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Corvinus University of Budapest
Institute of Social and Political Sciences

The Metamorphosis of the Far Right in Hungary: The case of Jobbik

CEERES Master's Thesis

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September, 2022
Budapest, Hungary

Field of Studies:

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of:

Master of Arts in Political Science (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

International Master's (IntM) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Glasgow, UK

Master of Arts in Social Sciences (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Tartu, Estonia

Word count of the thesis: 26,601 (including all tables and footnotes in the text, excluding abstract, acknowledgments, table of contents, bibliography and appendices)

Authorship Declaration: I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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
“The Metamorphosis of the Far Right in Hungary: The case of Jobbik”

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Abstract

One of the most successful far-right parties in Hungary and among the Visegrad Four states, Jobbik, has moderated and transformed into a centrist people's party. This thesis analyzes the incentives and effects of repositioning the far-right party on mainstream politics in Hungary. The metamorphosis of the Movement for a Better Hungary has entailed overriding changes, starting from the emergence of breakaway extreme-right groups to the rhetorical shifts of the ruling party. The study fosters an understanding of the strategy shift of the far-right and enhances the paucity of data regarding the outlined phenomenon by virtue of expert interviews with party members and employing primary data derived from the analysis of party electoral manifesto and declarations. To advance understanding of the far-right strategy shift, demand- and supply-side factors, and its reverberations, the thesis embraces various facets of the populist radical right party family, gauging populism, ethnonationalism, nativism, and copious determinants that have stipulated this shift. Apart from electoral opportunism, the Hungarian tradition of the far-right, socio-economic and extrinsic factors are analyzed. In the course of changing political and economic situation emanated by the Russo-Ukrainian war, moderation of fringe politics has entailed mainstreaming extremism and the more rigid rhetoric of Fidesz. The 2022 Hungarian National Assembly elections paved the way for these changes after unprecedented unanimity of the opposition when former far-right Jobbik cooperated with leftist and conservative parties.

Keywords

Hungary, Jobbik, Far-right politics, Right-wing populism, Populism

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my supervisors József Duró and Louis John Wierenga, for their supervision and recommendations. I would like to thank József for his assistance and advice notably during the data collection part of the thesis. I am thankful to Louis, whose course during the first semester in Tartu greatly assisted me in the writing process.

I am also hugely grateful to Ammon Matthias Cheskin and Clair Clarke for their readiness to help and technical assistance.

Let me express my gratitude to the Erasmus+ program and their financial support during my studies in Tartu, Glasgow, and Budapest.

I am grateful to my professors, classmates, and friends for making this experience more memorable. Last but not least, I appreciate the support and encouragement from my family.

Introduction

This thesis analyses strategic incentives for the transformation of the far-right. Strategy shift prompts other mainstream parties to revamp their ideological stances to appeal to the larger masses. Due to electoral competition, the evolution of a single party can entail the repositioning of the whole political spectrum either in the more extreme or moderate direction. This alteration drastically changes the domestic political landscape. The case study of Jobbik is examined for a more in-depth and explicit analysis of the aforementioned phenomenon. As moderation of Jobbik affected other parties and even a breakaway group of Jobbik, Our Homeland Movement, emerged as a result of the party's repositioning, the study examines how this transformation affected this and other parties. More accurately, Jobbik's cooperation with its former opponents as a member of the United for Hungary political alliance and its relations with the ruling party Fidesz is overviewed.

After a thorough analysis of cumulative knowledge from past research regarding the phenomenon, I have encountered valuable seminal works and scholarly debates; however, despite its overall theoretical value, the particular case of Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary, is not much-scrutinized. The overwhelming majority of studies focus on the rise of Jobbik as a far-right party.

The discursive repositionings of the far-right are a mixture of transitional socio-economic, political opportunism, and nationalistic sentiments. Notwithstanding a myriad of factors that can elucidate the phenomenon, the proper analysis of the case is essential to analyzing changing political landscape of the country. The study detects the strategic inducements for absorbing or oppositely deconstruction the far-right rhetoric and its influence on certain parties. The 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election proved that the remolding of Jobbik and joining a more "moderate" opposition alliance excluded its electorate from the coalition's supporters and paved the way for Fidesz and other contenders to radicalize their narratives even more. Yet, how and why this repositioning has occurred needs to be examined.

Hungary is often depicted as a pariah in the EU and is constantly in the limelight due to the alleged breaching of liberal democratic standards. The country with the most institutionalized party system among the Visegrad Four countries, with unique socio-economic underpinnings, is mainstreaming far-right extremism. Given the sheer volume of the existing research collected for the analysis, these ideological clashes and interrelation between far-right and more moderate parties still require clarification and more attentiveness.

The case of Jobbik is selected to research the phenomenon of the populist radical right and its metamorphosis at the national and regional levels. Few other momenta for case selection have been Jobbik's influence and ideological peculiarities; Jobbik often releases academically valuable manifestos and official documents and has declared the purposes they strive to achieve. The Movement for a Better Hungary, often portrayed as a challenger of Fidesz in the media and the most prominent far-right party among the Visegrad Four, has moderated to the center. Quite a few scholars, such as Kim (2016),

assess the party's rise and moderation as “a unique post-Communist political development that is rooted in elements of Hungarian nationalism.” (Kim D. S., 2016). Moreover, its deradicalization unquestionably affected the ruling party Fidesz and other actors in Hungary and altered its international image. Hence, analyzing merely Jobbik is not feasible without full scrutiny of the domestic political spectrum. The study covers the relations of Jobbik with the ruling party Fidesz and outlines the role of the fragmentation of opposition parties. The period covered starts from 2013; Spanning from 2013 to the recent 2022 elections, the study observes these ideological changes and assesses if it was a justified shift in the long run or just a short-term electoral strategy.

Thus, the study uncovers the real motives of the party transformation in Hungary and explains the recent developments in the country; Herewith, it examines more global phenomenon, such as the rise and moderation of extremist parties in modern democracies.

This specific example of Jobbik contributes to filling the gap in the existing literature and observes the crisis of liberal democracy in the context of rising populist radical right-wing parties. Having discussed the goal of this thesis, the formulation of the research questions this study aims to answer are the following: What are the incentives for the deradicalization of Jobbik, and how does it affect the party politics at the national and regional levels?

The research relies on both secondary and primary data; Secondary sources are predominantly expert analysis and seminal works on populism, and far-right utilized in the empirical and theoretical parts of the research. On account of the terminological confusion over populism and the far-right party family in academia, secondary sources were indispensable for drawing conclusions and analyzing the phenomenon; The primary data are face-to-face expert interviews and the analysis of the electoral manifestos that are used to scrutinize and explore the ongoing transformation of Jobbik and its effects on Hungarian politics. Additionally, one pitfall might have been the Hungarian language barrier. The available literature in other languages I speak has not been more voluminous than in English; However, as literature abounds on populism, and Jobbik has the English version of its website, this factor did not impede the research process. An alternative way to alleviate this limitation was through expert interviews, thus obtaining primary data. Expert interviews are also essential because the empirical case of Jobbik, namely its moderation is still ongoing, and academic literature is not fully-fledged.

The theoretical framework and conceptualization of populism is another challenge of the research. The contending approaches to populism are interchangeably interpreted as a thick, thin ideology or occasionally as a political tool. Additionally, there is no consent on what encompasses the radical right, extreme right-wing parties and what are the characteristics that define these party families. Measuring the rise of populism, the shift towards extreme-right, and the extent of moderation of politics are other factors that make this vague moderation of the party even obscurer. While defining these concepts, the study predominantly employs the existing literature; The interviews conducted with the members of Jobbik and the analysis of party manifestos contribute to filling in the void left by the scarcity of literature regarding the mentioned case.

A theoretical framework will be provided from the beginning to later connect to the empirical case study. Chapter 2 analyzes the empirical case and provides background information; The methodology part then connects and utilizes the conceptual and empirical debates through the mixed methods for data collection. It ensures a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon. The qualitative content analysis aims to detect the extent and implications of the moderation strategy. Face-to-face in-depth expert interviews with the senior members of Jobbik complement obtained data and assist in drawing conclusions based on the conceptual debates and secondary data.

Chapter 1. Theoretical Background and Conceptualization

This chapter analyzes the conceptualization of populism and its various dimensions. The following classification of the far-right party family aims to later detect the place of Jobbik in the party family. By doing this, the theoretical and conceptual debates intend to scrutinize the empirical case study and explain the reasons for the moderation of populist radical right parties and their effects on other parties. The analysis is based on the specific case of Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary, and its implications on the opposition alliance, the ruling party Fidesz and a breakaway group - Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk). The chapter proceeds with an exploration of the core concepts of populism.

The constant tussle between theoretical debates, limitations, and diverse definitions of several concepts often leave much room for interpretations by party leaders, members, or even scholars. Resultantly, this chapter underlines and defines concepts from the beginning and bridges theory to the main case. Cas Mudde, one of the most eminent political scientists mastering populism and political extremism, claims that an increasing number of authors focus on terminology. For their selected cases, arbitrary determination of concepts is not sufficient anymore; It is vital to examine all ins and outs. But still, this does not oversimplify the process and leads to even more divergence between scholars (Mudde, 2007, p. 12). A clear conceptual framework lays a solid foundation for the later data collection and analysis, as it serves as a guide during the analysis of an empirical case.

1.1. Conceptualizing populism

Mickael Minkenberg, one of the eminent researchers in the realm of the radical right, outlined that during the EU's Eastern enlargement in 2004-2007, the radical right had a limited or "nonexistent" influence on "the consolidation of democracy". However, the trend has reversed; "the influence has extended to major parties" in Eastern Europe. The author highlights Hungary and Poland as the most conspicuous examples. The core of right-wing radicalism is "a myth of a homogenous nation lies at the core; it is a romantic and populist ultranationalism that challenges the concept and reality of liberal and pluralistic democracy" (Minkenberg, 2017, p. 27). This chapter first tackles the notion of populism, and in the following parts, the other vital terms will also be addressed.

The term populism is repeatedly criticized due to its vagueness and objectivity. In the political narrative, we encounter this concept referring to both left-wing and right-wing parties. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) define populism in the context of liberal democracy. Their interpretations often invoke criticism; however, this dissertation relies principally on their works. The authors' attempts to alleviate and explain all the limitations of the concept render it more reliable. However, the debates regarding its vagueness and limitations require explanation. The other critique of the term groups around its broadness and complexity. On the one hand, the term can be applied to all

political actors and, on the other hand, for being “a political *Kampfbegriff* (battle term)” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 1).

Another source of doubt with the concept concerns its origin; Francisco Panizza, in his 2005 book, highlights the problems of contradicting approaches to populism and differentiates between three indicators to analyze it. Among them is "historicist accounts"; This approach connects certain events to specific historical periods. "Social formation, historical process or set of historical circumstances"- for instance, Latin American populism might be linked to the economic crisis of the 1930s before "the import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) model of development in the late 1960s". Thus, the intrinsic element of this approach is class subordination to charismatic leadership such as "Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, and Lazaro Cardenas". However, this analysis excludes references to other time periods and cases. Thus, its reliability is restricted (Panizza, 2005, pp. 2-3). Moreover, while disparate reasons have entailed the establishment of populist-radical right parties, the definition of the concept remains contested. For example, in the European context, we predominantly speak about anti-immigration, or xenophobic sentiments, while in Latin America, the emphasis is on clientelism and economic crisis. Thus, analyzing diverse approaches to populism is essential to delve further into the topic. While discussing various approaches to populism can be time-consuming, this chapter focuses only on several of them that are relevant to the dissertation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 2-4).

Populism remains one of the most tested phenomenon. However, the classification and comparison of European parties in terms of their degrees of populism is still a challenge. Comparing parties and making assumptions about which one is more populist can be manipulative and inaccurate. There are certain limitations when it comes to defining and then measuring populism.

Based on aforementioned scholarly debates, certain **limitations** of populism as a concept are outlined in the study:

Multidimensionality. Populism is a complex concept, and its numerous elements require separate analysis and operationalization. Among them are the notions of ordinary people, the corrupt elite, or people’s general will; These concepts are core to populism. In regard to measurement, multiple authors recommend “holistic” methods such as coding public speeches/textual analysis to evaluate the overall degree of populism. However, through textual analysis, answers are often enumerated dichotomously, whether the party is populist or not. Qualitative in-depth analysis is also an approved method by scholars; Reputedly, the recommended methodology is limited and fails to nudge researchers to diverse choices (Meijers & Zaslove, 2020, pp. 377-380).

The **ambiguity** of concepts. Owing to its vagueness, the chances of misleading interpretations increase. It is described interchangeably as a “pathology, a style, a syndrome, a doctrine,” a phenomenon, a movement, and leadership (Stanley, 2008, p. 95). Others argue that populism is merely a thin ideology or a tool rather than a thick ideology. This ambiguousness makes quite a few scholars doubtful of its analytical value. However, even when populism is interpreted as a thin ideology, it still “conveys a distinct set of ideas” and is applicable to determining and expound the tactics of the parties (Stanley, 2008, p. 95).

Confusion. It is facile to mix up the concept of populism with other related notions such as nativism and Euroscepticism. Thus, categorization of populism is challenging, and the risk of invalid categorization and references are considerable (Rooduinn, 2018, p. 362).

Moreover, quite a few compelling categories of populism can be observed. Populism can be discussed as an ideology, “political logic”, discourse style, political strategy, and part of the party image/style. (Benjamin Moffitt, 2014, p. 381). Furthermore, by certain populist parties, the label “populist” is considered to be praiseworthy, while the majority of scholars discuss the term with a negative connotation.

After discussing the limitations of the term, it is essential to break down several principal approaches and select the most relevant one for the dissertation.

An ideational approach; Populism as a thin-centered/thick ideology

Populism, extensively used as a political tool or a discourse style in the media, has entailed debates regarding its academic relevance. The conceptualization of populism has become puzzling for researchers. Cas Mudde also deems the usage of the concept without delineating it to be one of the challenges in academia. He argues that the multidisciplinary nature of the conducted research is not the root cause of this complexity; Even though research often involves diverse realms in social and political sciences, economics, or history, this does not elucidate the fuzziness of the concept. "Even within one single discipline, like political science", scholars find it difficult to reconcile on common ground. Cas Mudde relies on Ernesto Laclau's definition of 1970 and tells apart four approaches to populism. "Three of them consider it simultaneously as a movement and as an ideology. A fourth reduces it to a purely ideological phenomenon." Then the author embraces the ideational approach due to its increasing popularity in academia (Mudde, 2017, pp. 1-2). One of the authors who endorses the analytical value of populism as a concept is Benjamin Moffitt. He underlines that the reason for the majority of prolific authors who consider the concept to be meaningless is its misinterpretation and usage "in a derogatory manner to denigrate any political personality we do not like". Moffitt acknowledges Ionescu and Gellner's (1969) claim that "there can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is clear what it is". Thus, Moffitt draws on the second consideration that without analyzing and apprehension of populism, the evaluation of the contemporary political situation would not be comprehensive (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 20-21).

Populism as a thin-centered ideology. Thus, defining populism with the only minimal definition by Cas Mudde might not be sufficient. The vast majority of scholars designate this rather normative concept through an “ideational approach”- the most popular style predominantly used in Europe and the Americas (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 19). Those who back up the ideational approach to populism might examine the notion in a different manner. A number of them confer populism as a thin-centered, thick ideology, a discourse style of other approaches interchangeably (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 514). As mentioned above, there is no concurrence regarding its precise definition. The concept of populism is not readily detectable and explicit. However, scholars concur on several core indicators. The common elements include references to “the people” and “the

corrupt elite” in all variations of populism. Here populism is portrayed as a thin-centered ideology. That implies the attachment of its several components to the alternative ideologies. However, as this definition is wide-ranging and can be relevant to other political actors or approaches, divisive indicators should be allotted. The divisive elements to distinguish populism from substitute ideologies can be elitism and pluralism. Elitists believe that “the people” are inferior to the elite. They should be intellectually and culturally subordinated to the elite, as “unstable” and “dishonest” people are not capable of exercising authority. Thus, elitists entirely or partially reject democracy. With respect to pluralism, the theory is grounded on the belief of a divided society into contrasting groups or subgroups with their unique characteristics. As diversity here is discussed in a positive context, various centers of power are acceptable. Hence, these two major opposing concepts underline that the notion of populism can exist in the form of ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 19-20). Moreover, unlike “full” ideologies, populism has “a restricted morphology,” and is often mixed up with its “host ideologies” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Mudde considers Nativism to be the host ideology for radical right. “Nativists are torn between the ideal and the practice, the dream, and the reality.” They envisage the creation of “a monocultural state”. However, the essence of nativism will be examined more in-depth later in the theoretical part of the thesis (Mudde, 2007, p. 138).

Hence, populism is “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6)

Thick ideology. Hence, there have been general debates that construe populism as a contested concept. This paragraph presents populism as a thick ideology. To concede populism as a fully-fledged ideology like socialism or liberalism its ideological base should be made more explicit. By that means, the core determinant of the ideology can be nostalgia for a “sacred heartland”, of a country’s past, where homogeneous people used to live peacefully; “People are uprooted and alienated, and they long for a return to the” rootedness “of an integrated and coherent ‘community of the people’”. Rydgren suggests that every ideology has its utopian aspects. For populism, as a thick ideology, this aspect is an idealization of the past (Rydgren, 2017, pp. 3-5). Anders Ravik Jupskås states that populism is mainly “combined with ‘thicker’ ideologies like nationalism or socialism”. Nativists represent populism as a constant clash between “the pure” people and “the elite”. The elite here is accountable for all the grievances of the ordinary people, as they prioritize non-native people. Socialist populists advocate the rights of “the pure people” (Jupskås, 2020). Thus, these parties are anti-establishment “defending” the rights of the common people against exploitative and “corrupt elite”; Populist leaders criticize and elicit social institutions: political parties, media, and financial or bureaucratic establishments; “The people” are “monolithic” and always presented as a unanimous actor in their rhetoric, while external groups are second-fiddles. By means of this,

minorities, immigrants, or sometimes even ultranationalists are a perceived menace to populist leaders. (Rydgren, 2017, pp. 3-5).

Criticism and populism as a discourse style. While a sizable body of research employs Cas Mudde's definition and depiction of populism as a thin-centered ideology with restricted morphology, many others challenge his ideas and criticize them. Paris Aslanidis (2015) has been one of the contributors who discerns populism as a discourse style. He claims that Mudde's *"ideological connotations are ill-conceived both conceptually and methodologically and that its normative implications and failure to acknowledge the graded nature of populist behavior hinder the further evolution of the field of populism studies"* (Aslanidis, 2016). Conversely to Ernesto Laclau and other forerunners in the field, Aslanidis supports the idea of framing populism as a discourse style. The author neglects acknowledgment of populism both as a full-bodied ideology and its thin-centered nature. Aslanidis shares Gerring's (1997) idea that the core component of every single ideology is its coherence. Thus, the "value" of populism is its constantly changing nature and attachment to other ideologies; This exposes the fact that numerous parties are entitled to be populist, but "no trace of ideological coherence can be substantiated across these cases" (Aslanidis, 2016, pp. 88-89). Thus, the third and the most popular strand depicts populism as a discourse style that certain parties use to express their viewpoints. Parties can be more or less populist, but they consistently use populist rhetoric in their discourses (Rydgren, 2017, pp. 7-9).

