

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU  
Euro College

Master Thesis

Kristina Liik

**RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER: THE CASE OF MOLDOVA  
AND ARMENIA**

Supervisor: Kristian L. Nielsen, MA; Margit Säre, MA

Tartu 2013

I have written the Master's thesis independently.

All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

..... (signature of the author and date)

Student's code: 48806024217

The defense takes place: Tartu, Lossi 36, room 103 on the 31<sup>st</sup> of May

Opponent: Maili Vilson, MA

## Abstract

The concept of soft power has become an increasingly popular topic of debate since the early 1990s. A countries' attractiveness can bring about wanted results without the use of hard power, consequently being an important attribute to a countries ability to influence the target. Equally important however, is the targets perception and the context of the relationship, making it hard to "touch" the intangible soft power and to measure it. Current thesis examined Russia's soft power in the case of Moldova and Armenia with an aim to show how, how do they vary and what might be the reasons. The results revealed that while Russia has significant leverage in terms of culture and values, the use and perception of policy is different and brings about different results. While Russia uses hard policy in order to influence Moldova thus undermining its soft power, in Armenia, Russian military presence empowers Armenia and contributes to the perception of Russia as the security guarantor. The thesis confirmed the importance of image and perception and the distinction of how soft power is used: when soft power was used and perceived as controlled, soft power *over* someone type of way, it had a more undermining effect than when soft power was used to contribute to the *empowerment* of someone.

## Kokkuvõte

Mõiste pehme jõud on muutunud üha populaarsemaks aruteluteemaks alates 1990. aastast. Pehme jõu oluliseks mõjutamise vahendiks on atraktiivsus, mis võib kaasa tuua soovitud tulemuse sunnijõu kasutusega. Samal ajal on pehme jõu kasutamisel oluline ka sihtriigi taju ja suhte kontekst, mistõttu on raske "katsuda" immateriaalset pehmet jõudu ja seda mõõta. Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks oli uurida Venemaa pehmet jõudu Moldova ja Armeenias näitel ning selgitada, milles seisnevad nende erinevused ja mis võiks olla selle põhjusteks. Kuigi Venemaa oluliseks pehme jõu allikaks on kultuur ja väärtused, toob poliitiline tegevus ja sellest tingitud taju kaasa erinevaid tulemusi. Venemaa sõjaline kohalolek õõnestab tema pehmet jõudu Moldova puhul, kuid Armeenias on Venemaa kohalolek tajutud julgeoleku garantiina, tuues kaasa soodsama meelestatuse pehme jõu osas. Magistritöö kinnitas kuvandi ja taju olulisust pehme jõu uurimisel ning tõi välja olulise erisuse pehme jõu kasutamisel: kui pehmet jõudu kasutati ja tajuti

kontrollitult, oli sellel rohkem kahjustav mõju kui siis, kui pehmet jõudu kasutati kellegi kindlustamiseks.

## Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank the University of Tartu and the Euro College for the wonderful European Union-Russia Studies MA programme, lecturers, and staff. The author would especially like to thank the following people for their kind help and contribution: Kristian L. Nielsen, Kadri Liik, Olga Bogdanova, Heiko Pääbo and all of the interviewees.



Table of contents:

INTRODUCTION .....	8
1.THE NOTION OF POWER.....	10
1.1. Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power .....	12
1.2. Nye’s concept of soft power .....	15
1.2.1. Soft power: resources .....	17
1.3. Russia and the concept of soft power.....	20
1.4. The limits of soft power .....	25
2. METHODOLOGY .....	28
2.1. Research problem.....	28
2.2. Research questions .....	30
2.3. Research design.....	31
2.3.1 Semi-structured interview method .....	34
2.4. Research limitations .....	38
3. ANALYSIS .....	40
3.1. Russia’s culture as a source of soft power .....	40
3.2. Russia’s values as a source of soft power .....	44
3.3. Russia’s foreign policy as a source of soft power.....	49
3.4. Other sources of Russia’s soft power.....	53
4. CASE STUDIES .....	58
4.1. Russia’s soft power in Moldova and Armenia.....	58
4.1.1. Main results: culture.....	59
4.1.2. Main results: Values.....	63
4.1.3. Main results: Foreign Policy .....	70
4.2. Different impact of Russia’s soft power .....	78
CONCLUSION.....	81
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	83
Appendix 1 .....	93

## INTRODUCTION

The concept of soft power has become an increasingly popular topic of debate since the early 1990s, when American scholar Joseph Nye Jr. described the power of attraction and the ability to persuade without using hard power. Starting out as a concept to describe the USA experience, the notion of soft power penetrated from a state-centric view to a worldly accepted and widely used concept. Accordingly, a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. “This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.”<sup>1</sup> Nye<sup>2</sup> has pointed to three primary resources that generate soft power: culture, values, and foreign policy.

The interest of the author of the thesis is to expand the research on soft power in the case of Russia, which has been traditionally seen as a case of hard power. Soft power in the case of Russia has been mostly described via power resources that are hard to distinguish on the basis of soft-hard dichotomy, especially when taking into account power conversion and Russia’s power behaviour outcomes. However, soft power depends not only on the action of agent but also on subjects’ perception. In order to study Russia’s soft power in a more coherent way, current research takes into account soft power resources and how they are being utilized as well as perceived in target countries. The author has chosen two case studies to illustrate the uniqueness and the universality of the concept of soft power both at the same time. The aim of the study is to identify, if and how does soft power affect Russia’s influence in Moldova and in Armenia, how do these two cases vary in the same framework and what might be the reasons.

In order to achieve the study aim, the author has chosen to follow the concept of soft power developed by Joseph Nye. The first chapter focuses on the notion of power, and

---

<sup>1</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (Public Affairs, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public diplomacy and soft power,” *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, 616, no 1 (2008), 94-109.

more concretely on the concept of soft power. A literature overview is provided in order to map soft power research with a special emphasis on Russia. The second chapter describes the methodology and data as well as research limitations. The third and fourth chapter introduces Russia's soft power resources using primary and secondary data. In order to put Russia's soft power into specific context, a subject centric view, taking into account the perception of Russia's soft power in the target country, is introduced via interview results as well as description of the relations of the two countries. Finally, in order to show the possible variation of the case studies, the two countries are compared and a conclusion provides a synthesis of results on Russia's soft power in Moldova and Armenia. The author has used relevant books that form the basis of the theory, scientific journal articles and policy papers to elaborate on soft power research and included the main findings in current research. Various data from national statistics service from Russia, Moldova and Armenia as well as compiled indices from other relevant sources have been introduced in order to establish a more comprehensive overview of the study.

The relevance of the study lies in the fact that soft power as a theoretical concept on the one hand, and Russia's power on the other hand, can be studied in a more refined and conceptualized manner leading to result that may indicate if Russia's soft power is having an effect in the target countries. The theoretical framework takes into account relevant research and criticism of soft power in order to address the issues of current study in a more coherent way. The thesis contributes to soft power literature by introducing both agent and subject centric view between Russia and the case study countries as well as elaborating on the importance of image and perception in soft power research.

## 1. THE NOTION OF POWER

Power is one of the most disputed concepts in IR. The notion of power can be understood in various contexts and as such we can speak of political power or social power; categorize power by its resources and name them hard, soft or economic power. With this, one should not treat the concept of power literally. As Haugaard<sup>3</sup> notes, words should be viewed as conceptual tools that help to create ideas and theoretical systems. However, it is hardly the case when theorists fall into one specific category of power debate<sup>4</sup>. This is also one example of how the concept of power is inevitably subject to disputes.

At the most general level, power refers to subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviour of one or more units depends in some circumstances on the behaviour of other units<sup>5</sup>. Dahl's agency-based concept of power states that, at its most fundamental, power entails the capacity of one actor to make another actor do something which they would not otherwise do in the form of A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done.<sup>6</sup> If to turn to social power, Barry Barnes<sup>7</sup> argues that social power presupposes social structure; the success of A's ability to make B do things that they would not otherwise do is premised upon the predictability of B's behaviour. Nye uses also agent-focused definition of power as it refers to the common usage of the concept (for example in dictionaries). However, according to Haugaard,<sup>8</sup> structure can be conscious on a discursive level, but more often than not actors fail to critically evaluate their acts on structural reproduction, so in what Haugaard<sup>9</sup> has called the three-dimensional power, this is practical consciousness knowledge.

---

<sup>3</sup> Mark Haugaard, *Power: A Reader*, (Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Haugaard categorizes the power debate into four major clusters (languages): normative political theory of the analytical conceptual variety, political theory building of non-conceptual variety, and social theory of modern orientation and postmodern social theory. Haugaard, *Power: A Reader*, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Dahl, "Power," in *Power: A Reader*, by Mark Haugaard, (Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Dahl, "Power," p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Barry Barnes quoted by Haugaard in *Power: A Reader*, p. 304.

<sup>8</sup> Haugaard, *Power: A Reader*.

<sup>9</sup> Mark Haugaard, *The Constitution of Power* (Manchester University Press, 1997).

Constructivist Felix Oppenheim approaches to power in terms of a probabilistic causation thus, concepts of power can differ in the extent to which action X is either sufficient, or necessary and sufficient for the action Y to happen or to be prevented. The widely used approach in empirical theorizing is to use the concepts as variables, whose content needs to be fixed in order to allow for a rigorous and reproducible analysis<sup>10</sup> however, operationalization can have the risk of neglecting the concepts' most significant aspects. Therefore, the dilemma of having a core concept that can serve as a communication tool between different contexts of a concept or having a rigorous variable construction is what an analyst must choose within, because achieving both might not be possible.<sup>11</sup> One can note that the subject of current thesis follows the explanation of a concept serving as a communication tool between different contexts.

In 1939, E. H. Carr mentioned a power of opinion.<sup>12</sup> In the realist school of thought, power was reduced to measurable resources. Nye<sup>13</sup> argues that there is no contradiction between realism and soft power but it is the legitimacy that is the power reality. However, the realist view does not take into account the fact that attraction and persuasion are socially constructed. The weakness of the theory of realism is the concern of how states define their interest and how states learn. In short, realist theory is better at explaining interactions than interest.<sup>14</sup> Nye in collaboration with Keohane has outlined three main conclusions that reversed three realist assumptions: states were the only significant actors; force was the dominant instrument; security was the primary goal.<sup>15</sup> Realism and liberalism in Nye's view can even be complementary, as the sophisticated version of liberal theory addresses the manner in which interactions among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics of the state in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define their interest.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Stefano Guzzini "The concept of power: a constructivist analysis", in *Power in World Politics* ed. by Felix Berenskoetter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 26-27.

<sup>11</sup> Guzzini "The concept of power", p. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 82.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Power in the global information age: from realism to globalization* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 23-24.

<sup>15</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

<sup>16</sup> Nye, Jr. *Power in the global information age*, p. 3.

Nye's definition of power is the following: "*Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants*"<sup>17</sup>. Nye also introduces a second definition of power, which states that the possessions of capabilities or resources can influence the outcomes.<sup>18</sup> However, measuring resources is not the same as measuring power that brings expected or wanted results. The question that Nye addressed next was, which resources provide the best basis for power behaviour in a particular context,<sup>19</sup> and this is another crucial fact: the resources that were important some time ago, may well be meaningless after some time of period or in a particular context. Steven Lukes makes an important note on the sources of attraction or indoctrination in specific cases: "*Both the agent-centered, strategic view of Nye and the subject-centered, structural view of Foucault lack this distinction' between indoctrination and the exercise of power that leaves those subject to it free to live according to the dictates of power of their nature and judgment.*"<sup>20</sup> In order to make this distinction between agent and subject-centered view, Lukes<sup>21</sup> introduces a series of questions that lead to a better understanding of the difference and operationalization, which will be considered in the theoretical framework.

### **1.1. Nye's distinction between hard and soft power**

It is Nye's belief that the rather crude distinction of power in different schools of thought should be left aside; rather, a careful case analysis can illuminate the hard and soft power strategies of a country. Success can be evaluated in terms of ethical values as well as effectiveness.<sup>22</sup> The distinction between hard and soft power is one of degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources: both are

---

<sup>17</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The Benefits of Soft Power," *Compass: A Journal of Leadership*, 8, no. 2 (2004), p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Steven Lukes „Power and the Battle for the Heats and Minds: on the Bluntness of soft power," in *Power in World Politics* ed. by Felix Berenskoetter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 97.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. „Notes for a soft-power research agenda," in *Power in World Politics*, ed. by Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 172.

aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by affecting the behaviour of others.<sup>23</sup> In Nye's view, command power is the ability to change what others do and can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power is the ability to shape what others want and can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.<sup>24</sup> Soft power sources tend to be associated with co-optive power behaviour, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behaviour.<sup>25</sup> He notes that the distinction is imperfect as some deeds may be established by using hard power but become or are regarded legitimate later.<sup>26</sup> For example, countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate.<sup>27</sup> But the general association is strong enough to allow the useful shorthand reference to hard and soft power.<sup>28</sup> The second distinction between hard and soft power deals with the tangibility of power resources. Soft power resources are characteristically intangible resources: culture, ideology, values, and institutions are the most common examples.<sup>29</sup> In sum, the distinction between hard and soft power is given by taking together the nature of the agents' behaviour and the tangibility of resources.

