell, the aim of the law was giving to the Russian or any other minority language the status of a "regional language". In such a way, not less than 13 regions of Ukraine would adopt the Russian language as the second official one de facto. In 2018, this law was recognized as anti-constitutional¹¹³. However, prior to it, in February 2014, Verkhovna Rada voted for the cancelation of the law. This action became a ground for the claims about "oppression of Russian-speaking citizens of Crimea". Soon after it, Crimea was annexed by Russian militants. In his address to Russia Parliament, on 18th March 2014, the day of "accepting" Crimea to Russian Federation, V. Putin said:

¹¹² Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine. 2018. *А. Подольський: Українські євреї показали себе прихильниками та симпатиками Революції гідності*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://vaadua.org/news/podolskiy-ukrayinski-ievreyi-pokazali-sebe-prihilnikami-ta-simpatikami-revoluciyi-gidnosti>. [Accessed 12 May 2018].

¹¹³ Украинская Правда. 2018. *КС признал языковой закон "Кивалова-Колесниченко" неконституционным*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2018/02/28/7173097/>. [Accessed 17 May 2018].

The main executors of the coup became nationalists, neo-Nazi, Russophobes and anti-Semites. Exactly them are still determining life in Ukraine. The first thing that so called 'power' have done was including a scandalous law on reconsideration of language policy that directly oppressed right national minorities¹¹⁴.

The chain of equivalence of Russophobes, anti-Semites, and neo-Nazi gives a seemingly logical way to perceive the military aggression of Russia as a peace-making operation. Jolanta Darczewska and Piotr Żochowski stress that the strategy to oppose against Russophobia in its primary purpose has an influence on domestic consumption. Attacking “Russophobes” is a tactic of preventing Russian society itself from any doubts about the Kremlin`s policy (Darczewska and Żochowski, 2015:28).

In October of 2014th in Moscow happened yearly international summit (since 2006 it took place in Berlin and Cologne, then in Slovakia and Belarus). The newspaper *Time* describes the attempt of Russian hosts of the conference on crimes of Nazism to turn it to accusation of Ukrainians in Nazism:

The photographs shown by several of the Russian speakers put the atrocities of the Nazi SS right alongside pictures from the current war in eastern Ukraine. There is not much difference, the Russian historians suggested, between the actions of the Ukrainian military in its war against separatist rebels and the atrocities that Hitler`s forces committed during World War II¹¹⁵.

The effort to present Ukraine as a Nazi state takes place not only on political arena, but also on scientific, especially, on historical. It is called to generate the attitude of disalignment in the

¹¹⁴ Главными исполнителями переворота стали националисты, неонацисты, русофобы и антисемиты. Именно они во многом определяют и сегодня ещё до сих пор жизнь на Украине. Первым делом новые так называемые «власти» внесли скандальный законопроект о пересмотре языковой политики, который прямо ущемлял права национальных меньшинств

Президент России. 2018. *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>. [Accessed 17 May 2018].

¹¹⁵ Simon Shuster. 2014. *Russians Rewrite History to Slur Ukraine Over War*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://time.com/3545855/russia-ukraine-war-history/>. [Accessed 4 May 2018].

perception of the image of Ukraine on various levels of public life. This narrative especially touches the vulnerable place if to count that European Union provides a work on prevention of repetition of fascist movements through the ethic of memory as one of the means. The expected outcome of it might be the reduction of the international support to Ukraine in its politically and economically weak condition. Also, a negative image of Ukraine would serve as a background support for Russia in implementing aggressive politics towards Ukraine, avoiding international condemnation.

Therefore, the representation of Ukraine in the international informational discourse is built on juxtaposition of facts from the World War II and civic revolution of 2014. In this context, foreign countries play the role of ‘significant other’, to whom this strategic narrative is addressed. Europe and USA are primarily ‘others’ in distribution of the narrative. The reason of their significance lays in economic dimension (that is related to various forms of sanctions) as well as geopolitical one. The successful delivery of the strategic narrative would prevent the legalisation of the annexation of Crimea from critical obstacles that Russia has faced. We could conclude that this narrative serves as a justification of geopolitical aggression in the eyes of European and American communities as the decision-makers in international policy.

