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REVISIONIST CHALLENGES TO PACIFIST STATE?: ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE JAPAN'S
FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY DURING ABE SHINZO'S PREMIERSHIP

MA thesis

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Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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Abstract

Japan's foreign policy identity and security posture have been mostly discussed with *either* material *or* ideational factors. However, this 'either/or' rationale does not explain the contradiction of Japan being a pacifist state while having leaders with revisionist ambitions, especially after the end of the Cold War. Focusing on Abe's security policy, chiefly the controversial adoption of the limited right to Collective Self-Defense (CSD), publicly introduced in 2014 and enacted in 2015, this study aims to comprehend the dialectic relation between material and ideational factors in Japan's foreign policy identity. While Abe has been regarded as a revisionist challenger to Japan's pacifism, how was the security policy reasoned for its successful adoption, despite the society's support of the pacifist norm? To answer this, critical discourse analysis, a method that enables context-sensitive research while focusing on agency or power relations, has been conducted. The analysis has found that Abe's discourse has created a momentum of 'change' by introducing a new common sense of 'active posture for achieving peace.' Abe reasoned the adoption of the CSD, undoubtedly a revisionist change in the means, as a minimum necessary extension for achieving the conventional purpose of the pacifist norm - enhancing deterrence and avoiding Japan's war engagement. Thus, Abe's security policy is a revisionist change within the framework of pacifism. Significantly, the study shows that the material interest of revisionism - proactive redistribution of resources - and the ideational interest of pacifism - upholding the pacifist norm - are both crucial in Japan's foreign policy identity.

Keywords: Foreign policy identity, Security policy, Revisionism, Pacifism, Dialectic

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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CSD	Collective Self-Defense
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
IR	International Relations
ISD	Individual Self-Defense
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JIP	Japan Innovation Party
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
KM	Komeito (political party)
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NHK-BCRI	NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
UN	United Nations
WWII	World War II

Introduction

International politics and foreign policy decisions are usually explained with either material or ideational factors. However, both need consideration as they interrelate. Japan's foreign policy identity, when examined through its security policy, has also been explained mainly with the 'either/or' rationale. Proponents of ideational factors have argued that Japan's pacifist norms have been determining its security policy. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan places military restraints. National security was highly reliant on the U.S. military, while resources were allocated to economic recovery in the postwar period. Benefitting from this development, Japanese society embraced the pacifist norm, disapproving of any attempts to change constitutional restraints. Existing studies that adhere to material factors have discussed that Japan has started to face an increasing threat environment in its region, especially after the end of the Cold War. In this situation, revisionist leaders of the conservative faction have gradually shifted the security policy. Despite differences in degree, these revisionist leaders share ambitions of revising the constitution, becoming autonomous from the United States, and reinterpreting its wartime history. There are material interests in redistributing the resources to achieve these ambitions.

The debate of whether Japan's foreign policy identity is pacifist or revisionist is also the debate of whether there is a continuation or reversal of the pacifist norms. This issue was illustrated in Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's constitutional reinterpretation of Article 9 and the new security policy that substantially enabled Collective Self-Defense (CSD), a controversial topic in Japan's security posture. While national security is an independent field of study, it also constitutes and interrelates with foreign policy by determining the state's posture on security matters in international politics. This thesis will study Japan's foreign policy identity by examining the new security policy, including constitutional reinterpretation and legislative deliberation.

From the debate of 'whether pacifist or revisionist?' emerges the puzzle that while Japan has been globally recognized as a peace-loving country with the pacifist norm firmly upheld in the society, the country has had conservative leaders who are considered revisionist. Although becoming more prominent in the post-Cold War era, there were leaders with revisionist ambitions even during the Cold War. The revisionist leaders have made an effort to maintain strong ties with the United States, defying the expectation of pursuing an autonomous security policy. The puzzle leads to this study's objective of explaining the contradiction in Japan's foreign policy identity,

more precisely, the struggle between pacifism and revisionism, which became highlighted in the development of Abe's new security policy.

The struggle intrigues several questions. Knowing the controversial feature of this subject matter, how did Abe explain and reason for the adoption of the latest constitutional reinterpretation and the new security policy? While scholars admit that strengthening Japan's security capabilities has been an ongoing trend since the 1990s, why was the new security policy adopted in the form of new legislation in 2015? Lastly, how and to what extent do the developments of this security policy indicate a change in Japan's foreign policy identity?

By exploring Abe's reasoning, what points or factors were considered significant in advocating for the adoption of the new policy, particularly in 2015, could be identified. Eventually, the policy was adopted, meaning that a revisionist turn, to some extent, was taken in the pacifist society. Abe's reasoning, or the degree of revisionist ambition he expressed in his explanation, is related to this change because openly suggesting the denial of the pacifist norm would have made the passing of the legislation impossible in Japanese society. Therefore, examining the question of 'Why 2015?' and 'How and to what extent of change in foreign policy identity?' leads to understanding the main research question of 'how' the new policy was reasoned.

This study draws on the long debate between material and ideational factors, divided into different schools of thought: realism, or neorealism, and constructivism. Constructivist explanations have argued that Abe's policy signals dramatic change or reversal of the pacifist norm. In contrast, realist and neorealist explanations have argued that Japan's security policy has been shifting gradually, even before Abe, to address the changing security environment, and the pacifist norm has not disappeared with Abe's security policy. While existing studies on Abe's security policy have mostly discussed the issue using the 'either/or' rationale between material and ideational factors, this thesis focuses on the interrelation of both factors to provide academic significance.

Neither factor completely denies the other, but the disagreement has been on 'which becomes the primary factor?'. Material and ideational factors do not exist independently and are not dichotomous. They interrelate, and this relationship must be studied. Structures defined by material capability and social interaction that leads to shifts in ideas exist simultaneously. The shift in idea can affect the material structure, and within the new structure, social interaction occurs again. An outcome emerges from the dialectic relation between material and ideational factors,

where principles of both factors are maintained as distinguishable. The expectation of the study is that the change or continuity in Japan's foreign policy identity comes from both material interests of revisionism and ideational interests of pacifism.

Despite the ideal of upholding the pacifist norm, there have been material conditions of threat that Japan has been required to deal with. This situation was not only faced by Abe, and there had been, especially in the post-Cold War period, a gradual indication of revisionist ambitions by the state leaders. Hence, the theoretical expectation that both material and ideational factors need consideration in foreign policy identity is also relevant, at least partly, to the puzzle of this study: Japan has been a pacifist country with a revisionist leader. This puzzle could be explained, to some extent, by examining 'how' Abe reasoned the new security policy, which is expected to reflect the dialectic relation between material and ideational factors.

Empirically, this study becomes important in assessing the current security posture in Japan. In 2022, Japan decided to raise its defense spending to two percent of the GDP, compared to the previous spending of about one percent. The direct cause is Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ever-increasing threats in the region. However, the loosening of military restraints during Abe's premiership can be considered a stepping stone for recent developments. By reflecting on Abe's security policy, the study provides a better understanding of Japan's present security stance and foreign policy identity.

In studying Japan's security policy, the historical context of Article 9's restraints becomes critical, and the qualitative approach best suits such context-sensitive research. It is possible to conduct a comparative study between Abe's security policy and other cases where pacifist constraints exist, especially security policies under other Japanese revisionist leaders. However, Abe's case is considered a deviation, introducing change from the previous security posture and successfully adopting it. Thus, an in-depth study of this single case has significance. The question that asks 'how?' can be effectively analyzed with the method of discourse analysis, but considering Abe's authority and the power relation between revisionism and pacifism, critical discourse analysis is applied. This is a constructivist method but assumes the role of material power.

The primary data of Abe's discourse are retrieved from speeches and press conferences on constitutional reinterpretation and the new security policy. The Diet deliberation records on the legislative bill implementing the security policy are also significant as Abe sought to gain understanding in the process. The analysis searches for tools used in the discourse to overcome the

obstacles and facilitate the adoption of Japan's new security posture. This approach also examines why such a move was possible at that particular time. To study the extent of change in Japan's foreign policy identity, the substance of the policy will be analyzed.

The content of this thesis is as follows. The first section introduces the theoretical discussion of material and ideational factors and how they interrelate. The discussion will be more detailed in Japan's context, exploring the concepts of pacifist norms and revisionist challenges. The first chapter will end with introducing the security debates within Japanese society, demonstrated by public polls. In the second chapter, the methodological approach will be explained, focusing on the importance of a single case study and how critical discourse analysis is suitable for this study. Data collection criteria and the limitations will also be discussed, ending with the principles of analysis of the information retrieved from the data. Next, the analysis section will first explore the context of Japan's security environment. Then, the content of the constitutional reinterpretation and the new security policy will be examined to lay out the proposed changes, focusing on the substantial aspect. The result of critical discourse analysis, discussing Abe's tools and how the dialectic relation of material and ideational factors is demonstrated in the reasoning, will follow. Subsequently, the reaction and the development of the debate will be explained, ending with a discussion of the extent of change in Japan's foreign policy identity. At the end of the thesis, the findings and main arguments will be summarized in the conclusion.

Chapter 1

1.1 Material and ideational factors affecting foreign policy

There are different factors in making foreign policy decisions, and theories of International Relations (IR) have usually given preference to certain factors. Within the discipline, the notable contestation has been between material and ideational factors and their influence on foreign policy decisions (Sato & Hirata, 2008; Temperley, 2013). The question asked was: *Which factor is the primary driving force that explains the continuity or change in foreign policy and international politics?* Material factors, such as military strength and economic capabilities, have been supported by the realist group, namely neorealism, which considers the world system as anarchy without central authority among the states. As the primary actor, states seek to survive in this anarchical system by using measures based on the state's material capabilities (Lind, 2004; Matsuda, 2020; Schmidt, 2004; Sørensen, 2008; Waltz, 2000). In other words, material capabilities determine the state's interest and behavior in the international system.

In contrast, constructivists claim that ideas and norms become the causal factors of the actor's behavior. Shared beliefs and perceptions, constructed through social interaction, could affect the state's posture in the international system (Fierke, 2013; Hagström, 2015; Sørensen, 2008; Wendt, 1987). Each theoretical argument will be examined in this section, focusing on the causal relationship between material or ideational factors and foreign policy. However, like the structure-agency debate, neither provides a complete explanation alone. These factors are not exclusive but rather interrelating, and both need to be considered for comprehensive analysis of foreign-policy making.

Material factor, namely, the distribution of material capabilities, is the primary concern of neorealism. Another central argument made by neorealism is that the world system is anarchy with no central authority above states. As the highest authority in the anarchic system, states become the unit of international politics, epitomizing the theory as highly state-centric. With anarchy as the fundamental and objective 'as-given' system of the world, all states constantly seek survival. States could strive to strengthen their security capabilities, but not all states can or have the resources to do so. There are material limits. Thus, the distribution of capabilities, including military and economic strength, determines the power balance between states (Lind, 2004; Matsuda, 2020; Schmidt, 2004; Sørensen, 2008; Waltz, 2000).

While some may object to including economic capability as neorealism's material power for its argument that "the separation between state and market turns the economy into a relatively autonomous sphere of society" (Sørensen, 2008, p.14), when considering the state as the sole unit, its economic strength does lead to military strength. Moreover, economic interdependence and institutionalism claimed by liberalist groups have become substantially irrelevant, as it has not prevented states like Russia from seeking more power. Moreover, China is now one of the most important trading partners for many countries, but this has not led to a decrease in the strategic confrontation between these states and China. Therefore, economic capability can be treated as a material factor under neorealism.

Strong states have the capability to defend themselves. States without the capabilities will take measures of balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging, whichever benefits the state's security most. They can also try to maximize their security by joining or forming alliances. However, neorealism posits that uncertainty still dominates. These measures do not contribute to guaranteed security because of the security dilemma. Despite these drawbacks, with survival as the primary goal, states will make structural arrangements, and thus, the balance of power will be maintained in the anarchic world (Waltz, 2000).

According to neorealism, the anarchic system and distribution of capabilities define the structure of international politics. This theory provides the material context in which states are situated. Because states have to act within this structure, the proposition of neorealism is that material factors constrain and determine the states' actions or behavior. Its argument centered on the structure and its constraints brought criticism that neorealism favors the status quo and does not account for changes in the structure (Schmidt, 2004, pp.430-431; Wendt, 1987, p.342). The often-heard criticism is that neorealism failed to explain the end of the Cold War, the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar structure in the 1990s (Fierke, 2013, p.189). Indeed, Waltz (2000) mentions that within-system change can frequently happen at the unit level, but the anarchic system in international politics will remain unchanged (p.5). Regarding the end of the Cold War, neorealists made a counter-argument based on this anarchic system that states will continue to maintain the balance of power by balancing against the U.S. unipolarity, leading to multipolarity (Sørensen, 2008, p.23).

Still, as Waltz (2000) admits, neorealism does not explain "how states will respond to the pressures [of structure]" (p.27; see also Goddard & Nexon, 2005, p.24). In fact, advocates of

neorealism do not entirely deny ideational factors but consider material factors as predominant over ideational factors in explaining the continuity or change in state behavior. From a neorealist perspective, the material factors shape the state's views and ideas, and therefore, states are expected to act within the material structure.

The criticism towards neorealism and its emphasis on material factors comes mainly from constructivists. It argues that neorealism's inability to explain why changes happen is caused by the lack of attention to internal matters (Wendt, 1987). Rather than viewing the states as the sole unit of international politics, constructivism sees the internal social functions and actors as influential to state decisions. Especially, shared ideas and understandings, such as norms and identity, are considered the factors that can explain the outcomes (Jung, 2019; Fierke, 2013; Sørensen, 2008).

Like the realist group, there are variances and different branches within constructivism, but as a social theory, the main point is that ideas are a social and relational creation (Palan, 2000, p.580). Actors or agents form their identity and perception in relation to Others through social interaction. This development could occur at different levels, domestic and international. Constructivism has broadened the sphere of agency and unit, but in IR, studies tend to focus on explaining state behavior and, thus, remain mostly state-centric (see Hagström, 2015; Oros, 2015; Tamaki, 2015). According to constructivists, ideational factors determine the state's behavior, which leads to its action in international politics. Therefore, constructivism, with its emphasis on agency, could contribute to explaining the changes, unlike neorealism. At the same time, it is usually criticized for not examining material change (Sørensen, 2008, p.10).

It is important to note that constructivism does not oppose the effect of material factors, just like neorealism does not deny ideational factors. Wendt (1987), in his extensive discussion on the agency-structure issue, repeatedly states that agency and structure are mutually implicating and constitutive. The theoretical development itself is based on the limit of neorealism that became discernable at the end of the Cold War. Constructivism aims to explain a particular aspect of a phenomenon that neorealism cannot explain (Fierke, 2013, p.189). In other words, the constructivist explanation builds on the assumption that neorealism provides a legitimate explanation to some extent. This is evident with the 'constructivist turn,' the increased scholarly attention to constructivist theories in the 1990s, which aspired to make explanations other than conventional power politics (Jung, 2019, p.1). For constructivists, the material does exist, but not

objectively or independently. There are meanings attached to these materials in order to have an impact on state behavior. Actors subjectively ascribe the meanings through social interaction (Fierke, 2013, p.192; Palan, 2000, p.582). As Onuf (1998) says, people “make the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other” (p.59). Consequently, in constructivism, ideational factors have predominance in accounting for state behavior.

Both groups of neorealism and constructivism acknowledge that neither material nor ideational factors alone are sufficient for providing a full explanation. Still, the debate has been largely centered on which factor has the superiority. It is like a parallel line that does not meet, creating a dichotomy. As a consequence, a block emerges to impede a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon. To overcome the hurdle, these factors should be removed from the dichotomous scale, and instead, the relationship between them should be examined (Marsh, 2009; Sato & Hirata, 2008; Sørensen, 2008). Indeed, scholars have pointed out this issue. Singh (2008), with his study of a shift in Japan’s security policy during and after the Cold War, aims to transcend the dichotomy of different theoretical explanations (p.305). Hudson (2005) claimed for more actor-focused Foreign Policy Analysis in the structure-dominated IR theory, as this will help “identify the point of theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of state behavior: material and ideational factors” (p.3).

In a critique of Wendt’s dichotomous conception of constructivism and materialism, Palan (2000) comments that Wendt divided domestic politics as the domain of constructivism and international politics as the domain managed by materialism (p.578). Similarly, Telhami (2002), in his discussion of Waltz and neorealism, says that neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy but should be regarded as the framework of international politics (p.159). Telhami argues that there needs to be an explanation of how states construct and perceive their ‘motives’ to elucidate their behavior (p.170). What these interpretations show is that there is a connection between material and ideational factors. Neither exists independently. Berg and Ehin (2009) write, similar to Telhami, that “two theoretical frameworks are not incompatible and could, in principle, engage in effective two-stage division of labour” (p.8).

This relation could be described as the two factors making up for each other’s limitations in the causal explanation. However, this interpretation is not merely positioning each factor in a place where it is most efficacious or agreeable, which can be described as cherry-picking bits of

different theoretical frameworks. For a more comprehensive analysis, how the factors affect and transform each other, or their interrelation, needs to be considered. Marsh (2009) describes this relationship as “dialectical” or “interactive and iterative” (p.680). Based on the theoretical conception, structures, defined by material capability, and social interaction exist simultaneously. That is, while actors act within the structure, they “use ideas to interpret” (Marsh, 2009, p.680) the context. This suggests that while there are structural constraints, there are social interactions that can lead to a change of ideas, which in turn could affect the structure. The shift in idea, especially when it happens at a politically influential level, could be reflected in state behavior affecting the material structure. The same process occurs within the new structure, making the process iterative.