In Nye's view, military and economic power both serve as hard power and can be used to get others to change their position. He notes that hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). These might be achieved using threats or payoffs.<sup>30</sup> The most likely resources of hard power in Nye's distinction are force, sanctions, payments and bribes, whereas the most likely resources of soft power are institutions (in agenda setting) and values, culture and policies.<sup>31</sup> Nye uses also command power and co-optive power as an alternative way to distinguish hard and soft power. Also, if a country faces

---

<sup>23</sup> Nye, *Bound to Lead*, p. 267; Nye, "Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age", p. 176; Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 7; Nye, "The Benefits of Soft Power," p. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 7.

<sup>26</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> The forms of behaviour between command and co-optive power range along a continuum: command power, coercion, inducement, agenda setting, attraction, co-optive power. Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 8.

<sup>29</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 8.

hard power resources decline, it is likely to lose soft power as well, but it does not mean that soft power depends on hard power.<sup>32</sup>

### *Military and economic power*

A well run military can be an attractive image; on a personal level, people might be attracted to strength and military cooperation and training programmes can establish transnational networks.<sup>33</sup> Yet, military resources can undercut soft power- this is why military resources more often than not create hard power. Nye notes that more research needs to be done on the relationship between military resources and soft power.<sup>34</sup> Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states, for example, the Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe.<sup>35</sup> But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. As Nye states, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power.<sup>36</sup>

Economic resources can produce both hard and soft power behaviour (to coerce or attract). Successful economy is an important source of attraction but at the same time it can provide resources that can be used as hard power inducements in the form of payments as well as coercive sanctions.<sup>37</sup> But as Nye refers to Cooper, in a Dahl's one-dimensional power behavioural system, there is little economic power if there is a consensual market conditions that clears the market.<sup>38</sup> With this, power depends on the asymmetry of the market relationship. The more vulnerable one is, the more likely the other part can use this as a source of coercive power.<sup>39</sup> In sum, complex economic resources produce a mix of hard and soft power behaviour.

Nye uses the three dimensions of ethics (motives, means and consequence) and argues that soft power differs in terms of means and with regard to this dimension, one might construct a normative preference for greater use of soft power, even if international

---

<sup>32</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 9.

<sup>33</sup> Nye, „Soft-power research”, p. 167.

<sup>34</sup> Nye, „Soft-power research”, p. 168.

<sup>35</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 9.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Nye, „Soft-power research”, p.165-166.

<sup>38</sup> Nye, „Soft-power research”, p. 166.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

dialogues are not based solely on reasoned persuasion.<sup>40</sup> Nye argues that it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others, as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. With this Nye once again addresses the issue of soft power-hard power in countries power behaviour.<sup>41</sup> In the 21st century, under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, the sources and distribution of power are being transformed in a profound way. Non-state actors have gained greater power and, as a result, more activities are outside the control of even the most powerful states.<sup>42</sup> Nye has also developed the concept of smart power, where he combines both hard and soft power and indicates that the information age is having an increasing impact on countries' interaction and power behaviour.<sup>43</sup> In sum, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce or undermine each other because both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behaviour of others.<sup>44</sup>

## 1.2. Nye's concept of soft power

Nye's definition of soft power is the following:

*“Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.”*<sup>45</sup>

*“If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do **not** want. If a country represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.”*<sup>46</sup>

The concept of soft power arose from Nye's interest in how culture and ideas could contribute to power as he felt that the power of attraction often grows out of culture and values, but are frequently neglected.<sup>47</sup> When Nye developed the concept of soft power,

---

<sup>40</sup> Nye, „Notes for a soft-power research agenda,” p. 170.

<sup>41</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age,” in *Re-Ordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11<sup>th</sup>*, ed. by Mark Leonard. (Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) London, United Kingdom, 2002), p. 4-5.

<sup>42</sup> Nye, “Hard and Soft power in a Global Information Age”, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*.

<sup>44</sup> Nye, “Hard and Soft power in a Global Information Age”, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, x.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Nye, *Power in the global information age*, p. 5.

he also referred to what has been called “the second face of power” which builds on Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz work.<sup>48</sup> In this paper, Bachrach and Baratz study the elements of conception of power and how these concepts can be utilized more effectively in case studies.<sup>49</sup> A crucial point that they make about decision-making is that a decision cannot be said to be a result of power or influence or authority or force unless and until it is specified from whose point of view the decision is being examined and that the distinction between “specific” intent and intent inferred from actual behaviour could be done.<sup>50</sup>

Often misused, Nye argues that the term represents a series means of influence: a country can attract others with its culture, its values and domestic practices and the perceived legitimacy of its foreign policies.<sup>51</sup> Nye states that common goals as well as interdependence is what drives countries to take the lead but it matters a great deal whether a country appears to be acting on narrow self-interest or a broad approach that incorporates the interest of others.<sup>52</sup> He notes that soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. The fact that civil society is the origin of much soft power does not disprove its existence. As the state cannot simply create soft power resources, it should adopt behaviours, which exploit and reinforce the soft power resources it already has, and make sure its actions do not end up undermining them.<sup>53</sup> Nye also makes a link with democracy saying that soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. He makes a distinction between soft power and influence, saying that soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by arguments. Soft power is the power of attraction that often leads to acquiescence.<sup>54</sup>

How do agents win the hearts and minds of a subject? Nye argues that the spectrum of behaviour between command and co-optation runs through coercion to inducement to agenda-setting and attraction<sup>55</sup>. Soft power is attraction, but agents can control agendas and structure subjects’ preferences so that things appear attractive that might otherwise

---

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>49</sup> Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” *American Political Science Review* (September 1963), pp. 632–642.

<sup>50</sup> Bachrach and Baratz, *Decisions and Nondecisions*, p. 641.

<sup>51</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 11.

<sup>52</sup> Nye, *Power in the global information age*, p. 8.

<sup>53</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 11.

<sup>54</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> ‘ Nye, “The Benefits of Soft Power,” p. 8.

not be so.<sup>56</sup> Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favourable outcomes depends upon the context and the skills of the agent in converting the resources into behavioral outcomes, which is not unique to soft-power resources and depends on the context.<sup>57</sup> With this, Nye focused on the relational nature of soft power, answering questions put forward by several analysts in *Power in world politics*.<sup>58</sup> In Nye's view, countries that are likely to gain soft power are (1) those whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy), (2) those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed, and (3) those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance.<sup>59</sup> The parenthetical conditions are the key in determining whether soft-power resources translate into the behaviour of attraction that can influence others towards favourable outcomes.<sup>60</sup> Soft power arising out of cultural attraction can be positive sum, but where objectives differ, soft power can become a zero-sum relationship. As Nye<sup>61</sup> importantly notes, soft power need not to be used only for zero-sum game, a positive-sum interaction may bring about the reduction of the likelihood of conflict. In his book „*The Future of Power*“, Nye<sup>62</sup> once again turns back to the essence of soft power. He argues that despite of the growing impact of economic tools (such as Russia is known to use) there is a limit to economic power as such. The diffusion of power to non-state actors, including transnational corporations and NGO's make it more difficult to control market conditions.

### 1.2.1. Soft power: resources

According to Nye, soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: “*its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad- acceptance) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)*.”<sup>63</sup> In terms of soft power resources, Nye states

---

<sup>56</sup> Nye, “Soft-power research,” p. 163.

<sup>57</sup> Nye, „Soft-power research,” p. 164.

<sup>58</sup> Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (ed), *Power in World Politics*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>59</sup> Nye, *Power in the global information age*, p. 90.

<sup>60</sup> Nye, „Soft-power research”, p. 165.

<sup>61</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*.

<sup>62</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*.

<sup>63</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 11.

that the assets that produce attraction are the resources and whether a certain asset is a resource can be measured by asking people through polls or focus groups. Yet the judgment on whether such resources produce policy outcomes that are set as a goal depends on the careful evaluation and judgment of the context and particular cases.<sup>64</sup> This is why a case study that gives a deeper overview of a particular case is expected to have better result in evaluating soft power outcomes. Although attraction does not always determine others' preferences, the gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behaviour cannot only be related to soft power but all types of power.<sup>65</sup>

Co-optive power can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others to fail in expressing their preferences.<sup>66</sup> The attraction to certain values and the commitment to honour or to contribute to these values is the currency that soft power uses.<sup>67</sup> The resources that produce soft power in international politics arise from the values an organization or country expresses in culture, in the examples it sets by its international practices and policies and in its foreign policy.<sup>68</sup> The political values and institutions strongly affect the preferences of others. When government institutions effectively uphold values like transparency, justice, and equality at home, they are naturally more attractive abroad.<sup>69</sup> Yet, as Nye<sup>70</sup> presents, some imitation or attraction does not produce much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable outcomes. According to Nye, policies can soften or sharpen hard structural edges, and they can affect the ratio of love to hate in complex love-hate relationship. Nye also notes that unpopular policies are the most volatile element of the overall image, and there seems to be more stability in the reservoir of goodwill that rests on culture and values.<sup>71</sup> In this regard, as the current thesis builds mostly on Nye's view on soft power, the theory indicates that policies can have a significant impact on enhancing or undermining the perception of a countries soft power in target countries.

---

<sup>64</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 6.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 8.

<sup>67</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 8.

<sup>69</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Public diplomacy and soft power," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, 616, no. 1 (2008), pp. 94-109, p. 95.

<sup>70</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*.

<sup>71</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 38-39.

The underlying conclusion that Nye makes (about the United States decline of attractiveness in his 2004 book, right after the start of Iraq war) is that it is not enough just to have visible power resources; when one talks about soft power, it is the question of what messages are sent and received by whom and under which circumstances; how that affects the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants.<sup>72</sup> He then suggests that messages and images are conveyed partly by government policies at home and abroad, and partly by culture. Yet, the contextual analysis of soft power is of crucial importance, because the same message is “downloaded” and interpreted with different effects by different receivers and settings; with this, soft power varies by time and place and should not be treated as a constant.<sup>73</sup> An important thing about the instruments of soft power is the fact that while governments can control policy, culture and values are embedded in civil societies. Moreover, soft power depends on credibility and when governments are seen as manipulative and information is perceived as propaganda and indoctrination, credibility is destroyed.<sup>74</sup>

To sum up, the distinction between power behaviours and power resources is the crucial element in Nye’s concept of soft power; power behaviours (ranging from command power to co-optive power) are ways of exercising power. However, it is important to note that while any type of power resources can produce soft power (examples were brought in *hard and military power* section), at the same time, any type of power behaviour is not soft power. Nye explains that the “carrot and stick” policy does not have to be implemented, the concept of soft power is rather to attract via personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.<sup>75</sup> Nye’s earlier work on soft power faced the criticism of being too agent-centric and not focusing on the subject. In order to link soft power resources to behaviour, strategic conception as a missing element in Nye’s concept of soft power has been introduced by critics<sup>76</sup> and the conflation of relational and structural forms of

---

<sup>72</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 44.

<sup>73</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 44.

<sup>74</sup> Nye „Soft-power research”, p. 171.

<sup>75</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*.

<sup>76</sup> Nye’s concept of soft power, when first developed in the 1990s, focused more on agent-centric view, while his examples indicate the importance of the role of subject and social structures that determine what it means to be attractive which is as important as the agents operating within the social structures. Edward Lock, “Soft power and strategy: developing a ‘strategic’ concept of power” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. by, Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (Routledge, 2010), pp. 32-50.

power are contributed to the unstrategic conception of soft power. Nye's later work started to address the issue of subject and context of the relationship, when he wrote about interdependent decision-making that took into account various roles such as leaders, followers and the context in which the relationship exists.<sup>77</sup> Hence, a relational as well as structural form of power must be both included in soft power research and a study on their interdependence can lead to more comprehensive overview of the interaction. For example, the power of values or norms can be "exercised" by agents who want to change the values of others with the help of TV for example, but it can also be exercised by social structures when changing the policies of others within shared cultural and political values.<sup>78</sup> It is important to note that because of the play of meaning (due to which social structures can be reinterpreted and reconstituted) that is inherent within intersubjective structures, the nature of these terrains cannot be conceived as being either natural nor necessarily permanent.<sup>79</sup> While social structures may constitute and regulate the practices of certain actors, they are themselves capable of being challenged, reinterpreted and reconstituted by those very actors.<sup>80</sup>

### **1.3. Russia and the concept of soft power**

The conceptual divide between hard and soft power resources and the case of Russia is thoroughly presented in a Master thesis by Andrew Michael Johnston<sup>81</sup> who concludes that individual policy instruments can bring about hard as well as soft power effects, resulting in hard power acting soft and soft power acting hard. The blend of hard and soft power<sup>82</sup> is a subject of debate among theorists and policy analysts. Due to the fact that the current thesis makes the starting point of its discussion on Russia's soft power a resource centric approach (and only then proceeds to the subject oriented view), a further elaboration on soft power resources will be presented in the present chapter and in the analysis part.