However, the scores of authors share Mudde's definition and employ his research as a baseline; Another author who contradicts "thick" to "thin" debates is Ralph Schroeder. In contrast to Aslanidis (2015), he claims that populism might be "elastic" but so are other ideologies such as "socialism, liberalism or conservatism" (Schroeder, 2020, p. 47). He goes beyond and analyzes whether populism meets the criteria of thick ideologies or not. He states that "by treating populism as 'thin', there is a risk is of overlooking a new set of beliefs that have influenced the political direction in several countries." (Schroeder, 2020, p. 28)

As a larger number of scholars describe populism as a thin-centered ideology, this dissertation also adopts this approach. Framing populism as a thick ideology is extremely rare and not supported by numerous scholars. Populism as a discourse style is complex and often lacks validity in empirical research. Thus, utilizing populism as thin centered ideology would contribute to the academic applicability of the notion. Herewith, employing the ideational approach has its methodological advantages. Hawkins and Kaltwasser have succeeded in providing "empirical measures of populist discourse" and concluded that "defining populism in ideational terms is analytically and methodologically convenient" and effectual (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 523).

1.2. Defining the right-wing populist party family

The emergence of the party family and its importance. Right-wing populist parties emerged in Europe in the 1980-the 90s in Italy, France, and Austria. Since the 2000s, their popularity has reached other continents, and they have gained recognition in the

US, India, and various corners of the world (Guy, Dani, Erdi, & Luca, 2021, p. 2) The emergence of radical right parties has invoked the curiosity of scholars. Defining the radical right party family can be perplexing; Quite a few authors even avouch that one can identify several subgroups in the “the extreme right” party family. Often the term also applies to the far-right, neo-Nazi, extremist parties. This sub-chapter foremost tries to tackle this challenging task and define the party family.

Terminological debates

The terms “radical”, “extreme right”, “populist radical right”, and “far-right” are ambivalently and interchangeably used by scholars. As the notions usually refer to the same organizations, this additionally complicates the conceptualization of the party family (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p. 910). Pippa Norris shares this concern. She sometimes even negates the existence of the radical right as a phenomenon or as a “loose category” (Norris, 2005, p. 43). Overviewing myriad terms to portray the party family, among them “new right”, “extreme-right” and “anti-immigrant”, she clearly accentuates the “radical right” to label the party family. This notion “avoids prejudging the programmatic content or rhetorical appeal”, not labeling them to be extremists or against migration. Contrastingly, labeling the radical right leaves room for researching the parties more thoroughly (Norris, 2005, pp. 44-46).

The binds between radical and extreme parties are vague. The debates also touch upon whether extremist parties can be labeled as neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist. Due to the notable differences between the far-right parties, some link them to neo-fascist parties. However, borderlines between them should be drawn. Firstly, fascist parties have ultraradical, “fascist programs, and methods.” Meanwhile, PRR parties might challenge the ruling elite; however, they acknowledge the existing borders of the country and forms of liberal democracy. Herewith, they are often apologists of the pro-Market economy. Due to their nativist and nationalist rhetoric, they resemble fascist parties, but these differences rule out their complete affinity (Karapın, 1998, p. 218).

The fundamental difference between the extreme right and radical right parties is that far-right, extremist parties neglect all forms of liberal democracy, while radical right-wing parties endorse democratic institutions and free elections. (Mudde, 2022, p. 12).

“The term ‘radicalism’ resp. ‘radical’ has consequently undergone a change of meaning. What we characterise as ‘extremist’ today, used to be characterised as ‘radical’. Nowadays, attempts that are characterised as ‘radical’ are those aimed at one-sided solutions that go ‘down to the root’ of certain problems, without (yet) aiming at the full or partial elimination of the free democratic order.” (Mudde, 2022, p. 12).

Thus, these parties are “verfassungswidrig (opposed to the constitution) or verfassungsfeindlich (hostile towards the constitution)” respectively. On top of that, Mudde acknowledges that “right-wing populism, radical right-wing populism, national populism, new populism, neo-populism” are used as synonyms by scholars. He adds that only a few authors “working within the extremist-theoretical tradition, clearly distinguish between the various terms” (Mudde, 2022, pp. 11-13). Therefore, the extreme

right is against democracy, while the radical right is against liberal democracy, and these differences are of utmost importance.

Conceptualization problems and peculiarities of the party family. Certain peculiarities complicate the quest for a conventional definition among scholars. Radical right-wing parties tend to have different attitudes toward many fundamental issues. For instance, some are more nationalistic and advocate for regional interests, while others are not. They also differ in regard to xenophobic attitudes (Karapın, 1998, p. 218). Herewith, these parties are not merely a protest phenomenon against the authority. The ideological dimension and its variations greatly influence its electorate. The extremism these parties are advocating is not alluring in the long run, and in numerous countries, this extremism is not even legitimate. However, the “type of activists” radical-right wing parties appear to often behoove the parties to employ this declamatory rhetoric in the long term; Moreover, “the winning formula for far-right parties involves combining a pro-market position on the economic dimension with an authoritarian position on the cultural dimension” (Golder, 2016, pp. 489-490).

According to Cas Mudde, immense terminological debates and the quest for a clear definition of the “extreme right” party family is inefficient. Despite numerous conceptualizations, all of them share the problem of “circularity”; There is disagreement on the “a priori and post facto criteria” of the party family. Several solutions address these limitations. Wittgensteinian concept of “family resemblance” suggests that in default of identical party families, one can observe similar party families that share several features. The core element here is ideology. Max Weber, discussing his “ideal type” of party family, also attests that all the party families have disparities and similitude; hence, there are no identical parties. However, the problems surrounding these definitions cast doubts on their relevance and authenticity. The first concern is related to measurement. To what extent is these similarities/resemblance necessary to be assigned to a specific party family. The shared features can also link certain parties to other divergent party groups and thus question the existence of the entire party family. Here, Cas Mudde suggested using less problematic and feasible definers, the so-called “minimum definition” or “lowest common denominator.” Hence, choosing a party “prototype” and based on that party, appertain all the other parties to the party family would be a way out of the impasse. The core denominator should be an ideological similarity. Or the other way would be to select several features, “minimal” factors, and only assess the parties by dint of these definitions. However, a risk of muddling up several parties and falsely including them in certain families is considerable. Herewith, the process would be time-consuming as it requires studying and evaluating the ideologies of all the members of the family. The other option is “most dissimilar system design,” and examines all the disparities between parties (Mudde, 2007, pp. 11-16).

The importance of context

As everything is meaningful in a context, a definite context is essential to classify certain parties. After the conceptual discourse, a quest for the context becomes felicitous.

As outlined in the earlier sections, liberal democracy is a context in which extremist parties withstand all forms of liberalism.

Michael Minkenberg, in his book in 2017, distinguished between the far-right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. The author points out that parties in Eastern Europe are more radical, volatile, organizationally more fluid and fragile. Moreover, radical right parties in Western Europe dwell on immigration issues. The parties in the post-Soviet states nourish "historical animosities and conflicts"; The existence of refugees and ethnic minorities aggravates their narrative of the antagonistic groups. Minkenberg states that although radical parties in Eastern Europe enjoy less stable electoral stability, nationalistic claims are constantly prevalent in the region. Thus, these parties never wane in popularity and connect past grievances to modern problems (Minkenberg, 2017, pp. 5-6). It is necessary to take notice of a post-Communist transition context pertaining to East European parties. With "fluid party systems" mainstream parties are often radicalized. The academic value of the region and its peculiarities provoke quite a few scholars. Minkenberg has described the assignment of Fidesz and Law and Justice in Poland in the party family as a "right-wing populist with programmatic elements of the radical right," and this way delimited from the far-right party family. Regardless, both parties are often more radicalized than their counterparts in Western Europe (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, pp. 910-913).

Owing to the fact that a greater number of scholars typically focus on their counterparts in Western Europe, Pirro (2013) also accents the importance of examining radical right parties in Eastern European countries. Subsequently, the unique post-Soviet context often remains unexplored. Pirro tries to fill the scarcity of literature data and examines the supply-side of the populist radical right in the CEE region; Due to these diverse contexts and regional discrepancies, PRR parties do not share identical ideologies. Accorded elements of the parties are nativism, authoritarianism, and populism; "The structural, cultural, and institutional starting points of ex-communist countries at the outset of the transition" have determined the differences between these parties. "The post-communist syndrome" - higher and conflicting expectations gave them an additional impetus to radicalize. "Modernization losers" - a theory offered by Jens Rydgren or Minkenberg's losers of transformation theory, which claims that "the losers of recent economic developments emerge as populists" (Minkenberg, 2015, p. 48). Moreover, the dissatisfied electorate were prone to "romanticize the past and idealize authoritarian traditions"; Thus, the support for the radical right has increased rapidly in the past decades (Pirro A. L., 2014, pp. 599-603), especially within the context of the global financial crisis.

Concepts

The core indicators. As previously noted, populism is an all-encompassing notion and is one of the features of the radical right populist party family with nativism,

ethnonationalism, and authoritarianism. Yet, all other designators also require the proper definition.

For Marxism, the core element is class struggle, while for feminism, it is gender. For the radical right party family, the initial, central concept for its “minimal” definition can be “nation” and then “nationalism”; Thus, in order to define the party family, these concepts should be clarified (Mudde, 2007, p. 16). Herewith, the conceptualization of the concepts is propitious for a more comprehensive analysis of populist electoral manifestos. Defining the party family is pivotal to determining the place of Jobbik since its establishment and after its metamorphosis.

As follows, the central attribute of the party family is nationalism. Defining nationalism can be challenging. Diverse conceptualizations and its redefinition as a political doctrine are still contrasting. The prime intention of the rhetoric of nationalism has been the establishment of a “monocultural state”, a homogenous unity of the people. This can be attained by means of “separatism, assimilation, expulsion, or ultimately genocide” (Mudde, 2007, p. 16).

The configuration of nationalism is onerous. There is no universal definition of nation or nation-state, and scholars are on a collision course while interpreting nationalism. Because of this, the term nationalism is widely used interchangeably; Webster's New International Dictionary differentiates six distinct meanings of nationalism. These include national character, identity/the distinctiveness of people, the superiority of national interests, patriotism (evinced in devotion), collectivism, and supremacy over other nations (Davitashvili, 2003, pp. 46-47).

Nationalism often derives from distant ideologies, such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and feminism, along with others. However, the essence of the term is that it binds “the entire native population”; Nationalism is cemented together with the concept of nation. The nation is an even vaguer concept. Scholars are at variance on indicators to define the concept. However, the bulk of them connect it to the idea of the heartland. That implies that people belong to certain places congenitally. Nations are *“historically constructed named units of the population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link to a historical territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites”* (Bergmann, 2020, pp. 29–52).

- ***Ethnonationalism/ Nativism/National Populism***

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the study employs the definition offered by Cas Mudde, which depicts populism as a thin-centered ideology. As Jobbik became popular with its anti-Roma, the so-called “Gypsy crime” campaign, other varieties of nationalism have been incorporated into the study. Ethnic nationalism and nativism are also attributes of the party family.

For nationalism and nativism, “**nation**”, and “**people**” are central concepts; however, they appeal to them differently. According to Bergmann (2020), the convergence of nativism and populism is a well-used rhetorical tool. While nationalism appeals to the entire population, populists refer to “the pure people” against “the corrupt elite”; However, the links between the above-mentioned units are sparse. Many populist leaders can be identified as ethnic nationalists. Thus, nativist populists can be in

“opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreignness”; The category of “others” that was previously discussed is relevant also in this regard (Bergmann, 2020, pp. 29–52).

Thus, ethnic nationalists designate the concept of the nation through ethnicity; It would be highly complex to discuss the myriad elements of nationalism, yet, certain peculiarities need to be addressed. More specifically, the distinction between liberal nationalists, so-called “moderate” nationalists” and “radical” nationalists will be illustrated; The radical parties gain traction through the rhetoric regarding ethnicity, culture, racism against minorities, segregation, and anti-establishment attitudes. Albeit, the distinction between these “extreme” nationalists and moderate parties sometimes is not that conspicuous; The concept that renders its essence clearer is nativism, with its “anti-immigrant” and “antialien” ideas. Nativism refers to the aspiration of the country to be inhabited exclusively by native people; The attributes of the “native” can vary and include religious, cultural (core determinant), racial, and ethnic elements. In this sense, nativism resembles “extreme” nationalism, but in contrast to ethnonationalism, the essence of nativism excludes all forms of liberal nationalism (Mudde, 2007, pp. 17-19).

As already discussed, nativism is an intrinsic indicator of the party family. The notion is bounded by the concept of “citizenship”. With the motto of “own people first” and its exclusionism, their vision is a state inhabited by native citizens, “the nation”; However, this deprives other “non-native” citizens of their rights and perceives them as a threat to “the pure people”. As radical parties in Eastern Europe are predominantly concerned with territorial revisionism, their target can be ethnic minorities, for example, Romani people in Central Europe (Mudde, 2007, p. 302).

Authoritarianism and populism are other two vital indicators of the party family. Authoritarianism is characterized by anti-establishment attitudes, emphasis on the “law and order” and traditional values. Detecting the extent or determining indicators of radicalism can be challenging. The perception of the “radical” measures/ narratives depends on the political culture of the respective country (Mudde, 2007, p. 302). Hence, radical right-wing parties intersect with nativism, populism, authoritarianism, and ethno-nationalism.

These core concepts are the ideological basis for populism and populist right-wing parties. However, numerous elements can be assigned to these core concepts. Sometimes they even form independent categories. However, in this study, fundamental elements that comprise the party family would be united into the abovementioned categories. These concepts include:

“People”; “People-Centrism” “Pure people VS. the corrupt elite”

The first concept is “people”; The vagueness of the conceptualization of “people” contributes to the success of the PRR parties. The point of reference is sometimes citizens as a unity; However, at times this has an ideological/ figurative meaning. The positive valorization of people is used for manipulations and appeals to different groups despite their backgrounds. The following usage of the concept is the most widespread: “the people as sovereign, as the common people, and as the nation.” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 9-10). **People-Centrism** denotes the reference to “the people”. According to Van

Leeuwen (2019), “people-centrism” is one of the most popular discourse attributes of populism for researchers to measure the phenomenon. However, to what extent they refer to the people is a moot case. In the empirical analysis, the easiest way to measure people-centrism is simply by counting the quantity of references to the people in party manifestos. However, the task is not as simplistic as one might think. In all the manifestos, parties refer to people. The flagrant indicators are required to distinguish the homogenous people by populist understanding and actual citizens. The authentic identifier of the people in populist conception is that they are homogeneous (not any subgroups, minorities) and seen as a positive unity. Politics should serve the interests of “the common man”; “The people” are always a focal point (Van Leeuwen, 2019, pp. 1-4).

“Pure people VS. the corrupt elite”

Most notably, the “pure” homogenous people only have their relevance in opposition to “the elite”; Thus, all the PRR parties are anti-establishment. The denigration of the elite is typical for populists. Herewith, populists holistically inspect the elite and criticize not certain elements or members of the elite but perceive it as a negative unity per se (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 11-12).

General will and popular sovereignty

All parties should express “a general will of the people”; “The general will” is one of the core components of the party family. The populist understanding of the concept derives from “common sense”; The perception of this powerful lever is appealing to their electorate. Mobilization of “the people” against “the corrupt elite” often undermines the strength of the ruling parties. However, along with it, populist leaders lean toward authoritarianism. Their ideas resemble German theorist Carl Schmitt’s claims, which urged the creation of homogenous unity for concrete improvements and strengthening democracy. An outlier, not a part of this homogenous unity, is a threat. The only supreme value is complying with the “general will” standards at any cost, including illiberal, authoritarian means (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 16-19).

Anti-elitism is an indivisible attribute of populism. The notion infers the oppression of the people by the elite. Populist leaders offer that people should be sovereigns and call for direct democracy. The most reliable indicator to distinguish the notion of anti-elitism from people-centrism is that it is politicized. The politicization of the concept makes it “anti-status-quo” and dissociated from the elite. These also give greater freedom to the notions of “the people” and the elite. The people are interpreted as “the nation, the poor, the natives, the “let down,” the “badly governed,” the “left alone,” and the “others” can be “migrants, refugees, traitors, experts, the establishment, technocrats, the system, or others.” (Ridel, 2017, pp. 290-291).

- **Glorification of the past-** Any historical references and calls to revive old glory or order. “Nostalgia and reliance on the conception of a ‘sacred heartland.’” This nostalgia is stipulated by the “unfavorable” baseline conditions for the “pure” and “homogenous” people that are unlawfully or unduly oppressed. The intent of returning to “rootedness of an integrated and coherent community of the people”

is central to the populist narrative (Rydgren, 2017, p. 3). General discontent and references to tradition, memories, and identity are intrinsically populist.

- **Religion-** “Religion matters first and foremost as a marker of identity” and to delimit between “the good “us” and the bad them”; Christianity/Catholic church is predominantly used to evoke nostalgia, revive nationalistic sentiments, and also depict the image of the animosity, such as “other” Muslims that are not an integral part of their culture (Shterin, 2018, pp. 177-178).
- **Family Values-** Populists interconnect family values with religion; the most valuable trait is traditional family values. Attitudes regarding family values differ, especially in relation to LGBTQ rights. More frequently, populists oppose LGBTQ rights and gender equality. Gender is not a populist attribute; however, these issues are often emphasized by PRR parties. However, sporadically the opposite trends can be observed. They adopt “identarian ‘Christianism’- ‘a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defense of gender equality, gay rights and freedom of speech”; This excludes non-European immigrants (Guy Ben-Porat, 2021, pp. 3-4).
- **Social Justice-** Populism is a reverberation of the "failure of existing social and political institutions" which renders populists vehement supporters of social law and order (Panizza, 2005, p. 9)
- **Fair Representation** - The “underprivileged” people should be represented exclusively by populist leaders. They often use identifiers such as “we” to underline that they know and are in charge of resolving all the problems (Barát, 2021, p. 65). Consequently, according to populist leaders, these people deserve fairer elections and direct representation.
- **Protectionism-** Economic nationalism depicts immigrants and foreign actors as a threat and generally impedes cooperation with external actors by imposing higher tariffs, quotas, or regulations on imported goods in the context of globalization and rapid technological diffusion (Fratzcher, 2020, pp. 2-3). Kent Jones exemplifies the concrete cases of populist parties and claims that populist trade protectionism has an adverse impact on "the global trading system " due to its "protectionist policies" which also contradicts the standards of the WTO. The concrete lever here is "anxieties over globalization and other forms of social change" (Jones, 2022).
- **Welfare Chauvinism-** Welfare Chauvinism connotes that *"welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, particularly to the natives of a country as opposed to immigrants."* Thus, the concept is related to nativism; The radical right parties employ welfare chauvinism against immigrants to appeal to the electorate by claiming to be decreasing unemployment rates. They adopt "a leftist social policy position regarding natives with a rightist social policy position regarding nonnatives" (ECPS, 2018).