To conclude on this part, the aim of the narrative is to arrange the social relations of condemnation of civic processes in Russia and abroad. In Russia, the narrative has a function of unification of the inner audience. In this case, the unification happens not around some target, but against the other, i.e. Ukraine as the state, associated with fascism. Thus, the reader is supposed to adopt the attitude of condemnation and the desire to answer to the call for action, as we have seen on the experience of former military volunteers from Russia. Moreover, the narrative invites to attitudinal alignment with active measures of Russian government against Ukrainian state. Therefore, Russian government and military volunteers in Donbass region, presented as fighters against fascists, are the characters, which the recipients ought to empathise with. This narrative opens the possibility of the narrative “Крым Наш” (“Crimea is Ours”), that was revealed itself actively after a massive imposition of the narrative

“Ukraine is a Nazi State”. The “Crimea is Ours” justifies the annexation of Crimea due to ‘fascist threat’ from Ukraine, propagated on peninsula.

The purpose of the narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state” abroad is to develop an argument against Ukraine as a sovereign state through showing that Ukraine as independent from Russia can end up only in violence, self-destruction, and danger for Russian ‘compatriots’ and Russian-speakers. Furthermore, this narrative is called to justify the Russian geopolitical intervention and to serve as a shield against economic and political punishment for violating the integrity of the other state and moving the geographical borders of Europe.

Condemnation, hatred, and moral outrage are a strategically sequenced combination of attitudinal values in the analysed narrative. The narrativized world directs the reader to experience the historiographical past, narrated by Soviet and post-Soviet official institutions. This ‘heroic past’ is depicted in common practices of commemorations such as celebration of 9th of May, more detailed, in the culture of parading and participation in the movement “Immortal Regiment”. The narrativized world is accessible through the products of mass-culture, such as series, political TV-shows, and news, produced by Russia Today media holding.

Overall, the narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi State” invokes a deep view of Ukraine as a state with the values opposite to the ones officially proclaimed as Russia’s values. This narrative communicates not only difference, but also threat to “Russkiy Mir” civilization. This message calls the recipients to become actors, even up to the point of physical or financial participation in the invasion of Ukrainian territories in the form of voluntary militants. Moreover, it has united the inner audience in Russia in approval of annexation of Crimea. Potentially, this narrative will demoralise the Russian citizens to stand against military aggression towards the Ukrainian territorial sovereignty if it will expand in the future. The narrative “Ukraine is a Nazi state” blocks the critical evaluation of the Russian military aggression among the majority of ordinary Russian people.

Conclusion

This research is focused on analysing the construction of the image of Ukraine as the Other in Russian media. The framework of semiotics of power combined with linguistic discourse analysis helped to describe how the image of Ukraine as the Other is built and to explain the correlation of the conveyed image to the kindling of hatred inside Russian society and undertaking real actions.

The paper demonstrated that the application of the theory of Appraisal can be used as a tool of qualitative analysis of propaganda and has potential to complement qualitative methods of research in the research of information warfare. My case study concentrated on the examples of two strategical narratives, intensively exploited in the information warfare against Ukraine by the Russian government.

Specifically, we analyzed the two narratives: “Ukraine is a failed state” and “Ukraine is a Nazi state”, observing it in the frame of the “Russkiy Mir” paradigm. My study indicated that these narratives are constructed not randomly, but systematically. For example, I noticed that RIA Novosti (the governmental media) is tightly related to the think-tank “Zinoviev Club”. In particular, RIA Novosti has a special project dedicated to this club that includes a special rubric of the club on this media source, moreover, media-coverage of regular meetings of the club. The members of the club belong to the ‘methodologists circle’ discussed in our research that was focused on crisis-management and during Soviet times and had tight relations to power. The members of this ‘methodologists circle’ are closely related to the “Zinoviev Club” project of RIA Novosti. In this way, the members of these two mentioned clubs obtained the role of experts in RIA Novosti media. Appraisal analysis and theory of conceptual metaphor allowed to identify the character of the produced materials by those

authors as such that it continuously constructs the image of Ukraine as a failing state. The observation of the materials starting from 2014 to 2018 led me to the conclusion that the negative loading of the material appears systematically, without correlation to the occurrence of negative issues. The articles analysed contain reminiscence from the Soviet and Russian historiography and in this way, builds the image of Ukraine as a weak and insufficient state. The narrative that was analysed composes the ground for the development of the narrative “Project Ukraine” that communicates the artificial nature of the existence of Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian territorial integrity. This narrative can be used for the populist justification of the annexation of the Ukrainian territories by Russia.