---

<sup>77</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>78</sup> Lock, "Soft power and strategy," pp. 32-50.

<sup>79</sup> Lock, "Soft power and strategy," p. 47.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Andrew Michael Johnston, *Powerplays in a de facto State Russian hard and soft power in Abkhazia*, Master Thesis (The University of Texas at Austin August 2011).

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.,

Generally, soft power research has usually focused on a specific aspect (resource). For example, the most commonly used variables are public diplomacy<sup>83</sup>, student exchange<sup>84</sup> or theoretical aspects of soft power research<sup>85</sup>. Current thesis will present a brief overview of specific soft power research done so far with a special emphasis on Russia. The model on Russia's soft power and China's soft power has become a subject of Joseph Nye's recent work<sup>86</sup> when he elaborates on the possible future of the BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), and also on why Russia and China fail when it comes to understanding soft power.<sup>87</sup> He concludes that Russia and China make the mistake of using government as the main instrument of soft power, neglecting the phenomena of a society to society interaction. He also makes reference to the fact that soft power needs not to be a zero-sum game<sup>88</sup> as it often is in the case of Russia and China. A thorough overview of soft power discourse in the case of Russia and China concludes that while the two cases have similarities in how the concept is treated by leaders (deploying the concept in foreign policy toolkit in a controlled manner), the underlying difference is explained with how the concept is being used.<sup>89</sup> Russia, in its specific national conditions, follows the western type soft power techniques, while China, deviating more from Nye's original definition, emphasizes the promotion of its culture and uses soft power in its domestic policy behaviour.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, current thesis examines Russia's soft power from Nye's point of view as he is the original author of the concept and it has been previously shown that the Russian model follows a western type soft power behaviour.

---

<sup>83</sup> For example, see Henry H. Sun, International political marketing: a case study of United States soft power and public diplomacy, *Journal of Public Affairs*, 8, no. 3 (2008), pp. 165–183.

<sup>84</sup> For example see Carol Atkinson, "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6 (2010), pp. 1–22.

<sup>85</sup> In terms of culture see Junjie LI, Konglai ZHU & Xiang WANG "Study of Cultural Soft Power under the Construction of New Rural Areas", *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 8, no. 1 (2012), pp. 52-55; Daixingm TANG, Xiaoping LI & Xingyu YANG, "Research on Soft Power and Its Discipline Orientation", *International Business and Management*, 4, no. 1 (2012), pp. 18-27.

<sup>86</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 167-186.

<sup>87</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what\\_china\\_and\\_russia\\_don\\_t\\_get\\_about\\_soft\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power) (accessed 30 April 2013).

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., In the case of Russia, this is also highlighted by some policy analysts, see for example James Nixey, *The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia*, Chatham House briefing paper June 2012 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2012), p. 16.

<sup>89</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson, *Soft Power: A Comparison of Discourse and Practice in Russia and China* (August 22, 2012), [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2134457](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2134457) (accessed 30 April 2013).

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

The emergence of Russia's soft power and its objectives have been discussed in various forms since 2004, when the colour revolutions started in the neighbourhood and Russia started to actively use other means than hard power to influence its "near abroad".<sup>91</sup> Vladimir Rukavishnikov has divided different viewpoints of how Russia is discussed within the concept of soft power into four major groups, covering the analysis done so far and indicating that Russia's soft power has been studied within extremely opposing views in essence,<sup>92</sup> however, Nye's approach has not been covered. An interesting overview of Russia's schools of thought and the motives of exploiting soft power behind Putin's foreign policy established that Russia's motives might not be so incompatible with the western objectives, the key issue being stability in the region.<sup>93</sup> The issue of model of governance and how 'regional authoritarian learning' can explain Russia's strength in enhancing its image is analyzed in a case study of Central Asian regimes which concludes the importance of 'receptivity' of ideas and practices, the provision of benefits (financial or legitimacy), and perceived threats to regime survival.<sup>94</sup> Kazantsev and Merkushev have analyzed the role of a country's "image" and the importance of positive or negative stereotypes in relation to target audience,<sup>95</sup> concluding that the importance of image in relation to Russia's soft power is heavily underestimated. In light of this, current thesis also emphasizes the importance of attractive national image and the perception of the latter in target countries in order to include a more subject centric view on Russia's soft power research.

---

<sup>91</sup> For example see Nicu Popescu, "Russia's soft power ambitions", *CEPS Policy brief*, no. 115 (October 2006); Fiona Hill, "Moscow Discovers Soft Power," *Current History*, 30, no. 2, (October) (2006), pp. 341–347.

<sup>92</sup> Namely, the four groups divide the issue of Russia's soft power firstly as pleasing for Russians and alarming for Westerners, secondly views that are disappointing for Russians, thirdly as opinions both explanatory and shaming and fourthly as basically anti-American in nature. Vladimir Rukavishnikov, "Russia's "Soft Power" in the Putin Epoch," in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. By Roger E. Kanet (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

<sup>93</sup> Andrey P. Tsyganov, "If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin's Foreign Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58, no. 7, (November 2006), pp. 1079 – 1099.

<sup>94</sup> Nicole J. Jackson, "The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rule: a case study of Russia's influence on Central Asian regimes", *Contemporary Politics*, 16, no. 1, (March 2010), pp. 101–118.

<sup>95</sup> Андрей Казанцев, Виталии Меркушев, Россия и постсоветское пространство: перспективы использования «мягкой силы», *Полит 2* (2008), <http://www.mgimo.ru/publish/document34174.phtml> (accessed 30 April 2013).

One of the most thorough soft power analysis on Russia's and the EU's influence in the Eastern Partnership region is the analysis made by Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson<sup>96</sup> that compares soft power as well hard power presence. According to the analysis, the most important "levers" of Russia's soft power in Moldova and Armenia are prevailed by the reliance on hard power resources. The analysis also explains the EU's prospects and how they can compete with Russia in the region. Leonard & Popescu<sup>97</sup> have made a distinction between Russia's hard and soft power resources (under soft power there are for example mass- media, the financing of the NGO's, visa-free regime) and it has been shown, that when it comes to the neighbourhood, Russia's foreign policy offers a great deal of carrots (better organized than the EU) but also sharper sticks. "*While Europe has largely been content to sit back and rely on what Carl Bildt calls the "magnetism" of the European model, Russia – not usually considered particularly adept at the use of soft power – has learned the power of incentives as well as of coercion. Russia offers the neighborhood energy and easy membership of multilateral organizations.*"<sup>98</sup>

A country specific analysis on Russia's influence on Moldova in the time period 2000-2008<sup>99</sup> covers the first two terms of Vladimir Putin presidency and analyzes areas that are considered "most vulnerable to Russian interests"<sup>100</sup>, based on articles and reports as well as expert interviews. The study gives a comprehensive overview of variety of issues, however, it does not rely of soft power theory nor does it categorize the influence in soft-hard power terms. James Nixey has considered the political, economic and cultural aspects of Russian 'soft power' resources in the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, concluding that, in terms of Armenia, the cultural and economic penetration (also in the case of Kyrgyzstan) is at its highest and a multi-dimensional presence is one of the greatest asset Russia has in the region.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> Nicu Popescu & Andrew Wilson, *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighborhood* (London: The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009); Andrew Wilson and Nicu Popescu, "Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 9, no. 3, (September 2009), pp. 317–331.

<sup>97</sup> Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russian Relations*, ECFR Policy Paper (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).

<sup>98</sup> Popescu, and Wilson, *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite*, p. 27.

<sup>99</sup> Riina Kaljurand, *Russian influence on Moldovan politics during the Putin era (2000-2008)*, Analysis (International Centre for Defence Studies, November 2008).

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Nixey, *The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia*.

Various research focuses primarily in mapping different approaches within the discourse of Russia's soft power, applying a resource based analysis, or focus on the policy outcomes in determining soft power behaviour. The "Russian style" soft power is however treated more often than not in a negative way, hence the critics of soft power concept and Russia's power behavior state that the use of force, coercion or payment is simply in disguise and wearing the image of soft power. It is the case of Georgian and Russian interaction after the 2008 August war, when every diplomatic move or speech is viewed in a hostile manner<sup>102</sup> or the compatriots policy, which is seen in the Baltic States as not protecting minorities but undermining the Baltic States government actions. In a report on Russian soft power, Conley and Gerber<sup>103</sup> tackle the minority issue in Estonia and raise a question whether in fact soft power is soft propaganda and the suggestion is that it might be a mix: "...a heavy-handed Soviet cultural propaganda model with twenty-first century accoutrements."<sup>104</sup> In the case of Russia, the soft power concept has undergone a severe case of concept stretching- soft power is everything that hard power is not and sometimes it is just hard or economic power in a „softer“ way. Matthews<sup>105</sup> uses the heading „Softer Russian Power“ to emphasize that Russian language is losing its grip among the Post-Soviet countries youth and thus it needs to regain its position by using softer influence. However, a more distinct categorization in terms of Nye's theory based soft power resources, tools and outcomes can explain the importance of perception in distinguishing power resources and soft power behaviour. Despite the problems that occur when conceptualizing and operationalizing the concept, soft power highlights the factors of communication and image<sup>106</sup> and according to some authors, may be a "safety net", minimizing damage of foreign policy mistakes.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup> For further see Tengiz Pkhaladze (ed.), *Soft Power''- the new concept of the Russian Foreign Policy Towards Georgia (August 2008 Postwar Period)* (International Centre for Geopolitical Studies Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 2010).

<sup>103</sup> Heather. A. Conley and Theodore, P. Gerber, *Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An examination of Russian compatriot policy in Estonia*. A report of the CSIS Europe Program. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011).

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Owen Matthews, "Softer Russian Power", *Newsweek Magazine*, 31 of May, 2008, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/05/31/softer-russian-power.html> (accessed 1 June 2012).

<sup>106</sup> Sergei Medvedev and Linda Jackson "Sovereignty or Interdependence?," in *At the Crossroads of Post-Communist Modernisation: Russia and China in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Christer Pursiainen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.190.

<sup>107</sup> Medvedev and Jackson "Sovereignty or Interdependence?," p. 181-223.

#### 1.4. The limits of soft power

The limits of soft power are most often treated by the critics as something insurmountable, namely how to measure soft power. Public opinion and survey based research to measure soft power<sup>108</sup> does not give a comprehensive overview, and in order to overcome this issue at least two kind of soft power indices have been developed.<sup>109</sup> However, these show the resource based soft power analysis and compare the countries performance.<sup>110</sup> It is correct to point out that soft power does deal with intangible resources that cannot be “counted” like units of measurement. However, this does not mean that soft power does not exist or social science cannot take it into account. What is more, soft power is having an increasing influence in international relations and not only there: soft power is transcending to peoples’ everyday lives on a daily basis. Nye introduces two sets of soft power models that produce either direct or indirect effect of soft power (elite interaction or society to society, when elite is ultimately influenced).<sup>111</sup> A direct effect can be seen for example in elite relations (like the former tandem of Merkozy or G7 meetings, which does not mean that manipulation is not one resource of soft power). But more often, a two-step model in which publics and third parties are influenced, and they in turn affect the leaders of the countries, may occur.<sup>112</sup> If to turn to the causal effects of soft power, process-tracing may detect multiple causes, but judging indirect causation through process-tracing might not be enough; a careful content analysis can provide for first estimate of the indirect effect.<sup>113</sup> However, Nye does not explicitly address the issue of measurement and uses various examples and indices

---

<sup>108</sup> As stated by Nye (see further in Nye, *Soft Power*), public opinion polls are not sufficient enough to detect soft power effects; it has been shown that a deeper case study analysis has to be conducted in order to assess the soft power causes and effects of a given country.

<sup>109</sup> Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders* (Institute for Government, 2010); Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power* (Institute for Government, 2011); *Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index*, Ernst & Young in collaboration with The Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO (Ernst & Young’s Emerging Markets center, 2012).

<sup>110</sup> What is more, these results show Russia’s poor performance, Russia scored in the comparison of 26 countries the last rank (0.45). The index gives a relative overview of the possible leverage, but does not address the issue of subjects. McClory, *The New Persuaders*; In 2011 Russia ranked 28<sup>th</sup> out of 30 countries. McClory, *The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft*; The second index focuses on emerging market countries to measure the correlation between GDP and soft power indicator, but the index seems to be developed in order to shed more positive light on emerging markets. *Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index*, Ernst & Young’s.