All in all, this chapter addressed the categorization of the radical right, defined the concepts related to the Hungarian far-right, and principally the notions of populism, nativism, ethnic nationalism, and elements of authoritarianism. The ensuing chapter will

focus on the empirical case of Jobbik and other parties that entailed the changes in the Hungarian political landscape.

1.3. Transformation of the far-right

“While party positions can change relatively quickly, the traditional ideology of the Hungarian far-right and its topics seem rather eternal.” (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, p. 15).

As the political situation changes frequently, so do the actors. “A shift by radical forces closer to the political center is a well-known practice”, and they might not maintain these new positions in the long run. “Centre-right political forces may sometimes become radicalized, too” (Juhász, et al., 2017, p. 7). Focusing on fringe politics, Pirro and Fagen (2019) have analyzed the case of Jobbik. The authors outline that the shift was preconditioned by “an increasing crowding on the right side of the left-right ideological spectrum” (Pirro AL, 2021, p. 23).

Capaul and Christian Ewert (2021), in their comparative analysis of radical right-wing populist parties in Western European countries, asseverate that the sheer majority of radical parties have moderated their politics once they joined the government. Without achieving significant electoral success, they refrain from remolding. The authors claim that such metamorphosis is probable even before mainstreaming their narrative; however, the cases related to this phenomenon are improperly tested. Using a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, they have explored the prerequisites for moderation. Their findings are noteworthy. Indicators such as “the degree of governmental responsibility” and the internal organization are determinants of party success. Joining the ruling coalition requires unanimity of the members, thus instigating the party to adjust the ideological beliefs of all members (Capaul & Ewert, 2021, pp. 779-781). Populist parties in the government most likely will be forced to moderate due to the influence of demand-side factors. These alterations would diminish their populist narrative. However, a number of empirical pieces of evidence prove the opposite. In some cases, they do deradicalize, but often they “push through the undemocratic reforms they promised their voters” (Kaltwasser, Taggart, & et.al., 2017, pp. 710-711).

Borbáth and Gessler (2021) argue that changes in the demand and supply-side factors and the inability to gain new voters push PRR parties to moderate their nativist rhetoric and elaborate more on their moderate populist narratives. This phenomenon of moderation of politics is a well-known tactic of the populist radical right parties that have already achieved electoral success. However, they do not enjoy a stable electoral fortune or have difficulties mobilizing new voters. They usually reach only some predictable margins. However, changing or balancing their course and appeals to enchant new voters have become problematic. “Differentiating party messages to core supporters and the wider electorate” is a tested way for the parties to amplify their influence and lure potential voters. In Central and Eastern Europe, PRR parties are less institutionalized than their counterparts in Western Europe. Due to their competition after a significant amount of time, their pariah status becomes unavoidable. Their investigated case of Jobbik explored that with the decreased reliance on its nativist rhetoric, the party

increased its populist embellishments (Borbáth & Gessler, 2021, pp. 1-2). Tol & Johnson (2021) have also raised a debate regarding right-wing movements as "moderators of the far-right." They state that right-wing parties tend to contribute to "the mainstreaming of the far-right." On the flip side, this radicalization affects the right-wing parties, and they might moderate. According to the authors, the right-wing parties inhabit the "moderating space" that is "difficult for ordinary conservative and centrist parties to fill" (Tol & Johnson, 2021).

Stojarová (2018) argues that the migration crisis has given momentum to the PRR parties in Central Europe. Anti-European, anti-Semitism, and anti-Roma rhetoric have transmuted, and since 2015 the principal "targets" have become migrants and, more specifically, Muslims. The "moderation" is just changing the focus. Increasing nationalism and xenophobia are still evident. Analyzing PRR parties in the V4 countries, the author considers only Jobbik and SNS as a significant power (Stojarová, 2018, pp. 32-45). Another view suggests that the PRR parties are more likely to maintain their popularity in the wake of the topics they affiliate regarding immigration and Europeanisation. These topics never lose popularity. Herewith, older extremist leaders are always replaced by more pragmatic youngsters. They put forward more effective tools to cooperate at the international level. This way, they entice even more and more voters (Rooduijn, 2015).

Centrist and Radical-Right Populists. Stanley (2017) differentiated between the following populist typologies- radical and centrist populism in the 1990s and 2000s (Petrović, Raos, & Fila, 2022, p. 3). The post-Communist transitional context to democracy gave both centrist and right-wing populist parties new momentum. "The clash of interests between relative winners and losers of transition" would create a contending status quo between parties that "offered pro-market, cosmopolitan, and internationalist policies, and parties which offered particularism, interventionist, and anti-integrationist policies." (Kaltwasser, Taggart, & et.al., 2017, p. 188) Radical populists believed that party politics in the CEE region would become more institutionalized, while centrists claimed it would be "hollowed out". Thus, centrists believe that the one-party closed system during the soviet rule impeded institutional development (Kaltwasser, Taggart, & et.al., 2017, p. 189). Radical right-wing populists in the CEE region advocate predominantly oppressed and vulnerable groups affected by the Soviet legacy. Centrist populists employed a "pragmatic approach to the thick- ideological aspects of their appeal, and the foregrounding qualities such as competence, probity, and newness". Both approaches are typical for the party system in the CEE region (Petrović, Raos, & Fila, 2022, p. 3).

In Western countries, the term "new populism" is widely used. The notion implies the adopted elements of populism by extreme-right parties. These new centrist populist parties are usually anti-establishment that emphasize "the virtues of the people" and the inevitability of popular sovereignty (Ucen, 2004, p. 48).

Hungarian far-right

After Jobbik sued a private television ATV for labeling the party as a far-right, terminological debates regarding the far-right in Hungary became prevalent. The attempts to distinguish between radicalism and extremism have brought new perspectives into the limelight. The endeavors to use these debates for political gains have become implausible. As radicals acknowledge liberal democracy and extremists condemn all forms of liberal democracy, the rhetorical confrontation was inadequate to downgrade certain radical-right parties. Moreover, these affirmations emanate from rather dubious assumptions. Firstly, in consolidated democracies, radical-right parties have to adjust the terms dictated by liberal democratic parties. If these extreme parties join the parliament through elections, they are unlikely to abandon their rhetoric (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, pp. 19-21). Secondly, Austin's (1990) work urges us to observe parties and their actions rather than their rhetoric. Actions include "ideas, speeches, statements, and symbols." Lastly, the distinction between extremism and radicalism is problematic in political science. While legally there might be a difference, in social and political sciences, this is a normative enquiry, and their divisors are vague (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, pp. 22-24).

Chapter 2. Case Selection

“The rise of the extreme right”, “the crisis of liberalism”, and “Hungary's lost democracy”, have become one of the most widespread headlines portraying Hungarian politics and the party system; The shift toward radicalism and populist narratives disseminated in the political spectrum is typical for Hungary. However, reversely, Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary, allocated itself to the centrist people's party and distanced from its past nativist credentials; Being the most successful far-right party in the country and among the Visegrad four states, Jobbik commenced to moderate its policies and established closer relations with other European parties.

It is notable that moderation, an evolution closer to the political center, is a tactic dictated by electoral opportunism after the populist radical right's electoral breakthroughs; It serves the prime intention to appeal to new and retain committed voters. Hence, attempts to boost voter mobilization and other parties emulating the same tactics enforced Jobbik to moderate; However, adopting the opposite tactics and values can raise several questions about its international image, reliability, and volatility as a partner for other opposition parties. The doubts about whether this is a merely temporary restructuring for political gains or a complete transition are also considerable.

Determining ideological pursuits is not that superficial and explicit. Most scholars converge on the idea that radicalization of the mainstream parties and moderation of fringe politics stimulate the shift of the country's direction and mainstreaming of the far-right; However, the variance of interpretations is noticeable regarding the rationales why these alterations occur; While a number of scholars agree that Fidesz, formerly a liberal party, “*successfully used Jobbik as an instrument to extend the frontiers of the political field*” (Kreko, 2015), or the other way around, Jobbik pushed Fidesz to change. The others consider that this shift is merely a post-transitional phenomenon and not a simple strategy shift.

“We think that the general simplifying explanation that Jobbik pushed Fidesz more to the extreme position is simplifying and misleading. What we can see instead is that the problems with post-transitional Hungary” (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, p. 13)

On the one hand, due to moderation, other extremist parties have emerged; On the other hand, the second-largest opposition party – Jobbik, tries to cooperate with other leftists, liberal or center-right parties. After the ruling party Fidesz, a former member of the Liberal International until 2000, left the European People's Party in 2021, there are ongoing negotiations regarding establishing a new “radical rightist parties” group in the European parliament; On this account, the topic has become more salient. Moreover, the far-right Our Homeland party entered the parliament in April 2022, as a result of occupying Jobbik's niche. This demonstrates that implications of the shift still need to be observed; This maneuver of moderation unquestionably has a significant influence on Hungarian politics, and the current leader of Jobbik is expected to play an indispensable role in politics. The ideological restructuring of the parties does not only affect internal

actors, but this restructuring affects EU politics; The narrative of Fidesz has become more rigid during the election campaigns in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war in order to woo voters from a more "moderate" opposition coalition; Thus, the chapter analyzes the restructuring of Jobbik and its implications at the European level.

The following empirical part of the thesis will address the outlined questions. Furthermore, as Jobbik is the political successor of another extreme-right party-MIEP, the chapter will recapitulate historical premises.

2.1. Background

The demise of the USSR and the transition to democracy gave new momentum to the far-right in Hungary. The country has become one of the “strongholds of the radical right” (Kim D. S., 2016, pp. 345-346). One of the most prominent predecessors of Jobbik was the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life, MIEP, founded in 1993. In 1998, this extreme, ethno-nationalist party entered the parliament with 5.5 percent of the votes and fourteen seats. Over that period, the current ruling party Fidesz transformed from a liberal party into a national-conservative party. MIEP supported Viktor Orbán’s political creed and agenda. Such that, MIEP became “opposition to the opposition”; The party was primarily focused and constructing its radical narrative on the “Trianon trauma” (using the so-called Trianon syndrome phenomenon), hard Euroscepticism, anti-liberalism, anti-Western values, anti-Semitism, and anti-communist values (Pytlas, 2016, pp. 35-36). Fidesz’s amplified success led to the party’s “marginalization, making the country immune to far-right inroads for over a decade” (Pirro, Pavan, & Gazsi, 2019, p. 22).

The successor of MIEP and surpassingly successful radical right-wing party has become Jobbik. At first, it started gaining popularity as a political movement and was connected to various semi-formal “radical right and national-conservative university clubs and thought circles.” Youth mobilization at the grassroots level became one of the preconditions for the success of Jobbik. Gabor Vona, Jobbik’s leader since 2006, was also involved in these youth organizations. This association of the far-right youth used to function as a think-tank close to the mainstream right-wing (Pytlas, 2016, pp. 35-37). The failure of Orbán in the 2002 elections and the withdrawal of MIEP did not create an auspicious situation for the youth organization, “a national civic organization,” which had 1500 members in 2002. This youth association, founded at ELTE university, became the predecessor of Jobbik. Their initial aim was to break ties with Communism (Nagy & Rona, 2013). Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik was officially founded in 2003. "Jobb" in Hungarian implies "right". Thus, the party name denotes the “right choice”. That could be interpreted either as a "better choice" or "more to the right" (Fielitz & Thurston, 2019, p. 71). In 2006 the MIEP–Jobbik Third Way Alliance of Parties, failed to surpass the threshold. Jobbik increased its prominence after establishing its militia wing, the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Garda), in 2007. This “patriotic-nationalistic” association was established during Jobbik’s anti-Roma campaign. Their blatant campaigns through marches, demonstrations, and provocations aided Jobbik to enhance visibility in the media (Pytlas, 2016, p. 37). Emphasizing the myth of "gypsy crime" has become the

impetus of Jobbik's soaring success. The party was trying to legitimize the claim of “Roma criminality”, as they considered Roma people “genetically predisposed to criminal activity”. The Guard was patrolling Roma-populating areas and organized rallies against Romani. The Guard has been another factor in Jobbik’s emergence and growing success (Kim D. S., 2016, p. 347).

Herewith, party organization and its strength increased during 2008 and 2009. In the meanwhile, Jobbik had more than 3000 members. Ultimately, the 2009 European parliament elections became a landmark and a bottom-up point for the party. Jobbik received 14.77% of the votes (427,000) and three seats in the European parliament. Moreover, in the 2010 parliamentary elections, the party obtained 47 seats with 16.7 percent of the votes. Jobbik became the third most powerful party in the parliament. Jobbik also represented the party image better in the media and throughout election campaigns than its predecessor MIEP. Its presence in social media and billboard campaigns was also conspicuous. Furthermore, their rhetoric was aligned with Fidesz's “national renewal” claims. (Pytlas, 2016, p. 37).

2.2. Jobbik’s ideology and symbolism

“Jobbik is not a [phenomenon] representing the continuity of Nazism in Hungary, but an entirely new phenomenon. Jobbik is different from other far-right parties in Western Europe” (Kim D. S., 2016, p. 345). The inter-war period for pro-Nazi populist movements was the terminus a quo of their popularity. In the 1950s, their point of departure became taxation, and eventually, in the 1980s, anti-immigration narratives became the lever for political manipulations. Radical right parties were adroitly using all the alterations of the political landscape to seize power throughout Europe. The 2006-2009 financial crisis became even more fruitful for these Euroskeptic parties (Kim D. S., 2016, p. 345). In Central and Eastern Europe, these parties emerged right after the demise of communism. Hungary adopted effective lustration and restitution laws following the dissolution of the USSR. Since 1998 the Hungarian party system has been one of the most institutionalized with a “bipolar configuration and the two principal poles – the conservative and the socialist” till the 2000s. Since the downfall of the MSZP entailed by the 2006 Ószöd speech leakage, delivered by the Hungarian prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, Fidesz has been maintaining its power as a sole pole (Pirro, Pavan, & Gazsi, 2019, p. 22). Thus, the expectations that after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the country would become a consolidated democracy were soon dispelled. Freedom House has assessed Hungary as a “transitional or a hybrid regime” (House, 2021). In this transitional context, Jobbik is not merely “a protest phenomenon, expression of social disenchantment with the transitional economy”. Its transformation from the movement organization to the parliamentary party was a nationalistic phenomenon. Mythic Turanism, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma campaigns, and “paternalistic economic systems” have been combinations used by Jobbik in its early campaigns (Kim D. , 2016, pp. 345–357) The first words of Jobbik’s 2010 manifesto “Radical Change” included: “There is an alternative. Hungary, and the Hungarian nation, is not only possessed of a part, but a future also. The time has come”. The

nationalism that is fundamental for Jobbik roots back to mythical Turanism and several historical and mythical doctrines such as St Stephen's Crown (Pytlas, 2016, p. 38). Albeit, this unengaging combination in their campaigns of ethnonationalism, historical references, and fragile political narrative have become one of the motives for its moderation. The power of its symbolism was enough to gain initial success; however, Jobbik had to be brisk in its responses to the changing political situation with a concrete electoral plan.

Miroslav Mares and Vratislav Havlík (2016) named five primary factors that stipulated Jobbik's success. Among them are "the tradition of ethnonationalism", extremism, different societal or ideological cleavages/fragmentation, and several peculiarities such as the methods used during the negotiations and the electoral geography of Hungary (Mares, 2016, pp. 323-333). Apart from ethnonationalism, religion has also played a central role in the party upheaval since its foundation. Jobbik identifies itself as a Christian party. Interestingly, the Catholic church distanced itself from Jobbik as the church explicitly supports Fidesz (Nagy & Rona, 2013).

The scandal surrounding the socialist party in 2006 assisted Jobbik in gaining momentum. Ferenc Gyurcsány, the former prime minister, claimed that "continuous lying had been necessary by MSZP to secure re-election". The following riots and unrest gave impulse to the extreme right. "Magyar Gárda, Nemzeti Orsereg, Betyarsereg and Vedero" were established at the period. Even in the 2020 and 2022 parliamentary elections, the MSZP collapsed, and the share of its voters fell dramatically. People became more open to radical ideas and changes (Bartlett, Birdwell, & et.al., 2012, pp. 23-24). Jobbik sporadically influenced Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) afterward. MSZP became more prone to populist messages to its electorate to contend with Jobbik. Jobbik also affected LMP. The Greens (LMP) seemed to enjoy cooperation with Jobbik rather than MSZP. LMP also opposed globalization and criticized the ruling elite as Jobbik (Bíró-nagy & Boros, 2015, pp. 249-251).

Jobbik, along with many other radical parties, claims that the castigation of the political elite since 1990 would be a just decision. The party disregards the tense situations and conflicts in the media and attests that it is all fabricated. In 2010 "politician crime" and anti-establishment sentiments were not only part of the political manifesto but also at the center of the election campaign. As specified by Jobbik, the ruling party solely serves its own needs. They have neglected all the external players. In line with their claims, globalization rules dictated by these alien actors are also used by the ruling elite (Nagy & Rona, 2013).

Conversely, the resemblance between Jobbik and Fidesz was due to Jobbik's initial attempts to employ the ruling party's visions. The trend was later reversed. However, this has contributed considerably to Jobbik's popularity. To give an instance, one of the most noticeable is homophobia. Fidesz has amended the "Anti-Paedophilia Act", which bans the "promotion of homosexuality" under the age of 18 near schools or churches. According to the EU, it is a violation of human rights (Euractiv, 2021). In 2007 Budapest's Pride march was opposed by Jobbik. According to Jobbik, the Pride march was against Christian, thus Hungarian values. Jobbik has attempted to support much stricter anti-LGBTQ laws than it is in Russia. They even demanded 8 years of a sentence for those who would spread homosexuality, "disorder of sexual behavior" (Sheet, 2015).

2.3. Voter composition and peculiarities

"In 2007, the Hungarian far-right was considered to be the weakest in Europe". This trend has been reversed since 2009 when Jobbik managed to become the most successful far-right party in the country and the region. "Jobbik's dynamic growth" significantly affected the Hungarian political landscape (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, pp. 66-67). During 2009-2010 the northeastern part of the country was the stronghold of Jobbik. This region is among the less developed and with the worst standard of living in Hungary. The majority of the population is Roma; that implies that rampant unemployment is the other serious problem here. However, Jobbik's supporters are not merely "poor, unemployed, undereducated people", but the party has managed to appeal to the larger masses. Jobbik's voters are usually younger than the average voters nationwide. Herewith, Táarki Social Research Institute (2011) conducted the survey and concluded that Jobbik's voters are not less educated than any of the other party's voters and even exceed the index of the average population (Bartlett, Birdwell, & et.al., 2012, pp. 21-23). One of the main pillars of Jobbik's popularity has always been youth mobilization and activism. During the moderation politics, Jobbik tried to use young people again. Jobbik used social problems, pressure, and "disillusionment of young people" to good advantage, and young activists became pillars for this far-right party. Since 2014, the mobilization of young voters has once again become a priority. In 2016 there was a survey conducted regarding the attitudes toward Jobbik in which 53 percent of Hungarians between 18 and 35 ages assessed Jobbik positively and declared that they would vote for the party (Kenes, 2020). Indeed, Jobbik supporters are not from lower strata. On the contrary, generally, they constitute high-skilled workers, educated with "better-living circumstances than the national average". However, among them are more people who would flee the country. Thus, their support for Jobbik is determined by the fear of losing their status and positions in society (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, pp. 82-83).