Material and ideational factors interrelate, but they are not indistinguishable. They are separate or distinctive, having their own effects (Fiaz, 2014, p.498; Parsons, 2016, p.450). Moreover, Fiaz (2014) demonstrates that simultaneous observation of material and ideational factors is possible by implementing a meta-theoretical lens of critical realism to constructivism (pp.498-499). According to Fiaz, constructivism tends to emphasize epistemology over ontology (p.495). With the approach of critical realist meta-theory, the focus shifts to ontology, or the object arena, where ontological circumstances that enable discursive formulation of identity are located (Fiaz, 2014, pp.495, 499). In sum, the interrelation, or dialectic relation, of material and ideational factors provides a more comprehensive account of state behavior - the change or continuity in foreign policy - as the outcome includes the principles of both factors as distinctive and distinguishable.

1.2 Pacifist norms in Japan’s security policy

Almost all countries proclaim peace as their goal in international politics. States prefer to be viewed as peaceful rather than aggressive because peace or the characteristic of being peaceful is considered a shared value. The United Nations Charter embodies this value as its principal. Still, the reality is that security threats remain, and ‘normal’ states are expected to have a military that defends itself. In this regard, Japan has long been categorized as abnormal or an anomaly without an official military. Even when possessing military capabilities, it does not correspond to economic strength (Hagström, 2015, p.127; Miyashita, 2008, p.21). The often discussed reason for this ‘abnormality’ is Japan’s self-imposed restrictions based on Article 9 of its constitution. This article, also known as the ‘peace clause,’ declares that Japan will “forever renounce war as a sovereign

right of the nation” and deny the “right of belligerency” (The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II Article 9) as a state. Officially, Japan has given up its military capabilities in the forms of “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential” (The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II Article 9).

Despite the controversial existence of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), Japanese people have taken pride in this pacifist constitution, especially during the high military tensions of the Cold War (Gustafsson et al., 2018, p.138). Moreover, this pacifism has become a vital label or brand by which Japan is recognized by other countries. As an identity, pacifism has marked Japan’s posture and role in its foreign policy. Therefore, Japan has evidently been conscious of the pacifist brand and has asked other countries about this image in the opinion polls managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). According to MOFA (2022), the most recent poll conducted in the fiscal year 2021 reveals that more than 80% of the respondents in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) view “Japan as a peace-loving nation” (4. ASEAN), and this figure reaches 90% in India. Indeed, the number and other demographic differences of the respondents in different regions exist, but these results enhance the pacifist pride in Japanese society.

Pacifism, as the guiding principle of Japanese mentality and conduct, has become a shared norm that represents the state. Scholars have discussed this pacifist norm as the factor for Japan’s self-restraining security policy (Gustafsson et al., 2018; Gustafsson et al., 2019; Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015; Izumikawa, 2010; Miyashita, 2008; Oros, 2015). However, they have different explanations for questions such as: *How was it formed, and what meanings are attached to the pacifist norm?* Before exploring these arguments, the difference between pacifist identity and pacifist norm, sometimes used interchangeably, must be clarified.

On the one hand, identity can be understood as characteristics and ideas that define a particular subject and its interests. Here, in the discussion of IR, states frequently become the subject, and drawing on Singh’s (2008) definition, state identity “refers to what a state is and what it aspires to be” (p.305). Putting state identity as a type of collective identity, Singh describes it as relatively stable but can be susceptible to change through interaction with other conflicting identities (p.305). From a constructivist perspective, identity is relational and constructed through differentiation from the significant Other (Hagström, 2015, p.134; Berg & Ehin, 2009, p.2). Norm, on the other hand, is constructed from identity. It is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors

with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.891; see also Sato & Hirata, 2008, p.8). Therefore, one can say that the norm guides the action based on identity. As the norm is directly connected to behavior, not pacifist identity, but pacifist norm becomes the focus in examining Japan’s security policy, a state posture on security matters in international politics.

The consensus on the origin of Japan’s pacifism is its history of aggression and defeat in World War II (WWII). Under the U.S. occupation, Japan was required to conduct reforms, especially creating and adopting a democratic constitution, in order to restore its sovereignty and legitimate position in the international community. While being an aggressor and inflicting harm on Asian neighboring countries from the early twentieth century, the war also disastrously affected Japanese society. At least, Japanese people remember the war as ruinous and consider the strong military influence on politics responsible for these developments (Gustafsson et al., 2019, p.505; Izumikawa, 2010, p.126). The idea of pacifism was constructed and accepted under these circumstances, where Japan had to find a new Self in the postwar era. In other words, the pacifist identity and the norm that derives from it is a construct in relation to its temporal Other, or Japan in the past (Gustafsson et al., 2019, p.505; Miyashita, 2008, p.25).

Adding to this constructivist view, Miyashita (2008) explains how structural factors also encouraged the dissemination of pacifist norms. In the immediate postwar era, Japan desperately needed economic growth to achieve recovery. In terms of resources, it was not able to rebuild its military or did not see the necessity to do so under the Cold War bipolarity. Japan took a political decision to prioritize economic recovery, despite sometimes being criticized as a ‘free rider’ of U.S. security. Moreover, by deploying the “security scarcity/abundance thesis” (p.34), Miyashita demonstrates that even during the Cold War, when Japan perceived the level of threat was high, the pacifist norm weakened and vice versa. Thus, Miyashita aimed to show the relation between ideational and material factors by stating that norms are “a reflection of underlying material interests and resulting political struggles” (p.23).

Throughout the postwar era, pacifism has been accepted as the shared norm, but there are debates on what meaning it entails. Even though war and military forces are renounced, the establishment of JSDF and the U.S. military bases shows that Japan’s pacifism has not gone to the extent of adopting “unarmed neutrality” (Miyashita, 2008, p.26). Is ‘peace-loving’ the only aspect of pacifism? Why would Japan continue to allow the existence of JSDF and U.S. bases within its territory when they sometimes cause controversy in Japanese society?

Izumikawa (2010), who uses the term ‘antimilitarism’ as Japan’s pacifist norm, argues that there are three components that constitute the antimilitarist norm: “pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment” (p.125). Among these elements, Izumikawa defines pacifism and antitraditionalism as ideational factors, while the fear of entrapment is a realist or structural factor. Here, pacifism means complete disarmament, including elimination of U.S. bases, and antitraditionalism is opposition against conservative pre-war values, regarding liberal democracy as the most crucial standard, even above pacifism (Izumikawa, 2010, pp.129-131). Izumikawa argues that the combination of these ideational and structural elements best explains Japan’s security policy, including Article 9, which the constructivists explain only as a normative constraint. The combination also helps comprehend why, at times, the pacifist norm was diluted.

While Izumikawa (2010) demonstrates the complexity of the pacifist norm with the concept of ‘antimilitarism,’ there still is a view that ‘pacifism’ is the better term to describe Japan’s security policy. Gustafsson et al. (2019) refer to Thomas Berger’s work as the proponent of the term ‘anti-militarism’ but disagrees with Berger by pointing out that the narratives of Japan’s security policy were constructed around pacifism rather than antimilitarism (p.505). At the same time, Gustafsson et al. (2019) admit that Japan’s pacifism is not absolute but relational, constructed in comparison to other states and Japan’s temporal Other (p.505). In sum, the pacifist norm in Japan is not single-aspected but includes different views on the standard of being a pacifist country. It is difficult to completely detach the yearning for peace and the distrust towards the military. However, in general, the expectation remains that Japan will be a peaceful state without military confrontation, promoting world peace and not repeating the past mistakes of aggressive warfare.

Then, how has the pacifist norm affected the security policy in Japan? Although not solely attributable to this norm, Japan’s security policy has been considered passive or reluctant (Liff, 2017, p.147). For instance, despite the realists’ expectations, Japan has not proceeded to possess nuclear weapons, adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Izumikawa, 2010, p.126; Waltz, 2000, p.34). The topic that has caused the most significant controversies is the measure of collective defense. In Japan’s context, collective defense is acknowledged more as ‘Collective Self-Defense’ with the term 集团的[Collective]-自衛権[right to self-defense] widely used in the society. This is so because, based on its constitution, Japan does not have an official military that it can deploy overseas to defend its allies. The principle has been ‘exclusively defense-oriented’ security policy, or Individual Self-Defense (ISD), defending its own territory with minimal

military capabilities and only when directly attacked by foreign powers. The ‘individual’ is questionable, as Japan’s security has been reliant on the U.S. forces. Still, in conventional understanding, Japan only admits itself the right to ISD.

Japanese politicians are very sensitive in separating the usage of these terms to differentiate the Japanese understanding of self-defense from the internationally approved self-defense, which includes collective defense with military deployment. As a member of the United Nations (UN), a contradiction emerges regarding Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Japanese government has explained this by referring to Article 9 of the constitution. Based on the UN Charter, Japan has both rights to CSD and ISD, but the Constitution of Japan limits the former, substantially excluding CSD as Japan’s sovereign right.

Kishi Nobusuke, Japan’s Prime Minister from the late 1950s to 1960, pushed through the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, aiming to make Japan an equal ally to the United States. Fearing the entrapment in U.S. military operations, the Japanese society reacted harshly. Kishi assured the public that CSD, in terms of overseas deployment of JSDF, is not allowed in the constitution (Hughes, 2017, p.101). However, the legality of CSD in other measures, such as providing military bases and financial support, was left unspecified (Sakaguchi, 2016, p.3). The basic interpretation of CSD, that Japan does not have the right to it, did not change throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku confirmed the strict application of ISD as the only right of self-defense that Japan has, and Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei reaffirmed the overseas deployment of JSDF as the *excess* of minimal necessary possession of force under the constitution (Hughes, 2017, p.102; Sakaguchi, 2016, p.9). Other Prime Ministers followed suit, considering this constitutional interpretation as the most appropriate under the pacifist norm.

The pacifist norm functioned as a constraint on Japan’s active security policy. At times, it also enabled Japanese leaders to pursue economic growth or provided an excuse to evade the U.S. demand to increase Japan’s commitment to the alliance (Hughes, 2017, p.99). To put it differently, the pacifist norm was occasionally manipulated by political elites to achieve certain policy goals or “particular material interests” (Sato, 2008, p.106). Undoubtedly, the pacifist norm has remained strong in Japan and influenced security policies. Nevertheless, it did not exist independent of structural or material factors. It is worth pointing out that norms, like collective identity, can “evolve and change” (Sato & Hirata, 2008, p.9) through interaction, with social actors’ intention

or discourse attached to it. The challenges to the pacifist norm and its actors will be examined in the next section.

1.3 Revisionist challenges to Japan's security policy

International politics faced a major structural shift with the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of bipolarity in the late 1980s raised questions about whether the U.S. commitment to Japan's security would continue at the previous level. In this new structure and material reality, Japan encountered the necessity to strengthen and widen its security policy. The gradual shift in security policy has occurred since the 1980s, with then-Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko expanding Japan's protection of the sea lines of communication up to one thousand nautical miles (Hughes, 2017, p.102). However, it was in the 1990s that the debate on the revision of security policy and, inevitably, Article 9 of the constitution surfaced more prominently. This trend accelerated in the 2000s, with the then-Prime Ministers openly challenging the constitutional constraints. These leaders are often called revisionists.

The concept of revisionism is generally used to define states that are dissatisfied with and rebellious towards the existing established order or the status quo. Most literature in the discipline of IR discusses certain states as being revisionists, such as the so-called rising states of China and Brazil. Destabilizing states, such as Iran and North Korea, are also included in the revisionist camp (Behraves, 2018; He et al., 2021). Turner and Nymalm (2019) criticize that this concept of revisionism, like other IR concepts, is Western-centric and used to categorize non-Western states that are insubordinate to the status quo. Moreover, He et al. (2021) argue that even the status quo powers, like the United States, can be considered revisionist, deploying "soft revisionist strategies" (p.162) through international institutions.

Seeing a problem with the conceptual stretch of revisionism, Behraves (2018) redefines "state revisionism as *dissatisfaction activated towards changing the existing pattern of structures and distribution of resources, material or ideational, in ways that involve conflict/war or are prone to cause it*" (p.838, emphasis in original). More importantly, Behraves points out that the revisionist is willing to accept the risk that accompanies the strategies of "proactive resource redistribution" (pp.838-839). Although Behraves focuses on revisionist states, this concept can be applied to narrower agents, especially state leaders. Here, Behraves's conceptualization of two modes of revisionism - thick and thin, becomes useful (p.839). Thick revisionism employs

offensive measures, such as invading other sovereign states, to achieve resource redistribution. In contrast, thin revisionism uses strategies of “destabilizing export of ideology and spread of soft power, cultivation and use of proxies, or defiant power-maximizing action within the territorial boundaries of the state itself” (Behraves, 2018, p.839). Even under democracy, state leaders and their agencies have some degree of influence on political decisions at the national level. If they have revisionist views on certain issues and are willing to accept the risks, they may politically challenge the established norms and institutions that constrain domestic resource distribution.

In terms of Japan, the revisionist idea stems from the history of the U.S. occupation following the defeat in WWII. While different reforms took place during this period, the focal point was the constitution. Japan’s postwar constitution was drafted and adopted under the occupational force’s guidance (Ryu, 2018, p.658). As discussed in the previous section, the Constitution of Japan has been the pillar that fostered and supported the pacifist norm and has never been amended thus far. Another issue related to the postwar constitution was the imperial system and its preservation. The occupying force in Japan saw the emperor and imperial system as necessary to stabilize the postwar society. The emperor was exempted from the prosecution of war crimes and reinstated as the national symbol to help cultivate Japan’s fragile democracy (Kersten, 2003, p.15). Those with revisionist views see Japan’s constitution as externally imposed or even illegitimate, violating the sovereign right of self-determination. Particularly, the constitutional constraints on military capabilities are deemed critical. The imperial system, too, despite its preservation, is regarded as a desecration of Japanese traditions. Ryu (2018) nicely sums up the origin of Japan’s revisionism by stating that “national pride and national security as two main dimensions” (p.656) where the revisionist motivation comes from.

History is another aspect of Japan’s revisionism that emerged from the ambition to restore national pride, and therefore, its proponents are usually regarded as nationalists (Kersten, 2003, p.19). They deploy a victim narrative and call Japan’s history education ‘masochistic,’ which makes Japanese people ashamed of their country. Although there are both governmental/non-governmental groups and individuals who endorse this view, historical revisionism continues to attract attention with the occasional visits to Yasukuni Shrine by the then-Prime Ministers. In the Yasukuni Shrine, military personnel, including Class-A war criminals, are worshiped. The visits by Prime Ministers and other officials of prominent status have repeatedly caused diplomatic friction and criticism from China, South Korea, and the United States. However, the Prime

Ministers, especially those who belong to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its conservative faction, are also aware that their political base expects a strong posture against these obstacles.

As regards the national security dimension, revisionism can be understood as becoming autonomous from the U.S.-dependent security policy while mitigating regional threats. It does not mean a break from the U.S.-Japan alliance, but expanding Japan's military role and aiming for less influence from U.S. foreign policy. Still, this autonomy does not suggest a "remilitarized Japan" (Easley, 2017, p.67) as it does not aim for aggressive invasion, and Japan would still be within institutionalized multilateralism. In fact, Japan has maintained international cooperation, with the United States as its primary partner. However, to achieve autonomy or, in the revisionists' view, to regain the sovereign right of self-determination, the 'externally imposed' constitution must be revised.

In sum, Japan's revisionism defines the ambition for revising the constitution, gaining autonomy from the United States in political and military terms, and reinterpreting Japan's wartime history with the installment of national pride. Although there are differences in degree, revisionists, represented mainly by the LDP's conservative faction, share these ideas and pose challenges to the pacifist norm.

Even before becoming mainstream in the 2000s, there were political leaders with revisionist views. One prominent example is Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, mentioned briefly in the previous section, who pushed through the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty despite strong opposition from society. Kishi achieved his aim with the new treaty - Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America - taking effect on June 23rd, 1960, but announced his resignation the same day to settle the social unrest. Witnessing severe resistance to Kishi's revisionist views - Kishi was also ambitious about constitutional revision - most subsequent LDP leaders refrained from openly promoting nationalistic conservative policies and their revisionist ideas (Izumikawa, 2010, p.134; Miyashita, 2008, p.34). Instead, they prioritized economic policies, bringing wealth to the Japanese people by exploiting security provided by the United States. In the 1960s to early 1980s, the pacifist norm and its constraints were convenient excuses for the LDP leaders to divert fewer resources to security. In Kawasaki's (2001) analysis, it was not the constraints of norms that decided Japan's security trajectory but the cost-sensitive attitude, which he defines as post-classical realism. This cost-transferring was also referred to as 'buck-passing' (Lind, 2004). However, the prioritization of the

economy actually helped increase the acceptance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as people started to see the U.S. security guarantee as the source of prosperity (Miyashita, 2008, p.35).

Another revisionist often pertained to is Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served as the Prime Minister for almost half of the 1980s. He is considered the first revisionist Prime Minister who received stable political support (Samuels, 2007a, p.89). According to Sato (2008), Nakasone did have a more flexible view on CSD, but his intention was still limited within the U.S.-Japan bilateral relations and not applicable to a wider framework (pp.93-94).