<sup>111</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*.

<sup>112</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 94.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

stating that an indirect way of measurement will give a more thorough overview of a country's soft power.<sup>114</sup>

Nye has referred to Steven Lukes, who states that even though it might be hard to distinguish the rational or non-rational modes by which the “third face of power” operates and how targets’ preference and self-interest is formulated, one can distinguish indoctrination from free choice in most cases.<sup>115</sup> Therefore, the importance of perception and its evolution that takes into account various aspects of influence is the critical point that produces soft power outcome. Lukes formulates a set of questions that should be raised in order to focus on both agent and subject<sup>116</sup>: “*Exactly how do agents succeed in winning the hearts and minds of those subject to their influence- by wielding power over them or by contributing to their empowerment? How exactly do those with power ‘shape the preferences’ of those subject to their power? Or, better because more precisely: to what extent, in what ways and by what mechanisms do powerful agents influence others’ conceptions of their own interest?*” These questions bring more preciseness to how soft power research should be conducted and what are the crucial aspects to consider when building a research design. Nye argues that the objective measure of potential soft power has to be attractive in the eyes of specific audience, and that attraction must influence policy outcomes.<sup>117</sup> For this, the specific context of the relationship is important in order to establish the importance of specific versus wider audience importance in using its soft power.

Another limitation is soft power conversion i.e. how soft power resources are converted to power behaviour (outcome). The chain of this argument (resources→policy tools→conversion skills→target response→outcome) is long and vague enough to create obstacles and fundamental misunderstanding of what soft power is. Nye uses the approach of Vuving<sup>118</sup> and the crucial ability to influence target perception. The crucial thing is whether the target responds positively or negatively. In this regards, there is no set of universal soft power skills that can be used exactly the same way and under any

---

<sup>114</sup> Nye argues: “...even though polls can measure the existence and trends in potential soft power resources, they are only first approximation for behavioral change in terms of outcomes,” Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 95.

<sup>115</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 87.

<sup>116</sup> Lukes „Power and the Battle”, p. 97.

<sup>117</sup> Nye *Soft Power*, p. 34.

<sup>118</sup> Alexander L. Vuving “*How Soft Power Works*” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, September 3 (2009), pp. 7-8.

circumstantial factors. However, soft power resources are conveyed into outcomes that have evidence and while exact process tracing might be imperfect, it is proof enough of how soft power in a specific case has worked. Measuring power in terms of changes in power behaviour may be misleading if we do not know what are the preferences or motives behind these alterations of power behaviour. Hence, as Nye argues, power always depends on the context in which the relationship exists. Of course, to obtain this knowledge might be impossible or very hard, still, this does not deny that even without a thorough knowledge of others perceptions, one might still have influence, if, for example, the actions are seen legitimate or having moral authority, which is another point of Nye's.<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, pp. 2-3.

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

The following chapter introduces the methodology of the thesis. Firstly, the research problem will be introduced and a justification of the two case studies provided. Secondly, research questions will be introduced in order to establish, how the research problem is being operationalized. Thirdly, the research design and data with which the research problem is studied will be established. Finally, research limitations will be discussed.

### **2.1. Research problem**

Stemming from the aim of the study, the research problem of the current thesis is formulated as follows: *Is Russia's soft power having an effect in Moldova and Armenia? If so, how is Russia's soft power influencing Moldova and Armenia?*

Russia represents a power in the region that is alternative to western democracy type regimes. Yet, Russia has been successful in building its economy, state apparatus and until recently popular leadership and contained voters after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Moldova and Armenia are closely linked to Russia in terms of energy and the economy as a whole, but also cultural affinity (with Russian speaking minority) common history and regional cooperation, to name some common denominators of bilateral relations. However, Russia's relations with the two case study countries vary a great deal. Moldova is currently pursuing EU integration, despite the long lasting political crises and weak economy. Russia's presence in the separatist region Transnistria causes tension and shapes the relations of the two countries in a significant way. Armenia on the other hand, sees Russia as one of the closest allies in the region. Russia's military presence in the country is uncontested and the two countries have a rather tight and friendly bilateral relationship. The EU represents a major soft power "force" in the region, having included 6 former Soviet Union countries (Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan) in a European Neighbourhood Policy initiative, the Eastern Partnership. The Policy is a country-specific roadmap for

further EU integration, but EaP has one major fallout: it is a partnership without a definite perspective of inclusion, which in some countries is under more active debate than others, enhancing Russia's image as an alternative.

Two case studies have been chosen due to the fact that soft power is a contested concept, which takes into account various aspects of interaction between countries A and B. Additionally, there is no universal measurement of soft power and a single case study can bring out the complexity of not only the concept of soft power but the interaction between two unique actors. An analysis of two case studies that uses the same framework can give a more comprehensive overview and affirm the validity of the study and help to bring more general conclusion that underlines the different aspects of the same theoretical framework. With this, one can study common dynamics playing out in different unique contexts.

In light of the literature, the emphasis on Russia's soft power resources and behaviour became more present after the color-revolutions in its "near abroad", hence the time period of the research is from 2000-2012 (taking also account the last Russian foreign policy concept published in February 2013). The case of Moldova and Armenia has been chosen in order to show the relationship between former Soviet Union countries that have a shared history and how this might affect the gradual development of the countries relationship. Also, the two are both of comparable size, they are both considered to be in the Russia's "sphere of influence", they both have frozen conflicts, where Russia is somehow involved, the two countries are also part of the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative. Additionally, according to literature, Moscow places old Soviet Union countries in one of three categories: countries it has to control, countries that are not essential but that it wants to control and countries that are valuable but are not in Moscow's sights because they are easy to control. Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are all in the third category.<sup>120</sup> Hence, it is possible to use the same framework in both cases.

---

<sup>120</sup> "Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras." *Stratfor Analysis* 4 (2010).

## 2.2. Research questions

The research problem has established the focus of the current study indicating that the author of the current thesis has to take into account firstly, (Russia's) soft power resources, secondly, how they are being converted into soft power and thirdly, the influence it has.

In order to establish Russia's soft power, the following question is raised:

*How and from where does Russia get its sources of soft power?*

Current thesis uses three main variables- culture, values, and foreign policy- to answer the first set of questions. At the same time, as the theory states, in some occasion, economic and military resources can also produce soft power. While focusing on the primary soft power resources followed by Nye's definition, the study does not omit the effect of hard power resources that can produce soft power. For this, current thesis makes a first approximation of Russia's soft power resources.

Secondly, to find out, how soft power is being used, the following questions are raised:

*What are the mechanisms of Russia's soft power in the target countries and how does the context of the relationship influence Russia's soft power?*

In order to answer the second set of questions, an analysis of soft power resources and a semi-structured interview results is provided in the third and fourth chapter. With this, the methodology takes into account the crucial point of not only the influence effort of the agent but also the perception of the target.

Finally, to study, if and which kind of effect Russia's soft power has, the following question is raised:

*What are the main differences in Russia's soft power behaviour in Moldova compared to Russia's soft power in Armenia?*

In order to answer the third question, the thesis combined the findings to establish the overall effect of Russia's soft power in Moldova and Armenia and later compared the two case studies in order to establish the main differences.

### 2.3. Research design

The research design is stemming from the concept of soft power introduced by Joseph Nye but it also takes into account various studies that have measured soft power in a quantitative as well as qualitative way, bearing in mind that the current research design follows qualitative method. The compilation of the design follows the research problem and questions raised above.

As established in the theory, the existence and trends in potential soft power resources are the first approximation for behavioral change in terms of outcomes. What is more, the thesis cannot rely only on research of Russia's soft power resources done so far as there is no exhaustive list of power resources compiled and secondly, due to the timeframe and unique context. The available sources are used to build a potential soft power image and to illustrate the case of Russia. Hence, Russia's soft power resources and Russia's image world wide is introduced with the following indices: Anholt – Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI)<sup>121</sup>, Soft Power Index cultural sub-category<sup>122</sup> and diplomacy and government sub-index metrics<sup>123</sup>, where a first approximation of soft power resources and the metrics can be found; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators<sup>124</sup> (starting from the year 2000 to 2011), Global Competitiveness Index,<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>121</sup> The Index takes into account awareness, favourability, experience as well as rating scales on subject like export, governance, culture, people, tourism, immigration and investment. Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, [http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice\\_areas/roper\\_pam/nbi\\_index/index.en.html](http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/index.en.html) (accessed 2 March 2013).

<sup>122</sup> According to the Soft Power Index culture sub index, the following metrics have been taken into account: tourism, tourism spending, reach of state sponsored media outlet, foreign correspondents, language, Olympic profile, music, art gallery attendance, world heritage, status in international football. McClory, *The New Persuaders II*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>123</sup> As the compiled soft power index is not replicable to its full extent and does not disclose the countries exact scorecard (only by sub-categories), the author has made a subjective choice of indicators taking also account Nye's examples of countries attractiveness, consequently selecting culture, diplomacy and government sub-index.

<sup>124</sup> Consisting of 6 dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. World Bank Worldwide governance indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> (accessed 25 March 2013).

Pew Research Global Attitudes Project,<sup>126</sup> Eastern Partnership country overview,<sup>127</sup> United Nations Human Development Index,<sup>128</sup> Democracy index 2012,<sup>129</sup> Freedom House freedom in the world index,<sup>130</sup> European Journalism Centre analysis,<sup>131</sup> George Weber's language influence study,<sup>132</sup> the International Federations of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital Music Report 2013<sup>133</sup>, UNESCO World Heritage list,<sup>134</sup> Olympic profiles (2012 London and 2010 Vancouver),<sup>135</sup> World Tourism Organization Yearbook of Tourism Statistics,<sup>136</sup> World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators<sup>137</sup> (starting from the year 2000 to 2011), Nobel Prize winners,<sup>138</sup> Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2012-2013<sup>139</sup> and Times Higher Education World Reputation Rankings<sup>140</sup>, Russian Federal Statistics Service<sup>141</sup>, Global Go To Think

<sup>125</sup>Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, World Economic Forum, <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013/> (25 March 2013).

<sup>126</sup> Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=27> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>127</sup> Eastern Partnership overview. Armenia. <http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/armenia> (accessed 02 April 2013).

<sup>128</sup> Human Development Report 2013, *Explanatory note on 2013 HDR composite indices*. Russian Federation, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/RUS.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2013)

<sup>129</sup> Democracy index 2012. *Democracy at a standstill* (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

<sup>130</sup> Arch Puddington, *Freedom in the world 2013: Democratic breakthroughs in the balance*, Freedom House, [http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web\\_0.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web_0.pdf) (accessed 25 March 2013)

<sup>131</sup>European Journalism Center. Available at [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/russia/](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/russia/) (accessed 18 March 2013).

<sup>132</sup> Weber, George, "The World's Ten Most Influential Languages" *Language Monthly*, 3 (997), pp. 12-18

<sup>133</sup> IFPI Digital Music Report 2013, [http://www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/publikationen/DMR2013\\_Germany\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/publikationen/DMR2013_Germany_FINAL.pdf) (accessed 20 March 2013).

<sup>134</sup> UNESCO World Heritage list, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list> (accessed 21 March 2013).

<sup>135</sup> Russian Olympic Committee official website, <http://london2012.olympic.ru/scheduleandresults/awards/countries/> (accessed 24 March 2013); All about Olympics. Russian Profile. [http://www.olympic.it/english/country/id\\_RUS](http://www.olympic.it/english/country/id_RUS) (accessed 24 March 2013).

<sup>136</sup> World Tourism Organization, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, Compendium of Tourism Statistics and data, *Index Mundi*, <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/russia/international-tourism> (accessed 21 March 2013)

<sup>137</sup> Consisting of 6 dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. World Bank Worldwide governance indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> (accessed 25 March 2013).

<sup>138</sup> Nobel Prize winners, [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/lists/all/](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all/) (26 March 2013).

<sup>139</sup>*Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2012-2013* <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking/region/europe> (accessed 26 March 2013).

<sup>140</sup>*Times Higher Education World Reputation Rankings*, <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013/reputation-ranking> (accessed 26 March 2013).

<sup>141</sup>Foreign students enrolment in public and municipal higher education institutions of the Russian Federation. Russian Federal Statistics Service. [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-11.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-11.htm) (accessed 26 March 2013).

Tanks index<sup>142</sup>, newspaper articles, *Rossitrudnichestvo* web page<sup>143</sup> and *Russkiy Mir* web page.<sup>144</sup> The author has also considered Joseph Nye's theory derived examples (on how he has explicated the U.S soft power<sup>145</sup>) as well as Anholt Nation Brand Index Heritage and Culture as one corner of the Brand's hexagon variables.<sup>146</sup> One has to note that when it comes to soft power resources, the selection that is introduced in the thesis is not in any way exhaustive. The soft power resources introduced in the framework are compiled on the basis of the theory and research done so far. The first approximation of values will be derived from the context of political discourse. A set of unique characteristics of Russia's political discourse under Putin and Medvedev will be taken into account. This will be done via existing literature and secondary data to establish Russia's government official discourse on the political values it projects home and abroad. The first approximation of foreign policy will be based on international relations between Russia and various other countries and organizations in the world. However, as values and foreign policy in some aspects are deeply interrelated, Russia's foreign policy concepts starting from 2000<sup>147</sup> serve as the basis for both sources.