The other narrative that went in the focus of this research is “Ukraine is a Nazi state”. The examination of the commemorative action “Immortal Regiment” initiated in Russia and the culture of parading at the 9th of May shown a deep correlation between the top-down raise of populace patriotism and the boost of hatred towards Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian government in particular. In details, parading during the 9th of May (Victory Day) and the performance of the action “Immortal Regiment” encourage the revival of the “Great Patriotic War” discourse. We found out that his discourse is the source of the articulation of the Russian strategic communication towards Ukraine. This discourse of the past has a strong potential of the consolidation of the Russian nation in the present. In particular, the association with ‘heroic fathers’ – fighters of fascists. Simultaneously, governmental media continuously make emphasis on ambivalent events of Ukrainian history of World War II, providing analogies with the events of present days, conveying that supporters of the Revolution of Dignity and Ukrainian government not only behave as fascists, but actually are fascists. In the subchapter “Ukraine is a Nazi State” we show several cases of influence of the narrative on the decision of its recipients to participate in armed conflict in Donbass. This narrative composes the ground for the strategic narrative of “Russian Revenge” (“Вставание России с колен”), that has potential to mobilize its recipients for military activity against the territorial integrity of other countries.

Overall, during the conducted research, I concluded that the combination of the discourse analysis of Ernesto Laclau, the theory of conceptual metaphor of Lakoff and

Johnson (1980) , and the Appraisal theory of Martinand White (2005) can provide both picture of an exploited strategic narrative and the analysis of the psychography of the audience. Binding theories from philosophic, literary and linguistic domain in our research proved that altogether they effectively overcome limits of using them separately.

The application of the theoretical framework that we used helps to answer the question what exact elements of the common sense assist the occurrence and the development of a narrative. Understanding of the latter is vital for developing measures of counteraction to destructive narratives. With the application of semiotic approaches to strategic narratives, I concluded that semiotics can help with the constitution of a theoretic model in order to show how strategical narrative is constructed and deconstructed. Moreover, such an approach helps us to find the systematicity in the propaganda transmitting. This point is highly important, because finding a system gives a more critical view and prevents from generalization. In the example of my research, finding out that both the narratives that we analyzed are produced by a certain group of people in concrete media, can serve as an argument in peacemaking endeavor during the work with both Ukrainian and Russian audience, in order to prevent conflicts and hatred in future.

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Appendix 1 The original of analyzed text in 2.1.4

Член Зиновьевского клуба МИА "Россия сегодня" Тимофей Сергейцев рассуждает о том, в какой политической культуре возможно существование единого государства Украина.

Тимофей Сергейцев, член Зиновьевского клуба МИА "Россия сегодня"

*Section 1 [Ukraine as a **pity** example]*

И снова об Украине. Дело ведь не только в том, что Украина настолько нам близка, что представляет собой нашу "внутреннюю" проблему (хотя в мире глобального влияния разделение на внутреннюю и внешнюю политику уже не работает). Украинский разлом показывает нам всю неприглядную анатомию современной мировой власти, современной демократии, он даёт нам представление о проблеме выживания культурного и цивилизованного народа, которая превращается в смертный исторический приговор, если народ не способен обратиться к доступной ему политической культуре, к преемственной исторической практике сохранения и развития своего народа. Нужно иметь "своё" государство. А какое государство считать "своим"?

Section 2: Fail to make reasonable decision (the core value is incompetence)

Практическое понимание политического, владение политической культурой не может возникнуть на пустом месте. Политика, говорят, — это искусство возможного. Добавлю: исторически возможного. Выживают те страны-государства, власть и народ которых вместе (пусть даже в конфликте друг с другом) способны отказаться от

иллюзий и увидеть действительно необходимое, то, что нужно делать в данный момент. Это же касается и народов, государств не имеющих.

Section 3: Philosophical stance: democracy lies

В политике нет друзей, но обязательно есть враги (пусть ещё и не дошло до войны). Знать своих врагов, несмотря на всю их успокаивающую маскировку, — значит быть политически грамотным. Современная всеобщая демократия занимается максимальным оглушением каждого человека, попавшего в поле её влияния, но это не значит, что исчезает политическая компетентность как таковая, просто происходит её монополизация действительной властью, подлинная политическая позиция тщательно маскируется.