The end of the Cold War further pushed revisionist leaders to become more open about their ambitions. The alliance with the United States has remained the central security framework, but it has gradually expanded to engage with other countries as well. This was triggered by the military inabilities faced by Japan during the Gulf War (Midford, 2018, p.413). Due to its constitutional constraints, Japan could not send the JSDF to combat zones and mostly contributed with financial support. Japan's actions were criticized for not shedding blood and ridiculed as "checkbook diplomacy" (Hughes, 2006, p.731). From this incident, the debate within Japan about its role in international security has become more vibrant. Especially on the topic of CSD, the issues were: *To what type of missions could Japan send its JSDF, and to what extent can Article 9 be flexible for Japan's contribution to international security or the U.S.-Japan alliance?*

Ozawa Ichiro, the Secretary-General of LDP during the Gulf War and who later joined the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), suggested that Japan should be able to deploy its military forces to UN-mandated missions as a member state that values international peace (Hughes, 2006, p.731; Samuels, 2007b, p.142). In his understanding, the preamble of the Constitution of Japan calls for Japan's contribution to UN-mandated missions, which led to his proposal of creating a separate security force to be deployed to these operations. (Hughes, 2006, p.732; Sato, 2008, p.93). Although Ozawa's proposals did not materialize, the Japanese Diet passed International Peace Cooperation Act (the so-called Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)-law) in 1992, enabling JSDF overseas deployment for peace-keeping missions. However, this expansion of JSDF's role was strictly limited to non-combatant assignments, avoiding deployment to areas with ongoing conflict and even restricting the use of weapons to protect the local population from attacks (Liff, 2015, p.81; Miyashita, 2008, p.22).

With the 9.11 terrorist attack in 2001, Japan became more active in overseas deployment. While not participating in military engagement, Japan under the then-Prime Minister Koizumi

Junichiro, the revisionist leader of LDP and staunch supporter of President Bush's 'war on terror,' deployed JSDF to refueling missions in the Indian Ocean and Iraq's reconstruction. To circumvent the constitutional constraints and accusations of illegitimacy regarding the pacifist norm, Koizumi's government implemented special measures law that would limit the application of the law to specific circumstances and time frames (Sato, 2008, p.95). Moreover, by emphasizing the importance of Japan's contribution to international peace and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the government tried to divert the focus from the controversial debate of CSD (Sato, 2008, p.105). The security environment in East Asia was also changing at the same time. Since the early 2000s, North Korea has heightened its missile and nuclear threat, and China has become more powerful both in economic and military terms (Monten & Provost, 2005, p.293). Along with the attention to North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens, the threat perception was shared in Japanese society and facilitated people's acceptance of more powerful defense capabilities.

This trend continued even under the DPJ government. As one of the biggest opposition parties in the 2000s, the DPJ achieved a rare power transfer by becoming the ruling party in 2009. With the complicated history of merger and enlargement, the members of DPJ had diverse opinions on security policy, but the mainstream view within the party was similar to that of LDP (Hughes, 2017, p.106; Pugliese & Patalano, 2020, p.623; Suzuki & Wallace, 2018, pp.715-716). Alliance with the United States was still important, but compared to LDP, DPJ aspired to focus more on Asian diplomacy and enable Japan's contribution to international security through the UN mandates, fearing the entrapment to U.S. military operations (Easley et al., 2010, pp.54-56). More importantly, the party did not propose the revision of Article 9, albeit the first DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio had suggested easing the restriction on CSD before coming to power (Easley et al., 2010, pp.55-56; Hughes, 2017, p.106).

Reflecting on the developments of Japan's security policy since the end of the Cold War, despite gradually expanding its role in international security, Japan has not been able to reach a consensus on how to deal with its constitutional constraints. The pacifist norm, strongly manifested from the 1960s, has long determined Japan's security policy. However, the revisionist leaders, who aim to revise the constitution and transform Japan into an autonomous proud state, have become prominent in the post-Cold War period. The elevation of regional security threats has also added to the challenges against pacifism. Therefore, the government was forced to adopt ad hoc special measures law to cope with the increasing pressure on Japan's commitment to regional and

international security, while circumventing the established pacifist norm. In other words, the pacifism in the constitution has been stretched. This was the pre-existing condition of Japan's security policy when Abe Shinzo returned to the premiership in late 2012 after an abrupt resignation during his first term in 2007. Since his comeback, Abe commenced a more determined and fierce challenge to constitutional constraints with his revisionist ambitions.

1.4 Security debates and Japan's foreign policy identity

The two factors - the pacifist norm and revisionist ambitions - show a conflict at the basic foundation of the state, the Constitution of Japan. They have been impacting Japan's security posture in the international system and, thus, the state's foreign policy identity. The pacifist norm has been considered the dominant factor, at least until the 1990s, but revisionist challenges have caused fluctuations, creating a deadlock on the debate of constitutional constraints. However, the biggest revisionist challenge since the end of the Cold War was presented by then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2014. Abe proposed a new security policy that would adopt a constitutional reinterpretation of Article 9, substantially enabling Japan to engage in CSD operations. This has reignited a debate asking whether Japan's foreign policy identity has changed to revisionism or remains to be pacifism. There have been divided views among scholars and society.

In the academic field, constructivists and realists, especially neorealists, have made different arguments based on their theoretical perspectives. Singh (2008), focusing on elites' identity, captured the shift in Japan's security posture "from a peace state to an international state" (p.309), which understands its role as a responsible actor in international security. The notion of being responsible, according to Gustafsson et al. (2019), was how the pro-revision figures promoted an anti-pacifist narrative after the Cold War (p.509). The narrative even described pacifism as a threat and abnormal, enabling the turn of identity and the norm (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015, p.17). Hughes (2017), in his examination of Abe's new security policy, concludes that it is a radical shift from the "antimilitaristic principles of the past" (p.126). Gustafsson et al. (2018) go as far as to argue that "Japanese pacifism is dead" (p.152). In this understanding, with the identity shift, the pacifist norm was reversed or even abolished, and Japan's behavior has become more revisionist in terms of military capabilities.

In contrast, scholars (Auslin, 2016; Liff, 2015; Monten & Provost, 2005) have mentioned material factors, such as the increasing security threat in the region and the obligation to commit

to a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance, as the main driving force of Japan's security orientation in the post-Cold War period. To deal with the changing environment, Japan needed to upgrade its defense capabilities, and revising the constitution has been regarded as necessary to some extent. Despite evaluating Abe's 2014 security policy as a radical shift, Hughes (2006) has propounded that the revision of Article 9 was not only the LDP's goal but shared by other parties, including the opposition (p.19). In fact, Abe's security policy is considered a continuation of the existing trend under both the LDP and DPJ leadership to strengthen Japan's capabilities (Liff, 2015, pp.80-81; Lind, 2016, pp.6-7). While acknowledging the substantial transformation of defense capabilities, there is an argument that the pacifist constraint remains in Japan's security policy (Easley, 2017, pp.78-79; Liff, 2017, p.169). Pugliese and Patalano (2020) assess that Abe had revisionist ideas but, at the same time, was a pragmatic politician and had to act under the circumstances to the extent that his revisionist ambitions were not fully reflected in the security policy. In essence, there are views that the new security policy was a critical reaction against the structural reality of increasing threat in Asia. The pacifist norm has not been fundamentally changed, reversed, or abolished but is experiencing evolution (Liff, 2015; Lind, 2016).

In Japanese society, the focal point of the discussion has been the constitution. Since the political debate of constitutional amendment or revision became vibrant with international criticism for Japan's inaction during the Gulf War, society gradually started to examine and question the constitutional constraints, displaying a new trend from the long-established pacifism (Karasudani, 2005, p.63). The political compromise made by the Japan Socialist Party, the strong advocator of Article 9 and unarmed neutrality, to form a coalition government with the LDP in 1994 did not help in maintaining public trust towards the pacifist group (Izumikawa, 2010, p.130; Miyashita, 2008, pp.37-38). Still, many people, including writers and lawyers, disputed the constitutional revision. They founded civil society organizations or publicly expressed their goal to protect Article 9. One of these groups is the 九条の会 [Article 9 Association], established in 2004 and spread throughout the nation with the local network of similar organizations.

These groups may not agree on all matters of how to define and protect Article 9. Some may see the mere existence of JSDF as unconstitutional, while some may consider further expansion of JSDF's role as a danger to pacifism. Nevertheless, the constitutional debate has remained a significant concern for Japanese society. Related to this issue of unconstitutionality is the debate on the political procedure for constitutional revision. Article 96 stipulates the formal

process for making any changes to the constitution, which starts with amendment proposals at the Diet and finalizes with a national referendum. However, knowing the political contest and public wariness of revising Article 9, LDP's conservative leaders have taken another route - constitutional reinterpretation- to upgrade Japan's security policy incrementally.

Hughes (2006) identifies Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's view of "Article 9 as prohibiting both offensive war and the right of self-defense" (p.3) as the initial interpretation made during 1946-1947. Continuing, Hughes mentions that Yoshida soon changed this interpretation to allow Japan the right to ISD, but on CSD, the basic interpretation has remained that the Constitution of Japan forbids this right (pp.3-4). Even when Prime Minister Kishi pushed ahead with the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and when the possibility of entrapment emerged with the Vietnam War during Sato Eisaku's premiership, the basic interpretation of CSD did not sway (Sakaguchi, 2016). In 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi suggested the possible reinterpretation of CSD, even before the 9.11 terror attack, but eventually did not take that course (Tani, 2002, p.132). This precedent was broken in 2014 when Abe implemented the reinterpretation of the right to CSD with the Cabinet Decision on The Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014). This cabinet decision was guided by Abe's security policy and became the foundation for the new legislation to officially enable CSD.

Public polls conducted in 2007, 2013, and 2014 by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (NHK-BCRI), a research center under the public broadcaster Japan Broadcasting Corporation, show that opposition to the amendment of Article 9 is explicitly higher than pro-amendment opinions, except for 2013. Table 1 indicates that in 2013, 'Pro-amendment,' 'Undecided,' and 'Anti-amendment' had similar percentages, but 'Pro-amendment' was slightly higher than the opposing voices. Another interesting point is that 'Undecided' increased between 2007 and 2013 and remained quite the same in 2014. For all three years, the main reason for 'Anti-amendment' was that "Article 9 remains the most crucial clause for the pacifist constitution" (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.80, 2013a, p.3, 2014a, p.3). In contrast, the most common reason for the 'Pro-amendment' was that "Japan's defense capabilities should be constitutionally recognized" (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.79, 2013a, p.3, 2014a, p.3).

Table 1*Public Poll on the Amendment of Article 9 (in %)*

Year	Pro-amendment	Undecided	Anti-amendment	Other (N/A etc.)
2007	27.7	26.0	40.5	5.7
2013	33.1	31.8	29.9	5.1
2014	23.1	31.6	38.4	6.8

Note. The data for 2007 are from *憲法改正議論と国民の意識* [The People’s Awareness of the Debate on Constitutional Reform], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2007 (https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/071201_02.pdf). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). The data for 2013 are from *2013年4月 憲法に関する意識調査 単純集計表* [2013 April Attitude Survey on the Constitution of Japan Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2013 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/130503.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). The data for 2014 are from *2014年4月 憲法に関する意識調査 単純集計表* [2014 April Attitude Survey on the Constitution of Japan Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2014 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/140503.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).

Regarding CSD, the 2007 poll asked whether the respondents knew the concept of the right to CSD. Almost half, 48.7%, answered ‘no,’ while 44.3% answered ‘yes.’ Of those who knew the concept, 22.3% agreed to the adoption of CSD, while 18.6% opposed it (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.80). The trend of pro-adoption continued in the 2013 poll, in which 47.9% agreed and 25.9% disagreed (NHK-BCRI, 2013a, p.3). However, this was reversed in 2014. Those who agreed were 34.1%, and 41.5% disagreed with the adoption of CSD (NHK-BCRI, 2014a, p.3). Although not covered in NHK-BCRI’s polls, Suzuki and Wallace (2018), in their study of how the LDP’s revisionist image affected Abe’s security policy, demonstrate that support for CSD was higher than the opposition, even during the DPJ government in 2009-2012 (p.716).

Considering these data, people generally have favored keeping Article 9 over the years, but the proportion of those who responded as ‘Undecided’ has become significant. The question of CSD emerged in 2007, when Abe, with his revisionist ambitions, became the Prime Minister for the first time in 2006. Pro-adoption was the majority up to the beginning of Abe’s second

premiership in 2013. The polls have demonstrated that the pacifist norm still exists and can impede revisionist ambitions when it becomes too real too fast.

Another question constantly asked in the polls is whether or not to make a constitutional amendment (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.79, 2013a, p.1, 2014a, p.1). From Table 2, a simple comparison of ‘Pro-amendment’ and ‘Anti-amendment’ shows that the former is higher than the latter. The most common reason for the ‘Pro-amendment’ is that “the constitution has become unfit for the new era and environment, unable to deal with current issues” (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.79, 2013a, p.1, 2014a, p.1). Since the question is not specific to Article 9, it can be assumed that different issues, such as the reformation of the electoral district, could have been in respondents’ minds when they gave this reason. However, the second highest reason in all three years is that “amendment is necessary for Japan to contribute and play its role in international society” (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.79, 2013a, p.1, 2014a, p.1). For ‘Anti-amendment,’ the main reason has always been the “protection of Article 9” (NHK-BCRI, 2007, p.79, 2013a, p.2, 2014a, p.1).

Table 2

Public Poll on the Amendment of the Constitution (in %)

Year	Pro-amendment	Undecided	Anti-amendment	Other (N/A etc.)
2007	40.8	30.4	24.4	4.3
2013	41.6	39.3	16.0	3.1
2014	28.4	40.3	26.2	5.1

Note. The data for 2007 are from *憲法改正議論と国民の意識* [The People’s Awareness of the Debate on Constitutional Reform], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2007 (https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/071201_02.pdf). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). The data for 2013 are from *2013年4月 憲法に関する意識調査 単純集計表* [2013 April Attitude Survey on the Constitution of Japan Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2013 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/130503.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). The data for 2014 are from *2014年4月 憲法に関する意識調査 単純集計表* [2014 April Attitude Survey on the Constitution of Japan Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2014 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/140503.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).

Here, a conflict can be observed. People recognize the necessity to change the constitution so that Japan can deal with, and act in, the changing world system, but also continue to claim the pacifist norm, represented by Article 9 and its constraints, as an important principle for the state. The increase in the percentage of 'Undecided' in both Table 1 and Table 2 reflects this dilemma.

The pacifist norm emerged in the aftermath of WWII and has deeply ingrained in the society, limiting Japan's defense capabilities. This is now being challenged by the revisionist ambitions that partly arise from national security issues: the changing environment in Asia, being responsible for its own foreign and security policy, and the requirement to actively participate in international security. The revisionist challenge aims for "proactive resource redistribution" (Behraves, 2018, pp.838-839) while acknowledging the accompanying risk. The structural shifts and revisionist ambitions as the material factor and the pacifist norm as the ideational factor are interrelating, showing the struggle between the factors. Thus, both factors need consideration in analyzing foreign policy identity.

Chapter 2

2.1 Single case study and case selection

The debate on Japan's security policy - whether 'reversal or continuity' - and foreign policy identity - whether 'revisionism or pacifism' - illustrates a contradiction. While the pacifist norm has remained strong in Japan, the country has had conservative leaders who are considered revisionist. These leaders have made an effort to maintain strong ties with the United States, defying the expectation of pursuing an autonomous policy. Within this framework, several questions arise regarding Abe's security policy proposed in 2014. Knowing that the new policy would be publicly unpopular with the unwavering support of Article 9, how did Abe explain and reason for the adoption of it? Also, Liff (2015) states that strengthening Japan's security capabilities has been an ongoing trend since the 1990s and did not abruptly emerge under Abe's administration (pp.80-81). Why, then, was the new security policy introduced in 2014 and adopted in the form of new legislation in 2015 while the pacifist norm was still strong in society? Lastly, how and to what extent do the developments of this security policy indicate a change in Japan's foreign policy identity?

Answering these questions requires a qualitative approach with a single case study of Abe's security policy. This is not to say that pacifism or anti-war sentiment is unique to Japan. Other countries broadly adopt and present these ideas. For example, Germany is frequently brought out as a comparison to Japan. Both share historical backgrounds and constraints, committing atrocities and being defeated in WWII. Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, can also be characterized as pacifistic, putting military activities under parliamentary scrutiny and showing reluctance in deployment to outer NATO territories (Miller, 2010, pp.200-204). Still, in the context of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (then-West Germany) was allowed to join NATO and rearm itself with military capabilities already in the 1950s. Japan also established the original institution of the current JSDF in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War. However, Germany's Basic Law has clearly affirmed the possession of armed forces since the 1950s, making a contrast to Japan, where the existence of JSDF remains unclarified in its constitution. The degree of acceptance and the distance to the armed forces in Germany and Japan, respectively, come from different circumstances.

If comparing countries is difficult, then comparison within Japan might be possible. Particularly, Koizumi, who was the Prime Minister during 2001-2006, and Abe shared nationalistic

views, and they both strived to expand JSDF's role in international security. Koizumi appointed Abe as the LDP party secretary and the chief cabinet secretary, lifting Abe to be the front-runner for post-Koizumi leadership. The difference is highlighted in how these two figures tried to address security issues. While both indicated their willingness for the constitutional reinterpretation of the right to CSD, Koizumi eventually ceased that track. With the unexpected 9.11 terrorist attack, which happened less than six months into Koizumi's first term, Koizumi adopted special measures laws to enable swift support to the United States while circumventing the challenging process of constitutional amendment or reinterpretation. During Abe's premiership, there were no comparable events that required urgent reconfiguration of security policies, but nonetheless, Abe adopted constitutional reinterpretation.

While small-n case studies and quantification of factors are not impossible for examining Japan's foreign policy identity, this study aims to find out how Abe's security policy was accepted by the Japanese public and why it was adopted at that particular point in time. In such inquiries, the context matters, and to consider it as much as possible, focusing on a single case is preferable (Landman, 2008, pp.86-87). Moreover, in terms of academic relevance, this study aims to demonstrate that both material and ideational factors are necessary. Existing study on Japan's security policy tends to take an 'either/or' argument regarding the factors, but there were scholars who, especially focusing on the postwar era and the 1990s, have explained employing both factors (Izumikawa, 2010; Miyshita, 2008; Sato, 2008; Sato & Hirata, 2008). Nevertheless, the discussion on Abe's security policy remains divided into an 'either/or' rationale, with less attempt to provide an extensive explanation. Therefore, this study will focus on the case of Abe's security policy.