---

<sup>142</sup> James G. McCann, *The Global Go To Think Tanks Report 2011* (United Nations University Edition, 2012), <http://www.gotthinktank.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2011GlobalGoToThinkTanksReport-UNEditionWITHOUTLETTER.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>143</sup> Россотрудничество, <http://rs.gov.ru/> (accessed 29 March 2013)

<sup>144</sup> Russkiy Mir Foundation. Russian Centers. <http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/rucenter/catalogue.jsp?pager.offset=0&pageIndex=1&pageSize=15> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>145</sup> Nye, uses some examples of how economic power produces soft power (for instance the top 500 companies and how much of them are American and also top 100 brands). As for social indices, he uses the following: Inflow of foreign immigrants; Export of films and TV programs world wide; students enrolled in universities outside their own country; The number of foreign scholars in a countries educational institutions; Books publishing; Music sales; The number of Internet website hosts; Nobel prize wins; Scientific and journal article publishing.

<sup>146</sup> According to the index, the Culture and heritage point of the hexagon, is designed to measure perceptions of the country's cultural heritage; their appreciation of or intention to consume its popular, more commercial cultural products and activities; and their perceptions of its sporting prowess. In addition, the respondents are asked to name what kind of cultural activity they most expect to find in each country, in order to understand how they perceive the country's main cultural strengths. Anholt Nation Brands Index General Report 2005 fourth quarter, 2006 Simon Anholt/GMI (Global Market Insights, Inc.), p 2. For more methodology see The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index: SM Methodology and Quality Control for the 2009 NBI Study, September 2009, <http://www.simonanholt.com/Publications/publications-other-articles.aspx> (accessed 19 March 2013).

<sup>147</sup> The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation 2000, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm> (accessed 29 March 2013); The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12, 2008, <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml> (accessed 15 December 2012); Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013, English unofficial translation, [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (accessed 29 March 2013)

### 2.3.1 Semi-structured interview method

The interview method is used for conducting research on Moldova and Armenia. Secondary data is used to provide context for the case studies. The semi-structured interview was divided into three sections: culture, values and foreign policy and contained 10 questions making the total number of questions 30. The first section focused on Russia's cultural soft power resources and their image as well as perception in the given country. The main measurement indicators were Russian cultural output in the country, specifically media, language, high and pop culture, brands and overall image. The second section focused on Russia's values and their perception. Namely, shared values, Russia's leadership and elite image, Russia's political discourse and its perception, model of governance, attractiveness in terms of migration, study exchange and business. At this stage, the interviewees were asked to name any values that can be related to Russia and their perception as well as importance in the given country that first came to mind. It is important to note that the values were not restricted to political values only. The third section focused on Russia's foreign policy and the perception of Russia's actions as an international actor. Namely, the activity of Russian NGO's, foreign policy events in bilateral as well as international relations, involvement in frozen conflicts, Russia's influence in the target countries decision-making processes, the image of Russia as a foreign policy actor in the country and region, its perceived objectives in the target country as well as trustfulness of the relationship and overall image were the main measurement indicators.<sup>148</sup>

It is important to emphasize that the interviews were semi-structured leaving the interviewee the option of explaining the answer as well as bring relevant examples and bring it different indicators than the ones introduced in the questionnaire. Also, there was an overall question introduced at the beginning or at the end of the interview: *How would you define Russia's soft power?* This served the purpose of conceptualizing Russia's soft power as perceived by the interviewees. However, the question was not introduced in the written questionnaire form due to which two interviewees were not introduced to this question. Another crucial point is the fact that not all of the questions

---

<sup>148</sup> For the entire set of semi-structured interview questions see Appendix 1

were answered by all of the interviewees, however, the three categories were the subject of every interviewee in its various forms.

The interviewees were selected based on their expertise and knowledge of the case study countries and the region. For this, contacts were gathered browsing various policy institutes (think tanks) web pages world wide with a specific emphasis on the projects related to Russia and the region. Policy institutes and non-profit organization web pages of Moldova and Armenia were also browsed to seek contacts from these countries. Various experts residing in Estonia were also contacted to answer the interviews or provide possible contacts namely in the target countries. Approximately 25 interview inquiries in English and 2 in Estonian with a cover letter and interview questions were sent out to different experts or professionals asking for an interview personally, via Skype or in a written forms. Some respondents referred the author to other experts in the field and another 10 interview inquiries were sent to new contacts. All of the interviewees were provided with the semi-structured interview questions beforehand. During personal or Skype interviews, the same question set provided as the basis of the interview and additional questions were asked to clarify or expand the answers. All of the interviews were fully recorded. The interviewer translated the questions in order to conduct the interviews in languages other than English. However, all of the interviewees stated that the English version sent beforehand was sufficient in understanding the questions.

All together, 14 interviews were conducted starting from the 12<sup>th</sup> of March to 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2013. The length of the interviews varied from 21 minutes to 3 hours and 36 minutes. Out of 14 interviews, 10 were conducted in English, 2 in Estonian and 2 in Russian language. The interviewer conducted 3 personal interviews (two in Tallinn and one in Tartu), 9 interviews were conducted via Skype and 2 interviews were submitted in a written form. Due to the fact that some of the interviewees claimed anonymity, the author divided the respondents according to their occupation. The composition of the interviewees were as follows:

- 1) 5 international experts:

- International expert no. 1- European Council on Foreign Relations policy fellow since 2009, in the field of EU's foreign policy towards the Eastern partnership countries and Russia, Central Asia and democratization in the post-Soviet space.
- International expert no. 2- Professor of International Relations in Linguistic University and Professor of Political Science in Public Service Academy; has been a visiting fellow in over 10 institutions, research fields include Russian foreign policy analysis, international security and regionalism. Additionally, has published several articles on Russia's soft power.
- International expert no. 3- Historian and political scientist specializing in Eastern Europe, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, published on the politics and culture of the European neighbourhood, and on the comparative politics of democratization in the post-Soviet states.
- International expert no. 4- Communications professional (20 years of experience gained from the public sector, as a consultant and trainer for the UNDP and as an international expert for the EU.) Has provided strategic communications advice including government offices in Moldova (Public relations training expert EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)), currently an international expert for the EU in Armenia.
- International expert no. 5- Currently a visiting fellow in the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. The interviewee is an expert on the Caucasus, as well as Black Sea, regional security, nationalism, interethnic conflicts and de-facto states in the Post-Soviet area.

2) 2 diplomats (Due to the request of the interviewees, the interviewer can only disclose the fact that the interviewees are diplomats of Moldova)

- Diplomat no. 1- University professor in social science department, later became a diplomat.
- Diplomat no.2. – Academic by first profession, became a diplomat later.

3) 4 national experts (Due to the request of one interviewee, the interviewer can only disclose the fact that the interviewees are national experts of the target countries)

- National expert no. 1- Political scientist and analyst/researcher on Armenia and Russia, specializing in history and bilateral relation.

- National expert no. 2- ICSR (Institute for Civil Society and Regional Development) think-tank expert, covering the major political, economic and social issues facing Armenia, Caucasus and the neighbourhood.
- National expert no. 3- Political expert, currently in IDIS (Institute for Development and Social Initiatives) “Viitorul”, has published extensively on Russia and the post-Soviet space.
- National expert no. 4- Having an background of policy fellow and analyst for a renowned think tank, currently working for one of the target countries government as a policy expert.

4) 1 NGO representative

- NGO representative no. 1- Representative of Armenian NGO, engaged in youth activity and Armenian diaspora activities. Currently working for an international IT-company.

5) 1 academic

- Academic no. 1- An Armenian academic specialized in international law, currently living in UK.

6) 1 student (with previous experience in international cooperation projects)

- Student no. 1- Moldovan professional in cross-border cooperation and regional projects, currently a student in Estonia.

Due to the fact that 5 international experts addressed both target countries, 10 interviewees answered the questions about Moldova and 9 interviewees about Armenia. The nationality of 8 interviewees was either Moldovan or Armenian. Non of the 5 international experts nationality was that of the target countries, but two of them have Russian nationality.

The interview data was used to establish an organizing system built upon the theoretical framework and research questions as well as constructed with the data itself. Sections of data with topics noted (above) were sorted by coding labels for categories based on soft power resources and their perception. The codes included country abbreviations to distinguish the two case studies in order to make country specific conclusions. The final stage of analysis consisted of re-contextualizing the categories into one pool of

meaning<sup>149</sup> under the three major categories (culture, values, policy) to analyze interviewees' answers and attitudes. The specific question on conceptualizing Russia's soft power in the stage of re-contextualizing took into account the soft power resources driven analysis done by the author as well as the specific characteristics of Russia's soft power in terms of the overall image and perception data gathered during the interviews. A conclusion of similarities and differences of the case studies is provided to put the findings in perspective and the main findings of the thesis are presented in the conclusion.

#### **2.4. Research limitations**

Due to the fact that Nye's soft power theory does not explicitly state the methodology in great detail other than introducing a direct effect model and an indirect effect model, latter being more effective and comprehensive, the author has include suggestions from scholars like Lukes<sup>150</sup> and Bachrach and Baratz<sup>151</sup> to conduct soft power research in a more comprehensive way. These supplements build upon Nye's indirect model of effect, however, the proposed research design is only one of the ways how soft power can be studied.

In terms of gathering quantitative data, one of the main problems was the accessibility of data and the time frame it covered. The issue posed more problems in terms of finding proper data for Armenia. Also, the author is not a native speaker of the two countries and could only rely on data found in English or in Russian. In terms of interviews, the author of the thesis did not see major obstacles other than some concepts that were named in English as well as when the interview was not conducted in English. However, the questions presupposed that the respondent is to some extent aware of the concepts<sup>152</sup> and familiar with the situation and follows the issues raised, which is why an expert sample was chosen. Also, due to the fact that the method was a semi-

---

<sup>149</sup> Udo Kelle and Heather Laurie "Computer Use in Qualitative Research and Issues of Validity" in *Computer-aided qualitative data analysis Theory, Method and Practice*, ed. by. Udo, Kelle, Gerald Prein and Katherine Bird (London: Sage Publication, 1995), pp. 19-28.

<sup>150</sup> Namely, Lukes addressed the relevance of soft power *over* (wielding) or *empowerment* to establish a more effective approach of soft power influence. Current thesis evaluates the distinction on the basis of soft power resources and the perception established in the interviewees to answer the question with regard to Russia's soft power in the target countries.

<sup>151</sup> Indicates the importance of the "second face of power", one has to consider closely the context of relationship, which is also what Nye indicates in his latter work.

<sup>152</sup> At this point, the interviewer asked the interviewees (excluding international experts), if they were aware of the meanings of the concepts used in the questions set, and clarified the concepts when needed.

structured interview, not all of the questions were answered by all of the interviewees, however, the purpose for choosing such a method was the fact that the respondent could be as open as they could about the questions, giving more accurate overview of the various issues.

If to briefly introduce the interviewees subjectivity on the issues, the author can note that out of the 14 interviewees, the 5 international experts approached Russia's soft power in a more pragmatic or even skeptical way. However, other interviewees perceived the connectedness and Russia's role in the country in a much more profound way underlying the significance of current analysis. Overall, the sample expressed pluralistic views and hence the author considers the results balanced. The sample of 14 interviewees may not cover all aspects and opinions and cannot be treated as inductive reasoning especially if it comes to perception. Nevertheless, the views of the interviewees were presented as rather balanced due to their expertise and knowledge. At the same time, perception can never be treated as something objective and it is always the subject of debate. Thus, the sample of expertise tried to combine various professions in order to have an objective outcome. The interviewer at this point tried to be as objective as possible and abstained from any personal views when conducting the research.

The question of evaluating the "effectiveness" or influence of soft power in the case of outcomes is not solved completely. Current thesis takes into account the value of perception as an indicator of attractiveness, due to the fact that soft power is not about how the agent views itself, but how others (the subject) sees you. In this regard, soft power influence based on the resources, government actions and interview answers serve as the data for evaluating attractiveness. The differentiation of state and society and the interconnectedness of shaping others views via government interaction or civil society however need to be further researched. Thus, the limits of soft power are shown, but the hypothesis was not disproven.

