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MIHKEL SOLVAK

Private member's bills in parliament – a comparative study of Finland and Estonia

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ABBREVATIONS

M	district magnitude
MP	member of parliament
OLS	ordinary least squares regression
PPG	parliamentary party group
PMB	private member's bills
PR	proportional representation
PV	personal vote
S	assembly size
SD	standard deviation
SMD	single-member district

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"Saadikute eelnõud Riigikogus: pseudo- või pärisseadusandlus?" ("Private members' bills in Riigikogu: pseudo- or real legislation?") *Riigikogu Toimetised (Journal of the Estonian Parliament)*, (2007), 16: 96–105.

"Saadiku koht parlamendis: vabadus ja sõltuvus," ("Position of the individual MP in parliament: freedom and dependence") *Riigikogu Toimetised (Journal of the Estonian Parliament)*, (2006), 14: 116–123.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Private member's bills are legislative drafts sponsored by individual members of parliament. Formally, these include both full text laws regulating as well as bills amending other full text laws. Anyone familiar with the workings of a modern day parliamentary democracy knows that the vast bulk of passed laws tend to be government initiated (e.g. Döring 1995b; Döring & Hallerberg 2004). Private member's bills (PMB) are therefore indicators of the truly independent law making power of the legislative branch of government. Ironically, however, these draft laws have a uniformly low chance of ever being passed (see Mattson 1995). Puzzlingly this does not discourage members of parliament (MP) from initiating these bills in great numbers. For example, in Finland, one of the cases studied in this thesis, MPs sponsored 665 private member's bills between 2003 and 2007. Only 30 of these, i.e. 4.5 percent, were passed and this includes bills that were merged with government drafts. Even more, this is a comparatively high rate for a given electoral period in Finland (see Wiberg 2004).

The aim of this study is therefore to explain why MPs sponsor such bills, both in form of full text laws and amendment laws, and what implications this has for the nature of the bills and the treatment of them in parliament. The contribution of the thesis is however not in describing the empirical details of a generally inconsequential legislative instrument, but in using and widening the concept of the personal vote to explain variance in the sponsorship level and in the subsequent and more intricate parts of the legislative process. The subsequent analysis demonstrates that the personal vote level does indeed explain why some MPs are more likely to sponsor PMBs and do so in greater numbers than others. However, it does not explain too much of the variance in the technical sophistication of the bills, nor the choice of topics. Also, the treatment of the bills in the legislative process is clearly more dependent on the opposition or coalition status of the MP, with the personal vote having only limited explanatory power.

The personal vote will be defined in detail in the second chapter, but the explanatory mechanism behind the concept can be summarized as the combination of electoral rules that give a politician the incentive to cultivate a strong personal image among actors (most notably voters). The usage of this concept has mostly been limited to majoritarian systems and if used cross-nationally, then as a rule for comparing majoritarian with proportional systems and not investigating within system variation further. This underestimates the heterogeneity in incentives that can be created within proportional systems and not only between different types of these, but within the same system. For example, Shugart et al present evidence for "previously unrecognized cross-district bias in electoral systems" (2005, 446) when it comes to so called vote earning attributes of candidates and note that we are only beginning to understand the variation within electoral rules. More attention beyond the simple proportional vs majoritarian dichotomy has shown that the effects of district size variance within a proportional system, for example, might display a nuanced non-linear,

but still clear, effect (Grofman & Selb 2011). This differs from what one would expect by simply comparing majoritarian and proportional systems on the aggregate level, since an implicit assumption is that these different systems have a qualitative difference between them. However, one can think of smaller, not qualitative, but quantitative distinctions between and also within systems that will also have behavioral consequences. The only difference is the strength of the same mechanism at work. Thinking of the distinction between majoritarian and proportional systems to run along a continuum, where certain types of rules contribute towards making certain types of behavior being more or less pronounced, raises the possibility that the same type of system might have sufficient variance in its rules so we can think of actors within that same system facing slightly different sets of rules, which themselves can also be placed on that very same continuum. In that vein a mechanism of "primacy of reelection" might result in diverging effects within proportional systems, if the rules and setting all actors face is not totally uniform and usually it tends not to be. Extending the logic of the personal vote to within the same type of proportional system is one of the goals of this thesis, the precise way and logic why this should be so will be explained in more detail below.

Investigations of the personal vote have done previously relied on mostly aggregate national level data, so the link between the personal vote and actual behavior is "assume[ed] rather than test[ed]" (Tavits 2010, 216). This thesis uses individual level data on MP behavior and data on the actual PMBs, which goes much further than a comparison of aggregate level sponsorship frequencies. All PMBs sponsored in Estonia between 1999–2007 and in Finland between 2003–2007 have been included into a combined dataset of 993 PMBs. This allows observing the personal vote phenomenon at the level where it actually occurs and will therefore avoid a possible ecological fallacy that aggregate level studies might fall victim to. The personal vote itself has been used to explain a range of phenomenon (see section 2.1.4.) and in terms of parliamentary behavior its impact can be measured through a range of indicators, such as constituency service levels, personalistic campaigning, using of parliamentary oversight tools. However, this study will not analyze the impact of the personal vote on all ranges of parliamentary behavior and business, but rather place PMBs and the legislative process connected to them, within the overarching explanatory framework of the personal vote.

Besides examining the personal vote effect within proportional systems using individual level data, the thesis also theorizes the impact of the concept on details of the legislative process beyond mere sponsoring of these bills. As will be explained in detail below it is reasonable to assume that the different incentives the system creates for MPs also structure the nature of the bills they present and the way these are treated in the process by other MPs. In a nutshell the thesis contributes (a) to the understanding of PMBs by using a comparative two country design and (b) to the understanding of possible effects of the personal vote concept on the wider legislative process by example of PMBs. The approach is therefore both X- and Y-centric (Ganghof 2005, 77–78), as it

seeks both to evaluate the effect of specific variables, but also to explain the legislative processes connected to PMBs.

A study on PMBs can only use cases where sponsoring these is actually possible. The cases of Estonia and Finland fulfill this criterion. The discussion below will show that the nature and purpose of PMBs specifically has not been studied much on a comparative perspective, but the few studies on the matter have brought forward generalizations that seem to apply for most of Western-Europe (Bromhead 1956; Marsh & Read 1988; Mattson 1995; Marsh & Marsh 2002). The central explanatory factors have however not really been tested much and in many cases boil down to national idiosyncrasies, especially for the UK. What has however been widely studied is the constituency link and if one classifies PMB related activities as part of constituency service, then the results of these prior studies should apply to this specific legislative instrument as well. The discussion will show however that things might be more complicated and there are various factors that influence PMB related activities, so a case selection to include institutional variation is crucial. The central variation a study of the personal vote looks for is that of the electoral system. This connection between the personal vote and electoral system has been widely studied in comparative designs including proportional and majoritarian systems, with the result being that the connection is stronger in the latter systems. The nature of this connection in proportional system should depend on how close or open the system is, with the connection stronger in the latter again. As already mentioned, whether there is a difference within certain types of proportional systems is however not so well established. It is therefore possible that the strength of this link varies within a proportional open list system for example. The personal vote notion elaborated below certainly suggests it is possible and some studies have investigated this link.

The case selection follows a two stage logic, first choosing proportional as opposed to majoritarian systems, secondly choosing systems that have clear variance within their electoral systems and allow for individual MPs to sponsor bills. Estonia has a two-tier electoral system that creates three distinct type of mandates, which all differ according to the personal vote level. Finland has a simple open list proportional system with a wide range in district magnitudes, which provides for a more quantitative variance in institutional setting that should also induce strong personal image cultivation (for a thorough description of both systems see section 2.2.3). On top of that, both countries show a high frequency of PMB sponsoring, which provides for a sufficient case number for statistical analysis. The variance within the electoral system, which in both cases is also clearly candidate centered, allows therefore examining these effects on legislative behavior by example of PMBs. Through the analysis of these cases the thesis contributes to the empirical analysis of the effect of variance within proportional systems on behavior of legislators. This is done by using individual level data on the whole legislative process, something that is usually not undertaken precisely because of lack of data.

Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the theoretical mechanism of the personal vote, a more general introduction to PMBs and the connections between PMB related activities and representation will be presented in the remaining part of the introductory chapter.

1.1. Private member's bills

The term used throughout this thesis is private member's bill[1] although one could also call it single member bill. Single member bill is a slight misnomer however, as there are frequently multiple MPs sponsoring such a bill together.

PMBs are a relatively understudied part of legislation as those bills tend to be unimportant in formulating public policy. In a number of parliaments individual members actually lack the possibility to initiate legislation on their own and where they do, the success chances of these draft bills tends to be very low (see Mattson 1995). Mattson therefore refers to some of those bills as pseudolegislation (see detailed discussion in section 1.3.), as sponsoring bills while knowing that these will have no realistic chances to become actual policy, must mean that there are other motivations than the intention to regulate behind PMBs. This becomes especially clear if one looks at the discrepancy between success rates and number of sponsored bills. The already mentioned success rate of 4.3% in Finland for the period of 2003–07 is even high considering that out of the 21 402 PMBs introduced between 1945–2002 only 1.4% were passed (Wiberg 2004, 19). Why MPs use their limited time to engage in obviously fruitless efforts to regulate is therefore the first puzzle that justifies a closer look at this particular legislative instrument.

Looking at research on PMBs one has to conclude that these tend to be a curious part of the legislative process. The PMB procedure in the British House of Commons for example is in essence a formalized lottery[2], where MPs enter by putting down their names without any suggestion about the kind of bill they want to introduce and wait until a number of names is drawn, who can then proceed to initiate PMBs. The whole reading process is also very strict and intricate (for a history and nature of this procedure see Marsh & Read 1988; Bromhead 1956). Besides this, the whole procedure is notoriously susceptible to obstruction by other counterparts and bills can be killed off with relative ease in a process that is sometimes described as "the slaughter of the innocent" (de Waal 1990, 21). Securing government support is therefore vital. Besides this

[1] Not to be confused with private bills, which are bills that might also be introduced by MPs, but serve to grant specific rights or exemptions for individuals or single actors. Private bills belong to private law as opposed to public law or common law and their idea is to grant privileges that would not be possible in the framework of public or common law. Private bills are a frequently used type of legislation in Anglo-Saxon countries (see Krumm 2004; Hill & Williams 1993).

[2] There are also some other ways to introduce PMBs, see http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/private_members.cfm, and Griffith (1989).

last point, the odd nature of British PMB procedure leaves serious doubts about the external validity of those studies for continental parliaments. Acknowledging the specific rules however, PMBs are still one instrument that many parliaments around the world share. External validity concerns are of course serious, the devil is in the detail, but as with so many intricacies of parliamentary institutions, there are remarkable similarities in structural features of parliaments across polities and cultures, probably more so than with any other institution (Loewenberg 2007, 825). Besides structural similarities, other factors might also contribute to the dissemination and loaning of parliamentary practices.[3] A look at PMBs in the UK and other countries is therefore still worthwhile and will provide insight into the two countries under study in this thesis as well.

The first issue that arises with looking at PMBs is determining the actual sponsor behind these bills, which is less straightforward than what one would expect. Are PMBs in fact initiated by MPs, never mind the formalities, or are they just frontmen for the whole party, committee or government? Mattson claims that there is no accepted standard on how to "distinguish the innovator from the messenger in the legislative process" (Mattson 1995, 454). This is a serious problem. PMBs might be so called "hand out" bills, given to MPs by the government, which for some reason prefers not to introduce such legislation under its own name. As the backing for such a bill is guaranteed, MPs anxious to get their name into the statute books might be very willing to sponsor these under their name (de Waal 1990, 21). This is what Arter calls a "parliamentary assist". An "executive assist" on the other hand, occurs when a MP sponsors a bill and the government backs it by helping with drafting or promising it support in committees and on the floor (Arter 2006, 466). Many PMBs in the UK are parliamentary assists and many PMBs are by definition also executive assists, as no bill is likely to pass if the government is not supporting it, or being at least sympathetically indifferent towards it. Marsh and Read estimate that as much as 40% of UK PMBs in the 1980s had their origin in government departments and it is not uncommon for MPs whose names were drawn in the lottery to approach the government for a non-partisan, i.e. passable, bill (Marsh & Read 1988, 43–47). Mattson concludes that PMBs that get passed are in essence government initiated and only those that do not are proposed by MPs genuinely (Mattson 1995, 477).

1.2. Topics of PMBs

Besides the sponsors the substance of the topics of these bills tends to be also somewhat peculiar. One of the few monographs on PMBs demonstrates how the

[3] A peculiar example is brought by Vettik (2008). The institutional vacuum and lack of experience during the democratic transition in Estonia made learning from western colleagues such a common practice, that even the ways of spelling bill titles was adopted from abroad, even though local grammar rules covering it existed (Vettik 2008, 117).

topics that were subjects of these bills have changed from big issues into relatively minor ones in Britain between the two wars (Bromhead 1956). This trend has only been strengthened over the 20th century with clear de-politicization of PMBs. Nowadays they deal mainly with non-partisan and relatively minor issues, like broadly defined moral questions that cut across party differences or some technical matters (Marsh & Read 1988, 29). The same applies to all of Western Europe. PMBs deal with uncontroversial and trivial issues, are technically simple, and mostly used by members of minor opposition parties (Mattson 1995, 479–480). The trend of PMBs being used by the weak and in decreasing numbers has unfolded for a long time and is explained by the general increasing dominance of the executive over the legislative branch in parliamentary systems (see Bromhead 1956; Weiss & Brichta 1969; Hyson 1974; Marsh & Read 1988). Issues such as regulating the "administration of the Church of Maria on the island of Tenos" (Mattson 1995, 479) or that "naval signals should be sent out in reformed spelling" (Bromhead 1956, 60), just to give a few colorful examples, give Austin Mitchell's quote of PMBs being "one of the few prospects of achievement, a rare escape from the impotent futility which is the backbencher's life" (Mitchell 1986, 1) a very ironic twist.

1.3. Intention of the bills: pseudo- or real legislation

All of the above suggests that PMBs are indeed a peculiar legislative instrument. The notion of pseudolegislation introduced above, assigns PMBs a communicatory function above a regulating one. If we accept this, then PMBs are more of a communication tool, drawing attention to certain issues and promoting a debate on the topic (Marsh & Read 1988, 24). Introducing PMBs can hence best be seen as form of negotiation to influence the process of legislation (Mattson 1995, 482). However, this is an inherent part of any piece of legislation, why should PMBs then be different?

To answer this question we should briefly dwell on legislative acts and their intentions from a formal point of view. Fundamentally, regulation means "state intervention in private spheres of activity to realize public purposes" (Francis 1993, 5). In order for this to be legitimate, certain procedures of drawing up legislation need to be followed (see Waldron 2006) and the need to regulate has to be justified. Hence, regulation should always be motivated by stating the problem and intention of the regulative act. This "instrumental view of legislation" (Mader 2001, 122) poses however legal and conceptual problems in defining the legislative intention that is very relevant to treating PMBs. The subjective intention of the bills sponsor or "intention of parliament" and the legislative intent of the bill, as interpreted by courts, are two very different things. The intention of the MP behind a bill is clearly subjective, the later interpretation of the law in court or in a government agency is on the other hand objective, following mostly the language used in the bill. (Greenberg 2006, 17).

Or as Antonin Scalia put it "we are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators" (Shepsle & Bonchek 1997, 71). This more objective interpretation that follows later on in the process, as the law is applied, is bound to differ from the specific ideas or motivations that actually produced the law. Why this is so, is obvious. Law, as any regulation, is relatively abstract and hence always "incomplete". It can be complete only theoretically, as it would have to be self-explanatory in a sense that "every addressee agrees to the meaning of the law and, by implication that there is no need for interpreting the law." (Pistor & Xu 2003, 938). As the reality around a law changes and its abstract word needs to be applied in very concrete circumstances[4], law necessarily has to be interpreted, making it in that sense always incomplete. It is obvious that if the law is interpreted, then the chief aim is not to find out subjective interest behind it, but to follow the word and spirit of the law (Greenberg 2006, 18). Furthermore we cannot say afterwards if the persons, whose initial subjective intention we hope to find, understanding of the law and its wording was exceptional or maybe even totally inadequate (ibid., 18). Underlining this kind of take on legislative intent is the opinion that a draft may well be sponsored and passed based on some kind of subjective interest, but as it becomes law it gets an objective meaning, ridding itself of this subjective interest and starting a life of its own. Another way to approach it would be to not attach subjectiveness or objectiveness to the law, but to the reader of the law. The one interpreting the law should, by putting him/herself in the position of the subjects or parties in a dispute, be able to find the meaning of the law (ibid., 20–21). But this again means that the intention of the law is totally open to interpretation as we do not know how a "typical reader" looks like. Finally we can focus on the problem that the law reacts to and see this as embodying the central meaning, but again, problems of interpretation are bound to arise. Hence we have to admit that the "notion of legislative intention is a fiction" (ibid., 24) and is construed by the courts post hoc. To establish the real subjective intention behind a bill would preclude that we really can reconstruct the reality surrounding the initiation, which is doubtful.

Having established that subjectiveness is inherent in all the stages of the legislative process and also in the final application phase, and that objectiveness is constructed only after the legislative process has ended, we can see PMBs in a more clear way. If we cannot determine individual motivations behind an act by looking at it, as the legislative act centered view above shows, then we need to interpret with the help of other, structural, electoral or indirect factors. While not wanting to say that we should dismiss the idea that bills want to regulate matters, which would be nonsense, I argue that by looking at the structural factors surrounding PMBs and other, at first sight indirect, factors will show us if the intention to regulate something is overshadowed by the intention to

[4] Law can be more or less incomplete depending on whether the bill is badly drafted or deliberately more abstract and vague so as leave more room to interpretation by the courts (Pistor & Xu 2003, 933). So besides the static law falling behind a dynamic society, law can also be made incomplete deliberately.

communicate. All legal acts need to do both, regulate things and be able to communicate their meaning to the target audience. For PMBs however, the communicative function might to a large degree overshadow the regulative function. Hyson calls it the "expressive function" of a PMBs and demonstrates that such usage is one of the "few remaining devices" that backbenchers can use to express themselves (Hyson 1974, 263–265).

Coming back to Mattson's point of seeing PMBs as pseudolegislation hence does not place them lower in a hierarchy of legislation such as secondary or quasi-legislation, which is treated differently from a formal and substantive viewpoint (see Tudor 2000; Argument 1992). It in fact places them outside of proper legislation. It is beautifully exemplified by the aphorism of a well known 19th century Westminster draftsman Henry Thring: "bills are made to pass as razors are made to sell". Thring himself created it out of a 18th century poem where a farmer buys razors in the city only to find out that they do not shave. Confronting the salesman the farmer gets the surprising answer that the razor were meant to sell not shave (Engle 1983, 9). A bill will hence have to be sold first (passed), otherwise it cannot shave (regulate), making it sellable to the parliament might however seriously limit shaving capacities. Thring's point was that a bill has to be drafted so well as to pass the house, but also to be quality legislation. Whether PMBs are however really mostly about selling and not shaving at all has to be determined empirically.

A slightly different angle for looking at regulation is presented by the constructivist perspective. Julia Black proposes it as a tool for better understanding of the "inner life" of legislating institutions (Black 2002). If we accept that PMBs are an odd type of legislation that frequently have nothing more than signaling without the realistic hope of regulating as their motivation, then applying "regulatory conversation" analysis to PMBs could help to better understand it as a communication tool between the voters and MPs. Her point on regulatory conversations is therefore similar to the interpretation of PMBs in this study though the methods differ radically. She defines regulatory conversation as: "communication that occurs between regulators, regulated and others involved in the regulatory process concerning the operation of that regulatory system" (Black 2002, 170–171).[5] PMBs could hence be seen as one of the pathways or mediums that this communication can take. To whom and what is communicated however is not as easily understandable. As the many studies quoted above have shown voters to be remarkably ignorant to the behavior of MPs, then expecting them to notice draft laws that are killed off during some stage of the legislative process is overly optimistic. We need to take the same line of argument that was forwarded by the early empirical studies on legislative behavior which started with an equally footed relationship between voter and the representative, but quickly understood that one of them

[5] One could take it quite literally and analyze the language used in legal texts which might include more explicit political rhetoric than is usually expected from formal legal texts. For an interesting analysis see Orr (2000).

has a advantage in terms of information, interest level and resources. PMBs might be a tool to communicate with voters, but in this sense only presented to them by the representative, translated into language understandable to them by him/her and only in cases when needed or usable. Otherwise it is probably more of a tool in the "inner life" of a legislative institution, something to drive a point home to political rivals. PMB might hence be a multifunctional mean to a frequently changing end.

1.4. PMBs and representation

Looking in detail at one and mostly inconsequential legislative instrument on its own needs also a more generalized justification than mere empirical interest. Otherwise one could simply take a descriptive and encyclopedic perspective on the matter, state the rules governing this particular aspect of legislative politics, demonstrate its usage and be done with it. The value added would be only empirical and not much theoretical insight would come out of it. PMBs should therefore be put into a wider context of representation.

Representation has a core meaning of "somebody or something not literally present is nevertheless present in some non-literal sense" (Pitkin 2004, 336), hence already a contradiction in terms that has many implications for the political use of the term. Representation has also a multiplicity of political meanings and necessarily a multiplicity of institutional configurations that claim to represent something or somebody somehow. Emphasizing the word *claim* already implicitly takes the position of the one doing the representing to mean what representing actually is. This is of course only one side of the story. Looking at it from the other side by taking a voter-centric view comes with its own complications. A highly mixed picture of awareness and interest levels in politics is one of the best documented empirical facts in election studies and social surveys, starting with the classical works of the Michigan school in electoral studies down to the contemporary ones (see e.g. Lazarsfeld *et al* 1944; Campbell *et al* 1954, 1960; van Deth 1990, van Deth & Elff 2000). The same was also established in the early empirical studies on representation. Assuming constituency level control, where citizens would issue demands to their representatives, was dismissed by evidence showing ill informed and not attentive constituents. This prompted a revision of the causal direction in representation from a representative who acts based on demands issued by voters, towards a largely autonomous representative, who dictates what is central in the relationship between the represented and representative (Eulau & Karps 1978, 58). This reversed order, against the more philosophical understanding of representation, has stayed the focal point of much contemporary research up to the rather skeptical claim by Hanna Pitkin, author of the seminal *Concept of Representation* (1967), that representation has in fact supplanted democracy with self-perpetuating elites acting "not as agents of the people but simply instead of

them" (Pitkin 2004, 339).[6] Pitkin's solution to this problem is a more vibrant engagement by the voters at the local level, so they would become more actor like and not see themselves as an atomized mass of individuals (ibid., 340).[7] The problematic nature of representation was eloquently described in the *Concept of Representation,* where in the end Pitkin abandons the quest to find a clear definition of political representation and suggests focusing on responsiveness instead. It is worth quoting her understanding of representative government in relation to responsiveness at length:

> […] a representative government requires that there be machinery for the expression of the wishes of the represented, and that the government respond to these wishes unless there are good reasons to the contrary. There need not be a constant activity of responding, but there must be a constant condition or responsiveness, of potential readiness to respond. It is not that a government represents only when it is acting in response to an expressed popular wish; a representative government is one which is responsive to popular wishes when there are some. (Pitkin 1967, 232–233)

The central aim in the study of representative government could hence be seen as the study of mechanisms that enable responsiveness. This does make it a bit easier, as we can move from the abstract level to the level of institutions, but it does not solve the above mentioned problem of inequality in a representational relationship, with the voters being in fact a clearly disadvantaged side.

This debate is typical of the contradiction between the more normatively focused approach to representation, i.e. what representatives "ought to do" and the more empirically focused approach, i.e. what representatives "actually do". In the first strand of thought one frequently finds discussions on how to even out at least a bit of the inequality between the representatives and the ones being represented. As the representative is by definition a more coherent actor than the one being represented, this inherent inequality can only be softened with giving the people who are represented more coherence. This in itself would already provide for stronger accountability, as a coherent actor can issue more clear demands than an incoherent one.

The more empirically focused approach proceeds from the representatives and tries to map out the how the daily process of representation takes place, sometimes taking accountability or the link between the representative and represented as a given. This is of course a simplification, even empirically focused studies cannot ignore the fact that representation, or more precisely representative democracy, is normatively laden and empirical findings should

[6] For a another take on this diagnose see Manin (1997), who discusses the elitist character of representative government and elections, saying in fact that the very essence of the electoral mechanism is fundamentally at odds with the equality demand underpinning most normative theories of democracy.

[7] For a detailed discussion of representation in democratic theory see Urbinati and Warren (2008).

be used to mend those problems wherever one finds the contradiction between normatively desired mode of representation and actual representative politics. But the empirical approach assumes explicitly that "what representatives do reveals something about what constituents want them to do" (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1987, 3).

Following Pitkin's advice to focus on responsiveness Eulau and Karps identify four components of it – policy, service, allocation and symbolic responsiveness – which all fit under the apt summary of legislative behavior proposed by John Hibbing, that legislators want either to "look good, do good or ladle pork" (Hibbing 1999, 155).

Policy responsiveness refers to how the policy preferences among the voters are connected to the policy orientation and ensuing decision making by the representative in relation to some issue of public policy. If the voter and representative have similar preferences and the latter acts accordingly, then there is responsiveness (Eulau & Karps 1978, 63). Note that it could equally mean that the representative perceives the voters to have such preferences or that the voters actually express such demands openly.[8] The question again boils down to the level of actorness by the voters, meaning here competence in public policy issues, or whether we can talk of a "district will" or should stick to more perceptually understood "district interest" (ibid.).

Service responsiveness involves "advantages and benefits" which the politician can acquire for the district or voter in the district. Case work relating to various grievances of the constituents falls under this type of responsiveness, together with more minor issues, such as answering written requests and organizing tours for politically interested people from the district (Eulau & Karps 1978, 64).

Allocation responsiveness is more commonly referred to as pork-barrel politics, meaning public projects for the whole constituency financed from the central government budget. Again, one can differentiate here between what kind of allocations voters in the district have expressed whishes for and what kind of allocations stem from the representatives assumptions of what is needed. Nevertheless, even not an explicitly demanded pork-barrel project can be successfully advertised as responsiveness, making the distinction largely irrelevant. Asked for or not, public spending in the district is a collective benefit and should in theory be welcomed anyway.

Lastly, symbolic responsiveness is closely related to political support. Those are gestures by the representative in response to support from the constituency, such as meeting voters face to face or opening public events. In other words everything that provides visibility and builds trust in the constituency with acts

[8] Evidence for this kind of responsiveness is inconclusive. There is evidence that legislators actually do not change their views although their constituency changes (e.g. Poole 2007; Levitt 1996), but also contrary evidence that they do alter their preferences in sync with their constituents (e.g Kousser *et al* 2007; Grossback *et al* 2005).

of symbolic nature (Eulau & Karps 1978, 66–67). This would fit under the "looking good" category of Hibbing.

Responsiveness is hence a multifaceted phenomenon. As already stated above it is the defining element of representative government. Eulau and Karps refine what should be meant under responsiveness by breaking it down into components that according to them "as a whole, constitute representation" (Eulau & Karps 1978, 62). They do however qualify this in their discussion a bit and accept that representative can be responsive on one component and unresponsive on another (ibid., 67). A representative can accordingly be seen to be representing in various manners and aspects, which can be and should be studied separately in order to have a better understanding of representative government.

PMBs as pieces of legislation should primarily be seen as policy responsiveness, although they might also entail elements of allocations responsiveness. Direct allocations from state budget for public projects in the district, brought about by budget amendments sponsored by MPs, of course do not fall under this category. MPs can however sponsor legislation that forces the state to become active and through this finance certain activities or projects in the constituency, making allocation responsiveness through PMBs also possible. This claim needs to be qualified however as a frequent rule of PMBs is prohibition of money bills, i.e. bills that put financial burdens on the state budget. The fact that legislative output in parliamentary systems is almost uniformly dominated by executive power does mean that PMBs tend to be the sole autonomous law making instrument of parliaments. Precisely because of this PMBs can be seen as an instrument that enables parliament to be responsive and is therefore an integral part of a responsive representative system of power, along of course a list of other options that enable responsiveness.

Talking of responsiveness raises the question "to whom"? Naturally to the voters, but depending on the electoral systems a more or less narrow segment of voters in constituencies.

Constituency definition is closely connected to the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of representation, as it is the basis of authorization for it (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 396). The traditional understanding of it is primarily territorial, i.e. constituency as a geographical district where the candidates stands for election. It can of course be conceptually broadened to include non-territorial or extraterritorial interest, as not all interest, opinions or even people necessarily reside somewhere. Those ideas are of course not novel, already in the 19th century Thomas Hare proposed the nowadays widely used simple quota as a solution that would enable "voters to create the constituency" (Birch 1971, 89). More contemporary ideas include randomly selected constituencies (Rehfeld 2005) or e-constituencies (Jackson 2008). Virtual in a literal sense or not, as long as territorial based constituencies are the norm, all other ways are bound to stay simply different ways to communicate with those same territorially based constituencies. The strength of the relationship with the constituency has hence relevance for representation and responsiveness.

How strong the link between politicians and their constituencies is primarily defined by the electoral systems. Single member constituencies produce a stronger link that is mainly down to clarity. If there is one representative from the constituency then he/she will have a clear and undivided responsibility for the given district.[9]

Lacking a clear single representative of course does not mean that there is no constituency linkage. Different combinations of electoral systems elements produce different incentive structures to cultivate a clear constituency link on part of the candidate or representative. This has been empirically demonstrated for multimember constituencies as well (Bogdanor 1985b, Bowler *et al* 1996). Also pork-barrel politics has been demonstrated to take place in open list proportional systems, creating serious problems for political stability as reelection seeking representatives hinder stable party politics and burden the budget by targeting pork-barrel project to districts that they seek reelection in. As name recognition is important in open list systems this can seriously hinder party discipline (Ames 1995).[10]

Multimember districts and proportional electoral system produce other effects that influence the MP constituency link. Multimember districts produce more fragmented legislatures as larger district magnitudes increases the number of parties that gain seats (Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Taagepera 2007). It can also influence the internal coherence of those parties, as multimember districts with preference voting produce more intraparty competition (see Katz 1986).[11] Besides those obvious structural factors at play, Adams has demonstrated that when candidates converge on the median voter in single-member districts, they locate away from the median in multimember districts, contributing to more internally ideologically diverse party factions in legislatures (Adams 1996, 140), the same has been demonstrated for general party positioning (Cox 1990). One can therefore expect that constituency-representative link is indeed weaker or somehow muddied in multimember district settings, it is however also reasonable to expect it to be much more complicated rather than nonexistent in cases one does not find the usual linkages identified in single-member districts. This linkage is discussed in more detail in the section on the personal vote below.

[9] This connection is of course not always clear cut, as already mentioned above, if one takes the voter centric view then this connection can become weaker, as voters are poorly informed about the actions of their representatives. Awareness level of voters could hence have implication for susceptibility to a personal vote seeking candidate (Zaller 2006[1992], 218). Thus constituency control can turn out to be a myth in single member districts as well (see Bernstein 1989).

[10] In cases were pork-barrel projects are based on collective party, as opposed to individual interest, those problems of course do not arise (see Denemark 2000).

[11] There is evidence however of parties trying to minimize this infighting that may under certain electoral formulas, such as single non-transferable vote, cause vote-splitting and a suboptimal solution for the party (see Browne & Patterson 1999).

1.5. Plan of the Thesis

The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two outlines the main theoretical framework of the study. It gives a definition of the persona vote notion, discusses the different forms it might manifest itself in and what kind of effects have been observed in the literature thus far. A subsection of the chapter is devoted to the measuring of this abstract concept and possible limitations hitherto unaddressed in the quantitative applications of the concept. The chapter ends with a summary of the main theoretical expectations explored empirically in the following chapters.

The three subsequent chapters take a closer look at three aspects of PMBs. First Chapter Three examines aggregate PMB sponsorship patterns to give a descriptive overview of the differences in sponsorship levels. After this two separate multivariate analyses show what distinguishes sponsors from non-sponsors and what might explain higher sponsorship activity by certain MPs. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main findings.

Chapter Four describes the topics PMBs deal with and the technical nature of the bills. It also looks at seasonality in connection to these two aspects. In addition the chapter describes the reading process of the bills and shows how they are treated in the plenary. Lastly, it looks at how these bills are amended based on Estonian data. All this serves as an extended introduction into chapter five. The chapter ends with a concluding discussion.

Chapter Five connects the attributes of the sponsor and revisits the topics, technical nature and treatment in the plenary to see if the nature of the sponsor plays a role for the character of the bill and the perception and subsequent treatment in the plenary by other MPs. In addition, using Estonian data, it investigates if the bills are amended based on who sponsors them and the results of this amending. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the central findings. The last, sixth chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis and offers a concluding discussion. In sum, the analysis of these separate aspects of the legislative process surrounding PMBs, together with the extension of the explanatory mechanism of the personal vote to explain variance in the legislative process will be the main contribution of the thesis to the literature.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILLS AND THE PERSONAL VOTE

This chapter presents the main explanatory mechanism that will be used in the data analysis in the subsequent parts of the thesis. It will start with a definition of the concept followed by an explanation of how it should structure behavior and in what kind of circumstances its effects might be observable. This is followed by sections discussing the application of the concept and the findings in the literature. Also, the connection with role theory is explored and the function of the party in relation to the concept is discussed. Finally, possible seasonality effects are outlined. The second major subsection deals with measuring the personal vote by explaining the composition and exploring the theoretical values of the index used to measure the concept. This is followed by a subsection discussing briefly other relevant aspects that need to be considered to get a true estimate of the personal vote effect, as there are obviously also other factors that influence who and why sponsors these bills. The last subsection outlines the central theoretical expectations regarding three aspects of PMBs – sponsoring, nature of bills and treatment in the plenary.

2.1. Personal vote

The discussion so far has not specified an underlining mechanism that causes the qualitative and quantitative differences in why certain MPs in certain systems might sponsor more real or pseudolegislation, be more responsive, cultivate stronger constituency links than others or in Hibbing words why some MPs want to "look good", others "do good" and third "ladle pork" (Hibbing 1999, 155). A possible causal mechanism is still not so apparent. Precisely this is provided by the personal vote notion.

2.1.1. Defining the personal vote

In order to estimate the balance of different motivations that might potentially arise out of structural factors, primarily the electoral system, a conceptual differentiation between the personal and non-personal part of the vote for a candidate is needed. Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina propose the following definition:

> The personal vote refers to that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities and record. The part of the vote which is not personal includes support for the candidate based on his or her partisan affiliation, fixed voter characteristics such as class, religion, and ethnicity, reactions to national conditions such as the state of the economy, and performance evaluations centered on the head of the governing party (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1987, 9).

A vote can therefore be broken down into those two parts – the personal and the non-personal. It is an analytical division that has however very real consequences, as it presents a classic collective action problem. The MP is him/herself responsible for the personal vote, whereas the non-personal part is a common good, primarily of the party as a whole. Hence a MP whose personal vote (PV) has had a substantial role in getting him/her elected or re-elected, should be concerned in retaining it by engaging in more active constituency service and campaigning.[12] This would in the extreme then lead to disruptive individual behavior from the point of view of the party and a breaking down of the institution of parliament into a atomized mass of selfish individuals. This scenario is balanced, but not totally neutralized, by the non-personal part of the vote, which introduces collective goals and the discipline following from it.

An MP who has a large PV should therefore be concerned with creating a personal image and free ride to a certain degree when it comes to creating party images, as this is to some extent guaranteed without the effort of the MP. Free riding is however a tricky subject, it is extremely hard to measure and the absence of the directly observable behavior does not mean automatic free-riding.

It is therefore necessary to focus on observable behavior and see the personal and non-personal vote as composites of the whole vote enhancing behavior, with the key difference that those composites aim in different directions, one at enhancing the personal standing, the other party standing, although fundamentally both directed at satisfying the key selectorate. We can go even further and widen the spectrum by including all key selectorates that come into play in getting elected/reelected. The first selectorate determines who will become a candidate; the second determines who will become a MP. About the first selectorate we can say that how inclusive or exclusive it is, determines the competitiveness of the process, as different selectorates proceed from different goals. An exclusive selectorate, such as party leadership, necessarily emphasizes party goals first and selects candidates based on that. A very inclusive selectorate, such as voters in primaries, have a bigger variety of criteria and potential candidates need to work harder to win favor. Hence a inclusive selectorate can mean higher competitiveness and the other way around (Hazan & Rahat 2006, 372–373). The candidate selection level is however very party specific and will for the sake of simplicity and operationalizational problems be left out of the equation. I will concentrate on the electoral system. The more choice it leaves for voters and the more freedom it gives voters to reshuffle the stack of candidates presented to them, the more important is the PV as intra-party competition is more heated. Hence a big PV should mean a less cohesive legislature as the personal image of MPs becomes relatively more important to

[12] The traditional understanding of constituency campaigning is campaign related activities in the constituency by local party activists, hence more of a campaigning for the party by the party (see e.g. Denver & Hands 1992; Denver, Hands & MacAllister 2004). A big PV should however bring with itself a constituency campaign by the candidate for the candidate.

ensure re-election. That's because the key selectorate are the voters and not the party oligarchies who draw up the lists.

2.1.2. Structural effects

There are however other indicators that need to be reckoned with in order to establish the importance of the personal vote, some structural and others situational. An introduction into the structural features serves to clarify the issue and make situational constraints more apparent. Carey and Shugart propose a method how to estimate the relative importance of PV in comparison to party image (or party vote) (Carey & Shugart 1995, 419). One of course notices that by presenting it as a dichotomy between the personal and party reputation, they simplify the approach of Cain *et al*, who include under the non-personal part besides party affiliation also voter characteristics such as class, ethnicity or other socio-demographic factors that might influence the vote.

Structural effects determining the level of the personal vote importance surface in a combination of four elements of the electoral system, the ballot structure, pooling of votes, number and type of votes cast and lastly, district magnitude (Carey & Shugart 1995). All these should tell us whether the electoral system pays dividends for politicians with a strong personal reputation.

Ballot structure refers to the freedom of the voter to reshuffle the deck, "disturb" the candidate list presented to her/him. In system with fixed lists drawn up by party leaders personal reputation is by definition of marginal importance as voters can choose between parties not among candidates. If the lists are open, PV is necessarily stronger, as candidates need to distinguish themselves from others in order to move up the list. Party endorsement is still needed though. Potentially strongest is a PV however in systems were ballot access and rank, and by definition also party endorsement, is not controlled by the party leaders. Systems were lists are drawn up with primaries might serve as examples.

Whether votes are pooled plays a role as well. A vote given to a candidate could be pooled across the whole party to determine the seats to be given to the party list. Most common PR-list systems use this type of pooling. Pooling could take place on a more limited scale across candidates in a district, such as the in the single transferable vote system, or across the whole party. Lastly votes for candidates could also be counted as such without any pooling taking place. Clearly the value of a personal reputation increases as no or limited pooling takes place.

The number and type of votes shows whether voters cast a single vote for a party or multiple votes for multiple candidates, such as limited vote system, alternative vote or voting over time as in primaries and then once more in proper elections. The basic point is that personal vote is of more value when a voter votes directly for candidates, but if there are many votes per voter, then candidates do not compete fully for one indivisible vote and personal reputation

is not absolutely central. Lastly, when voters cast a single vote below the party level, i.e. for a candidate, then a strong element of intraparty competition is added to the already existing party competition and personal reputation is at a premium.

The last variable is district magnitude. It affects PV by providing for a more precise estimate of the extent of the phenomenon (Carey & Shugart 1995, 419). In closed list systems an increase in district magnitude (M) should produce a decrease in incentives to cultivate a personal vote. As voters may not disturb lists, a big district with a long list of party candidates makes intraparty competition pointless, but also reduces the already marginal gain that a individual PV could potentially add to the whole party list vote. As Carey and Shugart put it: "as M [-district magnitude] grows in closed list systems, party reputation dominates the personal reputation of list members in drawing voter support" (Carey & Shugart 1995, 430), which is also consistent with evidence that smaller districts increase geographical particularism (Milesi-Ferretti *et al* 2001).

In all other systems party candidates compete against each other to bigger or lesser degree and an increase in district magnitude leads to bigger need for individual candidates to distinguish themselves, PV's importance hence grows together with M.

2.1.3. Situational effects

Carey and Shugart demonstrate the structural conditions for a personal vote in detail, but besides structural there are of course situational conditions that might mitigate or aggravate effects of the structural conditions. Two of those are electoral swings and degree of competition in the system. If swings are small (say 2%), then even a relatively little PV (say 3%) can have crucial importance, where as a comparatively bigger PV (for example 6%) can be of little importance if the common swing in the system is many times bigger (say 15%) than this "bigger PV". Still, even in such cases a PV can "augment favorable swings and depress unfavorable ones" (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1987, 11). So besides the *relative importance* connected with vote swings, the *nominal importance* might still be constant. Just as a reminder the PV's effect is of course at the district level, so instead of national swings we should use district level volatility, which in sum constitutes national volatility anyway. Assuming of course there is no two directional casual impact, where an anticipated national swing enhances district level swings, which might be an untenable assumption.

2.1.4. Established effects

The discussion above already shows that PV is in fact a measure of electoral independence of MPs. Its effects can hence be expected to be the dispersal of party power in the legislature and the substitution of "responsiveness to national electoral verdicts" for bargaining among near equals in parliament (Cain, Fere-

john & Fiorina 1987, 14) as the PV share increases. A smaller PV means more electoral dependence on party which should automatically mean that MPs fall in line and act more as "faceless troops in the party ranks" (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1984, 114). In parliamentary systems a legislature with less cohesive parties creates automatically problems for the executive. Hallerberg found some evidence that systems were there is a high PV have more restrictive voting rules in parliament, like for example not allowing to package bills or demanding a clause-by-clause vote that presumably makes it harder to push through favorable amendments and complicates logrolling (Hallerberg 2004, 31–32). Potentially destructive behavior is hence counterbalanced with restrictive rules.

A higher personal vote is also found to reduce budget discipline by creating a common pool resource problem (Hallerberg & Marier 2004). The PV is also found to contribute towards a more particularistic politics which can hamper recovery from economic shocks (Gaviria *et al* 2000), or even to establishing a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy which can be misused for constituency service by MPs (Golden 2003).

Besides general governance related effects, Cain *et al* see also possible influence on interest group bargaining patterns, relating systems with a big PV mainly to a pluralist as opposed to corporatist way of bargaining. More independent MPs need to personally secure support from various groups; hence they will also guarantee a more even playing field as no group can monopolize communication channels. As a downside, collectively negotiated agreements will be much harder sell to individual legislators (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1987, 18–19).

Cain found that MPs from marginal districts relied on a stronger personal vote. Marginal seats, where party label only does not guarantee reelection, are fought over based more on personal visibility and name recognition. MPs in those districts were found to work harder on constituency issues (more contact, case work, visits etc) to gain this additional recognition. Also younger members did more for their constituency, hinting that they assume it to be one way of securing reelection, or establishing a standing in the constituency (Cain 1983, 104).

This suggests indeed that the vote as a whole consists of the personal and non-personal part, when one increases the importance of the other increases and vice versa, and even in systems were parties are considered central as in the UK. If party fortunes decline, then MPs are motivated to try harder or work on their personal reputation to compensate for the party vote that is diminishing. This is of course strongly related to the election system as only in a single-member plurality or majority voting system can one candidate harbor ideas of defeating other partisans candidates with that little advantage that even a small personal vote can give (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1984, 111). Those first-past the post systems make every inch of popularity count, as it is by definition a zero sum game, ones win is always the others loss, not a situation than one necessarily encounters in multimember district proportional systems. Hence it would be wise to take the cautionary advice of Cain *et al* that the space between

individual motivations and collective interest may be big in some systems and small in others (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1984, 111).

I set out to test one part of it on PMBs with the help of the notion of personal vote in multiparty proportional representation systems. The puzzling thing about Cain's findings is that although the personal vote is structurally caused by the logic of the electoral system, it is nevertheless strongly conditional on other environmental factors. One could conceptualize it hence as a latent structural variable, that becomes more or less visible if other conditions take certain combinations. Among those situational effects theorized above are party popularity in district, party attachment levels, incumbency status, party leader ratings (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1984, 111). They conclude however that once the personal vote has gained some importance due to decrease in party role, a dynamic is set in motion that is in essence self-reinforcing. Party decline gives way to bigger personal vote, which itself reinforces party decline and increases the personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1984, 123). Party decline is a separate and disputed phenomenon (e.g. Dalton & Wattenberg 2002), but assuming the soundness of Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina's argument would suggest that personal vote is set to increase wherever parties lose some of their embeddedness in society. Besides this long-term sociological decline of parties, personal vote share fluctuates according to situational or accidental patterns according to changing party popularity ratings.

In addition to such exogenous factors the endogenous side should also be considered as no party-system can be expected to exercise total control over MPs, there is room for individual and egoistic action which according to Cain *et al* could spurs other MPs to similar action (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1984, 123).

A counterargument might be that if the above mentioned gap between MP and party interest is small, then it would be logical for the party to step in and help out MPs whose district is in danger of being seriously contested. In other words, it is the interest of the whole party to ensure reelection for individual MPs and not leave them to fend for themselves, something that has been demonstrated to apply in certain settings (see e.g. Denemark 2000). Regardless of the party standing, a big personal vote is an insurance of an MP against national level volatility, provided of course that no electoral tide is big enough to wash away even the holders of biggest PVs.

2.1.5. Personal vote and roles

The effects of the personal vote for individual level behavior might however be mediated by the individuals position in an institution and the obligations this brings. A brief discussion of role theory, a prominent instrument in studies on representation, is therefore needed in order to understand why the same level or a perceived personal vote might actually go hand in hand with observed differences in behavioral patterns.

Discussing effects that arise from electoral systems presents problems in interpreting individual actions. Action is necessarily preceded by motivation. A motivational approach needs an observable model of the political actor that defines when and how a motivation spurs the actor into action. A different approach would be of perceptual nature, emphasizing that perceptions translate motivations into actions. According to Wahlke this allows to sidestep a "needless commitment to a particular psychological school [of political behavior]" (Wahlke 1978, 25) and being therefore a more applicable analytical tool.

Certainly, one need not waste time in trying to elucidate idiosyncratic behavioral patterns of MPs, but focus instead on behavior in relation to institutional configurations and political realities. Shifting the focus on perception allows for an easier inclusion of institutional determinants in behavior, i.e. the self-perception in certain situations. The fact that institutional rules are stable helps to narrow down possible self-perceptions. This what Wahlke, as one of the pioneers of role theory, sees as its main virtue; the shifting from an individual to a social psychology with the accompanying narrowing of possible actions by constraints imposed upon the situation and other actors (Wahlke 1978, 26). One simply has to empirically identify "cues" that actors take from the environment and other actors and if those cues seem to be stable, i.e. arise always in those given circumstances, then one can talk of a role the individual has internalized. The institution, or environment, produces "cue-giving actions" that the individual will necessarily respond to by playing a role that he or she perceives to be appropriate response in this situation (Wahlke 1978, 29). An individual can hence play multiple roles simultaneously according to differences in settings. A specific individual is not central to the role, as roles are largely determined by institutional structure; roles are therefore structurally defined and will be played similarly by different individuals with some room for role interpretation (Saalfeld & Müller 1997, 7).

Role theory in legislative research has evolved, been immensely popular, but lost some of its appeal again. Donald Searing, who revived role theory after its structuralist-functionalist foundations had left it out of fashion, does not see it effectively as theory, as there are no general sets of statements for explaining why certain social phenomenon come about (Searing 1994, 7). Disagreements about the nature of the theory are plenty; it suffices to say that even on a fundamental conceptual level agreement on whether roles are created by norms, beliefs or preferences is lacking (Biddle 1986, 69). Role theory is therefore a bundle of different concepts and assumptions about legislative behavior and that is where Searing suggests it should stay by saying that the quest or a general theory should be abandoned in favor of particular explanations in particular institutional settings (Searing 1994, 7). His call for more particular approach does shift the focus of comparison onto the system level. As particular roles are properties of the individual MPs, only patterns of roles, which are properties of legislative institutions, would be comparable.

Nevertheless a discussion of role theory is relevant for the approach taken in this study as the general logic behind the theory is very straightforward and

appealing. The assumption that MPs (or anybody else for that matter) have presumptions about how "typical people in typical positions" are to behave helps to identify behavioral patterns in the first place. But more importantly, it suggests that positions matter. Especially with formal positions, very different incentives might arise depending on which position in the hierarchy of a institution a person occupies. One can therefore assume that certain effects discussed above will be mediated by the position. A high position in the parliamentary or party hierarchy should by definition leave less time for engaging in various activities. With an institutional position, such as speaker or vice-speaker, should come responsibility for the smooth working of the institution, i.e. a more collectivist and less individualistic focus.

Role theory proceeds from socially embedded behavior which in a parliamentary setting is further molded by institutional rules and the position of the individual in that institutional structure. The main problem of it was the frequently observed role conflicts, i.e. behavior that is inconsistent with the supposedly internalized role. More precisely, the emphasis was on two things. First role expectations towards MPs, meaning what kind of behavior is expected from them by others. And second, role orientation by MPs, meaning how they understand their position and tasks in the legislature. Those two phenomena were measured through surveys and interviews with MPs. What it includes only as a consequence of the role is role behavior or what MPs actually do. It would however seem plausible to assume that behavior might not be only the result of a internalized or expected role, but as well a cause for it (Patzelt 1993, 58). This criticism might boil down to a question of methods. Complementing surveys and interviews with quantified indicators of factual behavior might very well solve the problem. The shift from role orientation, description or elaboration from the early role studies, towards what exactly causes the role has in light of this criticism been observable. Although the primary explanatory variables are the differing ambitions of legislators (Mezey 1993, 343), the apparent lack of consistency with real world behavior has been identified to stem from a too strong reliance on survey methods where the normative concepts of researchers were imposed upon the politicians through question items (Saalfeld & Müller 1997, 9).[13] Nevertheless, the emphasis that formal positions bring certain roles

[13] A factor in the transformation of role studies has been the style notion of Richard Fenno, which could be seen as an addition to the earlier role theorie's neglect of actual behavior (Patzelt 1993, 76). Style is not normatively laden; it's simply behavior that is more or less similar across MPs, in that it is markedly contrasting to roles. Part of it is down to Fenno's method, he simply followed some members of the House of Representatives around and looked over their shoulder at everything they did. In his own words the research method was: "largely one of soaking and poking – or, just hanging around" (Fenno 1977, 884). This inductive approach, using anthropological methods, was free of the conceptualization problems encountered by role theorists. Fenno identified two distinct styles, the now widely used "hill style" and "home style" to differentiate between behavior in the legislature and constituency. It is also fruitful in a less personalized and more party centered polity, granted we

with them makes intuitively sense and the effects of the personal vote might be dependent on formal position in parliamentary and party hierarchy will be taken account in the analysis below. While not being able to use survey data and complement it with actual behavioral indicators, I will nevertheless proceed from the assumptions that formal positions matter to see if it translates into actually diverging behavioral patterns.

2.1.6. Party role

Taking an individualistic focus with the help of the personal vote poses a problem of clarification. The classical account of representation presented by Burke (see Pitkin 1967; Eulau *et al* 1978; Conniff 1977) refers to MPs style that might be adopted in representing the constituency, i.e. how one goes about the business of representing. As Bogdanor notes, many functions fulfilled by MPs in Burke's time are now functions of the party (Bogdanor 1985a, 4). Rudy Andeweg has taken it one step further by voicing concerns that the whole idea of representation has become obsolete as political parties in themselves, not as societally rooted organizations, are now the primal units being represented (Andeweg 2003, 150). The modes of representation conceived of by Burke could in that sense be slightly outdated and the usability of them in European context might be disputable (Uslaner & Zittel 2006, 461). They are in essence prescriptive and ignored the role of party. Party importance has increased and including this into role theory has been somewhat problematic (although see Patzelt 1993) because of the individual centered focus.