Another lever of the party is Christianity. Even though the party actively uses Christian populist rhetoric for appealing to the larger masses, the major part of its supporters are atheists. The share of atheists is higher than in any other party's supporters. As for the gender gap, 66 percent of the party's supporters were males. (Bartlett, Birdwell, & et.al., 2012, p. 23). Jobbik is an anti-liberal party. The overwhelming majority of Jobbik's supporters found "Chinese, African, Roma, or Jewish" neighbors unacceptable. The two most hated groups are Roma and Jews (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, p. 84).

Before moderation, the prime supporters were also from smaller cities. Moreover, the electorate that pushed the party to a roaring success were "predominantly either former Fidesz voters or politically inactive (undecided voters and non-voters, including first voters)." Thus, for the most committed supporters, the main incentive to support the party was ideological or cultural factors rather than economic interests (Bartlett, Birdwell, & et.al., 2012, p. 23). Due to these factors, the party became "sensitive" toward Fidesz's moves. Fidesz's appropriation of Jobbik's manifesto pledges became one of the primary causes of the party's downfall. The other facet of society used by Jobbik was "general

disillusionment.” In the transition process of the post-Soviet states, this is a typical phenomenon, and Jobbik adroitly used it. After the fall of Communism, the most successful parties that emerged were MSZP and Fidesz. They shaped the most of Hungarian political landscape and impelled radical ideas against “harsh anti-communist, anti-globalization, nationalist, and law and order rhetoric”. This phenomenon was first analyzed by the Political Capital Institute availing European Social Survey data (Bartlett, Birdwell, & et.al., 2012, pp. 24-25).

After moderation, in the 2022 parliamentary elections, Jobbik lost the core of the party’s electorate. Based on official data, opposition parties have lost 900,000 supporters since 2018. Jobbik’s electorate has scattered in several directions: They probably voted either for Fidesz or did not partake in elections. Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland Movement), Jobbik’s breakaway group, was the strongest in the districts where Jobbik was the leader during the previous elections (Vass, 2022). Thus, more radical supporters fell for the Our Homeland Movement. Only a negligible proportion of the Jobbik supporters voted for the united opposition alliance (Vass, 2022).

Left-Wing Economic Policy. This riveting leftist economic policy (typical for numerous right-wing parties in Eastern Europe) additionally stimulated Jobbik's electoral breakthrough. “Widespread popular disappointment” following the social and economic crisis in 2008-2009 (or before the "losers of transition" phenomenon) created a demand for the leftist policies (Nagy, Boros, & Varga, 2011). According to the party, they support “an active, intervening state that protects the society” in the context of globalization. The states should consider all the “harmful effects” of globalization. The progressive tax system, emphasizing the problem of unemployment and the poor people, were also beckoning to party voters. Moreover, the 2010 manifesto included references to the importance of sustainability and “social sensitivity”. “Eco-social economy” can label Jobbik to be a green leftist party. Jobbik accords to state ownership in many realms; however, the party also admits state interventionism to be essential as the state is the principal creator of jobs (Nagy & Rona, 2013).

2.4. Fidesz and a six-party opposition coalition

Jobbik occasionally enjoys the status of the second most influential party after Fidesz. Fidesz-Jobbik contestation and interaction have framed the political landscape for years. Hence, relations with Fidesz need to be delved into in detail. Initially, the transitional context of these relations will be clarified.

Since the breakup of the USSR, Hungary appeared to be a consolidated democracy. Over the years, the ruling party managed institutions and the Hungarian legal system to have modified to fit Fidesz's necessities and become more "flexible". The Constitution of 2011, which aimed to break ties with the Soviet past, was followed by another nine amendments and attempts to create “populist regimes constitutional identity”. Allowing the legal system to employ references to the historical constitution implies that the Basic Law of Hungary is broader than the fundamental law. The abovementioned amendments leave space for interpretations. This constitutional populism created fertile ground for

other radical-right narratives (Gárdos-Orosz, 2021, pp. 25-26). Moreover, two-thirds of the majority in parliament for modification of laws raises several questions about compatibility with the democratic standards. In terms of elections, the plurality of votes is usually transformed into two-thirds of the seats; This is a chance for the ruling party to modify a constitution in accordance with its needs. Thus, the supermajority has undermined the strength and level of democracy through legal means. Hence, these favorable circumstances lend a hand to populist parties such as Jobbik. However, as Hungarian institutions function and leave the chance to alter authority by democratic means through by-elections, the rationale for the ruling party's success could be impelled by different factors. Firstly, demand-side factors and population attitudes toward previously fragmented opposition might be core factors of this trend.

The reasons that elucidate the rise of the radical right are numerous; however, the Hungarian case is specific. The historical context, so-called "the modernization losers thesis" (by Hans-Georg Betz) to withstand the trade-offs of modernization, and traumatic experiences after the Treaty of Trianon were the initial impetus for populist rhetoric. Not even any recent changes in politics can thoroughly explain the trend; The specific traits in contemporary politics should be taken into account. Modern Hungarian radical right mostly settles on nativism, populism, and ultranationalism.

The radical right is still mainstream, and a cluster of parties usually gain ground with "extreme" campaigns and become influential players in Hungary. For example, Jobbik has become one of the authoritative PRR parties in the region and garnered support with anti-Roma and anti-immigration campaigns. Even though Jobbik moderated its politics, it does not reflect changes in the values and demand-side factors; Herewith, supply-side factors such as party organization, electoral mobilization, and media narrative affect voter turnout and electoral success. Herewith, the previously mentioned new electoral law since 2010 disproportionately plays into the most powerful party's hands. Usually, the PRR parties moderate their politics after reaching the mainstream and mobilizing the electorate with radical statements. But Hungarian case is an exception.

Fidesz, the Alliance of Young Democrats, was a liberal party after the collapse of the USSR. Modern Fidesz has claimed to be "building an illiberal state" and supremacy of national interests to be core for the state. When comparing the West and the East, Orban emphasizes the achievements of the other illiberal states (Tóth, 2014). Many scholars interpret this 2014 speech as a reversal in the political course. Viktor Orban contemplates that there are huge gaps between people's requirements/ideas and what is offered by mainstream parties (Tóth, 2014). Consequently, Fidesz has adopted these illiberal practices from other populist parties and created his own media empire or national consultation bodies. In light of this, the state has become more dependent on one party's political will. For a decade, the fragmentation of the opposition has been one of the reasons for the ruling party's success. Viktor Orban always tries opposition parties to stay fragmented. On the grounds, Jobbik had to adapt and moderate its politics due to the dominance of the Fidesz and conducting similar policies. In another case, the party would diminish electoral support. The result still was genuinely unfavorable for Jobbik. The party has lost wide support acquired during its early anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, anti-

establishment campaigns. Despite this, unanimous opposition still proved incapable of beating Orban in the 2022 by-elections (Simon K. , 2016).

A recent opposition candidate Marky-Zay Peter, had a chance to prevail over the prime minister. The 2022 national assembly election was also the first occasion when Orban had to contest with a united front of the opposition. Klára Dobrev, the eventual candidate against Marky-Zay, also vowed to support Marky-Zay (Thomson, 2021). The united opposition includes six parties of liberals and socialists, including conservative Jobbik. Mr. Marky-Zay, once sharing Orban's ideas, was without any party affiliation, thus without unwavering backing. However, an increased power during the pandemic has become an additional lever for Fidesz to control political actors or media. This way, the prime minister has become even more intrepid despite the final unification of the opposition forces (Tanács, 2021).

The recent 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections with referendum have proved that Fidesz has no alternative in the country. The import of cheap energy products and economic policy of Fidesz still have been decisive in the recent elections. Even Opposition unanimity, the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and campaigns depicting Orban as "Putin's closest ally in Europe" were not sufficient for the defeat. Fidesz's victory by a landslide was "crushing" for the opposition (Pawlak & Than, 2022). That also implies that "three-quarters of Hungary's parliament could be occupied by far-right politicians" (Hutt, 2022). This election is notable for Jobbik for a variety of reasons. After moderation, Jobbik mainly wooed Fidesz's conservative supporters. The purpose of cooperation with five other leftists and socialist parties was the victory in the elections. The alliance gained 56 seats, fewer than in 2019 when they participated separately. Jobbik has only ten seats, while Our Homeland Movement, which emerged on the basis of Jobbik's restructuring, has six. Thus, conservative supporters in the elections abandoned the party for Fidesz and more radical supporters for our Homeland party (Hutt, 2022). The 2022 election has demonstrated several inclinations. Fidesz's campaign was upended since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Fidesz enlisted the support of its electorate with extreme statements against Ukraine and accused the opposition parties of the rhetoric that "could lead the country into war" (Pawlak & Than, 2022). Viktor Orban even called Zelensky and Brussels "opponents". That demonstrates new and more radical parliament, where among others, Jobbik might need to find its new and more radical niche (Rimi, 2022). Thus, one can presume that a more extreme Fidesz implies a more radical parliament, and there would be no prospect for Jobbik to deradicalize even more.

However, on the other hand, Jobbik's radicalization might not be a potential option for the party. Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland Movement), the successful anti-vaccine party, has beaten Jobbik and entered the parliament with 5 percent. Thus, it "occupied" the space of Jobbik's older image. Furthermore, Jobbik needs to make up a choice for the United for Hungary alliance. Apparently, Jobbik's presence with leftist and conservative parties in the opposition alliance has diminished its popularity (Dougall & Palfi, 2022).

2.5. International relations with “illiberal states” and “Western Opening”

International Trends

While the building of “the illiberal state” (Tóth, 2014) is progressing, inter alia, Orbán’s pragmatic attitudes to balance and use gains from the Western and Eastern countries - Russia and China, Jobbik seeks to find its niche in the context. Jobbik strives to be acknowledged as a European party that is always open to cooperation with the West. The party failed in an attempt to stabilize relations with other far-right parties in France or Austria, while Fidesz is actively cooperating with these parties. Jobbik also cannot establish relations with the West due to ideological incompatibility. However, changes such as the party’s wage union initiative aim to legitimize its moderation strategy and develop closer ties with the West (Juhasz, et al., 2017, p. 49).

Jobbik, the Visegrad Group and the EU

Viktor Orbán adroitly uses Visegrad cooperation to become more influential in the EU. That explains his increasing interest in Visegrad cooperation. His closest ally in the region is the Polish ruling party Law and Justice (PiS). They largely back up and support each other’s illiberal statements. However, the relations have deteriorated. Donald Tusk - a Polish opposition figure and the former president of the European Council claimed that their cooperation should be separated over the core national interests in the EU. At first, it only resulted in a temporary crisis between the two parties (Juhasz, et al., 2017, pp. 49-50). Recently, a renewed conflict arose between the countries. Poland declared to freeze relations with Hungary over the Ukrainian issue. The prime minister of Hungary considers that Hungary should stay neutral in the conflict; However, his violation of international sanctions is now opposed in the region (News, 2022). Orbán was even forced to cancel the meeting with defense ministers of the Visegrad Four after Czech Republic and Poland pulled out due to the country’s position over Ukraine (Simon Z. , 2022). Furthermore, Hungarian-Polish and “Slovakia’s social democratic governing” parties often have incompatible stances in many settings, and the fact that they have reached mainstream becomes “encouraging” for other far-right parties. For instance, Czech Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant party leader Tomio Okamura named Viktor Orbán as a role model others need to follow (Juhasz, et al., 2017, pp. 49-50).

Jobbik employs various orientations to adhere to this cooperation. Moreover, as Fidesz’s campaigns and rhetoric affect the party, Jobbik often holds similar attitudes regarding external actors. If given a chance, Jobbik claims to expand and institutionalize the cooperation. In 2017 during the Hungarian presidency of the Union, Jobbik proposed expanding and inviting new members. According to the party, enhancing the organization to 11 members would deter emigration. Gabor Vona also had the initiative of establishing the Visegrad Parliamentary Assembly and negotiations regarding the implementation of the wage union (Juhasz, et al., 2017, p. 51).

With regard to the EU, the party was anti-immigration, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic. In 2012 there was an incident when they burnt the EU flag, demanding Hungary to have left the Union. However, after changing the political climate and

grasping the threat of this less attractive manner and the possibility that Fidesz could have “swallowed” the party, Jobbik switched the rhetoric. According to their new “Western Opening”, they support the wage union reform and introduction of the Euro. This way, Jobbik seeks to get noticed and legitimized by Europe (Juhász, et al., 2017, p. 52). In 2016 members of Jobbik officially declared that leaving the EU was not on the official agenda anymore. Gabor Vona’s Facebook post indicated the *following*: “*The EU will change over the next five to 10 years, and for the first time, it may be for the better*”. He stipulated his argument about the migration crisis and explained that this would give a chance to other populist leaders to transform the EU (Politico, 2016).

As “Franco-German Tandem” plays a pivotal role in EU politics, assessing the attitude of Jobbik in this regard is essential. The German-Hungarian Forum was not held in 2017; The forum has been a crucial platform for coordinating the relations between the countries for 27 years. Angela Merkel was seen as a proponent of “Islamic destruction” by the Hungarian government. Thus, the relations between Germany and Hungary were not in their best shape. Migration and the compulsory quota system have been the major issues of the Hungarian government’s dissatisfaction. As a result, Merkel also toughened her rhetoric against the Fidesz government in that period. Jobbik assuredly opposes Germany and supports the far-right in this regard. Jobbik is closer to the Radical National Front (FN). Jobbik even attempted to use the negotiations of the French president with the V4 states to support its campaign regarding wage unions; The members were manipulating that Macron had claimed that he could not tolerate differences in wages. (Juhász, et al., 2017, pp. 52-55).

Relations with “illiberal states”

As Viktor Orbán strives to deepen relations with Russia and China, Jobbik also supports the pro-Russian stance. They could not eliminate the pro-Kremlin rhetoric. The increasing dependency of Hungary on Russian energy has been the core factor of this. Since 2010 Viktor Orbán has rhetorically attempted to support “illiberal states”. The Hungarian government has strengthened relations with Azerbaijan, Iran, and other illiberal states. Thus, Jobbik members cannot ignore this dependence on Russia, and they continue to support the pro-Russian agenda and often explain how they see the place of Hungary as a balancer of the West and the East. Jobbik utterly ignores Russia’s attempts to use Hungary against the West and the EU (Juhász, et al., 2017, pp. 57-59).

After the demise of the USSR, Russia was perceived as an adversary by a majority of the far-right parties. However, “the positive reinterpretation” of the enemy was noticed in East European radical parties. Due to material support from Russia, the country has become attractive to these parties (Krekó & Juhász, 2017, pp. 169-170). Jobbik is also inculcated for the alleged ties with Russia and Iran. Some experts believe, that Russia and Iran were among the contributors and financiers of the party. They consider Jobbik, the initial movement that initiated as a student and young people’s movement could not gain that much influence without significant financial and political support. (Hungarianspectrum.org, 2012).

2.6 . Incentives for moderation

Jobbik started to “moderate” in 2013; Members and leaders of the party depicted Jobbik as a “people’s party”; the deradicalization strategy was a natural response to the country’s shift towards the far-right. The “Eastern opening” policy of Fidesz and idealizing the achievements of “illiberal states” or praising the role of modern countries such as Russia or Turkey was part of Jobbik’s rhetoric before. Jobbik still maintains some characteristics of a far-right party without explicit attitudes toward democratic institutions. Jobbik members also claim to limit the less educated voter from voting (Juhasz, et al., 2017, pp. 7-8). Thus, the tactic of Fidesz of adopting the electoral pledges of Jobbik compelled the party to deradicalize. The party enacted the manifesto pledges of Jobbik. Nativism, an axis for Jobbik, was also adopted by Fidesz. Time since the onset of the migration crisis, the Fidesz rhetoric became conspicuously rigorous. In 2015 the government decided to shut the border with Serbia and Croatia, and the construction of fences commenced. Orban “defending” Christian values and sovereignty was cheered by other leaders. Among them was Robert Fico- the former prime minister of Slovakia. For Jobbik, it took much more time to mobilize and guard “Europe’s Christian pillars of identity and protect Hungarian and European women from rapacious Islamic invaders”; Between 2016 and 2017, the politicians affiliated with Jobbik called to suspend the entry of Muslim migrants into Hungary. Hence, during the period, Fidesz was brisker and more effective at mobilizing the voters through anti-migration rhetoric (Petsinis, 2020). Another issue that should be outlined here is anti-Semitism. One can perceive that one of the “achievements” of Fidesz was to transform the narrative from anti-Semitism to anti-Sorosism. That was an efficacious approach for Fidesz to mobilize supporters and gain influence not only inside the country but also outside the borders as an “a virulent defender of conservative and Christian values”(Petsinis, 2020).

As a consequence of moderation, as of 2016, the Constitutional Court of Hungary concluded that Jobbik could no longer be labeled as “far-right” or “extreme right”; The party sued the TV channel ATV for referring to Jobbik as far-right. During the period, the party was quite influential. After the 2014 parliamentary elections, it had acquired 20.54% of the votes (BBJ, 2016). Thus, a blatant, antisemitic, and anti-Roma party drastically changed its rhetoric. It is notable that in 2015 Jobbik politician well-known for antisemitism was discovered to be Jewish (Thorpe, 2015). However, from that day forward, Jobbik had a leader with Jewish roots and even named Ferenc Varga as the first Roma MP to join the parliament (Nolan, 2022).

Jobbik’s moderation has influenced other political figures, parties, or organizations

“The vacuum” exacerbated by the “repositioning” of Jobbik entailed “repackaging” of the ideology. The previous extremist allies of the party were critical of this shift and preferred to stand aside from the party while maintaining relations with extremist party members of Jobbik. This vacuum later brought about the activism of other extremist parties. Among them were, Identitesz- Army of Outlaws; MÖM- Hungarian Self-Defense

Movement. Herewith, manifold networks were established during the period. Fidesz also used these extremist actors to diminish the influence of Jobbik and discredit the party (Juhász, et al., 2017, p. 62). It is also important to underline that the fragmentation and moderation of politics have stimulated the emergence of more radical parties by their former members; New parties that emerged include Force and Determination and Our Homeland Movement. Losing its “rich nationalist symbolism, rituals” implied losing voters who were glued to the party for that reason. This powerful symbolism and radical messages were later adopted by Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland Movement) (Hyttinen, 2021, p. 1).