### 3. ANALYSIS

The analysis of Russia's soft power and the case studies will be provided in the present and next chapter. One indicator that combines various variables of soft power is the Strength of National brand, which might be a more universal measurement and does not project only the cultural output a country has. A significant aspect of this is that it does not apply to specific countries view, but an overall view. This can give an implicit image of the country still. According to data published by the Anholt – Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI)<sup>153</sup>, in 2006 Q4<sup>154</sup>, Russia ranked 21<sup>st</sup> out of 38 countries. In 2007Q3 Russia ranked 22<sup>nd</sup> out of 35 countries. In 2008, Russia was ranked 22<sup>nd</sup> out of 50 NBI target countries. Considering the fact that the country brand has some leverage, Russia's overall image is analyzed in a more detailed way as follows.

#### 3.1. Russia's culture as a source of soft power

Current thesis will use the examples of high and popular culture, media, language, music and sports in order to illustrate Russia's culture. In terms of cultural image (a separate measure), Russia ranked 7<sup>th</sup> in the 2008 NBI index<sup>155</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> according to the soft power index in 2011<sup>156</sup>, which indicates a significantly higher ranking than the overall position of Russia in both indices. Regarding Russia's high culture, the author of the current thesis believes it is a common knowledge, that there are renowned classics popular all over the world. Russian literature, artists, music and philosophy, but also theater, ballet, painting, folklore and architecture are known all over the world. Also, not only is the list of cultural icons endless, it is worldly renowned. This fact is also highlighted by different indices (soft power or nations brand index) that confirm the high ranking of Russia's culture compared to the overall rankings in the world. Russian

---

<sup>153</sup> The Index takes into account awareness, favourability, experience as well as rating scales on subject like export, governance, culture, people, tourism, immigration and investment. The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index [http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice\\_areas/roper\\_pam/nbi\\_index/index.en.html](http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/index.en.html) (accessed 02 March 2013).

<sup>154</sup> Anholt – Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index 2006.

<sup>155</sup> Anholt – Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index 2008.

<sup>156</sup> McClory, *The New Persuaders II*.

Orthodox Church<sup>157</sup> and the Patriarch hold an important position among the members of the church and in the Russian society. It is estimated that the Moscow Patriarchate has over 150 million members in more than 60 countries around the world.<sup>158</sup> With this, a significant source of power that is unique to Russia has to be taken into account when analyzing Russia's soft power.

In order to find out the potential reach of state sponsored media outlet, the author firstly looks at the overall situation of Russia's media outlet in the world. Yet, one has to consider the fact that cultural similarities and closeness might play a significant role when it comes to certain type of media reach (one has to consider the cultural affinity and language factor). On the other hand, the US popular culture has penetrated all over the world, thus making global media reach a significant factor in enhancing its soft power. According to European Journalism Centre<sup>159</sup>, there are about 93 000 registered media outlets in Russia, including 27 000 print media outlets and 330 television channels. Additionally, Russia has the largest number of journalists in the world (more than 100,000), followed by China and the United States.<sup>160</sup> The most popular media channels vary to some degree depending on the source but most commonly newspapers like *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, *Argumenty i Fakty*, *Vedomosti*, *Kommersant* and *Izvestia* but also *Moscow Times* are referred to.<sup>161</sup> Some of the most popular radio stations include *Mayak*, *Ekho Moskvy* and *Russkoe Radio* but the list is not exhaustive.

TV is regarded as one of the most influential media channels in Russia. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, the public channels such as *Rossiya*, *Pervyj Kanal* and *NTV* are the most popular (figures from 2010).<sup>162</sup> In 2005 Russia launched an English-language satellite channel, *Russia Today* and the channel is broadcasted in over

---

<sup>157</sup> Also known as the Orthodox Christian Church of Russia (Eastern Orthodox Church) under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow

<sup>158</sup> "Русская церковь объединяет свыше 150 млн. верующих в более чем 60 странах - митрополит Иларион," ИНТЕРФАКС (2 марта 2011), <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=39729> (Accessed 04. April 2013).

<sup>159</sup> European Journalism Center, an overview of Russia's media landscape. [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/russia/](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/russia/) (accessed 18.03.2013).

<sup>160</sup> Russian Profile, [http://russiaprofile.org/culture\\_living/38517.html](http://russiaprofile.org/culture_living/38517.html) (accessed 18.03.2013).

<sup>161</sup> European Journalism Center, an overview of Russia's media landscape. [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/russia/](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/russia/) (accessed 18.03.2013).

<sup>162</sup> Federal State Statistics Service. (2010), [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/10-05.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/10-05.htm) (accessed 18.03.2013); [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/19-07.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/19-07.htm) (accessed 18.03.2013).

100 countries.<sup>163</sup> The three biggest news agencies in Russia are *ITAR-TASS*, *RIA Novosti* and *Interfax*, that all have correspondents all over the world and operate and broadcast in several countries including the CIS. According to the European Journalism Center analysis,<sup>164</sup> production of TV serials based on the classics of the Russian and Soviet literature has become particularly popular in recent years. Overall, Soviet-era movies continue to be extremely popular in the country indicating that this can be the same in Post-Soviet countries. The media landscape is strongly affected by state ownership through its close ties with the businesses world and state controlled regulatory bodies and media-related legislation.

An important indicator of Russia's cultural soft power resource is its language. According to George Weber's index of the global power of native language based on population, economy, secondary speakers production of IP in language, Russia ranks fourth among the world's ten most influential languages.<sup>165</sup> Although published in 1997, the author indicates that the language will have uncertain times especially when it comes to the former Soviet states but will probably stay in the top 10 languages. Although there is other empirical research done as well, most of them refer to Weber's article and in various top 10 lists Russian language still remains among the 10 languages.

In music sales, Russia is similar to France, Germany, Italy or Spain- countries that have fully developed domestic markets and whose music is not intended for export. The presence of significant Russian communities, however, could have an impact on the international scene through absorbing ideas in their new homes.<sup>166</sup> According to the International Federations of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital Music Report 2013<sup>167</sup>, Russia is placed under the emerging markets and having vast potential. Russia, currently holding the 23<sup>rd</sup> position, could be a world top 10 market, if it can create an

---

<sup>163</sup> Natalya Krasnoboka, Media Landscape- Russia, European Journalism Centre, [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/russia/](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/russia/) (accessed 19.03.2013).

<sup>164</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> George Weber, "The World's Ten Most Influential Languages" *Language Monthly*, 3 (1997), pp. 12-18 (p. 1).

<sup>166</sup> Vladimir Kozlov, Piracy still a hurdle, but online music has bright future, *The Moscownews*, <http://themoscownews.com/business/20130125/191174530.html> (accessed 20 March 2013).

<sup>167</sup> International Federations of the Phonographic Industry Digital Music Report 2013, [http://www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/publikationen/DMR2013\\_Germany\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/publikationen/DMR2013_Germany_FINAL.pdf) (accessed 20 March 2013).

effective environment for copyright enforcement.<sup>168</sup> According to the report, Russia has an outstanding musical heritage and contemporary artists with global appeal, such as the rapper Timati who has topped the charts across Europe, and classical pianist Denis Matsuev and it also has the largest online population in Europe, albeit with relatively low credit card penetration and online spending.<sup>169</sup> Another indicator of cultural soft power can be considered tourism and annual visitors. According to the world heritage list, Russia has a relatively high number of sights that have been included.<sup>170</sup> The annual number of tourists since the year 2000 has been over 21 million per year.<sup>171</sup>

Sport is another indicator of potential attractiveness or popularity of a country. According to the last Olympic profiles (2012 London and 2010 Vancouver), Russia ranked in the overall medals won ranking fourth in London<sup>172</sup> and eleventh in Vancouver<sup>173</sup>. In terms on medals won, Russia has been rather successful and the upcoming winter Sochi Olympics at home are even more so emphasizing the importance of sports and Russia's international image. In 2007, the Beijing Olympic Games took place, and then President Hu Jintao declared that China intends to increase its soft power by including this event in the strategy.<sup>174</sup> It can be argued, that this is what Russia will try to do as well with the upcoming Sochi Olympic Games and is in fact heavily investing in up to date (Sochi is named even the pet project of president Putin to promote Russia in the world). Russia's soft power can have a positive increase in international arena due to the large-scale investments done by the government into the infrastructure as well as to the overall venue to advocate for the hospitality of the Russian soul. An example of cultural soft power tools in the case of Europe was the Eurovision song contest where Russia, represented by old grannies, won a second place and immediately president Putin used the opportunity to express the cultural stronghold

---

<sup>168</sup> IFPI Digital Music Report 2013, p, 23.

<sup>169</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> According to the UNESCO World Heritage list, Russia has 25 sites, which is more than for example the United States have. UNESCO World Heritage list, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list> (accessed 21 March 2013).

<sup>171</sup> World Tourism Organization, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, Compendium of Tourism Statistics and data files via Index Mundi, <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/russia/international-tourism> (accessed 21 March 2013).

<sup>172</sup> Russian Olympic Committee official website, <http://london2012.olympic.ru/scheduleandresults/awards/countries/> (accessed 24.03.2013).

<sup>173</sup> All about Olympics. Russian Profile. [http://www.olympic.it/english/country/id\\_RUS](http://www.olympic.it/english/country/id_RUS) (accessed 24 March 2013).

<sup>174</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*.

that a little-known language from *Udmurtia* can have in order to shed positive light on the multi-national culture of the country.<sup>175</sup> All of the above mentioned indices and data emphasize the importance of Russian culture in its overall image (as well as having positive connotation such as popularity, high ranking and availability) thus being compatible with the concept of soft power that treats culture as one of the sources of soft power.

### **3.2. Russia's values as a source of soft power**

The conceptualization of Russian political values such as sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state are often illustrated by the resentment of NATO enlargement, which is seen as a hostile move towards Russia especially in its' near abroad. The interference by the western countries in human rights issues are seen extremely two-faced, as the western democracy itself is not flawless. The concept of "sovereign democracy", an alternative to western type (liberal) democracy, with its own uncontested values, was introduced by the Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov in 2006.<sup>176</sup> The importance of it lies in the fact that Russia has presented its own distinctive image of political values that are promoted in the region as well. Another concept used in Russia, is the underlying fact of multi-polar world that denies US monopoly in the world order and strives for balance. The West spreading its values (also with NATO interventions as spreading democratic values) has been contested by Russia, the latter being labeled as the other or an outcast.<sup>177</sup> A geo-political value can be seen in the Post-soviet states that are classified as Russia's "near abroad" since 1990's and Putin has referred to it as Russia's "sphere of influence". Policies such as the compatriots policy,<sup>178</sup> illustrate the intense interest in the near abroad and former Russian diaspora in the countries.

The concept of soft power has also emerged in political discourse. For example, Putin observed the increased use of soft power, which "*implies a matrix of tools and methods*

---

<sup>175</sup> Putin congratulates Russia's Eurovision top winners, *Global Times*, May 28, 2012, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/711593/Putin-congratulates-Russias-Eurovision-top-winners.aspx> (accessed 3 June 2012).

<sup>176</sup> Vladislav Surkov, "Sovereignty is a political synonym for the ability to compete," speech to the Center for Partisan Study and Preparation of the Staff of Unified Russia, February 7, 2006, <http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=11114> (accessed 4 March 2012).

<sup>177</sup> Natasha Kurt, "Russian foreign policy," in *Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society* ed. by Graeme Gill and James Young (Routledge: London and New York, 2012), p. 422.

<sup>178</sup> The issue of compatriots will be further elaborated in the policy section.

to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence.”<sup>179</sup> However, the activities of “pseudo-NGOs”<sup>180</sup> and other agencies that try to “destabilize” Russia with outside support are treated as unacceptable. A note on common values is stated in the 2013 foreign policy concept: “A true consolidation of efforts of the international community requires a set of common values as a foundation for joint action, a common moral denominator, which major world religions have always shared, including such principles and concepts as pursuit of peace and justice, dignity, freedom and responsibility, honesty, compassion, and work ethic.”<sup>181</sup> Here, a set of values that cannot only be related to political values are listed, such as religion and other universal values. Hence, while the main emphasis of values are the ones of political nature, one can distinguish the importance of values of other nature as well, making the value dimension extremely diverse. What is more, the perception of such values bears importance in assessing their impact. Notably, the “clash of values” is also introduced in the 2013 foreign policy concept: “For the first time in modern history, global competition takes place on a civilizational level, whereby various values and models of development based on the universal principles of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each other. Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world becomes more and more manifest.”<sup>182</sup>

According to Pew Research Global Attitudes Project opinion of Russia, polls from 2007 to 2012 (2008 is not available) show that Russians themselves think the highest of their country (above 80% of the people are favourable).<sup>183</sup> A more clear understanding of the more unique Russian values comes out in the questions on good democratic form of

---

<sup>179</sup> Nick Ottens, Putin Rallies Against Soft Power, Humanitarian Interventions. *Atlantic Sentinel*, <http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/03/putin-rallies-against-soft-power-humanitarian-interventions/> (accessed 20 October 2012).