Bogdanor's point about party centrality is beyond question, this centrality needs to be qualified however. Fact of the matter remains that legislatures are comprised of individuals who do behave accordingly, as individuals more or less immersed in party imposed constraints. Party centrality should therefore be qualified with Wahlke's remark that "no theory or explanation of why legislature does what it does […] can altogether dispense with a conception of why individuals do what they do" (Wahlke 1978, 23). It is essentially a question of the right balance, not wanting to doubt the centrality of party, one should equally not ignore that MPs do behave as individuals in settings that allow them so. Thomassen and Andeweg caution not to focus on party as the only possible actor through whom representation in continental systems take place. This leads in their assessment to a "underestimation of the role of MPs" and to danger of leaving certain, although not central, aspects of representation out of consideration (Thomassen & Andeweg 2004, 47–48). This study sets out not to question party importance, as this is already intuitively misplaced in parliamentary democracies, but to map one area of legislative activity that is more open to MPs engaging in individualistic as opposed to party centered behavior.

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take a more nuanced approach to by adding a "party style" and other relevant behavioral arenas (Patzelt 1991, 78), as a simple dichotomy might be too simplified in European setting.

Parties are not unitary actors, there tends to be a division of labor in parliaments meaning MPs with expertise in a certain field have the possibility to act autonomously and influence party positions on the matter. There is autonomy in the way the MP decides to follow the duties of a MP (Esaiasson 2000, 52). So while taking a individualist approach the party role will still be evaluated closely below and only after weighting the evidence can one say more definitely which is central to the understanding of PMB usage, the MP or the party.

2.1.7. Seasonality

A short discussion of seasonality is also in order. Why one should expect many aspects of legislative work to display patterns of seasonality is clear from the nature of the institution itself. The electoral cycle forces a certain degree of seasonality on any aspect of parliamentary work. The question is how much of it can be explained by the simple fact that law production for example cannot be kick started immediately after a new parliament convenes or that bills will pile up at the end of the period due to constant lack of time in parliaments (see Döring 1995a), and how much of it is down to purposefully becoming more active because of looming elections.

It is likely that for certain instruments at the disposal of an MP, seasonality due to looming elections is more prominent than the simple effect of a four year work cycle. The number of written and oral questions used frequently to press the government and force issues onto the agenda tend to peak before elections in Finland (Wiberg 1991, 193–195) and have a similar though not uniform tendency in Estonia for example (Riigikogu X koosseis 2007, 134–135). It is highly unlikely that the issues dealt with by these questions have simply piled up before elections. With draft laws concluding the same thing is not so straightforward. Submitting bills is a more work intensive activity than posing simple written or oral questions. Identifying the relevant problem, evaluating the impact of a change in regulation and drafting requires time which might explain why first years of any legislative period tend to have fewer sponsored bills than the subsequent ones. The seasonality observed in PMB sponsoring (e.g. Bowler 2010, 482; Wiberg 2004, 19) is therefore partly down to objective reasons of limited time.

One can also hypothesize seasonality in the reading process. On the aggregate level PMBs might be more heavily debated simply because MPs become more active as elections approach. On the disaggregated level there might be many competing explanations, such as MPs with a bigger personal vote sponsoring more bills later on in the legislative period and these being subsequently more heavily scrutinized so as not to allow for individual credit claiming. Or it might be that slightly longer bills tend to be sponsored later into the legislative period and these simply receive more attention because they are technically more complicated. There are other possible explanations, but it boils down to an empirical question that I will try to answer after considering the data.

2.2. Measuring of the personal vote[14]

After delineating what is meant under a personal vote, how this concept has been applied to analyze various problems and what are some of the empirical findings the operationalization of this concept in the thesis will be outlined. Due to the centrality of this concept in the explanatory mechanism tested in this thesis a thorough discussion of all aspect of measuring the concept are discussed together with some limitations that the operationalization outlined below brings with itself. Precisely this aspect of the section provides for added value in comparison to other application of the concept thus far, as these have largely overlooked clear limitations that given operationalizations might produce. Finally, the section also discusses a theoretical problem connected to the explanatory mechanism that the personal vote concept rests upon. It suggests an alternative way in which the incentive structure might function, although the assumed effects of the personal vote in this thesis follow very much the customary understanding proceeding from Carey and Shugart's seminal article (1995), it is conceivable that a low personal vote is in fact causing higher activity levels. This alternative is elaborated below presented together with some indicators that should help to pin down the correct explanation.

2.2.1. Coding

Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina used surveys of MPs and voters to determine the existence and amount of the PV. The main structural setting, the voting system, was kept constant as they studied the US and UK systems which have both single member districts. Structural influence was considered as given and no effort was undertaken to widen the concept of PV into other voting systems before Carey and Shugart (Carey & Shugart 1995). Their operationalization follows the logic explained above and is following. All constitutive parts, except the district magnitude, are coded from 0 to 2 depending on the strength of the incentive to cultivate a personal vote (Carey & Shugart 1995, 421–422):

Ballot:	0 – leaders present a fixed ballot, voters may not 'disturb' list
	1 – leaders present party ballot, but voters may 'disturb' list
	2 – leaders do not control access to ballots, or rank
Pooling:	0 – pooling across whole party
	1 – pooling at sub-party level
	2 – no pooling
Vote:	0 – voters cast a single vote for one party
	1 – voters cast votes for multiple candidates
	2 – voters cast a single vote below the party level

[14] This subsection is a reworked version of a paper prepared for Rein Taagepera's course "Logical models in social sciences" and is heavily indebted to his comments.

Those scores create a rank ordering of different electoral systems according to the incentives they create to cultivate a personal vote. They do not however give equal weight to all scores, as a simple summing of them does not in itself tell whether a certain electoral system is more prone to personal vote seeking than others and district magnitude effects are so widely different that those should be considered completely on their own. Every system needs to be analyzed separately in order to determine which particular element might be the most important one. This seems to be ignored by some of the application of this measurement of the personal vote, that use simple summing without checking if it indeed produces such a rank order. Hallerberg, and Hallerberg and Marier for example do include district magnitude in their equation, but take a simple additive approach when it comes to scores for ballot, pooling and votes (Hallerberg 2004, 21–22; Hallerberg & Marier 2004, 576). Furthermore, their manner of including the district magnitude is also questionable. They divide the summed scores with a natural log of district magnitude in closed list systems, which make sense, but add the natural log of M in all other cases.[15] The logic is that in a closed list systems (not plurality voting) bigger districts create a bigger disincentive for personal vote seeking; in all other systems personal vote matters more and bigger districts create more incentives as candidates need to be more visible among the bigger crowd running for parliament (Carey & Shugart 1995, 430–431). The district magnitude has hence an effect that can go either way, it has a directional influence that can grow additively or multiplicatively, but not additively in one direction and multiplicatively in another as Hallerberg's and Marier's approach would suggest. It would be tantamount to saying that the impact of the personal vote change is non-linear in closed list systems, but linear in all other cases, which might be theoretically possible due to different logics operating in such electoral systems, but why this should be so is not explained by them.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of the district magnitude in some sort of index for personal vote is needed and a natural log used by Hallenberg and Marier is right as expending a linear influence would produce intuitively doubtful results. Taking *only* the multiplicative approach for including district magnitude in the equation is probably more sensible as it is pretty clear that a change of district magnitude from 1 to 2 has a comparatively bigger effect for the importance of personal reputation to get elected than say change from 21 to 22. And besides, using the additive approach would cause negative values if we were to subtract M from the combined scores for systems with closed lists. This is not necessarily nonsensical, as we can think of the personal vote to be the opposite of the party vote, or the party vote to be a personal vote with a negative value, but it would probably confuse matters, as in the end the final vote will be a combination of both.

[15] The equation is hence following ballot+pool+votes/ln(M+1) for closed list systems and ballot+pool+votes+ln(M+1) for other systems.

We have to specify a problem in summing of the ballot, pool and vote variable however. The approach by Hallerberg and Marier (2004) or Gaviria *et al* (2000) ignore certain features of the combination of those variables. On their own they are indeed ordinal as Carey and Shugart claim, but combined scores do not lead to a strictly ordinal ranking. If one looks at the rank-ordering presented by Carey and Shugart, then it becomes immediately obvious that a combined score can be deceiving, as some systems with low scores have according to the rank ordering higher incentives to cultivate a personal reputation, as some systems with higher scores and vice versa (see Carey & Shugart 1995, 425). Hence, besides coding, they consider every system on its own in order to place it in the ranking. One could say they attach different weight to certain variables in some settings than in others. And lastly, averaging the scores of those variables to get an index like Gaviria *et al* do is problematic as it can only take values raging from 0 to 6, the decimal places for such a limited range of possible values makes more of the data than there actually is. This issues is addressed in the next two subsections.

2.2.1.1. Which district magnitude to include

The adding or multiplying of M does mitigate the rank order problem slightly by simply increasing the range of values the index can take as M is a natural interval that differs widely in and between electoral systems (see Taagepera & Shugart 1989, 112–125). Which M to use for between nation comparisons if not all districts in a country have the same size of course remains an issue. One could opt for a single national "effective magnitude" proposed by Taagepera and Shugart (Taagepera & Shugart 1989, 126–146), but this distorts the picture as PV unfolds at the district level with national level constraints playing a smaller role and effective magnitude being a hypothetical number combining many electoral restrictions is probably more a subliminal part in a politicians calculations. The most reasonable approach would be using the geometrical average of M in systems with a wide range of different district magnitudes. But again, as the range of M can be very big indeed, it is up to the researcher to determine when an average or averages among certain range limits is the best way forward.

The approach taken here does not have the problem of which M to take as I will calculate the PV index value for each individual MP. As MPs ran in specific district the respective M of that district is the basis for the calculation. I will also add the scores for ballot, pool and votes, with an important nuance explained below, and include M in a multiplicative fashion.[16] The formula for calculating the personal vote for closed list systems is hence:

$$PV = \frac{ballot+pool+votes}{\ln (M+1)} \quad (1)$$

[16] To avoid divisions with zero in case of ln(1), M+1 one will be used in calculations.

For all other cases the following equation will be used:

$$PV = (ballot + pool + votes) * \ln(M + 1) \qquad (2)$$

For both equations M has a range of 1≤M≥S, where S is the number of seats up for election.

Another issue is using the scheme for more complex electoral systems that have many tiers with different pooling and seat calculating rules on each one. The simplest solution would be to treat all tiers separately. In order to do that one has to artificially sever some connection that link the tiers, but this can produce nonsensical results, as some codes, such as the way votes are cast, has to stay the same for all tiers in systems where the voter only has one vote. Hence sometimes the impossible combinations spelled out by Carey and Shugart (Carey & Shugart 1995, 423–424) are possible, but only because of practical problems with complex electoral systems.

2.2.1.2. Establishing a rank order

The need to consider the intricacies that the same type of electoral systems can have in different countries is inescapable in applying the personal vote concept proposed by Carey and Shugart.

One can consider an arguably more universal measuring tool to determine if the index of the personal vote has produced ordinal results for the compared cases. One of those is specifying the:

> /…/ minimum number of voters whose concerted support for a single candidate would be required in order to elect that individual rather than an individual of the parties' choice defined to be those candidates who would be elected if no explicit preference votes were cast, assuming all other votes cast simple party ballots" (Katz 1986, 93).

As the nominal value of this number changes according to turnout we have to limit ourselves to relative values. The number can theoretically range from one voter to the whole party electorate in the district. The relatively larger it is, the more important a personal reputation is, as the candidate needs to gather this number of votes to move up the list in open list systems. For example, if there is no official list order and preference votes decide everything, like in Finland, then one vote would be sufficient, bearing in mind the conditions specified in the quote above. An example of a very restrictive system would be Norway, where more than half of the party's voters in the district have to move the same candidate up the list to officially rearrange the order[17], the minimum number is hence V/2, where V is the number of votes cast for the party in the given district (see Katz 1986 for more examples).

[17] http://bit.ly/jX2l1A (Accessed 10.06.2009)

This theoretical number can hence be a valuable tool helping to evaluate if scores that have the same summarized value for ballot, pool and vote induce more or less personal vote seeking. The larger the number is, the more valuable a big PV is and vice versa. Hence a potential rank ordering should be qualified with this theoretical variable to determine if the scores really create a true ordinal ranking.

2.2.2. Values and limits

In order to better understand the limits of this kind of operationalization of PV we should take the approach proposed by Taagepera (2008) and try to establish which theoretical values a personal vote, conceived according to equation (1) and (2), can take. First, let us establish the theoretical anchor points of the index.

For closed list systems the minimal value of the combined scores for ballot, pool and votes is zero. The UK system is an example of such a system. The maximum value is a bit more complicated. For closed list systems the ballot has to be scored zero, for a fixed ballot there is by definition also always pooling across the party, hence pooling has to be always scored as zero as well. Carey and Shugart also state a rule that if ballot=0 then vote≠2 (Carey & Shugart 1995, 423), but as I have stated above, it is possible for complex systems that a vote is counted as a vote for a candidate at a lower tier and as vote for the party at some other level, and we should count it the way it was given, hence a vote for a candidate. A maximum value in closed list systems for the scoring can then be ballot=0, pool=0 and vote=2. Which is a strange system, where voters are asked to vote for candidates, but their preferences are ignored later on as the votes are pooled across the party. An example would be the compensation mandate part of the Estonian electoral system. In any case, the value of a personal vote in closed list systems is bound to stay very limited.

For other systems it is clear that ballot has to be scored above zero. Hence the minimum scoring could be ballot=1, pool=0 and as one cannot reorder the list by giving a single vote for a party it would have to be vote=1, summed into a minimal value of two. Carey and Shugart cite the Italian system before 1993 with multiple votes per voter as an example of such a system (Carey & Shugart 1995, 426). The maximum value would be a system with open list, no ballot access or rank control by parties (ballot=2), no pooling taking place (pool=2) and with a single vote for individual candidates (vote=2), hence the maximum score of six. A single non-transferable vote would be an example of such a system.

Now we can proceed to combining ballot, pool, vote and M into one measure of personal vote according to equations (1) and (2) and establish possible anchor points.

For equation (1), i.e. closed list systems the anchor point with the maximum value of PV is defined by the biggest possible numerator and smallest denominator. It is hence a fixed value of:

$$PV = \frac{ballot + pool + votes}{\ln (M + 1)} = \frac{0 + 0 + 2}{\ln (1 + 1)} = \frac{2}{\ln (2)} = 2.886$$

The minimal value for closed list systems is defined by the smallest numerator and the biggest denominator. Such a system would be a closed list system with one nationwide constituency so district size of M is actually S, the total assembly size. In the current case however the smallest numerator is zero, so the index value will be zero as well. Therefore, PV index in closed list systems has a range from a minimum of 0/ln(S+1) to a maximum of 2/ln(2) or more precisely from 0 to 2.9.

For all other systems equation (2) applies. One anchor point defined by the maximum value is set at:

$$PV = (ballot + pool + votes) * \ln (M + 1) =$$
(2+2+2)*ln(S+1)=6*ln(S+1)

where S is again the assembly size. The other anchor point, defined by the minimum value, is set at:

$$PV = (ballot + pool + votes) * \ln (M + 1) =$$
(1+0+1)*ln(1+1)=2*ln(2)=5.772

So in all other systems PV has a range from 2*ln(2) to 6*ln(S+1) or more precisely from 5.8 to 6*ln(S+1). Figure 1 depicts the possible index values



Figure 1. Personal vote index limits and values.
Source: author

This result exemplifies a problem that an index combined out of coding plus a non-negative integer can have. Though it is theoretically sound to expect that

closed list systems are distinct from others when it comes to the personal vote, this kind of operationalization produces an index that creates forbidden areas between the theoretically possible minimum and maximum values for all electoral systems combined. This gap in the scale is not an issue in using the PV measure as a variable, if one bears in mind that it exists. Though this particular index was not proposed in such manner by Carey & Shugart, it does follow logically from their argumentation and is, with some adjustments, similar to other ways of operationalization in the literature (e.g. Gaviria *et al* 2000; Hallerberg & Marier 2004; Hallerberg 2004). Unlike the previous applications, however, the drawbacks and the actual empirical limitations of the index value imposed by the electoral laws are made explicit.

2.2.3. Empirical values and theoretical problems with the personal vote

This section discusses the coding of the personal vote for the two cases under study here.

I will treat all three Estonian mandate types independently of each other, although strictly speaking they are not. This is simply because of the complexity of the electoral system. As already mentioned above this means artificially severing some connections between the levels, but this is a necessary evil in case of complicated systems. The coding is depicted in Table 1 and explained fully in the sections below.

Table 1. Personal vote in Estonia 1999–2007 and Finland 2003–2007

	Ballot	Pool	Vote	District magnitude range	Personal vote range
Estonia					
Personal mandate	1	2	2	6–13	9.73 – 13.20
District mandate	1	1	2	6–13	7.79 – 10.56
Compensation mandate*	0	0	2	6–13	.76 – 1.03
Finland	1	1	2	6–33	7.78 – 14.10
Aland district	1	2	2	1	3.47

*Replacement members have also been included in this category. Although technically compensation mandates do not have a district, the MPs receiving this mandate nevertheless ran in a specific district, so this range is used here. For a discussion of this problem see below.

First of all, the so called personal mandate. Voters are presented with a open list and cast a single vote for a candidate on the list. If a candidate fulfills a simple quota V/M, where V is the number of votes in district and M the district

magnitude, then he/she is automatically elected. In essence it exemplifies a system with a vote below the party level, open lists and no pooling.

Secondly, for the so called district mandate the list is reordered according to votes received by candidates and the list receives as many mandates as the pooled number of votes fulfills the simple quota. This means that the personal vote is already of lesser value than for the personal mandate, as votes are pooled across the district. It is still important however as the rearranged order defines who gets the mandate.[18] This mandate is therefore a "system" with a vote below the party level, open lists and pooling at sub-party level.

The allocation of the reminding mandates as so called compensation mandates takes place according to a fixed nationwide list using the nationwide vote for the party and modified d'Hondt dividers. As the vote type cannot change, the compensation mandate exemplifies a peculiar "system", where voters are asked to cast a vote below the party level, these candidate preferences are then disregarder and the votes pooled across the whole party with a fixed nationwide list. According to Carey & Shugart such a system would be logically inconsistent (1995, 423). It is safe to say that the personal vote share for the compensation mandate is negligible, the nationwide voting tally of the party decides if any of such mandates are received. Over the years candidates with less than 200 votes have gotten into parliament with these mandates.[19]

This discussion shows also the problems of using an index that combines the structural features of the voting system with the district magnitude. If the mandates are distributed on many tiers the connection to the district is effectively severed. The compensation mandate holder in Estonia ran in a district, but was placed high on the nationwide list to guarantee getting elected. This means that the party fortune alone decided the fate of the candidate. It is obvious that the selectorate for this candidate is the party hierarchy and not the voter in the district (Hazan & Rahat 2006). Subsequently one can assume that the future MP will behave accordingly. There is in effect no geographical district for this mandate, but a virtual one composed of the party structure that decided the nationwide list composition and position. Including the district where the MP ran in a composite index of ballot, pool and vote is possible, but might be questioned if the link with the district is severed by changing the vote distribution tier. Multi-tier systems therefore raise the question "which M to include" even for studies with individual level data. However, as the MP actually ran in a specific district, although was subsequently elected in a manner that was not directly related to a specific district, the impact of the district on behavior cannot be ignored. Unless of course getting elected through some of

[18] Over the years minor changes to the electoral rules have raised the threshold for this type of mandate (see Toomla 2003). Since 2007 candidates need to receive at least 10% of the simple quota to qualify for that position.

[19] After 2002 candidates need at least 5% of the simple quota to qualify for this mandate, but if there are no people on the list who have this number of votes then the next best will still get the mandate.

the other options the system provides was the aim of the candidate and the district chosen was arbitrary and not really entering the calculations. This we cannot know and it is safer to check for district effects in any case.

None of these problems arise in the Finnish case as all mandates are distributed at the district level. The Finnish electoral system is a simple proportional open list system. The party presents a list in the district, voters cast a single vote for a candidate and the list is rearranged according to votes received by candidates. The mandates are distributed with d'Hondt dividers based on pooled party votes in the district. All the districts are multi-member, except Åland that is a single-member district and uses simple majority voting. The Aland district should be treated as an open list system though, as electoral alliances can put forward a list with up to four candidates (Election Act, section 110). This is somewhat counterintuitive, without any pooling taking place multiple candidates in one list would hurt each other's chances of gaining a simple majority in the district. But as it is a formal possibility the coding will have to proceed from that.

In the Estonian case the personal reputation is central to gather enough votes in order to get a personal mandate, it is also important to first qualify for the district mandate and secondly to be high up in the rearranged list when those mandates are distributed. For the compensation mandate one has however only to gather a marginal amount of votes to qualify for the mandate, otherwise the party reputation is central as the pooled votes really decide who gets the left-overs.

This discussion, and especially the Estonian case, has laid bare a possible conceptual confusion. Is the personal vote value an accidental artifact in some electoral systems, but in fact a prerequisite of getting elected in others? Who gets what mandate in the Estonian case is in the end to a certain degree decided by accidental effects. The analysis below will show that the mandates do matter when comparing behavior, so the question on its structuring role can be answered in the affirmative. The personal vote itself is however not a pre-requisite to getting elected, as it is in the Finnish case. This would raise the question of the comparability of the cases. My answer is that they are comparable because of the temporal outlook the incentive structure provides. Though there are other ways to get elected in Estonia than through the path requiring a big personal vote, every added vote means a higher chance of getting elected or re-elected. Though the line between the personal or district mandate is very slim in some situations and differs between districts and elections, it is rational to maximize the votes from an individual's perspective, as this is the best risk management strategy. Granted, this holds only when the candidate really wants to get elected or re-elected. One can assume like Mayhew that politicians are "interested in nothing else" than getting reelected (1974, 13). In essence the problem boils down to whether we see the MPs as wanting to get a high personal vote in the next election that they did not have before (1), retaining a high personal vote if they had one before (2) or not bothering at all as they do not plan to run (3). The starting point for the two first

MPs would be different, but the forward looking action would be similar. The third type of MP might score high on the personal vote, but show no behavior that can be connected with a wish to retain this in the next election. It becomes an empirical question therefore. If everybody is trying to maximize their vote shares in the future to increase the chances of getting elected then we should observe no real differences in parliamentary behavior. They all should be as active as possible. However, if the personal vote share translates into a kind of mandate, where it is by definition stronger for some than for others, then we should see differing activity levels. The fact that the personal vote is to a certain degree an artifact in the Estonian case therefore does not change the fact that it will structure behavior if the MP considers it as a mandate or as something that needs to be attained to increase re-election chances. The same in fact applies to the Finnish case.

Including measures that help to evaluate if the personal vote therefore might work as an *ex ante* incentive to cultivate a strong personal reputation or as an *ex post* mandate to retain a strong personal reputation is crucial in order to better understand the precise mechanism of this phenomenon.

The possible theoretical problem outlined here is therefore in fact reduced to an empirical problem.

One cannot really tell if and how much do these differences in the personal vote index translate into differences in behavior before the actual comparison is undertaken below, but a short discussion what prior empirical analyses have uncovered about both countries will indicate what to expect.

2.2.4. Prior studies on electoral system effects on members of parliament

Prior studies on Estonia are pretty limited. Most of them have proceeded from the three mandate type trichotomy and compared its impact. Tavits for example demonstrated that the share of MPs with local experience is highest among the personal mandate holders and that this translates into higher shares of defection rates from the party line in plenary votes (2010). Compensation mandate holders on the other had tend to feel more loyalty towards the party vis-à-vis the district voter (Pettai 2005, 23), while MPs with the personal or district mandate holders tend to have a more "entrepreneurial style of politics" (Pettai & Madise 2006, 96). Survey data has however suggested that MPs are not very active in cultivating an alternative power base separate of party control for themselves by communicating directly with the constituency (Pettai 2000, 128). Solvak found also evidence that a higher personal vote exemplified by the mandate type translates into higher activity levels and PMB sponsorship numbers in parliament (Solvak 2013). As a peculiar detail, the success rate of PMBs for the different mandate types, and therefore also for the levels of the personal vote, was exactly the opposite for a coalition vs opposition MP. For the former, an increase in personal vote came together with a decrease in PMB success rate

and for the latter it was the complete opposite (ibid.). This suggests that possible effects of the personal vote might be conditional on other factors, such as opposition status. To sum up, besides the relative scarcity of studies on Estonian MPs there is evidence that MPs do differ according to the mandate type, which in the current cases overlaps with certain ranges of the personal vote index.

The effects of the Finnish electoral rules and possible implications for parliamentary behavior are however much more widely studied. First of all the Finnish system is generally considered a candidate centered one, as candidates seem in comparison to parties to play a central role in determining the vote choice (Bengtsson & Wass 2011, 162; Kuitunen 2002, 70). Esaiasson found that personal representation of the constituency or a general category of "voters" is considered clearly more important than representing the party (Esaiasson 2000, 59). In these terms Finland seems to stand out among the rest of the Scandinavian countries (ibid., 61). In reality the Eduskunta is of course ruled by parties, but in a comparative perspective coalition discipline and party unity is lower than in Western Europe (see Bergman & Strom 2004; Sieberer 2006) and the MPs see themselves as quite independent (see Wiberg 2000). This does not mean that parties do not matter. On the contrary, since 1980's party groups have been formulating their own separate rules of procedures. The practice is not uniform and not all parties have them. But for some these can become very extensive written rules (9 pages and 41 articles for the National Coalition Party for example (Kookomusen Eduskuntaryhmat Säännöt 2003)[20] covering being present in meetings and voting in the plenary for example and might list even the expelling the MP from the group as the most severe sanction for breaking party discipline (Pajala 2010, 8). Nonetheless, certain features of the electoral system create strong incentives for individuals to stand out. The Finnish electoral system itself is classified as having strong preferential voting (Karvonen 2004). This means high party internal competition and campaigns can have a more candidate- than party-centric focus (Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002, 92). One has to bear in mind that the candidate selection process in Finland gives local party organizations a lot of autonomy in selecting candidates. This means a good personal image is crucial in both selection stages, in who becomes a candidate first and in who gets elected, as voters can reorder the party list at will. Arter demonstrates that the decentralized candidate selection system combined with strong preferential voting results in a strong constituency connection of the MPs (Arter 2011). Even more precisely, the support for specific MPs is not evenly spread out in their constituency, but is clearly localized in their home municipality (ibid., 134–135). Similar effects have been noted in other studies, MPs with local experience have clearly better electoral fortunes and there seems to be demand for this among the voters (Shugart, Valdini & Suominen 2005; Tavits 2009). Actual survey results among MPs have shown that Finnish MPs stand out from their Scandinavian colleagues by being more individual repre-

[20] I am crateful to Antti Pajala for being kind enough to share his copies of the party group rules from the 2003-07 legislative period with me.

sentation centric (Esaiasson 2000, 72) and also comparatively less keen on high party discipline (Jensen 2000, 221). Sundberg claims that there is in fact a system of segmented interest representation in Finland with party ideology playing a smaller role than representing special interests (1994, 171–172). The electoral system has also been linked to the relatively high turnover level for MPs, with being in parliament for not longer than two legislative periods being the norm (Nousiainen 1994, 270).

All this suggests that the personal vote should indeed have strong effects in both cases and that a individual centric focus is justified.

2.3. Additional explanatory factors

Though the personal vote effect is the central analytical element and the part supposed to provide for most of the value added of this thesis, one still has to control for the effects of other factors that structure the way PMBs are sponsored and processed in parliament. Furthermore, besides serving as controls to give a true effect of the personal vote, the substantive role these play is interesting on their own. Assigning a too big role for one possible explanatory mechanism should not come at the expense of other relevant factors.

2.3.1. Sponsor

The possible problem of the formal sponsor being not the actual sponsor of a bill discussed by Mattson (1995) and Arter (2006) is hard to solve in a straightforward manner. There is no direct way to determine how many of the PMBs are in fact hand-outs or parliamentary assist type of bills, except maybe for asking the sponsor about each bill directly. Some indirect indicators might however provide an answer as well. Drafting bills is not easy as there are strict technical rules that might pose difficulties. Most parliaments also require that some sort of legislative impact analysis should accompany the bill (see Mader 2001; Barnes 2006; Radaelli 2009), which tends to be a complicated issue (see Kidder 1983). It is therefore suspect if a MP sponsors many bills of good quality and technical complexity in a relatively short period of time. It is likely that government manpower may be behind such bills, even more so in parliaments where MPs have relatively few resources at their disposal. It may of course be that MPs simply prepare their bills long time in advance and sponsor them strategically at a time when safe passage might be more feasible. Submitting of numerous bills simultaneously or in rapid succession would be evidence for that.

The results will also have to be controlled for seasonality, as it is likely that MPs become more active as elections approach. A further indirect test to differentiate innovators from messengers is to check whether the same combination of MPs representing all the coalition partners are consistently sponsoring legislation together. In such cases it is highly likely that the bills are in fact

coalition or party group bills and a representative from each coalition party is needed to signal that it is so. Finally, a last piece of the puzzle could be evidence that MPs sponsor legislation on issues that clearly do not fit their area of specialization (indicated by committee membership) and hence should be active in unchartered waters.[21] Looking for clues in debates is also helpful as the exact role of the MP in connection to a given PMB might be elaborated upon, this is however a very burdensome way and not really an ideal standard to distinguish the innovator from the messenger, the absence of which is complained by Mattson.

2.3.2. Pseudolegislation

The expressive function of PMBs would mean they are "introduced to promote debate and publicity with no thought of success" (Marsh & Read 1988, 24). Again to qualify the statement a bit, PMBs can of course be very important legislation. How to measure this importance is however a whole different issue. It is hard to think of a standardized and objective measuring instrument as legislation is attributed significance in a wider societal process post hoc. Significant legislation in an extremely narrow setting might be very inconsequential for society at large. It is hence a rather futile exercise. One has to make do with subjective assessment of the impact on society, innovativeness, controversy and longevity of legislation. Clinton and Lapinski also point out that those assessments depend on political context as legislation that might be termed highly controversial and hence significant during one political era, might seem dull and inconsequential in another (Clinton & Lapinski 2006, 234).

Therefore, if the regulatory function of PMBs, which common sense would assume to be the central and explicit part of a draft law, takes backstage in relation to the expressive function, which is not immediately explicit, then we would have to pay attention to the technical characteristics of the bill, attributes of the sponsors, the legislative process connected to a particular bill and the institutional setting in which it takes place for cues to determine if indeed the implicit expressive function comes at the cost to the explicit regulatory function. Technical simplicity is one obvious indicator for a hastily drafted bill that might fit under the pseudolegislation label. Also technically simpler bills by actors whose success chances in getting bills passed is in general very low would suggest that the aim to regulate does not take centre stages. Equally a closer look at the amendment procedure should show these bills to be in need of heavy amending that results in a more complicated bill and again, this should be even more pronounced for bills by actors who do not have realistic chances of getting bills passed. The precise expectations that would point towards a

[21] One could argue whether committee membership is a sufficient indicator of specialization. MPs could also be sitting on committees that are not their first choice, which makes this measure invalid. However there is evidence that MP's expressed wishes on committee membership is usually taken as a base for committee appointment in Estonia and Finland (Arter 1984, 176–182; Pettai 2005, 15).

justified label of pseudolegislation are spelled out more clearly in subsection 2.4.2 and in the empirical chapter further below.

2.3.3. Constituency role and MP attributes

Besides the system level factors of the electoral rules captured with the personal vote score of the MP, there are various more specific factors that all play a role in how responsive, and to what kind of demands, the system actually is. The composition of the constituency for example might define the demands addressed to the system or the perception of constituency interest by the respective MP. Certain constituencies might have specific problems that require specifically tailored solutions or with other words more attention from the MP due to the extraordinary nature of the constituency. Geographically remote areas might need additional services or funding that present no issues in an urban setting. Bengtsson and Wass show that a bigger distance from the capital means more demand for regional representation by the voters in Finland for example (2011, 156–157) and Kuitunen claims that rural areas are underrepresented in parliament (Kuitunen 2002, 82), which might mean that MPs from more remote district might have behavioral difference in comparison to the rest. A specific voter composition of the constituency might also be qualified under this factor. A specific socio-demographic segment of the population might be overrepresented in the constituency which applies certain pressures on the MP representing that constituency. Voters might have clear expectations regarding the types of representation. This does not necessarily mean that they are articulated as such, but survey analysis has shown non-random patterns of what voters see as constituting a preferred form of representation (e.g. Carman 2006; 2007; Mendez-Lago & Martinez 2002; Bengtsson & Wass 2010; 2011). This desired mode of representation among the voters, if it differs somewhat between constituencies, might translate into a different outlook and subsequent behavior among MPs as well. One should therefore take account of the possible impact the constituency can have.

The nature of the MP might also play a role. Role orientations might influence responsiveness levels and nature. If a candidate or MP sees him/herself as a "good constituency man" then of course it predicts how important the constituency link to the MP is (Clarke 1978, 605–606). Or one could see it in the reversed causal order where an active constituency service defines the constituency role orientation. Besides this possibly relevant variables might be ideology, which influences constituency orientation indirectly as leftwing MPs could in theory be more in favor of holistic policy solutions, as opposed to particularistic solutions to specific problems sometimes ascribed to right wing MPs. Left wing MPs could hence pay less attention to problems of individual constituents (Clarke 1978, 607). Socio-demographic variables related to constituency and the MP in the constituency might also have its effects such as length of the time span MP has resided in constituency (if at all), low level of former

education by the MP, rural nature of constituency and domination of small communities in constituency. All those might affect the "localist" or "cosmopolitan" outlook of the MP bringing different constituency service levels with it (Clarke 1978, 607). The age of the MP might play a role as younger members could be more active in order to establish a stronger foothold in politics through securing strong constituency backing (Cain 1983, 104). If this is indeed an age effect, then it should be distinguishable from a possible seniority effect. Younger MPs might be more prone to sponsoring these bills to establish a foothold, but if they can indeed be used for such purposes then MPs with a high score in seniority might also be engaged in a similar practice. As seniority might go together with older age controlling for these two possible effects separately becomes necessary.

Besides individual level effects, structural factors inside the parliament have also been tested for influence on constituency service. One-party dominance might force MPs to abandon fruitless oppositional activity of government criticism and turn to constituency service instead (Clarke 1978, 609). Some parties might for unspecified reasons be more active than others. Some structural factors might however also seriously limit the constituency service levels by an MP. A high position in parliament, such as speaker or party group share, might mean a more collective outlook by the MP leaving little room for neither the motivation nor the time to engage in constituency casework.

This list is not exhaustive, one can think of many more factors that have the potential to influence responsiveness levels besides the electoral system. The focus of this study is not the many forms responsiveness can take however, but on PMBs and their treatment in parliament. A possible constituency link is simply one factor considered in the subsequent analysis.

2.4. Central theoretical expectations

Not all of the facets connected to PMBs that were discussed above can be evaluated with the data at hand. The subsequent theoretical expectations are the central ones and form the backbone of the data analysis below. Three aspects of PMBs will be evaluated in detail, namely general sponsoring patterns, nature and topics of PMBs, and lastly, the treatment of PMBs in parliament.

2.4.1. Sponsoring

First, MPs with a higher personal vote should be more likely sponsors of PMBs and they should sponsor these in bigger numbers while controlling for their status in party and parliament. However, as the discussion in section 2.2.3. theorized that the personal vote might have diverging effects depending on the temporal outlook of the MP, an alternative expectation would be that not the personal vote itself, but the strength of the mandate causes higher sponsorship frequency of PMBs. It could therefore be that the personal vote, conceived as an

index of how much personal image is rewarded by the setting they operate in, does not play any role at all, whereas actual strong electoral performance by an MP does. This would indicate that MPs do not really behave differently due to the institutional setting supposedly providing for diverging incentives. Instead their personal strong performance in the constituency, regardless of what the rules reward, determines later constituency related performance. Which variables and in what combination should point to this possibility is specified in section 3.3.2.1.

Second, in line with the empirical findings of prior studies on PMBs, opposition MPs should be biggest sponsors in comparison to coalition MPs. Furthermore, especially MPs from smaller opposition parties should be more active in sponsoring these bills.

Third, the question of separating the formal and the actual sponsor behind a bill has been a prominent issue. If the bill is in fact a "handout bill" by the government or a "parliamentary assist" as Arter put it (2006), then this should mean that MPs from coalition parties tend to sponsor bills together and these are more successful than opposition bills. While at the same time, we should see no party wide cooperation among the opposition, as these would be "genuine" PMBs.

Fourth, the discussion of role theory showed that formal positions go together with expected modes of behavior. One can expect therefore that MPs having frontbench status will be less likely among the sponsors as theirs is a collective agenda. Backbenchers might have more freedom to define their tasks in parliament as they have no clear position defined roles that come with certain positions in the parliamentary hierarchy (Esaiasson 2000, 74). Status will also act as an important control, as the other effects theorized here should occur while controlling for front- or backbench status. Sponsoring bills and debating them on the floor as a project of credit claiming should more likely be a backbencher activity.

Fifth, district nature might play a role. If PMBs can be and are used for individual credit claiming, but also for dealing with district specific issues besides other case work, then MPs from districts with specific problems should be more active in using this particular type of legislative instrument.

Sixth, the discussion has also shown that socio-demographics such as age might influence behavior in parliament, with younger MPs being more active in constituency service to establish a better foothold in electoral politics. For the same reason younger age should correlate with more frequent sponsoring of PMBs. This will however have to hold while controlling for actual seniority in parliament, as older MPs can in political terms be total novices if they have not been elected before.

2.4.2. Characteristics of PMBs

First, PMBs should be technically simple to justify the label of pseudolegislation. Even more, if PMBs are indeed used only to advertise, then we can expect them to be sponsored closer to elections and in the same vein be technically simpler still. A more precise directional expectation would therefore be that PMBs sponsorship frequency increases and technical sophistication decreases as elections approach. Equally, if PMBs are sponsored in bigger numbers by MPs for whom a personal vote is pivotal, then this might come at the expense of the sophistication of these bills.

Second, the notion of pseudolegislation has also implications for the expectations connected to the topic. If no wide reaching legislative agenda, but advertising takes centre stage, then bills should be very limited in topics, i.e. not covering all possible policy areas. It should also mean that we should observe seasonality in topics, meaning they get narrower still closer to elections as electioneering takes totally over.

Third, it should mean that MPs sponsor PMBs on these narrow topics regardless of their own specialization. Comparing the MPs field of expertise with the topic of the PMB he or she has sponsored should therefore show a mismatch.

Fourth, MPs with a high personal vote should be more likely to sponsor PMBs on a narrow set of topics in comparison to other MPs and while controlling for status in parliament.

2.4.3. Treatment in the plenary

First, if again, certain PMBs are treated as pseudolegislation with the attention of personal credit claiming, then one can assume bills by MPs with a high personal vote to be treated more critically by other MPs so as not to allow for credit claiming. These bills should therefore get a more intensive debate in comparison to bills by MPs with a smaller personal vote. Also, the closer to elections they are sponsored, the more intensive the debate should be.

Second, if the bills are very simple and short they would have to be amended heavily before being passed. Meaning bills sponsored by MPs for whom personal credit claiming is more central should be more heavily amended in order to become better quality legislation.

Third, one can however expect more subtle differences in amending. If turning the bills into more quality legislation is the reason behind amending them then one can assume that successful bills are more heavily amended and this is done by actors who have a clear responsibility for it, meaning some sort of collective actor like committee. If on the other hand, amending is caused by not wanting to allow for personal credit claiming, then other MPs should in fact be doing the amending and it should show seasonal effects, with more heavier amending closer to elections.

3. WHO SPONSORS PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILLS

This chapter aims to answer one simple question. Who sponsors PMBs? First a short overview of how is the sponsoring of these bills regulated, what is the aggregate sponsorship number and how successful are PMBs in becoming adobted is given. All this serves as an introduction into the rest of the chapter which proceeds to answer the above posed question in two stages and two distinct ways. First a largely descriptive overview using tables and graphs of general sponsorship patterns will give the reader a detailed picture if and how does the sponsorship activity differs depending on the party, district or position in parliament. This will show whether private members' bills in these two countries can in general be regarded as drafts by individual MPs or should they be understood as bills initiated by some collective agent. Besides the general picture, it will break down the data into relevant subsamples to show if sponsorship activity and cooperation patterns or lack thereof is distinct according to the size and status of parties or the positions the MPs hold.

This is followed by a section which presents possible personal vote effects on individual sponsorship frequency and an evaluation of the volatility at the district level, which might filter the theorized personal vote effects. That section is the central analysis of the chapter, which focuses on two distinct analytical questions. One is sponsorship as such, meaning what and how differentiates between MPs who decide to sponsor bills and MPs who do not engage in this type of activity. The second is sponsorship frequency, meaning what might explain the different activity levels of certain MPs. The chapter ends with a short summary and discussion of the results.

With the help of individual level data on sponsoring activity this chapter will give a much more detailed picture of the possible relationships at play than an aggregate level analysis would be able to do. More precisely, it will allow pinpointing how variance within an electoral system might play out in intra-parliamentary behavior and if the effects that will be observed are indicative of simple linear relationships or do weak linear effects actually hide strong non-linear relationship in the data. The precise theoretical expectations of the multivariate analysis were spelled out in section 2.4.1.

3.1. Possibilities to initiate legislation and success rate

Considering the part of individual MPs in legislation seems a futile exercise at first sight since parliaments tend to be dominated by executive power and party discipline. However, if we look at the absolute number of legislation initiated by MPs together with success rates, then dismissing it as irrelevant does not help us to understand the motivations of MPs. Precisely the fact that they sponsor bills in large numbers knowing full well that these will for the most part

never become enacted makes this practice interesting. In order to understand the process, the possibilities to initiating bills should be discussed first.

The Finnish MPs have a variety of ways to influence legislation (see Arter 2011). The central one, examined in detail in this thesis, is the private member's bill (*lakaloite*). The MPs can also request the government to legislate on an issue by submitting a 'request motion' (*toimeenpidealoite*), which is in essence a petition outlining a problem and pointing to the need to solve the issue. Besides these two options they can also try to influence the state budget by submitting amending motions to it (*talousarviloite*).

Estonian MPs have also multiple ways to influence legislation. The first option is to sponsor a bill (*seaduseelnõu*). Unlike in the Finnish case, single MPs in Estonia cannot submit a proposal to the government (*otsuse eelnõu*) to become active, but need at least three fifths of all MPs as signatories. The Estonian MPs can also submit amending motions to the state budget, but these are not regular amending motions, as they need to conform to the strict requirements spelt out in the State Budget Law. As the focus of this study is on PMBs i.e. draft laws submitted by MPs, these other possible options of influencing legislation through additional formal means or through informal channels, besides submitting PMBs, will not be discussed further.

The constraints on initiation of legislation from a purely formal point of view fall into four categories: numerical limits, time limits, technical requirements and limitations on the content (Mattson 1995, 458).

There are no numerical limits for initiation in the neither Finnish nor Estonian parliament; one MP is sufficient to sponsor a PMB. There are also no time limitations.[22] But the technical requirements in Finland are strict. A brief statement of reasons has to be supplied (Rules of Procedure, section 20) and the bill must be presented in the form of a law (Mattson 1995, 462). Occasionally bills might even be withdrawn because of poor technical quality (Arter 1984, 297).

Table 2. Legislative initiatives, passed laws and success rates in the Finnish Eduskunta

	Legislative period			
	1995–1999	1999–2003	2003–2007	
Sponsor	Initiated/Passed (%)	Initiated/Passed (%)	Initiated/Passed (%)	Total passed %
MP	509/8 (1.6)	746/14 (1.9)	665/30* (4.5)	2.7
Government	1018/994 (97.6)	937/912 (97.3)	975/950 (97.4)	97.5

Source: own calculations based on Annual Reports 2006, 2007 www.eduskunta.fi
*Includes 9 bills that have been merged with others and then passed

[22] Time limits apply to budget motions, but this is because of the seasonal nature of budget deliberations, otherwise no time limits exist.

Table 2 compares the number of initiated and passed laws for MPs and the government. Particularly telling is the success rate for MPs. An average success rate of 3% for three legislative periods is actually fairly good when one considers that two private member bills that became laws in 1980 for example was the highest figure over a decade (Arter 1984, 297).

Finland is a very good example why unsuccessful private member bills are nevertheless worth a closer examination. Eduskunta is making fewer changes to bills presented by government, the percentage of government proposals that were accepted without changes had risen from 49% in 1960 to 70% in 1983 (Anckar 1992, 182). If this trend has not reversed itself and as the majority of bills passed are government bills, then PMBs are actually the only ones that theoretically still fulfill the Eduskunta's law making functions. In general the success rate for bills sponsored by MPs in Finland is one of the lowest in Europe. For the period of 1945–2002 it was 1.4% for a total for 21 402 sponsored bills (Wiberg 2004, 19), which is very low. Besides sponsoring their own bills Finnish MPs have also the possibility to submit motions to request the government to initiate a draft law on a certain topic. These motions might also be used raise an issue of importance to the MPs constituency (Arter 2011, 142).

Unlike in the Finnish case, the right to initiate is granted to many different internal organs of the parliament in Estonia.[23] Besides individual MPs the right to initiate also belongs to the parliamentary party groups (PPG) and committees. Accordingly, we can get a clearer picture how many laws are initiated by only MPs alone. There are no limits to the content of drafts or to the timing of the initiation. Technical requirements are strict, an initiative has to be presented together with a thorough explanatory letter stating the aim, societal and economic consequences, cost of implementation and conformity with EU regulations. Technical requirements are therefore quite extensive, but as the number of initiated drafts shows (Table 3) this is not particularly constraining for MPs.[24]

Table 3. Legislative initiatives, passed laws and success rates in the Estonian Riigikogu

	Legislative period				
	1992–1995	1995–1999	1999–2003	2003–2007	
Sponsor	Initiated/ Passed (%)	Initiated/ Passed (%)	Initiated/ Passed (%)	Initiated/ Passed (%)	Total passed %
MPs	245/79(32.2)	218/91(41.7)	229/94(41.0)	106/33(31.1)	37.2
Government	345/285(82.6)	513/435(84.8)	646/555(85.9)	561/531(94.7)	87.5

Source: „Riigikogu X koosseis: Statistika ja ülevaated", (2007).

[23] Committees have the right to initiate legislation also in Sweden and Iceland for example (Arter 2004).

[24] The Estonian dataset used in this analysis contains 328 bills, seven less than is reported for the total number of these bills in official sources. The discrepancy comes from bills that were introduced in the 1999–2003 period and reintroduced or carried over into the period of 2003–2007. These bills have only been included once.

In comparison to Finland the PMBs in Estonia have a markedly higher success rate. For the period under study, every third PMB was actually passed. One can see however that the absolute number of sponsored bills is going down and so is the success rate.

A brief look at other parliaments shows that the limits on sponsoring are much more severe in bigger parliaments. For example individual MPs do not have the right to initiate legislation on their own in Germany, Italy, Spain or Poland. In case they can, other limits are very strict, like in Greece where they can be discussed once a month or the UK where they can be considered on only about ten Fridays (Mattson 1995, 459). The fact that the constraining rules do in fact limit the tabling of bills is exemplified by Poland where the minimal number of MPs allowed to sponsor a draft is 15, an analysis of bills during one month showed that 40% of bills were initiated by 15 to 21 members, that is the minimal number or close to it (Sanford 2002, 118). The success rate is however uniformly low in all countries were MPs can sponsor bills (Mattson 1995, 478).

The success rates between the two cases do differ a lot. In comparison to government bills however it is uniformly low for both cases. The relatively high average success rate for PMBs in Estonia can also be expected to be a passing phenomenon.[25] Since the governments success rate is very high as well, one can say that overall high success rate of bills mirrors the simple need to pass legislation in a time when prior legislation was largely not existing or outdated. Early 1990's where the time of extraordinary politics where transition from Soviet rule called for new legislation quickly and in large volumes. The persistently large rates in the late 1990's and early 00's can be explained with the EU accession process, where again the need to modify existing legal rules in large numbers or pass new legislation, simply overwhelmed the government which gave MPs also a change to initiate and pass bills. The number of initiated PMBs and their success rate is however continually decreasing.

The diverging success rate for the two countries does have implications for the subsequent analysis. Whereas in the Finnish case there is no doubt that sponsoring and passage rates are in stark contrast to each other, in Estonia this is necessarily not the case. The notion of pseudolegislation might therefore not be so easily applicable in that case, as some PMBs do indeed get passed. It is however still clear that depending on the characteristics of the sponsor the likelihood of the bill being enacted differs a lot. For pure opposition bills in Estonia for example the success rate for 1999–2007 was 25.1%, which is clearly lower than for PMBs in general. Therefore, the contradiction between sponsoring and passing still applies for Estonia as well, albeit not to such extreme degrees as in Finland.

[25] The Estonian success rate is among the higher end on a comparative level, while Finland on the other hand represents the lower end (see Mattson 1995).

3.2. General sponsorship patterns

Not all factors described in the sections preceding the multivariate analysis can be included in the regression model due to methodological issues elaborated below, this section gives a tabular description of PMB sponsoring broken down to four separate categories. One showing the general party patterns behind PMBs, one the district level differences in activity, one the MPs front- or back-bench status and PMB sponsoring and lastly, one the personal vote level and sponsoring on a purely bivariate level. This largely descriptive subsection should complement the multivariate analysis later on each other and help to get a better hang of the structures in the data.

3.2.1. Party role

The theoretical section above outlined possible problems with identifying if the PMB is indeed conceived and introduced into parliament by the formal sponsor or one might suspect some other actor as the actual initiator behind it. One of these might be the party, meaning we should treat some PMBs as not actual bills by individual MPs, but as part of the legislative program of the party or a general opposition-coalition rivalry in parliament. Other possible factors connected to the party might also influence the picture, like size and also ideological focus. A separate analysis is also needed as MPs from some parties might sponsor more or less bills due to an unobserved difference between then. Including party dummies in the multivariate analysis below that would control for this is not possible however, as the ratio of cases to variables gets out of balance producing a severe degrees of freedom problem. Looking at the party role separately will therefore compensate somewhat for this downside. The subsections will take a detailed look at Estonia and Finland separately.

3.2.1.1. Party patterns: Estonia

Sponsorship according to party is shown in Table 4. It reports the share of MPs who sponsored at least one bill, the mean number of PMBs sponsored by MPs, together with the standard deviation and quartile limits to evaluate the spread in the number of bills sponsored by individuals. The number of MPs reported for specific parties is the overall number of these party members in the dataset over the two legislative periods under study, including all replacement members. The rows are ordered according to the share of MPs from these parties in the dataset so it will be used to spot party size effects in sponsorship activity as well.

The table shows that members of some parties are much more active than others. Members of the centre-left Centre Party, which had been in and out of government for both legislative periods under study, sponsor bills in significantly higher numbers than the rest. Members of two centre-right parties, Reform Party and Res Publica, sponsor significantly fewer bills than the rest of the population. These three are also the biggest parliamentary party groups in the sample. The Reform Party has been in government for the two legislative periods under

scrutiny here, so their low activity level is in line with the theoretical expectations. That members of big governing parties tend to be less active when it comes to sponsoring PMBs has been corroborated by other empirical studies cited above. All the parties, except Coalition Party and United People's Party of Estonia, have spent time in government during the period under study.