Но правда всё равно выходит наружу, это мы и зовём историей. Вопрос в том, доживёшь ли до правды и поймёшь ли её.

Section 4: Ukrainian history is fantasy (rapid narrative shift from philosophy to downward realities)

Увы, но вопреки мечтам идеологов современного украинского национализма, обращённым исключительно в прошлое, украинская политическая культура никогда не существовала, вне зависимости от того, насколько древнее египетских пирамид окажутся "украины" при очередном переиздании украинского исторического фэнтези.

Section 5: Establishing real order of things, value of veracity

Более реалистичные попытки обосновать существование именно украинской политической позиции апеллируют к Киевской Руси и Запорожской Сечи. Однако Киевская Русь политически не подошла даже к феодальной культуре, оставаясь в плену родоплеменных отношений. А потом пришли монголы, которых сменили поляки. Запорожская Сечь была поселениями вооружённых людей без определённых территориальных границ. Эти люди довольно быстро, по историческим меркам, поняли,

что сами они не только не смогут защитить себя от власти настоящего государства — Польши, но и вообще не представляют собой самодостаточного по меркам XVII столетия социума, способного к самостоятельному воспроизводству. Чтобы быть обществом, недостаточно уметь махать саблями и стрелять из пищали. Проявив политический разум, запорожские казаки осознанно вошли в сообщество русской политической культуры, что создало возможность для выживания и развития украинского народа.

Section 6: Rereading a history in a correct way, monoglossia, positive appraisal

Украинское государство — как зависимое, но, тем не менее, уже именно государство — создали большевики. Они же проводили последовательную украинизацию, усиленное распространение украинского языка. Передача Крыма в состав УССР была актом укрепления советского украинского государства. Украина имела голос в ООН. Единство политической культуры оставалось принципом этого действия.

Советский (коммунистический) период развития русской политической культуры, стоящей равно как на имперском опыте, заимствованном у Византии (Рима), так и на постмонгольской идеологии единого пространства континентального масштаба, был "просто" следующим после периода православной империи шагом её исторического развития. Этот шаг никуда не делся, он и сегодня является элементом русской политической культуры, по отношению к этому элементу мы сегодня переживаем превращение его в исторический опыт, всё больше понимаем его значение, его возможности и ограничения. Можно сказать, что советский элемент становится культурой на наших глазах.

Section 7: Verdict to Ukrainian sovereignty and introducing two dialogic adversaries

Идея создания самостоятельной украинской политической культуры абсолютно утопична. И не только потому, что у такой культуры нет исторического источника. Такого на деле просто не допустят другие политические культуры — ни русская, ни американская (США), ни традиционно европейская.

Для рождения новой политической культуры нужны процессы иного масштаба и продолжительности, нежели происходящие сейчас с Украиной. Ничего сейчас не создаётся. Выясняется, что есть в наличии, что настоящее, а что иллюзия.

Главным носителем украинской политической утопии стал "пассионарный" Запад Украины, её католическая провинция. Под знаком этой пассионарности прошла вся политическая история постсоветской Украины — пока "пассионарии" не пришли к власти. После чего они немедленно развязали гражданскую войну с прицелом на войну с Россией — подстрекаемые, разумеется, извне, но в этом акте выразилась суть их собственной политической позиции. Решили исправить ошибку Богдана Хмельницкого, так сказать.

Section 8: Developing of the model of an empty signifier “Русская политическая культура”

Кроме очевидной политической нелепости и бессмысленности этого акта именно для самой Украины, "западенцы" своими руками создали другого "пассионария", собственного антипода — вооружённый Донбасс, политическая позиция которого реалистична, проста и понятна — либо самостоятельное государство Украина на основе русской политической культуры, либо никакого. Это, в отличие от западно-католических мечтаний, не утопия — британская (английская) политическая культура имеет аж пять таких государств, не считая по мелочам: Великобритания, США, Канада, Австралия, Новая Зеландия. Русская политическая культура — минимум два, Россию и Белоруссию, а на деле в этой же орбите находится и Казахстан. Такая позиция Донбасса полностью совпадает с политической позицией России.