<sup>180</sup> Refers usually to western sponsored NGO's.

<sup>181</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013. Article 21, Unofficial English translation, [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>182</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013. Article 13, Unofficial English translation, [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>183</sup> This is not unusual if to take for example the US or China where the situation is similar. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=27> (accessed 29 March 2013).

government versus strong leader<sup>184</sup> and good democracy versus strong economy<sup>185</sup> as well as confidence in Putin<sup>186</sup>. According to these polls (most of them having a continued answer since 2005), strong leader and confidence in Putin (which has a decreasing trend starting from 2007; 69% of the polled people in Russia had confidence in Putin in 2012) are more important than good democracy or democratic form of government (around 30% of the people have been in favour of democratic form of government). This can be explained by the national identity and historic development of the country that has led to particular kind of values.

According to the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators<sup>187</sup> (from 2000 to 2011), Russia has generally improved its governance score in all indicators except for voice and accountability that is related to citizen freedom and an extremely low score (and even worsened score) in control of corruption<sup>188</sup>. The same indicators for Moldova<sup>189</sup> and Armenia<sup>190</sup> are relatively higher. The comparing of Russian, Moldovan and Armenian rankings gives context to the realities of current situation in Russia as well as target countries. The Global Competitiveness Index that consists of 12 pillars, places Russia in its 2012-2013<sup>191</sup> report 67<sup>th</sup>, Armenia is ranked 82<sup>nd</sup> and Moldova 87<sup>th</sup>. It is notable that each country is in a different stage of development; while Moldova is factor driven and Armenia is efficiency driven, Russia is in transition for being innovation driven<sup>192</sup>.

---

<sup>184</sup>Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, democratic government indicator, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=47&country=181&response=Democratic%20form%20of%20government> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>185</sup>Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, good democracy indicator, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=48&country=181&response=A%20good%20democracy> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>186</sup>Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, country confidence indicator, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=49&country=181&response=Confidence> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>187</sup> Consisting of 6 dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. World Bank Worldwide governance indicators. Available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> (25 March 2013).

<sup>188</sup>World Bank Worldwide governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c187.pdf> (25 March 2013).

<sup>189</sup>Ibid.

<sup>190</sup>Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013/> (25 March 2013).

<sup>192</sup> Categorized by Global Competitiveness Index.

According to the United Nations Human Development Index, Russia ranks 55<sup>th</sup> according to the latest results<sup>193</sup> compared to Moldova, who ranks 113<sup>th</sup><sup>194</sup> and Armenia, who ranks 87<sup>th</sup><sup>195</sup> out of 187 countries. With this, an example of relatively higher living standard is measured, which can have a positive influence on Russia's perception in the given countries. Of course, there are several indicators that suggest more negative/other trends such as the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties survey, where Russia is considered a non free state, whereas Armenia and Moldova are considered partially free.<sup>196</sup> The 2012 Democracy index by the Economist<sup>197</sup> also places Moldova (ranked 67<sup>th</sup>) and Armenia (ranked 116<sup>th</sup>) higher than Russia (ranked 122<sup>nd</sup>). However, this might not represent the pillars of values introduced in the theory. According to Soft Power Index government sub index metrics“...*The 'political' pillar of soft power is inherently biased towards Western ideals of government and democracy. As a result, non-democratic countries face an immediate disadvantage in any assessment of relative soft power*”.<sup>198</sup>

If to rely on more indices of attractiveness, Nobel Prize winners (given criteria are born in *Russia, Soviet Union, Russian Empire and USSR now Russia*), Russian scientists have won 24 times different Nobel Prize types including physics, chemistry, literature and more, including the peace prize.<sup>199</sup> The *Times Higher Education* World University Rankings 2012-2013 table introduces the fact that, among 400 top Universities, 2

---

<sup>193</sup> The HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. Russian Federation's HDI is 0.788, which gives the country a rank of 55 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of Europe and Central Asia as a region increased from 0.651 in 1980 to 0.771 today, placing Russian Federation above the regional average. Human Development Report 2013, *Explanatory note on 2013 HDR composite indices*. Russian Federation, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/RUS.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2013).

<sup>194</sup> Moldova (Republic of), Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MDA.html> (accessed 24 March 2013).

<sup>195</sup> Armenia, Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ARM.html> (accessed 24 March 2013).

<sup>196</sup> Arch Puddington, *Freedom in the world 2013: Democratic breakthroughs in the balance*, Freedom House, [http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web\\_0.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web_0.pdf) (accessed 25 March 2013).

<sup>197</sup> Democracy index 2012. *Democracy at a standstill* (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

<sup>198</sup> McClory, *The New Persuaders II*, p. 19.

<sup>199</sup> Compared to for example the United States (247) or Germany (62-without the historic territories) this number is not something too attractive but on the other hands, there are a number of issues that have to be considered when trying to objectively evaluate the scientific acknowledgements a country has. Nobel Prize winners, [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/lists/all/](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all/) (26 March 2013).

Russian Universities are present<sup>200</sup> and one of them (Lomonosov Moscow State University) is also in the top 100 (ranked 50) in the *Times Higher Education World Reputation Rankings*, that employ the world's largest academic opinion survey to provide a list of the top 100 most powerful global university brands.<sup>201</sup> Although the quantity is poor, there are again a number of reasons why the rankings have been also criticized. However, this does not mean that Russian universities would rank higher and that students would be more attracted to go to study to Russia. On the other hand, to get a more accurate overview of the situations, global attractiveness might vary compared to the regional attractiveness. For this, the number of foreign students in the country is explored. According to the Russian Federal Statistics Service, the enrolment of foreign students in public and municipal higher educational institutions since 2000/2001 to 2011/2012 has doubled (current numbers being 126 319 students in total). In 2011/2012, the total number of Armenian students was 2067 and Moldovan students 1701, both increasing since 2000/2001.<sup>202</sup> An index that shows the attractiveness potential for research and academic world is the Global Go To think tanks index<sup>203</sup>, according to which Russia has a total of 112 think tanks and ranks 8<sup>th</sup> in the world in the 2011 report and has two Think Tanks among the top 30 list in the world. Also, it is highly represented in the regional think tanks rankings.

The author has now shown that various indices, and Nye's initial model of soft power in the case of US, use to describe a countries' soft power mostly via democratic/non-democratic governance. The fact is that a country can still possess significant leverage without being western type democracy. For example, in the case of China, there is no doubt it has significant soft power, and the soft power index shows more leverage in culture and education. As a result, if to take into account values as something more than a countries democratic performance, one gets a set of values that are more closely linked to the country in questions and consequently its potential soft power. Hence, the

---

<sup>200</sup>*Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2012-2013*, <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking/region/europe> (26 March 2013).

<sup>201</sup>*Times Higher Education World Reputation Rankings*, <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013/reputation-ranking> (26 March 2013).

<sup>202</sup> Russian Federal Statistics Service, Foreign students enrolment in public and municipal higher education institutions of the Russian Federation. [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-11.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-11.htm) (26 March 2013).

<sup>203</sup> James G. McCann, The Global Go To Think Tanks Report 2011, United Nations University Edition. 2012, <http://www.gotothinktank.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2011GlobalGoToThinkTanksReport-UNEditionWITHOUTLETTER.pdf>, (29 March 2013).

case studies intend to find out the core values that represent Russia vis-à-vis its soft power in the given countries.

### 3.3. Russia's foreign policy as a source of soft power

According to Nye, soft power depends in part on how one frames' its objects. Policies based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the national interest are easier to make attractive to others than policies that take a narrow and myopic perspective.<sup>204</sup> There have been three foreign policy concepts published: in the year 2000, 2008 and 2013. The Russian foreign policy concept published in 2000 emphasized the need to ensure reliable security of the country<sup>205</sup>, warned against the dangers of globalization, both political and economic; the concepts also reasserted Russia's role as a great power, belonging to various institutions and its' newly acquired status as a member of G8 put forward as a means for Russia to advance its foreign political interests.<sup>206</sup> In 2008, the foreign policy concept introduced under President Medvedev, concentrated on modernization and Russia's integration to the world economy.<sup>207</sup> The foreign policy concept also underlined the importance of compatriots living abroad and that there is a special interest zone of interest, and Russia intends to expand the relationship with its close neighbours.<sup>208</sup> With this, soft power tools were introduced already in the previous concepts. Soft power as a "comprehensive toolkit" was introduced by Putin in his political statements during presidential elections in spring 2012.<sup>209</sup> After his re-election in 2012, Putin issued a decree "On measures of implementing foreign policy agenda of the Russian Federation"<sup>210</sup>, which was the basis for the 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation<sup>211</sup> published in February 2013. Namely, Article 20

---

<sup>204</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 61.

<sup>205</sup> The Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2000.

<sup>206</sup> Kurt, *Russian foreign policy*, p. 423.

<sup>207</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12, 2008. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml> (accessed 15 December 2012).

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Vladimir Putin, Russia and the changing world, *Russia Today*, <http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/#> (accessed 04 March 2013).

<sup>210</sup> Указ «О мерах по реализации внешнеполитического курса Российской Федерации» от 7 мая 2012 года No 605, п 48 [http://www.rsr-online.ru/doc/2012\\_06\\_25/6.pdf](http://www.rsr-online.ru/doc/2012_06_25/6.pdf) (accessed 04 March 2013).

<sup>211</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013. English unofficial translation. [http://www.mid.ru/bdcomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdcomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (29.03.2013) and the original version in Russian: [http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/newsline/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F) (29.03.2013)

provides a definition of soft power.<sup>212</sup> Mostly, soft power agenda is introduced in the “International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights” section and the implementation of it in the “Regional priorities” section, where CIS countries are at the top of the priority area.

According to Fyodor Lukyanov, with an intent to use soft power, Russia is moving towards a new identity, which is a difficult and painful process without a clear path or end point, but without a clear set of goals and values, soft power will be at best limited to a set of technical measures – not entirely useless, but ultimately ineffective.<sup>213</sup> The Foreign Policy concepts’ top priority objectives<sup>214</sup> have both hard as well as soft power implications. The formulations of soft power in Russia’s foreign policy concept is worthy of noting due to the fact that, in essence, it does not build upon Nye’s soft power concept. A special emphasis on the possible “destructive” elements and the “unlawful” use of soft power, that can be viewed in Nye’s theory mostly under the values category, once again emphasizing the value pillar importance in understanding Russia’s soft power resources and consequently how they are being utilized. As the theory is abstract, the case of Russia’s soft power proves to have a specific approach to soft power. Also, soft power is viewed as a means (toolkit) for achieving foreign policy objectives building on more comprehensive ground than diplomacy only.

### *Policies*

Russia’s government actions have been lately, since Putin’s third term starting in 2012, called “soft authoritarianism” (with a special emphasis on domestic policies), which

---

<sup>212</sup> “Soft power”, a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations. At the same time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of “soft power” and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad,” article 20, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013. English unofficial translation. [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (29.03.2013)

<sup>213</sup> Fyodor Lukyanov, Uncertain World: Why Russia’s Soft Power Is Too Soft, 31.01.2013 *RiaNovosti* <http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20130131/179153876.html> (accessed 02 March 2013).

<sup>214</sup> Article 4. Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013. English unofficial translation. [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (29.03.2013)

refer to repressions and the overall repressive approach.<sup>215</sup> For this, real political change on the part of the Russian regime is hardly considered the case: Russian system makes authentic reforms unattractive.<sup>216</sup> Skeptics are right to note that cases like Khodorkovsky's imprisonment and trial, Pussy Riot trial and punishment, gas supply cuts to Ukraine or price fights, and the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 are just some examples of undercutting soft power. Nye explicates with US and Iraq war in 2003<sup>217</sup> that although people might like the culture and values its projects, a countries policies may have a seriously negative impact on its soft power.

Active NGO's are a useful tool for a country to promote its interest in other countries. With Russia, recent developments in its domestic policy concerning the activity of foreign NGO's in the country have been under active debate and criticism.<sup>218</sup> Established in 2011, office called *Rosstrudnichestvo (Roscomtrudnichestva)*<sup>219</sup> is the main task force of soft power policies that is responsible for the relations with other countries, compatriots abroad and humanitarian cooperation.<sup>220</sup> This agency is not an NGO, but acts on behalf of the country to promote its interest and NGO activities in the CIS countries with an emphasis on Russian language and culture.<sup>221</sup> This is done through Russian Centers for Science and Culture in various countries all over the world, including Moldova and Armenia. According to the federal target programme «Russian Language» in 2011 — 2015, *Rosstrudnichestvo* is the state customer of the federal program since 2011.<sup>222</sup> The two top objectives of the programme are supporting the Russian language as the basis for the development of integration processes in the CIS and addressing the language and cultural needs of compatriots living abroad. Also, an interstate program for innovation cooperation with the CIS until 2020 is listed as a

---

<sup>215</sup> For example, the repression consisted of attempts to punish and harass the participants of the 2012 May protests and their leaders like Sergei Udaltsov and Alexei Navalny – and especially the adoption of new laws on public assemblies, NGO funding, the internet, and libel. The new law on treason has potentially a very broad application).