Still, the limits of a single case study should be examined. The common criticism might be that it is difficult to produce generalizable knowledge and lacks representativeness (Landman, 2008, p.93; Ruffa, 2020, pp.1140-1141). Universal knowledge that can be applied broadly is preferred by positivists, but context-sensitive studies can be better conducted with an interpretive and qualitative approach (Kurowska & Guevara, 2020, pp.1215-1216). Another related criticism would be the selection bias in a single case study. Randomness in sampling could validate the universality of the knowledge. However, the aim of this study is to examine the meaning-making process or the reasoning behind the phenomenon of adopting a security policy that enables CSD, in socially constructed circumstances. In fact, existing literature (Hagström, 2015) on Japan's security policy has already described it as an anomaly, suggesting its deviant feature that cannot

be generalized.

In terms of representativeness, it is true that Abe does not represent all conservative ideas in the LDP or society. There are different degrees of revisionist ambitions within the conservative factions, and Abe might have been one of the most explicit cases. For the LDP, the largest political party in Japan, the formation of factions has been necessary for smooth internal functions and intraparty power balance. According to Park (2001), the factions were capable of restraining the party leader, who also is the Prime Minister, “producing a relationship of interdependence and reciprocal checks and balances” (p.460) within the LDP. This relationship started to change gradually around Koizumi’s premiership, and from Abe’s second premiership, factions’ constraints weakened (Takayasu, 2014, pp.43-44). Seeing Abe’s firm control in the party, LDP party members might have embraced Abe’s revisionist ambitions simply in anticipation of gaining the leader’s endorsement for candidacy in the next elections. To put it differently, even if the LDP party members showed definitive support for Abe’s security policy, it does not mean that all genuinely agreed with his visions.

Moreover, despite the decline of Abe’s approval ratings during the Diet deliberation on the new security policy in the summer of 2015 (NHK-BCRI, n.d.), Abe managed to maintain long-term administration until he stepped down in 2020. The general support of the Abe administration was not based only on security policies but included other spheres, namely economic policies. In a more pessimistic view, the voters might have felt that there were no other political parties capable of competing with the LDP. The subsequent electoral successes of the LDP and Abe, in particular, from 2012 and so on, do not suggest that the public was convinced by Abe’s revisionist ambitions, and there is no ruling out of other political agendas when considering the approval rates. Therefore, when focusing on the developments of Abe’s security policy, there may be limits to understanding the extent of the shift in Japan’s foreign policy identity.

Still, as a country with a democratic system, the election results show that among the constituents and those who voted, the mainstream was general acceptance of Abe’s, or the LDP’s, set of policies. Admittedly there are issues of election turnouts, public indifference towards politics, and a sense of helplessness in making political change by voting. However, these are debates concerning different topics of challenges to democracy, which exceeds the scope of this study. Rather, the lack of representativeness makes the question - ‘Why was the new security policy accepted, particularly in 2015 under the Abe administration?’ - more intriguing. While previous

administrations did not initiate such moves to reinterpret the right to CSD, Abe was capable of achieving it, and this deviation makes a single case study an appropriate approach for answering the research questions.

2.2 Critical discourse analysis

There have been different discourses regarding Japan's security policy, as already discussed in the previous chapter. Pacifism was accepted as a way to achieve recovery after the defeat in WWII. Even the close security relationship with the United States, although facing strong resistance in 1960, came to be accepted as a necessity for Japan's economic development. Being a promoter of peace, or securing its peace by not allowing JSDF to engage in foreign conflicts and keeping the constitutional restraints, has been the dominant view. Contrary to this pacifist norm, competing ideas - gaining momentum in the 1990s - called for Japan's stepped-up defense capabilities and the loosening of restraints to engage in international security issues. Viewing the constitution as limiting its sovereign right to defend itself, the aim has been to revise, or, to a lesser degree, amend, the constitution, especially Article 9 and the interpretation of CSD.

These discourses do not exist independently; they communicate and interact. Abe also used discourse to gain public acceptance and achieve the adoption of the new security policy that substantially enables the deployment of JSDF for the exercise of CSD. However, Abe's discourse is not entirely his original. It is constructed upon existing discourses and texts, demonstrating both interdiscursivity and intertextuality (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p.46; Fairclough, 2001, p.124; Locke, 2004, p.9). Analyzing his discourse assists in answering the questions: 'How did Abe reason the adoption of the security policy?' and 'Why was it successful at that particular time?'. More precisely, the study will examine what meanings were attached and what tools were used in Abe's discourse.

The method of discourse analysis has been used in different disciplines and can be beneficial when studying certain topics related to society or shared ideas. Viewing language as a field where social meanings are constructed (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, pp.43-45), discourse analysis is considered a part of the constructivist method. As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) explain, the stress on "widely shared or intersubjective beliefs" (pp.392-393) is one of the main features of constructivism. Therefore, understanding intersubjective meanings becomes important in the constructivist method, and this is facilitated by looking into the process (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 2001, p.395; Jung, 2019, p.3). Here, discourse becomes a suitable vehicle to examine intersubjective meanings because discourse can be defined as a ‘meaning-making process’ (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p.4). Since it is a process and practice, discourse does not provide a fixed meaning, but it is made to seem like it is incontestable (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, pp.2-3; Fairclough, 2010, p.230). Discourse constructs the reality the subjects live in, enabling “*actors to make sense of the world and act within it*” (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p.4, emphasis in original).

Then, discourse analysis can be explained - in a very simplified way - as an examination of the meaning-making process, showing how reality is understood and what social acts were taken based on that understanding. Taylor (2013) states discourse analysis as “the analysis of language data as evidence of social phenomena, theorizing language as communication, practice or selective constructions derived from accrued social meanings” (p.27). Studying discourse allows comprehension of the society on which the research is conducted. Thus, discourse analysis is a suitable method to examine whether and to what extent foreign policy identity shifted in Japan.

While there are different approaches to discourse analysis, this study will apply a critical one. Critical discourse analysis enables analysts to focus on agency, as power relation becomes the central concern. In fact, with the influence of critical social theory, the critical approach aims to lay out the “structure of domination” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p.398). The power relations can be inferred from the text, such as what issues are presented as important and what issues are marginalized. According to Wodak (2001), language itself does not have power, but it “gains power” (p.10) depending on who makes use of it. This relates to which speaker, or the actor, has the power, how this is resisted, or what obstacles exist to the paramount issue (Fairclough, 2001). Also, Milliken (1999) mentions that the power relation is produced in the discursive practice of shaping “the common sense(s) of societies” (p.237). Disclosing power relations requires consideration of the context, and thus, the examination of intertextuality and interdiscursivity becomes an indispensable approach in critical discourse analysis (Meyer, 2001, p.15; Wodak, 2001, p.11).

Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) evaluate critical discourse analysis as an approach that regards ideas as more “linked to relations of material power” and, therefore, allocates a “weaker autonomous role for ideas” (p.398). In this sense, material power is accepted as the premise of the social process of meaning-making, although the position of power or agency is still a social construct. In this method, the concern is how the actor in a certain position uses the language.

Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) also mention the critical approach's contribution as 'denaturalization,' which shows how power has affected the social construction processes (p.398).

For this study, critical discourse analysis is applicable because Abe - the agent with power and revisionist ambitions - and his discourse become crucial elements in examining the developments of Japan's security policy. What tools and how Abe used them in the discourse to explain the adoption of new security policy exhibits his understanding of the reality and how he viewed the contesting discourse of pacifism. At the same time, there could be an approach to compare the discourses of revisionism and pacifism, which were both routinely deployed, especially the latter, during the time of the study. However, the authority Abe possessed, created a discrepancy in the abilities between the two views, making the comparison ineffective (Hansen, 2006, p.69).

To some extent, critical discourse analysis takes a linguistic approach. As Fairclough (2001) states, the method "is [an] analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices" (p.123). Fairclough (2001) means 'dialectic' in that elements are different "but not discrete, fully separate" (p.122). Language is a part of social activity, and it produces representations or recontextualization (Fairclough, 2001, p.123). The dialectic relationship is embedded in the method itself. Although considered a constructivist method, it assumes the role of material power in the meaning-making process. Moreover, with the focus on power relationships, critical discourse analysis is suitable for conducting research on Japanese society, where a struggle between revisionism and pacifism has been taking place.

2.3 Data collection, selection criteria, and limitations

The data of Abe's discourse are collected from official archives. The transcripts of press conferences and policy speeches by Abe are retrieved from the Prime Minister's archived website. Nonetheless, some records of policy speeches are missing from this website. For these, the data are retrieved from the Diet minutes, as Prime Minister's policy speeches have been traditionally delivered at the Diet. Abe has published several books and dialogue collections in which he conveyed his vision for Japan and his political ambitions. However, following Hansen's (2006) criteria, these will not serve as the primary data. According to Hansen, there are three criteria for selecting texts in discourse analysis: the texts "are characterized by the clear articulation of

identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position” (p.76). Abe’s personal publications might fulfill the first two criteria but lack the official authority of the Premiership. In contrast, the texts of Abe’s communication, such as press conferences and policy speeches delivered while in office, meet all three criteria.

Abe also participated in the Diet deliberations of the legislative bills regarding the new security policy. The special committees in both the Lower and Upper House, designated for the deliberation of the new security policy, asked questions and requested Abe’s answers. While Hansen (2006) warns that parliamentary debates “may not be widely read and attended to” (p.76), the nature of the bills was of high concern to the Japanese public. Therefore, the official minutes of Diet deliberations, mainly from the Lower and Upper House special committees, are also included as text data of Abe’s discourse. When relevant deliberation occurs, the records of plenary sessions are also retrieved for data.

Text, here, is understood as a “material *site of emergence* of immaterial *discourse(s)*” (Kress, 2011, p.36, emphasis in original) and is not limited to written language or oral speeches. There are multimodal texts in which writings, speeches, images, and gestures are mixed (Fairclough, 2010, p.233; Kress, 2011, p.36). For Abe’s press conferences and policy speeches, there also are archives in video format provided by the Cabinet Public Affairs Office. In this study, the transcripts and visual images are combined for extensive discourse analysis. Particularly, the video format supplies information on what terms or phrases were emphasized and where the intervals were placed for effects (See Appendix for the full list of data for critical discourse analysis).

As the time frame of the analysis is from January 2013 to September 2015, the data are collected from this period. Abe fully came back to power as Prime Minister with a massive victory in the Lower House election in December 2012. Since the installment of the new government, Abe has suggested the adoption of a new security policy and officially proposed it in 2014. The formal Diet deliberation of the legislative bills began in May 2015 and gained approval in September. The legislation was enforced in March 2016, but the study will not include the period after the Diet approval. During this development, there were three spheres of debate regarding Abe’s security policy: legal, substantial, and procedural. Some legal interpretations saw the new security policy as dubious of constitutionality. The procedure of the cabinet-led constitutional reinterpretation was seen as undemocratic, which also became entangled in the legal debate. At the same time, practical

defense measures are based on this latest governmental reinterpretation, and this research will focus on the substance of this security policy.

With the constitutional aspect being highly controversial, Abe was obliged to explain the policy to his constituents, the Japanese public. Simultaneously, he was very active in explaining Japan's new security stance to his counterparts in other countries. There are several public speeches, such as those delivered in the Shangri-La Dialogue and the U.S. Congress, that can be traced for data. Nevertheless, this research aims to study the contestation in Japanese society and its relation to foreign policy identity. Therefore, considering the different contexts of the speeches delivered to foreign and domestic audiences, the speeches during Abe's trip abroad are not included in the primary data. The context is related to the language of the text, and thus, data of Abe's discourse are collected in the Japanese language for viable examination.

However, even while targeting domestic audiences, different weights might be assigned to the speeches depending on the timing and type of communication. For instance, the policy speeches at the beginning of the Diet sessions are delivered in front of the Diet members, while most press conferences are a more direct form of communication, albeit through media, from the Prime Minister to the society. The policy speech is also divided into two types, categorized as *施政方針演説* [Administrative Policy Speech], delivered at the regular Diet sessions, and *所信表明演説* [Policy Statement], delivered at either extraordinary or special Diet sessions. Officially, both types are translated as 'policy speech.' However, as the regular Diet sessions are convened at the beginning of the year, 'Administrative Policy Speech' tends to lay out the government policies more extensively. The 'Policy Statement' would rather focus on selected issues that require deliberation at that Diet session. Moreover, external factors such as elections may affect the speech content and its weight. When the elections neared, Abe might have toned down certain policies, including the security policy, to mitigate contention between revisionist and pacifist views. The timing and the type of communication must be taken into account when working with the data.

Another limitation of the collected data is that while Abe's communication is expected to be centered on his agency with genuine intention to achieve revisionist ambitions, other actors could have influenced the content in the speech-writing process. This process remains inaccessible, either because it was done backdoors or it requires access to Abe's personal cognition. However, the texts of Abe's discourse are selected based on Hansen's (2006) criteria and represent Abe's official view that he put out to the public. In fact, Dunn and Neumann (2016) state that certain

ideas are accepted “not because of any inherent “truth” but because of the strength of that specific representation” (p.55). This means that whether Abe truly believed in and upheld revisionist ideas does not matter, but the discourse being deployed as the Prime Minister’s view denotes its value.

Regarding sources that are not included in the critical discourse analysis, these are retrieved and analyzed to illustrate Japan’s security environment at the time of the study, examine the substantial aspect of the new security policy, and present the reaction from the opposition or the public. Documents prepared for the Diet deliberation, resources provided by relevant ministries, and academic articles on Japan’s security policy are consulted as secondary sources to demonstrate the threat environment to Japan. Abe’s speeches delivered during foreign trips suggest which countries were considered close or hostile in that environment. The substance of Abe’s security policy is studied from the cabinet decisions, legislative proposals, and relevant materials provided by the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The reactions to Abe’s security policy are mostly retrieved from the Diet minutes, tracing the opposition’s arguments in the deliberation, mainly from the special committees. Also, the statements issued by different political parties, influential associations or organizations, and public polls are studied to show either positive, negative, or ambiguous responses.

2.4 Principles of analysis and interpretation

Critical discourse analysis in this study aims to inductively examine how Abe reasoned and explained the new security policy. What the discourse sought to achieve is clear, but to answer ‘how?’, the analysis searches for tools Abe used in the discourse. Tools could be Abe’s interpretation of threats and security that were conveyed to the public as the policy is formulated based on the subject’s interpretation. Critical discourse analysis, a constructivist method that assumes the role of material power, enables the interpretation of Abe’s tools and how he sought to overcome the obstacles using the tools. These tools were something Abe saw as necessary to facilitate the public’s understanding and adoption of the security policy. Being acknowledged as a revisionist, Abe needed tools to make the new security policy acceptable for the long-established pacifist norm and the staunch supporters of Article 9. In other words, while not subordinating the revisionist ambition, Abe had to explain that the constitutional reinterpretation and the new security policy do not go against or overturn the pacifist norm. The ideas or meanings that enabled this are the tools.

There could be several tools in Abe's discourse. Some may come from past discourses, especially from the 1990s and 2000s when the security structure shifted in the world, and Japan started to face pressure to expand its commitments to global security. This intrigues the question of why at that particular time, which is 2015, was Abe's security policy adopted. There has been a gradual build-up of revisionist views, prominent since the end of the Cold War, but the pacifist norm also remained firmly established. To promote the adoption, there might have been new tools Abe deployed during the period of the study. Also, tools from past revisionist discourses could have been presented in a different light to make the new security policy acceptable.

In analyzing whether Japan's foreign policy identity has changed to revisionism or has been in continuation of pacifism, the redistribution of resources becomes the principle. When this redistribution happens with the acceptance of the risk of conflict, this indicates revisionist change (Behraves, 2018, pp.838-839). Resources do not only point to economic or material capabilities. It includes strategies and means to compensate for the insufficiency or reinforce the capabilities. In terms of how and to what extent it changed, the study focuses on the substance of the security policy. As discussed in the previous section, there were two other spheres of debate, legal and procedural, regarding the security policy. The domestic discussions let the substantial aspect slide, with a higher interest in constitutional revisionism. However, the substances of the policy become the practice of security. As identity is the determining factor of practice, the extent of change in Japan's foreign policy identity is analyzed through the substances. Also, looking into the substances of the bill on the security policy, which was proposed in May 2015, and comparing them with what was adopted in September manifests the extent of change accepted or denied.

Examining the substance requires an understanding of how security and threat are defined in the constitutional reinterpretation and the new policy. On top of that, how the means to achieve security are defined becomes essential, as it suggests new or different practices that have been lacking or insignificant in the previous security policies. Pursuing the adoption of the new policy or upgrading security could induce threats to others, especially the neighboring countries that have experienced past aggressions by Japanese forces. Therefore, the new policy should indicate its primary purpose - enhancing Japan's security - without causing a security dilemma. How the policy aims to accomplish this is another concern in studying the substance.

Moreover, even long-term allies and partner states could show caution in fully embracing their partner's new security policy that could change the previously held stance. Abe's

constitutional reinterpretation and the new security policy have to assure these states that Japan is not becoming completely autonomous in the global security structure. At the same time, the new policy also needs to demonstrate that Japan is willing to increase its contribution to international security.

Throughout the study, the theoretical expectation is that material and ideational factors interrelate, and thus, both need consideration in examining state behavior. Neither is sufficient alone, and they make up for each other's limitations. Marsh (2009) describes the relationship between the two factors as dialectic, and for this, the principle or the essence of both factors should be maintained in the synthesis as distinguishable. To put it differently, the material interest of revisionism - the proactive redistribution of resources - and the ideational interest of pacifism - upholding the pacifist norm - both should be present in the substances of the new security policy. Abe's discourse, aimed at gaining the public's understanding of the constitutional reinterpretation and the adoption of the security policy, is also expected to demonstrate the dialectic relation between both factors.