2.7. Implications and prospects

The new political frame of the “people’s party” is the protection of “Hungarian values and interests”; This shift first reemerged before the 2015 parliamentary elections. During the election campaign, Jobbik adopted a “new style of communication” and other softer elements (Kenes, 2020). The moderation of politics is also known as the “cuteness campaign”; The novel campaign started in the media, with new billboards and the release of propaganda messages; One of the slogans claimed, “us, Jobbik supporters.” The posters and commercials spread under this label usually depicted the youth and large families as an expression that Jobbik was willing to solve the problems of all the people despite their age and status. Jobbik became a “people’s party”; Indeed, these messages were the opposite of the 2009-2010 campaign’s motto, “20 years [in prison] for the last 20 years [in politics]” (Bíró-nagy & Boros, 2015, pp. 244-246). The party claims to be conservative rather than nationalistic; conversely, according to their manifesto, “the party’s political horizons are not defined by the current borders of Hungary but by the borders of the Hungarian nation.” They want to reestablish the pre-Trianon Treaty order and still appraise the dissolution of the Austria-Hungarian Empire as a loss for the Hungarian nation. They do not hold up coercive mechanisms but anticipate some cultural autonomy inside the EU framework. Despite the fact that Jobbik claims to be moderate, it still has extreme populist claims. Thus, it was not that straightforward to abandon all their previous ideas (Kenes, 2020).

As noted earlier, scores of Jobbik supporters were previous supporters of Fidesz. The growing popularity of Fidesz compelled Jobbik to moderate its politics to the center. As a result, Jobbik's campaigns with puppies and kittens caused dubiety whether these changes were long-term or not. In 2016 when the refugee crisis was still part of mainstream political debates, Gábor Vona, the leader of Jobbik, declared the moderation of politics when other extremist parties were emerging or were on the rise across Europe (Csaky, 2016). The fate of Jobbik and its prominence might not be as important as the influence this party might have on the public debate. Even though a coalition of six opposition parties jointly opposed Orbán, the fact is that Fidesz still determines and creates a political narrative. Jobbik lost a sheer amount of its supporters after the moderation strategy, which implies that its future is not predictable. Fidesz, its popularity and fueling the opposition to stay fragmented might affect the anti-establishment parties and can finally diminish their popularity (Csaky, 2016). Herewith, the moderation of

politics also caused the dismantling of the party and the expulsion of several members. Before the 2018 parliamentary elections, Gabor Vona promised that if moderation politics would not lead to political success and ultimate victory, he would resign. After Orbán's third successive executive term and the defeat of Jobbik in the elections, Vona left its mandate in the parliament and also quit the party presidency (Staff, 2018). The victory of Fidesz and its fourth consecutive term has radicalized the composition of parliament even more. Jobbik should identify itself in this novel political situation. However, the party might not have manifold options. As Our Homeland party has filled out the "extreme" gap left by Jobbik and wooed its supporters, radicalization might not be effective. The party also might consider leaving the opposition alliance as the elections proved that cooperation with "moderate" parties was not appealing to Jobbik's electorate. According to several elections data, "Jobbik's voters were the most likely to be missing from the opposition coalition's camp" (Capital, 2022).

Chapter 3. – Methodology

3.1. Methods

The thesis relies on primary data collected from four face-to-face and three published expert interviews. The respondents are senior members of Jobbik who have implemented the strategy alterations. The expert interview seeks to respond to the research questions of the thesis, scilicet, addressing the incentives for the transformation of Jobbik, its impact on the other opposition parties or the ruling party Fidesz, and implications at the regional level. To complement the obtained data, content analysis of the 2010 electoral manifesto "Radical Change" and two declarations of the party, released in 2003 and 2020, will be carried out. Given the affirmation that Jobbik has moderated its politics, the quantitative content analysis of the party declarations expects that the proportion of extreme-right elements and statements has pared down since its establishment in 2003 until the recent manifesto of 2020. Through the in-depth analysis of the 2010 manifesto, the study observes the electoral pledges of Jobbik and draws a parallel to the ruling party Fidesz. This way tries to approve that Fidesz has enacted pledges articulated by Jobbik.

3.2. Content analysis of manifestos

The simple conclusion that can be drawn from the literature review: Since 2013, Jobbik has moderated its rhetoric, and this repositioning provoked other parties to shift their strategies; However, the actual extent of moderation remains vague; The literature review is scanty on measuring the deradicalization and the degree of populist communication of the party.

A growing body of scholars discerns two diverse approaches to the study of populism - gradualist and normative; The normative approach provides only dichotomous answers and categorizes parties into populist or non-populist categories, whereas the gradualist approach seeks to determine the degree of populism. Scholars do not recommend any systemic method to measure the phenomenon comprehensively; Therefore, the gradualist approach would enrich the usage of the notion and its applicability (Balcerre, 2014, pp. 481-482). This thesis adopts a deductive approach to content analysis, which implies that it relies on existing codes and methods utilized by other authors.

Overview of the content analysis

The measurement is essential to elaborate on the meaning of moderation, ascertain and discuss the outcomes of this political shift, its implications in the internal political spectrum, or influence at the European level. Before measuring the phenomenon and assessing the degree of moderation, any suggestions or viewpoints might not be accurate.

Manifestos are the documents released by the party. Two types of manifestos can be allotted. The first type is offered by parties ahead of the elections and is written in the

period of “hegemonic calm, political normalcy”. The second type is a “broader, long-lasting, more radical and disruptive” manifesto. From history, we can reference one of the most prominent ones: The Communist Manifesto of 1948 and “the Futurist Manifesto”; They both became “widely-consulted” influential political documents (Knott & Eklundh, 2020, pp. 107-108). Herewith, “only the largest parties tend to have these long versions” of manifestos, while smaller parties “due to the lack of capacity or ability” offer shorter programs. That makes the analysis more facile (Balcere, 2014, pp. 481-482).

Jobbik often releases party programs. The party possesses “more than three thousand proposals after 2010” (Böcskei & Molnár, 2019, pp. 6-7). The chapter overviews the 2010 electoral manifesto "Radical Change" and two declarations. The 2003 and 2020 documents are released by senior members of the party (News D. , 2020). These documents have been selected and are in accordance with the assigned codes. Herewith, the relatively smaller size of the texts will ensure comparability. The goal of the content analysis is to detect the degree of ideological moderation through quantitative analysis and policy areas adopted by the ruling party. These documents have been embraced due to their analytical values as primary sources.

Limitations

While the selected research method has its advantages, a number of limitations should be pointed out. According to Elias Dinas and Kostas Gemenis (2009), party manifestos are one of the most reliable sources to measure their ideological position. However, party manifestos are not always conformant to their declared ideological stances. “Distribution of the ideological spectrum within a given political context” differs. That can be particularly applicable to the extreme right parties. The second vital factor to contemplate while using manifestos as sources is their prime incentive to influence their electorate and not draw up action plans. However, scholars agree that these limitations are not significant and cannot cast doubt on the validity and reliability of the research method (Dinas & Gemenis, 2009, pp. 1-23). Jessica Di Cocco and Bernardo Monechi (2021) have also outlined that “temporal and spatial measurements” are one of the challenges of studies on populism. They have tested the “Supervised Machine Learning” method to measure the degrees of populism. "Process of human annotation for the analysis of vast corpora” might be another limiting factor; however, the authors still embrace the textual analysis of populism as it enables the researcher to observe the ideas of the elite and measure the phenomenon (Cocco & Monechi, 2021).

The ambiguity of manifesto texts

Certain pitfalls must be avoided while analyzing documents through populist lenses and concepts. Not repeating the conceptual debates regarding the vagueness and the essence of populism and its definitions, during dissecting textual data, additional risks

might emerge. For example, references to the expression “we” might be an indication of people-centrism- “we, the people “ or the party itself “we”, as a party (Balcere, 2014, p. 482).

The concept of people is also problematic. The people can be referred to as citizens or as the country. The attributes that distinguish the people from the populist understanding of the concept include a positive valorization of people and always putting them in the best light. These are the common denominators. People are a homogenous, pure unity; Purification of the homogenous group from "alien" sub-groups is one of the aims of the populist parties. References to the sub-groups such as minorities, migrants, or other fragmented groupings are not typical for populism. Occasionally populist leaders deliberately highlight negative strands of the issues to depict their parties as a savior. They often highlight the problems of political, social cleavages, and functioning of democratic institutions, but that does not necessarily mean they are against democracy (Brigham, 2017). Populists repeatedly highlight the negative contexts and effects of society dichotomy and division between two antagonistic groups. The elite is seen as an oppressor despite their place in the government, media, and administrative or non-administrative entities. Moreover, the vicinity of the concepts of people-centrism and anti-elitism is also problematic. Certain statements that are people-centered due to the lack of critics of the elite, are not considered populist (Balcere, 2014, p. 482). Furthermore, incipient statements can be assigned to more than one category; In this case, the researcher has to consider all these variations and code them properly in a sole category. Considering above-discussed discrepancies regarding the notion of populism, several indicators have been selected for content analysis to address these limitations. The “people” is a central notion for populists. As discussed, several determinants distinguish the actual citizens and people and their “general will” from the populist understanding. “Homogenous unity” is always referred to positively, “oppressed” by other groups; However, these limitations and obscurities highlight the advantages of manual qualitative analysis of textual data over the electronic. The researcher can envisage the contexts of the statements and determine the actual essence of the quasi-sentences.

Categories

The first chapter has provided a clear conceptual framework for the research, including the attributes of the party family. Herewith, the study elaborates on the concept of populism offered by Cas Mudde as the most thorough and reliable; Hence, categories for the content analysis of manifestos are derived from his definition of populism and the populist radical right party family, complemented by other authors. The coding categories and the structuring of the graph are inspired by the “Team Populism”(think tank) research guidelines and studies conducted. They provide a thorough analysis of the manual coding of populist paragraphs in research (Brigham, 2017). Renowned researchers from Europe and the Americas employ different methodological tools to examine populism. Herewith, analysis of party manifestos enables to make comparisons and emphasizes alterations of the party (Werner & Volkens, 2010, p. 8). As grouping several categories in a domain is feasible, four distinct domains are

selected; The remaining minor categories or indicators are assigned to the domain. Employing Mudde’s definition of populism and populist radical right party family, the following domains have been selected: people-centrism, anti-elitism, the general will, and ethnonationalism. Under the mentioned units of meaning, several other indicators can be combined. Qualitative coding and operationalization of each unit with respective examples are provided in the table below. Both documents are almost identical in size. Selected two declarations might not reflect the complete ideological profile of the party, albeit, the two are summarized and written by senior members of Jobbik and demonstrate the purpose and values of Jobbik.

Analysis of categories. Moderation: To what extent?

Three documents are selected to assess the deradicalization of the party. Two of them are published on the official website of Jobbik as the declaration of their principles and values utilized to launch their action plan. The first is entitled Manifesto, written in 2003. The second is the declaration of principles, released in 2020. The third electoral manifesto is analyzed separately. The parliamentary electoral manifesto "Radical Change" is utilized to analyze the adoption of Jobbik's pledges by the ruling party Fidesz.

The comparison of these particular documents and units of meaning will allow us to analyze the principles declared in respective documents. Moreover, contrasting several declarations of different periods allows a better understanding of how the party rhetoric has changed. Both generated new information through in-depth interviews, and data derived from the manifestos will be used for drawing conclusions.

How to quantify qualitative data?

The quantification of data casts doubts, *"suggesting that such an inversion sublimates the very qualities that make qualitative data distinctive: narrative layering and textual meaning But assessment in the university (and the policy implications that flow from it) demands that the data are presented within a scientific construct"* (Sight, 2010).

The major challenge here is to convert the text into numbers. Assigning codes and then "simple frequencies and relationships between variables can be calculated either manually, or by using qualitative software, such as EZ Text" (Sight, 2010).

Ideological Factor	Index	Meaning/Operationalization /Populist interpretation	1 st manifesto-Populist-Phrases (2003)	2 nd manifesto-populist phrases -June 30, 2020
“Pure people” “Anti-elitism”	The concept of the people VS. the “corrupt” elite	Society dichotomy-references to the society as divided, existence of two antagonistic groups. Demonizing political elites, “culprit” for “exploitation” of the “people”-a homogenous unity. -Herewith, appeals to the populist leaders that they understand better all	Condemning “light years of gap between the living standards of the rich and the poor!”. “The interest of bankers and the elite class” to “abuse people with low living standards”	Emphasizing “merit-based Hungary where honest people have nothing to fear” and inculcating the elite for “nepotism, and servility to the governing party” to be a sole means for the “social advancement”

		the existing grievances rather than “the corrupt elite”		
General will	Popular Sovereignty	Requisition of the greater power of people; usually calls for their direct participation in the political processes. -People as sovereigns, authentic representation	Calls to join efforts and direct participation in politics “to create a more liveable Hungary”	The party assertion that people are aware of their deficiencies and “how they should organize their lives therefore, there is no need for any ideology, political party, state or leader to control citizens and social groups.”
Ethnonationalism/ Nativism/ National Populism Nativist Populism	Patriotism and nationalism -	Ethnic nationalism- one ethnicity is considered superior, and others are blamed for any drawbacks. -As nationalism/ethnonationalism is a complex concept (discussed in Chapter 1. Hence, its several dimensions are combined. In this category, “superior values” of the ethnicity in terms of religion (Christian populism), traditional family values, and glorification of the past are also considered	-Condemning “pseudo-debates” that “sweeps under the carpet or veils” the actual demographic problems but emphasizes “the situation of the Gypsy community” thus, the sellout of national assets” -“ In the age of globalism and consumerism, there is an increasingly pressing need to truly form a common nation with the Hungarian communities living in the territories torn away from us so that we could connect with them more closely and demonstrate the vitalizing force of national togetherness to the upcoming generations.”	Giving hope to “the Hungarian communities living within and beyond our borders” for the auspicious future

Please note that not all the statements/sentences are provided in this table. Due to its length and uselessness, all the sentences here are selected by the author. For the full version please, review the official website of the party.

	Number of quasi-sentences	“Pure people” “Anti-elitism”	General will/ Popular Sovereignty	Ethnonationalism/ Nativism	Total proportion of populist/radical right statements
Manifesto - 2003	22	19	2	7	56
The recent Manifesto	43	3	4	1	15.6

Analysis. Categories in both declarations. Similarities

In both declarations, the apparent demarcation of the two antagonistic groups is at the center of attention. The people VS. the “corrupt” elite is the most adroitly used proposition by the party; Firstly, “injustice” caused by the incomplete transition from the Communist regime to democracy, which according to the party, “cannot yet be considered as a real democracy” denotes “pure citizens” vulnerable to the elite. Secondly, stressing the social cleavages and transition period, the party emphasizes the significance of denigration of the ruling elite. Thus, the prominence of cultural and social cleavages, among them, the post-Communism VS. anti-Communism cleavage, is an obtrusive problem for the party. Here, Jobbik’s 2003 declaration depicts the new regime as an exploiter that uses new external factors such as “globalism that subdues the entire world” as a tool to maintain power; “Post-Communist” leftist parties are considered to be serving the interests “of bankers and the elite class”. The core objective and goal of the party is

the removal of “the successors of the Communist Party and the extremist liberals”. “Unfulfilled promises”, lies and corruption are other “tools” how “the elite” exploits “the people”. In the second document, “political kingpins, oligarchs or multinational corporations” are still depicted as a threat; Thus, appealing to people as a homogenous unity and Post-Communism and anti-Communism populist dichotomy that also encourages anti-elitism is typical for the party (Jobbbik, 2020).

Another attribute of populism is- General will. In both documents, one encounters elements of presumed social inequality. The 2003 document underlines that people are different and unequal in almost all aspects, and “the imperfection of all worldly, human creations” is evident. The party strives to build up a society more evolved and “just”; For the development of this kind of society, the party considers “credible political will” and direct participation of people to be of vital importance; Private businesses and “Unfair” unions are considered to be “exploiters” that increase the gap between “the rich and the poor” (Jobbbik, 2003).

In the earlier sections, the radical-right party family was defined through Mudde’s maximum denominators; Having overviewed the elements of populism, the pillar of the radical right party family should also be outlined; This indicator is nativism (Jobbbik, 2020).

Patriotic and nationalistic credentials are pillars of the party. In the 2020 declaration, Jobbbik identifies itself as a “patriotic, Christian, conservative, center-right, socially sensitive people's party.” In the first document, hostile attitudes toward minorities are perceptible; “The Gypsy community, the sellout of national assets” is cemented in the charter. Assuredly, anti-Roma campaigns played a remarkable role in increasing the success of Jobbbik. “Gypsy crime” bolstered by the party can be perceived as a pillar of its early success. Religion, namely, Christianity, encompasses a significant part of the manifesto. Christianity is even equated to the national identity (Jobbbik, 2003).

The signs of nativism and neglecting the post-Trianon treaty order are evident in the following statement: “need to form a common nation with the Hungarian communities living in the territories torn away from us” (Jobbbik, 2020). However, if we compare the two manifestos, the second is softer in respect of the declared nativist aspirations. The declaration only exhorts for equal rights “for all members of the Hungarian nation”, while the emphasis on the national minorities or other “external” players is played down. Furthermore, The party accents the protection of the environment and dedicates the whole paragraph to "protecting the environment", and this way mobilizes the green supporters.

Changes. New categories have emerged; While in the first manifesto, any external alliances are mostly perceived as a menace and are condemned, in the second declaration, the calls for closer linkages with Europe and different associations/organizations are conspicuous. Thus, an initial affirmation that Jobbbik has moderated its rhetoric has been proved in respect of the foreign policy. The softer attitudes with regard to education, and culture are also noticeable.

- **“Radical Change” 2010 parliamentary electoral manifesto**

Initially, I aimed at collating the parliamentary manifesto pledges of 2014 and 2018. Due to the recent reorganization of Jobbik's official web page, copious samples of their documents have been erased; Both from their and other web pages, English and Hungarian versions of manifestos are deleted. I have retrieved the 2010 electoral manifesto from “archive.org” which was the lone version of their parliamentary electoral pledges. As I could not have ensured comparability, I analyzed this manifesto in the chapter, and then for comparison, I have already discussed two other declarations. All of them are valuable documents released by the senior party members.

In the bargain, my intent is an exploration of the phenomenon through populist lenses. In this chapter, I aim at responding to the enquiries about how moderation affected other parties. After an in-depth analysis of the 2010 electoral manifesto pledges, I looked at Fidesz and its enactment of the same tactics or statements. I do not seek to observe Fidesz's narrative or manifesto pledges but rather inspect the party's actions and implementation of Jobbik's pledges. This data will later complement the expert interviews. Assuredly, it might not be impeccably accurate to ascertain that Fidesz adopted these tactics from Jobbik. However, from these specific examples, notable and explicit assumptions can be drawn. Primary data obtained from the experts will make these suggestions more reliable.