Table 4. PMB sponsoring activity by party membership in Estonia 1999–2007

Party (N)	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Sponsoring quartiles		
			Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Centre Party (77)	88.3	8.5 (6.6)	3.5	9.0	12.0
Reform Party (62)	71.0	2.6 (3.3)	.0	1.5	4.0
Res Publica (40)	77.5	2.0 (1.7)	1.0	2.0	3.0
Social Democrats (32)	87.5	5.0 (4.8)	2.0	4.0	6.8
Pro Patria Union (30)	90.0	3.5 (2.3)	1.8	3.5	5.0
People's Union (27)	88.9	3.3 (2.5)	2.0	3.0	5.0
Coalition Party (8)	75.0	6.6 (6.7)	.5	4.5	13.8
United People's Party of Estonia (6)	100.0	5.2 (3.9)	2.5	4.0	8.3
Total	83.0	4.7 (5.1)	1.0	3.0	6.3

Examining possible effects of differences in size shows that smaller parties do not behave according to a uniform pattern. Even though the average activity level of their members is higher than the total average, the activity levels of their members as shown by the quartile limits are very dissimilar.

Whether these different activity levels can partly be explained by the party's coalition or opposition status can be inferred from Table 5. It shows the differences between activity levels for parties whose status changed during the period. The differences are very big for Centre Party and the People's Union, with substantially higher activity levels during their opposition period. The quartile limits tell that this change in activity is down to bigger number of MPs getting more active, not simply a few hyperactive party soldiers. This is not the case for other parties. The marginal changes in activity levels are down to the same low activity patterns both in and out of government. Table 4 and 5 together show that some of the differences between aggregate activity levels of party members do disappear when accounting for their government or opposition status. This means that the differences between some party members caused by them simply behaving differently, regardless of any other factors included in the analysis, are not overly big. This is a good sign for the multivariate analysis below that could not include party dummies. However, if being in the opposition translates into comparatively higher activity for some parties, but not others, then this could be a deliberate party strategy. Or with other words are we in fact looking at party, not private members' bills? In the Estonian case there is the possibility for party groups to sponsor bills as well, so why not attach a party label to the bill becomes the question?

Table 5. PMB sponsoring activity change by opposition or coalition status in Estonia, 1999–2007

Party	Status	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Sponsoring quartiles		
				Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Centre Party	in coalition	76.6	2.4 (2.2)	1.0	2.0	3.0
	in opposition	77.9	6.0 (5.5)	1.0	6.0	9.0
People's Union	in coalition	88.9	2.9 (1.8)	2.0	3.0	4.3
	in opposition	88.9	4.2 (3.6)	1.5	3.0	7.0
Pro-Patria Union	in coalition	77.3	2.1 (2.1)	.8	1.5	3.0
	in opposition	73.3	1.9 (1.9)	.0	1.5	3.0
Res Publica	in coalition	65.0	.8 (.8)	.0	1.0	1.0
	in opposition	60.0	1.1 (1.2)	.0	1.0	1.8
Social Democrats	in coalition	85.0	3.2 (3.4)	1.0	2.5	3.8
	in opposition	71.9	2.9 (3.0)	.0	2.0	4.8

The "partyness" of bills can be evaluated with Figure 2, which graphs the ratio of sponsors to party faction size in the given legislative period on the y-axis, against the cumulative percentage of this distribution for all the bills where members of the given party are among the sponsors on the x-axis. A ratio of 1 on the y-axis means that all party group members were sponsoring a given bill. An early rise of the line would suggest that a big share of party group members sponsor many bills together. A late sudden rise would mean few members sponsor most of the bills. The latter is the case for Estonian parties. The profiles show almost uniformly a very late and sudden rise; and hit the ratio=1 mark on the y-axis only for three parties. What's more, the ratio of 0.5, signifying that 50% of the party members sponsor a bill, is not hit until the cumulative percentage of 90 for all cases, except the Coalition Party. This shows that throwing the weight of even half of the party MPs behind a bill is very rare. For Centre Party, Reform Party, Pro Patria and Social Democrats 90% percent of bills are sponsored by MPs composing up to a fifth of the total party group size. The rise is more sudden for smaller parties, which is partly down to their small group size, where few individuals make up a bigger proportion. However, the mode for all parties is still one MP per bill, except two for the Coalition Party, meaning the most frequent is still having only one MP from a party sponsoring a bill. PMBs seem to have more numerical support relative to party size in small parties than in bigger ones. The same can be said about Finnish PMBs (see next section). Granted, the simple ratio of sponsors to group size might be deceiving as one can think of situations where a single MP hands in a bill that the party has decided should be sponsored. The MP might still be a mere front, but the party profiles and the fact that Estonian parties have in fact the possibility to sponsor bills suggests that the party role is limited. One needs to keep in mind also that this section did not look at separate bills, but the graphs and central

tendency statistics were calculated using all bills where the party members were among the sponsors. Figure 2 therefore shows the general "partyness" of PMBs per individual parties, with single MP sponsored bills as well as, intra- and interparty co-sponsored bills together.



*x-axis is the cumulative percentage of the ratios for bills, where given party members are among the sponsors. y-axis is the ratio of sponsors from the given party to total party group size

Figure 2. Cumulative percent distributions of ratio of sponsors to party group size, Estonia 1999–2007*

The descriptive part does not test if the observed patterns would still be such when controlled for other factors. General features of the party, such as group size and also the coalition or opposition status of the MP, are however included in the multivariate analysis below.

Examining the possible party role further by looking at the simple number of sponsors behind certain bills shows some other interesting patterns. Table 6 separates pure opposition and coalition bills, i.e. bills that have only opposition or only coalition MPs as sponsors, and jointly sponsored bills.

Table 6. Mean number of sponsors per bill in Estonia 1999–2007

Type (N)	Mean (SD)	Quartile limits		
		Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Pure opposition bills (211)	2.9 (3.6)	1.0	2.0	3.0
Pure coalition bills (79)	2.5 (2.2)	1.0	2.0	3.0
Mixed bills (38)	14.0 (21.1)	3.0	5.0	14.8
All bills (328)	4.3 (9.4)	1.0	2.0	3.0

Out of the 328 PMBs sponsored during the period, roughly two thirds are purely opposition sponsored. The mean number of sponsors for all bills is slightly over four MPs, 29.3% have only one sponsor and 90% of bills are sponsored by up to seven MPs. A dozen bills are sponsored by more than 20 MPs. Substituting the individual sponsors with their respective party labels shows an average of 1.6 parties behind bills (SD=1.1). 67.0% percent are sponsored by MPs from one party only and 90% sponsored by up to three parties. One can therefore say that the big picture is one of not single member's bills in a literal sense, but in fact cooperation between MPs, but who tend come from the same party.

Purely opposition or coalition bills have different sponsorship patterns. Though the mean number of sponsors does not differ much for both types of bills, the standard deviation does, indicating that the number of sponsors behind opposition bills is more spread out. 35.1% of opposition bills have only one sponsor and 90% are sponsored by up to four MPs. Seven out of the 211 pure opposition bills had more than 10 sponsors. Though the big share of single MP sponsorings says already that these tend to be one party bills, the share of bills sponsored by MPs from one party only is an overwhelming 86.7%. These are therefore efforts by MPs from the same party and not a case of opposition-wide cooperation. The lack of opposition cooperation is further exemplified by voting coherence on these bills. The Rice cohesion index[26] for the opposition vote on opposition sponsored bills during the 2003–07 legislative period was 78.8, while for the coalition it was 94.0 (Solvak 2007, 103). Granted, a 78.8 score on

[26] R=2*(100*Mv*j*/Tv*j* – 50), where Mv is the majority of the group *j* who voted in one direction and Tv the total voters of group *j*.

an index that has the lowest possible value of 0, meaning a 50/50 split in the group vote, is still impressive. But it pales in comparison to the almost total uniformity by coalition MPs. With such iron coalition discipline the opposition cannot even harbor ideas about catching the coalition off guard and actually passing one of their own bills, even if they would decide to cooperate.

Of the pure coalition bills 29.1% have only one MP as sponsor and 90% are sponsored by up to three MPs. Only three bills out of the 79 pure coalition bills have more than four sponsors. Looking at the partisanship of these sponsors shows an average of 1.9 parties as sponsors. In fact 46.8% (37) had at least one MP from all coalition partners (and 15 out of those were bills with exactly one MP for each coalition partner as sponsor), 16.5% had a representative of one coalition party missing and 36.7% had two coalition party representatives missing. This pattern of opposition MPs sponsoring bills together stands in marked contrast to the individual efforts by opposition MPs when it comes to PMBs. Even more, the fact that to a large degree all coalition parties are systematically represented among the sponsors suggests what Arter called a "parliamentary assist" (Arter 2006, 466), with the government handing out a bill that is guaranteed support in the plenary. Even more, bills where MPs from all coalition partners were represented as sponsors seem to be initiated by a select group of MPs. The same names frequently pop up when the sponsors of these bills are more closely examined. It might of course be that these are the so called "work horses", whose job is to do substantive and not so public legislative work, as opposed to the more attention seeking "show horses" (Hall 1987, 107).[27] Such a division of labor is possible, but the fact that all coalition partners are represented among a large number of coalition bills suggests there is more to it than simply a group of active law producers getting together.

The nature of these bills will be looked at in more detail in the subsequent chapters. Without rushing ahead one can already say that coalition bills differ systematically from opposition bills. This can of course mean that coalition MPs differ systematically in what and how they want to regulate. However the fact that coalition MPs cooperate along the coalition lines, together with the fact their bills differ systematically from pure opposition bills, suggest that there is more to it than simply coalition MPs being inherently different type of MPs.

Mixed bills present a different picture. First of all, there a relatively few of those, which shows that parliamentary-wide cooperation is rare. Secondly, only 15.8% are sponsored by two MPs, one from the coalition one from the opposition. As shown by the quartile limits, mixed bills have many more sponsors, so it is not a simple decision by some MPs to bridge the coalition opposition divide and sponsor a bill that they feel should be sponsored. Instead, these are parliamentary wide bills on non-divisive issues (e.g. change of the traffic act), matters that require some sort of qualified majority (e.g. amending the basic

[27] As one anonymous Estonian MP once put it: "20% of MPs work hard, 30% are very needed, 50% are irrelevant" (Kalamees 2006).

law) or simply bills that should be decided on a consensual base (e.g. amending the rules of parliamentary procedure).

Four things stand out in a summary of the evidence so far. First, when it comes to PMB sponsorship frequency and party then not size nor ideology seem to matter, but whether the MP's party belongs to the opposition or coalition side. Changing from a coalition to a opposition party also changes the activity levels of its members. Secondly, PMBs in Estonia are cooperative efforts by multiple MPs. Thirdly, PMBs are not clear party bills, as the share of party members from particular party groups among the sponsors in comparison to total party group size is small. Fourthly, inter- and intraparty cooperation patterns differ according to opposition or coalition status. Opposition MPs go at it alone and cooperate less with MPs from other parties. Coalition MPs on the other hand are somewhat more cooperative and as a rule of thumb include representatives from all or at least from most coalition partners among the sponsors.

3.2.1.2. Party role: Finland

The sponsorship pattern for Finnish political parties is somewhat different from the Estonian case (see Table 7). Differences between parties are bigger, MPs from different parties show very diverging activity levels. The share of MPs from the given party who actually engaged in sponsoring bills is an overwhelming majority just like in the Estonian case. Coalition parties in the legislative period of 2003–07 were the Centre Party, Social Democrats and Swedish People's Party. All of them show a clearly lower activity level than the rest. A look at the quartile limits shows that a small part of MPs from these parties are very active, with the rest rather passive. The differences between the limits are much more pronounced than for opposition parties. The activity levels between MPs are clearly more even for opposition parties. Rows in the table are again ordered according to party size. No clear pattern separating smaller from bigger parties is apparent. Only the Christian Democrats stand out as having hyperactive members when it comes to PMB sponsoring. The True Finns and the Greens are not significantly distinguishable from the rest.

Table 7. PMB sponsoring activity by party in Finland 2003–2007

Party (N)	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Sponsoring quartiles		
			Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Centre Party (58)	87.9	25.5 (20.9)	11.8	25.5	36.0
Social Democratic Party (54)	87.0	25.7 (16.8)	8.3	29.0	36.5
National Coalition Party (42)	100.0	79.24 (24.2)	68.5	80.0	97.3
Left Alliance (19)	100.0	75.5 (17.4)	67.0	78.0	90.0
Greens (16)	100.0	67.44 (24.9)	50.3	66.0	83.8
Swedish People's Party (11)	72.7	17.5 (14.7)	1.0	18.0	29.0
Christian Democrats (7)	100.0	123.86 (21.9)	101.0	130.0	146.0
True Finns (3)	100.0	72.33 (18.5)	51.0	82.0	84.0
Total (210)	92.4	47.6 (34.9)	21.0	37.5	77.0

Moving on to the party profiles of sponsors to party group size ratios (Figure 3) shows a very different picture from the Estonian case. Two things stand particularly out. First, the differences between small and big parties are more apparent. Big parties on the right hand side of the figure show a concave like profile with a slightly later and more sudden rise. The smaller parties on the left hand side have a bellied profiler with an early slow rise. This means that the smaller the party, the more bills are sponsored by groups of MPs whose ratio to the overall party size in parliament is big. Put more simply, PMBs seem to be party bills for smaller groups and real private member's bills for bigger party groups. The second clear difference is the much earlier rise of the Finnish party profiles. Finnish bills have a bigger share of party members among sponsors than Estonian bills. Though this will be qualified in a moment, it is obvious that unlike the Estonian case, where party groups have also the possibility to sponsor bills, the lacking of this option in the Finnish case means that PMBs might be used as "party bills". The connection between the personal vote share of a single MP might for this reason be somewhat weakened. For five of the eight parties in parliament the line reaches the ratio=1 mark on the y-axis, meaning there are bills where all MPs from a certain party sponsor a bill together. The ratio of 0.5 is also crossed relatively early, except for the two big coalition parties, so all in all, the PMBs in Finland have a much more partisan feeling to them. With other words, it means that PMBs in Finland have nominally a larger share of party faction members among the sponsors. If one can place PMBs on a continuum, where at one end stand single member bills, i.e. bills sponsored by one MP with the initiative and idea belonging solely to this one MP, and at the other end is in fact a bill jointly sponsored by all MPs from a given party faction, which is in fact a bill drafted and initiated jointly by all MPs from that party, then Estonian PMBs are clearly more closer to the endpoint defined by single member bills than Finnish PMBs.



*x-axis is the cumulative percentage of the ratios for bills, where given party members are among the sponsors. y-axis is the ratio of sponsors from the given party to total party group size

Figure 3. Cumulative percent distributions of ratio of sponsors to party group size, Finland 2003–2007*

Table 8 shows the breakdown of opposition and coalition bills. It exemplifies why the profiles in Figure 3 differ from the Estonian case so much. Finnish opposition and coalition MPs are much more cooperative when it comes to

PMBs. A third of all bills have sponsors from both sides of the divide. This does not translate into success chances as will be discussed in chapter 5, but it does show a much more cooperative spirit in parliament.

Table 8. Number of MPs behind bills, Finland 2003–2007

Type (N)	Mean (SD)	Quartile limits		
		Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Pure opposition bills (392)	8.5 (10.5)	1.0	5.0	11.0
Pure coalition bills (77)	2.0 (2.4)	1.0	1.0	2.0
Mixed bills (196)	33.1 (36.7)	8.0	18.5	42.8
All bills (665)	15.0 (24.5)	1.0	6.0	6.0

The table also shows how the mean number of 15.0 sponsors behind a bill is a result of actually very different sponsorships patterns between the opposition and coalition. Suffice to say that 28.7% out of all the bills have a single MP as sponsor. The mean number of parties behind a bill is 2.2; 67.7% are sponsored by MPs from one party only, 6.8% by two parties. All eight parties are represented among the sponsors for 5.7% of the bills. The distribution of MPs behind bills is substantially different from the Estonian case. The Finnish parliament is almost twice the size of the Estonian one, so the party groups are also nominally much bigger. This does not mean much in itself, the real differences are not down to size, but to the proportion of MPs behind bills. Finnish bills have on average more sponsors, taking the difference in size into account. Meaning they are on average not single member endeavors, but have in fact proportionally more MPs as sponsors behind single bills than in Estonia.

Looking at pure opposition and coalition bills separately shows that opposition bills have on average more MPs as sponsors. Only one MP as sponsor had 34.7% opposition bills and 90% are sponsored up to 19 MPs. Switching to party membership one can say that 95.7% are sponsored by representatives of one party only, or that intra-opposition cooperation happens in 4.3% of cases only.

For pure coalition bills 71.4% are sponsored by one MP only, 90% are sponsored by up to six MPs. 97.4% of these bills are sponsored by representatives from one coalition party only. Only two bills where cooperative endeavors. None of the coalition party bills had representatives from all coalition parties as sponsors. If coalition MPs sponsor bills, they do this mainly alone and do not cooperate with MPs from their nor other coalition parties. The profiles of figure 5 are therefore mainly down to the big number of mixed bills where a large number of MPs from different parties engage in sponsorship. Leaving mixed bills out of the equation tells us that Finnish PMBs are single member's bills in a literal sense for coalition MPs, but seem to be more like party bills for opposition MPs.

The last category, mixed bills, contains like in the Estonian case parliamentary wide co operations. Only 2% of the 196 mixed bills have exactly two MPs as sponsors. The quartile limits tell that a big share is sponsored by very many MPs together. 90% are sponsored by up to 105 MPs, with one of these bills having 177 sponsors. The mean number of parties behind these mixed bills is in fact 5.0 and 19.4% are sponsored together by all eight parliamentary parties.

Summing up one can say that the higher activity level of opposition party members is very similar to Estonia. The party size does seem to play a role as the two biggest parties are clearly less active than the rest, however it is not uniform and the effects will most likely disappear when controlling for opposition status as will be done below. A crucial difference is however in the way MPs cooperate. When in Estonia coalition MPs are more cooperative then in Finland it is the other way around. PMBs are single member bills in the case of coalition MPs and cooperative efforts for opposition MPs. As parties as such cannot sponsor bills then PMBs by opposition MPs have a clear partisan feeling to them. More interesting is however the fact that bills by coalition MPs do not share the traits that one would assume for a "parliamentary assist" as they do in Estonia meaning no systematic representation of coalition partners among the sponsors is evident.

3.2.2. District patterns

District influences will be evaluated in the multivariate analysis below, but only with the help of two variables. This section will give a more descriptive and specific overview whether and how do MPs from different districts differ in their sponsorship activity levels. This will therefore give also a hint if possible district effects might play a role in the regression analysis, while controlling for other factors. As in case of parties, district dummies, that would capture any unobserved heterogeneity between districts, will not be included in the multivariate analysis below because of the cases to variables ratio.

The discussion of the personal vote showed that MPs from bigger districts should be more active in sponsoring. Also, the remoteness of the district might give rise to district specific problems that might require a more active engagement from MPs, these two details will however be evaluated in the multivariate section.

3.2.2.1. District patterns: Estonia

Sponsorship activity according to district is shown in Table 9. Rows are ordered according to district size. The second column shows that an overwhelming majority of MPs from the districts actually sponsor at least one bill. No strong pattern according to district size seems apparent. Except for the unusually active district of Ida- and Lääne-Virumaa, it seems in fact somewhat the other way around, the smaller the district the more active the MPs seem on average to be. The standard deviation and quartiles show that the data is quite spread out, meaning MPs from the same district do not behave uniformly when it comes to

sponsorship. Only clear difference from the rest of the population is obvious for the Ida- and Lääne-Virumaa.[28] The quartile limits show that this is not down to a few MPs sponsoring a majority of bills, but in fact all MPs sponsoring bills more actively than delegates from other districts. The activity patterns do differ from district to district though. In some districts few MPs seem to be very active, as shown by the 3rd quartile limit (Q_3).

Table 9. PMB sponsoring activity by district, Estonia 1999–2007

District (district size)	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Quartile limits		
			Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Ida- and Lääne-Virumaa (13)	100.0	10.9 (10.4)	3.0	7.5	14.3
Harju- and Raplamaa (12)	69.7	3.3 (3.9)	.0	2.0	5.0
Kesklinn, Lasnamäe and Pirita (10)	78.1	4.5 (4.6)	1.0	3.5	6.8
Võru-, Valga- and Põlvamaa (9/10)	93.5	4.1 (4.0)	2.0	3.0	5.0
Järva- and Viljandimaa (9)	84.2	5.4 (5.8)	1.0	4.0	8.0
Haabersti, Põhja-Tallinn, Kristiine (8)	85.7	5.7 (5.9)	1.3	3.5	9.0
Pärnumaa (8)	95.0	5.7 (5.1)	2.3	4.0	8.0
Jõgeva- and Tartumaa (8)	90.5	5.1 (4.1)	1.5	5.0	9.0
Ida-Virumaa (8)	81.8	5.0 (6.1)	1.0	2.0	14.0
Tartu linn (8)	75.9	3.5 (4.3)	.5	2.0	5.0
Mustamäe ja Nõmme (8)	75.0	3.3 (2.5)	.3	4.0	5.0
Hiiu, Lääne and Saaremaa (7)	85.7	5.6 (4.2)	2.0	6.0	8.3
Lääne-Virumaa (6)	80.0	5.1 (6.6)	.8	2.0	8.0
Total (101)	83.0	4.7 (5.1)	1.0	3.0	6.3

No particular geographical idiosyncrasies seem apparent from the table. All in all, MPs from different districts show different activity patterns, but the average sponsorship frequency does not differ significantly between different constituencies. This in itself is not proof that no district specific idiosyncracies might be at work if other factors are controlled for, it might be such a case for Ida- and Lääne-Virumaa, but this question cannot be answered here.

3.2.2.2. District patterns: Finland

Table 10 shows that the total activity level of Finnish MPs is higher than in the Estonian case, with 92.4 of all MPs having been among the sponsors on at least

[28] This district was split into the Ida-Virumaa and Lääne-Virumaa district for the 2003 elections.

one occasion. The rows are again ordered according to district size. It is not very clear from the table, but if one would graph the district size against the mean number of PMBs sponsored by MPs from the district and fit a line to the data, then a upwardly bellied curve would emerge. MPs from middle-sized districts seem to be more active than the rest and MPs from big districts comparatively more active than MPs from small ones.

Table 10. PMB sponsoring activity by district, Finland 2003–2007

District (district size)	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Quartile limits		
			Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Uusimaa (35)	88.6	44.9 (32.0)	18.0	37.0	79.0
Helsinki (24)	83.3	42.8 (32.2)	16.8	44.0	63.3
Pirkanmaa (19)	100.0	63.0 (34.2)	34.0	54.0	90.0
Varsinais-Suomi (19)	89.5	51.0 (38.9)	20.0	40.0	78.0
Oulu (18)	94.4	44.8 (34.9)	17.0	34.0	73.3
Vaasa (17)	100.0	48.1 (35.3)	28.0	37.0	64.5
Häme (14)	92.9	52.9 (40.6)	20.5	43.5	80.3
Kymi (13)	92.3	45.4 (36.4)	14.0	33.0	82.0
Keski-Suomi (10)	90.0	63.2 (49.5)	29.0	43.0	103.8
Pohjois-Savo (10)	100.0	43.9 (36.4)	17.0	30.0	73.0
Satakunta (9)	88.9	38.8 (36.6)	10.0	22.0	80.0
Lappi (8)	87.5	36.6 (29.8)	12.3	29.0	68.5
Pohjois-Karjala (7)	100.0	46.7 (12.6)	39.0	42.0	57.0
Etelä-Savo (6)	100.0	33.0 (31.1)	8.8	27.0	53.3
Aland (1)	100.0	29.0 (–)	–	–	–
Total (210)	92.4	47.6 (34.9)	21.0	35.5	77.0

The quartile limits tell a story of varied activity levels between MPs from the same district. For some districts, such as Keski-Suomi, the differences within the districts are huge. This is not down to the fact that there are more opposition MPs from that district than coalition members, it is the opposite for that given district actually. The real reason is the two to even five times higher average sponsorship activity of the opposition MPs than coalition ones in each district (excluding the Aland district). Regarding the possibility that certain district idiosyncrasies could turn out important if controlled for other factors faces the same hurdle that was already mentioned in connection with the Estonian data. It is hard to evaluate how much this influences the results. On the one hand, Finland is a sparsely populated land with big distances between settlement centers, the district could therefore have many distinctive issues that translate into

different behavioral patterns for MPs from these. Pajala, Buntine and Jakulin for example found that MPs from certain districts behave more uniformly as voting blocs than MPs from other districts (2009, 20). This is however explained by the domination of government MPs in these districts (ibid.). If and to what extent district remoteness plays a role is evaluated with a help of one variable in the multivariate analysis below.

3.2.3. Position in parliament

The position in parliament might also play a significant role in sponsoring. It is reasonable to expect that the higher the position the less active the MP is when it comes to PMBs. Frontbenchers have more responsibility for the collective, i.e. the party fortune or the working of the institution, so they might refrain from individual credit claiming. Backbenchers have more freedom to define their tasks in parliament and one can assume also more time on their hands.

3.2.3.1. Position in parliament: Estonia

Sponsorship activity for front- and backbenchers is reported in Table 11. MPs who are speakers, vice-speakers, party group chairs and vice-chairs and committee chairs and vice-chairs and former ministers, or ministers during the given legislative period whose time in government has ended have been classified as frontbenchers. It shows the expectations to be wrong. Frontbenchers show a higher activity level, and the difference is significant. This is counterintuitive. One explanation might be that including a frontbencher among the sponsors will give the bill more exposure or add seriousness to it. Considering the personal vote issue elaborated above adds another nuance to this unexpected pattern. The Estonian mandate types can be ordered according to the personal vote share with personal mandate holders scoring highest, followed by district mandate holders and lastly compensation mandate holders. Juxtaposing this with their bench status shows that 84.0% of personal mandate holders, 57.7% of district mandate holders and 37.7% of compensation mandate holders would have frontbench status (Solvak 2013). Frontbenchers simply have more MPs with a high personal vote share among them than do backbenchers. Their high activity level would be in line with the theoretical explanation regarding the personal vote influence. A final answer to this will be given in the multivariate analysis below, which includes both characteristics as variables.

Table 11. PMB sponsoring activity by front- or backbench status, Estonia 1999–2007

Status (N)	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Quartile limits		
			Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Frontbencher (158)	84.8	5.3 (5.6)	1.0	4.0	7.3
Backbencher (124)	80.6	4.0 (4.3)	1.0	3.0	5.0
Total (282)	83.0	4.7 (5.1)	1.0	3.0	6.3

3.2.3.2. Position in parliament: Finland

Table 12 shows the mean sponsorship activity according to front- or backbench status in Finland. The classification is the same as in the Estonian case, but the results are completely opposite. Backbenchers are significantly more active than frontbenchers. The share of MPs who have ever sponsored a bill is also smaller among the frontbenchers. Furthermore, the quartile limits show that the mean level is probably caused by a small number of very active frontbenchers.

Table 12. PMB sponsoring activity by front- or backbench status, Finland 2003–2007

Status (N)	Sponsoring MPs %	Mean sponsoring (SD)	Sponsoring quartiles		
			Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
Frontbencher (94)	84.0	41.7 (38.5)	5.0	31.5	70.8
Backbencher (116)	99.4	52.3 (31.0)	29.3	41.5	77.5
Total (210)	92.4	47.6 (34.9)	21.0	35.5	77.0

The backbenchers on the other hand display a much more even activity level. Comparing the mean personal vote index levels for these two groups (not reported) shows marginal difference in one decimal in favor if the backbenchers. So a possible explanation forwarded in the Estonian case above does not seem to apply here.

3.2.4. General personal vote effects

Chapter 2 outlined a connection between the personal vote share and parliamentary activity levels. A straightforward first step would be to graph these variables against each other to see if one can already spot a connection without controlling for anything else. Figure 4 graphs the sponsorship activity against the personal vote index for the two countries. Fitting a polynomial trend line to the Finnish data ($y = –0{,}6017x^2 + 13{,}753x – 29{,}312$) shows that an increase in the personal vote correlates positively with an increase in sponsorship activity to a certain range of the index ($11 < x < 12$), after which it turns into a negative trend. A better fit with more terms in the equation would definitely be possible, it is a futile exercise however as the spread in the data is too big to justify fitting any lines. The purpose of the trend lines is simply to give a hint of a possible relationship. The Finnish index is in fact the district magnitude times a constant (except for the Aland district that differs on the pooling variable), so the downward slope means that sponsorship activity starts to decrease from a certain district magnitude level.



Figure 4. Personal vote and PMB sponsorship frequency

The spread of the Estonian data is equally problematic. The index values have a gap between compensation mandate holders and the rest, so an overall trend-line cannot be fitted. If one would fit a similar line to the Estonian data with cases on the far left side of the figure dropped, then a downward slope as the personal vote increases towards its maximal value would emerge ($y = 0{,}0496x^2 - 1{,}4618x + 14{,}947$).

The trends in the Estonian and Finnish data therefore suggest similar things. Staying on the bivariate level shows that there is no linear relationship between the personal vote share and frequency of sponsoring private members' bills. The relationship is non-linear, and not in a certain direction, but a slightly positive one to a certain personal vote value, after which it becomes negative. The picture emerging here is therefore much more nuanced than a comparison of the aggregate personal vote level with aggregate number of PMB sponsoring would show. This is however without taking any other factors into account.

One needs also to keep in mind the possibility of situational effects mediating the personal vote effect. Section 2.1.3. discussed the possibility of a general unstable system. Small electoral swings might raise the importance of the personal vote as small differences might decide if a candidate gets elected or not. With other words, in a system with stable party support, individual differences in a preferential voting system are crucial in deciding which candidate gets elected. With large swings the personal vote even in a system with strong preferential voting might not play much of a role, though it might counteract an unfavorable swing on the party level. As the personal vote works on the district

level, then the district level volatility would show how much of a role for the personal vote we can expect. Figure 5 graphs the vote shares of individual MPs out of the total votes cast in the district, with the vote share in the first election on the x-axis and the same indicator for the next election on the y-axis. This way the differences in district turnout will not hinder a comparison. For a stable system one would expect MP seat shares to fall roughly on the diagonal, and if sitting MPs manage to increase their popularity, maybe through active work in parliament, then the data points should fall above the diagonal. In the Finnish case the expectation does hold, MPs seem to perform at roughly similar levels in two consecutive elections. In Estonia, however, extreme instability in individual MP performance in the district is evident.



*NOTE: Only MPs who contested two subsequent elections are shown. The paired elections for Estonia are 1999 and 2003; 2003 and 2007. Paired elections for Finland are 2003 and 2007.

Figure 5. MPs vote share (%) in district for two consecutive elections, Estonia (A) and Finland (B)*

For Estonia the Pearson *r* is .57 (*p*=.01, N=211) by pairing the 1999 elections vote share with the one in 2003 and the one in 2003 with the one in 2007. For Finland it is much more stable, with a correlation of .83 (*p*=.01, N=210) by pairing the 2003 and 2007 elections. In the Finnish case we would therefore be able to predict the MPs individual vote share simply by looking at the previous election, something that is not the case in the much more unstable system of Estonia. This suggest that even small effects of the personal vote might be crucial in the Finnish case, whereas large swings in Estonia might dampen any additional edge a personal vote might give a candidate in getting elected or re-elected. It also emphasizes the need to include country controls if the personal vote effect is estimated in a multivariate model.

The next step is to move from a bivariate analysis to a multivariate one, and see if there is a possible relationship after controlling for a range of other factors that might influence PMB sponsorship activity.

3.3. Explaining sponsoring

A multivariate analysis will allow controlling for the effects of the theorized variables simultaneously and will therefore give more precise answer to the question of how much, and if at all, can PMB sponsoring be explained with the given factors. It will also allow specifying the exact impact of the characteristics of the MP on actual sponsoring behavior. It is possible that some of the observed effects, like the personal vote level will, actually not play a role once we have controlled for other factors, such as the opposition coalition status of the MP. On the other hand, the not observed differences, like a clear effect of district size on sponsorship activity, might become strong and significant once other factors have been taken into account. This section and section 3.4 will hopefully present clear evidence as to what extent are the theorized relationships backed up by data, before moving to variable selection a note discusses on how to proceed with the investigation and what type of regression analysis is best suited for this specific question.

3.3.1. Methodological note

The number of PMBs sponsored by MPs is by definition count data. It is a non-negative integer that has one anchor point at zero and in theory at least no fixed maximal value. The standard for modeling such data is the Poisson regression, a special type of nonlinear regression (Cameron & Trivedi 1998, 9). Though the "industry standard" ordinary least squares regression (OLS) might be considered inappropriate in such situations, it can be used on transformed data and will produce results that are substantively analogous to a Poisson model (ibid., 89). Log-transformation in order to use OLS assumes that the data has a log-normal distribution. Figure 6 is a histogram of the number of PMBs sponsored by MPs from Estonia between 1999–2007 and Finland between 2003–07.[29] It has a severely skewed distribution typical of count data, which cannot be corrected by log-transformation. The square-root transformation, also frequently suggested for a positive skew (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, 82), does not produce better results. Therefore, OLS on transformed data seems ill-advised for the current situation.

[29] This is the pure PMB sponsoring count that does not separate the activity levels while in government or opposition.



Figure 6. Histogram of PMB sponsoring frequency

The figure shows however that the data also do not have a standard Poisson distribution where the mean equals the variance, so a method that would take over-dispersion in the data into account, such as negative binomial regression, will most likely provide for a better fit. The histogram indicates one further problem. There is a big share of zeros in the data, meaning that the single biggest "group" are MPs who do not sponsor anything, even though they are a minority in comparison to the MPs who sponsored at least one bill. Some of these non-sponsors might be defined as structural zeros, meaning they cannot have any other value than zero on the variable of interest. These might be MPs who suspended their mandate while in government for example. This is a potential issue with the Estonian data, as MPs who are in government need to suspend their mandate.[30] Structural zeros become an acute problem if they contribute to an excess of zeros in the dataset (see e.g. Mullahy 1997; Lachenbruch 2002; Sileshi 2008). Zeros make up 13% of the cases in the raw count of sponsoring and 20% in a slightly modified version used and explained in detail below. The possible excess zero problem here is therefore not comparable to examples from medical research with zero shares in the dataset having an absolute majority of up to 95% (Lachenbruch 2002, 297). Some of the zero values would fit under a more relaxed definition of structural zeros, but there

[30] It is not an issue for Finland as government members do not leave parliament while holding a governmental position.

are only a handful of people who have been in the government for a full legislative period in the Estonian case. There are obviously also a number of individuals who have been elected to parliament and have subsequently relinquished their mandate for good. Dropping these people from the dataset would however be problematic, as for a limited period they were in fact MPs. So they had the theoretical possibility to sponsor bills, and cannot be classified as structural zeros to be subsequently dropped. The ideal approach would be to take the length of the period spent in parliament somehow into account. This would however complicate the analysis immensely, as the turnover between elections in Estonian is big, for example, 158 people were at some time MPs for the period of 2003–07, although the size of the parliament is only 101. Another possibility would be to drop all non-sponsors completely and model only those who engaged in sponsoring. This would swing the pendulum in the other direction, as one would have to correct for the lack of zeros in count data. It would also be counterintuitive, as there are in fact a lot of non-structural zero values in the dataset. Such a truncated count model would make sense only when there are no observed zero values due to a specific research design, one that collects data only when events occur for example (Cameron & Trivedi 1998, 117–118). In the current analysis a non-event is as meaningful as an event. The best approach would therefore be a method that accounts for both the obvious overdispersion shown in the histogram and act also as a precaution for a possible excess zero problem. A zero inflated Poisson regression for example takes the particular type of overdispersion created by excess zeros into account, by combining binary logistic regression for the zero outcome group, with Poisson regression for cases with zero and a larger positive count (see Fox 2008, 392–394). This is however beyond the technical capabilities of the data analysis software used in this thesis (SPSS 18). Instead I will take the logic behind a zero inflated model and apply it in two steps. First, a simple binary logistic regression is performed with the dependent variable a dichotomy of sponsor vs non-sponsor. This way a possible issue with excess zeros is solved as the count data will be turned into a dichotomy and zero values will not have the biggest share on the dependent variable. This analysis will show what accounts for a decision to sponsor a bill as opposed to not sponsor one, or comparing the zero values against all others in technical terms. Secondly, the question of why certain MPs sponsor more bills than others will be explored through using negative binomial regression and the actual count of sponsored PMBs as the dependent variable. Negative binomial regression is especially designed to account for the overdispersion observed in the current dataset. This two step analysis therefore serves two purposes. It covers a conceptual question as it is important to explain the occurrence of an event (sponsoring) vs a non-event, but also the frequency of occurrences, as this is hard to do with a single technique only. The second purpose is to provide an insurance against the possible excess zero problems.

In combination this should be sufficient to answer the two central questions – what explains why some MPs sponsor bills while others do not? And why some MP sponsor bills in greater numbers than others?

The multivariate analysis will proceed in two steps. First a binary logistic regression is used to evaluate what explains the decision to sponsor a bill vis-a-vis not to sponsor. Secondly, a negative binomial regression will show what explains why some members sponsor more bills than others. The case number is 652 MPs, i.e. all MPs who in parliament in Estonia for 1999–2007 and in Finland for 2003–07, with MPs whose opposition or coalition membership status changed during the legislative period duplicated in the dataset and the dependent variable for these cases corresponding to the activity while in the opposition or in the coalition respectively.

3.3.2. Explaining sponsoring and non-sponsoring

3.3.2.1. Variable selection and expectations

This section explains the variable selection for the binary logistic regression and applies with only a difference in the dependent variable to the negative binomial regression also.

The dependent variable for the binary logistic regression is a simple dichotomy of whether the MP is a PMB sponsor (1) or non-sponsor (0).

First the *personal vote* will be included as the index specified in section 2.2. It is rounded to the nearest decimal to make interpretation of its impact more straightforward. The expectation is it to have a positive impact, meaning a score indicating higher personal vote should increase the likelihood of belonging to the sponsoring group. As the literature shows district magnitude to be one of the main variables capturing electoral system effects a second model will be estimated where the index is substituted with the *district magnitude*. As the direction of the effect of it is expected to depend on whether the system is an open or closed list, the *ballot type* will be included as a dummy as well. It is a natural dummy for the Estonian and Finnish case already, and in essence boils down to a comparison of Estonian compensation mandate holders against the rest (see Table 1). Besides these two variables the two separate models will be identical.

The personal vote is a theoretical construction of the incentives the setting the MP got elected might provide, it therefore needs to be validated with actual electoral performance of the MP. A share of district votes the MP received in the prior election out of total votes in the district *(vote share in district)* will therefore be also entered into the model.[31] This is a relative measure that takes into account the differing district sizes and fluctuating turnouts between districts and elections. To make interpretation in the percentage metric possible the

[31] See Appendix C for a discussion on possible electoral payoff of sponsoring connected to this variable.

values have been rounded to the nearest integer plus one, as for some MPs the share was below 0.5%. This way the coefficient will show the effect of a 1% change in the predictor on the dependent variable. This variable has a relatively high correlation with the personal vote index value in the Estonian case. Section 2.4.1 specified that if the personal vote index does not play a role, then one could speculate that what matters is not the setting, but the actual electoral performance of the MP, perceived as a strong mandate. The stronger its effects in relation to the personal vote index, the less MPs will actually proceed from arguably strong rewards for a personal reputation by the system, as opposed to an actual strong personal support in the constituency. This variable will therefore allow separating which of the three temporal outlooks specified in section 2.2.3 might be the central ones. If the MPs are striving for a high personal vote, then one should expect a strong effect of the index, together with weak effect by mandate. If retaining a high personal vote that they had before is central, then strong effects by both, the index and mandate, are to be expected. If they do not plan to run or do not see re-election as central, then weak effects by both, the index and mandate, are expected.

Opposition or government status of the MP is included as a dummy, with opposition membership as the reference category. One would expect that it has a significant role to play even after controlling for other factors, as the descriptive section showed it to produce a very clear dividing line inside parliament. Coalition MPs should have a significantly lower likelihood to be sponsors of PMBs.

The variable on *party group size* represents the group at the beginning of the legislative period.[32] Prior empirical studies have shown smaller parties to be more active in sponsoring bills, one can expect it to have a negative coefficient, showing that the likelihood of being a sponsor decreases as party group size increases.

The position of the MP in the political and institutional hierarchy is captured with four dummy variables. The descriptive part above showed a somewhat unexpected results for front- and backbenchers, so breaking this status down to see if it produces more clear results is reasonable. A first of these dummies compares whether the MP is a speaker or vice-speaker, chair or vice-chair of a standing committees or chair or vice-chair of a party group in the legislative period under study, with the reference category being MPs who do not hold such a position *(high current position in parliament)*. The second dummy is essentially the same, but refers to the MPs position in the previous parliament, with all others being the reference category *(high former position in parliament)*. A third dummy includes MPs who are holding a ministerial position

[32] Leaving the party group for whatever reasons has been an issue in almost all Estonian parliaments, although the frequency of it has gone down from the unstable party politics of the early 90's. The party group size for certain parties has therefore changed between elections. This is not taken account for data analysis simplicity, as some MPs leaving the party group will have a very small effect on the party's relative size in parliament.

during the given legislative period *(minister)*. Estonian MPs have to suspend their mandate while in government, so if there would have been governments that lasted a whole legislative period the variable would not have made much sense. However, there are MPs who sat and were active in the parliament when their period in governmental ended, so controlling if holding a ministerial position has any influences is also possible in the Estonian dataset. No such problems arise in the Finnish case, as MPs who hold ministerial positions do not suspend their mandate. Lastly, a fourth dummy is coded for MPs who have held ministerial positions in governments in office during former legislative periods, with all others being the reference group *(former minister)*. One would expect that these MPs tend to be "political royalty" and for that reason to be more focused on the wider party welfare and less active in day to day business on the parliamentary floor. All these dummies should therefore have a negative effect on the likelihood of being a sponsor, but they should also help to pin down what might cause the above observed divergence in frontbench effects.

In the same vein a variable on *seniority* will be included, which is a simple count of prior memberships in parliaments. It has a very limited range of two in the Estonian case for MPs from the 9th Riigikogu and three for MPs from the 10th Riigikogu. The range is bigger in the Finnish data. There is no clear expectation connected to political seniority. It can go either way. The sections above have shown that PMBs have meager success chances, one would expect that senior MPs are more knowledgeable of the "rules of the game" and do not spend their time on sponsoring matters that get axed pretty early on in the process. However, if PMBs are an integral part of constituency service, then seniority could mean a higher activity level as it would play a role in them getting reelected. It should also act as a control for the *year of birth* variable. The theoretical discussion showed that younger MPs might engage more in constituency service, so as to establish a foothold in the constituency. Age should therefore play a distinguishable role from seniority and one could even expect their effects to be contrary while controlling for each other.

As mentioned in the descriptive section district variables in the form of dummies cannot be included in the model. Though there is no agreed standard, at least a 30 fold differences between sample size and variables used is desirable, as logistic regression needs larger samples than OLS regression to produce results of same validity (Meyers, Gamst & Guarino 2006, 222). The variables to cases ratio problem arises sharply and the rule of thumb would be violated if district level dummies where to be included. What is however included is a variable on the district *distance from the capital*. Geographically remote areas could have specific problems that need the attention of MPs from that district. The variable is the distance in kilometers of the district's administrative centre from the capital; the shortest road distance given by Google Maps. In case where many administrative regions are included in one electoral district the variable will be the average distance of the regional centers from the capital. So for the Oulu electoral district in Finland, for example, it is the average of the distances from Helsinki to Oulu, as the regional capital of

Pohjois-Pohjanmaa, and Kajaani, as the capital of Kainuu region. Similarly for Estonia the variable for the Tartu- and Jõgevamaa district is the average distance of Jõgeva and Tartu to Tallinn. If the district has specific problems then this variable could have a positive effect on the likelihood of sponsoring.

Socio-demographic controls included in the regression model are besides the already discussed *year of birth* and two dummies, one for *gender* and one for *higher education*.

Lastly, a *country* dummy is included, with Finland as the reference category. As the Finnish MPs sponsor more PMBs than Estonian ones it should obviously have a negative effect, but the real purpose is serving as a control to keep unobserved country effects constant.

Table 13 gives the descriptive statistics of variables used in the binary logistic regression. It reports the response group share for nominal variables and the mean with the standard deviation for the interval variables.

Table 13. Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression models on sponsoring

Nominal variables	***%***	***Interval variables***	***Mean (SD)***
Sponsor: yes	79.9	Party group size	27.89 (14.36)
Coalition status: yes	55.7	District magnitude	12.02 (6.31)
Ballot structure: open list	64.4	Year of birth	1954.02 (10.52)
High current position: yes	40.0	Personal vote index	7.24 (4.83.75)
High former position: yes	25.6	Seniority	.94 (1.14)
Minister: yes	11.5	Distance from capital	146.6 (161.4)
Former minister: yes	12.8	Vote share in district	5.27 (3.98)
Higher education: yes	87.3	–	–
Gender: male	75.3	–	–
Country: Estonia	67.8	–	–

3.3.2.2. Logistic regression results

Table 13 shows some dummy variables having quite unbalanced distributions, the reasonable standard errors in the model shown in Table 14 tell that this does not translate into major problems however. The data was analyzed for absence of multicollinearity by examining bivariate correlations, with 0.7 was taken as the threshold (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, 84) and variance-inflation factors (VIF), with the value of 10 taken as the threshold. No problems were detected.[33]

Table 14 reports the coefficients (*B*) with standard errors in parentheses and odds ratios (*Exp(B)*) of the logistic regression. A positive coefficient that goes together with an odds ratio above one for a dummy variable indicates that the likelihood of being a sponsor is greater for the response group (coded as 1) than

[33] The strongest significant correlation was .388 (p=.01) between the party faction size and the personal vote index. VIF values where appreciably smaller than 10.

the same likelihood for the reference group (coded as 0). An odds ratio of one indicates that these two likelihoods do not differ for the groups. A negative coefficient and an odds ratio below one indicates that the likelihood of being a sponsor is smaller for the response group than the same likelihood for the reference group. For an interval variable a positive coefficient and an odds ratio below one indicates how much does the odd of being a sponsor increase for a 1-unit change in the predictor. A negative coefficient and an odds ratio below one indicates the opposite, and an odds ratio of one means there is no difference between different values of the predictor.

Models 1 and 2 include all the variables discussed above. Before moving to the interpretation of the full model a short note on the independent explanatory power of the three most frequently evoked aspects in the literature is in order. Two additional models with only the personal vote, opposition or coalitions status and party group size as predictors were estimated. One with the personal vote index, and the second with the district magnitude and the ballot type instead of the index. Though both models seem to provide for a statistically significant improvement over the constant only model (model with personal vote index, party size, coalition status χ^2 (df=3, N=652) = 27.48, $p<.001$ and model with district magnitude, ballot type, party size, coalition status χ^2 (df=4, N=652) = 31.15, $p<.001$), the Hosmer and Lemershow test is significant in both cases, indicating very poor performance. The Nagelkerke R^2 shows that they do not have much explanatory power, with only 6.5% and 7.4% variance accounted for by these two models respectively. In the first model only the personal vote index showed a significant effect with a modest odds ratio of 1.109. In the second model only the ballot type showed a significant effect with a quite big odds ratio of 2.6. Surprisingly the parsimonious models therefore do not show clear independent effects for the variables usually mentioned in explaining who sponsors PMBs.

Let us return to interpreting the models with all the relevant variables included. Both provide for a significant improvement over the constant only model (model 1 χ^2 (df=14, N=650) = 122.90, $p<.001$ and model 2 χ^2 (df=15, N=650) = 129.87, $p<.001$). The variance explained is also relatively big with 27.2% for model 1 and 28.6% for model 2. The overall validity of the models is good. Classification accuracy is high, over 80% for both models. Table 14 shows that the model with the personal vote index and the one with it substituted for by the district magnitude and ballot type are very similar.

Table 14. Private members' bills sponsorship predictors, reference category: non-sponsor (binary logistic regression)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
Independent variables	***B (SE)***	***Exp(B)***	***B (SE)***	***Exp(B)***
Personal vote index	.134 (.037)	1.144***	–	–
Coalition status (1=yes)	–.014 (.230)	.986	–.026 (.231)	.974
Party group size	–.034 (.014)	.967*	–.035 (.015)	.965*
District magnitude	–	–	–.071 (.036)	.931*
Ballot type (1=open list)	–	–	1.473 (.354)	4.362***
Vote share in district	–.072 (.035)	.930*	–.095 (.033)	.910*
Distance from capital	.002 (.001)	1.002	.000 (.001)	1.000
High current position (1=yes)	.959 (.254)	2.608***	.892 (.256)	2.440***
High former position (1=yes)	.139 (.355)	1.149	.267 (.364)	1.306
Minister (1=yes)	–1.717 (.325)	.180***	–1.661 (.326)	.190***
Former minister (1=yes)	–.249 (.355)	.780	–.234 (.361)	.792
Seniority	–.223 (.165)	.800	–.263 (.167)	.769
Year of birth	–.010 (.011)	.990	–.008 (.011)	.992
Gender (1=male)	–.401 (.283)	.670	–.378 (.284)	.686
Higher education (1=yes)	–.948 (.499)	.387	–1.027 (.504)	.358*
Country (1=Estonia)	–1.179 (.595)	.308**	–2.177 (.754)	.113**
Constant	24.213 (21.714)		27.132 (22.465)	
Nagelkerke R^2	.272		.286	
% correctly predicted	81.1		80.9	
N	650		650	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

For model 1 the odds ratios are most pronounced for the ministerial position, country dummy and parliamentary position, but the personal vote index, party group size and vote share in district are also significant. Let us consider them in the same order as in section 3.3.2.1.

A one unit change in the personal vote increases the odds of being a sponsor by 1.14 times. This is not particularly much, but the range of the personal vote index in the model was 1 to 14 units (including the gap). Those having a score of 5 on the index for example have a 1.3 times greater likelihood[34] of being sponsors than those scoring 3 on the personal vote index. The maximally possible 13 point difference would mean that those having a score of 14 have a 5.7 times greater likelihood of being a sponsor than those with a score of 1. To evaluate if the average effect of the PV shown in the table is weakened by a possible curvilinear relationship, where the personal vote share and activity levels are positively related to a certain level, after which a higher PV value

[34] Odds ratio for a n unit change in the predictor is $e^{(n*B)}$, where B is the coefficient.

show the opposite trend, i.e. a small negative relationship as the PV increases further, the index value was turned into dummies, one for the index range of 7 to 10 and the other above 10, with the range of up to 4 serving as the reference category. This showed that MPs with an intermediate PV level have on average four times higher likelihood of being a sponsor than MPs with the lowest level ($p<.000$), while MPs with the highest PV share have on average 2.6 times higher likelihood of being sponsors ($p<.05$) than the reference group. This suggests a bellied relationship, where MPs with the lowest PV share are more likely non-sponsors than the rest, intermediate level the most likely sponsors, and high level also very likely sponsors, but less so than the intermediate level, while holding everything else constant. One needs to keep in mind that this effect is observed while controlling for country, so the fact that Estonian MPs face a much more unstable setting does not mean that personal vote seeking is of no value to them.