This theoretical expectation is also partly relevant to the research puzzle: the contradiction in Japan's foreign policy identity, in which the pacifist society has had conservative leaders who are considered revisionist. Upholding the pacifist norm has long been the ideational interest, but, at the same time, material conditions of threat and the material interest of redistributing resources for security have also been - especially in the post-Cold War period - the issue for state leaders, including Abe. Thus, the analysis of the main research question of this study: 'how' Abe reasoned the new security policy, could, in part, explain this contradiction with Abe's discourse reflecting both material and ideational factors.

The sub-questions: 'Why was the new security policy adopted in 2015 while the pacifist norm was still strong?' and 'How and to what extent do the developments of this security policy indicate a change in Japan's foreign policy identity?' are also related to the analysis of the main question. Abe's reasoning could indicate what factors were perceived as crucial for advocating the adoption of the new security policy at that particular time. Additionally, the degree of revisionist ambition Abe demonstrated in his explanation is relevant to the eventual adoption of the policy in 2015 because the complete refutation of the pacifist norm would have inhibited the adoption, considering the strong support of pacifism in Japanese society. Therefore, examining the sub-questions would assist the analysis of 'how' Abe reasoned and explained the security policy.

Reflecting on this chapter, the single case study of Japan's security policy under the Abe administration, more precisely during 2013-2015, allows context-sensitive examination. While neither this case nor Abe represents all of the revisionist ambitions, it makes the successful adoption of Abe's reinterpretation of CSD and security policy a deviation worth studying. The method of critical discourse analysis is applied to answer the questions: 'How Abe explained and reasoned for the adoption of Japan's new security stance?' and 'Why at that point in time?' The extent of change in Japan's foreign policy identity is examined through the substances of the security policy, which should be presented in Abe's explanation. In this analysis, the data of Abe's discourse are retrieved from his speeches and press conferences. Diet deliberation records of the bills on the security policy are also crucial as the subject matter was of great concern in Japanese society. The next chapter will move on to the analysis but will start by laying out the context of Japan's security environment at the time of the study.

Chapter 3

3.1 Japan's security environment in the 2010s

Shortly after starting his second term as Prime Minister in late December 2012, Abe Shinzo and his government were confronted with a tragic event that took place on January 16th, 2013. On that day, an Islamic extremist group attacked a gas plant in Algeria and took foreign workers, including 10 Japanese, as hostages. Despite the diplomatic tools utilized to request the secure recovery of these hostages, after the Algerian government's rescue operation, the hostages, including all 10 Japanese, died. While acknowledging the rising risk of terrorism in the North African region, a faraway place from Japan, this incident was still shocking for Japanese society. This distant threat would recur in 2015 when two Japanese hostages were killed by Islamic State militants.

At the same time, the distance to Africa and the Middle East in terms of maritime security has become much closer for Japan. Since 2009, Japan has been deploying its JSDF destroyers to join the multinational counter-piracy operations on the coast of Somalia and the Aden Gulf. To facilitate the operation, JSDF established its first foreign base in Djibouti in 2011 (MOD, 2013, pp.244-246). In spite of the remoteness, the mission to secure the safe passage of maritime cargo is crucial, which can be reflected in Japan's situation as an island country that relies on maritime trade.

However, the nearby threats have been felt more keenly. The most explicit threat comes from North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Hagström and Hanssen (2015) have pointed out that Japan tends to be more concerned about the abduction issue than the issues of missile and nuclear developments (p.74). This has been inevitable, as the discussions between the two governments on the abduction issue have almost completely stalled, despite the return of several victims in 2002. The families of the abductees and those who returned have been acting strongly to keep the public's awareness.

Nevertheless, the missile and nuclear issues have become a pressing matter with the succession of Kim Jong-un in 2011. In 2012, with the amendment of its constitution, North Korea specified in the preamble to become a nuclear state (Son, 2015, p.130). Moreover, the so-called 'satellite' launch in December 2012 has been considered a missile test to develop its intercontinental ballistic missile technology (Son, 2015, p.133). Regardless of the international condemnation and strengthened sanctions, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, the first under the new leadership, in February 2013. For Japan, as Abe mentioned several times at the

general debate of the UN General Assembly, the aggression from its northwest was increasing and must be dealt with (2013, 2014c, 2015b).

Another nearby threat with a significant impact is the Chinese military, which has been growing its influence broadly in Asia. One of the most explicit challenges posed by China in the region has been the de facto control of the South China Sea. In 2012, China forced the Philippines out of the Scarborough Shoal and has been further increasing militarization in the area (Storey, 2013, p.146). The dispute has caused friction not only with the Philippines but also with Vietnam, Indonesia, and others who claim maritime rights. Japan, reflecting the situation in the South China Sea onto its security concerns in the East China Sea and for the protection of the trade route, has been showing support to the ASEAN countries, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, through both multilateral and bilateral means (Shoji, 2014, pp.131-132). Abe has sought to internationalize the problem by referring to freedom and the rule of law in the maritime order in his speeches during foreign trips (2014a, 2014b, 2015a). Japan has also engaged in multilateral discussions, fostering cooperation between the ASEAN states and the United States while providing patrol vessels through bilateral cooperation (Shoji, 2014, pp.132-133, 137-138).

Officially, Japan does not acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. The islands are under Japanese administrative control, but China's de facto control in the South China Sea has caused concerns that Japan would be forced out once China gains effective control of the islands. This has led Japan to assert its territorial sovereignty over the islands. Within this circumstance, the 2010 incident, in which a Chinese fishing boat collided with the Japanese patrol vessels, heightened the tension (Storey, 2013, p.144). Although the islands were under private ownership, the Japanese government purchased them in 2012, causing strong criticism and protests from China. Since then, Chinese territorial intrusion from sea and air increased sharply (MOD, 2014, pp.180-183, 2016, pp.54-56).

Another provocative measure was taken in November 2013, when China announced its Air Defense Identification Zone, which includes the East China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While the United States has refrained from taking a particular position on the territorial dispute between China and Japan, then-President Obama has stated that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would apply to the Senkaku Islands (Rinehart & Elias, 2015, p.20). Still, Japan cannot be completely relieved, as Article 5 specifies its applicability as "territories under the administration of Japan" (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the

United States of America, 1960), suggesting the necessity for Japan to keep asserting its administrative control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Moreover, the continuing growth in the Chinese defense budget and the lack of transparency in its military modernization have increased the tension in East Asia and have remained high since then (Storey, 2013, p.145). Compared to North Korea, the aggressiveness in China's discourse might not be as explicit, but its impact on regional security is much more immense. Along with its vast landmass and population, Chinese behavior in the region is unignorable for Japan.

In terms of territorial dispute, another adversity has been the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands issue with Russia. In 2010, then-President Medvedev visited the disputed territories, marking the first visit by Russia's head of state. Although mainly for defense purposes and small in size, the Russian military has remained in the area (MOD, 2014, p.58). However, the relationship between Russia and Japan was rather ambiguous in the 2010s. To prevent the strengthening of China-Russia ties that could cooperate against Japan on territorial claims, Japan sought to improve or maintain reasonable relations with Russia (Dian & Kireeva, 2022, p.861). After returning to power, Abe held an official visit to Russia in April 2013, which was the first visit in decades by a Japanese Prime Minister. During the visit, the two countries decided to initiate a Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation, also called a 'two-plus-two' Ministerial Meeting. At the same time, the two countries agreed to restart the negotiations on a peace treaty and territorial issues. From Russia's perspective, keeping a stable cooperative relationship with Japan was also favorable for checking the balance against growing Chinese power in Northeast Asia (Hyodo, 2014, pp.868-869). It was not mutual trust but the strategic interests of the respective countries that maintained a reasonable distance between Russia and Japan.

Facing these security environments, Japan has been adjusting its defense policies. With Abe and the LDP regaining power, Japan took measures to reaffirm its alliance with the United States, which was somewhat damaged under the DPJ government. It was also important not to miss the tide of the U.S. 'pivot to Asia' under the Obama administration. On his first trip to the United States after returning to the Premiership, Abe discussed the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, a document laying out the framework and roles of the two countries in defense cooperation. While this revision of the Guideline was proposed in the last few

months of the DPJ government, Abe took over this task, pushing ahead with a more specific vision of broadening JSDF's role within the framework (MOD, 2013, pp.152-154).

Abe not only restrengthened the U.S.-Japan relation but also implemented domestic measures. In early December 2013, the National Security Council (NSC) was established under the cabinet, holding regular meetings among the ministers. With this establishment of NSC, the cabinet adopted a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 17th with a cabinet decision, replacing the old Basic Policy on National Defense, issued in 1957. Accompanying the new NSS, related defense program guidelines and plans were revised. The same month, the cabinet-drafted Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets was passed in the Diet. Also called the Secrecy Law, it intends to prevent the leakage of highly sensitive information concerning state security. It also aimed to assure Japan's allies in their defense cooperation (MOD, 2014, p.127).

In April 2014, another cabinet decision was made, which normalized former exceptions on Japan's arms exports. At the height of the Cold War, Japan had put out Three Principles on Arms Exports, which initially targeted arms export bans to the Communist bloc or other states specified in UN resolutions. However, the principles were soon interpreted broadly as a total ban on arms exports, regardless of the recipient states. In reality, this policy never altogether prohibited arms exports but singled out certain states. For other states, Japan took extra caution in deciding the exports. Therefore, Japan has taken a case-by-case approach. For instance, the U.S.-Japan cooperation on developing defense capabilities and provisions of patrol vessels to the ASEAN countries were enabled as exceptions to the principles (MOD, 2014, p.329). The cabinet decision in April replaced the former principles with the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, loosening some restrictions that would take account of the previous extraordinary measures.

Revising documents and principles may end up with changes only in writing. To materialize the measures implemented, Japan increased its defense budget in 2013 after 11 years of decline. Since then, the budget has been increasing yearly (MOD, 2022, pp.217-218). In other words, the build-up of uncertainty in Japan's surroundings - and even in distant regions - has been undeniable, especially since the early 2010s. While Japan has reached out for security cooperation against piracy in the Middle East and Africa, it has been mostly incapable of rescuing its citizens, who were taken as hostages by Islamic extremists. The new order in North Korea under Kim Jong-un has accelerated its provocative nuclear development. China, with its growing military budget

and modernization, has continued to increase its presence in the South China Sea as well as in the East China Sea. The relationship with Russia was ambivalent, but Japan's official position has been that Russia continues the illegal occupation of the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands.

Concomitantly, Japan has sought to reinforce its alliance with the United States and its domestic security institutions, which were advanced further by Abe's return to office. In 2014, Abe delivered another proposal regarding Japan's security policy that would affect the constitutional interpretation of Article 9, the peace clause. The substance of this new policy and the legislative proposals for its implementation will be examined in the next section.

3.2 Content of Abe's Security Policy (2014-2015)

The development of Japan's new security policy consisted of four major steps. While the suggestion to review Japan's security policy was already made in early 2013 by Abe, its first public introduction was in 2014. Abe held a press conference on May 15th to explain the course of direction in the process of reviewing the security policy. Then, on July 1st, after the review, a cabinet decision was made on the basic course of the new policy, outlining the constitutional reinterpretation. Around a year later, in May 2015, the cabinet submitted legislative proposals to the Diet for deliberation. Shortly, the Diet deliberation began, which lasted until mid-September. This section will examine the substance of the new security policy through cabinet decisions and legislative proposals. However, first, the background of the press conference held in May 2014 and the process of reviewing the security policy, introduced by Abe, will be discussed.

The press conference on May 15th, 2014, was held upon the submission of a final report by the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. This panel was a private advisory commission, established originally in 2007 by Abe, but was suspended after he resigned from the first prime ministerial term. Upon returning to power, Abe reconvened this panel and received its suggestions in the final report in May 2014. According to Abe, there were two different suggestions: one was the adoption of the right to CSD to its full extent, and another was the adoption of the limited right to CSD (See Appendix CDA-6). The purpose of the press conference was to introduce the suggestions made by the panel and the government's consideration regarding the suggestions for the security policy. It also laid out the procedures the government will take in reviewing the security policy (MOD, 2015, p.139).

The process explained by Abe was as follows: it begins with the final report by the advisory panel, and the government will explore further on the possibility of adopting the limited right to CSD. Within this examination, the government might consider changing the conventional interpretation that the constitution only allows ISD upon attack against Japan. If reinterpretation is inevitable for Japan's security, then the government and the ruling coalition will also discuss how to change it. Moreover, if constitutional reinterpretation takes place to allow the limited right to CSD, there must be changes to the legislation to enable and implement the new security policy. The government will create a legal framework and legislative proposals and submit them for Diet deliberation upon cabinet decision.

Complying with the procedure, the government announced the result of its review on the possible adoption of the limited right to CSD on July 1st, 2014. This announcement was made in the form of a cabinet decision, formerly the Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People. Within this document, the government decided that a new legal basis and legislation are necessary for mainly three domains of Japan's security policy. The three domains are: "Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack," "Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community," and "Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution" (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014, pp.2-3, 6).

The first domain is related to the gray zone situation in security, which is neither peacetime nor a full-fledged incident. In Japan's case, the concern is an infringement of its territorial islands by armed groups that is short of an attack. To be prepared for such situations, the government has decided to consider a system to enhance collaboration between concerned agencies, such as the police and coast guards, and expedite procedures and the issuance of orders for security operations. Another supposed case of a gray zone situation, according to the government, is the infringement against the U.S. forces that are engaged in activities for Japan's defense. The cabinet decision states that in such circumstances, the JSDF should be allowed to use weapons in a limited way to protect weapons and other equipment of the relevant units of the U.S. forces upon the United States' consent (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014, p.3). It should be noted here that the 'use of weapons' by the JSDF has always been under tight scrutiny due to the conventional interpretation of the constitution. It has been chiefly allowed for defending Japan against an attack or for JSDF members' self-preservation during missions.

The second domain, contributions to international peace and stability, is separated into two topics: the JSDF's logistics support and weapons use in international peace cooperation activities. Traditionally, the operative area of JSDF's logistics support to assist foreign military forces has been limited as it needed to avoid being involved in actual combat. The Japanese government has called these limited areas 'rear area' or 'non-combat area' but decided that the limits must be redefined to only the 'scenes' where no combat activities are conducted. To put it differently, the government stated its aim to expand the operative area of JSDF's logistics support with the future legislative proposals.

In terms of JSDF's use of weapons in peace cooperation activities, as with the first domain, the cabinet decision stated the government's aim to expand the legal basis for weapons use. The expansion will allow the use of weapons for the so-called 駆け付け警護, an act of offering armed protection to people - local population or non-governmental organization workers - in distant places, and the use of weapons that do not amount to provocative 'use of force' during the missions of international peace cooperation activities. More importantly, the expansion will allow rescue missions of Japanese nationals abroad that accompany JSDF's weapons use, based on the territorial state's acceptance of such missions.

The third domain discusses the government's stance on the constitutional interpretation of Article 9. The conventional understanding, upheld by previous governments, has been that Article 9 does not prohibit Japan from taking necessary self-defense measures to ensure its peace, security, and survival. Abe and his government do not differ from this view, but the 2014 cabinet decision brought a new interpretation of the conditions for exercising the right to self-defense. These conditions have been called the Three Conditions for Use of Force, and previously, the first condition stipulated that an attack, or imminent and unlawful infringement, *against Japan*, is necessary for exercising the use of force for self-defense. With the new interpretation, this first condition will change to include "an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan . . . and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn [the Japanese] people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014, pp.7-8).

The second condition - there are no other appropriate means to repel the attack - and the third condition - the use of force must be to the extent of the minimum necessary required - remained fundamentally unchanged. However, the crucial point here is that the change to the first

condition substantially allows Japan the right to CSD, which was considered prohibited under constitutional constraints. According to the government, the right to CSD is still limited, as the official purpose is to defend Japan and its people, unlike the internationally acknowledged CSD that aims for the defense of other states under illegitimate attack (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014, p.8). In other words, while the only measure allowed for Japan's defense has been ISD, the new condition would also include CSD as a necessary measure for self-defense. It can also be understood that the exercise of CSD is now considered a part of the minimum necessary required use of force, despite the past governments' interpretation that CSD exceeds that acceptable minimal level (Takahashi, 2019, p.41). Thus, the 2014 cabinet decision is, in effect, a constitutional reinterpretation by the Abe administration.

The government, since the constitutional reinterpretation, has proceeded to the creation of legal frameworks and legislative proposals. In May 2015, a series of cabinet decisions were made on the coordination for responding to gray zone situations and on the legislative proposals for enabling the new security policy presented in 2014. Regarding the gray zone situation, no new legislation was introduced, but the cabinet decisions set forth acceleration in the issuance of orders for security operations (Takahashi, 2019, p.42). The legislative proposals - because numerous amendments to existing laws and some new draftings were necessary - were made into two packages. One contained bundles of amendments and new drafts, and another consisted of a new single legislative draft (MOD, 2015, pp.141-147).

Both packages mostly followed the basic direction of the security policy presented in the 2014 cabinet decision, but some points are worth highlighting. While the 2014 cabinet decision mentioned that the JSDF should be allowed the use of weapons to protect the equipment of the U.S. forces engaged in activities for Japan's defense, the legislative proposals loosened the restriction on the eligible recipient of this support to include other foreign forces that are engaged in similar activities. However, it also clarified a different restriction that such support by the JSDF will not be provided on actual combat scenes.

As with the 2014 cabinet decision, the legislative proposals reiterated that in logistics support, the JSDF's operative area would be expanded. In case of perilous situations which could threaten Japan's security - regardless of where the incident occurs - the eligible recipient of the logistics support will also expand. Previously, the U.S. forces engaging in activities for Japan's defense were eligible. However, it will include other foreign forces that are carrying out missions

in congruence with the aims of the UN Charter. Still, this logistics support will not be provided on the scenes where actual fighting is taking place.