То, что никакой украинской политической культуры нет и не может быть, признаёт и сама украинская пропаганда, содержание которой сегодня дрейфует от надежды пристать к европейскому берегу к ещё более утопическому желанию пристать к берегу американскому (США).

Но если у Западной Европы ещё есть хоть какие-то, хоть теоретические интересы, синтетичные и синергичные собственно украинским интересам (хотя основа европейского интереса — использовать, использовать и ещё раз использовать украинцев и их территории); если хотя бы эти интересы носят условно мирный характер (война не является целью сама по себе, но может быть средством), то для США Украина — это в чистом виде топливо для войны ради войны и территория для охоты и собирательства.

Section 9: How bad is empty signifier British Political culture

Стать частью британской политической культуры можно, только в ней родившись. Эта культура принципиально расистская, таких условий принадлежности не выдвигает даже традиционно европейская политическая культура, хотя именно она сформулировала принцип мирового цивилизационного превосходства европейцев. Британская политическая культура создаёт государства, истребляя местное население, зачищая территорию. Общество британской политической культуры — самое закрытое, формировавшееся всегда на самой окраине европейского мира, всегда ему противопоставленное. Питать надежду войти в него таким способом, как это сейчас делают украинцы, — значит проявлять верх политической наивности.

Section 10: Empty signifier Russian Political Culture, argument against “the third side”

Русская политическая культура, напротив, самая открытая из существующих. Она обладает потенциалом создания новых государств, не ограниченных требованиями этнической чистоты или вообще наличия титульной нации. За такими государствами будущее. Русская политическая культура строится на основе опоры на собственные силы, нацелена на воспроизводство человека как на главную цель. Она и сильна этим человеком. Поэтому мы и вправду ни с кем не хотим воевать и не собираемся никого грабить — ни прямо, ни косвенно. Всё это гораздо важнее формальных, а самое главное, лживых рассуждений о "демократии".

Section 11: Reinforcement of the argument for disalignment with the third party

Западной Европе никакая единая Украина в принципе не нужна. Есть югославский сценарий, да и без него осваивать такое пространство и такое количество людей европейцам нужно по частям. Единственное, что удерживает Европу от раздела Украины, — это понимание, что едва ли не большая часть Украины тогда немедленно переместится в зону русского политического влияния. Для этого временно Украина в рамках европейской политики насильственно удерживается как целое через опору на западноукраинский пассионарный субъект, ресурсы которого, однако, убывают. Дальнейшего решения у европейцев нет.

В отношении США о какой-либо единой Украине как политической цели говорить не приходится вообще. Украина для США — таран против России. Насколько долго таран выдержит при интенсивном употреблении? США нужна территория для военного базирования, но это совсем не обязательно такое большое и единое государство. Только украинская политическая наивность могла предполагать, что американский сценарий крымского кризиса (несостоявшегося) предполагал сохранение Крыма в составе Украины.

Национальный акцент планируемого США конфликта в Крыму предполагал бы установление там татарской нации как титульной; отделение Крыма от Украины; создание территории по типу Косово под военным протекторатом США; втягивание в этот процесс Турции (с прекращением, таким образом, её отношений с Россией); неограниченное военное присутствие США в Крыму, разрушение геополитического режима Чёрного моря в связи с появлением нового "субъекта". Это — как минимум для начала.

Единую Украину удерживает Россия (вполне в духе советской имперской политики), проводя "непредсказуемую" и "коварную" политику отказа от вторжения и "взятия

Киева" (а США и Европа об этом русском вторжении мечтают), обращая фактор времени в свою пользу, удерживая украинское пространство от скатывания в хаос, пусть и внешней, но стабильностью, поддерживая политическую позицию вооруженного Донбасса по сохранению государства Украина в поле русской политической культуры. Политический пиар, средствами которого западноукраинские пассионарии при поддержке США работают с населением страны, как и любой пиар, на длительный срок эксплуатации не рассчитан. Он должен прикрывать спецоперацию (как с оружием массового поражения в Ираке), а потом о нём забывают.