Hence, I have grouped the issues in the manifesto into three major categories; This way, I also tested how strong the assignment of the party was into the extreme right party family before Fidesz's maneuver. Drawing on the conceptual debates in chapter 1 of the thesis, I have selected three categories: The first category is authoritarianism, with radical religious attitudes and traditionalism. Followed by extreme nationalism, synonyms of ethnonationalism and welfare chauvinism, and ultimately economic populism.

During the analysis, I found Molnar Csaba’s (2020) work particularly riveting. He already grouped the policy areas of Jobbik’s manifesto based on their proportion in the 2014 Fidesz manifesto. He grouped pledges into 21 major topics and tested whether these topics were repeated in Fidesz's 2014 electoral manifesto. He compared the salience of the issues in these 21 policy areas (Molnár, 2020, pp. 523-525). However, as I have outlined aim here is not detection of similarities between pledges but rather to observe the implementation of policy issues.

	Statements in 2010 Manifesto	Fidesz Implementation
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<p>Authoritarianism</p>	<p>The idea that liberalism undermines national values (pg.9) “Global capitalism based on the free movement of multinational capital has broken down.” (pg.2)</p>	<p>“Illiberal Democracy” 2014 speech delivered by Victor Orban</p>
<p>Welfare Chauvinism/Ethnonationalism/Nativism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Nativism and emphasizing Hungarian minorities. “Legal assistance to Hungarian-populated territories in the Carpathian basin” (pg.24). ○ “The most pressing of these issues is undeniably the halting of gypsy crime” (pg.11). Stating that segregation of Roma people should be allowed in case it is required. ○ Ethics and religion at schools ○ Turanism, Revisionism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In 2015, Fidesz closed the country’ southern border to Serbia and Croatia. Erection of fences. Fidesz also Capitalizes on “Trianon Trauma” ○ 2010 - 2016 -The segregation index of the Hungarian school system has dramatically risen. May 2016: The European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Hungary (Commission, 2016). ○ Implemented ○ June 4 - Day of National Cohesion- declared by Fidesz in 2010 to commemorate the Treaty of Trianon
<p>Economic protectionism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ “We will reform the pensions’ system, and will review certain age allowances” (pg.4)“We will abolish compulsory private pensions and lead the pension’ system back towards a state arrangement, in which individual account-holding would nevertheless remain.” (pg.9) -Prioritizing domestic SMEs, businesses, and higher tax rates for foreign businesses. Calls for “decreasing the national debt burden”. Establishing the Hungarian banking system. (pg.3) State-Funded Schools ○ Taxing multinational corporations and external actors. ○ Russian issue; support to Russian projects such as the Paks nuclear plant (pg.7) and “yet the opportunities now presented by the strengthening countries of the East (China, India, Russia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Indonesia)” (pg. 3). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 2010- Fidesz abolishing the private pensions systems and nationalizing funds. By 2014, the completed process of nationalization of the early retirement accounts. Some of them even kept their private accounts’ system, so-called- “second pillars”, but decreased the amount of investment in them (Naczyk & Domoknos, 2015). Implementation of a centralized public work system. Herewith, early retirement schemes were reduced, revision of the categorization of disabled people. In 2014, more than half of the financial sector was nationalized. Nationalization of church schools in Hungary; Privatization of universities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Fidesz: - sectoral taxes. 4 sectors: energy, telecommunications banking, and retail (all of them were dominated by foreign actors). In 2012 – FX (foreign exchange) denominated loans were prohibited. ○ “Eastern Opening”; Loans from Russia, supporting Paks II power plant construction. Relations with “illiberal states”
<p>Constitutional Populism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ “We will constitutionally protect ancient national symbols that have been the victim of baseless attacks: the Holy Crown, our historic flags and the Turulbird emblem.” (Pg. 14) “It is a combination of the Hungarian constitutional spirit (the Holy Crown principle) and the constitutional statutes (cardinal laws) that together would provide true constitutional authority. Jobbik’s most important constitutional principles, are: the return of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown to its fitting and honourable position” (pg21-22) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Holy Crown - a state symbol since 2010. Fidesz attempts to create a new Constitutional Identity. <p>The preamble of the Hungarian Constitution 2011:</p> <p><i>“[w]e honour the achievements of our historical constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the nation. We do not recognise the suspension of our historical constitution due to foreign occupations.”</i></p> <p><i>“The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the achievements of our historic constitution”</i> (Constitute, 2022).</p>

The most salient topics detected in the 2010 manifesto have been anti-gypsism (Antizaganism), Ethno-nationalism, and reminiscence of various state symbols and myths. Jobbik proclaims “Hungarian populated territories beyond the border to be part of a unified protected Hungarian economic zone” (pg.1).

Both parties unquestionably affected each other, however, complete affirmation here can be misleading. Fidesz adopting Jobbik’s tactics was the momentum for Jobbik to moderate. Jobbik’s moderation also affected other parties, and even a new party Mi Hazank emerged, which surpassed the 5% threshold and entered the parliament with six seats; According to Hyttinen (2022), “Jobbik’s transformation led to the emptiness in the symbolic and ritual sphere” which was replenished by Mi Hazank (Hyttinen, 2022).

3.2. Semi-structured expert interviews

To assess the deradicalization of the party and analyze the actual strategic or ideological rationale for these drastic alterations, I have carried out expert interviews with party members. Due to the ongoing complex challenges in Hungarian politics and the changing nature of the phenomenon, the primary data derived from expert interviews would be of utmost importance.

Before contacting interviewees, I consulted with the Ethics Committee of the University of Glasgow. All the respective documents, (the Plain Language Statement, Ethics Form, Consent Form of the Participants, and Privacy Notice) were submitted to the Committee. The copies of the documents were later provided to the respondents before the interviews. The guidelines, purpose, and their role in the research were discussed before starting the interviews. The permission for the audio recordings was obtained. A semi-Formalized interview structure has been prioritized, and pre-detailed templates were prepared. The party members are not native speakers of English; thus, the questions were sent a week before the interview date. This would alleviate the language barrier during the interview process.

On the other hand, several other limitations should have been considered. I have consulted several guidelines before the research process. Below are listed the most relevant and useful ones. On the other hand, several other limitations should have been considered. I have consulted several guidelines before the research process. I will list down the most relevant and useful ones.

- Emanuele Toscano (2019), in her book, outlines all the discrepancies, ethical, conceptual, or methodological biases when researching the far-right. Close-range field access, certain subjective attitudes of the researcher or interviewees in relation to the topic, or personal prejudices might have affected the interview process or outcome. Contrasting values or presumed emotional dimensions of the relations are another challenges (Toscano, 2019, pp. 5-7). However, these

limitations will be well-assessed in advance, and the recommendations of the Glasgow Ethics Committee, have been considered.

- Koen Damhuis and Léonie de Jonge, in their analysis outline the analytical value of in-depth interviews in relation to the radical right-wing parties. The large sum of literature utilizes quantitative analysis for the far-right. However, in recent years qualitative methods have been prioritized. All the challenges that arise from in-depth interviews with the radical right actors are not properly addressed in the literature. The research includes tips for finding and persuading respondents, determining the site for the interviews, and rapport with them. Despite all limitations, the authors outline the superiority of qualitative research on the far right that enables many “respondents to express their views in their terms.” They claim that through the process the majority of their “interlocutors turned out to be (much) more ‘humane’ than their public image might predict” (Damhuis & Jonge, 2022, pp. 1-11) .
- Antonis A. Ellinas (2021) outlines that interviews are not a popular method to explore the far-right. Even though quite a few studies count on single-country or small-N studies, which would benefit from the analysis of interviews, the sum of such research is limited. This limitation predominantly concerns the parties of the 1980s and 1990s. The rise of the populist radical right in the last decade has determined the revision of the research. The methods and the urgency to research these parties more attentively. For in-depth analysis of various dimensions of the parties, face-to-face interviews will be conducted. According to the author, interview-based research has made a number of contributions to the literature (Ellinas, 2021).

Thus, researchers outline numerous methodological, ethical, and conceptual risks pertaining to the qualitative analysis of the far-right. However, the positive contributions face-to-face interaction can entail outweigh the risks and difficulties. One should envisage the growing attention to the qualitative research of the far-right. Herewith, all the potential risks are well addressed beforehand and alleviated through assistance from the thesis supervisors and advice from the Glasgow Ethics Committee.

According to many scholars, face-to-face interviews are laborious to obtain from the populist radical-right wing/ far-right party members. This perplexity was accompanied by the recent reorganization context, which entailed the resignation of both party president Peter Jakab, vice-president, and most of the party members who distanced themselves from Jobbik. Hence, I was unable to conduct as many interviews as planned initially.

Correspondingly, my personal interviews will be complemented by several other published interviews and official declarations issued by the party or declarations jointly promulgated with other opposition parties.

4. Findings

4.1. Jobbik manifestos and moderation of the party

After a comprehensive analysis of manifestos, several conclusions can be drawn. Reliant on content analysis, one can observe that the proportion of nativist statements has almost been halved. Jobbik, a pure nativist party, has moderated and become progressively centrist and gradually more “liberal.” Both manifestos are nearly identical in size; thus, this factor could not affect this variation. Nativist statements, namely, negative references to the Roma community or other minorities, are not illustrated in the recent manifesto; The moderation is also evident in relation to the foreign policy (moderate Euroscepticism); In soft Euroscepticism, I foremost refer to the latest calls to be more proximate to Europe. The entire paragraph in the recent declaration is dedicated to "Our place in Europe".

Cultural, educational, and moderation of ethnonationalism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Roma rhetoric also come on the scene. In the 2020 manifesto, the terms education and culture are more frequently referred to; However, reviving the Trianon Treaty order is still indirectly mentioned in the second manifesto. The party still outlines the importance of unifying "Hungarian communities living within and beyond our borders". As a result, a number of extreme nationalistic statements still can be observed, albeit, the party has significantly moderated its rhetoric. Populist pledges in the categories of poor people, elitism, and popular sovereigns are still evident. No profound changes can be detected, especially with regard to anti-elitist statements.

From this analysis, the conclusion might be that Jobbik, owing to its narrative, cannot be classified as an extreme/far-right party that condemns all forms of democracy and membership in European associations or other external organizations. The party is still a populist, but the proportion of extreme statements significantly fell off; Thus, for the time being, Jobbik is a populist center-right party. The moderation is related to changes in attitudes in its foreign policy, culture, and educational realms; An initial affirmation that Jobbik has moderated its rhetoric has been reaffirmed.

Analysis of the parliamentary electoral manifesto also demonstrated policy ideas and pledges of Jobbik adopted by Fidesz; These tactics indubitably affected Jobbik. Generally, liberal democracy is a context in which we discuss the far-right and their moderation. Following the analysis of the 2010 manifesto, one can notice that Jobbik shifted in the realms embraced by Fidesz. Namely, ethnic nationalism (except for the revisionist appeals), economic protectionism, authoritarianism, and constitutional populism. Hence, Jobbik stimulated or dictated large-scale reforms in the country. Among them are even constitutional amendments, economic reforms, notably privatization of pension systems, and the introduction of sectoral taxes. Hungarian government even declared June 4 as the Day of National Unity to commemorate the Trianon Treaty following the Jobbik 2010 revisionist manifesto, Radical Change, pledges. It would be

misleading to attest that without Jobbik, these changes would not occur; However, Jobbik "gave" Fidesz a valuable action plan which had already proved its effectiveness after the electoral breakthrough.

To complement the obtained data, the next chapter elaborates on the expert interview outcome.

4.2. Analysis of expert interviews and declarations

Referring back to the purpose of the study, the following categories, units of analysis, are distinguished comprising the incentives for moderation, internal and international dimensions. Scilicet, the typology of the first category is along these lines: respondents surmise that the party transformation was a positive and inevitable sequel of their ideological constructions, and others who elicit that the shift has been futile for Jobbik and played in favor of the ruling party.

The typologies in the second and third categories include respondents who connect the transformation to the demand-side factors in the country and vice versa, respondents, who believe that external factors have instigated the remolding of the party.

Incentives for transformation

Unfolding the real motives of the moderation would shed light on the ongoing debates about whether this is just a temporary restructuring or a drastic ideological turn.

In the interview with Ferenc Almássy, Peter Jakab, the former president of Jobbik, corroborates that the restructuring was a tactical shift in the context of the migration crisis when Fidesz capitalized on the issues previously advocated by Jobbik. He asseverates that these changes were dictated by Hungarians and their needs. He also claimed that this was "a herald of cooperation" between the opposition and Jobbik. ¹

Tamás Gergő Samu, a political scientist and a former member of parliament from 2010 to 2011 and a representative of the Békés County Assembly since 2014, in my interview also specified that this shift had been more tactical:

*"I didn't think there was much change in our mind. Everyone restrained themselves. we knew that was the only way we had a chance at a good result or victory. There were "extreme" manifestations at the local level. Society expected this from us, and we can only represent society if we get in government. This was the goal."*²

From my interview with Dr. Brenner Koloman, I can draw some interesting points regarding this debate. He is a Deputy Speaker of the Parliament since 2020 and a Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He served as a Deputy Leader of

¹ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

² Tamás Gergő Samu, Personal Communication. May 30. 2022

the Jobbik faction between 2018 and 2020. He claimed that he helped Jobbik as an expert in two areas: in foreign policy, especially regarding contacts with German-speaking countries, as well as in education. “I was allowed to work on Jobbik's educational programme, and my experience as a long-time vice-dean and as secretary of the Humanities and Social Sciences Commission of the Hungarian Rectors' Conference flowed into it. An intellectual circle was formed around the party, where I was even allowed to take over the coordination in the new legislature.”³

He mentioned that *“Jobbik’s progress into a people’s party dates back as early as 2013. This was the time when the policies typical of the radical far-right started to be pushed back into the background. In his State of the Nation speech, Gábor Vona laid down the foundations of the party’s eco-social policy. The symbolic and sometimes really extremist political acts were replaced by an appreciation for the social idea in the party’s line. Launched by Gábor Vona back in 2013, Jobbik’s progress into a people’s party has been completed by the autumn of 2019. The municipal elections clearly demonstrated that Jobbik was an indispensable factor in Hungary’s political sphere, and it is fully dedicated to European values as well as the restoration of the rule of law. These are the core values that have allowed Jobbik and the leftist parties to cooperate efficiently and successfully ever since.”*⁴

Moreover, Peter Jakab was also enquired about how they were able to swap their narrative from “Neither Fidesz nor the left” and ended up cooperation with liberals and leftist parties. The former president of Jobbik reckons that in opposition to Mr. Orban unanimous opposition is vital. Jakab states that in the country, the elections take place; albeit, democratic institutions are not functioning by-right.⁵

Hungary is continuously in the limelight due to its Eastern Opening policies. The opposition accuses the ruling party of a mountain of problems. In the midst of the two-thirds majority principle, constitutional amendments, controlled media empire, judicial system concerns, privatization of universities, subordinating them to the private foundations usually with close ties to the ruling party, and corruption scandals. Herewith, one of the strictest measures is activated against Hungary by the European Commission. There is no mechanism to expel a member of the EU, yet, the rule of law mechanism was first activated against Poland in 2017 and then against Hungary in 2018. In 2020, Orban wanted to declare a state of emergency indefinitely and thus rule by decree; During the period, the Commission consulted triggering article 7. Correspondingly, the rule by decree was later not backed up by the Hungarian parliament.

Formerly a center-left and liberal party, Fidesz gravitates toward extremism. With its two-thirds of the majority, the party has an opportunity to mainstream extremism. It would be misleading to assert that Fidesz has radicalized its rhetoric due to Jobbik; however, we can firmly declare that Fidesz took advantage of Jobbik and implemented the party's ideas. After the famous 2014 speech of Victor Orban, the "building of illiberal democracy" required more rigorous rhetoric to vanish and undermine the opposition. The

³ (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

⁴ (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

⁵ Almásy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: “We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties”. Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

analysis of Jobbik's electoral 2010 manifesto offered in the methodology part of the thesis demonstrates that Fidesz implemented Jobbik's pledges and capitalized on authoritarianism, nativism, economic protectionism, and populism. Jobbik became popular with its blatant media campaigns. Its members have been intellectuals who proposed programs relevant to the post-transitional context and societal prejudices. Their communication style, Turanism, authoritarianist elements, and economic policies have always been effective. That is how the party relished the status of the second-largest party from time to time. The Russo-Ukrainian war and election campaigns have demonstrated that Fidesz has become more xenophobic and populist, with a more resilient anti-Western narrative. That is partly due to the remolding of Jobbik- the contender and former challenger of Fidesz, which has left more space for interpretations. With two-thirds of the majority, Fidesz has an opportunity to mainstream extremism. Thus, mainstreaming Jobbik pushed Fidesz to employ the party's tactics and stimulated its moderation.

Other issues in the debate interrogate the enticements of why this restructuring has occurred. Three distinct answers can be disclosed in academia to this question. On the one hand, those who claim that Jobbik pushed Fidesz and the other way around; On the other hand, those who argue that this phenomenon usually occurs after groups of the far-right achieve significant electoral success and is more prone to political opportunism. The scholars discuss the case not artlessly as electoral opportunism but envisage it as a general phenomenon in the post-communist, transitional context; *"The general disillusionment from the democratic ideals and Western models and approaches"* are named as the reasons for the transformation of both parties (Krekó & Juhász, 2017). János Árgyelán, also confirms this dissection. He is a municipal councilor, a representative of the Fejér county general assembly, and was a member of Jobbik spanning 2008 to 2018. He is a current member of Our Homeland Movement and is in charge of the party's International Relations. He claimed that: *"If a party wants to go beyond its 'glass roof' limits, moderation is needed. More precisely, Jobbik seemed to be the most capable political party after Fidesz, the strongest party, in Hungary, to become the winner of the next election. To become the winner, they obviously needed modification: milder communication, more popular (populist) rhetoric, fresh political objectives."*⁶

Peter Jakab, the former president of the party, has its interpretations and affirms the initial assumption that Fidesz pushed them to cooperate "with all Hungarians".⁷ The opposite affirmation was also offered by my interviewees. Samu voiced that Fidesz was the one who took the advantage of the situation.

*"I think it was more the other way around. Fidesz took the opportunity from us. And then our policy was empty. And much of society expected the opposition to unite. It's just not our main base."*⁸

⁶ (Árgyelán János. Personal Communication. June 17.2022)

⁷ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

⁸ (Tamás Gergő Samu., Personal Communication. May 30. 2022)

Drawing on the interview with Peter Jakab, it divulges that the 2018 elections have been the "wake-up call to democracy" and a turning point when they finally surmised to cooperate with the opposition employing the opposite views or ideologies.⁹ At the same time, the instigator of this transition, Gabor Vona, had to leave the office due to his previous vow. Vona was formerly a candidate for the position of Prime Minister by Jobbik; He vowed to resign in case of the baffling election in 2018 and stuck to his word. An interview with Gabor Vona, the architect of this metamorphosis, is a key to discerning what happened to this formerly far-right party. Vona, who previously claimed that he would resign if he were Jewish, averred to "open a new chapter" and alienated against anti-Semitism; He also sent a letter to the Jewish community for Hanukkah greetings in 2016.¹⁰

The former party leader, Peter Jakab, reveals his endeavors to promote democracy after the downfall of the Orban regime. Jakab believes that transformation is a positive change that allows cooperation with other parties despite drastic differences. He also conjectures that electorally this shift has not been a winning formula. Jobbik remains a radical party that "recognizes its mistakes." "We decided to go for the center, whilst Fidesz went for the extremes."¹¹

Tibor Bana (a political scientist) also confirms that this shift was an unfavorable electoral strategy. He was a vice-chairman of Jobbik (from January 2007) and a National Assembly member, from January 2010 until March 2020. From 2004-2006 he was also a member of the youth organization of the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIEP.