In the package, there was a proposal to amend the so-called PKO-law to enable JSDF's participation in international peace cooperation activities that are not under UN supervision. The existing law limited the participation to only the UN peacekeeping operations. In both peace cooperation activities - whether under UN supervision or not - the legislative proposals aim for the expanded use of weapons by the JSDF to execute necessary missions. Using weapons would also be eligible for rescuing missions of Japanese nationals abroad when the territorial state accepts such missions.

Most consequentially, the legislative proposals stipulated the new condition for exercising the use of force for self-defense. As already discussed, this condition would substantially enable Japan to execute CSD, and with the approval of the Diet, it will become formally legalized. This shift in the fundamental principle of Japan's security policy undoubtedly became the biggest concern in Diet deliberation and society. The debates of the new security policy concentrated on the legal and procedural aspects, mostly leading to criticism of the Abe administration for being unconstitutional and undemocratic. Here, the substantial aspect of the new policy needs closer examination to understand how and to what extent Japan's foreign policy identity changed.

From the 2014 cabinet decision and the 2015 legislative proposals, security is defined as the survival of Japan, the protection of its people and independence, and the prevention of military confrontation - or deterrence. There were some specific examples of threats in the 2014 cabinet decision, such as changing global power balance, the development or diffusion of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and terrorism (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014, p.1). In a broader interpretation, in the new security policy, the threat is considered a disruption to international peace and security. Particularly a disruption that would gravely affect Japan's survival, peace, or security, regardless of where the disruption occurs.

Concerning the means for achieving security, the new policy has two major approaches: strengthening Japan's capabilities, especially in terms of mutual cooperation with the United States, and increasing its contribution to international peace and security. One example is the enabling of JSDF to protect weapons or other equipment of the U.S. forces and other foreign forces engaging in activities for Japan's defenses. The expansion of the operative area of JSDF's logistics support and the eligible recipient of the support, under certain circumstances, is another means that

represents both approaches. The loosening of the restrictions on JSDF's use of weapons in international peace cooperation activities is clearly aimed at enhancing Japan's contribution to international security. Moreover, the adoption of CSD complies with both approaches, although the legislative proposals do not specify which countries are in "a close relationship with Japan" (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014, pp.7-8). Therefore, the two approaches to achieving security are not mutually exclusive and can overlap.

Overall, the means is to upgrade Japan's capabilities in a limited manner. Also, the two approaches assure the allies and partners that Japan is not becoming completely autonomous in the global security structure. However, the new mission of rescuing Japanese nationals from abroad, and the permission for JSDF's justifiable weapons use in such missions, is a relatively autonomous expansion of security measures.

While expansions in Japan's security policy could alarm others, especially the neighboring countries, the new security policy has also emphasized the remaining limitedness and unchanging defensive posture to mitigate the security dilemma. The logistics support and protection of other forces' weapons will be carried out in a way to avoid JSDF's direct involvement in the actual combat. The use of weapons, despite some easing of the restrictions, is still subject to certain conditions so that it does not violate Article 9 and the legitimate conditions for the 'use of force.' Regarding the adoption of CSD, which could be considered the most significant shift, the emphasis was on its ultimate purpose to defend Japan. The new policy stressed the limited applicability of CSD with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, particularly the first condition. Also, the new procurement of defense weapons or equipment was not mentioned in the 2014 cabinet decision or the 2015 legislative proposals.

In terms of material and ideational interests, Abe's new security policy evidently illustrates the redistribution of resources by proposing legislation to expand the JSDF's capabilities and missions under certain conditions. Above all, the constitutional reinterpretation and the reconfiguring of the fundamental measure of self-defense - to incorporate the right to CSD - is a revisionist change to the previous minimum necessary requirement for the use of force. At the same time, the new policy is intended to uphold the pacifist norm. The policy aims for deterrence in the sense of preventing Japan's military confrontation. Despite the JSDF's increased capabilities, the limits and conditions remain. With the perception that disruption of peace in one place can

affect the security of others, the new policy emphasizes international cooperation for peace and security as eventually leading to Japan's peace and security.

Therefore, the new security policy takes a different attitude to peace. Previously, Japan took an individualistic strategy by focusing on its own security and not being involved or concerned with international security. Moreover, Japan relied heavily on the U.S. forces for its protection. While the reliance on the U.S.-Japan alliance will not wane, the new policy will take a proactive approach by increasing Japan's own capabilities for the ultimate goal of peace and security in Japan - and the world. In other words, the new security policy can be regarded as a revisionist change within the pacifist norm. This does not mean that the pacifist norm is not changing at all. Undoubtedly, there are changes and redistribution of resources, but still within the framework of pacifism.

Still, this section has only discussed the proposals made by Abe on the direction of Japan's security policy. The 2014 cabinet decision was an official suggestion from the Abe administration on how to organize Japan's security policy, and a more specific scheme was presented in the 2015 legislative proposals. The finalized policy would be determined with the Diet deliberation. Thus, the legislative proposals should be compared to the finalized policy passed by the Diet, which will be discussed in a later section. Before that, Abe's reasoning and the tools he used in the discourse of the new security policy, aimed for its acceptance, will be analyzed in the next section.

3.3 Abe's reasoning

The speaker, Abe Shinzo, created his 'world,' composed of multiple layers of Self and Other, with his discursive practice. The layers can be interpreted using Chilton's (2004) indexicality or the axes of time, space, and modality (pp.56-61). According to Chilton, the speaker, or deictic center, constructs 'reality' based on the three axes. 'Time' indicates the speaker's understanding of the present, or the current situation, as Self, in relation to the past and future - the Other. 'Space' shows positional or social closeness and remoteness. 'Modality' is divided into two indices: epistemic and deontic, indicating, respectively, 'what is more certain to be true' and 'what is morally right' as associated with the Self (Chilton, 2004, pp.58-60). Within his 'world' or the 'reality' constructed, Abe's discursive practice formulated ideas and meanings, which were used as tools to make the new security policy, particularly the right to CSD, acceptable in the pacifist society.

There were three types of speech formats in the data: policy speeches, press conferences, and Diet deliberation. The policy speeches were important in terms of signifying the change of political leadership from the DPJ-led to the LDP-led government. Overall, the policy speeches sought to advance or stimulate an ‘active’ mindset. However, this could be partly explained by the nature of these speeches, where various policies were covered, including not only security policy but also economic matters, social issues, and reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the massive earthquake in 2011. In addition, the policy speeches had a somewhat ceremonial aspect signaling the beginning of a new Diet session. In these speeches, the government and ruling coalition tend to ask for cooperation and constructive discussions from other parties. Therefore, the policy speeches relatively lacked specific discursive tools, such as the differentiation between the Self and Other, compared to the other speech formats.

Some of the press conferences, as well as the policy speeches, were influenced by election timing. Economic issues were focused more before and after the major elections in 2013 and 2014. Notably, the tone of the policy speech in February 2015, after the Lower House election in December 2014, was more assertive and confident than previous speeches. The election result, in which the ruling coalition won and maintained the majority, stabilizing Abe’s administrative control, boosted this confidence. As this speech was an Administrative Policy Speech, it covered broad topics but conveyed that Abe’s policies, including the security policy, are correct and must be proceeded forward. Here, it is important to point out that 2015 was the only year within the time frame of this study when national elections were not held. Without the need to consider immediate electoral influence, this could have allowed the speaker to project assertiveness in the discourse during the 2015 Diet deliberations of the legislative proposals.

The power relation, or the use of the speaker’s political position as a tool, was common and consistent throughout all speech formats. Coming back to power with the election in December 2012, and with the emphasis on subsequent election results, Abe’s position in power and its legitimacy were constructed. It created the idea that Abe’s policies, based on the campaign agenda - including the new security policy and the ambition for constitutional revision - are ‘correct’ or ‘right,’ especially after the failures under the DPJ government in 2009-2012. Interpreting with the axis of ‘space,’ the Self - as the collective ‘we’ of the elected ruling coalition - have the authority, capability, and duty to discuss or decide the security policy. Numerous times, Abe asked for people’s understanding of the new security policy, but what he did not ask for is the people’s

opinion of it because the election results - and the authority granted through them - already justified the pursuit of his policies. The deontic modality is also identified as the Self - Abe and the ruling coalition - having the responsibility to take action to increase Japan's security.

The construction of this Self differentiates or distinguishes the Other as 'incorrect' for not having the legitimacy to represent the majority or 'irresponsible' for not taking necessary actions for Japan's security. Although Abe rarely mentioned specific names of politicians or political parties in criticism, this Other includes the political opposition, especially the DPJ, or other opponents who are critical of the new security policy. In Abe's reality, the DPJ government and its security policy were a failure that Japan should recover from on the occasion of LDP's return to power. Abe links this 'present' change of power to the idea that it is time to recover and change for a better 'future' by departing from 'past' security policies and passive attitudes. This discourse explains why Abe started to press on with the adoption of the new security policy in 2013 and had the legislation passed in 2015.

However, a few points need consideration. First, as already mentioned, while there was an Upper House election in 2013 and a Lower House election in 2014, there were no national elections in 2015. Abe could have intentionally chosen 2015 as the most convenient occasion to submit the new legislative bills to the Diet without facing immediate electoral backlash, as another Upper House election was already scheduled in 2016. Second, 2015 marked the seventieth anniversary of the end of WWII, which Abe also linked to the discourse of time to 'change.'

This 'change' is also related to Abe's construction of Japan's security environment in the 'present.' The 'threat' changed from the past and has become 'transnational' in which insecurity *in any region of the world* affects *Japan's* security. In other words, while the East-Asian security environment remains the most influential for Japan, the scope of security has expanded from regional to global. The intertextuality of North Korea's missile and nuclear tests and terrorist attacks by Islamic extremist groups frequently appeared in Abe's explanation of the 'present' security environment. For a long time, North Korea and its military developments have been widely accepted as one of the critical regional threats. Abe presupposes that Japanese society also knows about the threats of terrorism and the recent incidents in 2013 and 2015, in which Japanese nationals became victims in Algeria and Syria, respectively. These terrorist attacks, despite the geographical distance, brought the sense of 'threat' close to Japanese society. This construction of shift in 'threat' as becoming 'transnational' or 'cross-border,' along with the actual cases of

insecurity surrounding Japan since the early 2010s, justifies Abe's aim to adopt the new security policy in 2015.

Regarding indexicality, North Korea and terrorists are the 'threatening' Others on the 'space' axis - the actors causing disruption in international security. Interestingly, China is also associated as a 'threat' but simultaneously positioned as an important economic partner, making the differentiation as the Other relatively less significant. Similarly, Russia is viewed both as a 'threat' *and* a negotiation counterpart in the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands issue. In contrast, Abe constructs Japan as the Self that upholds the rule of law and aims for international peace and security.

Abe's construction of the 'present' security environment becomes crucial for his reformulation of the meaning of 'limit' on Japan's defense capabilities. Unlike Others - the states with the necessary capabilities - Japan, or the Self, faces a 'limit' inscribed in its constitution. Traditionally, this 'limit' was broadly accepted to define Japan's orientation to pacifism, or abandonment of aggressive intentions, after WWII. Put differently, the 'limit' was considered appropriate for achieving Japan's peace and security. Abe, with his explanation of the 'present' security policy, refutes this as an outdated discourse. With the changing 'threat,' the 'limit' has become inappropriate or insufficient for realizing Japan's security, and instead of peace, it brings insecurity to the Japanese people. This point was emphasized particularly in the May 2014 press conference, in which Abe explained the reviewing process of the security policy. Unlike other press conferences, Abe used an explanation panel that depicted the 'limit' under the conventional interpretation of the constitution, asking the public whether it is acceptable for the government to not respond to the 'limit' and the 'threat' it brings (See Appendix CDA-6). Hence, having the capabilities is now the security.

The doctrine set forth by Abe to address the 'threat' was Proactive Pacifism, or formally, "Proactive Contribution to Peace" (Cabinet Secretariat, 2013, p.1), as endorsed in the NSS of 2013. This was the foundational ideology of the Abe administration's security policy, but a similar idea has been presented even under the Noda administration of the DPJ government. Still, the DPJ, as the result of enlargement with mergers, was less unified on security policy and was not able to take as far decisive steps as the Abe administration did.

In the new security policy under Proactive Pacifism, the crux is to be 'active,' especially in terms of being ready or prepared, to increase Japan's engagement in international security. The

entire development of the adoption of the security policy is about preparing a legal basis in case of situations that require a further increase in Japan's contribution to international security. Abe repeatedly mentioned that the adoption of the policy does not automatically initiate the exercise of CSD. Abe stressed that it is a necessary preparation for possible scenarios that will threaten the survival of Japan (Appendix CDA-16, CDA-17, CDA-18, CDA-19, CDA-21, CDA-22, CDA-23, CDA-24, CDA-25, CDA-26, CDA-28, CDA-29, CDA-30). During the Diet deliberation, Abe reassures the audience - fellow policymakers and the public - that Japan will continue to be part of the international community but will decide autonomously on whether or not to exercise CSD. Therefore, Japan's international cooperation will be based on its agency. This argument is linked to Abe's denial of the counter-discourse, which claims that the increased capabilities will increase the possibility of entrapment in foreign wars.

Here, Abe articulated 'active' as being autonomous, not isolated individualism. Moreover, being completely autonomous in the global security structure is difficult. Thus, to assure the people of Japan and partner states, 'active' is presented as autonomous with a cooperative attitude. In contrast, the 'passive' posture of the past security policies and traditional pacifism is interpreted as self-centered. Together with the perception that constitutional restraints are appropriate to achieve Japan's peace, this indifference to international security with the fear of entrapment in foreign wars is considered, by Abe, as the obstacle to enhancing Japan's security. Historically, the fear of entrapment has been associated with anti-U.S. sentiment. Although not strongly expressed as was in the past, this sentiment still exists. Society, and thus, political parties, have different views on Japan's relationship with the United States regarding the security alliance. Some may consider that Japan must become completely independent from the U.S. military and focus on the conventional, exclusively defense-oriented policy without strengthening militarily. Others may view the alliance with the United States as sufficient for Japan's security and do not see the need to strengthen international cooperation. Undoubtedly, there are many more different opinions on this, but these two particular views, from Abe's perspective, are 'passive' and self-centered regarding the enhancement of security.

The push for an 'active' attitude can also be interpreted from Abe's construction of Japan on the 'time' axis - 'present' as the Self, while 'past' and 'future' as the Other. In the 'past,' Japan, in the name of pacifism, accepted the 'limit' and was irresponsible with its self-centeredness regarding international security. *Now*, in the 'present,' Japan still upholds pacifism and accepts the

'limit' on its defense capabilities. However, it has started to face the reality of changing 'threat' and is taking action - starting to act responsibly - for international security. With the adoption of the new security policy, in the 'future,' Japan will continue to uphold pacifism but will be able to protect its people with its capabilities increased to some extent. Moreover, the increased capabilities as an 'active' contribution to international security will eventually lead to Japan's security. Hence, Abe's doctrine of Proactive Pacifism and the new security policy under this ideology are advancing a shift in Japan's security posture from passive to active.

In fact, this shift from passive to active is presented as the change in the means to achieve peace and security. As the discussion of the content of the security policy in the previous section has shown, the posture toward peace has changed, but the purpose remains the same - to realize Japan's peace and security. It is a revisionist change of means within the framework of pacifism. Abe described the new policy, including the adoption of the limited right to CSD, as the minimum necessary extension. There will be certain conditions for JSDF's overseas deployment, and Japan's capabilities will remain limited compared to other states. Also, the ultimate goal - Japan's security - is congruent with the concept of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Furthermore, the new policy follows the basic logic of the conventional constitutional interpretation - minimum necessary required use of force is allowed for self-defense - under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. Based on this interpretation, the limited exercise of CSD is a mere extension of the minimum necessary capability.

The discourse of constitutionality not only legitimizes the adoption of the new security policy but also serves as a tool to overcome another obstacle, which was the people's perception of Abe as a revisionist politician. The opposition parties asked critical questions regarding Abe's historical interpretation of WWII during the Diet deliberation, and his view of the current constitution as 'forced upon' by the Occupation Forces was well known. Abe attempted to diminish this revisionist image by referring to past cabinets' statements of deep remorse for the war and agreeing to these messages. Regarding the constitution, Abe emphasizes the aim of its revision as the party's goal - not only personal ambition - since its establishment in the 1950s (Appendix CDA-26). Abe also mentions the coalition partner, the Komeito (KM), and its involvement in the processes of reviewing the security policy and the drafting of the legislation (Appendix CDA-17, CDA-20, CDA-22, CDA-27, CDA-28, CDA-30).

According to Abe, the legitimacy of the new security policy is not only warranted based on the Constitution of Japan but also by the UN Charter. Japan, as a member state of the UN, has always acknowledged the right to CSD but denied this right to itself due to constitutional restraints. However, with the new security policy, a new definition of CSD - in Japan's context - was constructed. While the purpose of internationally recognized CSD is to defend other states that are under illegitimate attack, the new definition is differentiated with the aim of defending *itself*. This can be contradictory because Abe calls for the adoption of the limited right to CSD - under Japan's definition - while partly seeking its legal basis on the internationally acknowledged legitimacy of the UN Charter, which articulates the purpose of CSD as a defense of other states. However, this contradiction is ignored or muted in Abe's explanation.

Instead, Abe's most crucial discursive practice was the establishment of a new common sense in Japanese society. Abe constructed an idea that it is the world's shared understanding that no state can defend itself alone and states must increase cooperation to enhance international security, suggesting that Japan should also adopt this as its common sense (Appendix CDA-6). On top of that, having the necessary capabilities and contributing to international security are formulated as 'appropriate' as a member of the international community. In other words, Abe's discourse suggests that Japan cannot be, or will not be, acknowledged as fully part of the international community without such capabilities. Therefore, the new means to achieve security - enhancing deterrence with the increased engagement in international security, particularly with the adoption of the limited right to CSD - is 'logical' and 'right' in Abe's construction.