Сегодня в сознании украинцев во всём виновата Россия, но завтра или послезавтра точно так же станут виноваты во всём Европа и Америка (США). От любви до ненависти — один шаг. Пиар всегда имеет отдачу, обратную волну, когда обман вскрывается. Будет ли ещё к этому моменту существовать Украина (Ирака де-факто уже нет, как и Афганистана, Ливии, Сирии)? Сохраняя единую Украину, Россия оставляет ей шанс вернуться в поле русской политической культуры и продолжить своё государственное развитие.

Appendix 2: Table B: Articles conveying the strategic narrative "Ukraine is a Failed State"

Title	Description (Preface)	Author	Date	Source
Non-European State: the program of historical degradation ¹¹⁶	As predicted, the processes of <u>degradation</u> and <u>collapse</u> of Ukraine happens in the frame of the previously made forecast	Timofej Sergejcev	08.04. 2016	RIA Novosti
Ukrainian project – the model of organized degradation for the whole Europe ¹¹⁷	New Europe, created by USA instead of an old one, will be as such as today`s Ukraine in the sense of social management technology.	Timofej Sergejcev	02.02. 2016	RIA Novosti
Why Ukraine is collapsing? ¹¹⁸	The member of Zinoviev Club Timofej Sergejcev thinks that Ukraine lost its chance to become a historical state, a true concurrent and rival of Russia.	Timofej Sergejcev	02.02. 2016	RIA Novosti

¹¹⁶ Sergejcev, Timofej. 2016. Neevropskoe negosudarstvo: programma istoricheskoy degradacii. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20160408/1405196120.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

¹¹⁷ Sergejcev, Timofej. 2016. Ukrainskij proekt — model' organizovannoj degradacii dlja vsej Evropy. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20160202/1368693799.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

¹¹⁸ Sergejcev, Timofej. 2015. Pochemu razrushaetsja Ukraina. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150317/1052972979.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

The logic of lie ¹¹⁹	In Ukraine people faced contemporary universal manageable democracy, comes to conclusion Timofej Sergejcev	Timofej Sergejcev	24.07.2014	RIA Novosti
industry, heat and electricity: the nearest perspectives of Ukraine ¹²⁰	We discussed a lot the fact that Ukraine is balanced on the brink of complete destruction and slipping in a large-scale conflict. This evaluation is an adequate in a given situation. But let's imagine that some power in Ukraine will be kept, and it will be possible to avoid chaos and collapse in Ukraine. Then, what?	Dmitrij Kulikov	06.04.2017	RIA Novosti
Degradation of Ukraine. Becoming of Donbass ¹²¹	There have passed three years since “revolution of dignity”, simpler speaking, since the coup d`etat in the neighbouring country. As predicted, the	Dmitrij Kulikov	02.03.2017	RIA Novosti

¹¹⁹ Sergejcev, Timofej. 2014. Logika lzhi. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20140724/1017234598.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

¹²⁰ Kulikov, Dmitrij. 2017. Bez promyshlennosti, tepla i sveta: blizhajshie perspektivy Ukrainy. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20170406/1491632523.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

¹²¹ Kulikov, Dmitrij. 2017. Degradacija Ukrainy. Stanovlenie Donbassa. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20170302/1489114892.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

	processes of degradation and collapse of Ukraine happens in the frame of the previously made forecast			
Exchange in Ukrainian way: illusion of well-being instead of realising of reality¹²²	In Lviv just finished celebration of the 110 anniversary of birth of hangman, commander of UIA Roman Shukhevych “Shukhevychfest” We again are wondering what else they can come up with there? When they regain consciousness? Can we hope for Ukraine become sober or there is no hope anymore?	Iskander Valitov	04.07.2017	RIA Novosti
Political scientist: Ukrainians understood why there is chaos in Ukraine	USA media New York Observer told how Ukrainians lost credit to Kyiv power. Political scientist Vladimir Kornilov in the air of radio Sputnik expressed opinion that there will be enough of one match for a	N/A	16.06.2017	RIA Novosti