*"It had an effect on the results. An other important point was the lack of values and strong character after Jakab was elected as a party leader in 2020. My definite standpoint is that the most important task is to build a choosable alternative against Fidesz but its possibility is stronger if we don't continue the previous form of cooperation."*¹²

Consequently, *"Jobbik lost its voters because it lost its creditability, little corrections in communication should have not meant the complete abandoning of previous ideology and principles as well as making new friends out of old enemies."*¹³ Argyelan also outlined drastic changes in the composition of their electorate. "Jobbik lost voters in all groups because of the mentioned reasons. I think it is the older, male voters who are less likely to change their preferences and remain loyal even if the party they used to support goes astray."¹⁴ "Little changes in communication can boost the number of supporters, and

⁹ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

¹⁰ Bayer L. 2017. Gabor Vona "Exclusive: In First Talk With Jewish Media, Hungary's Far Right Leader Strikes A New Pose". At <https://forward.com>

¹¹ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

¹² (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

¹³ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

¹⁴ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

more people will come from the center. So, what worked in 2015, could have worked later. But Jobbik started to make friends with the previous enemies, thus losing its credibility. The main problem here is that we have a party that used to identify itself as a radical, national, conservative movement, and not one of these match them anymore. The credibility is lost for most of the old voters because they expect something else, and new voters hardly choose such a "deradicalized" party".¹⁵ However, Dr. Koloman claims the opposite and believes that, among others, youth mobilization is still a pillar for Jobbik. "Jobbik has always enjoyed high support among young people. The fact that young people interested in politics are constantly applying to our party's youth section is a good indication of this. It should be added that the younger age group tends to be more apolitical than other age groups, which is why we may have stronger support in other age groups. But I must admit that I have seen research that says the opposite. In the research that I know of, Jobbik has always been one of the most supported parties among young people".¹⁶

To unravel whether the transformation was a temporary or complete political-ideological shift, we need to answer the question of whether the process is still ongoing or not.

Despite being a purely tactical shift, Jakab claims that the expulsion of Jobbik members in 2018 was not due to ideological discrepancies rather than methodological.¹⁷ After the 2022 parliamentary election failure, when Jobbik's supporters were exempt from the supporters of United for Hungary, it seemed apparent that the cooperation and tactic of being an accomplice of the opposition failed. Reorganizations and expulsion of members demonstrate that not everyone was content with the altered and moderated stances. Unexpectedly even Peter Jakab resigned from the presidency in June. Among the interviewees, ambivalent attitudes were evident. While one part claim that there were no other options for the party but to cooperate with the opposition, the others state that the leadership has failed and the methodology should have been more radical. Peter Jakab, in the interview, also claimed that the shift has been accomplished¹⁸. Dr. Brenner Koloman also attested that "Jobbik's progress into a people's party has finished. It was not a self-serving process because the greatest challenge is still to come: the party has to lead Hungary back to the community of European member states governed under the rule of law. Jobbik stated its values as a Christian, centre-right people's party¹⁹". However, Tibor Bana, in my personal interview, avowed that

"On one hand the change was successful but on the other hand some extremist members remained in the party. The aim of Gábor Vona was to create a centre-right party. I supported it but there were some bad decisions on that way. From my point of view, it

¹⁵ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

¹⁶ (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

¹⁷ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

¹⁸ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

¹⁹ (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

was a positive decision but after the beginning of Péter Jakab's presidency it went to a wrong way with a close cooperation with Ferenc Gyurcsány and the Democratic Coalition. Péter Jakab's strategy and leadership style was and is still really bad and uneffective.”²⁰

Thus, restructuring might continue and depends on the members of the party. The party distanced itself from Turanism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Gypsyism. Party members claim that the party has completely abandoned this extreme rhetoric. The recent reorganization, and an exodus of several members by Peter Jakab, among them, Vice president of Jobbik, Anita Potocskáné Kőrösi, (in 2022) and then his resignation, is a harbinger of future changes. These reorganizations might entail changes in regard to the party's cooperation with opposition parties.

“The opposition lost the elections, and Fidesz has won with the best ever result. The cooperation failed, the actors will have to try to find other ways to show themselves. I don't think the cooperation will die away completely, but ties will be weaker and less binding.”²¹

To sum up, the main takeaways can be summarized that all party members agree that the shift was positive; however, some of them disregard the methods of the current leaders and consider that the metamorphosis might not be complete. In terms of incentives for moderation, there is still some vagueness. While some still agree that in the external context of the migration crisis, Fidesz enacting Jobbik's ideas was the motivator of changes, others consider that these changes emanated from the people and their demand to see a united opposition against Fidesz.

Political and ideological implications in Hungary and international dimension

2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections and Fidesz–KDNP alliance victory reaffirmed that right-wing populism was prevalent in Hungary, and their contenders were feeble comparing the ruling party; This later resulted in united opposition ahead of the 2022 parliamentary elections, United for Hungary, a political alliance. For this reason, the opposition elected Peter Marky-Zay, a conservative candidate and former supporter of Fidesz. They knew that a liberal candidate could not contend with Fidesz.

Before the prominence of Jobbik, Fidesz's major contenders were leftist and liberal parties. Accordingly, Jobbik has supported Fidesz's internal and external policies; Jobbik claimed to establish a German-Russian-Turkish triangle in line with Fidesz's Eastern Opening policy and backed Fidesz's initiatives in the country. Nevertheless, after the enactment of Jobbik's pledges, the situation reversed. In addition, several other factors have deteriorated the relations between the two parties.

In 2015, Jobbik got its first individual constituency in Tapolca, which can be perceived as validation of the party's still effective policies. After closing its borders with

²⁰ (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

²¹ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

Serbia in 2015, and Fidesz capitalizing on refugee issues, in 2016, Fidesz even called for a referendum regarding the European Union's migrant relocation plans, the so-called "quota referendum"; Originally, both Fidesz and Jobbik supported the referendum. After the referendum failed to modify the constitution, Jobbik boycotted Fidesz and even urged the prime minister to resign; Moreover, Lajos Simicska, a former business magnate of the period, supported Jobbik and promoted Jobbik's media presence. He even funded Jobbik during the 2018 elections; However, after Fidesz's consecutive victory in elections, he went bankrupt and had to shut the newspaper Magyar Nemzet. Following this, the smear campaigns conducted by pro-government media outlets depicted Jobbik as an ally of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the former Prime minister, who was tarnished and discredited in the period due to his infamous speech in Balatonőszöd (Juhász, et al., 2017, pp. 236-239).

For the time being, Fidesz opposes all far-right and leftist parties, which has resulted in the unprecedented unanimity of opposition. The cooperation of the former far-right with the leftist and conservative parties was unprecedented. Jobbik cooperates with Ferenc Gyurcsány's Democratic coalition, which was a famous rival. Dr. Brenner Koloman considers that despite opposition failure, cooperation was a justified choice.

“As a young person, I had experienced the end of a one-party system, Fidesz has built a power comparable to the one that ended 30 years ago, and I would never want to live in such a society again. People have also realized this and it is no longer ideological issues that have become important, but that Hungary should once again become a democratic state governed by the rule of law. In this situation, each opposition party is dealing with its own internal affairs. In the by-elections, unity was maintained.”²²

In the context of the 2022 parliamentary elections, Samu claimed:

“The MSZP was replaced by DK. DK built his party very skillfully. Never for the sake of a change of government, but for its own strengthening. Ferenc Gyurcsány is a really good politician. And the LMP, as a small party, could do nothing else. He snuggled in for some seats.”²³

After bizarre unanimity of opposition, they undeniably had a chance to beat Fidesz in the 2022 parliamentary elections. However, the new context of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the possibility of economic flops for Hungary overweighted the opposition campaign supporting the European Union policies.

Árgyelán János considers that the opposition failure was stipulated by their “unpopular” narratives and people expected radical stance regarding the ongoing events. He added: *“In the elections of 2022, in fact, the victory of Fidesz was not primarily because they were the best choice, but because Jobbik and all their partners on the left-liberal wing were much worse. Jobbik lost its voters who wanted to see and hear the politics of the original Jobbik, which was nowhere that time. Therefore, their original voters shifted to Fidesz and Mi Hazánk.”²⁴*

²² (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

²³ (Tamás Gergő Samu, Personal Communication. May 30. 2022)

²⁴ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

Jakab stated that their electorate awaited the changes earlier. Hence, the unification of the opposition should have been commenced priorly. However, while back they "were not yet ready to undertake such a thing then."²⁵ Many political analysts consider that Jobbik's previous success stimulated other parties to adopt more radical rhetoric. Among them are the Democratic Coalition, once labeling Jobbik as a neo-Nazi party and LMP. However, after moderation, they started cooperating.

Dr. Brenner Koloman recalled that "in December 2018, the fourth Orbán government faced a series of political protests against its latest measures, particularly the submission of the overtime bill and the scandal-ridden Parliamentary session on 12 December 2018. On this day, the MPs of Jobbik, the Socialist Party, Politics Can Be Different, the Democratic Coalition and Dialogue obstructed the legislation process by whistling, shouting, throwing leaflets and blocking access to the Speaker's platform to prevent the Parliament from voting. Despite the opposition's protests, the Orbán government's MPs passed several controversial bills, including the Labour Code amendment called "slavery act" by the opposition, along with other proposals such as the bill on setting up the public administration courts or the amendment of the land trade act. On 16 December 2018 a civil activist organized a demonstration which was joined by trade unions and such opposition parties as Jobbik, LMP Politics Can Be Different, Momentum, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Coalition and Dialogue. The demonstration involved a crowd of about 10-15 thousand marching together from Heroes' Square to Kossuth Square. Throughout the series of protests, Jobbik marched and acted together with liberal, leftist and green parties. This would have almost seemed unimaginable just a year before. Roma organizations and gay rights activists were demonstrating in peaceful unity together with Jobbik supporters. This cooperation laid the foundations for the success of the coordinated candidacy in the 2019 municipal elections²⁶."

We still cannot prognosticate whether they recommence cooperation after the 2022 election failure or not. However, many consider that the relations with leftist parties are not compatible with Jobbik's views:

*"Jobbik built too strong relations with Ferenc Gyurcsány and DK. An other problem was that none of the mentioned parties could renew".*²⁷ Árgyelán János considers that "most parties of the left-liberal wing have no perspective, no clear political objectives, weak political communication, harsh conflicts within the bloc and the party. DK stands out, partly, that is exactly why they became the strongest within the bloc."²⁸

Many political analysts have claimed that Jobbik's symbolism and ideology is a pillar for the new parliamentary party, Mi Hazánk, and one of the core reasons for its success in a short time.

²⁵ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

²⁶ (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

²⁷ (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

²⁸ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

“Mi Hazánk’s ideology is nearly the same than Jobbik’s ideology was 15 years ago but we can find some differences. For example Jobbik was not so unifacial than MHM, there were more polarised opinions and directions in the former Jobbik.”²⁹

Interestingly, many consider Jobbik’s symbolic power to be the root cause for Mi Hazánk’s success. However, Samu claimed:

“Mi Hazánk has won many Jobbik-voters. Not all, but enough to get over 5% with vaccine skeptics. If Jobbik hadn’t given up on its principles, it certainly would have been a chance.”³⁰

Falling back on the interview analysis, the principal objective has been the apprehension of whether Jobbik’s moderation left the space to be filled by more extremism from other parties. Fidesz’s rigorous rhetoric during the election campaigns and Mi Hazánk’s success in the 2022 elections are benchmarks for this. It can be assumed that remolding the far-right fringe parties might stimulate mainstreaming radicalism. Members of Jobbik mostly accord with that affirmation. A few of them deem that these changes are not spurred by Jobbik. Bana: *“Yes, absolutely because they realized the empty space that was formed.”³¹*

“The Mi Hazánk reheated the rhetoric of Jobbik’s early years and hurled vehement attacks at Jobbik for being, in Mi Hazánk’s view, liberal dissenters. Seeing the potential in this new party, Fidesz has provided the openly Neo-Nazi organization with all communication and financial assistance ever since the summer of 2018. Fidesz’ main goal is to divide the opposition and distance leftist parties from Jobbik once again. They are trying to achieve this goal by giving forum to the wildest anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and smear Jobbik on a daily basis with the help of Mi Hazánk’s politicians. Jobbik’s 2018 split was the first event to truly catch the attention of the international media. Up until then, foreign correspondents had seemed to have a common understanding that Jobbik’s progress into a people’s party was nothing but a communication trick. However, the foundation of Mi Hazánk meant the beginning of a new era and allowed for the leftist parties and Jobbik to get closer and develop a common stance in certain professional issues³².”

Argyelan who is a former member of Jobbik and a member of Our Homeland movement affirms that *“If Jobbik had remained on its original political route of being a national, conservative, radical party, with tiny communicational moderations, the “self-consciousness of the nation” and considered left-liberal politics and political actors as enemies (instead of cooperating with them), it could have kept its second place on the political scale after Fidesz, and no other parties would have emerged on the right wing.*

²⁹ (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

³⁰ (Tamás Gergő Samu., Personal Communication. May 30. 2022)

³¹ (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

³² (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

*This shift obviously triggered the birth of other parties on the right wing, especially Mi Hazánk.*³³

If Our Homeland party is a reinvention of Jobbik, Fidesz might also avail from this. Two possible scenarios can be sketched. On the one hand, the ruling party can wield Mi Hazánk's rhetoric as it once did for Jobbik. Thus, this would eventually bring about more extermination of Fidesz and the fall of Mi Hazánk. On the contrary, Mi Hazánk has a chance to become a challenger as once was Jobbik. Jobbik's popularity was impacted by media campaigns and their rhetorical style in the context of conflicts with Roma minorities. In case such a stimulator emerges either internally related to minorities or external crisis (the party has already taken advantage of the Covid Crisis), Mi Hazánk has the potential to expand its supporter base, as once did Jobbik when the party reached 19.06% in 2018. Abel Bojar, a senior analyst, also thinks that an economic crisis can be a temptation for voters to stand aside from Fidesz (BIRN, 2022).

International Relations

Several significant trends that have altered after the restructuring of Jobbik should be highlighted; Namely, the formerly pro-Russian party transformed into a "European" party. In contrast to Fidesz's Eastern Opening, Jobbik has proposed a Western Opening. Jobbik, previously a pro-Russian party, nowadays opposes Fidesz's pro-Russian stance and proclaims that if Orbán's policies withstand, Hungary "could become a Russian colony in 15 years".³⁴ Hence, one can propose that the opposition party has become a supporter of the West and adopted an anti-Russian stance, while the mainstream has employed a more radical and pro-Russian stance.

The party members now neglect their pro-Russian stance, and many claim that their support for Russia was incentivized purely by economic motivations. Contrariwise, Orbán wants to "use Putin-style political methods" in order to maintain his status, states Jakab.³⁵

United for Hungary (The Democratic Coalition, Momentum, Jobbik, MSZP, LMP, Párbeszéd) released a joint statement in January 2022 condemning Orbán's pro-Russian stance. After Russia urged Hungary to leave NATO, the united opposition evaluated this as renouncing sovereignty and "rendering our country militarily defenceless." They projected Hungary's place to be in the European Union and NATO.³⁶

Thus, Jobbik's abrupt transformation pushed the party to cooperate with the opposition employing a pro-European predisposition.

³³ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

³⁴ Almássy F. and Lamberter N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

³⁵ Almássy F. and Lamberter N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: "We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties". Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

³⁶ Márton Gyöngyösi. 30/01/2022. At <https://www.gyongyosimarton.com/2022/01/30/united-opposition-for-hungary-orban-must-not-go-to-moscow-but-if-he-does-he-better-not-come-back/>

All the respondents agree that Victor Orban is an ally of Putin. In the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia-led International Investment Bank (IIB) headquarters moved to Budapest in March 2022; Loans from Russia, the Paks power plant, advantageous economic conditions for Russian businesses, and infrastructure projects funded by Russia or China; The opposition alliance claim that Orban is Putin's ally in Europe.

Peter Jakab considers that Hungary has to be open to new economic partners but asserts that with the current political course, the country is under submission to the East while diminishing cooperation with the West.³⁷

“Hungary should be the part of the Western world. Of course, it is important to build good economic relations with Russia or Turkey but the European values are more important than some economic benefits.”³⁸

The depiction of Russia as an adversary and Orban as a Russian ally has been at the center of the campaign during the 2022 parliamentary elections; However, economic benefits and dependency on Russian resources overshadowed political interests.

Jakab fears that the EU will no longer embrace Hungary, and the country will remain a supplier of "cheap Hungarian labor" to other EU countries³⁹.

My interviewees supported the idea that the moderation strategy was likewise ineffective in terms of the European Parliament elections and EP far-right group membership. In 2019 the party received only 6 percent of the votes for the EP elections, the lowest in recent years. The moderation was also the root cause the party did not become a member of the EP far-right group.

“Gyöngyösi [MEP of Jobbik] turned around completely, but no one believed him. It is right. Neither is the "far right." ⁴⁰ In terms of Euro-Atlantic cooperation:

“It is just as inefficient. Jobbik and Gyöngyösi will be incapacitated for a very long time, no matter what he says. I know they have very little "success" in the EP, but they are very far from a political group.”⁴¹

“It was only one of the reasons. An important part of the former Jobbik voters had a eurosceptic standpoint. Furthermore, the campaign strategy was not good enough and the intensity of the campaign was not the same everywhere. In my town, Szentgotthárd, my former party, Jobbik reached 18% because we made a strong campaign.”⁴²

It is notable that, lately, after I conducted interviews, Gyöngyösi became a new party leader. As an MEP, he apparently has a pro-European course. However, in the past, he

³⁷ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: “We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties”. Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

³⁸ (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

³⁹ Almássy F. and Lamberterie N. 2020. Interview: Péter Jakab: “We will only be able to bring this regime down with the help of the other parties”. Visegrad Post at <https://visegradpost.com>

⁴⁰ (Tamás Gergő Samu., Personal Communication. May 30. 2022)

⁴¹ (Tamás Gergő Samu., Personal Communication. May 30. 2022)

⁴² (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

was quite a controversial figure, even participating as an observer in the 2014 Crimean status referendum on March 16, 2014, claiming that there were no frauds.