Since the new means in the security policy have the same goal as traditional pacifism - avoiding Japan's military confrontation or engagement in war - the policy of active posture is conceptualized as adhering to the pacifist norm. Significantly, the adoption of the limited right to CSD, for the objective of enhancing deterrence and avoiding military conflict, is construed as the pacifist norm. This shift in the meaning of the pacifist norm - having active measures for peace - was how Abe aimed to overcome the obstacle of a 'passive' attitude, prominent in traditional pacifism, and achieve Japan's security with the new policy. Furthermore, the construction of 'same goal with different means' in the new policy demonstrates the dialectic relation of material and ideational factors, in which both the revisionist ambition of resource redistribution and the ideational interest of upholding the pacifist norm are included as principles, but are still distinguishable.

While criticizing the ‘passive’ aspect of traditional pacifism, Abe notes that the financial and humanitarian aid that Japan has been providing will still be a critical strategy of its foreign and security policy (Appendix CDA-22, CDA-24). However, as Abe also constructed the adoption of the limited right to CSD as adhering to the pacifist norm, Abe modified the norm to include both conventional and new methods for achieving peace under his Proactive Pacifism ideology.

In terms of indexicality, there are two conceptions of Self regarding the new common sense - respectively on the ‘modality’ and ‘space’ axes. The idea that Japan must share this common sense with other like-minded states, which intends to preserve international security with the rule of law, indicates that Japan and the like-minded states are the Self that is ‘morally right.’ Here, the like-minded states also become part of the Self on the ‘space’ axis because they share the same values with Japan, in contrast to states that threaten international security - the Others on both the ‘modality’ and ‘space’ axes. Interestingly, some of these like-minded states, especially the United States, have been the Other on the ‘space’ axis regarding the possession of necessary capabilities with fewer ‘limits.’ To put it differently, Abe sees that Japan, with the new security policy, will come closer to this Other, which will become the new Self - a collective ‘we’ with less ‘limit’ and ‘appropriate’ capabilities.

To justify his intentions, Abe referred to old discourses from the past cases of former Prime Ministers who actively upgraded the security policies and made analogies to his policy. For instance, Abe mentioned the establishment of JSDF under Yoshida Shigeru’s administration, the adoption of the so-called PKO-law in the early 1990s, and active cooperation in the ‘war of terror’ during Koizumi’s administration. In Abe’s perception, these cases are examples where then-Prime Ministers acted responsibly by facing reality and taking action with upgrades in Japan’s security policy. As a result of these cases, Abe argued, Japan and the JSDF gained the international community’s trust (Appendix CDA-16, CDA-25, CDA-28).

Particularly, Kishi Nobusuke’s case in 1960 had personal significance for Abe, not only as Prime Minister but also as a direct descendant of Kishi. From the video data examined for this study, Abe remained calm or consistent with the tone throughout each speech and press conference. However, he slightly changed the tone and became somewhat emotional or expressive with the hand gestures when he mentioned the 1960 case during the press conference on May 15th, 2014. In this press conference, Abe used his hand with his palms open to stress specific points, but when referring to the opposition Kishi faced and the active policy Kishi took, Abe emphasized with a

fist. As mentioned, Kishi sought to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty but faced a strong backlash from society, who feared entrapment in the U.S. military operation. Abe concludes that the series of public protests, or the Anpo Protests, were proven ‘wrong’ as no entrapment occurred as a result of increased capabilities and the revision of the treaty. Instead, it enhanced deterrence, bringing security to Japan. The binary of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ on the axis of ‘epistemic modality’ is constructed here, with the increase of capabilities as a reasonable way of achieving peace and security as “true” with “confident prediction” (Chilton, 2004, p.59).

There is a presupposition that people know about this case and the aftermath of it, in which Kishi was inevitably forced to resign in exchange for achieving his goal of revising the security treaty - despite being ‘right’ and ‘correct’ in Abe’s view. This understanding of Kishi’s legacy legitimizes Abe’s ideology of revisionism and ambitions that Japan should loosen its restraints on capabilities. Thus, both interdiscursivity and intertextuality were observed in Abe’s use of old discourses from past analogous cases, especially the case of the Anpo Protests.

To recap, the main findings in this section explain why the new security policy was adopted in 2015 and how Abe, with his discursive practice, reasoned the adoption of this policy, particularly the limited right to CSD, which has long been considered incongruous - or revisionist - to Japan’s pacifist norm. Through Abe’s reasoning, the theoretical expectation that both material and ideational factors need consideration in understanding a state’s behavior, or the change or continuity in foreign policy identity, is also demonstrated.

First, with his return to political power, Abe created the momentum of ‘change’ by differentiating the Self as ‘responsible’ or ‘right’ in contrast to the opposition as ‘wrong’ or ‘irresponsible’ for not taking necessary actions for Japan’s security. This sense of ‘change’ was also highlighted in comparison to the ‘past,’ in which Japan accepted ‘limit’ on its defense capabilities in the name of pacifism and took a passive posture regarding international security. Abe also constructed the current ‘threat’ as ‘transnational,’ pointing out the changing nature of ‘threat’ and Japan’s security environment. This discourse was validated by the incidents of insecurity in the early 2010s. Abe’s discursive practices partly explain why the new security policy was adopted in 2015 and not earlier when revisionist leaders and ambitions had already existed from the end of the Cold War. However, it is important to mention once again that 2015 was the only year during the period of study that national elections did not take place. Abe might have intended to take advantage of this and firmly pushed for the adoption of the security policy in 2015.

Second, Abe's revisionist ambition was not embraced to the utmost degree. Abe did advance a shift in Japan's security posture from passive to active. More specifically, the new security policy's intention was to be actively prepared to increase Japan's engagement in international security. Active was constructed as being autonomous with a cooperative attitude, not a complete conversion to isolation. In fact, the new policy is presented as a mere extension or evolution, at most, of the conventional security policy, to the extent of minimum necessary. The purpose remains the same: the security of Japan, but the means will change to include the limited right to CSD as part of the minimum necessary capabilities. The involvement of the KM, the coalition partner, was also mentioned to indicate that the development of this security policy is not a full-fledged adoption of revisionist ambition. These discursive practices elucidate to what degree Abe denoted his revisionist ambition in his reasoning to attain the adoption of the new security policy.

Third, the establishment of the new common sense - states cannot defend themselves alone and must contribute to international security by having necessary capabilities - made the new means in the security policy, including the limited right to CSD, 'logical' and 'appropriate' for Japan. The new means is linked to Japan's pacifist norm because it shares the common goal with traditional pacifism: avoiding Japan's engagement in military conflicts or war. This reasoning shows the dialectic relation between the material interest of revisionism - proactive redistribution of resources - and the ideational interest of pacifism - upholding the pacifist norm. Both factors' principles are maintained but distinguishable in the new security policy.

Fourth, following the previous point of the new common sense, is that Abe's discursive practice modified the pacifist norm by constructing the adoption of the limited right to CSD as 'pacifism,' with its purpose of enhancing deterrence and avoiding war. The meaning of the norm shifted to 'having an active attitude' - departing from a passive posture - in achieving peace and security. Thus, adopting the new security policy is construed as an appropriate behavior of the pacifist norm and also appropriate as part of the international community. Overall, these discourses enabled Abe to advocate for the adoption of the new security policy without bending his revisionist ambition, but at the same time, mitigating its public perception as a policy that will overturn the pacifist norm.

Lastly, the texts and discourses continued with the past trend of stretching pacifism and the pacifist norm in the constitution. Just like the past cases brought up by Abe, leaders with revisionist

ambitions have existed, becoming prominent in the post-Cold War, and their upgradings of security policy were also the stretching of pacifism - without revising the constitution. Abe's security policy has proposed this stretching to the maximum extent possible. Indeed, Abe has answered at the Diet deliberation that "further expansion of the constitutional interpretation is unthinkable" and "[formal] constitutional revision will be necessary for the adoption of general [internationally-acknowledged] exercise of the right to CSD" (Appendix CDA-27). Therefore, Japan's foreign policy identity, examined through its security policy, has long been determined by the dialectic relation of material and ideational factors - the revisionist resource redistribution while upholding the pacifist norm - contributing to Japan's contradictory state as a pacifist society with revisionist leaders.

3.4 Reaction and debate

Abe's new security policy, officially introduced in the press conference of May 2014 and its basic course outlined in the cabinet decision of July 2014, was received negatively by the public and opposition parties. The negative reactions intensified during the 2015 Diet deliberation of the government's legislative proposals aimed at implementing the practices of the security policy. Mass public demonstrations, relatively rare in Japan, took place throughout the country, and these sentiments were reflected in the cabinet's approval ratings. This reaction was expected, and despite the risk of a further decline in approval ratings, Abe proceeded with the policy adoption. However, different public polls and arguments by the opposition show that constitutionality and the adoption process were the main issues. Moreover, to some extent, there were understandings and agreements on several points made in Abe's explanation, such as the changing security environment of Japan, the necessity to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities, and the importance of contribution to international security.

NHK-BCRI conducted public polls in August 2013 and July 2014 on people's perceptions of peace. Examining these two polls allows a comparison of public opinion before and after the cabinet decision made on July 1st, 2014. Both polls had the same question about the perception of the threat to Japan in the then-current international affairs. In 2013, 68.8%, in total, answered that there is a 'high' or 'some degree of' possibility of a threat to Japan's security (NHK-BCRI, 2013b, p.1). This percentage slightly increased to 72.9% in the 2014 poll (NHK-BCRI, 2014b, p.2). In contrast, those who chose 'not so much' or 'none at all' to the possibility of threat decreased from

26.7% in 2013 to 20.9% in 2014 (NHK-BCRI, 2013b, p.1, 2014b, p.2). This suggests that threat perception was shared among society, already in 2013, but after the press conference and cabinet decision in 2014, the understanding of this threat became even more common. Abe’s explanation of the necessity to strengthen defense capabilities was acceptable in society.

However, at the same time, Tables 3 and 4 show that when asked about the need to strengthen JSDF and the security alliance with the United States, there was an increase in respondents preferring to maintain the present condition (NHK-BCRI, 2013b, pp.2-3, 2014b, pp.2-3). With the developments of the security policy in May and July 2014, it can be considered that people became cautious about the expeditious, or hasty, reinforcement of Japan’s capabilities. Nevertheless, there were no dramatic increases in respondents who preferred reducing JSDF’s capabilities or the U.S.-Japan alliance. Most of the society saw the JSDF and the alliance with the United States as necessary and significant for Japan’s security.

Table 3

Public Poll on the Preferable Future State of JSDF (in %)

Year	Reinforced	Same as present condition	Reduced	Other (N/A etc.)
2013	29.6	54.8	6.3	9.3
2014	22.8	60.5	8.1	8.7

Note. The data for 2013 are from *2013年8月 平和観についての世論調査 単純集計結果* [2013 August Public Opinion Survey on the View of Peace Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2013 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/130815.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). The data for 2014 are from *平和観についての世論調査 2014 単純集計結果* [Public Opinion Survey on the View of Peace 2014 Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2014 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/140901.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).

Table 4

Public Poll on the Preferable Future State of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Based on the Security Treaty (in %)

Year	Reinforced	Same as present condition	Reduced	Dissolution	Other (N/A etc.)
2013	26.3	49.5	8.4	5.1	10.6
2014	18.9	57.3	10.2	3.4	10.1

Note. The data for 2013 are from *2013年8月 平和観についての世論調査 単純集計結果* [2013 August Public Opinion Survey on the View of Peace Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2013 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/130815.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). The data for 2014 are from *平和観についての世論調査 2014 単純集計結果* [Public Opinion Survey on the View of Peace 2014 Summary sheet], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2014 (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/140901.pdf>). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).

Another survey conducted in 2014, asking people’s attitudes toward the Constitution of Japan, indicates that the public had a common perception, as Abe, on the importance of contributing to international security. There was a specific question on people’s view on the adoption of the right to CSD, which result was introduced previously (see Section 1.4). The most common reason for the ‘Pro-adoption’ of the right to CSD was “Japan needs to undertake international activities concerning security” (NHK-BCRI, 2014a, p.3), with 38.3%. For the ‘Anti-adoption,’ “even without the exercise of CSD, Japan can contribute with logistics support” (NHK-BCRI, 2014a, p.3) was the main reason with 41.6%. This was higher than another ‘Anti-adoption’ reason, “the fear of entrapment in foreign wars” (NHK-BCRI, 2014a, p.3), which had 33.5%. Interestingly, this data points out that both ‘Pro-adoption’ and ‘Anti-adoption’ respondents admit the necessity of Japan’s contribution to international security. Furthermore, this survey was conducted before Abe’s press conference in May 2014, showing that the society already had a shared understanding of the importance of international cooperation and Japan’s contribution, even before the official proposal of the new security policy.

The same survey in 2015, like the previous ones, asked people’s opinions on whether or not to amend the constitution and Article 9 (see Tables 1 and 2 in Section 1.4 for 2007, 2013, and

2014 data). Compared to the 2014 poll, the data for the 2015 poll, in Table 5, shows only a slight change for both questions (NHK-BCRI, 2015). In fact, the percentage of anti-amendment for Article 9 was precisely the same between 2014 and 2015. The proportion among ‘Pro-amendment,’ ‘Undecided,’ and ‘Anti-amendment’ remained the same for both questions from 2014 to 2015. Also, the main reasons for ‘Pro-amendment’ and ‘Anti-amendment’ were the same. The comparison of data from these two years suggests that respondents who prefer the anti-amendment of Article 9 did not immensely increase even after the cabinet decision of July 2014. The slight increase in the percentage of ‘Undecided’ for both questions can be considered as the exacerbation of conflict, or dilemma, in the Japanese society, which somewhat accepts Abe’s revisionist ambition, but also continues to value the pacifist norm.

Table 5

2015 Public Poll on the Amendment of the Constitution and Article 9 (in %)

	Pro-amendment	Undecided	Anti-amendment	Other (N/A etc.)
Constitution	27.7	42.8	24.6	4.9
Article 9	22.1	33.8	38.4	5.7

Note. The data are from *憲法に関する意識調査 (2015年4月) 単純集計表 (一部)* [Attitude Survey on the Constitution of Japan (2015 April) Summary sheet (excerpt)], by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2015 (https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/yoron/pdf/20150508_1.pdf). Copyright by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).

Not only the public but the majority of the opposition parties in the Diet voiced understanding towards Abe’s explanation of the changing security environment surrounding Japan and the necessity to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, as well as the contribution to international security. Most of them shared the view that deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance was inevitable to deal with the evolving threat in the Asia-Pacific region. Still, some opposition parties saw the adoption of the right to CSD, even limited, as a leap too far for a measure to strengthen Japan’s capabilities and argued that there were other ways to enhance security before jumping to CSD. Particularly, Maehara Seiji, a prominent member of DPJ and former Minister for Foreign Affairs, mentioned that Japan should develop its autonomous capabilities on intelligence and

defense technologies, as a gradual and steady means to security, rather than adopting the limited right to CSD (2015).

Another common ground among the opposition parties regarding the substance of Abe's security policy was that the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, which allows the limited exercise of CSD, are ambiguous, leaving space for different interpretations. They argued that this creates the possibility of overstepping constitutional restrictions depending on the administration at the time and its interpretation. Also, some opposition parties claimed that Japan should focus on the Asia-Pacific region and not expand its scope of security beyond the area. DPJ and Japan Innovation Party (JIP), especially, criticized the lack of legislation by the government on the gray zone situations concerning Japan's territorial islands. In response to the government's cabinet decisions on gray zone issues, DPJ and JIP submitted a joint bill for territorial defense.

JIP submitted several other bills to compete against the government's legislative proposals. These bills by JIP were basically similar to the government's but with more precise and strict conditions placed on the new capabilities that Japan will acquire under Abe's security policy. Simultaneously, during the Diet deliberation, JIP held talks with the ruling coalition to discuss possible amendments to the government's legislative proposals. However, at this time, JIP was undecided on the party's stance regarding the right to CSD. Some of the JIP members were openly supportive of adopting CSD. Others considered that the expansion of ISD, such as further cooperation in the U.S.-Japan alliance, would be sufficient.

As a result, the JIP's bills did not clarify whether their proposed policy was CSD or ISD in Japan's use of force for defending other countries' militaries under attack. In fact, they explained their policy as having strict conditions *similar to* the exercise of ISD but did not specify it as ISD - or CSD - itself (Japan Innovation Party, 2015). In the Diet deliberation, the ruling coalition criticized JIP's proposals as incompatible with international law. Onodera Itsunori, a LDP member, pointed out that Japan can be accused of illegitimate preemptive strike if it claims the expanded right to ISD - without adopting the right to CSD - as its reason for the use of force in a situation that would be internationally recognized as the exercise of CSD (2015).

Other than JIP, three other minor parties: the Party for Future Generations, the New Renaissance Party, and the Assembly to Energize Japan, in the House of Councillors - the Upper House - submitted a joint bill as an amendment proposal to the government's legislative bill. The three minor parties supported the government's legislation but considered stronger involvement of

the Diet necessary in deciding the deployment of JSDF, with no exception to the Diet's pre-approval. They also demanded a regular review of the deployment, even during the mission, to ensure compliance with the constitutional restriction as well as the safety of JSDF. Like JIP, alongside the Diet deliberation, the three parties held talks with the ruling coalition to reach an agreement on their amendment proposal.