The vote share in district presents an interesting picture. It has a negative effect, meaning 1% more votes of the district total reduces the likelihood of being a sponsor by 0.93 times. The bigger the vote share, the less likely the MP will sponsor bills. The significant positive effect of the personal vote index, in combination with a negative effect of the share of votes received, suggest that the personal vote functions indeed functions in the hypothesized way. What matters is that the MP got elected in a setting incentivizing personal image strength and not the actual strong personal performance in the district.

The idea behind model 2 was to establish possible district magnitude effects. The district magnitude and ballot type entered in place of the personal vote are both significant. It is logical that some of the index constituting elements turn up significant if the index itself captures what it is intended to do. However, the district magnitude coefficient has an unexpected sign. Keeping everything else constant shows it to have a negative effect, or as the district magnitude increases by one unit the odds of being a sponsor decrease by .931 times. The magnitude itself ranges from 1 (Aland district) to 33, so the odds ratios for very different district sizes will be big. There is however only one single member district in the dataset, the second smallest district has a magnitude of six. The 27 point differences between this and the biggest district translates into 0.14 times differences, or in more human language translates into 7 times reduction in the odds of being a sponsor. The same effect was observed when fractionalizing it into dummies and taking the MPs coming from the smallest districts as the reference group. MPs from the biggest districts have indeed a smaller likelihood of sponsoring PMBs. The negative effect of district magnitude is puzzling as it happens while controlling for country effects as well.

The ballot type has a huge odds ratio. Remember that this variable is in essence separating all other MPs from the Estonian compensation mandate holders. This means that MPs elected according to an open list have on average four times higher likelihood of being sponsors than MPs elected through a closed list, while controlling for other factors. This is in accordance with the theoretical prediction and is a strong indication of electoral system effects at work.

Unexpectedly the coalition or opposition status did not play a role at all. The sign indicates that coalition members are less likely sponsors than opposition members, which is the way one expects it to be, but the coefficient itself is not significant. However, as a majority of MPs, regardless of their opposition or coalition status, sponsored at least some bills the fact that controlling for other factors shows no difference in the likelihood to be a sponsor vs non-sponsor makes sense.

Party group size has also a significant effect and in the expected direction. The bigger the group, the smaller the odds of being a sponsor, which is the expected direction. Being a member of party group that has one additional member in comparison to a smaller group reduces the odds of being a sponsor by .96 times. This is a rather small effect, but that so subtle difference in group size translates into different behavioral patterns is interesting. The range of the group size in the data is from 3 to 55. So a difference in 10 MPs for example would mean a .711 times smaller likelihood of being a sponsor for the bigger group members.

Holding a ministerial position means a .108 times smaller likelihood of being a sponsor; by taking the reciprocal of it one can say that not being a minister increases the likelihood of being a sponsor roughly five times in comparison, while controlling for other factors. Against all expectations, having a high ranking position in parliament increases the likelihood of being a sponsor by more than two times holding everything else constant. This result is counterintuitive as it means frontbenchers are more likely to sponsor bills. A former high-ranking position in parliament or being a former minister does not have a significant influence.

Neither seniority nor year of birth played a role. This means having prior experience as an MPs is irrelevant when it comes to PMB sponsoring. The expected effect of younger members being more active is also not backed up by the data.

The variable on distance from capital, intended to capture possible district specific issues, did not play any role nor did any of the sociodemographic variables.

The country dummy serves as a control, it does not tell us anything that was not already apparent from the descriptive statistics, Finnish MPs sponsor nominally many more bills as the odds ratio tells us, while controlling for everything else.

An alternative possibility to evaluate the impact of the significant variables is to see how much does the predicted probability of being a sponsor changes for the maximum and minimum values of the given variables while keeping everything else constant.[35]

For model 1, having a high-ranking position in parliament in comparison to not having one increases the predicted probability of being a sponsor by 23%, which is a very big impact. Being a minister however reduces it by 31%. Moving the personal vote from a minimum of 1 to the maximum of 14, in-

[35] Predicted probabilities are calculated using the formula $P(Y=1)=1/1+\exp(-(a+BX_1+\ldots BX_n))$, where a is the intercept, B the logged-odd regression coefficient and X the mean value of the given interval variable or value 1 for dummy variables.

creases the predicted probability of being a sponsor by 40%. The similar effect for change of party size between 3 and 55 is a reduction of 40% in the predicted probability. And lastly, the change from the smallest vote share in district of 1% to the biggest of 28%, reduces the predicted probability of being a sponsor by 44%. The last three effects should be taken with a grain of salt however, as the bigger the variable range, the larger the differences between the minimum and maximum values will by definition be.

Besides the district magnitude and ballot type model 2 is essentially similar to model 1. Only the education dummy becomes significant indicating than MPs with a higher education are less likely to be sponsors. The predicted probability of being a sponsor is 35% higher for open list MPs than for closed list. A change from the smallest district size of 1 to the biggest of 33 reduces the predicted probability by 47%. This last difference is again dependent on the big variable range.

As the predictive power of a logistic regression solution suffers from outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001, 523) and additional analysis was run to determine possible effects these might have in the current case. Gaining a good model fit by dropping cases is not the purpose of this analysis, so this note is simply to indicate the possible impact of outlying cases and will not be analyzed further. Standardized residuals were examined and cases with the value of 2.5 or below –2.5 filtered out and the regression was run one more time (N=633). The explanatory power of the models rose substantially, the Nagelkerke R^2 for model 1 was .385 and for model 2 .403. The only substantive changes were gender and education dummies showing a significant negative relationship and the distance from capital a small, but significant positive relationship. All variables that where significant in the model with the outliers, were also such in the one without outliers; party size and the vote share in district gained in significance. For model two, seniority gained a significant negative relationship and district magnitude lost its significant impact. Otherwise the significant variables stayed the same.

3.3.3. Explaining sponsoring frequency

The negative binomial regression uses the same independent variables as the binary logistic regression, only the dependent variable is not binary anymore, but the actual count of the PMBs the MP was involved in sponsoring. The descriptive statistics in table 13 describe the same data, the only difference is the PMB count, which has a mean value of 17.34 (SD=28.88). This value differs from the histogram in Figure 6 due to the duplicating of MPs whose opposition or government status changed during the period under study.

3.3.3.1. Negative binomial regression results

Evaluating the model fit of a negative binomial regression is not straightforward as there is no equivalent to R^2 in generalized linear models allowing to separate explained and unexplained variance (Cameron & Trivedi 1998, 153). The

deviance statistics shown in Table 15 is a relative measure of model badness, meaning how much worse is the current model from a perfectly predicting one. The lower this value is the better. A pseudo-R^2 can be calculated for Poisson regression by comparing how much the deviance of the intercept only model differs from models where predictors are added. For the negative binomial regression used here, there is however no such possibility because of the way overdispersion is taken into account. The parameter used for this is estimated from the data and therefore differs between models (Coxe, West & Aiken 2009, 132).[36] Table 15 reports the goodness of fit statistics. For a well fitting model the deviance statistics should be low and the ratio of deviance to degrees of freedom should be close to one. Models 1 and 2 are again very similar in their fit and the value/df ratio is reasonably close to one for the deviance statistic. Non-nested models can be compared using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). AIC takes model fit and the number of parameters into account. It penalizes models that have the same fit as a simpler one, but use more parameters to achieve this. BIC does the same, but takes sample size also into account. A model with a smaller AIC or BIC value is better than one with a bigger value (Coxe, West & Aiken 2009, 133), models 1 and 2 have AIC and BIC differences in decimals only, so one is not better than the other.

Table 15. Goodness of fit statistics for the negative binomial regression models

	Model 1	***Model 2***
Deviance	610.37	609.62
df	635	634
Deviance /df	.961	.961
Pearson Chi-Square	504.66	508.27
df	635	634
Pearson Chi-Square /df	.79	.80

Examining residuals and performing tests for outliers faces also hurdles as contrary to linear models there is no single type of residuals that works for all settings (Cameron & Trivedi 1998, 140). There is also no agreement on diagnostics, i.e. no established principles for interpretation, such as cutoff thresholds for outliers (Coxe, West & Aiken 2009, 129). As in the logistic regression there are outliers at work here as well, but the impact of these will be discusses at the end of the section, the reported results are based on the full dataset. Following Cameron and Trivedi (1998) deviance residuals were chosen and graphed against

[36] For this reason there is no possibility to compare more elaborate models with more parsimonious ones to see how much the model fit improves, as the simpler models are not nested in the more complicated ones.

the predicted outcome, which showed the models to have problems predicting lower counts, otherwise the fit lines followed relatively closely the residual=0 line. Another crude graphical measure to assess model fit is to graph the average predicted proportion of count values and compare it with a graph of observed counts (Cameron & Trivedi 1998, 155–156). There is no overall formal baseline how close the predicted and observed frequencies actually are, so reporting this graph is not really informative. It is useful however in establishing count ranges where the model over- or underpredicts, something that is harder to tell from residual graphs. The comparison showed both models to underpredict zero counts (i.e. non-sponsoring), overpredict lower counts in the range of 1 to 6, but to perform well for higher counts. As attaining a high model fit is not an aim in itself here one can conclude that explanatory power is reasonably good.

Table 16 reports the negative binomial regression coefficients (*B),* with standard errors in parentheses, and the exponentiated coefficients (e^B), which show the effects in the count metric. The results are similar, but not the same as for the logistic regression. The exponentiated coefficients show the predicted multiplicative effect of a 1-unit change in the independent variable on the number of bills sponsored. Dummies show how much the response group differs from the reference group on the dependent variable. With this in mind the interpretation is rather similar to OLS.

Both models are again very similar. A look at model 1 shows that the personal vote index has a positive effect. Holding everything else constant, a one point increase in the personal vote index value increases the predicted number of sponsored PMBs by 1.03 times or about 3%. This is not a big effect, but considering the range of the index it is still relevant. Taking a closer look at the effects with the help of dummies in the same vein as above indicated the same as the respective logistic regression did. Intermediate and high level personal vote dummies showed that the former sponsor on average 31% more and the latter 45% more bills (both significant at $p<.05$) than the reference group of MPs with the lowest PV index value. This therefore suggests a linear effect with increase in the PV value leads to PMB sponsoring in bigger numbers. One has to keep in mind that this happens while controlling for position in parliament and the opposition-coalition status of the sponsor. Looking at the ballot structure and district magnitude effects with the help of model 2 shows the former having a similar influence as in the logistic regression. MPs elected according to open lists sponsor on average 1.41 times or 41% more bills than MPs elected through a closed list. Interestingly the district magnitude does not play a significant role, though its sign indicates a negative relationship as in the logistic regression. Fractionalizing the district magnitude and comparing dummies does not show any significant effects between the different levels either.

The vote share in district has a small negative influence with a 1-unit change reducing the number of sponsored PMBs by .968 times or around 3%, meaning that better performance in the district leads to fewer PMBs being sponsored in the subsequent legislative period. The combination of these two variables is therefore the same as in the model comparing PMB sponsors with non-sponsors.

Remember that coalition status rather unexpectedly did not play a role in predicting sponsoring or non-sponsoring in the logistic regression. In this new model it has a big role in predicting who sponsors more bills. Holding everything else constant, coalition MPs sponsor on average .48 times less PMBs than opposition MPs (model 1 e^B=.487; model 2 e^B=484). Or with other words, they sponsor on average only 48% as many bills as opposition MPs, while controlling for the other factors.

Party group size, which showed the assumed negative effect on the likelihood of being a sponsor, is actually not significant in predicting the frequency of PMB sponsoring.

Being a minister in the given legislative period has a clear negative effect in comparison to MPs who have not held a ministerial position in the given legislative period. Holding a frontbencher's position in the current legislative period means a higher number of PMBs sponsored, they sponsor on average around 1.33 times or 33% more bills than backbenchers. So frontbench status goes together with both being a more likely sponsor and also sponsoring more PMBs, which is completely opposite of the expected.

Table 16. PMB sponsoring frequency predictors (negative binomial regression)

	Model 1		***Model 2***	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	e^B	*B* (SE)	e^B
Personal vote index	.033 (.014)	1.034*	–	–
Coalition status (1=yes)	–.719 (.098)	.487***	–.726 (.098)	.484***
Party group size	–.006 (.004)	.994	–.006 (.004)	.994
District magnitude	–	–	–.006 (.011)	.994
Ballot structure (1=open)	–	–	.348 (.140)	1.417*
Vote share in district	–.033 (.013)	.968*	–.038 (.015)	.962*
Distance from capital	.001 (.000)	1.001*	.000 (.000)	1.000
High current position (1=yes)	.291 (.099)	1.338**	.282 (.099)	1.326**
High former position (1=yes)	.112 (.144)	1.121	.129 (145)	1.138
Minister (1=yes)	–.801 (.171)	.449***	–.775 (.171)	.461***
Former minister (1=yes)	.130 (150)	1.139	.130 (.151)	1.139
Seniority	–.094 (.058)	.910	–.094 (.058)	.911
Year of birth	–.006 (.004)	.994	–.006 (.004)	.994
Gender (1=male)	–.028 (.109)	.973	–.023 (.109)	.977
Higher education (1=yes)	–.314 (.131)	.731*	–.310 (.131)	.734*
Country (1=Estonia)	–2.482 (.175)	.084***	–2.599 (.202)	.074***
Constant	16.377 (9.225)		15.280 (9.265)	
N	650		650	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Seniority nor year of birth play any role in predicting PMB sponsoring frequency, as was already indicated by the logistic regression.

The distance of the constituency from the capital does show a significant but weak effect in model1. Considering it shows the effect of a one kilometer change in distance on PMB sponsoring frequency then the weakness becomes relative. However, when district magnitude and ballot type are entered instead of the personal vote index the effect disappears, which suggests it might have been of spurious nature.

Lastly, higher education shows the same effect in both models, MPs with a higher education sponsor 73% as many bills as MPs without a higher education.

The country dummy tells the same story as in the logistic regression, but its substantive effects are not interesting as it served the role of a control variable.

The data was also analyzed for outliers. Though there is no established convention regarding the cutoff point of outlying cases in generalized linear models, the relevant statistics, such as the Cook's D are still meaningful (Coxe, West & Aiken 2009, 130). Such a case might be producing the significance of a predictor or the other way around, might dampen a predictor's effect. Filtering out cases whose Cook's D was over the size adjusted cutoff point of $D_i > 4/(n - k - 1)$, where n is the number of cases and k the number of regressors (Fox 2008, 255), produced small changes in the models. For Model1 the personal vote gained in significance and the coalition status together with ministerial status had more pronounced effects. Distance from capital lost its statistical significance. For Model 2 ballot structure gained in significance, the effects of ministerial status gained in strength and party group size showed a minor though significant negative effect.

3.4. Discussion

PMB sponsoring can be broken down to two analytically distinct questions. First, what motivates somebody to sponsor a bill? And secondly, what might cause the higher observed activity levels among some of the MPs? Summing up the results of the bivariate and multivariate analysis tells us the following.

First of all, PMB are sponsored in big numbers, meaning MPs do use this legislative instrument extensively. It stands however in marked contrast to the low success rates of PMBs. It is therefore clear that the intention to regulate, even though it might be there, cannot be taken as the prime motivations behind sponsoring these bills. It is unlikely that MPs would engage in activities that seem like a clear waste of their time, as they know how unlikely it is that a draft bill proposed by them will actually be enacted as law. Other motivations therefore have to explain this at first site puzzling behavior. If the substantive regulatory considerations cannot be central, then situational and institutional effects might explain the behavior. Breaking down the data according to relevant subsamples in a tabular format did show clear diverging activity patterns in PMB sponsoring.

Secondly, PMBs are clearly not single member bills, but are as a rule sponsored by multiple MPs together. How many MPs and in what combination tend to sponsor bills together is however very different depending on their opposition or coalition status. The cooperation in sponsoring raises the question of the "partyness" of PMBs. The opposition or coalition status of the MP's party seems to be the strongest explanatory factor for diverging activity levels without controlling for anything else. Estonian data showed that a change in party status brings with it a clear change in the activity levels of the MPs. This is of course nothing new, it was to be expected that if a party loses the possibility to enact its program through government, then it will try to compensate for it through other methods, such as becoming more active in parliament. What is however interesting is that the way the bill is sponsored starts to differ between these two camps as well and what's more, it shows very diverging patterns for the two countries.

Estonian bills tend to be sponsored by a couple of MPs together, so at least formally there seems to be no party group wide support behind it. They are in essence clearly more individual MP than party bills. Opposition MPs however do not cooperate as widely with other parties in the opposition and also not so much with MPs from their own parties. The share of true single member bills is clearly bigger among pure opposition bills than it was for pure coalition bills. Coalition MPs on the other hand cooperate more, and importantly, seem to sponsor bills together with MPs from other parties and not only with their fellow party members. The fact that PMBs by coalition MPs seem to have consistently all or most of coalition partners represented among the sponsors suggests that this is part of the wider coalition agenda that they are enacting. It is also evidence that at least some of government bills might be handed out to MPs, as bills that had MPs from all coalition parties as sponsors tended to be sponsored by a select group of MPs. Although these might be hard working MPs, the representation of all coalition partners among the sponsors suggests their work is part of the wider coalition agenda.

The Finnish case however differs clearly. PMBs are cooperative efforts, but more so for small opposition parties. A comparatively bigger share of all the party group members is among the sponsors of these bills than in Estonia. Again, this is not unexpected. As party groups, unlike in Estonia, do not have the right to initiate legislation in Finland they do this through PMBs. These are therefore at least partly party bills. However, the fact that it is not the case for coalition MPs suggests a more nuanced picture. PMBs by coalition MPs in Finland are to a large degree endeavors by a few MPs only, so there is not even intra-party cooperation. There is no evidence that these PMBs are part of a wider legislative agenda of the coalition that the MPs simply enact on their own.

The picture is therefore a complete opposite for Estonia and Finland. In the former opposition MPs do not cooperate with others, but coalition MPs do and clearly try to include MPs from all coalition partners as sponsors. In the latter, opposition MPs are the ones cooperating with each others, whereas coalition

MPs tend to sponsor bills alone and there is no evidence that they proceed from a coalition agenda, at least when one looks at sponsors. The usage of PMBs is therefore clearly distinct and the generalization that PMBs are minor pieces of pseudolegislation imitated by small opposition parties does not sit so well.

A closer look a district patterns did not show that certain areas stand out, with MPs from particular district using this particular legislative instrument more than others. Especially in the Finnish case, where district sizes vary greatly and geographical distances are big, one could have expected more uniform patters. Neither bigger nor more remote districts however spur MPs to more PMB related actions. Though Arter showed that PMBs are used for constituency service as well in Finland (Arter 2011, 141–142), it does not seem that they are used by MPs from certain district more than others.

Looking at sponsoring and sponsoring frequency separately did bring out substantively important results, although the differences between the results of the binary logistic and negative binomial regression are not very big. The signs indicating the direction of the relationships are the same on all significant variables. Similarly, the non-significance of certain variables applies for both. The crucial difference is the role opposition or coalition status of the MP plays. Though it is the most frequently mentioned factor in studies on PMBs, it does not separate sponsors from non-sponsor in the current case. Every MP seems to be sponsoring PMBs regardless of the status. As this happens while controlling for country as well, the fact that Finnish MPs are hyperactive cannot explain why one still observes an effect. Opposition/coalition status does however play a substantial role in the amount of PMBs sponsored. So one can add a qualification to the above statement by saying that all MPs engage in PMB sponsoring, but opposition MPs do it more than others.

Theoretically most interesting part is however the effect of the personal vote index and its role when controlling for other factors. The results show clearly, that in addition to the fact that the personal vote can explain between country variance, an application on individual level data shows it can also explain country internal variance in MP behavior. It was theorized above that the incentives created by the system might not be observed if they work in a manner where MPs not being subject to rules most strongly favoring a personal vote nevertheless show very individualistic behavior so as to increase their personal vote in the future and increases their electoral independence. If the mandate type would have played a strong role and not the personal vote, then the incentive structure of the system would not have seemed as relevant in comparison to the actual performance of the MP in the district. The data suggests however that precisely incentives created by the system seem to matter in form of the personal vote index and not the mandate as such. One can therefore conclude that the more conducive the environment where the MP got elected is to a strong personal image, the more active this MP actually is in sponsoring PMBs while in parliament. Furthermore, it suggests that even the smallest variances created by the electoral system within countries translate into actual behavior differences of MPs once in parliament. It is however a very

nuanced picture. The bivariate and multivariate analysis suggests an intricate pattern. The effect of the personal vote on the likelihood of sponsoring a bill is positive but non-linear. Meaning personal vote increase to a certain level goes together with an increase in sponsoring likelihood, after which a small negative effect is observed, meaning further increase in the personal vote starts to reduce the likelihood of sponsoring. In case of sponsoring frequency however a linear effect is observed, meaning higher personal vote values lead to more PMBs being sponsored by the MP. So for the personal vote we have a non-linear effect on the sponsoring likelihood of a MP, but once this MP decides to sponsor a bill, there is a linear positive effect on the number of bills sponsored.

Why a curvilinear effect on the sponsoring decision and a linear effect on the frequency of sponsoring is observed is hard to explain. It is important to remember that this happens while keeping the other relevant factors constant.

One possible explanation could be a case of diminishing returns. Competition between candidates from two parties is theoretical not capped at some level, as a strong personal image can only work to the advantage of the party the candidate is running for. If the system however induces also intra-party competition, as it does in Estonia and Finland, then too much of individualistic and competitive behavior among the candidates might start to hurt the general party fortune. One can think of a situation where feuding candidates start to damage the overall image of a party list. This might also translate into a curvilinear effect in parliamentary behavior. If the institutional setting encourages individualistic behavior, such as sponsoring PMBs, then when a big share of MPs starts to use these on their own more damage than good can be inflicted on the party. This is supported by the fact that the likelihood of being a sponsor for MPs with the biggest personal vote is still higher than the one for MPs with the lowest level, meaning that the increase of sponsoring likelihood up to a certain level of the personal vote, does not decrease back to the lowest level at increasing values of the personal vote. Rein Taagepera suggested (in a personal communication) a coattail effect as another explanation for the curvilinear effect. Larger districts, which are correlated with a higher personal vote importance, increase the possibility that very successful candidates bring with themselves into parliament or artificially increase the voting tally of otherwise less successful candidates on that same list. This is especially so in the Estonia case. These less popular candidates might also be generally less active, or not striving for more electoral independence that a general high activity level might translate into while re-running for office. Instead riding on a future coattail might be a cheaper strategy for getting re-elected. Once an MP however is among the sponsors of a bill, he or she will do this in greater numbers as the personal vote value increases. So the theorized impact of the personal vote is clearly supported by empirical evidence, the actual pattern is however much more nuanced than expected.

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILLS

This chapter will take a look at four issues, two connected to the nature of the bills themselves and two at the subsequent treatment of the bills in the plenary. In the process it will present evidence that will help to evaluate if the notion of pseudolegislation forwarded above applies to the current cases. As the reading process in Estonia and Finland differs the analysis is separated for the two cases. The data for this and the subsequent chapter comes from coding of the bills and their reading process. The analysis in this chapter is largely on a bivariate level, a multivariate look at the data will be taken in the fifth chapter. The concept of the personal vote so heavily emphasized above will for a brief period take second stage as this chapter does not connect the sponsor and all the details of the bill yet. The current chapter will to a certain degree therefore also serve as a descriptive introduction to the next chapter, which will look at some of the same indicators in more detail and in a somewhat different manner. This does not mean that it will not present substantively relevant information in helping to understand the usage of this legislative instrument. On the contrary, examining who sponsors these bills is only one side of the coin, what these bills actually contain and what happens in the subsequent legislative process will provide a picture of the other side before the fifth chapter ties it all up and provides the last piece in a holistic picture of PMBs.

First a section will look at what issues PMBs actually deal with. It was argued that pseudolegislation should be sponsored on a limited set of topics only, as it does not make sense to spend much time on drafting bills dealing with a wide range of topics if the fact of sponsoring and not the actual aim of regulating is taking centre stage. In the same vein seasonality in sponsoring should be observable, with the range of topics becoming even narrower the closer elections are.

This will be followed by a section on the technical attributes of PMBs, which will examine in detail what do these bills actually look like and how sophisticated can one consider them to be. Again, simplicity and seasonality connected to this should tell us if the pseudolegislation label sticks. Simplicity does not necessarily mean bad quality and might simply be a result of lack of resources. It is hard to separate if the sponsoring of simple and short bills is caused by the latter or is a result of purposeful behavior. Simplicity as such will therefore have to be backed up by additional evidence that will allow a more informed interpretation of the data. This additional information used in the subsequent sections arose mostly through observations during the coding of the bills and the legislative process connected to them. The tabular and graphical presentation of the data will be interpreted together with this additional information that was not so easily quantifiable.

A third subsection takes a closer look at the treatment of the bills in the plenary. This will shows how intensive the debates are, who are the ones mostly scrutinizing or debating these bills and if some sort of seasonality is manifested

in all of this. It was theorized above that PMBs as an effort of personal credit claiming should spur other actors in parliament to be more critical or active in debates, so as not to allow for such behavior by political rivals. The treatment of these bills in the plenary, if the pseudolegislation notion holds, should therefore mirror this nature. These bills should be heavily debated and more so closer to elections. Lastly, the amending of PMBs will be considered in this section also. More specifically the questions of who, how much and in what way amends these bills will be answered. Only Estonian data is available for this last part.

The connections between the sponsor of the bill and its attributes and treatment in the plenary will be looked at in the next chapter.

4.1. Topics of PMBs and seasonality

Surprisingly, the substantive questions treated with PMBs have been the focus of very few studies on this piece of legislation. One can suspect three main reasons behind.

The first is probably the marginal success rates of these bills. Though whole books have been written on the fate of one single bill (e.g. Reid 1980), the few monographs on PMBs as a separate legislative instruments treat topics as a footnote in a few case studies to illustrate the legislative process (e.g. Marsh & Read 1988) or discuss a wider trend in topics through focusing on PMBs that have had some societal impact (Bromhead 1956). It is clear that dwelling on the topics of draft laws that as rule will not be passed and cannot subsequently have an impact in the "real world", does not make much sense in itself.

The second reason might be methodological. Producing an exhaustive scheme to classify the main topics of a draft laws is complicated. Not all bills can be neatly grouped under specific topics. The fact that a significant amount of bills in many European countries are assigned to more than one committee exemplifies this (Mattson & Strom 2004, 103).[37] This means the bills tend to deal with issues that fall under the competence of many committees simultaneously. Obviously, the lead committee will still be indicative of the topic of the bill, but in many cases additional committees have to give their opinion on it. All this does not mean that pinning down a topic is impossible. There are databases such as NATLEX[38] on labor and social security legislation sustained by the International Labour Organization. It has been used for example to analyze the legislative process of specific types of legislation (Becker & Saalfeld 2004), but also the substance of legislation by applying a comparative law perspective (Scholz & Trantas 1995). Applying a scheme close to the one used by NATLEX is however beyond the possibilities of this thesis. One could of course take a different approach and substitute the topic for the importance of

[37] Examining a random sample of bills on labor and social affairs Mattson and Strom found that only 11% of bills are assigned to one committee only in Finland (2004, 103).
[38] http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home

the bills, such as having a significant impact on societal processes, which would give a good indicator of what they are actually about. Evaluating this is however even harder (see Clinton & Lapinski 2006). The introduction of the thesis showed also that in a comparative perspective the PMBs that are eventually passed tend to deal with truly trivial matters, so this approach would most likely end with a rather short discussion.

The third reason for the lack of discussion on topics is that some studies treat PMBs not as substantive legislation, but an indicator for a phenomenon of more substantive interest. The electoral connection (e.g. Bowler 2010) or opposition coalition relationship and the effect of procedural rules (e.g. Marsh & Marsh 2002) might be the real issues studied and examining PMBs and the related processes simply a means to it.

The approach of this study is both an X- and Y-centric (Ganghof 2005, 77–78), looking both to evaluate the effect of specific variables, but also to explain the legislative processes connected to PMBs, a discussion of topics therefore has to be included. It will be short however due to the problems outlined above. The descriptive overview below will be used to identify key subject areas the PMBs deal with and the insight gained from this will be used in the next chapter to analyze if some of the variables used in the previous chapter can explain if and what kind of MPs tend to sponsor bills on certain topics.

Knowing the problems with this indicator I will still take the lead committee the bill was referred to as a proxy for the topic of the PMB. Even though the bills might be, and frequently are, deliberated by various standing committees, it is standard practice to assign one leading committee that is responsible for the bill. In fact picking this to indicate the topic of the bill provides probably for a more objective indicator than a self-devised classification scheme, as the ones deciding the committee referral have an intimate knowledge of what specialized bodies in the form of standing committees are competent in dealing with the given bill. Lastly, cultivating specialist knowledge is the very reason behind committees in legislatures in the first place (Mattson & Strom 1995, 253), so a lead committee of a bill is a good indicator of what knowledge was deemed necessary to deal with the topic treated by the PMB.

Table 17 examines the share of bills referred to different lead committees for the two legislative periods under study in Estonia.

Somewhat unexpectedly the committees the bills get assigned to differ between the two legislative periods. For 1999 to 2003 a lion's share of 74.4% of the bills were referred to four committees and more than a fifth of the total to the Social Affairs committee. For 2003 to 2007 almost a similar share went again to four committees, however a quarter specifically to the Constitutional Committee. The fact that the Cultural Affairs Committee stands out in dealing with a large amount of PMBs in the second legislative period is down to MPs being generally less active in sponsoring bills on other topics, the number of bills referred to it have stayed the same.

Table 17. Share of bills referred to lead committees, Estonia

Committee	Riigikogu 1999–2003, N (%)	Riigikogu 2003–2007, N (%)	Total N (%)
Environment Committee	5 (2.2)	2 (2.1)	7 (2.1)
Cultural Affairs Committee	17 (7.4)	17 (17.5)	34 (10.4)
Rural Affairs Committee	11 (4.8)	–	11 (3.4)
Economic Affairs Committee	37 (16.0)	7 (7.2)	44 (13.4)
Constitutional Committee	39 (16.9)	24 (24.7)	63 (19.2)
Finance Committee	43 (18.6)	18 (18.6)	61 (18.6)
Social Affairs Committee	53 (22.9)	16 (16.5)	69 (21.0)
Legal Affairs Committee	26 (11.3)	13 (13.4)	39 (11.9)
Total	231 (100.0)	97 (100.0)	328 (100.0)

The Social Affairs Committee is the lead committee on bills dealing with issues such as pensions, family benefits, and benefits for the disabled, unemployment insurance and labor protection, social welfare, child welfare, labor relations, health and safety issues and health and medical care.[39] The Finance Committee deals mainly with questions regarding the state budget, taxes, insurance and banking.[40] The Constitutional Committee leads on issues regarding the basic law, and institutions named in the basic law, such as the parliament, president, courts. It is also responsible for questions on public administration, citizenship, elections and referendums.[41] The Economic Affairs Committee is leading on matters of general economic policy, business and entrepreneurship, state loans, questions of ownership, transport and communication, intellectual property, consumer protection and tourism.[42] Finally, the Cultural Committee is the lead committee on questions on culture, education and science policy.[43]

Though some of the listed committees get a bigger share of PMBs referred to them, the differences are not very big. This means that PMBs deal with a variety of issues and and there is no one central topical focus. The fact that the Social Affairs Committee features high on the agenda was however expected, as questions on benefits are more susceptible for advertising than issues regarding public administration for example.

What is telling however is that PMBs are not really referred to two particular committees the Environmental and the Rural Affairs Committee. The first deals with issues of environmental policy and protection and usage of natural resources, the latter with rural affairs, agriculture and fishing. That environmental questions do

[39] http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=33392. *Accessed, January12, 2011.*
[40] http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=33382. *Accessed, January12, 2011.*
[41] http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=33383. *Accessed, January12, 2011.*
[42] http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=51694. *Accessed, January12, 2011.*
[43] http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=33385. *Accessed, January12, 2011.*

not feature high on the agenda of PMBs is understandable. The absence of PMBs on rural issues is however surprising. Considering that MPs have rural constituencies and that the level of development between rural and urban areas in Estonia is very unequal, it would seem like an area where MPs could score easy points by showing they care about these issues. A possible explanation is the underrepresentation of rural areas due to compensation mandate holders, who are elected based on nationwide lists, coming disproportionally from the two biggest cities of Tallinn and Tartu, as noted by Pettai (2005, 23).

The possible change in topics due to approaching elections can be evaluated based on Table 18. It shows the share of bills referred to committees for both legislative years combined and can be used to examine both the seasonality in sponsoring and in topics. There are subtle differences in topics between years. The share of bills referred to the Social Affairs and the Constitutional Committee does indeed increase in the final year before the election. Roughly 38% of all bills that get referred to these committees are handed in in the final year. Close to a third of all PMBs handed in in the final year are referred to the Social Affairs Committee, which does suggest a effect of upcoming elections, but then again it is not an overwhelming concentration and the share of PMBs referred to the three most popular committees stays roughly the same.

Table 18. Annual share of bills referred to lead committees, Estonia 1999–2007

	Year of legislative period, N (%)				
Committee	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	All PMBs
Environment Committee	–	4 (4.0)	1 (1.2)	2 (2.1)	7 (2.1)
Cultural Affairs Committee	3 (5.8)	12 (12.0)	14 (17.3)	5 (5.3)	34 (10.4)
Rural Affairs Committee	–	6 (6.0)	–	5 (5.3)	11 (3.4)
Economic Affairs Committee	3 (5.8)	18 (18.0)	10 (12.3)	13 (13.7)	44 (13.4)
Constitutional Committee	10 (19.2)	14 (14.0)	17 (21.0)	22 (23.3)	63 (19.2)
Finance Committee	15 (28.8)	18 (18.0)	17 (21.0)	11 (11.6)	61 (18.6)
Social Affairs Committee	13 (25.0)	13 (13.0)	15 (18.5)	28 (29.5)	69 (21.0)
Legal Affairs Committee	8 (15.4)	15 (15.0)	7 (8.6)	9 (9.5)	39 (11.9)
Total	52 (100.0)	100 (100.0)	81 (100.0)	95 (100.0)	328 (100.0)

The bottom row showing the annual totals does not indicate any clear seasonality effects in terms of overall sponsoring seasonality. After the expected low number of PMBs sponsored in the first year, the subsequent years do not show a

continuing climb as elections approach. So no clear aggregate pattern in seasonality in sponsorship is apparent. The last row is a combination of the trends in two separate electoral periods, which do differ somewhat. For 1999–2003 the last year does stand out with 14.3, 29.4, 21,6 and 34.6% of PMBs sponsored in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th year of the legislative period respectively. For 2003–2007 the same indicators are however 19.6, 33.0, 32.0 and 15.5% for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th year of the legislative period respectively.

Seasonality is also examined on the individual level in the next chapter. One can however say that the topics treated by PMBs in Estonia seem to be of a wide variety and there is not a very strong concentration on certain ones closer to elections. The assumption that the bills are being sponsored on a very limited range of topics overall and more so the closer to elections, is not really backed up by the data.

The breakdown of share of bills referred to specific committees in Finland is shown in Table 19. Three committees, the Grand Committee, Audit Committee and the Committee for the Future, have been left out of the table, as deliberating on bills is not their main function. The ultimate column shows the overall distribution.

The pattern differs significantly from the Estonian one. There is clear concentration on two specific committees with a total of 57.9% of PMBs being referred to the Finance Committee and the Social Affairs and Health Committee. All other committees handle less than 10% each of the total volume of PMBs. It might of course be that as the Finnish committee system is more elaborate, it has also more room for specialization. This means bills that on the face of it deal with same issues might be referred to one committee in Estonia, e.g. the Social Affairs Committee, but to a different committee in Finland, e.g. Employment and Equality Committee. However the fact that six out of ten PMBs get referred to these two committees indicates that Finnish PMBs are more targeted towards certain topics than Estonian ones.

More than one third of the Finnish PMBs are deliberated in the Social Affairs and Health Committee. This committee deals with questions on social benefits, social insurance, pensions and health care issues.[44] The second most popular committee, the Finance Committee, specializes in budgetary matters, taxation and finances.[45]

[44] http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament/committees/socialaffairs.htx, *Accessed March 10, 2011*

[45] http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament/committees/finance.htx*, Accessed March 10, 2011*

Table 19. Annual share of bills referred to lead committees, Finland 2003–2007

Committee	Year of legislative period, N (%)				All PMBs N(%)
	1st N(%)	2nd N(%)	3rd N(%)	4th N(%)	
Grand Committee	–	–	–	–	
Finance Committee	35 (21.1)	36 (23.7)	46 (28.8)	56 (30.3)	173 (26.1)
Foreign Affairs Committee	–	–	–	1 (.5)	1 (.2)
Education and Culture Committee	13 (7.8)	12 (7.9)	14 (8.8)	18 (9.7)	57 (8.6)
Constitutional Law Committee	8 (4.8)	5 (3.3)	5 (3.1)	3 (1.6)	21 (3.2)
Employment and Equality Committee	5 (3.0)	8 (5.3)	6 (3.8)	3 (1.6)	22 (3.3)
Administration Committee	12 (7.2)	8 (5.3)	12 (7.5)	7 (3.8)	39 (5.9)
Social Affairs and Health Committee	57 (34.4)	43 (28.3)	46 (28.8)	65 (35.1)	211 (31.8)
Environment Committee	1 (.6)	4 (2.6)	6 (3.8)	2 (1.1)	13 (2.0)
Legal Affairs Committee	16 (9.6)	19 (12.5)	12 (7.5)	12 (6.5)	59 (8.9)
Commerce Committee	7 (4.2)	9 (5.9)	1 (.6)	7 (3.8)	24 (3.6)
Committee for the Future	–	–	–	–	–
Agriculture and Forestry Committee	3 (1.8)	–	8 (5.0)	5 (2.7)	16 (2.4)
Defense Committee	–	1 (.7)	–	–	1 (.2)
Transport and Communications Committee	9 (5.4)	7 (4.6)	4 (2.5)	6 (3.2)	26 (3.9)
Total	166 (100.0)	152 (100.0)	160 (100.0)	185 (100.0)	663 (100.0)

Seasonality of sponsorship can be examined by looking at the last row in the table. It does show a small growth as elections approach, 27.9% of all bills are sponsored in the final year. In comparison to the one electoral period under study here, Wiberg's analysis of time series between 1945–2002 has shown much clearer seasonality of sponsorship for PMBs (2004,19). Some periods therefore might not show very strong effects, but overall seasonality of sponsoring is demonstrated by other sources in the Finnish case. There is also evidence for seasonality in the topics PMBs deal with. A bigger share of PMBs are referred to the two most popular committees in the final year before

elections than in any other period. Roughly one third of all the bills referred to these two committees are done so in the final legislative year. One can conclude that Finnish MPs do get more active in sponsoring when elections approach and they tend to sponsor bills dealing with social and financial affairs later on into the legislative period. This particular aspect is clearly distinct from the one in Estonia.

A closer look at Finnish PMBs brings out a curious detail. A significant number of them are not unique, meaning MPs tend to sponsor the same bills over and over again. Even more perplexing, substantively identical PMBs can be sponsored by different sponsors in relative short succession. For example, a bill amending a law on alcohol taxation was sponsored by MPs from three different party groups within a time space of 13 days in 2006 and the three bills were identical down to the last comma. That very bill has been sponsored with miniscule differences on seven occasions in total and MPs from four party groups have had their go at it (LA123/2003, LA115/2004, LA123/2005, LA137/2005, LA106/2006, LA115/2006, LA126/2006). Another example, amending one article in the VAT act has been tried with a very similar bill on eight occasions, three times out of which with identical bills.

Out of the 665 PMBs sponsored between 2003 and 2007 a total of 123 (18.5%) are identical to some other PMB. Besides this, there is also a list of bills that differ in the smallest of details. For example, two bills changing certain social benefits with the only difference between them being one setting the benefit rate at 19.18 and the other at 23.03 euros (LA11/2003 and LA62/2003). One can observe all kinds of sponsorship patterns for such bills, like the same group of MPs sponsoring the same bill in different years or different groups of MPs sponsoring the same bill in rapid succession or different groups of MPs sponsoring bills that amend the same law, but in slightly different ways.

Similar practice is going on in Estonia as well, but not to such a degree. Although the Estonian Social Democrats have even accused the Centre Party in public of "stealing bills that have been drafted by other party groups".[46] Out of the 328 PMBs in the Estonian dataset 16 (4.9%) are identical to some other bill in the dataset. Many others amend the same laws, but differ in the way they do this. So this practice of submitting the same bills repeatedly is not uncommon in Estonia either, the scope in Finland is however extraordinary.

Another interesting phenomenon in the Finnish case is PMBs that try to amend government bills that are being considered by parliament at that time. These are alternatives to government legislative proposals and are referred to as *rinnakkaislakialoite.* Technically these spell out the articles subject to change in the government bill, but list that all other parts should remain as stated in the government bill. This is an effort to present an alternative to government initiatives. Though referred to with another formal term, they are in essence also PMBs sponsored in a reactive manner, as an alternative to a government

[46] Eesti Päevaleht „Sotsid süüdistavad Keskerakonda eelnõude varastamises." June 6, 2007. http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/388206

proposal on the agenda at the given moment. This is one more piece of evidence suggesting that sponsoring is what matters with PMBs, not the need to regulate issues.

What to make of the habit of sponsoring large numbers of same bills again and again in the Finnish case? Two competing explanations for this kind of behavior can be forwarded.

If the same bills are sponsored over and over again by the same MPs, then this could indicate a substantive legislative program they have set themselves, but cannot fulfill it due to the way laws are passed i.e. the government simply dominates over the legislative branch. They are therefore trying to enact their program, even though knowing their efforts are fruitless.

If these similar laws are however sponsored by different groups of MPs, from different parties and what's more, frequently very close to each other, then identifying a legislative agenda behind it is questionable. It is more likely an example of agenda setting attempt by opposition forces through bringing a certain issue repeatedly to public attention. Whether this reflects a part of a larger opposition agenda is, however, questionable. The previous chapter showed that 95.7% of Finnish PMBs sponsored by opposition MPs have representatives of only one party among the sponsors, so why not sponsor the same bill together repeatedly? The simple fact that opposition MPs do not cooperate with MPs from other opposition parties makes clear that one cannot interpret these as separate attempts at enacting some sort of opposition program. It is more likely that different actors seize on the opportunity of dictating the agenda without actually cooperating on the topics that are the substance of these attempts. Although survey results have shown that MPs do cooperate across party lines in Finland and especially on local and regional issues (Jensen 2000, 231), the data here suggest that this does not apply to PMBs, as one should otherwise see a bill on a topic being sponsored together and not the same bill being sponsored on repeated occasions by MPs from different party groups only. The topics and the way the same bills change hands points towards what one would expect a piece of pseudolegislation to be like. Certain bills seem simply to be seized upon at the appropriate moment and initiated under their own name by various actors. Especially the fact that similar bills are sponsored by different parties in close proximity to each other suggests a bandwagoning effect with certain topics. One would have to examine the circumstances around the initiation of these bills more closely to establish if these PMBs were sponsored in reaction to some events making headlines in the media at that time or a controversial issue that was deliberated in parliament in the same period.

Estonian stands in marked contrast here. No clear apparent seasonality, no focusing on very narrow segment of topics and less sponsoring of identical bills over and over again suggest that the PMBs fulfill a different purpose and labeling them pseudolegislation might be out of place. Especially the coverage of a comparatively wide topic area suggests PMBs are used like other legislative instruments.

4.2. Technical nature of PMBs

The studies cited in the introduction mention frequently that PMBs are technically simple and tend to be amendment laws. Table 20 reports the share of full text and amendment laws for Estonia and Finland comparatively.

Table 20. PMB type in Estonia and Finland

Type	Estonia 1999–2007, N (%)	Finland 2003–2007, N (%)
Law	22 (6.7)	36 (5.4)
Amendment law	306 (93.3)	629 (94.6)
Total	328 (100.0)	665 (100.0)

Very few of these bills are full text law drafts, with an overwhelming majority amending other legal acts. For example, for the 2003 to 2007 period in Estonia only one out of the 97 sponsored PMBs was a full text law. This was a bill on widening the breath of the Estonian territorial sea to 12 nautical miles in order to hinder the construction of the North Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Germany. The bill was four articles and 60 words long. Out of the total law production between 1999–2007 amendment laws made up 78.7% (excluding laws on the state budget and international treaties) (Riigikogu X koosseis 2007, 121). Though I lack data on how much of all proposed bills, including government bills, were amendment laws, one can assume that the proportions are reasonably similar to passed bills. This means the share of amendment laws among PMBs in comparison to bills sponsored by other actors is bigger. Full text laws are more complicated legal documents than amendment laws, with the latter frequently simply changing or adding a few articles of laws already in force. Paradoxically it makes sense that more complicated pieces of legislation are proposed by the executive, as it can draw back on a bigger pool of expertise in the form of ministerial bureaucracies. The legislatures do not have so ample resources and have to stick to more simple matters in the legislative process.

The technicality of the bills can be evaluated by looking at the length of the bill, its structure, and how many legal acts it amends in case of an amendment bill. Table 21 gives an overview of these indicators.

The average length of 413 words for Estonian PMBs corresponds roughly to half a page of single spaced text. In that sense the bills tend to be short. The second quartile shows the median to be at 109 words and the third quartile tells us that 75% of them are only up to 250 words in length. The overwhelming majority of Estonian PMBs are therefore not longer than a single short section of text. Besides the length, the structure of the bills shown by the number of articles might also be informative. One has to bear in mind however that this is a somewhat problematic indicator for amendment laws, as these tend to have a different structure than full text laws. The former contain long references to technical designations of legal texts and might list an array of articles and sections were

frequently only one word is substituted for another. While this makes then incomprehensible to laymen and raises the question of language used in legal texts (see Barnes 2006), it might also compromise this indicator. The amendment law might simply list the changes it makes in one section without the need to structure the text itself with articles. The number of articles has been used in multivariate analysis as a measure of bill length (Becker & Saalfeld 2004, 67), because of the problems with amendment laws I will however use length in words as an indicator in the multivariate analysis in the next chapter and stick to simple descriptive statistics of the number of articles here.

Table 21. Technical characteristics of PMBs

				Quartile limits			
Characteristics	M (SD)	min	max	Q_1	Q_2	Q_3	N
Lenght in words							
Estonia	413.67 (1143.94)	16	10420	62	109	251	327
Finland	177.94 (249.37)	26	4481	86	114	177	663
No. of articles in bill							
Estonia	5.23 (14.01)	0	159	1	2	3	327
Finland	.44 (2.38)	0	41	0	0	0	663
No. of laws amended by bill							
Estonia	1.25(1.21)	1	18	1	1	1	307
Finland	1.15 (.84)	1	11	1	1	1	631

In total 21.7% of Estonian PMBs have no articles at all in their structure, 12.8% are one-article laws, 32.7% contain two and 11.6% three articles. They amend on average 1.25 legislative acts, but the median is one amended law as shown by the 2nd quartile limit. In fact, 86.6% of the amendment laws amend one legal act only, 10.4% two legal acts and the remaining 2.9% up to 18 different acts.

A comparison with the Finnish PMBs in the table shows them to be technically simpler than Estonian ones. The trouble with comparing the arithmetic means is its sensitivity to extreme values. One can see from the standard deviations that the spread in the data is big for all the indicators. The median shown by the second quartile limit is a less sensitive measure of central tendency for bill length and seems to suggest that Finnish bills are in fact longer. This is however not really the case as the 5% trimmed mean for Estonia is 211.37 words, whereas it is 143.22 words for Finland. Without 5% of extremely long and 5% of extremely short bills, the Finnish PMBs are still on average shorter. The third quartile limit shows that 75% of them are 177 and 90% are in fact only up to 310 words in length. An overwhelming share of 91.9% are not structured formally with articles themselves, 0.9% have one and 3.2% two articles in the text. In comparison, the average number of articles in the 17 851

passed legal acts for the period of 1945–2002 in Finland is 5.99 and 42.1% of them are one- and 32.7% two-article laws (Wiberg 2004, 52–53). Finnish PMBs amend on average 1.15 legal acts with the median of one act, 93.3% amend one act only, 3.8% two acts and the remaining 2.9% up to 11.

In sum one can say that PMBs are indeed short and technically simple. As rule they are not new legal texts, but amend existing ones and mostly single acts only. Though there are some very extensive legal texts among the sample of PMBs in the current dataset, a great majority of them are no more than a section in length. This is partly down to them being amendment laws, which tend to be much shorter than full text laws anyhow. Nevertheless, a great majority are not more than one or two section long which means they are indeed quite simple draft laws. Analysis that goes further by examining if different sponsors initiate more simplistic bills than others will be undertaken in the next chapter, but the generally very short nature of the PMBs in the dataset confirms what is already discussed in the literature, PMBs are indeed technically simple.

It was hypothesized that if MPs start to sponsor these bills in greater numbers closer to elections, then this might have also implications for the technical attributes of the bills. As the time at their disposal is limited, sponsoring more bills should come at the consequence to their sophistication and quality. In the vein of pseudolegislation one should as a result observe seasonality in the technical nature of the bills with simplicity increasing together with closeness to elections. In the Finnish case sponsorship seasonality was apparent, less so in the Estonia case however, which might also mean no differences in technical characteristics will be observed in the latter case. Figure 7 graphs the distance to elections in days against bill length in words for Estonia (7A) and Finland (7B). The Estonian case does not show very clear effects, some very long bills sponsored earlier on in the legislative period convey a general impression of bills getting shorter the closer to elections, but this is somewhat deceiving. There is actually a slight upward trend closer to elections if one focuses only on bills shorter than 2000 words. Also, a simple linear regression of distance to elections (x) on length (y) with all of the bills gives the following equation $y=510.26 -.13x$, meaning the bigger the distance to elections the shorter the bill. The coefficient is however not statistically significant. A similar trend is apparent for Finland, the graph suggests a small increase in length as elections approach, a simple linear regression of distance to elections (x) on length (y) gives the equation $y=209.99 –.43x$, the relationship is however again too weak for the coefficient to have statistical significance.



Figure 7. Bill length in words and distance to elections, Estonia (A) and Finland (B)

Table 22 breaks the period down into four legislative year and compares the geometric means of bill length in words for all the bills sponsored in that specific year. As this measure is not so sensitive to extreme values the impact of some very long bills will be reduced.

Table 22. Length of PMBs by year of legislative period (geometric means)

	Year					
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total	N
Estonia	117.26	163.56	133.82	156.01	145.74	327
Finland	118.54	126.82	143.63	132.44	130.06	663

Though nothing uniform is apparent from the means comparison, these numbers also suggest that bills sponsored closest to elections are comparatively longer than on average and than bills sponsored really early on in the legislative period. The next chapter will include the seasonality in multivariate models as well, so we can say more definitively if controlling for other factors will still show no apparent effects of seasonality on the technical nature of bills. So far the evidence actually points towards no effect. MPs might sponsor more PMBs closer to elections, as they clearly do in Finland, but these do not become technically simpler because of this.

4.3. Treatment in the plenary

This section will take a thorough look at the fate of PMBs in the legislative process. It will give an overview of the debate length and intensity connected to PMBs, but also show which actors are more active in debating these bills. In addition it will examine if seasonality is apparent in the way PMBs are debated.