¹²² Valitov, Iskander. 2017. Razmen po-ukrainski: illjuzija blagopoluchija vmesto osoznaniya real'nosti. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20170704/1497802516.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

	new “Maidan” in Kyiv.			
Polish expert about Ukraine: I am surprised how quickly insanity is spread	The quantity of Ukrainian migrants is raising in Poland. It is caused by a collapse of economics and collapse of politics in Ukraine.. This opinion expressed Polish expert Tsezari Kalita in the air on Sputnik radio	N/A	03.05. 2017	RIA Novosti
Betrayal everywhere. Observer tells how Ukrainians lost credentials to power¹²³	In the background of heavy social, political, and economical crisis citizens of Ukraine more often see in power represents betrayers of Motherland, rites American publisher New York Observer.	N/A	15.06. 2017	RIA Novosti
A big dump. Ukraine is plunging into chaos together with Chernobyl¹²⁴	A zone of alienation around former Chernobyl Atomic Station recently gained a status of biosphere reservation. However, it seems not for long Ukrainian politician	Marija Baljabina	12.04. 2017	RIA Novosti

¹²³ RIA Novosti. 2017. Vsjudu "zrada". Observer rasskazal, kak ukraincy poterjali veru vo vlast'. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/world/20170615/1496616603.html?inj=1>. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

¹²⁴Балябина, Мария. 2017. *Большая свалка. Украина погружается в хаос вместе с Чернобылем.* [ONLINE] Available at: <https://ria.ru/accents/20170412/1492059270.html?inj=1>. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

	have the other plans for this territory.			
Ukraine will receive what Moldova has already received. ¹²⁵	During a year Ukraine will come to more difficult situation, than that one in what “Euroassocoated” Moldova is, thinks a member of Zinoviev Club Dmitrij Kulikov.	Dmitrij Kulikov	27.01. 2016	RIA Novosti

¹²⁵ Куликов Дмитрий. 2017. *Украина получит то, что Молдавия уже получила*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20160127/1366008980.html. [Accessed 20 May 2018].

Resume

Конструирование образа Украины как Другого в российских медиа The Construction of the Image of Ukraine as the Other in Russian Media

Работа рассматривает конструирование образа Украины как Другого в российских медиа. В частности, в работе анализируется функционирование стратегических нарративов «Украина – неудавшееся государство» и «Украина – нацистское государство», которые формируют русскоязычный информационный дискурс в рамках информационной войны России против Украины. Теоретическая основа работы состоит из комбинации таких подходов как дискурс-анализ (E.Laclau), анализ оценивания или appraisal analysis (Martin and White, 2005), а также теория концептуальной метафоры (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Теория дискурс-анализа Эрнесто Лаклау позволила сформулировать общие характеристики дискурса «Русского мира» и описать психографическую ситуацию, которая формирует медийную среду реципиентов рассматриваемых стратегических нарративов. Одна из задач первого раздела ознакомить нерусскоязычного исследователя с контекстом русскоязычных медиа, производимых в России для того, чтобы ответить на вопрос почему нарративы «Украина – неудавшееся государство» и «Украина – нацистское государство» пользуются успехом.

Также, в ряде главных задач работы была задача проследить систематичность формирования указанных стратегических нарративов. С этой целью во втором разделе, в подразделе «Украина – неудавшееся государство» была рассмотрена информационная продукция государственного цифрового медиа «РИА Новости» с 2014 по 2018 год. Была найдена связь между проектом РИА Новости «Зиновьевский клуб», «Зиновьевским клубом» как таковым и «Кружком Методологов». Фактор связи этих организаций через работу одних и тех же кадров в этих организациях, а также лингвистический контент-анализ медиапродукции позволили прийти к выводу о

системности смыслопорождения и разработки образа Украины как неудавшегося государства. Анализируемый нарратив способствует развитию другого стратегического нарратива – «Проект «Украина»». Данный нарратив призван поставить под сомнение существование нации «Украинцы» и может быть использован для оправдания военной агрессии на территорию Украины.

Одна из целей работы – показать механизмы формирования образа Украины как Другого. Для этой цели была проанализирована ректуализация дискурса «Великая отечественная война» в более широком дискурсе «Русский Мир». В разделе «Украина – нацистское государство» рассмотрены культура парада, приуроченного празднику Дня Победы и функционирование акции «Бессмертный Полк». В работе объясняется как эти элементы дискурса «Русский мир» выработывают образа Украины и ее правительства как врага России и «фашистского государства». Данный нарратив способствует популяризации реваншистскому нарративу «Вставание России с колен» и имеет потенциал мобилизовать реципиентов для добровольческой военной деятельности в других странах, в частности, в Украине, по предлогу борьбы с фашизмом.

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