Party members agree that Jobbik preaching to establish closer relations with the EU and restore Hungary's reputation is the right path; however, the transformation affected their influence to attract voters. János Árgyelán believes that Jobbik could only reach out to voters before 2018, thus before Vona's resignation. He added:

*"I think that the biggest problem was the lack of real reformation. Now, the party doesn't have any serious foreign partners. The earlier partners are more radical and the potential new partners don't believe that the change Jobbik went through is trustworthy."*⁴³

However, Our Homeland Movement went down the same road as once Jobbik. Regarding extract from Jobbik's 2020 manifesto "to restore Hungary's international reputation as an independent and useful member of the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic cooperation" Argyelan claims: *"empty words, does not say anything about the real objectives and standpoint. A soft, or rather softened (that used to be powerful and clear earlier) statement does not reach people."*⁴⁴

Jobbik has lost its international image. The party cannot establish relations with leftist parties and is also left out of the European far-right group membership.

*"My personal experience in 2017 and 2018 was that Jobbik was still not accepted internationally and they did still not have trust in Jobbik because of its "dirty past". And the vicious circle in it is that the softer they try to be, the less credibility they will have and the more supporters they will lose. And the more supporters they lose, the less interested their potential partners will be in cooperating with Jobbik, since nobody cares about a 3-percent, disintegrating, down-sliding party that has constant conflicts in its leadership"*⁴⁵ outlines the former member of Jobbik and current representative of Our Homeland Movement.

Dr. Koloman negates that the deradicalization strategy proved its ineffectiveness in regard to the EP/or local elections. "Jobbik has shown strong results in the primaries, which proves that we are able to work together with other parties and that Jobbik is still one of the strongest opposition parties in the countryside. Election results depend on a lot of things. The 2019 results are not due to Jobbik becoming a people's party. I think we're moving in a positive direction in this area, because we're in contact and working with organizations with whom this would have been unthinkable before. This also shows the success of becoming a people's party, that we are able to engage in dialogue with organizations that would not have spoken to us before."⁴⁶ However, drawing on the actual results, Peter Jakab, who ran for the prime ministerial seat, was eliminated in the first round of the 2021 primary.

⁴³ (Tibor Bana, Personal Communication. June 1. 2022)

⁴⁴ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

⁴⁵ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

⁴⁶ (Dr. Brenner Koloman. Personal Communication. July. 19. 2022)

Our Homeland Movement is also an inheritor of Jobbik's ideology and adopts similar attitudes regarding international relations and partnerships. Jobbik's former policy of supporting the "German-Russian-Turkish triangle" is now adopted by Our Homeland movement. "If Germany, Russia, and Turkey realized that their cooperation represented the strongest economy in the world, the economic map of the world would look much different."⁴⁷ Mi Hazank also adopts a pro-Russian stance as once Jobbik.

All in all, the reorganization of Jobbik has entailed changes in the country. While the opposition has become more "moderate" and vocal supporters of the EU values, Fidesz has employed a more radical stance. Here, Mi Hazank (Our Homeland Movement) has arisen as a third force. Inheritor of Jobbik's ideology, the party has the potential to become either a challenger of Fidesz or preyed on by the ruling party. Jobbik has problems and needs to reaffirm its credibility at the international level. Rejected by EPP and far-right European Parliament groups, the party stays away from any of the European Parliament groups' membership.

⁴⁷ (Árgyelán János. Communication. June 17.2022)

5. Concluding Remarks

This thesis is a contribution to the study of the Hungarian far-right, an attempt to analyze the reasons for the far-right electoral success and electoral opportunism. The study aimed at disclosing genuine incentives for the strategy shift of the far-right in Hungary and its effects on mainstream politics. Democratic disenchantment in Hungary has entailed large-scale political repositioning and swings in the parties' political ideologies.

As the moderation strategy implementation is related to the members of Jobbik, data analysis included expert interviews with the party members. The 2010 electoral manifesto and declarations released by the Movement for a Better Hungary were also analyzed to complement the interview data. The data analysis discerned that a combination of external context, internal electoral competition, and Hungarian tradition of the far-right led to the repositioning of electorally one of the most successful far-right parties, Jobbik. Fidesz enacting Jobbik's pledges and Jobbik cooperating with leftist and conservative opposition parties, on the flip side, have caused internal changes in the parties' positions. Jobbik and Fidesz have swapped positions. While Jobbik is becoming more centrist, Fidesz is leaning toward extremism. Content analysis of declarations revealed that Jobbik abandoned its nativist credentials, and Fidesz adopted more authoritarian, ethno-nationalistic, and even implemented populist constitutionalism through constitutional amendments. The policy areas copied by Fidesz caused moderation of Jobbik's Euroscepticism, cultural, educational, and extreme nationalistic assertions.

Formerly far-right and currently centrist people's party previously had influenced other parties to radicalize their narratives more to emulate Jobbik. However, nowadays, Jobbik cooperating with the opposition is impelled by the opposition and has transformed into a soft Euroskeptic party. Data analysis also demonstrated that Jobbik has lost a large proportion of committed voters and stimulated even more radicalization of Fidesz's rhetoric during the 2022 parliamentary elections. Formerly pro-Russian party releases joint declarations with opposition parties condemning Russian aggression and leaving ample space for other radical parties. Moreover, the deradicalization has also affected the breakaway party of Jobbik, Our Homeland party, which allured former Jobbik voters and entered the parliament. For Jobbik, moderation became even ineffectual in regard to European Parliament elections, and the party has tarnished its prestige for the moment.

As the content analysis of manifestos would not provide an overall picture of the situation, in-depth expert interview analysis was of utmost importance. The party has already abandoned the pledges in its former manifesto, and the metamorphosis is ongoing. An important finding drawn from the analysis is that the tradition of the Hungarian far-right has stimulated all of these changes. Fringe political parties attempt to reach the mainstream and vice versa constantly frame the country's political landscape. Fidesz has more flexibility to gravitate toward extremism. This change is not everlasting and depends on the party members. From the expert interviews, it is perceptible that not all-party members are satisfied with current policies, and Gabor Vona, who initiated this change, has already resigned. The ongoing exodus of members evinces that in case of

leadership change, the moderation strategy will reverse, too. This alteration will undoubtedly affect the mainstream as well. The analysis of this single party is crucial as changes in the party have entailed revamping mainstream politics. Years ago, with reference to the migration crisis, Hungary adopted a rigid political stance and a nowadays similar trend toward the Russo-Ukrainian war. The far-right remolding has stimulated Fidesz to have a radical viewpoint regarding economic sanctions against Russia. Herewith, the space formerly occupied by Jobbik, is now utilized by the new far-right party, Our Homeland Movement, which has the potential to influence the public narrative as once Jobbik did.

These changes affected voter propensity as well. While Jobbik has lost significant support, its voters have swapped either for Fidesz or Our Homeland party. Thus, Jobbik's shift has conducted to underpin the far-more extremist party Our Homeland and Fidesz with stiffer rhetoric.

The other challenge of this thesis was a theoretical framework. Measuring populism or detection of the place of Jobbik in the radical-right party family was not an easy task. A fortiori, studies predominantly focus on Jobbik's rise as a far-right party, and limited literature is available about its moderation. Theoretical framework later supported the data analysis part and identified the policy areas and far-right attributes later adopted by Fidesz from Jobbik. Hence, in such a manner approved that the radicalization of mainstream politics has affected fringe parties. Due to the scholarly discordance, defining the terms such as populism, nativism, populist radical right party family, and the moderation of the far-right have also been challenging. The theory immensely supported the analysis of the empirical case and highlighted the importance of nationalistic traditions in a country that has an enormous influence on today's politics.

All in all, Jobbik is a manifestation of fluctuating democracy in the country. This shift is a reverberation of the ruling party's strategy of building an "illiberal democracy"; As the transformation is still ongoing, the situation might change; however, the tradition of nationalism and the far-right in Hungary has always been balancing and dictating the rules to the far-right actors in Hungary.

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Appendices



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Appendix A

Consent Form

Title of Project: Strategy Shift of the Far-Right in Hungary: The case of Jobbik

Name of Researcher: Mariam Bregadze

Supervisors:

Dr. József Dúró (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Dr. Louis John Wierenga (University of Tartu)

DR. Ammon Cheskin (University of Glasgow)

Please tick as appropriate

Yes No I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

Yes No I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.

Consent on method clause

Yes No I consent to interviews being audio-recorded

Yes No I acknowledge that copies of transcripts will be returned to participants for verification.

Confidentiality/anonymity clauses

Yes No I acknowledge that participants will be referred to by pseudonym.

Yes No I acknowledge that participants will be identified by name in any publications arising from the research.

I agree that:

- Yes No All names and other material likely to identify individuals will be anonymised.
- Yes No The material will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all times.
- Yes No The material will be destroyed once the project is complete.
- Yes No I waive my copyright to any data collected as part of this project.
- Yes No Other authenticated researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.
- Yes No Other authenticated researchers may use my words in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form
- Yes No I acknowledge the provision of a Privacy Notice in relation to this research project.

Consent clause

I agree to take part in this research study

I do not agree to take part in this research study

Name of Participant Signature

Date

Name of Researcher - Mariam Bregadze... Signature

Date

..... End of consent form

Appendix B



University
of Glasgow

College of Social
Sciences

Plain Language Statement

Researcher: Mariam Bregadze

School of Social and Political Sciences

Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies

Project Title: Strategy Shift of the Far-Right in Hungary: The case of Jobbik

Contact information: 2548293b@student.gla.ac.uk

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DR. Ammon Cheskin

Senior Lecturer in Nationalism and Identity (Central & East European Studies)

Email: Ammon.Cheskin@glasgow.ac.uk

Invitation paragraph

Thank you for considering participation in the research, which contributes to enriching the existing academic sources based on the example of your party.

However, before we proceed and you decide whether or not to participate, it is vital to familiarize yourself with the purpose, methods, and presumed outcome of the study.

After careful consideration, please notify me about your informed decision.

In case of any doubts/queries, do not hesitate to ask me for clarification. Feel free to contact others if you deem it is necessary.

Take time and tell me your decision regarding participation or not.

Thank you for your time.

What is the purpose of the study?

The study examines the transformation of the most successful far-right party among the Visegrad four states to the centrist people's party. The "transformation" and attempts to deepen relations with the EU, affected their electorate and their place and image in the region. As Jobbik from time to time, is the second most influential party after the ruling party in Hungary, and the future of the ruling party Fidesz is not clear after the unprecedented unanimity of the opposition parties, it is crucial to more thoroughly analyse the recent developments in Hungary. This case is not only beneficial for Hungary. As the country is a member of the EU and Jobbik had representatives in the European parliament, thus tries to affect the narrative outside Hungary, the importance of the party becomes more evident.

Academically, there are scarce sources regarding the mentioned case. The study examines more global phenomenon, such as populism and radical right politics.

Why have I been chosen?

As the moderation of politics of Jobbik was stipulated by mutual decision of the members, for the better analysis of the case, the perspectives of decision-makers are vital.

Do I have to take part?

Participation is entirely voluntary. Even if you decide to join, you can withdraw at any time during the interview.

What will happen to me if I take part?

Participation only implies one interview, which might last for 40 to a maximum of 60 minutes.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

You can choose to remain anonymous or allow the researcher to use your name and other personal information agreed upon before the interview.

If you choose to remain anonymous, all information regarding you will be kept strictly confidential. You only will be identified by exclusive ID number/code, and any signpost of your personalities such as the name or address will be removed. Recognition is not possible.

However, the sample size is small. Herewith, all of the participants of the interviews are members of the party or activists. Thus, any potential implication of these factors on anonymity should be considered.

Please note that assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless evidence of wrongdoing or potential harm is uncovered. In such cases the University may be obliged to contact relevant statutory bodies/agencies.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

Data will be used in the dissertation and published by the consortium of universities in the framework of the Erasmus Mundus programme. However, the identification of participants or referencing/using data for other purposes/publications will not be feasible, without the approval by the interviewee.

Who is organising and funding the research? (If relevant)

The research is the part of the Erasmus Mundus Programme, funded by the European Commission, Directorate General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture.

Who has reviewed the study?

The project has been reviewed by the School of Social and Political Sciences Ethics Forum.

Contact for Further Information

If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of this research project, you can contact the School of Social and Political Sciences Ethics Officer [Dr Susan Batchelor](#) email: susan.batchelor@glasgow.ac.uk.

End. _____

Appendix C PRIVACY NOTICE

Privacy Notice for Participation in Research Project: Your Personal Data

The University of Glasgow will be what's known as the 'Data Controller' of your personal data processed in relation to your participation in the research project: (Strategy Shift of the Far-Right in Hungary: The case of Jobbik). This privacy notice will explain how The University of Glasgow will process your personal data.

Why we need it

We are collecting basic personal data such as your name and contact details in order to conduct our research. We need your name and contact details to arrange an interview.

We only collect data that we need for the research project and will de-identify your personal data from the research data. Any identifiers such as your name, address will be coded and all the answers during the interviews will be pseudonymised. Please note that your confidentiality may be impossible to guarantee for example due to the size of the participant group, location etc.

Please see accompanying **Participant Information Sheet**,

Legal basis for processing your data

We must have a legal basis for processing all personal data. As this processing is for Academic Research we will be relying upon **Task in the Public Interest** in order to process the basic personal data that you provide. For any special categories data collected we will be processing this on the basis that it is **necessary for archiving purposes, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes**.

Alongside this, in order to fulfil our ethical obligations, we will ask for your **Consent** to take part in the study Please see accompanying **Consent Form**.

What we do with it and who we share it with

All the personal data you submit is processed by the University of Glasgow in the United Kingdom. In addition, security measures are in place to ensure that your personal data remains safe: all the identifiers will be removed. Data will be coded/ pseudonymisation will be used.

Please consult the **Consent form** and **Participant Information Sheet** which accompanies this notice.

Due to the nature of this research, it is very likely that other researchers may find the data collected to be useful in answering future research questions. We will ask for your explicit consent for your data to be shared in this way.

We will provide you with a copy of the study findings and details of any subsequent publications or outputs on request.

What are your rights?*

GDPR provides that individuals have certain rights including: to request access to, copies of and rectification or erasure of personal data and to object to processing. In addition, data subjects may also have the right to restrict the processing of the personal data and to data portability. You can request access to the information we process about you at any time.

If at any point you believe that the information we process relating to you is incorrect, you can request to see this information and may in some instances request to have it restricted, corrected, or erased. You may also have the right to object to the processing of data and the right to data portability.

Please note that as we are processing your personal data for research purposes, the ability to exercise these rights may vary as there are potentially applicable research exemptions under the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. For more information on these exemptions, please see [UofG Research with personal and special categories of data](#).

If you wish to exercise any of these rights, please submit your request via the [webform](#) or contact dp@gla.ac.uk

Complaints

If you wish to raise a complaint on how we have handled your personal data, you can contact the University Data Protection Officer who will investigate the matter.

Our Data Protection Officer can be contacted at dataprotectionofficer@glasgow.ac.uk

If you are not satisfied with our response or believe we are not processing your personal data in accordance with the law, you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) <https://ico.org.uk/>

Who has ethically reviewed the project?

This project has been ethically approved via the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee or relevant School Ethics Forum in the College.

How long do we keep it for?

Your **personal** data will be retained by the University only for as long as is necessary for processing and no longer than the period of ethical approval ([Insert end date of ethical approval](#)). After this time, personal data will be securely deleted.

Your **research** data will be retained for a period of ten years in line with the University of Glasgow Guidelines. Specific details in relation to research data storage are provided on the Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form which accompany this notice.

End of Privacy Notice _____

Appendix D

Interview Questions

-Since when are you/were a member of Jobbik?

1. During the party congress in 2016, ambivalent messages were vocalized. It seemed that not everyone agreed on moderation. After reorganization in 2018, do you consider that the party has completely abandoned its extreme rhetoric/campaigns and accomplished its shift?

-What was the ideological momentum for moderation?

2. In the context of the 2022 parliamentary elections, how justified was this shift for your electorate?

3. Jobbik's supporter base has become more diverse. Diminishing youth support at the grassroots level, but increasing the number of voters over the age of 50, also the share of male supporters have plummeted. How do you think, this played in the favor of the ruling party?

4. At the national level, Jobbik unquestionably affected Fidesz's policies, especially after the migration crisis. The nationalization of private pension funds, taxing the multinational corporations and external actors, or issues related to migration and minorities. Do you think that the shift of Jobbik to the center, has become one of the reasons for Fidesz's subsequent success in the elections?

5. What have been the implications for other parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party MSZP, LMP, or DK?

6. Jobbik's ideology is shared by Mi Hazánk. Do you consider the emergence of the other parties, such as Mi Hazánk would not occur without Jobbik's restructuring?

-Has Jobbik's moderation been a prompt for other contenders to radicalize more?

7. How do you see the cooperation with the opposition alliance after the national assembly elections?

8. At the 2014 April parliamentary elections (the turnout was 62%), the moderation strategy proved its effectiveness and attracted quite a few undecided voters. In 2015, it entailed the first individual constituency in Tapolca. However, for example, in 2019 the party received only 6 percent of the votes for the EP elections. Do you think that the deradicalization strategy proved its ineffectiveness in regard to the EP elections? (In 2009 15%).

-EP far-right group membership?

9. Jobbik has become a soft Euroskeptic, and calls "to restore Hungary's international reputation as an independent and useful member of the European Union and the Euro- Atlantic cooperation." How do you think this shift affected Jobbik's regional/international image? -How relations with other regional players have changed? Is it more or less effective? 10. Please evaluate the effectiveness of the "Western Opening" strategy to establish a "German-Russian-Turkish triangle.

Appendix E



School Ethics Forum for Non-Clinical Research

Involving Human Subjects

Notification of Ethics Application Outcome – UG and PGT Student Applications

Application Details

Undergraduate Student Research Ethics Application Postgraduate Student Research Ethics Application

Application Number:

Applicant's Name: Mariam Bregadze

Project Title: Hungarian right-wing populism: The case of Jobbik

Application Status: Fully Approved

Date of Review: 31/03/2022

Start Date of Approval 20/04/2022 End Date of Approval 01/10/2022

NB: Only if the applicant has been given approval can they proceed with their data collection from the date of approval.

Fully approved

Means that the applicant can proceed with data collection with effect from the date of approval.

Amendments required

Where amendments are required by reviewers, applicants must respond in the relevant boxes below to the recommendations of the School Ethics Forum and provide this as an 'Amendments Response' document to explain the changes made to the application as well as amending the documents, as relevant. Changes to the application form or supporting documents should be highlighted either in **block highlight** or **in red coloured text** to assist the reviewers. All amended

application documents should then be sent to the ethics administrator by the Supervisor for the approval of the SEF before data collection can proceed.

Rejected

If your application is Rejected a new application must be submitted to the School Ethics Forum. The reviewer feedback below will indicate whether a similar future project is likely to be supported. Where recommendations are provided, they should be responded to and this document provided as part of the new application. A new reference number will be generated. The new application forms should be signed off and submitted to the ethics administrator by the Supervisor.