The legislative process between the two countries differs somewhat. In Estonia, after initiating, the bill is first referred to the leading committee for deliberation by the board of the Riigikogu. Which committee the bill gets referred to is in practice decided by the civil servants working for the board (Adams 2002, 38). The committee then debates the bill, forms a decision and submits it to the plenary for the first reading. The bill's fate can be sealed at that stage already as the lead committee can recommend the dismissal of the bill during the first reading. This is a quite frequent case as will be demonstrated below. If the bills survives the first reading it will go back to the committee and the relevant actors can propose motions amending the bill to the committee. The committee forms its opinion on the motions and submits the bill to the plenary for the second reading, where the amendments are discussed and might be voted on separately if a MP requests it. If the second reading is not suspended, the bill is sent to the third reading. In case of suspensions it will go back to the committee, where amending motions can be submitted after which it will go the third and final reading. The debates itself are separated into two parts. First a report is presented on the bill, usually by the sponsor, this might be followed by a co-report by a committee representative or someone else designated as co-rapporteur on the specific question. MPs have the possibility to pose questions on the bill and the subject to the rapporteurs. After that a general debate can be opened where MPs have the possibility to hold short speeches on the issue.

In Finland the bill will go to an introductory reading in the plenary first. After this it is referred to a committee based on a proposal of the speaker's council. The committee submits it to the plenary for the first reading. At this stage the MPs can propose amendments to the bill and these might be voted on. In comparison to Estonia it is however rare that amendments or in fact the bill itself gets voted on. After the first reading the bill proceeds to the second reading which will end with the acceptance or rejection of it. Such formal separation between questioning and holding speeches as in Estonia does not apply for Finland.

A crucial difference between the Estonian and Finnish PMBs is the way they are dismissed. Where as it is very common for Estonian PMBs to be rejected by a formal vote either during the first or second reading, the Finnish PMBs are simply dismissed without a vote or a substantial amount are simply left stuck in the legislative process and lapse with the end of the electoral period. A whole 60.2% of the 665 Finnish PMBs in the sample here ended up being stuck and lapsing. A comparatively small share of 35.0% were formally rejected and .3% withdrawn. Only 4.6% were either merged with another bill and passed or passed on their own. In Estonia only 20.7% of the bills in the dataset lapsed because of the end of the legislative period.

4.3.1. Debate in Estonia

The way PMBs are treated can be evaluated by examining the reading process and the debates in detail. Out of the 328 PMBs for 1999–2007 some 20% are actually withdrawn before, or not submitted for the first reading by the committee. A PMB is usually rejected during the first reading, relatively few make it into the second reading or third reading and are then dismissed. The subsequent data is therefore relevant only for bills that progressed to the first reading and beyond. The total number of questions asked and speeches held by opposition and coalition MPs separately was counted for each bill in each reading separately. The results are presented in Table 23. These frequencies can also be used to evaluate the length and intensity of the debate on the bill. One could of course be even more precise and record the length of the speeches or questions (e.g. Lehnen 1967, 506–509), but the frequencies should be sufficient proxies showing how much in general and which PMBs in particular get the attention of other MPs in the plenary. In addition, the length of the speeches and questions has an upper time limit imposed by the rules of procedure, so this indicator would have a artificially limited range in Estonia.

Table 23. Questions and speeches in plenary debates on PMBs, Estonia 1999–2007

				Quartile limits			
	M (SD)	min	max	Q_1	Q_2	Q_3	N
1st reading							
Speeches held							
opp. MPs	2.02 (2.20)	0	15	1.0	1.0	2.5	57
coal. MPs	.81 (1.06)	0	4	0.0	1.0	1.0	57
Questions asked							
opp. MPs	5.16 (7.26)	0	64	0.0	2.0	7.0	260
coal. MPs	2.27 (3.92)	0	30	0.0	1.0	3.0	260
2nd reading							
Speeches held							
opp. MPs	3.85 (4.30)	0	21	1.0	2.0	5.0	74
coal. MPs	1.85 (2.70)	0	12	0.0	1.0	2.0	74
Questions asked							
opp. MPs	6.16 (10.96)	0	65	0.0	2.0	7.0	153
coal. MPs	1.78 (3.57)	0	23	0.0	0.0	2.0	153
3rd reading							
Speeches held							
opp. MPs	1.72 (1.32)	0	6	1.0	2.0	2.0	18
coal. MPs	.94 (1.06)	0	3	0.0	1.0	2.0	18
Questions asked							
opp. MPs	2.83 (4.67)	0	1	0.0	1.0	5.2	6
coal. MPs	.17 (.41)	0	12	0.0	0.0	0.2	6

The debate in the first reading is optional, meaning it might not happen if the MPs do not have any wish to speak. Strangely for politicians this does happen a lot, on 76.7% of occasions there is no debate in the first reading for PMBs. And when there is one, then opposition MPs are the ones doing the debating and questioning. On 50% of the occasions coalition MPs do not engage in the debate at all, the same holds for opposition MPs on 9% of occasions only. Similar proportions hold for questioning.

A debate in the second reading is a more frequent thing and happens with 47.1% of the bills that make it thus far. The same pattern of very active opposition MPs and rather passive coalition MPs repeats itself through the second and third reading in a similar fashion with a debate opened on 44% of occasions.

First thing to notice is that the debate intensity tends to be low, especially in the first and third reading.[47] The mean and quartile limits show that for a great majority of bills no more than two speeches per bill and roughly ten questions are asked. The second reading, where most of the amendments tend to be discussed, is the stage where the bills receive most of the attention.

Secondly, there is a huge difference between the activity levels of opposition and coalition MPs, with the former being many times more active. The maximum values show however than some bills undergo especially lengthy debates. As very few bills make it to the third reading the measures of central tendencies are reported for the sake of consistency, but should not be substantively interpreted.

The picture emerging from debates is therefore mixed, whereas on average PMBs do not receive much attention, some are debated quite intensively and more frequently by opposition MPs. Together with the fact that PMBs are mostly sponsored by opposition MPs one can conclude that PMBs are strictly opposition activities, by the opposition for the opposition.

Turning to seasonality reveals an interesting pattern. The third reading will not be analyzed as closely using graphical methods as only 18 bills progressed so far. Figure 8 graphs the total number of speeches held in a debate on a bill (y-axis) against the distance to elections from the bills registration date (x-axis). The number of speeches held in the first reading (8A) does not show any trend, regardless of the distance to elections debate intensity is constant. For the second reading however (8B) there is a clear decreasing of debate intensity as elections come closer. This is a complete opposite of the expected direction in the trend.

[47] Part of the debate length can be explained by the technical nature of the bill. It is reasonable to assume that more elaborate bills receive more attention in the plenary as there are simply more facets to discuss. This is indeed so, bill length correlates with the number of questions asked in debate for both the first (Pearson r=.148, p<.05) and second reading (Pearson r=.362, p<.01), but the correlations are not big. The number of speeches held in debates however does not show any correlation.



Figure 8. Speeches in 1st (A) and 2nd reading (B) and distance to elections, Estonia

Comparing this with the number of questions asked in debates on the bills shows a similar aggregate pattern (Figure 9). As elections come closer the questioning intensity goes down in the first (9A) as well as in the second reading (9B).



Figure 9. Questions in 1st (A) and 2nd reading (B) and distance to elections, Estonia

One obvious conclusion would be that contrary to the assumed, debates in the plenary are unaffected by electioneering or even more, the intra-parliamentary arena is not used for these purposes and other activities start to take away the limited time of MPs so overall debate intensity goes down. If the unexpected aggregate trends are however hiding actually very different trends can be evaluated based on Table 24, which breaks the speeches and questions down to whether they come from opposition or coalition MPs. It seems that opposition MPs become more active in plenary debates as elections come closer, but the

complete opposite happens with coalition MPs. The pattern seems to hold for all the readings. It is however somewhat deceiving as for some years the big standard deviations tell of a big spread in the data, with some bills being much more heavily debated than others. Appendix B lists the same indicators as scatterplots (Figure I – IV). Looking at the graphs shows that although some bills get really heavily scrutinized in debates by opposition MPs closer to election, an overall trend without the heavily debated bills suggests a slight downwards trend, as elections come closer. Although the trend is weak and none of the correlations computed on the same data game out significant. So comparing table 24 and figures I to IV in Appendix B suggests that some bills do get a more intensive debate the closer the elections, but for a majority it actually seems to be the other way around, with both opposition and coalition MPs becoming less active in PMB debates as elections come closer. The nature of debates therefore does change somewhat depending on the season, with opposition MPs becoming more active in debating a handful of bills, but showing decreasing activity levels otherwise. For coalition MPs however there is a uniform decline in debating activity the closer the elections. There is therefore seasonality in debates as well, but it is nuanced and it differs depending on the actor.

Table 24. Mean debate lenght and standard deviations by year of legislative period, Estonia 1999–2007

	Year, M (SD)					
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total	N
1st reading						
Speeches held						
opp. MPs	2.29 (1.25)	1.29 (.91)	2.00 (1.51)	2.45 (3.30)	2.02 (2.21)	57
coal. MPs	1.86 (1.46)	.57 (.65)	.62 (.72)	.75 (1.21)	.81 (1.06)	57
Questions asked						
opp. MPs	4.05 (5.44)	4.49 (6.35)	5.92 (7.34)	5.96 (8.99)	5.16 (7.26)	260
coal. MPs	3.50 (5.66)	2.03 (3.77)	2.32 (3.64)	1.84 (3.06)	2.27 (3.92)	260
2nd reading						
Speeches held						
opp. MPs	3.56 (2.39)	3.09 (2.93)	4.28 (4.80)	4.61 (6.26)	3.85 (4.30)	74
coal. MPs	2.50 (3.52)	1.32 (1.81)	2.39 (3.47)	1.39 (1.69)	1.85 (2.69)	74
Questions asked						
opp. MPs	5.62 (7.38)	6.16 (12.66)	6.00 (10.40)	6.90 (11.10)	6.16 (10.96)	57
coal. MPs	1.62 (4.44)	1.97 (3.15)	1.85 (3.24)	1.45 (3.94)	1.78 (3.57)	57
3rd reading						
Speeches held						
opp. MPs	1.40 (.89)	1.00 (.00)	1.67 (1.03)	2.75 (2.22)	1.72 (1.32)	18
coal. MPs	.80 (.84)	–	1.50 (1.23)	1.00 (1.16)	.94 (1.06)	18

The possibility that decreasing debate intensity might be down to the MPs' attention turning to arenas outside of parliament can be indirectly inferred from roll call data. Each vote on a given bill was recorded and the data contains also information whether MPs were absent from the plenary at the time of the vote.[48] I have broken this data down according to whether the voting MP had opposition or coalition status at the time of the vote. Correlating the share of absent opposition and absent coalition MPs during a final vote on a bill (meaning it could be either a vote dismissing the bill earlier on in the reading process or a vote at the end of the process to pass or dismiss the bill) with the distance to elections gives a significant positive correlation for coalition MPs (Pearson's r=.214, $p\leq$.05) and a negative correlation for opposition MPs (Pearson's r=-.267, $p\leq$.01) for a total of 139 roll call votes on PMBs. This means that as distance to elections decreases, the share of absent coalition MPs decreases also, but the share of absent opposition MPs increases. Opposition MPs are therefore physically not present in parliament the closer elections are, at least for votes on PMBs that they themselves sponsor in greater numbers. I have not recorder the actual presence of MPs in debates on PMBs, but if the presence in roll call votes is anything to go by, then the increase of debate intensity by opposition MPs shown in table 24 was caused by some PMBs being clearly more heavily debated, while others in general less intensively (see Appendix B, Figures IB to IVB). This means that relatively few opposition MPs are responsible for these some very intensive debates close to elections. It is almost as if a share of opposition MPs will start to neglect parliamentary business as elections come closer, but another share becomes somewhat more active in it.

For coalition MPs however closeness to elections means more disciplined attending of roll call votes in connection to PMBs as well. It might be that it is down to the government not wanting to be caught off guard by not having the sufficient majorities together for crucial votes close to elections and MPs cannot for this reason take care of election business outside of parliament as opposition MPs seem to do. This discussion is already somewhat removed from PMBs, but it shows how sophisticated seasonality patterns in parliamentary behavior emerge if one looks at the process in detail. Obviously these patterns are not observable to the general public and one can be certain that the floating voter has any clue about them or that the MPs somehow inform their potential voters about their own behavioral trends. This does not mean that there is no electoral connection however. These patterns are caused either by simply a four year working cycle or a four year working cycle punctuated by an election. The latter explanation is much more likely to be correct, although it is hard to disentangle the effect of simple cyclical work from the effect of a significant event coming at the end of each cycle. I think there can be no doubt that elections are a major factor in producing these distinct seasonality patterns simply by rearranging the

[48] Each vote on a PMB contained the following options: voted for, voted against, voted neutral, was present but did not vote, was absent. Each of these was recorded separately for opposition and coalition MPs.

priorities of MPs as this crucial event nears. The electoral connection in seasonality is therefore not down to MPs changing their behavior to make voters knowledgeable of this change, but because elections affect what actions are assigned priorities over other ones by MPs.

4.3.2. Debate in Finland

As explained above, bills in Finland proceed to the plenary for an introductory debate before being referred to the committee for further deliberation before the first reading. Similarly to the Estonian case a debate does not necessarily have to take place if the MPs feel no need to speak. No introductory debate happened in case of 45 (6.8%) bills. Table 25 gives an overview of the length of the reading process. Contrary to the Estonian case there is no strict separation between speeches and questions to the rapporteur in the plenary readings, so all statements made by MPs were be counted as speeches.

Table 25. Speeches in plenary debates on PMBs, Finland 2003–2007

				Quartile limits			
	M (SD)	min	max	Q_1	Q_2	Q_3	N
Intro reading							
Speeches held							
opp. MPs	6.21 (9.70)	0	62	1.0	3.0	7.0	618
coal. MPs	2.78 (3.87)	0	24	0.0	1.0	4.0	618
1st reading							
Speeches held							
opp. MPs	23.40 (20.94)	0	143	10.0	18.0	34.0	253
coal. MPs	8.71 (10.53)	0	57	2.0	5.0	11.5	253
2nd reading							
Speeches held							
opp. MPs	9.83 (8.83)	0	50	2.0	9.0	16.0	190
coal. MPs	4.11 (4.59)	0	24	1.0	3.0	6.0	190

As mentioned above, some Finnish PMBs are in essence amending motions for government bills being currently deliberated in parliament. These PMBs are treated together with the government bill, meaning there are joint debates and reports on formally separate bills. Some of the debates the following statistics describe are therefore partly on government bills as well. There is no formal way to separate how much did a certain debate focus on the government bill at the expense of the PMB, but the fact that such occasions are relatively rare in comparison to the overall volume of PMBs will ensure that the statistics can be trusted.[49]

[49] Unlike in Estonia, bill length and debate intensity is not statistically significantly correlated.

Coalition MPs do not hold any speeches in 32.4% of introductory debates and when they do, then in relatively small volumes. Opposition MPs on the other hand, refrained from speaking in 8.1% of occasions only and tend to talk lot, more than twice the average of coalition MPs. Debate length of a bill is therefore determined by the opposition. In total 265 PMBs out of the 665 in the dataset had a first reading and a debate was opened on 95.1% of the occasions, meaning comparatively fewer bills are waved through the first reading without any debate whatsoever in Finland than in Estonia. Coalition MPs are somewhat more active in the first reading, but on 13.4% of the occasions still do not engage in any debate. The table shows however that the first debate is overwhelmingly dominated by opposition MPs with a mean of 23.4 speeches per bill. The quartile limits show that this is not only down to a few bills being debated extensively, but a majority of bills being debated at length. All the bills that had a first reading have also a second one but a debate was opened in 71.7% of these. One can see that the second readings tend to be much shorter than the first ones. Coalition MPs did not engage in debating in 23.2 % of the time whereas opposition MPs did so on only 2.6% of occasions.

The overall debate seasonality can be examined with Figure 10, which graphs the number of speeches held in a debate on a specific bill (y-axis) against the distance to elections from the bill's registration date (x-axis) for the intro, first and second reading. There is a somewhat clearer decrease in debate intensity in Finland than in Estonia. This is surprising and one cannot attribute it to some sort of national idiosyncrasy, as a similar pattern is apparent in both countries. If debates would have been used for election purposes or to scupper individual credit claiming efforts in the form of PMBs, they should in theory have become more intensive closer to elections. As the reverse is true for both countries for overall debate intensity, one can only conclude that the attention of MPs moves away from intra-parliamentary business the closer elections are.

Table 26 shows that opposition MPs tend to become more active in debates as elections approach. Though the same applies for coalition MPs in the second reading, overall they seem to become slightly less active in debates as elections approach. The data is presented as scatterplots in Appendix B, Figures V–VII. These suggest the same as means comparisons. A slight decreasing debating intensity trend for coalition MPs in the first reading is clear (Figure VA), although it is weak as shown by the Persons' r=.088, $p\leq$.05. The same holds for speeches by coalition MPs in the second reading (Figure VIIA), no real trend is apparent for the first reading though (Figure VIA). For the opposition the scatterplots suggests a weaker trend (Figure VIIB) than the means comparisons for the second reading does, but the same emerges for the introductory and first reading looking at the table and the graphs together.



Figure 10. Speeches in intro (A), 1st (B) and 2nd reading (C) and distance to elections, Finland

Table 26. Mean debate lenght and standard deviations by year of legislative period, Finland 2003–2007

	Year, M (SD)					
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total	N
Intro reading						
Speeches held						
opp. MPs	5.32 (7.01)	4.13 (5.97)	7.82 (8.36)	7.30 (13.96)	6.21 (9.70)	618
coal. MPs	3.35 (3.90)	2.46 (3.81)	3.04 (4.60)	2.30 (3.08)	2.78 (3.87)	618
1st reading						
Speeches held						
opp. MPs	23.38 (26.57)	22.83 (18.37)	23.39 (17.42)	24.42 (15.55)	23.40 (20.94)	253
coal. MPs	9.09 (9.84)	8.83 (10.42)	8.33 (10.71)	8.26 (12.23)	8.71 (10.53)	253
2nd reading						
Speeches held						
opp. MPs	8.34 (7.36)	9.92 (10.75)	8.41 (8.12)	14.93 (7.31)	9.83 (8.83)	190
coal. MPs	4.07 (4.31)	4.65 (6.15)	3.51 (4.06)	4.27 (2.43)	4.11 (4.59)	190

As voting on PMBs in Finland is not systematic a similar analysis of roll call data like in the Estonian case to establish if the diverging behavior by opposi-

tion or coalition MPs can be explained by their absense or prensence cannot be undertaken.

4.3.3. Amending PMBs in Estonia

This section will take look at by whom and how are PMBs amended. Data on amendments is only available for the Estonian case.

As already mentioned above, motions amending the bill can be submitted after the first, but also after the second reading. The latter is a rare occasion however and only in four cases were amendments submitted after the second reading. I will therefore focus on what happens between the first and second reading only. Table 27 reports the average of sponsored amending motions and successful motions per bill, broken down according to the sponsor of the amendment.

Table 27. PMB amending motions, Estonia 1999–2007

				Quartile limits			
	M (SD)	min	max	Q_1	Q_2	Q_3	N
Amending motions by:							
committee	5.97 (13.50)	0	113	.0	1.0	5.0	151
coal. party group	.07 (.39)	0	3	.0	.0	.0	151
opp. party group	.88 (3.08)	0	26	.0	.0	.0	151
coal. MPs	1.14 (3.81)	0	32	.0	.0	1.0	151
opp. MPs	1.72 (4.98)	0	32	.0	.0	1.0	151
mix. MPs	.29 (2.63)	0	31	.0	.0	.0	151
Total	10.31 (20.12)	0	147	1.0	2.0	8.0	151
Successful amending motions by:							
committee	6.26 (13.64)	0	110	.0	2.0	5.0	141
coal. party group	.05 (.26)	0	2	.0	.0	.0	113
opp. party group	.12 (.42)	0	3	.0	.0	.0	119
coal. MPs	.75 (2.62)	0	24	.0	.0	.0	121
opp. MPs	.49 (1.36)	0	8	.0	.0	.0	117
mix. MPs	.29 (1.98)	0	15	.0	.0	.0	
Total	7.33 (15.11)	0	128	1.0	2.0	6.25	146

On average 10.3 amending motions are submitted per PMB and as one can see these tend to come mostly from committees. Besides this, MPs themselves tend to sponsor more than one amending motion on average. From all the bills that made it past the first reading only 19.2% did not receive any amending motions. As Q_2 shows the median is two motions per bill and 75% received up to eight such motions. The differences between bills are however big as shown by the standard deviations. All in all, roughly 16% received more than 20 amending motions and a couple even up to or more than a 100. Besides the sponsors listed in the table, the government has also the possibility to submit amending

motions, but it did so in one case only, submitting four motions to the same bill. The committees are clearly the most active ones submitting on average almost six motions to each bill, 70% of all the bills received at least one motion from the committees. Opposition MPs submit at least one motion for 29% and coalition MPs for 26% of the bills. Party groups on their own and coalition and opposition MPs in cooperation submit amending motions rarely. The success of the different actors in amending PMBs is reflects the frequency with which they sponsor these in the first place. As a rule of thumb committees amend these bills and the amendments get the nod of approval from the assembly. The reason behind this is clear, committees are collective actors responsible for the substance and quality of the drafts referred to them. It is therefore also clear that they have a more collective outlook that translates into more substantive legislative work. If a bill is badly drafted or does not consider the policy implications thoroughly enough, then it is the responsibility of the committee to mend these problems.

In total 1557 amending motions were submitted for the 151 bills that progressed to stages where amending is possible, which means 10.3 amendments per bill. Accepted were 1070 amendments, so roughly 70% of the changes proposed to PMBs will be accepted, which means seven amendments per bill were approved. One has to keep in mind of course that these 151 bills were not all approved, quite a few were left hanging somewhere in the reading process and lapsed or were rejected later in the process. It does show however that the bills get heavily amended.

The longer the bills are the more heavily they are amended, length correlates highly with number of amending motions submitted (Pearson r=.687, p<.01) and can explain roughly 46% of total variance in frequency of amendments. The success rates of different actors in amending the bills can already be assumed from the table above. The precise figures show that 98% of amending motions by committees get accepted, opposition MPs have success rate of 22%, coalition MPs 53%, opposition party groups 11% and coalition party groups 60%, the motions submitted by coalition and opposition MPs in cooperation succeed in 75% of the cases. The four amending motions to a bill submitted by the government were all accepted, so technically its success rate is 100%.

It is hard to quantify the substance of these amending motions. One can however say that comparing the original text of the bill with the last version, if it progressed to the second reading, shows that the bills become lengthier. For example, the average length of the relevant subpopulation of PMBs was 653 words before and 817 words after, the median changed from 137 to 181 words. So on average the bills are lengthened by 164 words. The histogram in Figure 11 below gives the actual distribution of the change in length. It is clear that the trend is strongly towards lengthening the bills. Though it might not seem like radically changes in length, one has to keep in mind the average length of these bills in the first place, so they are on average considerably lengthened, they are made on average a full 78% longer.

In fact, breaking the bills that made it to the second reading down to whether they were eventually passed or not, shows that successful bills were on average lengthened by 185.9 words in comparison to the lengthening of 37.5 words for unsuccessful bills. This suggest that even PMBs that have higher success chances to begin with, are still in need of extensive "repairs" and will be mostly rewritten by committees.



Figure 11. Histogram of change in PMB length in words (last version – original version)

One can therefore conclude that the bills do need a lot of "repairing". They are heavily amended and as rule by standing committees and become lengthier in the process, which is an indication that the technical quality of the bills might have been poor.

The aggregate seasonality in the amending process can be examined with the help of Figure 12. Again, one would expect them to be in need of more amending the closer to elections these bills are sponsored, if indeed submitting bills for reelection purposes comes at the expense of technical quality. The figure suggests this is not the case by comparing sponsored and accepted amendments with the distance to elections from the bill's date of registration. Neither more amendments are sponsored closer to elections nor more amendments accepted.



Figure 12. Sponsored (A) and accepted amendments (B) to the bill in the 2nd reading and distance to elections in Estonia

Again, no apparent aggregate trend might actually hide very different behavioral patterns if broken down according to relevant subsamples. This is done in Table 28. It shows some interesting patterns. MPs on their own become clearly more active and especially so opposition MPs. Also, opposition party groups start to submit more amendment motions to PMBs as elections come closer. Why MPs will want to submit so many amendments is not entirely clear, as the likelihood of these being actually accepted is small. The next chapter will examine if the characteristics of the bills sponsor will influence how much and by whom it is amended. This will allow saying if the high activity levels observed for coalition and opposition MPs in amending PMBs is down to one side of the divide amending bills sponsored by the other side. Based on the data in Table 28 it is hard to say what might the possible reasons behind this noticeable rise in activity.

Table 28. PMB amending seasonality, Estonia 1999–2007

	Year					
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total	N
Amending motions by:						
committee	3.90	8.73	3.55	5.07	5.97	151
	(9.56)	(18.38)	(7.16)	(9.29)	(13.50)	
coal. party group	–	.08	.03	.14	.07	151
		(.46)	(.17)	(.68)	(.39)	
opp. party group	.59	.47	.36	2.63	.88	151
	(1.94)	(1.47)	(.93)	(6.13)	(3.08)	
coal. MPs	.45	.78	.85	2.90	1.14	151
	(.87)	(2.50)	(1.70)	(7.51)	(3.81)	
opp. MPs	.52	1.75	.64	4.07	1.72	151
	(1.55)	(4.94)	(1.90)	(8.13)	(4.98)	
mix. MPs	1.10	.20	–	–	.29	151
	(5.75)	(1.19)			(2.63)	
Total	6.62	12.22	5.42	15.62	10.31	151
	(12.41)	(24.18)	(8.21)	(25.03)	(20.12)	

One can see that the committees are in essence rewriting the bills and presenting these to the plenary. Sinclair speculates that MPs form competing parties might try to amend bills coming from committees controlled by members of a rival party (1986, 892). Amending would simply show their dissatisfaction with the bill. However, the originator of the bill here is still another MP or group of MPs. Unless the committees completely reverses the point of the bill, then which particular party controls the committee should not be central in sponsoring amending motions to it and Sinclair's explanation should not hold.

Lastly, a look at if there is seasonality in the nature of the amendments is also worth a while. This is shown by Figure 13, which graphs the change in bill length (y-axis) against the distance to elections from the bill's registration date (x-axis). There seems to be a weak relationship with bills being lengthened in smaller degrees closer to elections. This is however not strong enough to produce a statistically significant correlation and as one can see, it seems that PMBs were lengthened extensively at a particular period between 1100 to 800 days from the next elections, otherwise there is actually no apparent trend observable.



Figure 13. Change in bill length in words and distance to elections, Estonia

4.4. Discussion

A closer look at the characteristics of PMBs in Estonia and Finland confirmed what was expected based on the literature, but not in a uniform fashion. There were however also clear differences between the two countries under focus here.

First the topics PMBs tend to focus on. It became clear that Estonia and Finland do differ a lot. In the first case the bills deal with a relatively wide variety of issues. If electioneering using PMBs would have been common, which is in essence what the notion of pseudolegislation sees as the function of PMBs, then the topics should have been limited in scope. Proposing a wide alternative legislative program to the one actually enacted by government would have meant also a wide list of issues the bills deal with. In the Estonian case, looking at the lead committees the bills were referred to, suggests that the subject matter of PMBs is not limited in scope, hinting at a possible alternative legislative agenda behind it. Almost all committees got some share of the bills, although some more than others. In the Finnish case, however, a clear focus on two topics was evident. This fits the expectations. Furthermore, in the Finnish case there was also some indication of seasonality in sponsoring, meaning the issues PMBs deal with become even narrower in scope as elections approach. This might indicate that MPs try to raise their profile in a clearly limited area and enacting some sort of wider legislative program takes a secondary position. There was some evidence for seasonality in topics in the Estonian case as well, with more bills being referred to the Social Affairs Committee later on in the legislative period and closer to elections. For both cases therefore, with qualifications, the narrowing of PMB topics closer to elections holds. The crucial difference however allowing claiming that the Estonian PMBs do not and the Finnish PMBs do show clear signs of sponsoring taking centre stage over regulating, is the manner how same bills are sponsored repeatedly and by different actors. In the Estonian case this did happen, but not extensively. In Finland however a huge share of PMBs are sponsored over and over again. While this might mean that they are part of a parties legislative agenda that cannot be enacted simply because they are not in government, the fact that different actors from separate parties sponsor these bills with no change or only minor details altered suggests that this is not the case. PMBs seem to be used for opportunistic agenda setting purposes, mostly by opposition MPs and a big share of them simply circle between different players and are sponsored in the same form when the opportunity is deemed right. Also, some PMBs are in essence responses to government initiatives currently considered in parliament and show therefore clearly how a legislative instrument might be (mis)used for purposes other than regulating.

Secondly the technical nature of the bills was examined, which showed them to be relatively simple pieces of draft laws, as a rule no more than a section long and more than in 90% of the cases amending some other law. This fits again with what was expected, PMBs are not complicated legal documents or full text

laws, but rather simple efforts trying to change details in already enacted laws. The expected seasonality pattern with PMBs becoming shorter and simpler still the closer to elections was however not confirmed. In fact, a somewhat contrary trend could be observed. It seems therefore that more limited time resources closer to elections does not mean that MPs will therefore pay less attention to the technical nature of the bills and start to sponsor more sloppily drafted legislation.

Thirdly, the treatment in plenary debates was examined closely. Though the formalities of the debate do differ between the two countries, the nature of the debates looks rather similar. Some bills are very heavily debated and as a rule opposition MPs are the ones doing most of the talking. Frequently, however, no debate is opened at all on the bills, which hints that these draft laws are not taken too seriously. Considering the small success chances, this makes sense. MPs might not want to use precious plenary time to debate extensively on draft laws that everybody knows will not be actually passed. I assume a comparison with government bills would have shown a much more intensive debate. The seasonality pattern was however similarly to the change in technical attributes, i.e. reverse of what was expected. Except some outliers, the overall trends seems to be that all MPs become less active in debates as elections come closer. Though there is still a clear trend with some opposition MPs scrutinizing a handful of PMBs much more heavily closer to elections than at some other point in time, general patterns suggest that even opposition MPs turn some of their attention away from the plenary. There is however still a clear difference with coalition MPs becoming clearly uniformly less active. A surprising, but in hindsight very logical detail was observed in the Estonian case. When coalition MPs become less active in debates as elections approach, then their presence in votes on PMBs actually increases. So they are present in the plenary, but simply debate less. For opposition MPs, however, it seems that some become more active in debates, while a majority do not and their physical presence in the plenary goes down as elections come closer. Opposition MPs therefore seem to take care of business outside of parliament, while coalition MPs sit in the plenary and work on passing legislation and rejecting PMBs. It might be down to the government rushing through last parts of its legislative program and needing every vote in order not to be embarrassed by not having the needed majority together. Unfortunately, the actual presence or absence of MPs in the plenary could not be checked in the Finnish case as I do not have data on it that is comparable to Estonia.

Lastly, only in the Estonian case a closer look was taken at the amending of PMBs. Again, this was not undertaken for Finland due to lack of data. The results show that PMBs do get heavily amended. The next chapter will connect the amendments sponsored to a PMB with the nature of the bill's sponsor itself. So far however the data shows that regardless of anything else, bills get amended a lot and overwhelmingly by committees. The bills get more complicated in the process, as shown by their lengthening, and successful bills get on average lengthened more than unsuccessful bills. Meaning if a bill is

taken more seriously as it is likely to pass, it will also be worked on more extensively. The apparent seasonality in amending frequency, which if increasing, would again suggest that MPs sponsor more sloppy legislation closer to elections, does not hold very clearly. Committees do not amend the bills more heavily as elections approach. However MPs do become more frequent PMB amenders as elections come closer, which suggest that they try to influence the legislative process depending on the period. The substance of the amendments does not seem to change, although the data showed that earlier in the legislative period the bills do get lengthened more than later on, this trend seems however to be caused by some outliers and not by bills being lengthened not so extensively the closer to elections.

In general one can therefore conclude that the notion of pseudolegislation has been partly confirmed. The topics and technical simplicity suggest PMBs are used for very focused topics and tend to be very simple pieces of legislation. The expected direction of the seasonality trends are however observable only in the case of topics and somewhat in sponsorship frequency in Finland. PMBs do therefore become more focused on certain topics as elections approach, which fits with the expectation on pseudolegislation, but this does not come at the expense of technical quality, which does not fit with what was expected. The Estonian data suggests they need heavy amending regardless of the period they were sponsored in.

5. WHO SPONSORS WHAT KIND OF BILLS

This chapter connects the PMB and the sponsor characteristics to evaluate if certain features of the bills differ systematically depending on the sponsor. It will also shed light on the treatment of the bill in the parliament by examining if sponsor characteristics influence the way the bills is treated in the plenary by other MPs. The central aim is to determine if the personal vote structures subsequent stages of the legislative process after sponsoring.

The analysis will take a look at five separate aspects. First a close look will be taken at whether certain types of MPs are more likely to sponsor bills on certain topics. Secondly, the technical nature of the bills, with length serving as the indicator, will be examined to see if it depends on who introduces the bill. Thirdly, the bills treatment in the plenary will be analyzed in order to evaluate if sponsor characteristics influence how other MPs perceive and treat the bill. This is followed by a closer look at if amending PMBs depends on sponsor characteristics based on Estonian data. Lastly, again with Estonian data, the possible connection between the sponsors and the bills success chances will be examined.

A brief reminder of the central expectations forwarded in section 2.4.2. and 2.4.3. will show what to expect. It was hypothesized that if the bills are sponsored only for credit claiming or electioneering and not as substantive attempts of regulating, then the topics will most likely be limited in scope. That this is indeed so, with qualifications in the Estonian case, was demonstrated in the previous chapter. The same logic suggests that MPs should sponsor bills on these narrow topics regardless of their own specialization. Meaning there should be a mismatch between the MP's expertise and the topic of the PMB. Furthermore, some of the aspects that were hypothesized to be correlated with sponsoring more PMBs, like the personal vote prone environment, should also mean that MPs scoring high on these values should have a higher likelihood of sponsoring bills on these narrow topics.

With the technical nature of the PMB the expectation is also straightforward. If the main aim is credit claiming, then this should have implications for the technical sophistication of the bills. MPs for whom we can suspect that the personal vote to matter more, should put less effort into making them good quality legislation. Bills by MPs with a high personal vote should therefore be technically simpler than by other MPs, while controlling for a range of other factors.

When it comes to the bills treatment in the plenary then one can suspect that PMBs, which will be perceived as personal credit claiming operations by other MPs, will receive a more thorough treatment in the plenary, meaning bills by MPs with a high personal vote should be more intensively debated.

The amending of PMBs will be analyzed with Estonian data only. It is to be expected that PMBs by MPs, for whom a high personal vote is more central, should be in need of heavier amending, as their bills should be of poorer technical quality. It might however be somewhat more complicated. The analysis in the previous chapter showed that committees are the ones doing

most of the amending. MPs themselves however become somewhat more active amenders as elections approach. It could be that the reasons behind amending differ. If the bills are amended to turn them into more quality legislation then amending by committees makes sense. If MPs however are trying to amend more systematically bills by MPs for whom personal credit claiming is more central, then the reasons behind amending should be hindering personal credit claiming by rival MPs.

Before moving to the detailed examination of the data a section on the data structure will explain the technical side of the analysis.

5.1. Note on data stacking and implications

The previous chapters have shown that PMBs are not really single member bills. They tend to have multiple sponsors. This presents a technical problem in data analysis. In order to connect the characteristics of the sponsor with the characteristics of the bill, the data had to be stacked. This section explains what was done with the data and its implications for the regression analyses conducted below. If the reader is familiar with data stacking, then she can proceed directly to the next section.

While previous chapters have used either the MP or the PMB as the unit of analysis, this chapter combines the two. Stacking is a common practice in electoral research in if the interest is in some lower level unit of analysis and if additional information about these lower level units is added to the data. For example, the researcher might be interested if the likelihood of voting for a certain party is influenced by the party's characteristics. The respondent in a survey will be asked to state the likelihood to vote for each party individually. In the dataset the cases represented in rows are respondents and the answers appear as separate columns. In order to add party characteristics to these cases, to analyze possible connections, the separate columns with variables on the likelihood of voting for parties will have to be turned into rows, as otherwise one cannot add additional variables on the specific parties that the respondent was asked to state the likelihood of voting for. This is achieved by stacking each respondent (row) as many times as there are parties the respondent stated the likelihood for, and transposing the likelihood of voting for party variables, that were in one row as separate columns, as one column running through separate rows. For the same respondent, the likelihood to vote for a party now appears as one variable, which has individual values for each stacked row of the same respondent. Now additional variables on the specific party can be added to the rows where the likelihood to vote for this particular party appears as an individual value for "the likelihood to vote for" variable (see van der Eijk *et al* 2006).

In essence the approach taken here is similar. The dataset on PMBs had each bill in a separate row and the ID of each sponsor of the bill as a separate variable in that row. Meaning each row had a list of variables titled sponsor1, sponsor2, sponsor3 etc, with each of these variables having the unique ID of the

sponsor as the value. With more than one sponsor one cannot therefore simply match the dataset on PMBs with the one on MPs, as one PMB is represented as one row in the dataset, with its sponsors as separate variables in a list of columns, while these same sponsors are represented as individual rows in the dataset on MPs.

In order to make this matching possible the rows on PMBs in the dataset were stacked as many times as they had sponsors and the variables on sponsors for each PMB transposed as one column in the stacked dataset. Each bill appeared now as many separate rows, which were completely identical apart from one column which listed the separate sponsors of this one bill. After this, the data on MPs was simply added as a row of variables to the rows of the stacked dataset and each MP was matched with a particular PMB he or she had sponsored with the help of the column on sponsors.

The unit of analysis is now no longer the PMB nor the MP, but PMB times sponsor or with other words, each individual act of sponsoring by a single MP. A PMB with three sponsors, for example, will now appear as three rows in the dataset, each with the same values for the variables on the PMB, but differing values for variables on the sponsors. This allows connecting the attributes of the PMB with individual data on MPs and one can now use multivariate techniques to analyze if the characteristic of a sponsor influences characteristics of the PMB the MP has decided to sponsor. Furthermore, one can also see if the characteristics of the sponsor will play a role in the way the bill is treated in parliament.

This operation has however downsides. In essence it nests MPs into bills, which will become clusters if one is primarily interested in bill characteristics. There might be other clusters at work as well, but this is an empirical question. The real issue is that not all of the observations are strictly independent anymore and some effects will hence be fixed in the clusters. Furthermore, as one multiplies the PMBs with the number of sponsors and therefore gives them different weight in the dataset depending on their separate number of sponsor, one can no longer use bill characteristics to predict other variables of the bill, for example if lengthier bills are more heavily debated. The results would suffer from a severe case of alpha inflation, where the statistical significance would be calculated based on the observed case number, whereas the effective case number is many times lower.

The standard approach in such cases is to use some sort of multilevel models to allow for separate intercepts for the groups i.e. clusters (Gelman & Hill 2007, 237). The idea is to separate the variance explained by the different levels in the data, i.e. explain if group means of the variable of interest are explained by true contextual factors (higher level) or simply a different composition of the groups in terms of individual characteristics (lower level). Technically it boils down to fitting a regression to individual data (MPs sponsoring one PMB) and group (all PMBs) level data at once. This is however a major stumbling block in the current case. In order to use multilevel modeling sample sizes of the groups have to be sufficiently large (Gelman & Hill 2007, 240) and so too the number of possible groups (ibid., 247). While the issue of having not enough groups is

no problem, the very small sizes of the groups are. The 991 bills in the dataset stacked according to the number of sponsors, creates 11 329 cases, out of which 9987 are Finnish and 1342 are Estonian. This means the data contains on average 11 MPs per PMB only, and a big number are actually formed by one or a few MPs only.

Because of this I will not use multilevel models here, but stick to classical regression with bill and MP characteristics treated at the same level. The bill characteristics in case of a high number of sponsors will have fixed effects, they will not vary for this particular group, but because the number of bills is high, the total dataset still has the variance needed to estimate possible effects. What however cannot be done is using some bill characteristics to estimate the effects of other bill characteristics, as the cases in terms of bills are not independent of each other, whereas individual sponsors of these bills are.

I will include some of the bill characteristics in the subsequent models purely for control reasons, i.e. to fix possible bill effects in order to get a true estimation of sponsor effects. For example, the analysis of the not stacked dataset showed that debate length is also to certain degree connected to bill length. I will therefore include bill length as a variable in predicting debate length, but only to fix its effects for the variables on sponsors, as I am substantively interested if sponsor characteristics influences the bills treatment on the plenary floor. This will give a true estimation of sponsor effect on debate intensity, as bill length, which might also influence debate length, will be fixed. I will refrain from interpreting effects of bill characteristics substantively, as their significance is a result of alpha inflation due to specifics of the particular mode of data stacking undertaken here. In cases when bill characteristics showed an impact on the relevant dependent variable in *the not stacked* dataset, will a brief discussion of this be included, as this shows why including bill characteristics as controls in the stacked dataset was necessary. Furthermore, to show the effects the inclusion of bill characteristic controls have, the whole chapter reports two regressions models for each of the dependent variable together, one without and the other with the bill characteristics included. In order not to overload the reader with regression tables, models with the personal vote index substituted with its constitutive parts are listed in Appendix A. These will be briefly discussed in the chapter however, as especially the impact of the district magnitude might arise more interest.

As a final note, this data treatment might become a problem if analyzing stages of the legislative process that only very few bills will make it to, such as the third reading in Estonian. The effective case number might be substantially lower than the observed one. For example, if 10 bills make it to the third reading in the Estonian case, but appear as 100 cases in the dataset (with each having 10 sponsors), then using statistical analysis does not make sense anymore. These possible problems will be evaluated when they arise below.

Lastly, it might of course be that there is no ground to worry anyway, group level variation beyond the indicators I have included might be small, in which case even a multilevel model would be reduced to a “classical regression with

no group indicators" (Gelman & Hill 2007, 247). This is however too much to hope for, as some indicators used in the subsequent analysis, such as the number of sponsors a bill has, vary greatly.

5.2. PMB topics and sponsor attributes

This section takes the committee referral as the dependent variable by comparing bills referred to the most popular committees against the rest. Sponsor characteristics will serve as independent variables to determine if sponsoring PMBs on certain topics is influenced by the attributes of the MP. The aim is to see if MPs with certain traits tend to sponsors bills on a narrower set of topics than other MPs. The precise nature of the expectations will be spelled out below.

The multivariate analysis will be done on Finnish and Estonian data separately. The committee structure, as explained above, differs significantly between the two cases, one can suspect that the criteria for committee referral of a bill will as well. What passes as an issue for the Social Affairs committee in Estonia might not be so in Finland, as the more specialized committees will allow for very narrow topic definition. Because this might hide substantial effects if treated together, the two cases will be kept separate in the analysis.

5.2.1. Factors influencing PMB topics

5.2.1.1. Variable selection and expectations

The variables selected for the analysis are almost the same as the ones used for predicting sponsoring in section 3.3.2 of the third chapter with some differences. The direction of the expected effects is also very similar. Variables having a positive effect on more frequent sponsoring should have a same positive effect on sponsoring PMBs on a narrow set of topics if indeed it is simply sponsoring that matters. The reasoning is therefore the same and suggests that personal vote seeking produces behavior focusing on advertizing and not enacting a wide ranging legislative agenda.

The status in parliament has been recoded into a simple dichotomy of frontbencher vs backbencher. The four separate variables on bench status used in chapter three became severely unbalanced due to stacking, meaning MPs with certain attributes are very rarely among the sponsors, whereas others are overrepresented. As a result former ministers for example appeared only in 1.4% of the cases as stacked sponsors in the Estonian case. As so unbalanced variables are a problem for multinomial regression all of the four prior variables were coded into one, with frontbenchers representing MPs who had in prior periods or were at the time of sponsoring either ministers, speakers or chairs and vice-chairs of party groups and committees. Though the main purpose of the *frontbench status* variable is to act as a control, one can expect it to be negatively associated with sponsoring a PMB that gets referred to the most popular committees, as their interest should not be in initiating bills on a narrow segment of topics only, but

focus on a wider party agenda that presumably covers a range of societal issues. The *personal vote index* should show a positive effect, with the MPs scoring high on the index being the more likely sponsors of bills on a narrow set of topics, as using these for electioneering and not substantive regulatory work should be more pronounced for these MPs (while keeping in mind possible contrary effects discussed in section 2.2.3 and 2.4.1). This should also hold while controlling for the opposition or coalition status of the sponsor. The *ballot type* and *district magnitude* as constitutive parts of the index should show the same effects, meaning open lists and bigger districts being positively associated with sponsoring PMBs on limited topics. *Coalition status* itself should be negatively associated with sponsoring PMBs on these topics, as coalition MPs can be expected to be more associated with enacting the government program, whereas opposition MPs should be more interested in sponsoring larger amounts of PMBs and for this reason also keep it limited to certain topics only, if indeed initiation and not a wide ranging regulatory program is what matters with these bills. *Party group size,* which was entered in the regression above to control for the possibility that PMBs are initiated mostly by small party members, should play a similar role here. If PMBs are an instrument in the hands of smaller parties, then size should also correlate with narrower topics as small groups lack the needed expertise to be active in all subject areas needed for a comprehensive alternative governing program. The *share of votes in the district* is again understood as an indicator of mandate strength and should in combination with the personal vote index show if the hypothesized effect of a personal vote inducing environment will motivate MPs to be very active in a narrow field only or if this more individualistic behavior in parliament is actually down to a perceived strong mandate by the MP. The *district distance from capital* will show if MPs from more remote district are more active in sponsoring PMBs on these narrow topics. One can expect this variable to have stronger role in the Finnish case. The *year of birth, seniority, education level* and *gender* will act as controls. Again, as in the regression on sponsoring, one can assume younger MPs to be more likely sponsors on these topics. If PMBs can indeed be used for establishing a more secure foothold in the district, then this should hold while controlling for seniority of the MP. There are no directional expectations connected to gender or education status.

In addition, the regression includes three variables on the bill. First, the *distance to elections* in days from the date when the bill was introduced will serve as a control for possible seasonality in topics being sponsored. Whether bills that are referred to any of these more popular committees are sponsored systematically closer to elections than other bills will be evaluated separately with the not stacked dataset. Although this was to a certain degree already examined in the previous chapter, it will be reexamined here together with possible connections to other bill characteristics. The second bill variable is the *number of sponsors* the bill has. As the expectation was that MPs with a high personal vote are more likely sponsors of bills on topics that can be used for credit claiming, then this should hold while controlling for cooperation in

sponsoring. The third variable on the bill is its *length*. If bills on some topics are more prone to be used for credit claiming, then this connected with the personal vote notion might also mean shorter bills. However, this should hold also in cases were bills on certain topics are systematically shorter, regardless of anything else. Including it as a control will therefore allow for more definite claims about the connection between a topic and the personal vote.

5.2.2. PMB topics and sponsors in Estonia

The previous empirical sections have showed that the opposition/coalition status structures behavior very strongly. A brief look at how this might influence the topics the MPs sponsor bills on is hence worth a while. Table 29 shows the distribution of PMBs referred to different committees broken down according to whether the sponsors were only coalition MPs, opposition MPs or came from both sides of the divide. Two things stand out in the table. First, pure opposition bills tend to be assigned in bigger shares to the Social Affairs Committee than pure coalition bills. More than 80% of PMBs that get referred to this committee come from opposition MPs only. For the other committees, bills by opposition MPs make up roughly the same share as in the overall number of sponsored bills.

Table 29. Share of bills referred to lead committees by opposition and coalition status of sponsor(s), Estonia 1999–2007

Committee	Sponsors, N (%)			All PMBs submitted, N(%)
	Coalition MPs	Opposition MPs	Coal. and opp. MPs	
Environment Committee	3 (3.8)	3 (1.4)	1 (2.6)	7 (2.1)
Cultural Affairs Committee	8 (10.1)	23 (11.0)	3 (7.7)	34 (10.4)
Rural Affairs Committee	2 (2.5)	6 (2.9)	3 (7.7)	11 (3.4)
Economic Affairs Committee	13 (16.5)	26 (12.4)	5 (12.8)	44 (13.4)
Constitutional Committee	14 (17.7)	33 (15.7)	16 (41.0)	63 (19.2)
Finance Committee	19 (24.1)	37 (17.6)	5 (12.8)	61 (18.6)
Social Affairs Committee	9 (11.4)	56 (26.7)	4 (10.3)	69 (21.0)
Legal Affairs Committee	11 (13.9)	26 (12.4)	2 (5.1)	39 (11.9)
Total	79 (100.0)	210 (100.0)	39 (100.0)	328 (100.0)

The second big difference is that a substantial share of PMBs sponsored by coalition and opposition MPs together are referred to the Constitutional Affairs committee. These tend to be bills dealing with constitutional issues that require some sort of qualitative majority to get passed. They are therefore also initiated as cooperative efforts. For example SE 974 from 2006 dealt with changing the preamble of the constitution, SE 982 from that same year sought to include the possibility of citizen initiatives into the constitution, SE 1181 from 2002 changed the local election voting cycle, as spelt out in the constitution, from three years to four. Otherwise the differences between the coalition and opposition camps do not seem substantive.

If the MPs sponsor bills on the same topic that they have expertise on was evaluated through crosstabulating the MP's committee membership and share of the lead committees for bills he/she had sponsored. Leaving out the bills that were referred to the Constitutional Affairs Committee, showed that the MP's committee membership, which shows the field of expertise in parliament, overlaps to a significant degree with the field he or she has sponsored a bill on. Six out of the eight committees where PMBs were referred to, had the biggest share of PMBs coming from MPs who had been or were members of that same lead committee. This did not hold only for the Environmental Affairs Committee and the Rural Affairs Committee. This means that MPs do tend to sponsor bills on topics that they are more familiar with thanks to committee experience. The expected mismatch between MP expertise and PMB topics therefore does not occur in the Estonian case.

The Social Affairs and Constitutional Affairs Committee together with the Finance Committee stand out as being the prime recipients of PMBs. The fact that table 29 shows some difference between opposition and coalition MPs with regard to committee referral suggests that some of the topics PMBs deal with depend on the nature of the sponsor. To investigate this possibility further a multinomial logistic regression was run with the dependent variable being whether the bill was referred to one of the three most popular committees, with all other bills serving as the reference group and the variables specified in section 5.2.1. serving as independent variables.

5.2.2.1. Multinomial logistic regression results

Before moving to the discussion of the regression results a quick look at the not stacked bill dataset and the role of only bill characteristics in influencing committee referral is worth undertaking. A multinomial regression with committee referral as the dependent variable and only the three bill characteristics specified above as the independent variable run on the not stacked Estonian bill dataset shows that bill length, number of sponsors and distance to elections explain a whopping 17.7% percent of the variance. Bill characteristics themselves obviously do not cause committee referral, but it seems that bills do differ substantially depending on the topic. Specifically, the length of the bill and the number of sponsors play a role. Bills submitted to the Constitutional Affairs Committee have on average clearly more sponsors (*B=.134, Exp(B)=1.143, p≤.000*). The odds ratio shows the increase

in likelihood of being referred to the Constitutional Affairs Committee for a one MP increase in the number of sponsors. Each additional sponsor increases this likelihood by 1.14 times, which is a very strong effect. This is however not substantively interesting as bills on constitutional issues tend to need the support of some qualified majority in parliament, meaning they have to be party wide cooperative efforts. This effect merely serves to demonstrate that including the number of sponsors as a control in the analysis is necessary in order to get a true estimation of the effects of the sponsor characteristics on the likelihood of sponsoring a bill on the given topic. The other notable difference is that bills being referred to the Social Affairs Committee are clearly shorter than the rest. The length variable in its interval form does not show this, but examining the effects more closely by including dummies that compare bills with a length between 251 to 500 and 501 and longer bills, with the reference category of bills up 251 words in length, shows that bills longer than 500 words are roughly eight times less likely to be referred to the Social Affairs Committee (*B=–2.128, Exp(B)=.119, p≤.01*). With other words, bills referred to the Social Affairs Committee tend to be on average clearly shorter. This short analysis on the not stacked dataset that does not suffer from alpha inflation, shows that including bill variables as controls in the stacked dataset is therefore clearly needed.