As a matter of course, some parties voiced strong opposition to Abe's explanation. Arguments by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) indicate the remnants of anti-U.S. sentiment in the leftist group, bringing back the discussion of possible entrapment if Japan expands its capabilities and adopts CSD. A member of the JCP stated that Japan's post-WWII peace was achieved not with the deterrence of the U.S.-Japan alliance but with Article 9 of the constitution (Ichida, 2015). Also, JCP - and some other opposition parties - raised the concern of a security dilemma in the Asia-Pacific region with Japan's increased capabilities. However, JCP's arguments mainly concentrated on the protection of Article 9 and the unconstitutionality of Abe's security policy, distracting the debate from discussing the substantial aspect.

The inter-party talks between the ruling coalition and the parties that submitted counter or amendment proposals did not progress easily. Thus, the opposition parties sought to mobilize public opinion to make it harder for the government to push through with its original legislative proposals. This led to a further shift in the public discussion of the security policy, more toward legal and procedural debate. Both aspects have been received negatively since the official introduction of the new policy in 2014. In the legal debate, people - including lawyers, legal scholars, and retired government officials - voiced their concerns about the abandonment of Article 9 with Abe's policy. In the procedural debate, people saw Abe's use of the 2014 cabinet decision for constitutional reinterpretation as a circumvention of the referendum for a formal constitutional amendment. It was considered a dishonest or illegitimate step under democracy and constitutionalism. For the opposition parties, these two debates - legal and procedural - were easier to focus on as they were more understandable for the public than the discussion on the substance of the security policy. Since there was not much of a significant divergence in the substantial debate between the government and the majority of the opposition, these two debates made the opposition's standpoint more distinguishable.

Indeed, the substantial debate became even more obscure for the public. This is reflected in the public opinion surveys showing that the majority of the people had a negative opinion on

the deliberation process of the security policy (tv asahi, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e, n.d.-f). Related to the procedural debate, people thought the government had not sufficiently explained the policy and its substance. Also, they could not understand why the government was trying to pass its legislative proposals in that particular Diet session, ruling out the possibility of long-term deliberation over several Diet sessions (tv asahi, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d). People had the impression that the government was in haste to adopt CSD with insufficient deliberation. The growing distrust exacerbated their opposition to the security policy, primarily based on procedural and legal aspects.

Public demonstrations and civil organizations opposing the security policy spread widely throughout the country. While reading every statement is impossible, those accessed argued the threat to Article 9, democracy, and constitutionalism brought by Abe's policy (Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-related Bills, 2015; Greenpeace Japan, 2015; Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 2016; SEALDs, 2015). Public opposition was also reflected in the approval ratings of the cabinet. Admittedly, there are different methods of such surveys depending on the conducting organization, and different factors, such as other policies and political scandals, could have affected the approval ratings. However, approval rating surveys conducted by NHK-BCRI (n.d.) and Central Research Services, Inc. (n.d.) demonstrate that 'approval' of the cabinet decreased starting from June 2015 - during the Diet deliberation - and caused 'disapproval' to surpass 'approval' in August. It was the first time since Abe's return to the Prime Ministerial post that 'approval' ratings of the cabinet fell below 'disapproval,' marking lower than 40% (Central Research Services, Inc., n.d.).

To summarize, the negative reaction to the new security policy, overall, was not about its substance. The public opinion surveys show a shared understanding of the changing security environment and the importance of increasing Japan's contributions to international security. The significance of JSDF and the U.S.-Japan alliance has been recognized in society. Most of the opposition parties in the Diet shared similar views, to some extent, with Abe and the government's legislation. Several parties engaged in sincere talks with the ruling coalition to find agreement on the counter or amendment proposals to install more explicit restrictions in the new security policy.

However, throughout the whole deliberation, the procedural and legal aspects of the security policy became the center of the focus, obscuring the debate on the policy's substance. This aggravated people's impression of the security policy with the increased sense of 'lacking

sufficient explanation' from the government. The public saw the Diet deliberation as hastily proceeding without the society fully understanding the substance or how the adoption of the limited right to CSD, specifically, would be effective in enhancing Japan's security. Thus, disapproval of the new security policy was more prominent in society, but the negative reactions were not necessarily about its substance. To put it differently, while the ideational interest of pacifism - upholding the pacifist norm - was strongly expressed in the society, the opposition parties and the public accepted, to some degree, Abe's explanations for proactive redistribution of resources - or the material interest of revisionism.

3.5 Landing point: active adoption or passive acceptance?

The new security policy and the legislative proposals to implement the practices of the policy were deliberated for a considerable amount of time in both the Lower and Upper Houses. In the process, some opposition parties submitted counter or amendment proposals, but eventually, the government's legislative proposals were passed on September 19th. However, it was decided in the special committee of the Upper House that the legislation would be accompanied by a supplementary resolution for its enactment, indicating 'passive acceptance' as the landing point of the developments of the security policy.

The supplementary resolution, in Japan's case, is a resolution adopted in committees to demand certain measures or due consideration in enforcing the legislation to the executive branch or the government (Akitani, 2015). Supplementary resolutions are not legally binding, but as a resolution adopted by the legislative branch, the executive branch is required to respect these decisions. The supplementary resolution for this legislation was arranged upon agreement between the ruling coalition and three minor parties: the Party for Future Generations, the New Renaissance Party, and the Assembly to Energize Japan, which submitted the amendment proposal earlier. The resolution demands that Japan does not make a unilateral decision to deploy JSDF overseas, the Diet will conduct periodic monitoring of the JSDF missions, and the exercise of CSD should, as a rule, gain the Diet's pre-approval (Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). More specifically, the three minor parties asked that the dispatch of JSDF for exercising CSD or logistics support by the JSDF will have the consent of the receiving state. Also, excluding the emergencies of a direct attack on *both* Japan and the state in its close relationship, the three minor parties demanded non-exceptional pre-approval by the Diet for JSDF's deployment in exercising CSD.

As a result, the supplementary resolution came to embody the passive acceptance of the security policy and the legislative proposals. However, the stronger involvement of the Diet, which the three minor parties have been demanding, was incorporated to a certain degree. To put it differently, the opposition parties were able to, although very minimally, make Abe and the government more cautious and attentive to the limits inscribed in the pacifist norm. The supplementary resolution, after the passing of the bills, was also given the executive branch's guarantee with a cabinet decision. On a side note, there was an item in the resolution that the parties to the agreement will continue to discuss how to monitor and review JSDF's missions under the new legislation. However, the three minor parties all disbanded within a few years of the enactment, a situation that was not anticipated at the time of the agreement and left this particular item unsettled in midair.

Despite the non-bindingness, the supplementary resolution did limit the maneuvering in the security policy, at least from what Abe had initially intended. Still, the enactment of the legislation, almost entirely in its original form, indicates that the shift in the meaning of the pacifist norm - from passive to active - was adopted. Produced by Abe's discursive practice, this change in attitude, while the means of the limited exercise of CSD remains controversial, was accepted in Japanese society. Furthermore, norm, or "a standard of appropriate behavior" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.891; see also Sato & Hirata, 2008, p.8), is derived from identity. Thus, the adoption of the new security policy implies a shift in Japan's foreign policy identity in the sense that the norm has changed.

The passive acceptance of the new security policy might be called 'compromise,' but it is an optimum outcome in the struggle between the pacifist norm and the revisionist redistribution of resources. The outcome was not a full-fledged abandonment of pacifism or a full-fledged adoption of revisionism, which would suggest a path to embracing the JSDF as an official military, developing or possessing nuclear weapons, or dissolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The shift in the meaning of the pacifist norm has legitimized the strengthening of the capabilities in terms of means and strategy, but the pacifist norm itself was upheld. Therefore, the developments of the security policy, like its substance, indicate a revisionist change within the framework of the pacifist norm.

Conclusion

This study examined Japan's foreign policy identity through its security policy, specifically former Prime Minister Abe's security policy developments in 2013-2015. Drawing from the existing debate of 'whether pacifist or revisionist,' the aim was to explain the contradiction of Japan being a country with a firm pacifist norm but with leaders considered revisionist, who aspired to increase Japan's security capabilities. Rather than pursuing autonomous security policies, these leaders maintained a strong U.S.-Japan alliance, despite the resentment from their historical and nationalistic views regarding the origin of the Constitution of Japan and the limits inscribed within it. In other words, this study aimed to explain the struggle between pacifism and revisionism in Japanese society.

There has been a division of arguments concerning Japan's foreign policy identity: constructivists discussed the ideational factor, and realists, mostly neorealists, explored the material factor. However, both groups acknowledge that neither factor alone provides a sufficient explanation. It is not a dichotomy, and both factors and their interrelation should be examined. While structural constraints exist, social interactions exist simultaneously, leading to a change of ideas and affecting the structure. The outcome of the interrelation is dialectic, where both factors do not negate each other, and the principles of both factors remain distinguishable. The theoretical expectation has been that the dialectic relation of the factors provides a more comprehensive account of Japan's foreign policy identity and that Abe's explanation for the security policy reflects such a relation.

Considering Japan's historical background in its development of the pacifist norm - the generally expected behavior to avoid engagement in warfare - and the revisionist ambition - including constitutional revision and augmentation of its own capabilities, a qualitative single case study was preferred to take the context into account. Although not without limitations, a single case study is suitable for examining a deviant case, which, in this study, is the unprecedented adoption of the limited right to CSD. This case involves the latest constitutional reinterpretation regarding Japan's right to CSD and reignited the debate of whether Japan has become a revisionist state or continues to be a pacifist state.

The method of critical discourse analysis was applied to examine how Abe reasoned the adoption of the new security policy. This method examines the meaning-making process and the discursive practices that were used as tools, with power relations in its focus. Thus, text data of

Abe's discourse, from the beginning of 2013 to the enactment of legislation in September 2015, were analyzed to answer the following research questions: How did Abe explain and reason for the adoption of the new security policy?; Why was the new security policy adopted in the form of new legislation in 2015?; How and to what extent do the developments of this security policy indicate a change in Japan's foreign policy identity? The data, including Japanese transcripts of Abe's policy speeches, press conferences, and responses in the Diet deliberation, were collected from official archives.

The analysis has found that a stretch of the pacifist norm took place in Abe's proposal of the new security policy by discursively shifting the meaning of the pacifist norm - from passive to active. The substance of the new security policy is the expansion of Japan's capabilities and contribution to international security, but certain conditions remain. The most significant expansion, the unprecedented adoption of the right to CSD, is also in a 'limited' manner with the aim to deter insecurity. The degree of the revisionist ambition denoted in Abe's discourse demonstrates a similar shift. The new security policy, including the limited right to CSD, was presented as a mere extension of the conventional security policy, to the extent of minimum necessary, with the purpose remaining the same as traditional pacifism: peace and security of Japan by avoiding Japan's military confrontation or engagement in war. Therefore, regarding the extent of change in Japan's foreign policy identity, the substance of the policy and Abe's discourse both show that it has become revisionism - in terms of the means, but this change is still within the extent of pacifism - for its purpose of avoiding military conflict.

Abe's discourse also explains, although partially, why the new policy, in the form of legislation, was successfully enacted in 2015. Abe referred to 'change' in the political landscape, where Abe and the LDP regained power in late 2012. Another 'change' was the nature of 'threat,' as becoming 'transnational,' with insecurity in one part of the world affecting Japan's security. Indeed, Japan faced several incidents of insecurity in the early 2010s in distant and nearby areas. Abe differentiated himself as 'responsible' and 'right' for taking necessary actions for Japan's security, compared to the opposition and Japan's past security posture. This discursive practice legitimized the adoption of Abe's new security policy. Still, other factors, such as the election schedules, could have motivated Abe to press on with the Diet deliberation, specifically in 2015.

These explanations for how Japan's foreign policy identity changed and why at this particular time, constitute the common sense Abe constructed for adopting the security policy.

This common sense - a state cannot defend itself alone and must contribute to international security by having necessary capabilities - reflects the discourse of transnational threat and warrants revisionist ambition of strengthening capabilities to uphold the pacifist norm. Departing from the past passive attitude, the new active posture to achieving peace requires, in Abe's explanation, increased capabilities, including the adoption of the limited right to CSD, for enhancing deterrence and avoiding war. Thus, the new security policy, which increases Japan's capabilities, is construed as 'pacifism,' and adopting it is an appropriate behavior of the pacifist norm. Using the new common sense, Abe shifted the meaning of the pacifist norm - to have an active attitude to peace - to achieve the adoption of the new security policy.

Abe's discursive practice continues with the past trend of stretching pacifism without revising Article 9. While the pacifist norm has been deeply ingrained in society, the public has acknowledged the need to increase security and international cooperation, and previous governments have gradually upgraded Japan's capabilities. The stretching of pacifism, or the revisionist change within the pacifist norm, has been causing the contradiction of Japan being a pacifist country with revisionist leaders. In other words, both material interest - revisionist redistribution of resources to enhance security - and ideational interest - upholding the pacifist norm - have been relevant in forming Japan's foreign policy identity, and together, they explain the contradiction or the struggle between pacifism and revisionism.

The interrelation of material and ideational factors was reflected in Abe's reasoning. Japan's security policy has faced limited capabilities, partly shaped by the pacifist norm after WWII alongside the immediate post-war economic situation. However, the changing threat has called for increased capabilities with resource redistribution. These material factors have affected and transformed the ideational factor with Abe's discursive practices of establishing a new common sense and shifting the pacifist norm, leading to the adoption of the new security policy. With the dialectic relation between material and ideational factors, resource redistribution was made with the unprecedented adoption of the right to CSD, but the pacifist norm was upheld by maintaining the conventional purpose of traditional pacifism. The new security policy was an optimum outcome in the struggle between the factors. In the end, the new security posture and Japan's foreign policy identity become more comprehensible through the dialectic relation between material and ideational factors, which do not negate each other, and the principles of both factors remain distinguishable in the outcome.

Still, this study has explicitly focused on the security policy to assess Japan's foreign policy identity and the puzzle of Japan being a pacifist state with revisionist leaders. There could be other explanations, primarily domestic politics or electoral landscapes in Japan. Like Abe, the conservative LDP leaders, who are considered revisionists, may not have necessarily gained support for their security policies but for economic or other policies. Relatedly, the U.S.-Japan relations, which concern a broad range of issues, could be another element. With its relative decline as a global power and seeking equal sharing of the burden, the United States has demanded that Japan strengthen its capabilities to sustain the alliance. Also, maintaining good economic and trade ties with the United States is required of Japan's leaders by its constituents, regardless of their revisionist ambitions. The weak opposition parties, lacking core ideologies, especially since the 1990s, may have also been the contributing factor. Future research could integrate the elements of how the political landscape, particularly domestic issues and the state of U.S.-Japan relations, could affect Japan's foreign policy identity and the struggle between pacifism and revisionism.

This study partly contributes to the explanation of the puzzle. However, its significance is in the departure from the dichotomous scale of 'either material or ideational factor' in discussing foreign policy identity, particularly in the case of Abe's security policy, by examining the dialectic relation of the factors. It encourages consideration of different schools of thought and their interrelation in IR studies. Empirically, this study contributes to understanding Japan's current security posture. Abe's shift to active posture in Japan's pacifist norm has remained, with no new constitutional reinterpretation on CSD introduced since then or no overturn of the 2015 legislation. With increasing uncertainty, Japan has been actively preparing for its security, pursuing ever-enhanced deterrence to avoid military clashes in the Asia-Pacific region - in the near or far future.

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Appendix

Data list for critical discourse analysis

CDA-1:

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CDA-2:

Abe, S. (2013, February 28). “第183回国会 衆議院 本会議 第8号 平成25年2月28日 [183rd Diet session House of Representatives plenary session no.8 February 28th, 2013].” Japan. Diet. House of Representatives. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 183rd Diet session. <https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=118305254X00820130228¤t=8>

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CDA-3:

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CDA-5:

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CDA-6:

Abe, S. (2014, May 15). *安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見* [Press conference by Prime Minister Abe, May 15th, 2014] [Press conference transcript]. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet.

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CDA-9:

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CDA-19:

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CDA-20:

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CDA-22:

Abe, S. (2015, July 27). “第189回国会 参議院 本会議 第34号 平成27年7月27日 [189th Diet session House of Councillors plenary session no.34 July 27th, 2015].” Japan. Diet. House of Councillors. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 189th Diet session.

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CDA-23:

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CDA-24:

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CDA-25:

Abe, S. (2015, July 30). “第189回国会 参議院 我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員会 第5号 平成27年7月30日 [189th Diet session House of Councillors special committee on peace and security legislation for Japan and the international community no.5 July 30th, 2015].” Japan. Diet. House of Councillors. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 189th Diet session.
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CDA-26:

Abe, S. (2015, August 4). “第189回国会 参議院 我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員会 第7号 平成27年8月4日 [189th Diet session House of Councillors special committee on peace and security legislation for Japan and the international community no.7 August 4th, 2015].” Japan. Diet. House of Councillors. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 189th Diet session.
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CDA-27:

Abe, S. (2015, August 21). “第189回国会 参議院 我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員会 第11号 平成27年8月21日 [189th Diet session House of

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CDA-28:

Abe, S. (2015, August 25). “第189回国会 参議院 我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員会 第12号 平成27年8月25日 [189th Diet session House of Councillors special committee on peace and security legislation for Japan and the international community no.12 August 25th, 2015].” Japan. Diet. House of Councillors. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 189th Diet session.

<https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=118913929X01220150825¤t=12>

CDA-29:

Abe, S. (2015, September 11). “第189回国会 参議院 我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員会 第19号 平成27年9月11日 [189th Diet session House of Councillors special committee on peace and security legislation for Japan and the international community no.19 September 11th, 2015].” Japan. Diet. House of Councillors. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 189th Diet session.

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CDA-30:

Abe, S. (2015, September 14). “第189回国会 参議院 我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員会 第20号 平成27年9月14日 [189th Diet session House of Councillors special committee on peace and security legislation for Japan and the international community no.20 September 14th, 2015].” Japan. Diet. House of Councillors. *National Diet Library, Japan*. 189th Diet session.

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