The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the full regression are listed in Table 30 with means and standard deviations for interval and response category frequency for binary variables. Table 29 above showed that a big amount of bills sponsored by coalition and opposition MPs together are referred to the Constitutional Affairs Committee, this fact is also mirrored in the descriptive statistics table of 30 with the share of these bills becoming substantial due to stacking.

Table 30. Descriptive statistics of variables used in multinomial logistic regression on committee referral, Estonia*

Interval variables	***Mean (SD)***	***Nominal variables***	***%***
Party group size	21.67 (7.85)	Social Affairs committee referral: yes	11.5
District size	9.04 (1.80)	Financial Affairs committee referral: yes	10.9
Year of birth	1952.65 (9.71)	Constitutional Affairs committee referral: yes	47.9
Personal vote index	6.39 (4.29)	Coalition status: yes	41.6
Seniority	.71 (.85)	Ballot structure: open list	53.0
Distance to elections	673.33 (436.51)	Frontbench: yes	70.5
Number of sponsors	21.77 (27.41)	Higher education: yes	90.2
Share of votes in district	4.51 (3.88)	Gender: male	82.4
Distance from capital	105.21 (82.52)		
Length in words	365.39 (992.51)		

*stacked dataset

Results of the multinomial logistic regression are reported in Table 31. The variance explained is surprisingly high, a full 12.5% for the model with MP characteristics only as shown by the Nagelkerke R^2 . The model also classifies 49.8% of the cases correctly. This is substantially higher than a similar analysis of the Finnish committee referral below. The coefficients of interest are reported in model B, as this shows their effects when bill characteristics are fixed. Due to the alpha inflation problems the significance of the bill characteristics will not be discussed based on this model.

Examining bivariate correlations and VIF statistics showed no problems with multicollinearity. The likelihood ratio tests showed that neither the personal vote index, frontbencher status nor the educational level play any role in differentiating between the groups, other variables have some role to play.

Table 31. Factors differentiating bills referred to three most popular committees from other PMBs in Estonia, reference category: bills referred to any other committee (multinomial logistic regression)

	Referred to Social Affairs committee				***Referred to Financial Affairs committee***				***Referred to Constitutional Affairs committee***			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*
MP attributes												
Personal vote index	.018	1.018	.019	1.019	–.030	.970	–.044	.957	.013	1.013	.027	1.027
	(.030)		(.032)		(.030)		(.032)		(.020)		(.026)	
Coalition MP	–.650	.521**	–.582	.559*	–.211	.809	–.079	.924	.429	1.536**	–.227	.797
(1=yes)	(.223)		(.236)		(.209)		(.225)		(.136)		(.193)	
Party group size	–.019	.981	–.010	.990	.040	1.040**	.040	1.041**	.037	1.038***	.028	1.029*
	(.013)		(.014)		(.014)		(.016)		(.009)		(.013)	
Vote share in	–.049	.952	–.057	.944	–.013	.987	–.007	.993	–.030	.971	–.061	.941*
district	(.035)		(.035)		(.033)		(.033)		(.022)		(.029)	
Distance from	.003	1.003*	.003	1.002*	.003	1.003*	.003	1.003*	.000	1.000	.001	1.001
capital	(.001)		(.001)		(.001)		(.001)		(.001)		(.001)	
Frontbench (1=yes)	.169	1.184	.105	1.111	–.289	.749	–.320	.725	–.173	.841	–.121	.797
	(.264)		(.272)		(.244)		(.250)		(.164)		(.214)	
Seniority	.293	1.340*	.347	1.415**	.380	1.462**	.334	1.397*	.046	1.047	.328	1.388**
	(.127)		(.135)		(.137)		(.142)		(.093)		(.120)	
Year of birth	–.042	.959***	–.043	.958***	–.003	.997	–.008	.992	–.028	.973***	–.033	.968***
	(.011)		(.012)		(.011)		(.011)		(.007)		(.009)	
Gender (1=male)	–1.259	.283***	–1.310	.269***	–.462	.630	–.535	.586	–.626	.534**	–.595	.552*
	(.258)		(.269)		(.288)		(.295)		(.199)		(.246)	
Higher educ.	–.208	.811	–.220	.803	–.183	.832	–.189	.828	–.114	.892	–.398	.672
(1=yes)	(.358)		(.377)		(.333)		(.344)		(.229)		(.299)	

Independent variables	***Referred to Social Affairs committee***				***Referred to Financial Affairs committee***				***Referred to Constitutional Affairs committee***			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	B (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*
Bill attributes												
Distance to elections	–	–	–.001 (.000)	.999	–	–	.001 (.000)	1.001**	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000
Bill length	–	–	–.002 (.000)	.998***	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000
No. of sponsors	–	–	–.082 (.024)	.922***	–	–	–.079 (.024)	.924***	–	–	.126 (.010)	1.135***
Constant	80.596 (21.634)***		82.812 (23.303)		3.551 (20.742)		12.933 (22.065)		53.667 (14.175)		61.217 (18.246)	
Nagelkerke R^2	.125		.578									
% correctly predicted	49.8		63.4									
N	1339		1339									

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

What stands out immediately is the strong role of the opposition/coalition divide for bills being referred to the Social Affairs Committee. The odds ratio tells us that coalition MPs are on average .559 times less likely to sponsor a bill that gets referred to this committee or with other words the likelihood of sponsoring a bill on this topic is 1.75 times more likely for opposition than coalition MPs. One could anticipate this effect from the table 29, now it is apparent that the very strong effect holds while controlling for other sponsor and bill characteristics as well. The fact that nothing like that is apparent for the other two committees where PMBs tend to be referred to, suggests that PMBs by opposition MPs have a relatively narrow target of dealing mostly with social affairs, while controlling for other effects. This is a substantively interesting finding as it adds a nuance to the literature on the usage and substance of PMBs. These bills are not only the tools in the hands of minor opposition parties, but they are also narrow in their subject matter in dealing with matters of social affairs more often. The party size does not play a role with bills referred to the Social Affairs Committee though. Instead bills being referred to the Financial and Constitutional Affairs Committee have on average more MPs from larger parties as sponsors than other bills.

Interestingly gender plays even a much stronger role than whether the MP comes from the opposition or coalition. Men are on average less likely to sponsor bills that get referred to the Social Affairs Committee. Taking the reciprocal of the odds ratio .269 tells us that women are on average almost four times more likely to sponsors a bill on a topic dealt with by the Social Affairs Committee than men, while controlling for opposition status among others. One cannot go as far as saying that this indicates a gender based division of labor, as gender does play a role in bills being referred to the Constitutional Affairs Committee as well, but it does show that gender matters in the way MPs behave in parliament and especially in dealing with social issues.

Seniority seems to play a strong role as well with experience in prior parliaments leading to a higher likelihood of sponsoring bills that will be referred to any of the three most popular committees in comparison to other bills. What to make of this is not immediately clear. One is tempted to fit this into the explanatory framework used here and claim that if PMBs can be used for re-election purposes, then MPs with more experience in parliament are using this instrument more than others and this usage is partly the reason behind their re-election and seniority in the first place. This is however speculative and would need more thorough investigation. The real interest was a comparison of seniority and age effects with the expectation that younger MPs would be using frequently sponsored PMBs on popular topics to establish their foothold in politics. This effect should have been observable while controlling for seniority, as some younger MPs might already be experiences politicians and older ones mere rookies serving their first term in parliament. The year of birth does play a significant role, but with younger age brings a smaller likelihood of sponsoring bills that might be submitted either to the Social Affairs or Constitutional

Affairs Committee. So it works in the opposite direction as assumed and seniority and age have in fact opposing effects in both of these cases.

Personal vote in its indexed from does not play a role at all when controlling for other factors. Two elements of the index separately however do play a role with bills that are referred to the Financial Affairs Committee (see APPENDIX A, Table I). Bigger district increases the likelihood of MPs sponsoring bills that get referred to this particular committee, which fits with the assumptions that bigger district might create an incentive to sponsor many bills on a narrow set of topics. Also, the ballot dummy, which compares MPs elected with the personal or district mandate against the compensation mandate holders, who are elected according to fixed lists, is negatively associated with the likelihood of sponsoring bills dealing with financial issues. This means MPs elected according to an open list are less likely to sponsor bills on these narrow topics. The fact that overall the personal vote does not play any role at all, and its constitutive parts do not play a consistent role through all those three committee referrals, suggests that the assumed narrowing of subject matters for PMBs by MPs with a high personal vote does not hold.

The distance of the MPs electoral district from the capital was entered to control for the possibility that MPs from more remote district might behave differently as their constituency might have more unique problems. Longer distances from the capital are positively related to the likelihood of sponsoring bills that get referred to the two of the most popular committees. The effects seem small again, but the odds ratio shows a change in likelihood for every kilometer further away from the capital. So controlling for other factors does show that the further away a MPs district is from the capital the likelier he or she will sponsor a bill on social or financial questions. The fact that this variable has an effect for both most popular committee referrals suggest these might be used to specific constituency service.

Lastly, the vote share a MP received in the district, which was entered as a possible proxy for the perceived strength of the mandate, has a negative association with the likelihood of sponsoring a bill that gets referred to the Constitutional Affairs Committee. As constitutional affairs can hardly be used for constituency service or advertised as casework, it does fit the expectations that the so called “show horse” representatives do not engage as much in substantive legislative issues as “work horses” do (see Hall 1987). Remember that the PMBs referred to this committee tended to be party wide cooperative efforts and have on average a larger amount of sponsors. If the collective nature of these PMBs means MPs primarily interested in retaining or increasing their personal vote, do not engage in sponsoring these, one would assume a clear negative association between this committee referral and the variables on the personal vote. This is however not the case. The evidence is therefore somewhat inconclusive.

In sum there is clear evidence that the topic a PMB is likely to deal with is clearly influenced by the nature of the sponsor. A PMB on social matters is on average shorter and much more likely to be sponsored by slightly older female

MPs from the opposition ranks who have prior experience in parliament. A PMB on financial matters on the other hand is more likely to be sponsored by compensation mandate holders coming from slightly bigger districts and larger parties who have a prior experience in parliament. A PMB on constitutional matters is on the other hand a comparatively longer bill and a cooperative effort, with again slightly older women with prior experience being more likely among the sponsors.

What is however not backed up by the evidence is the assumed relationship between narrow topic scope and MPs for whom personal reputation is more crucial in getting elected. Therefore, one has to say that the more individualistic focus some MPs might have is not translated into sponsoring PMBs on a narrow set of topics.

5.2.3. PMB topics and sponsors in Finland

The previous chapter showed that the Finnish PMBs tend to be narrower in the subjects dealt with. Two committees, the Social Affairs and the Financial Affairs Committee, receive a total of 57.9% of all PMBs. Table 32 shows that the topics PMBs deal with are clearly affected by whether the sponsor is from the coalition or opposition. Opposition MPs are clearly very active in sponsoring bills that are referred to the Social Affairs Committee, whereas bills sponsored by purely opposition MPs make up 58.8% of all submitted bills, and they make up 71.6% of all the bills referred to the Social Affairs Committee. For pure coalition bills on the other hand, a big share is referred to the Finance Committee. This indicates that similarly to the Estonian case, the topic a PMB deals with might depend on the type of sponsors the bill has. Excepting the already mentioned committees, the distribution of bills referred to different committees is roughly similar for the coalition and opposition camp.

Crosstabulating the MPs committee membership and the lead committees the bills by these MPs get referred to gives a substantially different pattern than in Estonia. Only for members of two committees, the Social Affairs and Finance Committees, is the biggest share of bills sponsored by them actually referred to the same two committees, meaning these MPs sponsor bills on topics which their committee membership overlaps with. For the rest of the 10 committees out of 13, the committee membership does not overlap with the biggest share of bills being referred to the same committee. In fact, MPs from all other committees sponsor PMBs that are for the most part referred to either the Social Affairs or Financial Affairs Committee. This means that regardless of their own specialization, as shown by committee membership, MPs still sponsor bills on these two topics mostly.

Similarly to the Estonian case a more thorough investigation of factors influencing committee referral to the most popular committees, the Social Affairs and Financial Affairs Committee, will be conducted with the help of a multinomial logistic regression.

Table 32. Share of bills referred to lead committees by opposition and coalition status of the sponsor(s) in Finland 2003–2007

Committee	Coal. MPs, N (%)	Opp. MPs, N (%)	Coal. and opp. MPs, N (%)	All PMBs submitted, N (%)
Finance Committee	28 (36.4)	98 (25.1)	47 (24.0)	173 (26.1)
Foreign Affairs Committee	–	–	1 (.5)	1 (.2)
Education and Culture Committee	8 (10.4)	39 (10.0)	10 (5.1)	57 (8.6)
Constitutional Law Committee	6 (7.8)	10 (2.6)	5 (2.6)	21 (3.2)
Employment and Equality Committee	–	15 (3.8)	7 (3.6)	22 (3.3)
Administration Committee	7 (9.1)	17 (4.4)	15 (7.7)	39 (5.9)
Social Affairs and Health Committee	13 (16.9)	151 (38.7)	47 (24.0)	211 (31.8)
Environment Committee	2 (2.6)	4 (1.0)	7 (3.6)	13 (2.0)
Legal Affairs Committee	7 (9.1)	27 (6.9)	25 (12.8)	59 (8.9)
Commerce Committee	2 (2.6)	12 (3.1)	10 (5.1)	24 (3.6)
Agriculture and Forestry Committee	1 (1.3)	3 (.8)	12 (6.1)	16 (2.4)
Defense Committee	1 (.3)	–	–	1 (.2)
Transport and Communications Committee	3 (3.9)	13 (3.3)	10 (5.1)	26 (3.9)
Total	77 (100.0)	390 (100.0)	196 (100.0)	663 (100.0)

5.2.3.1. Multinomial logistic regression results

First let us take a look at the not stacked dataset on Finnish PMBs with the dependent variable being committee referral to the Social Affairs and Financial Affairs Committee, with all other bills serving as the reference group and independent variables being the three bill characteristics – distance to elections, number of sponsors and length in words. It shows that bill characteristics on their own explain only 2.1% of committee referral, which is minute in comparison to Estonia. Only the distance to elections plays a role, which is quite interesting. It shows that bills referred to the Financial Affairs Committee tend to be sponsored earlier in the legislative period than the rest of the bills. This effect applies especially in the first year of the legislative period with bills being almost two times more likely to be referred to this committee in comparison to bills being sponsored in the last year before elections (*B=.657, Exp(B)=1.926, p≤.05*). Length of the bill has no role to play. Unlike in Estonia, Finnish PMBs referred to the Social Affairs Committee do not differ in length from other PMBs.

Table 33 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression. It is apparent that even after stacking the share of bills referred to these two committees is retained in almost similar proportions to the original dataset (see Table 32).

Table 33. Descriptive statistics of variables used in multinomial logistic regression on committee referral, Finland

Interval variables	*Mean (SD)*	*Nominal variables*	*%*
Party group size	33.94 (17.30)	Social Affairs committee referral: yes	30.9
District size	18.33 (7.34)	Financial Affairs committee referral: yes	26.5
Year of birth	1954.50 (10.15)	Coalition status: yes	69.4
Personal vote index	11.67 (1.54)	Frontbench: yes	46.2
Seniority	1.40 (1.28)	Higher education: yes	72.1
Distance to elections	787.61 (399.04)	Gender: male	62.5
Share of votes in district	3.08 (2.21)		
Number of sponsors	55.02 (44.75)		
Distance from capital	242.28 (219.66)		
Length in words	178.49 (215.94)		

The results of the logistic regression are reported in Table 34. Examining bivariate correlation and VIF statistics did not indicate any problems with multicollinearity. The results are to some degree similar to Estonia, although clear differences are apparent as well and one needs to keep in mind that the dependent variable differs somewhat. The amount of variance explained is much lower than with the same variables in the Estonian case, only 2.6% in the case of MP characteristics in the model only as shown by the Nagelkerke R^2 and the model predicts correctly 43.1% of the cases. The likelihood ratio tests suggest that distance of the MPs electoral district from the capital, personal vote index, seniority, share of votes received in the district and frontbench status do not play any role in separating the groups of PMBs.

The same three effects that were observed in the Estonian case hold for Finland as well. Being a coalition MP reduces the likelihood of sponsoring a bill that gets referred to Social Affairs committee very much. This effect is even stronger for bills being referred to the Financial Affairs Committee. This is somewhat unexpected as table 32 showed that coalition MPs are also active in sponsoring bills on these topics. It turns out however that controlling for other effects shows this not to be the case.

Also, as in Estonia, men are less likely to sponsor bills that are on social issues. The effect is not so strong as in Estonia, but it is clearly significant. In the same vein, these seem to be on average older MPs, as shown by the negative coefficient. Bills referred to the Financial Affairs Committee however come from MPs who belong to a bigger party group and hold a university degree. Like in the Estonian case therefore sponsor attributes matter. Whereas bills referred to the Social Affairs committee are more likely to be sponsored by slightly older female opposition MPs, then bills referred to the Financial Affairs Committee are more likely to be sponsored by highly educated opposition MPs from bigger parties.

Table 34. Factors differentiating bills referred to the two most popular committees from other PMBs in Finland, reference category: bills referred to any other committee (multinomial logistic regression)

	Referred to Social Affairs committee				***Referred to Financial Affairs committee***			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp(B)*
MP attributes								
Personal vote index	–.014 (.021)	.986	–.017 (.022)	.983	–.014 (.022)	.986	–.012 (.023)	.988
Coalition MP (1=yes)	–.391 (.074)	.676***	–.367 (.076)	.693***	–.899 (.079)	.407***	–.947 (.082)	.388***
Party group size	–.002 (.002)	.998	–.002 (.002)	.998	.020 (.002)	1.020***	.016 (.002)	1.016***
Vote share in district	.009 (.014)	1.009	.008 (.014)	1.008	–.005 (.017)	.995	.002 (.017)	1.002
District distance from capital	.000 (.000)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000
Frontbench (1=yes)	–.018 (.061)	.982	.005 (.062)	1.005	.087 (.064)	1.090	.108 (.066)	1.114
Seniority	.007 (.023)	1.007	.010 (.023)	1.010	.018 (.024)	1.019	.024 (.025)	1.024
Year of birth(s003)	–.007 (.003)	.993*	–.008 (.003)	.992**	.001 (.003)	1.001	.000 (.003)	1.000
Gender (1=male)	–.104 (.057)	.901	–.119 (.058)	.888*	.071 (.059)	1.072	.037 (.061)	1.037
Higher educ. (1=yes)	–.002 (.056)	.998	.011 (.057)	1.011	.124 (.059)	1.131*	.130 (.062)	1.139*
Bill attributes								
Distance to elections	–	–	–.001 (.000)	.999***	–	–	–.001 (.000)	.999***
Bill length	–	–	–.003 (.000)	.997***	–	–	–.003 (.000)	.997***
No. of sponsors	–	–	–.003 (.001)	.997***	–	–	.004 (.001)	1.004***
Constant	12.530 (5.425)*		15.597 (5.535)		–2.638 (5.698)		.884 (5.922)	
Nagelkerke R^2	.026		.127					
% correctly predicted	43.1		49.3					
N	9981		9981					

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

The personal vote again does not play any role and neither does the district magnitude (see APPENDIX A, Table II). Turning the personal vote index value into various dummies did not show any effects in separating the groups; the same applies to the case of district magnitude.

Finland is a country with great geographical distances, so one would expect that district remoteness might play a stronger role than in Estonia. Alos, prior research has shown than Finnish voters do differ according to the distance from the capital in their desired mode for representation (Bengtsson & Wass 2011, 156–157). This might be reflected in MP behavior in parliament. However, at least for bills on these two topics, the district distances from the capital do not show any effects.

The analysis of the Finnish data therefore suggests the same as in the Estonian case. A high personal vote does not have an effect on MPs sponsoring PMBs on a narrower set of topics. Instead it is the opposition-coalition divide that seems to have a very strong effect on what topics MPs tend to sponsor their PMBs on. In the Finnish case it essentially means that not high personal vote holders, but opposition MPs are the ones who tend to initiate bills that deal with a limited range of issues. As the Social Affairs and Financial Affairs Committees deal with a big bulk of all the PMBs the result was to be expected from the tabular examination of the data, the regression shows that this holds also while controlling for other effects.

5.3. PMB characteristics and sponsor attributes

It was hypothesized above that PMBs by MPs with a bigger personal vote could be called pseudolegislation due to them not being meant to regulate matters in the first place. One attribute of this might be a comparatively lower level of technical sophistication. This section will investigate this possibility further by examining what factors and how might influence the technical nature of the bill. This is done in a relatively straightforward manner by taking the length of the bill as a measure of complexity and using it as the dependent variable. As the dependent variable has a relatively big range of 10404 words using OLS regression seems justified. Here the Estonian and Finnish data will be used in the same model, with a country dummy used to control for national idiosyncrasies.

5.3.1. Factors influencing the technical characteristics of bills

5.3.1.1. Variable selection and expectations

The first expectation is clear, if PMBs by MPs with a high value on the *personal vote index* sponsor pseudolegislation, then it should have a negative effect on bill length (with a contrary logic outline in section 2.2.3 and 2.4.1.). To control again if it is the personal vote inducing environment or the actual strong performance in the district that has the real effect the *vote share in*

district the MP received is entered as well. The *coalition status* of an MPs should however have a positive effect, as one can expect their bills to have a higher likelihood to succeed and might therefore also show less of the assumed attributes of a bill whose main aim is not to regulate issues, but simply draw attention to the sponsor. The *party group* size should again show if the fact that small opposition MPs tend to sponsor more bills means that their bills are also more simplistic, a positive effect of size is hence expected. The *frontbench* status should again show if parliamentary position matters, with the assumption that frontbenchers should sponsor bills that can be taken as more substantive attempts of regulating and hence be technically more complex. The assumed effect of age with younger MPs being more active in sponsoring PMBs has not been backed up by the data in previous sections. The *year of birth* will however be entered together with *seniority* of the MP to verify if prior experience and hence also knowledge of parliamentary business should mean that experienced MPs sponsor more simplistic bills. More experienced MPs would be knowledgeable of the cost-benefit tradeoffs of certain actions and put less effort into drafting bills, as they know not to use too much time working on bills that will most likely not succeed. To verify that it is indeed seniority that causes this, controlling for age is necessary. The *gender* of the MP and whether they have *higher education* will serve as socio-demographic controls. The district distance from the capital will not be used in this model as assuming a relationship with bill length is not founded. What is however included is a *country* dummy with Finland as the reference category as Finnish bills were shown to be shorter than Estonian ones on average.

As one bill characteristic is used as the dependent variable the other two will be used as independent variables. The previous chapter showed that bills become lengthier as elections approach, the *distance from elections* a bill was sponsored will therefore act as a control which will give more accurate coefficients for the MP characteristics. The previous section has shown that PMBs to be sponsored by more MPs in cooperation, notably dealing with constitutional issues. A control for the effect of collaborative efforts is also entered in the form of an independent variable for the *number of sponsors* the bill has. With collaborative efforts the PMB ownership is not clear. Fever sponsors might take the PMB as their personal project and invest substantial time into picking a topic and having a good quality draft as suggested by Mitchell's (1988) discussion of PMBs in the UK. More sponsors make ownership of the bill unclear and might reduce the effort that is put into the bill and this might be mirrored in the technical nature. This variable will therefore serve as a control for the possibility.

5.3.1.2. OLS regression results

The descriptive part above indicated that PMB length might not have a normal distribution. This is already a warning sign that the prediction errors of an OLS regression model might have a non-normal distribution. Running the same regression as reported in the table below with the bill length in words as the

dependent variable and examining residuals showed that non-normality was not a big issue. The model was however suffering somewhat from heteroscedasticity, with errors being clearly bigger for the lengthiest bills.[50] Examining the influence of certain cases by comparing Cook's distances showed that bills with more than 2000 words in length have clearly larger values than the rest, which indicates them being outliers (Fox 1991, 30). Out of the 11322 cases in the stacked dataset, with some case dropped due to missing values, 43 cases have a bill length over 2000 words. These outliers were deleted in the subsequent analysis. Deleting outliers is controversial, but can be defended in the current case with two arguments. First they will bias the estimators and one cannot be sure in which direction. Secondly, if there are relatively few of these cases, then the tradeoff with attaining a dataset that will not violate the assumptions of OLS against limiting the natural variance in the data is not too big (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007, 77). As the aim is not to explain bill length as such, but merely evaluate the impact of certain variables, while controlling for others, I feel justified in deleting the outlying cases. The negative binomial, binary and multinomial logistic regressions performed above were ran with outliers in the solution, but precisely because the central aim was to explain the variance in the dependent variable. Here this is not the central focus and as outliers contribute towards violating the assumptions of OLS through producing heteroscedasticity, deleting them can be defended.

Before moving to the full regression taking a look at the not stacked dataset and using distance to elections and number of sponsors as predictors for bill length is worth a while. It does not show any significant effects in the not stacked dataset. Even non-linear effects are not apparent after fractionalizing both distance to elections and the number of sponsors in various ways. Taking a look at the two cases separately does however show slight differences. Though Finnish PMBs are on average clearly longer, the other null effects do not apply in the same manner for Estonia. Estonian PMBs get slightly longer as elections approach, as was already suggested by the bivariate analysis in the previous chapter. The coefficient shows that a one day increase in distance from elections decreases bill length by a minuscule .08 words ($b=-.088,\ p\leq.05$). Fractionalizing the distance variable does not show this to be a clear linear effect, in fact, only bills sponsored in the first 200 days of the legislative period are on average 147 words shorter ($b=-147.0,\ p\leq.05$), in comparison to bills sponsored in the last 200 days before the elections. No other categories have significant coefficients. The apparent seasonality in bill length is therefore down to some very short bills being sponsored early on in the legislative period, as might have been already suspected based on the data in the previous chapter.

[50] Taking the natural logartihm of the bill length and using this as the dependent variable did mitigate the heteroscedasticity problem, but did not solve the issue completely. Using this as the dependent variable would make interpretation of the coefficients somewhat difficult, so the subsequent analysis uses length of bill in the original metric as the dependent variable.

All in all one can therefore say that bill length is not affected by the distance to elections when controlling for the number of sponsors. The small seasonal effect observed in the previous chapter will therefore most likely disappear if other factors are taken into account, but the distance to elections variable should still be included as a control.

With this in mind we can now move on to examine the results of the full regression. Table 35 gives the descriptive statistics used to predict bill length in words after the outliers have been removed. The sheer amount of Finnish PMBs, plus their on average larger number of sponsors than in Estonia, has tilted the balance heavily in favor of Finnish cases in the combined dataset. Also the ballot variable, which as mentioned compares the Estonian compensation mandate holders (elected according to closed lists) against the rest (elected according to open list), has a very unbalanced distribution due to stacking and the share of the Finnish cases in the data.

Table 35. Descriptives statistics for variables used in OLS on bill lenght (stacked dataset, without outliers).

Interval variables	***Mean (SD)***	***Nominal variables***	***%***
Length in words	181.38 (195.45)	Coalition status: yes	31.8
Party group size	32.55 (16.94)	Ballot structure: open list	94.6
District size	17.26 (7.54)	Frontbencher: yes	49.0
Vote share in district	3.246 (2.501)	Higher education: yes	74.2
Year of birth	1952.00 (10.14)	Gender: male	64.8
Personal vote index	10.97 (2.84)	Country: Estonia	11.6
Seniority	1.32 (1.26)		
Distance to elections	774.83 (405.21)		
Number of sponsors	51.29 (44.37)		

Table 36 gives the results of the OLS regression with the number of words as the dependent variable. The model has no problems with multicollinearity as shown by VIF and bivariate correlations. First thing to notice is that only 1.4% of the variance in bill length can be explained by sponsor characteristics. This abysmally low level of explained variance should not be seen as a null finding however, as the aim was not to explain length, but see if certain variables influence length. It means they do not influence it much, but the directions of their effects are still substantively interesting.

Table 36. Factors influencing PMB length in words, Estonia and Finland (OLS regression)

	Model A		***Model B***	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*
MP attributes				
Personal vote index	.413 (.895)	–.016	.840 (.888)	.012
Coalition MP (1=yes)	11.130 (5.087)	.027*	16.283 (5.103)	.039***
Party group size	–.994 (.149)	–.086***	–.842 (.148)	–.073***
Vote share in district	–1.220 (.769)	–016	–.840 (.763)	–.011
Frontbench (1=yes)	10.368 (4.596)	.027*	10.945 (4.557)	.028*
Seniority	1.507 (1.789)	.010	1.276 (1.774)	.008
Year of birth	–.112 (.210)	–.006	–.142 (.208)	–.007
Gender (1=male)	–4.256 (4.227)	–.010	–4.152 (4.190)	–.010
Higher educ. (1=yes)	.012 (4.425)	.000	.357 (4.387)	.001
Country (1=Estonia)	41.402 (8.272)	.068***	27.947 (8.308)	.046***
Bill attributes				
Distance to election	–	–	–.054 (.005)	–.111***
Number of sponsors	–	–	–.311 (.044)	–.071***
Constant	420.141 (410.569)		524.783 (407.057)	
R^2	.015		.033	
Adjusted R^2	.014		.031	
N	11278		11277	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

The beta weights show that out of the four significant coefficients for MP characteristics the party groups size has the strongest impact.

The personal vote, while controlling for other factors, shows no effect whatsoever. Not as an index in model B, nor through the constitutive elements of the index, like the district magnitude or the effect of being elected on an open list or not (see APPENDIX A, Table III). As the null effect is observed while controlling for other factors, one can conclude that the personal vote as conceptualized in this thesis does not translate into more simplistic bills or pseudolegislation. To be completely sure an analysis with the index and the district magnitude fractionalized into dummies was undertaken as well. Using dummies, with the smallest PV values as the reference category did not produce any significant effects. The district magnitude was fractionalized into two dummies with one for districts with a magnitude between 11 to 20 and the other for 21 to 33, with districts with magnitude up to 10 serving as the reference group. No statistically significant differences were detected between these two dummies and the reference group. One can only conclude that the hypothesized

relationship of MPs for whom a personal vote is more important due to the need to stand out among colleagues sponsoring more simplistic bills does not hold.

What does play a role though is the ballot type (see APPENDIX A, Table III), with MPs elected according to an open list sponsoring actually longer bills. This works in the other way as assumed and is the final nail in the coffin for the expected effects of a personal vote inducing environment on the technical nature of the PMBs.

The vote share the MP received in the district has no effects on the technical characteristics of the bill.

The negative coefficient for party size shows that bigger the MP's party group, the shorter the bill is, complete opposite of what was expected. A one MP increase in the size of the party group, means on average .84 word decrease in the bill length in words. It was suggested above that PMBs tend to be sponsored by minor opposition parties. It seems however that MPs from smaller parties seem to behave differently in general, as this effect occurs even when controlling for opposition or coalition status at the time of sponsoring. A closer look at the impact of party group size was taken by fractionalizing it into dummies with one for parties with a size between 16 to 30 and the other between 31 and 55 and taking the party groups with up to 15 seats as the reference group. This shows that bills sponsored by MPs from medium sized parties are significantly longer (on average 33.9 words longer, $p \leq .001$) than bills sponsored by MPs from smaller parties, while controlling for the other effects specified in model B. The second dummy comparing MPs from the biggest groups to the smallest shows the former to sponsor shorter bills (on average 15.9 words shorter, $p \leq .01$). MPs from small and medium sized parties tend to sponsor technically much more complex bills than MPs from bigger parties, but there is no continuous increase in bill length at the lower end of the party size scale. One should remember that this happens while controlling for the number of sponsors a bill has, so the assumed problem of PMB ownership in cooperative cases and hence less attention to the bill details cannot cause MPs from bigger parties to sponsor simpler bills.

The coefficient of the coalition status dummy shows that bills sponsored by coalition MPs tend to be on average 16 words longer than bills by opposition MPs. This is what was expected. The previous chapter showed that PMBs are very short in general and the descriptive statistics table above gives and average length of 181 words only. PMBs by opposition MPs are therefore shorter still and given the very low general average seem to be extremely short and simple bills. That this effect holds even while controlling for country is in line with what has been noted in the literature. PMBs are not only short and simple, but PMBs by opposition MPs are even shorter and simpler.

Lastly, frontbenchers seem to sponsor bills that are on average 11 words longer in comparison to backbenchers. A higher position therefore means sponsoring a more sophisticated PMBs. The assumption that frontbenchers take the regulatory functions of PMBs more seriously, as opposed to backbenchers who might be more interested in sloganeering, seems to hold.

The country dummy was entered to control for possible unobserved national idiosyncrasies, that Estonian PMBs are on average longer was already established in the previous chapter. The fact that the coefficient is significant here even after controlling for other factors shows that Finnish bills are on average 28 words shorter (see also APPENDIX A, Table III), regardless of the opposition or coalition status and the party size of the MP.

5.4. Debate in the plenary and sponsor attributes

Another aim of this chapter is to determine if sponsor characteristics influence the way the bill is treated in the plenary. As with the previous sections, the variables of interest are largely the same and so is the expected direction of effects. The dependent variables measures of debate intensity. In the Estonian case it is the number of speeches held in a debate on a PMB and the number of questions asked in the debate. In the Finnish case it is only the number of speeches held in a debate. This analysis will show if the bill's sponsor will have an effect who and how participates in debates on the bill. The descriptive part showed that there is some variance how bills are treated in the plenary; this section will provide for more definitive answers by controlling for bill and MP attributes in the same model.

5.4.1. Factors influencing debate intensity

5.4.1.1. Variable selection and expectations

The independent variables are the following. First of all again the *personal vote index* and in a separate regression its constitutive elements in the form of the *district magnitude* and the *ballot type*. If other MPs perceive the PMB by MPs for whom a high personal vote is essentially in getting elected as a form of personal credit claiming, then one can assume the debates on bills by these MPs to be more intensive, so as not to allow for this credit claiming. Again, as an option that it is not the institutional context, but actual electoral performance that matters, the *vote share in district* is entered as well. The rest of the variables are essentially controls, as central interest is in the personal vote's strength in structuring the debate of bills, so other factors that might influence debate intensity and hide potential personal vote effects should also be taken into account. The *frontbench* status of the MP should show if bills by frontbenchers receive less scrutiny in debates, as their position might mean backbenchers will refrain from scrutinizing them as heavily as they might otherwise. The *coalition status* is an essential variable here, as the previous chapter showed that debate participation depends heavily on it. Based on the analysis in chapter four, one can assume that bills by coalition MPs should receive more heavier debates as opposition MPs have been generally more active in PMB related activities and should therefore scrutinize coalition bills more heavily. Alternatively, as the success rates of bills by coalition MPs is

higher, at least in Estonia, these bills should receive a more substantive debated, as they are simply likely to become enacted laws. *Seniority, year of birth, education level* and *gender* will act as controls, together with the three bill characteristics of *length, distance to elections* and *number of sponsors*.

As the reading process differs between the two nations, the analysis is done separately on Estonian and Finnish data.

5.4.2. Debate intensity in Estonia

Though the number of speeches held or questions asked is also by definition a count of how many times an event occurs, the distributions of these variables are very different from anything that would require using a Poisson regression. Hence, like in the previous section OLS regression will be used. However, problems with using OLS on the raw data were apparent. Non-normality and heteroscedasticity were clearly observable in examining the residuals. As the substantive interest is in not only if sponsor characteristics influence the debate, but also how much of it can actually be explained by these variables, deleting outliers is out of the question. Instead log-transforming the dependent variable by talking the natural logarithm improved the picture significantly, especially so the with the heteroscedasticity problem. The downside is of course that interpreting OLS results will become less straightforward, as the coefficient will show the effects on the dependent variable in logged counts. This will also mean that coefficients showing small effects will appear even smaller due to the metric being used and might not have any meaningful values until the third or fourth decimal.

5.4.2.1. OLS regression results

First a short look will be taken at the effect of the three bill characteristics as independent variables in the not stacked dataset, with the logged number of speeches as the dependent variable. It becomes clear that including these variables as controls is justified; both the length of the bill and the number of sponsors a bill has show significant effects on the number of speeches held in debate in the first reading. Longer bills go somewhat unexpectedly together with a shorter debate, whereas more sponsors mean more debate, but the distance to elections does not play a role. Length itself shows a non-linear effect. Fractionalization it by taking bills of up to 250 words as the reference group shows that bills of 251 to 500 words in length show no difference in debate intensity, but bills longer than 501 words are clearly less heavily debated than the reference group ($b= -.772$, $p \leq .05$). With the number of sponsors a similar non-linear effect occurs, but with a positive sign meanings bills that have more than 40 sponsors are on average more intensively debated ($b=1.045$, $p \leq .05$) than a reference group of bills with up to 10 sponsors. For the second reading however bills of intermediate length of 251–500 words are more intensively debated ($b=.774$, $p \leq .05$) than shorter bills and there is no difference for the longest bills. Neither bill length nor distance to elections plays a role in the second reading.

Table 37 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Though technically Estonian bills can have up to three readings, only 18 PMBs out of the 328 made it so far. Because of the very limited case number, the third reading will not be included in the analysis. As can be seen from the table, the distribution of the variables does differ between the readings. In some cases, such as the opposition coalition divide or the bill length, the change is substantial. Obviously this is down to the some bills progressing to the given stages and others not. The fact that the PMBs by coalition MPs are much more likely to make it to the second reading, as shown by the change of the coalition status variable in the table, makes clear why running the same models on the indicators for each reading separately is necessary. Progressing of a PMB in the legislative process is not a random event, so summing the given dependent variables for the two readings and analyzing all the bills simultaneously would produce misleading results. Keeping the readings separate will also allow to evaluate if they way a bill is treated differs between the readings. This in itself is a substantively interesting question.

Table 37. Descriptive statistics for variables used in OLS regression on debate length, Estonia.

Interval variables	*Mean (SD)*		*Nominal variables*	*%*	
	1st reading	*2nd reading*		*1st reading*	*2nd reading*
Logged no. of speeches	1.19 (.73)	1.59 (.38)	Coalition MP: yes	43.9	60.0
Personal vote index	5.85 (4.23)	5.25 (4.35)	Ballot: open list	57.8	49.7
Party group size	23.01 (7.72)	20.94 (7.37)	Frontbench: yes	70.3	70.0
Vote share in district	4.648 (3.784)	4.207 (3.528)	Higher educ.: yes	91.1	88.7
District magnitude	8.64 (1.54)	8.93 (1.67)	Gender: male	83.1	82.6
Year of birth	1954.02 (9.43)	1953.73 (10.07)			
Seniority	.60 (.83)	.70 (.86)			
Bill length in words	202.15 (183.43)	521.75 (1480.58)			
Distance to elections	683.63 (521.84)	635.10 (482.91)			
Number of sponsors	40.15 (34.26)	44.06 (35.25)			

Table 38 reports the results of the OLS regression with the logged number of speeches held in debates on a bill in the given reading as the dependent variable. The amount of variance explained is very low, but it does differ clearly between the two readings. This indicates that there might be some substantive differences between variable effects between the readings as well.

Table 38. Factors influencing PMB debate length in speeches, Estonia (OLS regressions)

	Dependent: logged speeches in 1st reading				Dependent: logged speeches in 2nd reading			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*
MP attributes								
Personal vote index	–.001 (.012)	–.004	–.004 (.009)	–.035	.009 (.013)	.040	.000 (.010)	.002
Vote share in district	–002 (.014)	–008	.004 (.010)	.020	–.002 (.016)	–.009	–.013 (.013)	–.049
Coalition MP (1=yes)	–.007 (.077)	–.004	–.244 (.067)	–.167***	–.277 (.091)	–.146**	–.235 (.071)	–.124***
Party group size	.004 (.005)	.046	–.003 (.004)	–.035	.013 (.006)	.106*	–.005 (.005)	–.040
Frontbencher (1=yes)	–.067 (.096)	–.042	.014 (.074)	.009	–.032 (.109)	–.016	.041 (.085)	.020
Seniority	–.027 (.050)	–.030	–.015 (.039)	–.017	–.067 (.060)	–.062	–.061 (.047)	–.057
Year of birth	.012 (.004)	.149**	.003 (.003)	.039	–.001 (.005)	–.013	–.010 (.004)	–.104*
Gender (1=male)	.020 (.105)	.010	.031 (.081)	.016	.055 (.117)	.022	.013 (.091)	.005
Higher educ. (1=yes)	.137 (.142)	.054	–.007 (.110)	–.003	.087 (.147)	.030	–.045 (.115)	–.015
Bill attributes								
Length in words	–	–	–.001 (.000)	–.609***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.221***
Distance to election	–	–	.000 (.000)	.312***	–	–	.001 (.000)	.609***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.014 (.001)	.644***	–	–	.013 (.001)	.472***
Constant	–21.512 (8.657)		–5.196 (6.768)		3.671 (9.291)		19.227 (7.266)	
R^2	.026		.427		.040		.428	
Adjusted R^2	.002		.408		.023		.412	
N	373		373		456		456	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

The expected effect of the personal vote again does not show itself. Assuming that PMBs will be used to for re-election purposes by MPs and hence be also more heavily scrutinized by the competition in the plenary was overly optimistic. Fractionalizing the measure into dummies does not change that either. No linear nor non-linear effects are apparent in any of the two readings. Nor does the ballot type which compares compensation mandate holders against others show any effect. Lastly, the district mandate, which based on the debate above could be conceived as a proxy for the personal vote in connection with an open list, does not show an effect, neither as an interval (see APPENDIX, Table IV) nor through various dummies. The same applies to the share of votes the MP received in the district.

A uniform effect is the much heavier debate of opposition bills. The coefficient for the coalition dummy is negative and relatively big in all the models, meaning debates of PMBs sponsored by coalition MPs tend on average to be less intensive in terms of speeches held. This is somewhat unexpected, after all, why debate bills at length which will most likely not be passed? A possible answer to this will be explored in detail below.

Lastly, the year of birth seems to have a significant effect as well, with bills by younger MPs being less intensively debated. That this does not play a role in the first reading however suggests there is no substantive effect behind this. No effects are apparent for the other variables.

As explained above the speeches are only part of the plenary debate a PMB will receive in Estonia. Before that stage the bill gets presented first, followed by a question and answer session between the MPs and the presenter. This is a substantively different part of the plenary debate on the bills, so it is justified to take a completely separate look at it. Questions are asked on many more bills than speeches held, as a debate is only opened if somebody wants it. Questioning however happens almost with every bill that gets presented, so the relevant population of bills differs from the previous analysis. Also, posing questions to the presenter on the bill takes less effort than actually holding a short speech on the issue. As this instrument is easier to use, the effects of the above given variables should in theory be more pronounced, because MPs have an easier way scrutinizing an opposition PMB for example.

Using the logged number of questions as dependent variable in the not stacked dataset with the three bill characteristics entered as predictors shows that longer bills and bills with more sponsors are more heavily questioned in the first reading. Both, bill length ($b=.001$, $p\leq.05$) and the number of sponsors a bill has ($b=.027$, $p\leq.000$), have a positive effect on the number of questions asked and considering the metrics used, these are quite considerable effects. This emphasizes the need to include these variables as controls in the stacked dataset. The longer and presumably technically the more complex the bill the more questions it seems to be raising for the MPs. Distance to the elections however shows no effect. The same applies for the second reading, longer bills are more heavily scrutinized ($b=.001$, $p\leq.000$) and so are bills with more sponsors ($b=.017$, $p\leq.05$), but distance to elections plays no role. Remember that the big cooperative efforts

tended to be technically longer PMBs, as length here is already controlled for, it cannot be explained by that factor alone. One explanation why questions seem to be more numerous as the number of sponsors increase is the fact that there is a higher share of bills on constitutional issues among them, as was shown by the committee referral. With other words, these are big important questions the bills deal with and this might subsequently induce MPs to actively engage in the debate. As such issues are also more likely to get press attention; it might even be a party policy to get ones opinion on the particular matter out there, even though it might not get further than the recorded minutes of the debate.

Table 39 gives the descriptive statistic for essentially the same variables with the crucial differences that the cases are not exactly the same. Otherwise the changes of the statistics between the readings are in the same direction as in table 37.

Table 39. Descriptive statistics of variables used in OLS regression on logged number of questions asked in debate, Estonia

	Mean (SD)			***%***	
Interval variables	**1st reading**	**2nd reading**	***Nominal variables***	**1st reading**	**2nd reading**
Logged no. of questions	2.11 (1.13)	1.78 (1.17)	Coalition MP: yes	43.9	57.2
Personal vote index	5.63 (4.36)	5.28 (4.39)	Ballot: open list	53.9	49.6
Party group size	21.67 (7.69)	20.95 (7.36)	Frontbench: yes	71.2	70.6
Vote share in district	4.539 (3.803)	4.283 (3.671)	Higher education: yes	89.6	88.5
District magnitude	8.96 (1.76)	9.00 (1.78)	Gender: male	82.9	83.3
Year of birth	1953.11 (9.73)	1953.48 (9.84)			
Seniority	.72 (.87)	.71 (.87)			
Bill length in words	379.0 (1075.77)	489.93 (1356.53)			
Distance to elections	688.92 (433.34)	706.37 (455.86)			
Number of sponsors	23.41 (29.05)	31.16 (34.35)			

The OLS regression results for the stacked dataset are reported in Table 40, with the dependent variable being the logged number of questions asked on a bill in a plenary debate. The sponsor characteristics show almost no effects at all. For the non-effect of the district magnitude or ballot type see APPENDIX, Table V.

Only the coalition-opposition divide plays a role in the first reading, with bills sponsored by coalition MPs being actually more heavily questioned. This is somewhat odd, as it contradicts what was observed in the case of speeches in the first reading. It might be that opposition MPs are the ones scrutinizing bills by coalition MPs.

Table 40. Factors influencing PMB debate length in questions, Estonia (OLS regressions)

Independent variables	Dependent: logged questions in 1st reading				Dependent: logged questions in 2nd reading			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	B (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*
MP attributes								
Personal vote index	.004 (.008)	.017	.000 (.009)	.002	.001 (.011)	.005	–.005 (.009)	–.021
Vote share in district	.006 (.011)	.021	.005 (.101)	.017	.001 (.016)	.003	–.007 (.013)	–.022
Coalition MP (1=yes)	.425 (.069)	.187***	.122 (.061)	.054*	.109 (.094)	.046	–.001 (.079)	–.001
Party group size	.001 (.005)	.007	.000 (.004)	–.001	.003 (.007)	.018	–.007 (.006)	–.043
Frontbencher (1=yes)	–.081 (.082)	–.033	–.048 (.072)	–.019	–.105 (.112)	–.041	–.063 (.093)	–.024
Seniority	–.012 (.044)	–.010	.038 (.038)	.029	.054 (.060)	.040	.069 (.050)	.052
Year of birth	–.001 (.004)	–.007	–.002 (.003)	–.016	.008 (.005)	.063	.003 (.004)	.026
Gender (1=male)	–.032 (.090)	–.011	.002 (.077)	.001	.078 (.123)	.025	.063 (.101)	.020
Higher education (1=yes)	.015 (.113)	.004	–.099 (.098)	–.027	.079 (.152)	.021	–.040 (.126)	–.011
Bill attributes								
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	.124***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.342***
Distance to election	–	–	–.000 (.000)	–.037	–	–	.001 (.000)	.225***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.020 (.001)	.518***	–	–	.019 (.001)	.567***
Constant	3.500 (7.168)		5.239 (6.169)		–13.159 (9.790)		–5.179 (8.095)	
R^2	.037		.293		.008		.332	
Adjusted R^2	.029		.285		.005		.320	
N	1119		1119		676		676	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Examining this relationship more closely through other means provides for a possible explanation. I do have the possibility to break the number of questions asked or speeches held down to whether these were coalition MPs or opposition MPs doing the talking. These were not included in either of these regressions as separate independent variables as it would be tantamount to regressing the same variable on itself. One can however run the same regression with this time not the total number of questions asked, but the number of questions asked by coalition MPs as the dependent variable, also in logged format using the natural logarithm. This produces the same "uneventful" regression table with a crucial difference. The only significant sponsor characteristic is still coalition-opposition status, but it has a negative coefficient ($b=-.115,\ p\leq.05$), meaning bills sponsored by coalition MPs get asked fewer questions by coalition MPs in comparison to bills sponsored by opposition MPs. Using the logged number of questions asked by opposition MPs as the dependent variable however results in again only coalition-opposition status being the only significant sponsor characteristic, but it has a positive coefficient ($b=.287,\ p\leq.000$). This means bills sponsored by coalition MPs get asked more questions by opposition MPs in comparison to bills sponsored by opposition MPs. The effect on the total number of questions is therefore caused by opposition MPs scrutinizing bills by coalition MPs, as coalition MPs however are not so active in scrutinizing PMBs by opposition MPs, the overall effect is one of PMBs by coalition MPs receiving more questions in plenary debates. Nothing like that is however apparent in the second reading, even opposition MPs do not ask more questions on bills by coalition MPs, nor the other way around, the effects are not statistically significant.

For the rest of the variables no amount of data torturing brings out any effects, fractionalization does not show anything. Party size plays absolutely no role, not even a non-linear one. The same applies to the personal vote, bills by MPs with a higher personal vote do not get more heavily scrutinized. District magnitude also does not show any effects, even when turning it into various dummies and so through all the readings. Also, the vote share the MP received in the district has no role to play. Sponsor characteristics therefore seem not to matter much, expect the crucial opposition/coalition status of the MP.

With this added knowledge a new look at why no seasonality was observed in the not stacked dataset with only bill characteristics as predictors shows something completely different. The tables and graphs in the previous chapters suggested that opposition MPs get somewhat more active and coalition MPs less active in debates as elections approach. It might therefore be that the dependent variable of total debate intensity in speeches or questions is a sum of opposite trends that cancel each other out over time, so no seasonality effects are observed. Bivariate correlations between the total number of speeches or questions in both readings are obviously highly positively correlated with the speeches held or questions asked by opposition and coalition MPs, but the correlations are systematically stronger for opposition MPs. The tables on seasonality of debate intensity according to opposition or coalition status in the previous chapters showed how one type of actor became less active and the other more active.

For example, taking the logged number of questions by coalition MPs in the first reading as the dependent variable in the not stacked dataset and entering bill length, number of sponsors and the distance to elections in the form of three dummies for year of sponsoring with the first year serving as the reference category, shows negative coefficient for all dummies. This means each additional year closer to elections is associated with a smaller number of questions asked by coalition MPs, while controlling for the number of sponsors and bill length. Doing the same, but with the logged number of questions asked by opposition MPs as the dependent variable, shows the exact opposite. The overall effect of distance to elections on the aggregate indicator is therefore not observed in the first reading because it is a combination of two completely opposite trends, increasing opposition MP questions and decreasing coalition MP questions through time, which balance each other on the aggregate level and no clear seasonality seems apparent. Though this is hardly surprising, it is nevertheless interesting how a more detailed look shows very clear patterns of seasonality depending on which type of actor one looks at.

To sum up, the only sponsor characteristic that matters in aggregate debate intensity in Estonia is whether the MP comes from the coalition or opposition camp. Breaking the debate down into speeches and questions shows that this effect is reversed for the two indicators with bills by coalition MPs being less heavily debated in terms of speeches, but more heavily scrutinized in terms of questions. It takes certainly less effort to pose a question than to hold a speech, even though these tend to be more like short statements on the matter, as there is a time limit. As scrutinizing the government in question hours and through interpellations is a job usually filled by the opposition, the fact that PMBs by coalition party MPs are also more heavily scrutinized in general and specifically by the opposition is logical. Why speeches on the bill in the plenary show the opposite effects is therefore most likely caused by opposition MPs simply not bothering debating these and sticking only to posing questions when the bill is being introduced by the rapporteurs.

5.4.3. Debate intensity in Finland

It was explained in the previous chapter how the Finnish reading process differs. Unlike the Estonian case, the number of bills reaching the more advanced stages is higher relative to the total number of cases, so data on all readings is included in the multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the logged number of speeches held in debates, for the introductory, first and second reading separately. Examining the residuals of the OLS regression on the dependent variable in its original format showed similar problems as in the Estonian case and log-transforming using the natural logarithm mended this problem to a considerable degree.

5.4.3.1. OLS regression results

Looking first at the not stacked dataset of the Finnish PMBs with the same dependent variable, but with only the three bill characteristics entered as predictors

shows the following. Neither bill length nor distance to elections plays a role in debate intensity in the introductory reading. Similarly to the Estonian case the number of sponsors however has a clear positive effect (*b=.010, p≤.000*). This is not a truly linear effect though; fractionalizing the number of sponsors into dummies for each additional 20 sponsors, showed that the debate is clearly more intensive for bills with 21 to 60 sponsors and 100 and more sponsors, with the reference category being bills with up to 20 sponsors. No effects whatsoever were however detected in the first reading. In the second reading neither length nor number of sponsors show any effects. The distance to elections however does. The debate is somewhat more intensive in the last year (*b=.610, p≤.05*), with bills sponsored in the first year of the legislative period as the reference category. Entering these bill characteristics as controls is therefore clearly necessary.

Table 41 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Like in the Estonian case, the statistics differ between the readings because the relevant populations differ. Especially big is the increase in bill length, meaning longer bills are more likely to advance in the reading process. The coalition opposition balance of the sponsor however changes in a somewhat unexpected direction with less coalition sponsors among the bills that progress to the first or second reading. This might however also be down to stacking the data.

The results of the OLS regression on the stacked dataset are reported in table 42. No problems with multicollinearity were detected.

Table 41. Descriptive statistics of variables used in OLS regression on debate length in Finland.

	Mean (SD)				***%***		
Interval variables	***Intro reading***	***1st reading***	***2nd reading***	***Nominal variables***	***Intro reading***	***1st reading***	***2nd reading***
Logged no. of speeches	2.02 (1.05)	2.86 (1.23)	1.94 (1.16)	Coalition MP: yes	30.9	27.5	26.4
Personal vote index	11.67 (1.54)	11.68 (1.55)	11.68 (1.57)	Frontbench: yes	45.8	47.7	47.1
Party group size	34.06 (17.32)	33.71 (16.78)	33.72 (16.59)	Higher educ.: yes	71.9	73.1	72.8
Vote share in district	3.081 (2.188)	3.020 (2.150)	3.017 (2.172)	Gender: male	62.7	60.4	59.6
District magnitude	18.31 (7.33)	18.46 (7.40)	18.47 (7.45)				
Year of birth	1954.47 (10.13)	1954.57 (10.13)	1954.54 (10.15)				
Seniority	1.39 (1.28)	1.41 (1.28)	1.40 (1.27)				
Bill length in words	176.32 (212.07)	204.59 (285.17)	206.68 (308.42)				
Distance to elections	788.22 (400.93)	882.34 (374.41)	854.41 (371.20)				
Number of sponsors	55.85 (44.81)	56.88 (47.31)	52.30 (39.31)				

Table 42. Factors influencing PMB debate length in speeches, Finland (OLS regressions)

Independent variables	**Dependent: logged number of speeches in intro reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 1st reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 2nd reading**			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	B (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*
MP attributes												
Personal vote index	.022 (.009)	.032	.024 (.009)	.036**	–.031 (.016)	–.040*	–.018 (.012)	–.022	–.010 (.013)	–.013	–.024 (.016)	–.032
Vote share in district	.005 (.006)	.011	.010 (.006)	.020	–.006 (.012)	–.010	–.006 (.011)	–.011	–.027 (.013)	–.050*	–.026 (.012)	–.049*
Coalition MP (1=yes)	–.586 (.032)	–.259***	–.612 (.032)	–.271***	–.272 (.057)	–.099***	–.019 (.052)	–.007	–.098 (.060)	–.037	.163 (.057)	.062**
Party group size	.015 (.001)	.242***	.013 (.001)	.223***	–.003 (.002)	–.047*	.000 (.001)	.000	–.005 (.002)	–.076***	–.004 (.002)	–.063**
Frontbencher (1=yes)	.066 (.027)	.031*	.061 (.026)	.029*	–.063 (.049)	–.025	–.054 (.045)	–.022	–.125 (.053)	–.054*	–.123 (.049)	–.053*
Seniority	.000 (.010)	.001	–.001 (.010)	–.001	.042 (.019)	.044*	.034 (.017)	.034*	.057 (.020)	.062**	.045 (.019)	.049*
Year of birth	.001 (.001)	.007	.001 (.001)	.007	.000 (.002)	–.002	–.001 (.002)	–.006	.000 (.002)	.003	.000 (.002)	–.003
Gender (1=male)	.014 (.024)	.006	.004 (.024)	.002	–.076 (.043)	–.040	–.064 (.040)	–.025	–.038 (.046)	–.016	–.020 (.043)	–.008
Higher educ. (1=yes)	.022 (.025)	.009	.019 (.024)	.008	–.050 (.045)	.018	–.044 (.042)	–.016	–.038 (.049)	–.015	–.019 (.045)	–.007
Bill attributes												
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	.060***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.059***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.100***
Distance to election	–	–	.000 (.000)	–.152***	–	–	.000 (.000)	–.103***	–	–	–.001 (.000)	–.241***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.003 (.000)	.123***	–	–	–.009 (.000)	–.355***	–	–	–.007 (.001)	–.252***

	Dependent: logged number of speeches in intro reading				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 1st reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 2nd reading**			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*
Constant	–.069 (2.388)		.079 (2.340)		3.875 (4.337)		5.275 (4.040)		1.626 (4.660)		3.943 (4.324)	
R^2	.040		.079		.019		.150		.013		.151	
Adjusted R^2	.039		.078		.017		.148		.010		.148	
N	9537		9537		4101		4101		3175		3175	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

The amount of variance explained in the debate by MP characteristics only is between 1.0 to 3.9%, as shown by the adjusted R-squared. This is very small, meaning sponsor characteristics on their own do not affect debate intensity much.

What strikes one looking at the Finnish data is that sponsor characteristics do not have virtually any effects in the first reading after controlling for bill characteristics, as opposed to the introductory and second reading. Also interesting is the fact that all three of the sponsor characteristics that have significance both in the introductory and second reading, change in signs. The nature of the debate therefore differs between the readings depending on the nature of the PMBs sponsor. One has to bear in mind that this is observed while controlling for the same factors in each reading separately.

The introductory reading seems to work according to a different logic indeed, as only here does the widely anticipated personal vote play a significant role. The bills by MPs with a higher personal vote, receive more attention and are more heavily debated in the plenary. The same applies for the district magnitude effect (see APPENDIX, Table VI). Bills by MPs from bigger districts are more heavily debated in the introductory reading. This is the way it was expected it to be in the beginning. Fractionalizing the personal vote effect and the district magnitude showed the same thing and it showed that in the introductory reading the debate is significantly more intensive for bills sponsored by MPs from the biggest districts with a size of 21 to 33 (reference category 1 to 10). No differences appeared between midsized districts in comparison to the smallest. For the first reading the differences between midsized and smallest districts were significant, but not in comparison to the biggest ones. In the second reading district dummies showed no effect at all. Exactly the same happened with the personal vote effect, the debate is more intensive for bills sponsored by MPs with the highest PV value and no difference is apparent between midlevel and low personal vote values.

It seems therefore that the effect observed in the first reading reflects a more qualitative effect of the personal vote, with a clear differences between the scale endpoints more apparent than a continuous linear effect. Then again, the fact that the personal vote has shown weak effects at best in the range of areas I assumed it to play a role, might mean this is more a spurious than a substantive effect.

However, graphing the logged number of speeches against the district magnitude does indicate such a relationship, though it is very weak. Doing a simple linear regression with logged speeches in the first reading as the dependent and district size as the independent variable shows as positive effect ($b=.007,\ p\leq.000$). The fact that controlling for other additional factors, as was done in the regression on the stacked dataset, does not really change the strength of the relationship, might mean it is not entirely by chance that this connection is observed. It remains a puzzle though why this is observed in the first reading only.

That the effect of sponsor characteristics is different according to the reading is made also apparent by the role the coalition-opposition status of the sponsor plays. PMBs by coalition MPs are clearly less intensively debated in the

introductory reading and the effects are very strong. It is the other way around in the second reading however, bills by coalition MPs are more heavily debated. Examining this effect more closely in the same way as was done in the case of questioning in Estonia brings out entirely different effects. Substituting the total number of speeches held with the logged number of speeches by coalition MPs as the dependent variable shows a negative coefficient for the coalition status dummy in the intro reading. This means PMBs by coalition MPs are less intensively debated by coalition MPs. However, taking the logged number of speeches by opposition MPs as the dependent variable shows the same negative effect. PMBs by coalition MPs are therefore less intensively debated by both, coalition and opposition MPs. In the second reading PMBs by coalition MPs are in fact debated more intensively by coalition MPs, but no apparent significant differences exist when speeches by opposition MPs is used as the dependent variable. The fact that there is no clear effect with bills by opposition MPs being more heavily grilled by coalition MPs and the other way around, suggests a less pronounced opposition coalition divide in the Finnish parliament than in Estonia.

The vote share in district, which was entered to control for the possibility that not a high personal vote share of the MP, but an actual good electoral performance in the district might influence inter-parliamentary behavior and hence also the perception of the MPs actions by other members, has significance in the second reading. The negative effect suggests that bills by MPs who performed better in the district are less heavily debated in the final stage of the reading process. One would have expected it to work the other way, if it would have the same effects as a personal vote. The reasoning that good electoral performance works as a strong mandate, which subsequently might influence the MP to behave more individualistically in parliament, which should then spark other MPs into scrutinizing this MPs actions more heavily in the plenary, is not backed up by the data.

Party group size coefficients show that PMBs by MPs from bigger party groups are more heavily debated in the intro reading and the other way around in the second reading. If the heavier debate for cooperative efforts in Estonia could have been caused by these tending to be on constitutional matters and therefore having more central importance, then in the Finnish case this does not apply, as the previous and current chapter have demonstrated. What was however clearly different between the countries was an on average larger share of the party faction members behind a bill and that these tended to be MPs from one party only. It could be that a larger number of sponsors indicate the PMB to be a party bill, which might prompt other MPs to criticize it more heavily than they would do in case of a PMB by a few colleagues that does not have a clearly partisan feeling to it. Then again, this should hold in the other readings as well.

Lastly, bills sponsored by MPs defined as frontbenchers are more heavily debated in the intro reading, but less heavily so in the second. I expected a less heavy scrutinizing of frontbenchers; high ranking positions might command a certain level of respect from the backbenchers. But one can think of possible explanations why bills by frontbenchers could be more heavily scrutinized.

Opposition or coalition MPs might like to put the knife into high ranking members of the opposing side. But why the effects change between the readings remains a puzzle.

The opposite effect of three variables between the introductory and second reading cannot also be explained with the fact that bills that make it to the second reading are much more likely to be accepted and this causes the diverging patterns, as the success chances of Finnish bills is basically non-existent.

The Finnish case presents as puzzle. First, more sponsor characteristics show effects on debate intensity in comparison to the Estonian case. The effects are however not stable between all the readings. Some change signs, some become significant while others lose their significance. The small amount of total variance explained might suggest that the unstable coefficients are simply down to not substantive and uniform effects at play. Then again, the examination of the coalition opposition divide showed effects that make sense when the data is analyzed in detail. One possible explanation for it is that the bill's progress is not random. Although many Finnish PMBs go through all the readings, not all do so, as shown by the case numbers in table 42. Different effects might be observed because the bill's progress to the next stage might be systematically connected to certain factors that are not observed. With other words, progress to different stages is not a random occurrence, but some unobserved factor causes the coefficients to show different values between the readings. For example, the fact that coalition bills are less heavily scrutinized in the introductory reading, but more heavily in the last reading suggests that bills that make it thus far and come from coalition MPs, are taken more seriously and hence also debated at length. This would be clearly a non random effect.

The question is therefore if these potential omitted variables would increase the amount of variance explained and stabilize the coefficients between the readings. Unfortunately one can only diagnose an omitted variable bias once this variable is observed and included. If this is therefore a non-random effect that causes the difference in coefficient signs and effects or simply random noise cannot be answered without additional data.

5.5. Amending PMBs and sponsor attributes in Estonia

This section is a continuation of the descriptive section on the amending of PMBs in Estonia in the previous chapter. The purpose is to use essentially the same set of variables on the bill's sponsor to see if PMBs by some sponsors are more heavily amended. The added value of this section in comparison to the previous chapter is using multivariate analysis and including bill characteristics as controls, as the previous analysis showed that some bill characteristics, such as length, correlate with how heavily it is amended. Including these as controls will give a true estimation of the possible effects of the bill's sponsors on the amending process.

5.5.1. Factors influencing PMB amending

Most of the amendments to bills are submitted after the first reading and will be debated and if needed, voted on, in the second reading. Very rarely will bills go through a third reading as well, with the possibility of submitting amendments before that. As these cases are exceptional and only 18 of the 328 PMBs analyzed here had in fact three readings, the amendments introduced between the second and the third reading will not be analyzed. The subsequent discussion therefore focuses on the part where most of the amendments are sponsored, namely between the first and second reading. The dependent variable is the total number of amendments introduced for the second reading. In addition a model with the number of actually accepted amendments will be estimated as well. This will show which bills are actually amended, as opposed to which bills other actors simply try to amend without necessarily succeeding.

5.5.1.1. Variable selection and expectations

The set of independent variables is again the same and so are the expectations. First, MPs with a high score on the *personal vote index* value should in theory sponsor technically simpler bills that might need more amending. The previous sections have already shown pretty comprehensively that neither the technical characteristics of the bills nor its treatment in the plenary is actually influenced by the personal vote level of the sponsor. This will therefore be the last proof of evidence that whereas the personal vote value seems to have a clear effect on sponsoring, it does not translate into any substantive effects connected to other aspects of the bill nor its fate in the legislative process. Again, the *district magnitude* as well as the *ballot type* will be used in a separate regression model to evaluate if the constitutive elements instead of the index itself show any effects. Also, the actual *vote share in district* will again complement the personal vote index, to see if the perceived effect of the institutional structure or actual electoral performance plays a role. If this variable will play a role, then the effect should be in the same direction as with the index, meaning bills by MPs with a stronger mandate should need heavier amending. The *coalition status* of the MP will be used to estimate if coalition MPs, whose bills are clearly more successful, therefore also sponsor bills of higher quality that need subsequently less amending. It was already demonstrated above that some of the effects related to this variable were contrary to the expected. It is likely that these bills, precisely because of their higher success chances, will be more heavily amended as they are simply taken more seriously. This is however a substantively different explanation than lack of quality. The empirical picture might therefore lend itself to opposing interpretations. As the previous analysis has shown that MPs from smaller parties might behave differently even when controlling for coalition status, *party group size* will be entered as well in order to determine if group size matters. As there should be less expertise in smaller groups, the bills by these MPs should in theory need more amending. The usual controls are again *seniority, year of birth, education level* and *gender* of the MP.

With regard to bill characteristics three controls will be entered. As longer bills where more heavily amended *length of the bill* control will provide for more accurate sponsor characteristic estimates. *Distance to elections* is entered as even though there was no seasonality in aggregate amending levels, different actors did show different activity levels depending on the season. Finally, the *number of sponsor* will serve as a control for the case that cooperative efforts by MPs might need actually more amending if the issue of PMB ownership will have effects on the quality of the bill.

Due to non-linearity and heteroscedasticity problems the dependent variables had to be log-transformed again using the natural logarithm. An additional analysis with the same model was also run with amendments sponsored by committees, opposition MPs and coalition MPs as separate dependent variables. These three actors were responsible for the vast bulk of all the amendments, so controlling if they behave differently depending on the nature of the bill's sponsor is substantively interesting. One could hypothesize for example that MPs might submit more amendments for PMBs in order to counter individual credit claiming. Also, opposition MPs might for the same reason sponsor more amendments for PMBs by coalition MPs and vice versa.

5.5.1.2. OLS regression results

Before moving to the discussion of the full regression model on the stacked data, again a look at the relationships between the familiar bill characteristics and the amendments in the not stacked dataset will be taken. The three bill characteristics explain a respectable 29.1% of the variance in sponsored amendments. It is however down to one variable only. Bill length plays a strong role. The longer the bill, the more amending motions to it will be submitted and the relationship is linear. For example, taking the bills with up to 250 words in length as the reference category shows that bills between 251 to 500 words in length are clearly more heavily amended ($b=.571$, $p\leq.05$) and bills longer than 501 words even more so ($b=1.585$, $p\leq.000$). Considering that the coefficients show a change in the logged number of amendments submitted to the bill, then these are substantial effects. Neither the distance to elections nor the number of sponsors a bill has seem to play a role for the amending frequency of PMBs. The same effects apply to the number of accepted amendments. It is a fairly logical relationship therefore. Longer bills are more heavily amended, but it does not seem to be seasonal.

Using the number of amendments submitted by committees as the dependent variable shows the same things. There is however a difference when amendments sponsored by opposition MPs is used as the dependent variable. Though the relationship between the length of the bill and amending still holds, there is also evidence for seasonality. Especially bills sponsored in the last year of the legislative period receive more amendments from opposition MPs ($b=.508$, $p\leq.05$), with bills sponsored in the first years serving as the reference group. The second nor third year do not show any significant differences. Lastly, using the amendments submitted by coalition MPs as the dependent variable showed

the same effect of length of bill, but nothing for the other two variables. One therefore needs to qualify the statement given above a bit, the general pattern of amending is clearly connected to the length of the bill, while controlling for seasonality and the number of sponsors. Committees and coalition MPs amend PMBs in constant manner regardless of closeness of elections. One particular type of actor however acts according to a different logic. The opposition MP becomes a more active amender in the last year before elections.

Table 43 gives the descriptive statistics used in the regression analysis below and the results of the OLS regression itself are reported in Table 44.

Table 43. Descriptive statistics of variables used in OLS regression on PMB amending in Estonia

Interval variables	***Mean (SD)***	***Nominal variables***	***%***
Logged sponsored amendments	1.66 (1.33)	Coalition MP: yes	57.2
Logged accepted amendments	1.47 (1.09)	Ballot structure: open list	49.6
Personal vote index	5.28 (4.39)	Frontbench: yes	70.6
Party group size	20.95 (7.36)	Higher education: yes	88.5
Vote share in district	4.285 (3.675)	Gender: male	83.3
District magnitude	9.00 (1.78)		
Year of birth	1953.48 (9.84)		
Seniority	.71 (.87)		
Bill length in words	489.93 (1356.53)		
Distance to elections	706.37 (455.86)		
Number of sponsors	31.16 (34.35)		

The variance in amending explained by sponsor characteristics only is again very low. No effects by sponsor characteristics on the total number of amendments sponsored to a bill are apparent after controlling for bill characteristics. For the number of accepted amendments as the dependent variable, only one variable shows a significant impact. Bills by coalition MPs are in fact more heavily amended. One would have expected it to be the other way around. It might of course be that as bills by coalition MPs have clearly higher success chances, as will also be analyzed more closely below, they are simply taken more seriously in the plenary.[51] Sponsoring amendments to these bills therefore makes more sense, as in case of passing, they might have actual policy consequences. Instead of sloganeering or the usual opposition politics of not being able to really influence the legislative output, actual legislative work might therefore be taking place.

[51] This reason behind the effect was suggested by professor Rein Taagepera.

Table 44. Factors influencing PMB amending in Estonia (OLS regression)

	Dependent: logged number of sponsored amendments				Dependent: logged number of accepted amendments			
	Model A		Model B		Model A		Model B	
	B (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*	*B* (SE)	*Beta*
MP attributes								
Personal vote index	.005 (.013)	.016	.002 (.013)	.007	.011 (.014)	.043	.010 (.011)	.039
Vote share in district	.004 (.018)	.011	–.005 (.015)	–.013	–.001 (.016)	–.004	–.008 (.012)	–.028
Coalition MP (1=yes)	.174 (.107)	.065	.134 (.092)	.050	.227 (.095)	.103*	.160 (.077)	.073*
Party group size	.007 (.008)	.039	–.001 (.006)	–.005	.007 (.007)	.045	–.001 (.006)	–.004
Frontbencher (1=yes)	–.070 (.127)	–.024	–.068 (.109)	–.023	–.018 (.113)	–.008	–.018 (.090)	–.008
Seniority	.067 (.069)	.044	.000 (.058)	.000	.058 (.062)	.046	–.001 (.050)	–.001
Year of birth	.002 (.006)	.013	–.005 (.005)	–.036	.012 (.005)	.109*	.006 (.004)	.054
Gender (1=male)	.138 (.139)	.039	.067 (.118)	.019	.093 (.124)	.032	.030 (.099)	.010
Higher educ. (1=yes)	–.115 (.174)	–.028	–.034 (.149)	–.008	–.073 (.153)	–.021	.001 (.123)	.000
Bill attributes								
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	.471***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.544***
Distance to election	–	–	.001 (.000)	.317***	–	–	.001 (.000)	.268***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.009 (.001)	.231***	–	–	.008 (.001)	.224***
Constant	–2.105 (11.142)		9.939 (9.483)		–22.420 (9.762)		–11.242 (7.928)	
R^2	.009		.294		.027		.380	
Adjusted R^2	.004		.281		.012		.366	
N	671		671		578		578	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Also, bills sponsored by MPs from bigger districts are actually less heavily amended (see APPENDIX, Table VII), which is again contrary to the expected. However, after including the district magnitude and ballot type the coalition status loses its significance. The collinearity statistics did not show that these variables might have been blocking each other. In fact, leaving the district magnitude out, but the ballot type in, shows coalition status to have an effect. Only after including the district magnitude does it lose its significant effect. It means that taking into account the district size, shows that coalition-opposition status of the sponsor does not play a role in total PMB amending frequency. One has to conclude that in fact none of the expected effects were observed and bills seem to be amended no matter who the sponsor is.

Taking this analysis still one step further and using amendments by the three most active sponsors, committee, opposition MPs and coalition MPs, as separate dependent variables (in logged form) does not produce any substantive differences. The coalition opposition divide in fact does not appear relevant at all anymore. It seems therefore that opposition MPs are not more active in amending PMBs by coalition MPs nor the other way around, which is somewhat surprising. It is not possible to run the same separate analysis with the number of accepted amendments broken down according to their sponsors, as more than 90% of these are by committees, so MPs do try to amend the bills, but are largely unsuccessful in it. One can only conclude that the amending process of PMBs is in general unaffected by sponsor characteristics.

If the nature how the bills are amended could unfortunately not be evaluated using OLS regression with the change in words as the dependent variable. It suffered from extreme heteroscedasticity which could not be mended with any transformation techniques. The same applied when using the ratio of lengths between the two versions of the bill as the dependent variable. Splitting the bills into two, according to whether the length changed between +/–10% (which includes unchanged bills) or more than +/–10%, and using this as the dependent variable in a binary logistic regression did not produce any conclusive results in the stacked dataset with the same predictors as in the regression above, nor with bill characteristics as the only predictors on the not stacked dataset. This suggests that all PMBs if amended tend to be lengthened as established in the previous chapter, regardless of anything else.

5.6. PMB success and sponsor attributes

The last regression analysis run in this chapter looks at if sponsor specific factors influence the likelihood of a bill getting passed against being rejected or left to lapse until the end of the legislative mandate. As the success rate of Finnish PMBs is almost non-existent it does not really make sense to compare a handful of successful bills against the overwhelming number of PMBs that have a more unfortunate ending. Suffice to say that the handful of Finnish PMBs that were passed or merged with a government bill and passed had in comparison to rest of the PMBs a majority share of coalition MPs among the sponsors. They were sponsored also earlier in the legislative period, where on average longer and had more men among the sponsor than unsuccessful bills. Other characteristics did not differentiate much between the successful and unsuccessful Finnish PMBs.

5.6.1 Factors influencing PMB success

5.6.1.1. Variable selection and expectations

The higher success chance of PMBs in Estonia allows for a more thorough examination. This section will therefore focus on Estonian data only. The independent variables will be exactly the same as used in the regression above.

The dependent variable is whether the bills was passed (1) or not (0). One clear expectation is that bills by *coalition* MPs should be more likely to pass. With regard to the list of others one cannot really pin down how the numbers should fall. If the pseudolegislation assumption holds, then a higher *personal vote* should in fact mean lower success chances. In the same vein bigger *district size* and the *ballot type* with an open list might reduce the likelihood of a bill by that particular MP being passed. The *vote share in district* is again a control if actual electoral performance and not a personal vote inducing environment plays a central role. *Frontbench* status should go together with a higher likelihood of a bill being passed, as one can assume that people with this position take sponsoring more seriously and focus more on regulating issues than maybe sloganeering. They should also be able to command support from backbenchers, which might increase the chances for getting the bill passed. The previous sections also showed that frontbenchers sponsor more complicated bills, which adds weight to this expectation. The possible effect of *party group size* is not so clear, as it depends probably more on the given political circumstances in parliament. Nevertheless, entering it for exploratory purposes is worth a while as the previous sections have shown that party size does affect how its members behave in connection to PMBs. *Seniority, year of birth, gender* and *education* serve as controls. Lastly the three bill characteristics, *bill length, distance to elections and number of sponsors* are entered as a controls

5.6.1.2. Logistic regression results

Before moving to the full regression results an analysis on the not stacked dataset with the same dependent variable and only bill characteristics as independent variables was undertaken. It shows that distance to elections does not play a role in whether the bill will be passed or not. Longer bills however seem to have a higher likelihood of being passed. Length obviously does not cause the passing of a bill, what it does suggest, however, is that passed bills are clearly longer, meaning also technically more complex. Using the familiar dummy coding with bills up to 250 words in length as the reference category, shows that bills longer than 501 words are more than two times more likely to be passed than not ($B=.830$, $Exp(B)=2.293$, $p \leq .05$). Bills between 250 and 500 words in length do not show any differences in likelihood of being passed. The number of sponsors did not seem to matter. This is unexpected, as one would assume that cooperative bills are more likely to succeed. Apparently, while controlling for bill length and distance to elections nothing like that holds.

Table 45 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The dependent variable is a dichotomy of whether a bill was passed or not. One can already see that the dependent variable distribution in the dataset differs from the actual share of passed bills for the 1999–2003 period due to stacking. This indicates that the number of sponsors a bill has makes passing more likely. The actual results of the binary logistic regression are reported in table 46.

Table 45. Descriptive statistics of variables used in logistic regression on PMB success in Estonia

Interval variables	*Mean (SD)*	*Nominal variables*	*%*
Personal vote index	5.59 (4.40)	Bill passed: yes	40.3
Party group size	21.67 (7.85)	Coalition status: yes	41.7
Vote share in district	4.508 (3.629)	Ballot structure: open list	53.1
District magnitude	9.04 (1.80)	Frontbench: yes	70.6
Year of birth	1952.65 (9.71)	Higher education: yes	90.3
Seniority	.71 (.85)	Gender: male	82.4
Bill length in words	365.39 (992.51)		
Distance to elections	673.33 (436.51)		
Number of sponsors	21.77 (27.41)		

The regression results show that sponsor characteristics on their own explain a reasonably large amount of variance, 13.7%, in whether a bill gets passed vs not as shown by the Nagelkerke R^2. The model istelf performs reasonably well with prediction accuracy at 67.1%. So sponsor characteristics clearly influence the success of the bill.

Table 46. Factors influencing PMB success in Estonia, reference category: not passed bills (binary logistic regression)

	Model A		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B (SE)*	*Exp(B)*	*B (SE)*	*Exp(B)*
Sponsor attributes				
Personal vote index	–.005 (.018)	.995	–.007 (.018)	.993
Vote share in district	–.011 (.020)	.990	–.012 (.021)	.988
Coalition status (1=yes)	1.290 (.121)	3.633***	1.061 (.128)	2.888***
Party group size	–.016 (.008)	.984*	–.018 (.009)	–.983*
Frontbench (1=yes)	.207 (.148)	1.230	.235 (.152)	1.265
Seniority	.070 (.079)	1.073	.095 (.082)	1.100
Year of birth	.003 (.006)	1.003	.002 (.007)	1.002
Gender (1=male)	–.026 (.158)	.975	–.019 (.161)	.981
Higher education (1=yes)	–.375 (.203)	.688	–.424 (.207)	.654*
Bill attributes				
Distance to elections	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000
Number of sponsors	–	–	.015 (.002)	1.015***
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000***
Constant	–6.112(12.544)	.002	–4.591 (12.788)	.011
Nagelkerke R^2	.137		.185	
% correctly predicted	67.1		67.1	
N	1339		1339	

Moving to sponsor attributes does not show anything that was not already expected based on the descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses above. PMBs sponsored by coalition MPs are almost three times more likely to be passed than bills by opposition MPs.

Oddly, being a member of a bigger party however reduces the likelihood of the bill being passed. This cannot be explained by the fact that some big parties have been constantly in the opposition in Estonia and had therefore their bills rejected, as coalition-opposition status is controlled for. Bigger party means usually also more exposure, it could be therefore that party competition plays a role here. MPs from smaller parties do not really present opponents on equal footing with the big players, for this reason they might have an easier time getting their PMBs through parliament or at least benefit from a indifferent stand taken by other MPs in parliament. Bigger parties on the other hand might consider policy initiatives by MPs from their more serious competitors relevant enough to warrant an outright opposing stand on a given PMB.

Lastly, the education level entered as a socio-demographic control plays a role as well with MPs with a higher education having apparently a lower likelihood of getting their PMBs passed. The fact that this variable is not significant in the model with the district magnitude and ballot type included instead of the personal vote index, suggests some problems with it though. Other variables do not have any effects. The district magnitude does not show any differences as an interval (see APPENDIX, Table VIII) nor when fractionalized in different ways. Nor does the personal vote index show any effects whatsoever.

One can sum up therefore that what matters in PMBs getting passed whether the sponsor is a coalition or opposition MP and not much more. Controlling for the opposition or coalition status did not show the expected negative effect of the personal vote index value nor an effect in the same direction for bigger districts.

5.7. Discussion

This chapter connected MP characteristics with bill attributes and analyzed if the former had any implications for five aspects of PMBs: the topics, the technical nature of the bills, the reading process in the plenary, amending and lastly, the success chances of the bills. The two latter were evaluated based on Estonian data only. The results provided for a list of interesting findings.

First, the topics of the bills. The central assumption was that PMBs will be sponsored on a narrow set of topics depending on the sponsor's characteristics. MPs to whom a good personal reputation is central in guaranteeing reelection, should sponsor comparatively more PMBs. If the main function of these bills is however not regulatory, but expressive, then it would be rational not to spend time initiating bills on a wide range of issues, but focus on certain key topics only that are more susceptible to credit claiming and do not take additional resources in the form of having to familiarize oneself with various issues and

areas that might require regulatory action. MPs with a high personal vote should therefore initiate PMBs on a narrower segment of topics than other MPs. Also, if the notion of pseudolegislation would hold then a mismatch between MP expertise and the topics they sponsor PMBs on should be observable.

To test these assumptions the empirical distribution of the bills topics was taken as the starting point and sponsor characteristics for bills on most popular PMB topics compared with the sponsor characteristics of the rest of the bills. The main finding was that the personal vote level does not show consistent effects, neither in Estonian nor the Finnish case. For Estonia there was also clearly no big disparity between the MPs field of expertise and the topics of the PMBs. MPs tended to sponsor bills that were referred to the same committee they themselves had been or were members of. The coalition or opposition divide also did not show consistent effects. Although it became clear that opposition MPs are much more likely to sponsor PMBs on social issues.

The results of the Finnish case were partly similar to Estonia. The personal vote again did not show any effects. A more individualistic focus therefore does not influence the topic range of PMBs. What was however consistent in the Finnish case, was the more narrow focus of opposition MPs. They clearly sponsor PMBs on a very narrow set of topics only. Again, social issues, as in the Estonian case, stand out as a particular focus. Contrary to the Estonian case, however, Finnish MPs do not sponsor bills on issues they should themselves be experts on, as there is a strong mismatch between committee membership and PMB topics. Instead, no matter what, MPs initiate bills on two topics, regardless of their own committee membership. The Estonian and Finnish cases therefore do not support the assumed relationship between the personal vote level and PMB topics. They do however show that characteristics of the sponsor are systematically related to the topics the bills deal with. Opposition MPs in both cases are sponsoring bills on social issues and surprisingly, there is a strong and systematic relationship between gender and the likelihood to sponsor bills on this issue area. What they also do is to show that PMBs in general have a very narrow focus, as rule on social issues.

The second major focus was a connection between the bill's technical complexity and MP characteristics. The assumption was that PMBs sponsored by MPs elected in a context conducive to personal vote seeking will sponsor comparatively more PMBs and this will also be reflected in the technical characteristics of the bills. More precisely, PMBs by MPs scoring high on the personal vote should be technically simpler than others if the expressive and not the regulatory function is central. The evidence does not suggest such a relationship to hold. The technical nature of the bill does however depend on whether the MP belongs to the coalition or opposition and how big the party group the MP is member of is. Opposition MPs sponsor substantially shorter and hence also simpler bills than coalition MPs, whereas bigger party groups correlates with simpler bills. Instead of the personal vote effects, the notion of pseudo-legislation, which means simpler bills that as a rule will never be passed, applies to opposition PMBs. This finding is line with prior observations regarding

PMBs in European parliaments. PMBs are not only short and simple, but PMBs by opposition MPs are even much shorter and simpler. Why this is so might have several reasons. First it is clear that a lack of resources in comparison to ministerial bureaucracies means MPs have in general lesser abilities to tackle big and complicated issues that need extensive background knowledge in order to be able to proceed to drafting relevant policy instruments in the form of laws. Secondly, it is highly likely that knowing the low success chances an opposition bills has means that spending time on drafting a complicated and thorough bill to regulate a matter is clearly a waste of limited time and will hence be neglected, resulting in a more simplistic bill. Such behavior is very ration if the expressive function and not the regulatory function takes centre stage.

A third subject of the chapter was debate intensity and its connections with the sponsor characteristics. It was assumed that if indeed MPs with a high personal vote sponsor more bills for credit claiming, then this should spur other members into scrutinizing the bills more heavily in the plenary, so as to inhibit potential personal vote seeking. The evidence again did not support this. What was however supported by the data was different debate intensity depending on the opposition or coalition status of the sponsor. Especially in the Estonian case, a pattern with opposition MPs scrutinizing coalition MP bills and the other way around was evident. It also showed seasonality patterns with especially opposition MPs becoming more active. Besides this, the sponsor characteristics however do not show strong effects on the debate of a given bill as the variance explained stays low. In the Finnish case there is also substantial differences between the effects of variables through different readings, suggesting bills progress through the stages non-randomly and are treated differently depending both on the reading and sponsor characteristics.

A fourth aspect examined with Estonian data only was the amending of PMBs. Again, the central assumption was that PMBs by personal vote seekers are more heavily amended, as they are sponsored for electioneering purposes and therefore lack the quality a good draft bill has to have. It was further assumed that in this case the amenders should be collective actors responsible for the quality of legislation such as committees. If however the bills are amended so as not allow for individual credit claiming, then other MPs should be the ones amending the bills. The results suggest that only the opposition or coalition status of the sponsor matters, with bills by the latter being in general more heavily amended. Surprisingly, opposition MPs are not more active in amending bills by coalition MPs and the other way around. The actor doing most of the amending are committees. Why they amend bills by coalition MPs in bigger numbers is most likely down to these having higher success chances. Rewriting opposition bills extensively does not make much sense when these have a very low likelihood of being passed by the plenary.

The last aspect evaluated again only with the Estonian data was the connections between sponsor characteristics and the bills fate. As the very definition of a piece of pseudolegislation contained it not being sponsored to pass, the assumption was that a higher personal vote would mean a lower likelihood

of the PMB being passed. As the central effect was expected to be played by the coalition opposition status of the sponsors, then the personal vote, if important, should play a role while controlling for the arguably central divide. No such effects were observed. Coalition bills were many times more likely to be passed, but this finding is nothing novel.

The main finding of this chapter is therefore that although the assumed effect of the personal vote was observed in the case of PMB sponsoring, the subsequent process connected to the bills is not really influenced by it. Instead other central factors, mainly the opposition coalition divide, determine with what topics does the bill deal with, how it looks like and how it is treated in the plenary.

6. CONCLUSION

This study aimed at giving a comprehensive and detailed picture of private members' bills. The aim was both Y- and X-centric. The former meant taking a look at all aspects of the bills, starting with the sponsoring of the bill, then looking at nature of the bills themselves, followed by an analysis of the legislative process that comes after initiation and ending with the examination of the final fate of the bills – rejection or passing on the floor. The X-centric focus revolved around one central concept running through the analysis of all the aspects of PMBs – the effect of an institutional setting that should encourage cultivating a strong personal image. Estonia and Finland provide for especially good cases for testing this aspect. Estonia has a tiered electoral system that creates three distinct types of mandates, which all differ according to the just mentioned setting. Finland has a simple open list proportional system with a wide range in district magnitudes, which provides for a more quantitative variance in institutional setting that should also induce strong personal image cultivation. On top of that, both countries show a high frequency of PMB sponsoring. Data on 993PMBs, that is all such bills sponsored in Estonia during the period of 1999–2007 and in Finland during the period of 2003–2007, was used for the analysis. This short concluding chapter summarizes the central empirical findings of this study and discusses the contribution of the thesis.

The central theoretical approach taken in this thesis proceeds from the assumption that institutional rules affect behavior. It also assumes that individuals working within this setting are primarily self-interested. In the case of MPs therefore primarily interested in retaining their achieved position or as Mayhew put it, "interested in nothing else" than getting reelected (1974, 13). The precise behavior resulting from such a motivation has been shown to depend on the institutional setting. The effects of the setting have however been mostly demonstrated through a qualitative difference between proportional and majoritarian systems, where the latter have been shown to produce a more individualistic and constituency oriented outlook and the former a more general view of representing specific social strata or wider groups. It is clear that getting elected in a majoritarian system is dependent on name recognition in the constituency. A proportional system, on the other hand, emphasizes the party role more strongly. Engaging in comparisons of these two types of systems effectively boils down to taking extreme cases to demonstrate the theorized effects. There is obviously nothing wrong with such a study design. It does however mean that the mechanism which underlines why these two particular set of rules produce diverging behavior, is the result of strong qualitative differences between the two systems. One can however think that smaller, not necessary qualitative, but quantitative differences between and also within systems will produce also behavioral differences due to the same mechanism observed at work, this time not simply under conditions at either extremes. The mechanism of "primacy of reelection" can conceivably produce diverging effects also within proportional systems if one sees the settings individual actors

face along a continuum starting at one scale endpoint for environments strongly inducing personal image cultivation, and moving along to another endpoint not at all favorable to such behavior. This is precisely what Carey and Shugart do in their analysis of the degrees a good personal image might matter in different electoral systems (1995). There are still relatively few applications of this insight. This thesis contributes towards the empirical analysis of the effect of variance within proportional systems on behavior of legislators by using individual level data.

Such an approach faces its own problems. Focusing on within system variance and using individual level data raises the question of how to conceptualize and measure the phenomenon in a quantitative manner, as certain electoral rules and hence part of the institutional setting, are constant for all actors. The issue was resolved by simply taking Carey and Shugart's (1995) framework and applying it to the individual level. This means that some effects are indeed constant, some however not. The variance of the personal vote level conceptualized in that manner is necessarily smaller within a specific system than between systems. Using a two case study design allows including both, the somewhat limited within and the more pronounced between system variance. The personal vote level itself is conceptualized as the degree to which the system encourages strong personal image cultivation.

Proceeding from this the thesis contributes towards a more nuanced operationalization of the personal vote. It adds a small, but important detail to the way district magnitude effects are taken account in open list vs other system (see section 2.2.) by applying a multiplicative logic for both types, which differs from the multiplicative logic for closed lists and additive logic in other case used hitherto (e.g. Hallerberg & Marier 2004). The proposed operationalization can be used for aggregate level comparisons between different electoral systems as well and will provide for a measurement that is conceptually more coherent. The analysis applies also Rein Taagepera's (2008) suggestion of establishing the theoretical limits a measure can conceptually have, so as not to predict absurdities. This showed that indexing the personal vote in the manner of this thesis, which follows directly from Carey and Shugart's logic, might produce index values that one might otherwise see as having a qualitative difference between them, to be closer depending on specific factors within these systems. This issue has been ignored in the applications of the personal vote concept using indexes so far. Though it might simply be seen as an artifact of the operationalization, it does have theoretical implications as well. Contrasting majoritarian and proportional systems raises the impression that they provide very different incentives. Substituting this viewpoint with a more nuanced understanding that places the systems on a continuum will most likely show that certain types of these apparently diverging systems might actually be very similar in the type of incentives created. Exploring these overlaps further is one promising area for further research and the results might bring new insight to the debate on whether majoritarian, proportional or mixed member electoral

systems should be preferred in electoral system reforms (see e.g. Shugart & Wattenberg 2003).

The focus of this study was however not on electoral systems as such, but on PMBs and system effects on these. Besides conceptualizing and applying the effect of certain institutional rules on the strength of incentives to cultivate a strong personal image, the thesis also theorized that the effects of this setting could go beyond the mere sponsoring of certain pieces of legislation. If indeed the set of rules under which the MPs operate are conducive to a certain degree of individualistic behavior, then one can also assume that it will systematically affect what these bills actually contain and how they look like technically. A high personal vote should correlate with a high sponsorship frequency. This indicates that certain MPs use this instrument for their individualistic purposes. It means also that the expressive function of the legislative instrument overshadows the regulatory function, with other words, sponsoring as such will become more important that wanting to regulate. The fact that MPs sponsor these bills in big numbers, although their success rates are very low, can be rationalized through an environment conducive to expressive actions, which raise the profile of the actor. It was further assumed that this will have consequences for the bills topics and technical sophistication. After all, it does not make sense to use a lot of time to draft a good quality piece of legislation that will subsequently not be passed. The bills sponsored with primarily an expressive function at the centre, should therefore be limited in the range of topics and technically simpler than other bills. Ingvar Mattson referred to such bills as pseudolegislation (1995).

In addition to the nature of the bills, the treatment of them in the plenary by other actors could also be influenced by the personal vote level of the sponsor. Recognizing that the aim of the bill is personal credit claiming should spur other MPs to scrutinize these bills more thoroughly, so as not to allow for individualistic behavior. Then again, this kind of attention, even negative, might be what the MP is looking for to get more name recognition. In this case the other MPs might prefer not to give too much publicity to a PMB by somebody else. However, assuming that a observed lack of attention is due to other MPs purposefully ignoring the PMB to reduce attention to it is somewhat difficult to back up with evidence. The assumptions can therefore go either way and actual evidence will tell which interpretation is closer to reality.

If the bill has however some hope of getting passed, then they should need extensive amendments in order to improve the quality of the draft. In a nutshell the theoretical backbone assumed that the personal vote influences all aspects of the bill, first the sponsoring, then the nature and lastly the fate in the legislative process. The extension of this explanatory mechanism to the subsequent stages of the process is the main contribution of the thesis to the personal vote literature.

The thesis proceeded to analyze these aspects in three steps. First, in chapter three, it looked at sponsoring of PMBs. The empirical evidence shows that PMBs are sponsored in great numbers, but their success chance tends to be low

in the Estonian case, and extremely low in the Finnish case. This already indicates that the rationale behind these bills has to be something else than regulating and justifies the decidedly unorthodox approach to a legislative instrument taken here. The individualistic approach underlining the central explanatory mechanism of the thesis is however somewhat weakened by the fact that PMBs tend not to be single member bills. Though in both cases a large share of bills are sponsored by single MPs only, a substantial share are also cooperative efforts by multiple MPs. This in itself does not yet mean that one cannot use an individualist rationalist perspective to explain the behavior, after all, two or three MPs sponsoring a bill together can use this for individual credit claiming just as well as a single MP. If the cooperation reaches however limits where a substantial share of party members or in fact MPs from various competing political parties sponsor bills together, then the individualist explanation will stand in conflict with the actual behavioral patterns. The personal vote effect was still supported by the data, as MPs facing a set of rules that emphasizes a good personal image were clearly more active sponsors of PMBs.

However, detailed data analysis showed that there is a list of very diverging sponsorship patterns within both Estonian and Finnish cases and between them as well. The cooperation patterns differ according to the opposition or coalition status of the MP, with PMBs by coalition MPs in Estonian showing clear signs of inter-party cooperation. Opposition MPs, however, sponsor bills mostly in cooperation with their own party members and even then cooperate in smaller numbers. The partisan nature of sponsoring is therefore not uniform and some PMBs can be seen as being clearly single member bills, some as party bills and some most likely as disguised government bills or "handout bills" as David Arter put it (2006). In the Finnish case the opposition/coalition divide had exactly the opposite patterns with opposition MPs cooperating in larger numbers although still not across party lines. Coalition MPs in contrast did not cooperate among each other and preferred to sponsor bills alone or with a small number of colleagues. Interestingly, sponsoring as such was not influenced by the opposition or coalition status of the MP, the sponsoring frequency however was. It is clear that although all MPs seem to engage in sponsoring these bills, it is the opposition MPs who do it in bigger numbers.

The analysis of the personal vote effects showed that sponsoring is clearly influenced by the incentive structure that was theorized to arise out of the institutional setting. Crucially however it showed no linear effects for the likelihood of sponsoring a bill, but a curved relationship with an increase of personal vote level increasing the likelihood to a certain level, after which it will start to decrease somewhat, though does not fall back to the level at which it was for lower personal vote values. If the MP has however sponsored bills, then the frequency of this behavior increases linearly together with an increase in the personal vote level. This nuanced finding emphasizes why focusing on a comparison of cases that should have a qualitative divide regarding the phenomenon of interest, such as juxtaposing majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, might actually result in a false negative, i.e. in a conclusion

that no effect is apparent, where as in reality a non-linear effect is at work and one has to look between the scale endpoints to see that, as the possible explanation for the nonlinear effect is the tradeoff between individualistic and collective behavior. To a certain degree personal vote seeking behavior is compatible or does not interfere with the interest of the collective, such as the party. It will however not lead to a mass of atomistic individuals competing against each other, as this would start to hurt the party image and through this also these very same individuals, as even though the particular electoral rules create intra-party competition, the vote itself is a function of a variety of reasons, where the personal image of a candidate is just one aspect. Party infighting will reduce the "non-personal" part of the vote, which depending on the circumstances – is as important or even more important than the personal part of the vote. This means that not all MPs will necessarily engage in sponsoring PMBs, the extent of the behavior for the ones who do this however, is clearly larger, the more the institutional setting encourages personal image cultivation.

Secondly, in chapter four the thesis addressed the topics of the bills, their technical nature and subsequent fate in the plenary. It looked also in detail at the seasonality of these aspects of the bills. The chapter provided a descriptive overview that is helpful in evaluating whether the notion of pseudolegislation put forth by Mattson applies to PMBs. The prominence of the expressive function over the regulatory one was already addressed above, the notion included however also the technical simplicity of the bills. An important insight coming out of this chapter was the limited scope of PMBs and the seasonality in topics in one of the two cases. In Estonia, PMBs seem to deal with a wide variety of issues and MPs do not start to focus on a narrower set as elections approach, although the prominence of social issues was clearly apparent in both Estonia and Finland. This suggests that the notion of pseudolegislation does not sit well for PMBs sponsored in Estonia. One cannot go as far as saying that they represent a comprehensive legislative program of the opposition, but it seems at least that MPs try to regulate various societal issues using these bills. In the Finnish case, however, a clear dominance of two topics was apparent and became even more pronounced as elections approached. The issues Finnish PMBs deal with are very narrow and tend to be social issues mostly.

A curious detail to emerge in the Finnish case was a very big share, almost a fifth, of bills being the same or very similar to some other PMB, meaning MPs sponsor the same bills over and over. Even more, these same bills are to a significant degree sponsored by different actors. This is a clear indication that selecting a problem, considering the implications of regulating and subsequently drafting a bill, is not the way it necessary happens with PMBs in Finland. Instead, a more plausible picture is that of PMBs being used to force an issue onto the agenda by pressuring the government repeatedly on that same topic. The fact that these "repeat bills" are sponsored mostly by opposition MPs on a very limited set of topics and these simply circle between different players, suggests again that the centrality of the so called expressive function of PMBs.

Attaching some sort of ownership to such a bill is very difficult. If virtually all opposition forces have a go at a topic, but do it separately, then a more correct way is to see it as part of the daily political competition, between the opposition and coalition, and not as a substantive attempt at regulating some issue. The Finnish PMBs therefore show traits that fit well with what a piece of pseudo-legislation should look like. It is well possible that, given time, PMBs in Estonia will also start to show these traits more clearly as the Estonian parliamentary democracy matures.

On the technical side the bills do seem very simple, as a rule not longer than one short section of text less than half a page in length. They are also in overwhelming part amendment bills that attempt to change some aspect of one legislative act, very few change many acts simultaneously. The assumption that this simplicity increases as elections approach, which would again fit with the pseudolegislation assumption, is however not backed up by the data in either case. If anything, then the bills actually get somewhat longer closer to elections.

The treatment of the bills in the plenary was examined by looking at the debate intensity and amending of these bills. The two cases are similar when it comes to debating on bills. Some bills receive a very intensive debate, a majority however do not, and on many occasions MPs forfeit the possibility totally by choosing not to open a debate. The opposition/coalition divide is clear in debating the bills, with opposition MPs being clearly more active that coalition MPs. Seasonality shows however and interesting pattern, especially in the Estonian case. In general debate intensity decreases closer elections, so interestingly the intra-parliamentary arena does not heat up close to elections, at least not in case of debates on PMBs. The attention of MPs seems to turn arenas outside of parliament. In the Estonia case this means that opposition MPs are less active simply through missing from plenary sessions (based on roll call votes), whereas coalition MPs simply become less active, even though their attendance of sessions goes up closer to elections.

The amending of PMBs themselves was analyzed with Estonian data only. As a rule these bills are heavily amended with on average 10 amendments submitted for bills that progressed to stages were amending becomes possible. Amending tends to make the bills longer, on average a full 78% longer and considering the short length to begin with, then these bills seem to lack the technical quality a draft law should have. Almost all of the amendments to the bills that get finally accepted come from committees, so even though MPs do submit amending motions in big numbers, in the end collective actors are the ones rewriting the bills. No apparent seasonality in amending was evident, which suggest that drafting does not become sloppier closer to elections, so this particular piece of evidence does not fit with what one would expect in case of pseudolegislation sponsored by personal vote seekers.

Thirdly, the fifth chapter connected the bill and the sponsor characteristics and reexamined the topics, technical nature and treatment in the legislative process with this added knowledge. It was assumed that the personal vote would play a role with all these aspects. MPs looking for a high personal vote should

sponsor PMBs that are narrow in topics, technically simple, will be more heavily scrutinized in the plenary, in need of more amending and less likely to succeed than PMBs by MPs with a lower personal vote. An examination of the topics showed that this is not so. In the Estonian case MPs also tended to sponsor bills on topics they themselves are experts on based on their committee membership. In the Finnish case the personal vote also did not show any effect on topic selection, MPs however are clearly not sponsoring bills on topics falling within their own specialization. In both cases the opposition/coalition divide again played a role with opposition MPs being more likely to initiate bills dealing with social issues. Other sponsor characteristics seemed to play a role as well, like gender for example, with women being more likely among the sponsors of bills on social issues. Sponsor characteristics therefore do seem to matter with the choice of topics, but there is no evidence that the central theoretical mechanism, the personal vote, plays any role.

With regard to the technical sophistication of bills, personal vote effects are again not apparent. What does however clearly play a role is the opposition/ coalition divide. Opposition MPs sponsor clearly shorter bills than coalition MPs. It is likely that the pseudolegislation notion applies to a certain degree to the opposition bills in general. Their success chances are clearly lower than for the coalition, they are also more active in sponsoring these bills; the high sponsorship frequency therefore goes together with simpler bills. This makes very much sense as the low likelihood of getting bills passed means there is no point in spending much time in drafting complicated and comprehensive bills.

Debate intensity of the bills did show that sponsors matter, though not the personal vote level connected to a MP, but his/her opposition/coalition status. Especially the Estonian case showed a tit-for-tat debating pattern, with opposition MPs scrutinizing bills by coalition MPs and the other way around. In total however, sponsor characteristics do not seem to play a very strong role, as the amount of variance explained by the models was low.

The last aspects, amending and success rates were examined with Estonian data only. Again, the personal vote did not play a role. What did however play a role was the familiar opposition/coalition divide. Somewhat surprisingly, bills by coalition MPs were more heavily amended. This is probably explained by the much higher likelihood of being passed, as only this sponsor characteristic was connected to a significantly higher likelihood of successful passing. With other words, as coalition bills are more likely to pass, they are also taken more seriously and as a result will be more heavily amended.

Table summarizes the central assumptions spelled out in section 2.4. and the corresponding findings. It will give an easily accessible overview of the main dimension analyzed in the thesis and subsequent findings. To sum up, the personal vote impact as theorized in this thesis received partial support. The effects were clearly evident in sponsoring PMBs, the subsequent legislative process seems however not to be affected. Some other attributes of the sponsors still matter clearly, especially the opposition/coalition status of the MP and as this thesis demonstrated, even to a degree that the technical nature of draft laws

depends on it. Labeling PMBs as pseudolegislation did also receive some support, especially in the Finnish case with PMBs being sponsored in huge numbers although having a miniscule success rate, being technically very simple, dealing with a very narrow set of topics and being initiated repeatedly by different set of actors.

Table 47. Summary of central assumptions and findings

Sponsoring	
Assumption	***Finding***
Higher personal vote level increases sponsoring frequency of PMBs.	*Confirmed.* The likelihood of becoming a PMB sponsor increases non-linearly with higher personal vote levels. Personal vote has, however, a clear linear effect on sponsoring frequency of PMBs. The higher the level, the more PMBs will the MP sponsor.
Opposition MPs sponsor more PMBs.	*Confirmed.* Opposition/coalition status does not separate sponsor from non-sponsor, but opposition MPs sponsor PMBs in greater numbers
PMBs by coalition MPs are "parliamentary assists", while PMBs by opposition genuine PMBs.	*Partially confirmed.* PMBs by Estonian coalition MPs are clearly inter-party cooperative wide efforts, while opposition MPs cooperate less. However, PMBs by Finnish coalition MPs are clearly single member endeavors, while opposition MPs cooperate more within their own party.
Frontbenchers are less active in sponsoring.	*Disconfirmed.* Frontbenchers are more active sponsor of PMBs than backbenchers
PMBs will be sponsored by MPs from more remote districts.	*Disconfirmed.* District specific idiosyncrasies are not apparent.
Characteristics of PMBs	
Assumption	***Finding***
PMBs are technically very simple and this simplicity is seasonal in nature.	*Partially confirmed.* PMBs are indeed very short and simple amendment laws, but do not become more simple when sponsored in bigger numbers closer to elections
PMB topics are very narrow and become narrower closer to elections.	*Partially confirmed.* Estonian PMBs have a wide range of topics and no clear seasonality trends in topics. Finnish PMBs on the other hand have a very narrow focus and this becomes even narrower closer to elections

Assumption	***Finding***
MPs sponsor PMBs on topics that they have no expert knowledge of.	*Partially confirmed.* Estonian MPs sponsor PMBs mostly on topics they can be considered to be experts on. Finnish MPs however sponsor PMBs on a select number of issues without themselves having expertise on the issue.
MPs with higher personal vote sponsor PMBs with a more narrow focus.	*Disconfirmed.* Personal vote level does not play a role in PMB topic.
Treatment in the plenary	
Assumption	***Finding***
PMBs by MPs with a high personal vote are more heavily debated and more so closer to elections.	*Disconfirmed.* Personal vote does not matter. Opposition/coalition status of sponsor influences debate intensity.
PMBs by MPs with a high personal vote are more heavily amended because of lack of quality.	*Disconfirmed.* Personal vote does not matter. Coalition bills are more heavily amended and in the process made technically more complex.
PMBs are amended by committees to address lack of quality.	*Confirmed.* Committees amend PMBs, as a rule lengthen the bills and do it regardless of the characteristics of the sponsor
PMBs are amended by other MPs to inhibit personal credit claiming	*Partially confirmed.* MPs are the most frequent amenders after committees with opposition MPs trying to amend PMBs by coalition MPs and the other way around. But they are largely unsuccessful at it.

The institutional setting considered here therefore does explain why some MPs engage more in these practices than others, but it does not have strong implications in the subsequent phases of the legislative process. How to judge this behavior is beyond this thesis. It does however demonstrate that even though one can think of institutions and rules as "congealed tastes" (Riker 1980, 445), meaning that they induce behavior that is seen as beneficial and acceptable, the rules can also have undesired consequences, like one type of legislative instrument being used in a manner and to an ends that is probably not what its design was intended to do.

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8. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Table I. Factors differentiating bills referred to three most popular committees from other PMBs in Estonia, reference category: bills referred to any other committee (multinomial logistic regression)

Independent variables	*Referred to Social Affairs committee*				*Referred to Financial Affairs committee*				*Referred to Constitutional Affairs committee*			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	B (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*
MP attributes												
Coalition MP (1=yes)	−.633 (.223)	.531**	−.561 (.237)	.571*	−.155 (.212)	.856	.005 (.231)	1.005	.430 (.136)	1.536	−.207 (.194)	.813
Party group size	−.018 (.013)	.982	−.009 (.014)	.991	.043 (.014)	1.044**	.045 (.016)	1.046**	.037 (.009)	1.038***	.030 (.013)	1.031*
District magnitude	.070 (.059)	1.072	.066 (.060)	1.068	.221 (.056)	1.247***	.207 (.057)	1.230***	.018 (.040)	1.019	.077 (.051)	1.080
Ballot (1=open)	−.020 (.266)	.979	.009 (.286)	1.009	−.668 (.263)	.512*	−.789 (.280)	.454**	.060 (.176)	1.061	.065 (.230)	1.067
Vote share in district	−.034 (.034)	.966	−.044 (.035)	.957	.005 (.030)	1.005	.009 (.031)	1.009	−.026 (.023)	.974	−.046 (.029)	.955
Distance from capital	.003 (.001)	1.003*	.003 (.001)	1.003*	.004 (.001)	1.004**	.004 (.001)	1.004*	.000 (.001)	1.000	.001 (.001)	1.001
Frontbench (1=yes)	.158 (.264)	1.170	.101 (.273)	1.106	−.327 (.244)	.720	−.371 (.250)	.690	−.166 (.165)	.846	−.135 (.215)	.873
Seniority	.304 (.128)	1.355*	.362 (.136)	1.438**	.431 (.141)	1.539**	.384 (.147)	1.468**	.048 (.093)	1.049	.347 (.121)	1.415**
Year of birth	−.041 (.011)	.959***	−.043 (.012)	.958***	−.001 (.011)	.999	−.009 (.011)	.991	−.027 (.007)	.973***	−.032 (.009)	.968***
Gender (1=male)	−1.261 (.259)	.283***	−1.317 (.271)	.268***	−.515 (.289)	.597	−.584 (.297)	.558*	−.633 (.200)	.531**	−.601 (.248)	.548**
Higher educ. (1=yes)	−.180 (.359)	.835	−.181 (.377)	.834	−.046 (.338)	.955	−.066 (.350)	.936	−.104 (.230)	.900	−.368 (.298)	.692

Independent variables	***Referred to Social Affairs committee***				***Referred to Financial Affairs committee***				***Referred to Constitutional Affairs committee***			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	B (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*
Bill attributes												
Distance to elections	–	–	−.001 (.000)	.999	–	–	.001 (.000)	1.001*	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000
Bill length	–	–	−.002 (.000)	.998***	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000
No. of sponsors	–	–	−.081 (.024)	.922***	–	–	−.075 (.024)	.928**	–	–	.127 (.010)	1.136***
Constant	78.499 (21.859)***		82.208 (23.453)		−3.140 (21.059)		11.981 (22.408)		53.086 (14.209)		59.943 (18.383)	
Nagelkerke R²	.139		.584									
% correctly predicted	50.1		63.1									
N	1339		1339									

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table II. Factors differentiating bills referred to the two most popular committees from other PMBs in Finland, reference category: bills referred to any other committee (multinomial logistic regression)

	Referred to Social Affairs committee				***Referred to Financial Affairs committee***			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*	*B* (SE)	*Exp (B)*
MP attributes								
Coalition MP (1=yes)	–.395 (.073)	.673***	–.373 (.075)	.689***	–.900 (.078)	.406***	–.949 (.082)	.387***
Party group size	–.001 (.002)	.999	–.002 (.002)	.998	.020 (.002)	.980***	.016 (.002)	1.016***
District magnitude	–.002 (.004)	.998	–.002 (.005)	.998	–.003 (.005)	.997	–.003 (.005)	.997
Vote share in district	.011 (.013)	1.011	.012 (.013)	1.012	–.005 (.016)	.995	.003 (.016)	1.003
District distance from capital	.000 (.000)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000
Frontbench (1=yes)	–.015 (.061)	.985	.009 (.062)	1.009	.088 (.063)	1.091	.109 (.066)	1.115
Seniority	.006 (.023)	1.006	.008 (.003)	1.008	.018 (.024)	1.018	.023 (.025)	1.023
Year of birth(s003)	–.007 (.003)	.993*	–.008 (.003)	.992**	.001 (.003)	1.001	–.001 (.003)	.999
Gender (1=male)	–.102 (.057)	.902	–.118 (.058)	.888*	.073 (.059)	1.075	.038 (.062)	1.039
Higher educ.(1=yes)	–.002 (.056)	.998	.010 (.057)	1.010	.125 (.060)	1.133*	.132 (.062)	1.142*
Bill attributes								
Distance to elections	–	–	–.001 (.000)	.999***	–	–	–.001 (.000)	.999***
Bill length	–	–	–.003 (.000)	.997***	–	–	–.003 (.000)	.997***
No. of sponsors	–	–	–.003 (.001)	.997***	–	–	.004 (.001)	1.004***
Constant	12.589 (5.424)		15.706 (5.533)		–2.591 (5.693)		.929 (5.918)	
Nagelkerke R^2	.026		.127					
% correctly predicted	43.1		49.4					
N	9981		9981					

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table III. Factors influencing PMB length in words, Estonia and Finland (OLS regression)

	Model 1		*Model 2*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta
MP attributes				
Coalition MP (1=yes)	12.191 (5.119)	.029*	17.377 (5.134)	.041**
Party group size	–1.025 (.150)	–.089***	–.874 (.150)	–.076***
Vote share in district	–1.770 (.904)	–.023*	–1.407 (.896)	–018
District magnitude	.077 (.303)	–.003	.007 (.300)	.000
Ballot (1=open)	19.384 (11.621)	.022	23.270 (11.529)	.027*
Frontbench (1=yes)	9.866 (4.609)	.025*	10.399 (4.569)	.027*
Seniority	1.674 (1.792)	.011	1.473 (1.776)	.009
Year of birth	–.201 (.210)	–.005	–.129 (.208)	–.007
Gender (1=male)	–4.403 (4.231)	–.011	–4.321 (4.195)	–.011
Higher educ. (1=yes)	–.044 (4.426)	.000	.385 (4.388)	.001
Country (1=Estonia)	47.763 (8.614)	.078***	34.355 (8.641)	.056***
Bill attributes				
Distance to election	–	–	–.054 (.005)	–.112***
Number of sponsors	–	–	–.311 (.044)	–.071***
Constant	388.752 (410.907)		487.046 (407.373)	
R^2	.015		.033	
Adjusted R^2	.014		.032	
N	11278		11277	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table IV. Factors influencing PMB debate length in speeches, Estonia (OLS regressions)

	Dependent: logged speeches in 1st reading				**Dependent: logged speeches in 2nd reading**			
	Model A		Model B		Model A		Model B	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta
MP attributes								
Vote share in district	.004 (.013)	.019	.007 (010)	.038	.001 (.017)	.003	–.004 (.013)	–.015
Coalition MP (1=yes)	.002 (.077)	.002	–.238 (.067)	–.163***	–.275 (.091)	–.145**	–.227 (.071)	–.120**
Party group size	.004 (.005)	.045	–.003 (.004)	–.033	.013 (.006)	.106*	–.005 (.005)	–.039
District magnitude	.031 (.026)	.064	.018 (.020)	.038	.013 (.026)	.023	.038 (.021)	.069
Ballot (1=open)	–.045 (.100)	–.020	–.031 (.062)	–.021	.057 (.093)	.031	–.079 (.072)	–.043
Frontbencher (1=yes)	–.064 (.095)	–.040	.028 (.072)	.017	–.034 (.107)	–.017	.029 (.083)	.015
Seniority	–.035 (.051)	–.039	–.020 (.039)	–.023	–.065 (.060)	–.060	–.056 (.047)	–.052
Year of birth	.011 (.004)	.144*	.003 (.003)	.037	–.001 (.005)	–.012	–.010 (.004)	–.103**
Gender (1=male)	.025 (.105)	.013	.030 (.081)	.016	.055 (.117)	.022	.020 (.091)	.008
Higher educ. (1=yes)	.128 (.142)	.050	.005 (.106)	.002	.094 (.147)	.032	–.035 (.115)	–.012
Bill attributes								
Length in words	–	–	–.001 (.000)	–.157***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.220***
Distance to election	–	–	.000 (.000)	.309***	–	–	.001 (.000)	.611***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.014 (.001)	.643***	–	–	.013 (.001)	.482***
Constant	–21.037 (8.686)		–4.713 (6.791)		3.303 (9.321)		18.757 (7.269)	
R^2	.030		.429		.041		.431	
Adjusted R^2	.005		.409		.019		.414	
N	373		373		456		456	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table V. Factors influencing PMB debate length in questions, Estonia (OLS regressions)

	Dependent: logged questions in 1st reading				**Dependent: logged questions in 2nd reading**			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta
MP attributes								
Vote share in district	.006 (.012)	.020	.008 (.010)	.027	.000 (.016)	.000	–.001 (.013)	–.004
Coalition status (1=yes)	.423 (.069)	.186***	.124 (.061)	.055*	.108 (.094)	.045	.008 (.079)	.003
Party group size	.001 (.005)	.008	.000 (.004)	.000	.003 (.007)	.017	–.007 (.006)	–.043
District magnitude	–.009 (.020)	–.014	.009 (.017)	.014	–.003 (.027)	–.004	.028 (.022)	.043
Ballot	.038 (.073)	.017	.010 (.063)	.004	.016 (.099)	.007	–.076 (.082)	–.032
Frontbencher (1=yes)	–.080 (.082)	–.032	–.039 (.070)	–.016	–.105 (.113)	–.041	–.067 (.093)	–.026
Seniority	–.013 (.044)	–.010	.042 (.038)	.032	.054 (.061)	.040	.076 (.050)	.057
Year of birth	–.001 (.004)	–.007	–.002 (.003)	–.015	.008 (.005)	.063	.003 (.004)	.027
Gender (1=male)	–.033 (.090)	–.011	.003 (.077)	.001	.077 (.123)	.025	.063 (.101)	.020
Higher educ. (1=yes)	.010 (.114)	.003	–.094 (.098)	–.025	.077 (.154)	.021	–.016 (.128)	–.004
Bill attributes								
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	.123***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.341***
Distance to election	–	–	–.000 (.000)	–.036	–	–	.001 (.000)	.226***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.020 (.001)	.519***	–	–	.020 (.001)	.571***
Constant	3.732 (7.208)		5.018 (6.203)		–13.126 (9.845)		–5.793 (8.131)	
R^2	.037		.293		.008		.334	
Adjusted R^2	.028		.285		.005		.321	
N	1119		1119		676		676	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table VI. Factors influencing PMB debate length in speeches, Finland (OLS regressions)

Independent variables	**Dependent: logged number of speeches in intro reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 1st reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 2nd reading**			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	b (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta
MP attributes												
Vote share in district	.009 (.006)	.018	.012 (.006)	.024*	.002 (.011)	.003	.001 (.010)	.001	–.019 (.012)	–.036	–.020 (.011)	–.038
Coalition status (1=yes)	–.585 (.032)	–.259***	–.610 (.032)	–.270	–.281 (.056)	–.102***	–.017 (.052)	–.006	–.107 (.060)	–.041	.157 (.057)	.060**
Party group size	.015 (.001)	.243***	.013 (.001)	.223	–.003 (.002)	–.043*	.000 (.001)	.001	–.005 (.002)	–.072**	–.004 (.002)	–.060**
District magnitude	.007 (.002)	.050***	.007 (.002)	.050***	–.004 (.003)	–.025	–.002 (.002)	–.013	–.001 (.003)	–.007	–.003 (.003)	–.019
Frontbencher (1=yes)	.066 (.027)	.032*	.061 (.026)	.029*	–.055 (.048)	–.022	–.049 (.045)	–.020	–.117 (.052)	–.050*	–.117 (.048)	–.050*
Seniority	.002 (.010)	.002	.001 (.010)	.001	.040 (.019)	.041*	.032 (.017)	.033	.054 (.020)	.059**	.043 (.019)	.047*
Year of birth	.001 (.001)	.008	.001 (.001)	.008	.000 (.002)	–.004	–.001 (.002)	–.007	.000 (.002)	.002	–.001 (.002)	–.004
Gender (1=male)	.018 (.024)	.008	.005 (.024)	.002	–.073 (.043)	–.029	–.060 (.040)	–.024	–.029 (.046)	–.012	–.018 (.043)	–.008
Higher education (1=yes)	.020 (.025)	.009	.017 (.024)	.007	–.051 (.045)	–.018	–.045 (.042)	–.016	–.036 (.049)	–.014	–.020 (.045)	–.008
Bill attributes												
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	.059***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.059***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.100***
Distance to election	–	–	.000 (.000)	–.153***	–	–	.000 (.000)	-.103***	–	–	–.001 (.000)	–.242***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.003 (.000)	.122***	–	–	–.009 (.000)	-.355***	–	–	–.007 (.001)	–.253***

Independent variables	**Dependent: logged number of speeches in intro reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 1st reading**				**Dependent: logged number of speeches in 2nd reading**			
	Model A		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model A*		*Model B*	
	b (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta
Constant	–.109 (2.386)		.020 (2.338)		4.081 (4.337)		5.429 (4.039)		1.847 (4.661)		4.106 (4.324)	
R^2	.041		.080		.019		.150		.012		.151	
Adjusted R^2	.040		.079		.017		.147		.009		.148	
N	9537		9537		4101		4101		3175		3175	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table VII. Factors influencing PMB amending in Estonia (OLS regression)

	Dependent: logged number of sponsored amendments				**Dependent: logged number of accepted amendments**			
	Model A		Model B		Model A		Model B	
	B (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta	*B* (SE)	Beta
MP attributes								
Vote share in district	–.001 (.019)	–.001	–.007 (.016)	–.021	–.017 (.016)	–.059	–.021 (.013)	–.075
Coalition MP (1=yes)	.167 (.107)	.062	.132 (.092)	.049	.206 (.094)	.094*	.146 (.077)	.067
Party group size	.007 (.008)	.039	–.001 (.006)	–.005	.006 (.007)	.040	–.001 (.005)	–.006
District magnitude	–.020 (.030)	–.027	–.012 (.026)	–.016	–.067 (.027)	–.113*	–.060 (.022)	–.100*
Ballot	.065 (.112)	.025	.010 (.095)	.004	.254 (.122)	.117*	.125 (.079)	.057
Frontbencher (1=yes)	–.067 (.128)	–.023	–.071 (.108)	–.024	.007 (.113)	–.003	–.018 (.089)	–.008
Seniority	.063 (.069)	.041	–.005 (.059)	–.003	.041 (.062)	.033	–.021 (.050)	–.017
Year of birth	.002 (.006)	.012	–.005 (.005)	–.036	.012 (.005)	.108*	.006 (.004)	.054
Gender (1=male)	.138 (.139)	.039	.070 (.118)	.020	.094 (.123)	.032	.036 (.099)	.012
Higher educ. (1=yes)	–.133 (.176)	–.032	–.047 (.150)	–.011	–.125 (.153)	–.037	–.044 (.123)	–.013
Bill attributes								
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	.471***	–	–	.000 (.000)	.545***
Distance to election	–	–	.001 (.000)	.316***	–	–	.001 (.000)	.263***
Number of sponsors	–	–	.009 (.001)	.229***	–	–	.008 (.001)	.218***
Constant	–1.693 (11.198)		10.299 (9.530)		–21.551 (9.742)		–10.175 (7.906)	
R^2	.010		.294		.040		.390	
Adjusted R^2	.004		.280		.023		.376	
N	671		671		578		578	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table VIII. Factors influencing PMB success in Estonia, reference category: not passed bills (binary logistic regression)

	Model A		Model B	
Independent variables	*B* (SE)	Odds ratio	*B* (SE)	Odds ratio
Sponsor attributes				
Vote share in district	–.003 (.020)	.997	–.002 (.020)	.998
Coalition MP (1=yes)	1.308 (.122)	3.698***	1.081 (.129)	2.948***
Party group size	–.016 (.008)	.984	–.017 (.009)	.983*
District magnitude	.040 (.035)	1.041	.053 (.036)	1.054
Ballot (1=open)	–.128 (.156)	.880	–.165 (.160)	.848
Frontbench (1=yes)	.199 (.148)	1.220	.227 (.152)	1.254
Seniority	.074 (.080)	1.077	.102 (.082)	1.107
Year of birth	.003 (.006)	1.003	.002 (.007)	1.002
Gender (1=male)	–.019 (.158)	.981	–.010 (.162)	.990
Higher educ. (1=yes)	–.358 (.204)	.699	–.404 (.208)	.668
Bill attributes				
Distance to elections	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000
Number of sponsors	–	–	.015 (.002)	1.015***
Length in words	–	–	.000 (.000)	1.000***
Constant	–7.000 (12.617)	.001	–5.760 (12.873)	.003
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R^2	.138		.187	
% correctly predicted	67.0		67.1	
N	1339		1339	

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

APPENDIX B



Figure I. Speeches by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in 1st reading and distance to election, Estonia



Figure II. Speeches by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in 2nd reading and distance to election, Estonia



Figure III. Questions asked by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in 1st reading and distance to election, Estonia



Figure IV. Questions asked by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in 2nd reading and distance to election, Estonia



Figure V. Speeches by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in intro reading and distance to elections, Finland



Figure VI. Speeches by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in 1st reading and distance to elections, Finland



Figure VII. Speeches by coalition (A) and opposition (B) MPs in 2nd reading and distance to elections, Finland

APPENDIX C

The higher activity of MPs with a higher personal vote share is one thing. It suggests that electoral system effects might translate into behavioral patterns in parliament. Another issue is if there actually is an electoral payoff, or with other words, does this behavior pay off during the next election? If sponsorship activity would actually have an electoral payoff we should detect something resembling a correlation between the vote share of a given candidate and his/her sponsorship activity.

Figure I shows the difference of vote shares for two subsequent elections (y-axis) against the sponsorship activity of the MP (x-axis). The vote share difference is calculated as the ratio of the MPs individual vote share in the given district to the vote share in the previous election. This way the problem of diverging turnouts between districts and elections is taken into account. In the Estonian case the shares are a result of pairing the 1999 and 2003, and 2003 and 2007 vote shares for the candidates who contested both elections. For Finland the 2003 and 2007 elections are paired. Explaining the overall electoral performance of a candidate is not the aim here.[52] It is simply a look at a possible bivariate relationship between PMB sponsorship activity and actual electoral performance. The horizontal line of y=1 would show no difference in vote shares between the elections. Everything above it marks how many times the MP has improved the vote share in comparison to the previous elections, everything below it shows a loss of votes.



Figure I. Electoral payoff of sponsoring

[52] See Ruostetsaari and Mattila for a detailed analysis of factors influencing candidate success in Finland for example (2002).

It is obvious that there is no correlation between the electoral performance and sponsorship activity, if anything, it looks like a slight negative relationship. The enormously active MPs are actually loosing in their vote share. The best fit seems to be a line of $y=1.33/x^{0.1}$, which produces the smallest average differences between the observed and predicted y values at a given value of x. This suggests there is a slight negative relationship at low frequency sponsoring, which evens out towards no relationship as more bills are sponsored. This in itself is not evidence that there is no electoral benefit in sponsoring, as we have not controlled for any other factors. The Estonian and Finnish data is marked in the graph with separate symbols. It is clear that the overall best fit would not suit the two countries separately. For the Finnish case there is no relationship, which is already indicated by the high correlation between vote shares in the different elections (see section 3.2.4). In fact the best linear fit for Finnish data is virtually indistinguishable from the line at $y=1$, trying a fixed exponent function does not really make sense here. Sponsorship therefore varies a lot, but the vote share ratio stays the same. In the Estonian case it is the other way around. Sponsorship frequency does not vary for different values of the vote share ratio.

What to make of this? As already mentioned, this is not conclusive evidence that there is no clear electoral payoff, one would have to control for a multitude of factors that all influence the electoral performance of the given candidate. But one can speculate that there could be a small effect in Finland. As the vote shares of candidates are stable, though this is only a comparison of two elections, small details might bring small payoffs. Sponsoring a bill that might appeal to constituents could be an inexpensive way to slightly increase ones electoral fortune. In the Estonian case the huge fluctuation in candidate vote share ratios indicates and overall unstable system. Activity in the legislature might therefore be of marginal importance in guaranteeing the huge electoral payoff, such as the 11 fold gain in votes by one Estonian MP for example. Equally, being an inactive MP is probably not the reason behind a 33 fold loss in votes for the most “extreme loser”. In fact, the biggest winner sponsored no bills, while the biggest loser signed off on an impressive four bills, which is very near the average activity level in Estonia. So the analysis in the thesis shows that the there is an electoral system effect through the personal vote on PMB sponsoring activity, but there is no clear electoral payoff based on this brief analysis.

9. SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Saadikute eelnõud parlamendis: Soome ja Eesti võrdlev uuring

Parlamendisaadikute poolt algatatud seaduseelnõud moodustavad parlamentaarsetes demokraatiates reeglina kogu seadusloomest väikese osa. Enamikus sellistest süsteemidest domineerivad seadusandluses seadusandliku võimu üle tegelikult valitsuse algatatud eelnõud. Sellest hoolimata on saadikud üsna aktiivsed eelnõude esitajad. Antud uuringus on vaatluse all Eestis 1999–2003 esitatud 328 ja Soomes 2003–2007 esitatud 665 sellist eelnõud. Eesti puhul võeti antud perioodil seadustena vastu 37.9% ja Soomes 4.5% neist eelnõudest. Seega esineb selge vastuolu madala edukuse ja suure algatamise sageduse vahel. Eriti terav on see Soome puhul, kus antud Eduskunta koosseisu võib lugeda pigem suure saadikute eelnõude eduprotsendiga perioodiks, tunduvalt levinum on edukus 1–2% ringis ja aastatel 1945–2002 võeti seadustena vastu vaid 1.4% kokku 21402-st saadikute esitatud eelnõudest (Wiberg 2004, 19). Nende numbrite taustal tekib küsimus, miks saadikud nii ebaratsionaalselt käituvad ja kulutavad oma aega eelnõude esitamiseks, mis suure tõenäosusega kunagi midagi reaalselt reguleerima ei hakka, sest nad kas hääletatakse maha või jäävad toppama menetlusprotsessi teatud faasi ja aeguvad koos parlamendikoosseisu ametiaja lõpuga.

Käesoleva doktoritöö sisuks on saadikute esitatud eelnõude esitamise, sisu ja menetluse põhjalikum vaatlemine, mille abil püütakse leida põhjus antud vastuolule käitumises kui ka analüüsida selle võimalikke tagajärgi nende eelnõude sisule ja menetlemisele täiskogus. Põhiline seletav mehhanism, mille kehtivust testitakse, on nn personaalne hääl. See on osa häälest, mille kandidaat saab isiklike omaduste ja reputatsiooni põhjal. Analüütiliselt võib seda eristada nn mittepersonaalsest häälest, mis antakse kandidaadile siis kas parteist, programmist või muudest põhjustest lähtuvalt. Erinevaid valimissüsteeme saab personaalse hääle olulisuse ulatuse alusel järjestada ning selle alusel hinnata, kas väidetavalt individualistlikku käitumist soodustavad institutsionaalsed reeglid seda ka põhjustavad. Antud uuring analüüsib, kuivõrd saab ülalnimetatud käitumist reeglina mitteedukate eelnõude puhul näol seletada valimissüsteemiga, mis soodustab individualistlikku käitumist. Lisaks sellele võib eeldada, et kui institutsionaalsed reeglid tõepoolest soodustavad käitumist, mis on suunatud eelkõige isikliku nähtavuse suurendamiseks, on sellel tagajärjed vaadeldavad ka seadusloome osades, mis järgnevad eelnõude algatamisele. Võib eeldada et saadikud, kelle personaalse hääle osakaal on suurem, esitavad eelnõusid, mille nn ekspressiivne funktsioon domineerib reguleeriva funktsiooni üle. Selliste eelnõude puhul on keskne algatamise fakt, mitte aga soov mingit valdkonda reguleerida. Vastavalt sellele ei oleks ka ratsionaalne teha suurt tööd eelnõudes nii teemavaliku kui ka nende vastavusega õigusaktide tehnilistele normidele. Antud eelnõud peaksid seega olema üldiselt üsna piiratud teemavalikuga ja tehniliselt lihtsad. Need omadused peaksid veel tugevamalt nähtavad olema saadikute puhul, kelle personaalse hääle osakaal on suurem, võrreldes ülejäänud

saadikutega. Lisaks võib eeldada, et menetlusprotsessis saavad just sellised eelnõud teravdatud tähelepanu osaliseks ning vajavad põhjalikumaid muudatusi selleks, et saada õigusaktile esitatavatele nõuetele vastavaks. Kokkuvõttes võib eeldada, et personaalse hääle efekt avaldub nii esitamise sageduses, eelnõude sisus ja tehnilises pooles kui ka nende käsitlemises hilisemas menetlusprotsessis teiste tegutsejate poolt. Eelnõusid, mille esmane ja põhiline eesmärk ei ole reguleerimine, vaid pigem teatud teemadele tähelepanu tõmbamine ja esitaja profileerimine, on nimetatud ka pseudoseadusandluseks. Doktoritöö üks eesmärke on ka selle nimetuse sobivuse hindamine saadikute eelnõude puhul.

Antud doktoritöö vaatab mitte ainult personaalse hääle mõju eelnõude esitamissagedusele, vaid selle mõjusid ka laiemalt. Antud efekte on reeglina hinnatud proportsionaalsete ja majoritaarsete süsteemide võrdluses ning tuldud järeldustele, et efekt on selge viimaste puhul, kuid puudub suuresti esimeste juures. Samas lähtub selline võrdlus eeldustest, et süsteemide vahel on selge kvalitatiivne erinevus, mille tõttu ka see efekt on ühel juhul vaadeldav ja teisel juhul mitte. Imidži olulist rõhutavad selgelt ka mõned proportsionaalsed süsteemid. Mõistlikum oleks selliseid tagajärgi põhjustavaid reegleid mõista kui ühel kontiinumil asuvaid, kus ühes otsas on majoritaarsed ja teises teatud tüüpi proportsionaalsed süsteemid. Nende äärmuste vahel on võimalik eristada erineva tugevusastmega personaalse hääle mõju soodustavaid reegleid. Just seda loogikat antud doktoritöö rakendab, näidates, et ka üht tüüpi proportsionaalse süsteemi sees esineb variatsioone, mis ajendab samas süsteemis tegutsejaid erinevalt käituma. Teiseks kasutatakse töös detailseid indiviiditasandi andmeid menetlusprotsessi kohta. Tavaliselt piirdutakse kirjanduses reeglina agregeeritud näitajate esitamisega, sest puudub indiviiditasandi andmestik. Selle abil on võimalik indiviiditasandi andmetest lähtudes hinnata, kas antud süsteemisisene variatsioon tõepoolest põhjustab erinevat käitumist.

Eesti ja Soome on sobivad juhtumid personaalse hääle efekti mõju hindamiseks parlamendisisesel käitumisel. Eesti puhul tekitab mitmetasemeline kohtade jagamise süsteem mandaatide tüübid, mis erinevad oma personaalse hääle osakaalu poolest. Soomes tekitab avatud nimekirjadega proportsionaalne süsteem samuti vajaduse parteinimekirjades silma paista ning erineva suurusega valimisringkonnad põhjustavad selles vajaliku variatsiooni saadikute vahel. Personaalse hääle efekti hindamiseks on institutsionaalsete reeglite mõju mõõdetud indeksiga, mis võtab arvesse valimissüsteemi erinevate osiste mõju. Saamaks teada personaalse hääle tõelist efekti, on analüüsi kaasatud ka muid faktoreid, mis teatud tüüpi eelnõude esitamisele ja sisule mõju võiksid avaldada. Doktoritöö võtab seega eelnõud vaatluse alla nii nn X- kui Y-perspektiivilt, hinnates nii kesksete teoreetiliste faktorite mõju kui analüüsides üldiselt saadikute eelnõude sisu ja menetlust.

Antud küsimuste hindamiseks kodeeriti saadikute poolt esitatud 993 eelnõude sisu ja menetlusprotsessi Eestis ning Soomes, analüüsides andmestikku statistiliste vahenditega.

Töö sissejuhatavas peatükis antakse ülevaade saadikute eelnõude senisest analüüsist kirjanduses, kirjeldatakse, mil viisil ja kuidas tuleks sellist seadus-

andliku instrumenti mõista, ning seostatakse kitsam fookus laiema arusaamaga esindamisest. Teoreetiline peatükk defineerib personaalse hääle mõiste sisu, kirjeldab selle senist rakendust ja käsitleb põhjalikumalt selle indekseerimist.

Kolmas peatükk analüüsib juba empiirilist materjali ja eelnõude esitamise mustreid täpsemalt. Esmalt ilmneb, et kuigi suur osa antud eelnõudest on esitatud üksikute saadikute poolt, on suur osa algatatud mitme saadiku koostöös. Eesti ja Soome puhul erinevad aga esitamismustrid väga selgelt, eriti just saadikute opositsiooni või koalitsiooni kuulumise alusel. Eesti opositsioonisaadikud esitavad eelnõusid reeglina koos enda parteikaaslastega, kuid algatajate arv moodustab nende fraktsiooni kogusuurusest suhteliselt väikese osa. Koalitsioonisaadikud seevastu teevad algatamisel koostööd ka parteiüleselt ja üsna süstemaatiliselt on algatajate seas kas kõikide või enamuse koalitsioonipartnerite esindajad. Koalitsioonisaadikute algatatud saadikute eelnõusid on selle valguses õigustatud pidada pigem parteilisteks kogu koalitsiooni eelnõudeks, mitte üksikute saadikute katseteks teatud valdkonda reguleerida. Soome puhul seevastu on just opositsioonisaadikute algatatud eelnõude puhul näha selget parteilist joont, kus suur osa kogu fraktsioonist algatab eelnõu koos. Samas ei toimu ka nende seas parteidevahelist koostööd. Koalitsioonisaadikute esitatud eelnõude puhul on seevastu algatajate arv reeglina tunduvalt väiksem ning parteivahelist koostööd samuti ei toimu. Teisisõnu on Eesti ja Soome puhul täheldatavad vastupidised mustrid vastavalt koalitsiooni või opositsiooni kuulumisele. Keskne seletusmehhanism personaalse hääle näol omab samuti selget statistiliselt olulist efekti, kuid see ei ole lineaarne, ehk suurem väärtus ei tähendab alati suuremat tõenäosust eelnõusid esitada. Eelnõude esitamise tõenäosus suureneb personaalse hääle olulisuse suurenedes teatud väärtuseni, mille järel see muutub nõrgaks negatiivseks seoseks ehk suuremate väärtuste puhul hakkab esitamise tõenäosus hoopis vähenema. Samas kui saadik on ükskord eelnõusid esitama hakanud, siis suureneb esitamise sagedus lineaarselt koos personaalse hääle suurenemisega. Efekt on seega üsna nüansseeritud. Üks võimalik seletus sellele efektile on kahanev tulu, mida individualistlik käitumine selle ulatuse suurenedes toob. Kui institutsionaalsed reeglid on ajendiks personaalse profiili tõstmisele, siis nende ajendite suurenemine teatud väärtusest kaugemal ei too endaga enam kaasa individualistliku käitumise edasist kasvu, kuna siis kannatab kollektiivne maine. Valimiste kontekstis on nii Eesti kui Soome puhul kandidaatidel oluline eristuda enda parteinimekirjas, sest selles ülespoole liikumine võib otsustada valituks osutumise. Liigne parteisisene võitlus võib aga hakata kahjustama partei üldist mainet, mis on ju tagasivalimise juures samuti oluline.

Töö neljas peatükk analüüsib saadikute eelnõude sisuks olevaid teemasid, nende tehnilist iseloomu ning saatust menetlusprotsessis. Samuti hinnatakse nende näitajate hooajalisust, kuna ülal märgitud pseudoseadusandluse eelduse kehtimisel võiks oodata, et antud iseloomujooned esinevad tugevamalt, mida lähemal valimistele on eelnõu esitatud. Ka siin esinevad selged erinevused kahe juhtumi vahel. Eesti puhul on saadikute eelnõude teemavalik üsna lai ning pole näha keskendumist kitsale teemavaldkonnale valimiste lähenedes. Soome puhul

seevastu on kõikidest saadikute eelnõudest ligi kaks kolmandikku vaid kahel teemal, kolmandik puhtalt sotsiaalvaldkonna küsimustest ning antud valdkondade domineerimine suureneb selgelt valimiste lähenedes. Lisaks sellele on ligi viiendik eelnõudest korduvad ehk erinevad saadikud esitavad enda nimel all sisuliselt kattuvaid eelnõusid. Soome saadikute eelnõude puhul on seega selgelt näha nn pseudoseadusandluse tunnusmärke, kus tundub puuduvat laiem seadusandlik programm, temaatiliselt on tegemist väga kitsalt sotsiaalvaldkonna reguleerimisega ja suur osa eelnõudest sisult kattub. Need faktid koos kaduvväikese edukusega, näitavad, et Soome saadikute eelnõude puhul on selgelt oluline esitamise fakt, mitte soov antud valdkonda reguleerida.

Eelnõude tehnilise poole vaatamine näitas, et tegemist on väga suure ulatuses seaduste muutmise seaduseelnõudega ning reeglina soovitakse muuta vaid ühte õigusakti. Eelnõud ise on tehniliselt väga lihtsad, reeglina mitte pikemad kui üks tekstilõik. Eeldatud eelnõude veel suurem lihtsustumine valimiste lähenedes aga empiirilist tõestust ei leidnud.

Menetlusprotsessi analüüs näitas, et reeglina antud eelnõusid põhjalikult ei debateerita ning tihtilugu debatti ei avatagi. Aktiivsemad debateerijad täiskogul on opositsioonisaadikud. Samuti on esineb debattide puhul sesoonsus, kus intensiivsus väheneb valimiste lähenedes, mille üheks seletuseks on opositsioonisaadikute vähenev füüsiline kohaolek istungjärkudel. Samas suureneb koalitsioonisaadikute kohaolek, kuid väheneb nende aktiivsus debattidel osalemisel.

Eelnõude muutmist analüüsiti vaid Eesti andmestiku põhjal. Ilmnes, et eelnõusid muudetakse väga suures ulatuses, keskmiselt esitatakse eelnõule, mis on jõudnud muudatusettepanekute esitamise etappi kuni 10 vastavat ettepanekut. Nende tulemusena pikenevad eelnõud tunduvalt, mis viitab nende originaalversioonide tehnilisele puudulikkusele. Põhiline eelnõude muutja on juhtivkomisjon, samas kui suure osa ettepanekutest esitavad ka teised saadikud, reeglina aga need komisjoni või üldkogu heakskiitu ei leia.

Viies peatükk ühendab algataja ja eelnõu karakteristikud ning analüüsib, kas esimesel on mõju eelnõu sisule, tehnilisele iseloomule või ka eelnõu kohtlemisele menetlusprotsessis. Oodatud personaalse hääle efekt nendes valdkondades statistiliselt olulist rolli ei mänginud. Samas on endiselt väga oluline saadiku opositsiooni või koalitsiooni kuulumine. Opositsioonisaadikud esitavad süstemaatiliselt rohkem eelnõusid sotsiaalvaldkonna teemadel ning tehniliselt on tegemist selgelt lihtsamate eelnõudega. Võrreldes Eesti ja Soome saadikute enda spetsialiseerumise valdkonda nende poolt esitatavate eelnõude teemadega, hakkab silma, et Eesti puhul tegelevad saadikute eelnõud samade teemadega, milles saadikud ise eksperdid on, samas kui Soome puhul esitatakse hoolimata saadiku spetsialiseerumisest eelnõusid kas sotsiaal- või finantsvaldkonna teemadel.

Eelnõude debati põhjalikkus sõltub samuti algataja opositsiooni- või koalitsioonistaatusest, samas jällegi ei oma personaalne hääl oma oodatud mõju. Üsna ootuspäraselt debateerivad opositsioonisaadikud tihedamalt koalitsiooni-

saadikute eelnõusid ja vastupidi. Kokkuvõtvalt võib aga öelda, et debattide intensiivsus ei ole väga tugevalt sõltuv sellest, kes eelnõu algatas.

Vaid Eesti andmestiku alusel analüüsiti ka algataja omaduste ja eelnõu muutmise ning eduvõimaluste seoseid. Statistiline analüüs personaalse hääle efekti neis valdkondades ei näidanud, küll aga mängis jällegi rolli saadiku kuulumine opositsiooni või koalitsiooni. Üllatavalt muudetakse rohkem just viimaste poolt algatatud eelnõusid. Seda võib seletada asjaoluga, et just koalitsioonisaadikute eelnõusid võetakse tõsisemalt, sest nende edukus on kordades suurem teiste saadikute poolt algatatud eelnõudest. Vastavalt sellel on ka muudatusettepanekute tegemine loogilisem, kuna siis on suurem võimalus mõjutada mingi valdkonna reaalset reguleerimist.

Kokkuvõtvalt võib öelda, et oodatud personaalse hääle efekt ilmnes vaid esitamise puhul ja seal selgelt mittelineaarses vormis. Eelnõude enda sisu ja hilisem menetlusprotsess sõltub aga reeglina algataja kuulumisest kas koalitsiooni või opositsiooni ridadesse. Ühe valimissüsteemi sisene variatsioon seega struktureerib käitumist saadikute eelnõude esitamise näitel, samas ei ole efektid nii tugevad, et avaldaksid mõju seadusloome nendele etappidele, mis järgnevad eelnõude esitamisele.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Education

From 2006 PhD student of Political Science at the University of Tartu
2006 BA (political science) University of Tartu

Professional experience

2005–2006	Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board
2006–…	University of Tartu, Institute of Government and Politics, research assistant; Responsibilities have included teaching, project management and research activities within the framework of Estonian Science Foundation grants
2008	International Parliamentary Scholarship by the German Parliament, Berlin

Main research areas: legislative studies, electoral behavior

Publications

"Private Members' Bills and the Personal Vote: Neither Selling nor Shaving," *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19(1), (forthcoming, 2013).

"Muted Differences: Entrenching Legitimacy of the Bosnian Statehood?" with Eiki Berg, *Cooperation and Conflict,* (forthcoming, 2011).

"Hääle vahetamine 2011. aasta Riigikogu valimisel," ("Vote switching in the 2011 Riigikogu elections"), *Riigikogu Toimetised (Journal of the Estonian Parliament)*, (2011), 23: 50–55.

"Europe and the Estonian Election of March 6 2011," *European Parliament Election Briefing no 62,* European Parties, Election and Referendums Network, Sussex, UK, (2011), pp. 1–9.

"Party voters gone astray: explaining independent candidate success in the 2009 European elections in Estonia," with Piret Ehin, in Franklin, M.; Giebler, H.; Hobolt, S.; Marsh, M.; van der Brug, W.; van der Eijk, C. (eds). *An Audit of Democracy in the European Union: PIREDEU Final User Conference, Brussels, 18–19 November 2010.* (forthcoming, 2011).

"Events and Reliability of Measures: The Effect of Elections on Interest in Politics," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, (2009), 21(3): 316–332.

"The parliamentary elections in Estonia, March 2007," with Vello Pettai, *Electoral Studies*, (2008), 27(3): 574–577.

"Saadikute eelnõud Riigikogus: pseudo- või pärisseadusandlus?" ("Private members' bills in Riigikogu: pseudo- or real legislation?") *Riigikogu Toimetised (Journal of the Estonian Parliament)*, (2007), 16: 96–105.

"Saadiku koht parlamendis: vabadus ja sõltuvus," ("Position of the individual MP in parliament: freedom and dependence") *Riigikogu Toimetised (Journal of the Estonian Parliament)*, (2006), 14: 116–123.

Conference presentations

6th ECPR General Conference, 24–27. June 2011, Reykjavik. Paper presented: "Private members' bills and the personal vote: neither selling nor shaving"

An Audit of Democracy in the European Union: PIREDEU Final User Conference, 18–19. November 2010, Brussels. Paper presented: "Party voters gone astray: explaining independent candidate success in the 2009 European elections in Estonia" with Piret Ehin

42nd Annual Conference of the Finnish Political Science Association, 11–12. March 2010, Helsinki-Tallinn. Paper presented: "Private members' bills and the personal vote: neither selling nor shaving"

Conference on Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional, and Multicultural Contexts, 25–28. June 2008, Berlin, Germany. Paper presented: "Events and reliability of measures: the effect of elections on measures of interest in politics"

7th Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe, 8–10. June 2007, Lüneburg, Germany. Paper presented: "MPs in small legislatures: institutional constraints and individual possibilities by example of Estonia, Lithuania and Finland"

7th Annual Conference of Estonian Social Sciences, 23–24. November 2007, Tartu, Estonia. Paper presented: "Üksiksaadikute eelnõud Riigikogus: kas päris või pseudo-seadusandlus? (Draft laws introduced by MPs in the Riigikogu – pseudo-legislation or the real thing?)"

Teaching experience

- Comparing Political Systems (2007, 2009, 2010)
- Introduction to Political Science (2008)
- Electoral Studies (2009, 2010)
- Research Methods in Social Sciences (2009, 2010)
- Methodology of Science (2009, 2010, in English)
- Theories of Comparative Politics (2009, 2010)

Additional training

Winter school "Methodological Issues in Comparative Electoral Analysis" 8–11, March 2010, Nottingham University, Social Sciences Methods and Data Institute.

ECPR 2009 Summer School in Methods and Techniques, 31 July – 16 August 2009, University of Ljubljana – course: Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

ECPR 2007 Summer school in Methods and Techniques, 19. July – 4. August 2007, University of Ljubljana. Course: Comparative Survey Design.

Research methods seminar "Citizenship and Europe – Elite, Experts and Mass Interviews", 11–13. January 2007, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.

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Hariduskäik

Alates 2006 Tartu Ülikooli Riigiteaduste instituudi doktorant
2006 Tartu Ülikooli politoloogia osakond, BA

Teenistuskäik

2005–2006	Põllumajanduse Informatsiooni ja Registrite Amet
2006– ….	Tartu Ülikool, Riigiteaduste instituut, assistent
2008	Saksamaa Liidupäeva praktika, Berlin

Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad: parlamendiuuringud, valimiskäitumine

Publikatsioonid

"Private Members' Bills and the Personal Vote: Neither Selling nor Shaving," *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19(1), (ilmumas, 2013).

"Muted Differences: Entrenching Legitimacy of the Bosnian Statehood?" with Eiki Berg, *Cooperation and Conflict,* (ilmumas, 2011).

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Konverentsiettekanded

6th ECPR General Conference, 24–27. June 2011, Reykjavik. Ettekanne: "Private members' bills and the personal vote: neither selling nor shaving"

An Audit of Democracy in the European Union: PIREDEU Final User Conference, 18–19. November 2010, Brüssel. Ettekanne: "Party voters gone astray: explaining independent candidate success in the 2009 European elections in Estonia" koos Piret Ehiniga

42nd Annual Conference of the Finnish Political Science Association, 11–12. Märts 2010, Helsinki-Tallinn. Ettekanne: "Private members' bills and the personal vote: neither selling nor shaving"

Conference on Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional, and Multicultural Contexts, 25–28. Juuni 2008, Berliin. Ettekanne: "Events and reliability of measures: the effect of elections on measures of interest in politics"

7th Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe, 8–10. Juuni 2007, Lüneburg. Ettekanne: "MPs in small legislatures: institutional constraints and individual possibilities by example of Estonia, Lithuania and Finland"

7th Annual Conference of Estonian Social Sciences, 23–24. November 2007, Tartu. Ettekanne: "Üksiksaadikute eelnõud Riigikogus: kas päris või pseudoseadusandlus?"

Õpetamise kogemuse

- Poliitiliste süsteemide võrdlus (2007, 2009, 2010)
- Sissejuhatus politoloogiasse (2008)
- Valimisuuringud (2009, 2010)
- Uurimismeetodid sotsiaalteadustes (2009, 2010)
- Teadusmetodoloogia (2009, 2010)
- Võrdlev poliitika teooriad (2009, 2010)

Muu

- Talvekool "Methodological Issues in Comparative Electoral Analysis" 8–11, Märts 2010, Nottinghami Ülikool, Social Sciences Methods and Data Institute.
- ECPR 2009 Summer School in Methods and Techniques, 31 Juuli – 16 August 2009, Ljubljana Ülikool. Kursus: Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
- ECPR 2007 Summer school in Methods and Techniques, 19. Juuli – 4. August 2007, Ljubljana Ülikool. Kursus: Comparative Survey Design.
- Meetodiseminar "Citizenship and Europe – Elite, Experts and Mass Interviews", 11–13. Jaanuar 2007, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgia.

DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

1. **Allan Sikk.** Highways to power: new party success in three young democracies. Tartu, 2006.
2. **Holger Mölder.** Cooperative security dilemma – practicing the hobbesian security culture in the Kantian security environment. Tartu, 2010.
3. **Heiko Pääbo.** Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space. Tartu, 2011.