<sup>216</sup> Sean Roberts, *Russia's pressure politics*, FIIA briefing paper, 118 (the Finnish institute of international affairs, December 2012).

<sup>217</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 14.

<sup>218</sup> For example, adopted law on foreign-funded NGOs engaged in any political activity, who are obliged to declare themselves as “foreign agents” as well as recent examples of raids of the NGO's.

<sup>219</sup> С позиции "мягкой силы" Газета "Коммерсантъ", №6 (5037), 16.01.2013

<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2105575> (accessed 25 January 2013).

<sup>220</sup> *Rosstrudnichestvo* <http://rs.gov.ru/> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>221</sup> На пространстве СНГ. *Rosstrudnichestvo*. <http://rs.gov.ru/taxonomy/term/17> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>222</sup> Russian center for science and culture in Washington, DC. <http://rccusa.org/2012/07/10/1518/> (accessed 29 March 2013).

priority with the CIS countries.<sup>223</sup> The Agency (*Rossotrudnichestvo*) has put forward the importance of soft power and public diplomacy,<sup>224</sup> emphasizing the importance and huge potential Russia possesses via international reputation of Russian science and culture, the experience of the Soviet era, infrastructure of cultural centers around the world, the "Russian World" - millions of people in foreign countries, who are attracted to Russia, Russian language and culture, and experience the human need to maintain ties with Russia and Russians.<sup>225</sup> With this, the emphasis on the cultural attraction is especially strong when defining Russia's soft power in the words of the Agency and policies to promote Russia. *Rossotrudnichestvo* carries out interaction with NGO's such as the Foundation "Russian world", the Public Chamber of Russia, St. Andrew Foundation, Library fund "Russian abroad", the Russian Cultural Foundation, the International Council of Russian Compatriots, Theatre Union, the International Union of Museums, International Association "Twin Cities", the Moscow Union of Friendship Societies, St. Petersburg Association for International Co-operation etc; one of the main partners of the Agency is the Russian Association for International Cooperation.<sup>226</sup> The "Russian world" (*Russkiy Mir*) is a well-known establishment that aims to promote Russia's culture, language and heritage in the world. It promotes its objectives via Russian Centers of the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation; in Armenia there is one center and in Moldova there are four, according to the list.<sup>227</sup> There are also *Russkiy Mir* Cabinets, that various configurations at schools, libraries, universities, cultural centers, kindergartens, etc.<sup>228</sup>

In relation to regional cooperation, organizations like CIS, CSTO and EurAsEc are involving Armenia to a greater extent than Moldova but there is also a relatively new regional project, Eurasian Union that is also discussed. The membership (both Armenia and Moldova are members of the CIS; Armenia is a member of the CSTO) or observer

---

<sup>223</sup>Межгосударственная программа инновационного сотрудничества государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств на период до 2020 года. <http://rs.gov.ru/taxonomy/term/185> (accessed 30 March 2013).

<sup>224</sup> Народная дипломатия: эпоха инструментария «мягкой силы». <http://rs.gov.ru/node/33009> (accessed 30 March 2013).

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Russkiy Mir Foundation, Russian Centers, <http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/rucenter/catalogue.jsp?pager.offset=0&pageIndex=1&pageSize=15> (accessed 29 March 2013).

<sup>228</sup> *Russkiy Mir* Cabinet. <http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/rucenter/kabinet.html> ((accessed 29 March 2013).

status (EurAsEC) might have an impact on the perception of Russia as the leading country of these regional organizations. Yet, this is important to note due to the fact that the perception of EU and its influence in the region has to be taken account as well. Both countries are members of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy initiative, the Eastern Partnership (EaP). In this respect, both outlooks for the countries are put forward simultaneously by Russia and the EU; it is not only the case of Russia using or not using its soft power but it is also the question of the EU, widely referred to as a normative power or soft power in Europe and its neighbourhood. The EU's influence in the case study countries is beyond the scope of the thesis, however, current thesis addresses the EU's role in the perception of Russia's soft power image. If to briefly outline one of the major differences having an impact on peoples' everyday lives, it is the fact that visa freedom is provided between Russia and Armenia and Moldova, but not with the EU. However, there are numerous differences that can have severe impact on peoples' perception and this will be determined in the next section.

#### **3.4. Other sources of Russia's soft power**

The concept of soft power might encounter a metamorphosis à la Russia, meaning that in the case of Russia, the soft power introduced by Joseph Nye has a stronger presence of hard power resources. It has been argued that it looks to the past, mobilizing the memories and legacies of an imagined and real common history<sup>229</sup> and in this way influencing the minorities especially in the Post-Soviet countries to pressure the government and pursue its agenda. Also, much of Russian soft power is focused on elites, which is the direct model of influence according to Nye. It has been argued that the discussion of Russian soft power today is really a discussion of foreign policy<sup>230</sup> and as was established in the literature overview, most of policy papers deal with the tangible resources of power or emphasize very specific carrots that Russia benefits from. For example, Russia is the major supplier of natural gas and Moscow links the commercial operations of its energy exports to its political aims; cheap gas in exchange

---

<sup>229</sup> *Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence*, REP Seminar Summary 31 of March, (Chatham House, 2011), <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109675> (accessed 12 April 2012).

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

for control of a countries energy infrastructure or non-economic demands.<sup>231</sup> In literature, Russia's soft power is mainly regarded as rhetoric of fraternity, multilateral institutions with membership benefits, strategic investment, visa-free regime and open labour market, authoritarian regime support, alternative model, religion, media control.<sup>232</sup> Hard power is regarded to have two main sources: energy dependence (and infrastructure ownership and energy prices) and military presence. Related to these are the hard sticks of embargos on gas and other products.<sup>233</sup> What is more, Russia's soft power is missing the normative dimension that supports its goals.<sup>234</sup> Thus, in the case of Russia, hard and soft power interconnectedness is a crucial element in evaluating its attractiveness. While certain power resources can enhance its soft power image, they can also undermine it, making the difference of power conversion and what constitutes as soft and hard power difficult to separate from each other. Instead, the thesis examines the perception of various elements of Russia's image that build its soft power. Although the theory based soft power resources at this point are introduced, in order to proceed, the image of Russia's soft power will put the resources into perspective. This is done via analysis of the specific question introduced to the interviewees: *How would you define Russia's soft power?*

One of the interviewee<sup>235</sup> said that soft power is based on communication with your partners and the social environment is as important as the message itself. The issue of communication is something that Russia seems to be uninterested and hence the essence of soft power is misunderstood.<sup>236</sup> As the interviewee noted, one cannot just impose its ideas<sup>237</sup> - they first have to be understandable, acceptable (and legitimate) and fit into the social environment. Referring to the latest foreign policy concept, the interviewee said the following: "*The problem with soft power is that it can never be legally fixed (...)*"<sup>238</sup> and, paradoxically, Russia reproduces the most stereotypical images against which

---

<sup>231</sup> Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighborhood* (London: The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> For a thorough overview of the limits of Russia's soft power see Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz, *Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area*. Center for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations. July 2012 No 8

<sup>235</sup> International expert no. 2.

<sup>236</sup> International expert no. 2 and International expert no. 3.

<sup>237</sup> International expert no. 2.

<sup>238</sup> International expert no. 2.

Russia itself complains. One of the outcomes of this type of behaviour is that as long as Russia does not “modernize” its soft power, it will not have much leverage in the societies further away from the country. Nye in this respect hasn’t explicitly addressed the issue of “outdated” view of soft power, but he refers that the information age is having an increasing impact on countries’ interaction and power behaviour.

Another fundamental difference is the fact that criticizing the West for not understanding Russia is not only the problem of the West but also Russia itself. Different world views as such, and China is a case in point, does not mean that soft power cannot work in an engaging way. The lack of communication tools that are attractive come from the fact that Russia is not interested in promoting itself to more people than the ones who speak the language (as the main export tool of soft power) and share the views. Of course, one could ask if a *global like* (as one of the interviewee explicated soft power) image is something that Russia really wants. However, soft power in essence is attractiveness and this is manifested as a goal in Russia’s foreign policy concept as well as current political discourse.

The main tool that Russia uses is language and this has been put forward as the basis for the NGO activities. Also, from a foreign policy point of view, Russia is in a position where it does not “do” as much as the EU for soft power, and if it fails (the EU soft power sometimes has been criticized for not having any carrot in the near future for the EaP countries), while affiliation with Russia is made as easy as possible, the EU faces difficulties. With regards to how capable is Russia using its soft power resources, some of the interviewees mentioned Russia as a smart user of its resources, while others dismissed its capability. However, the interviewees did not question the vast potential of the soft power resources the country possesses. Some of the interviewees said that Russia’s soft power is derived from the Orange Revolution and their particular analysis of what happened in Ukraine. As one interviewee noted, that’s when they started to put their money into political technology that was trying to imitate what the western NGO’s do, but in their specific, controlled way, what is in fact the fundamental misunderstanding, as one interviewee noted.<sup>239</sup> As was established in the literature overview, currently, Russia’s soft power model is relying on the western type of soft power promotion in its own unique context and social environment.

---

<sup>239</sup> International expert no. 3.

The source of Russia's soft power was addressed in the following way: "(...) *Russia's soft power is much more rooted in direct experience of people with Russia (...) or relatives or friends experience with the country.*"<sup>240</sup> Another interviewee emphasized the importance of how soft power can be used: "*Soft power is not something you are it's something you have, especially vis-à-vis Russia,*"<sup>241</sup> which falls in line with the agent-centric view of soft power, that is the dominant soft power "paradigm" in Russia. According to another interviewee: "(...) *power is power in this Kremlin world-view. Which again is not true, because they have sticks and carrots in the same hand. (...) the carrot is often undermined by the stick. Plus, it's all transactional.*"<sup>242</sup>

When asked about the future of Russia's soft power, one interviewee described that Russia cannot secure its border and it is non-defendable in that sense, which explains the policies: "(...) *when someone says Russia is trying to buy everyone by subsidizing cheap gas, well partly yes, but partly this is their own security concern. (...) but what they ended up with is that they basically subsidized the pension systems in Belarus, social security networks in countries like Armenia and so one and I think that realization has come with a huge cost without getting anything in return (...)*"<sup>243</sup> This is also what was mentioned by another interviewee; the fact that Russia actually is unable to "use" its so called allies when needed and in this regards, the elite is not so strong to control the other states as they would like to.<sup>244</sup> Military presence was named essential in maintaining its influence as well as gas and transit fees. Several interviewees also brought out the point that Russia is not dealing with its present issues especially the ethnic diversity as well as demographic decline, rather, it is still focusing on its history and the legacy that has no real connection to the reality Russia faces today. The lack of clear approach was also the factor, which the interviewees brought out. "*I think Russia has a huge gap between the potential for realization of soft power and concrete forms of these realization.*"<sup>245</sup> The fact that people speak the language does not mean that they

---

<sup>240</sup> International expert no 1.

<sup>241</sup> National expert no 4.

<sup>242</sup> International expert no 3.

<sup>243</sup> International expert no 1.

<sup>244</sup> International expert no. 2.

<sup>245</sup> International expert no 5.

want to re-emigrate to Russia, and it is even not the case in Armenia, which is a mono-ethnic country.<sup>246</sup>

In sum, the lack of strategy and concrete tools is the main obstacle in achieving the goals, and it is the problem of weak state institutions as a whole. Russia does not have the working and effective institutions, maybe even the *know-how* on how to conduct the soft power policy. According to one interviewee, an important factor that is not taken into account by Russia, is that in small countries, even not “serious” publications or emotional approach on sensitive issues are having a substantial effect in the society,<sup>247</sup> which in turn can have a negative impact on Russia’s image. The particularity of perception and how the strategy is presented is extremely important in building image. The *mode* of how Russia’s soft power is understood is very much embedded in the stick and carrot method; however, the essence of soft power is attractiveness, which cannot be the subject of one-way model, but depends on the subjects’ perception as well. Russia uses its soft power resources to control the region, yet the very essence of soft power is above control, one cannot control the perception as well as attractiveness by imposing more soft power resources in a controlled way. The image of a country that uses soft power in a way that is controlled and even censored, also indicating that soft power can only be legitimate when it is restricted by laws, is not how soft power resources can work in a beneficial way for the country. Soft power is not only about the resources and money spent to promote its culture, especially language, as it is in the case of Russia, but it is about living up to the standards a country imposes on others the same way it deals with the issues at home. When a country tries to control foreign activity at home and at the same time promote its interest with the same or similar activities, a contradiction of what a country says and does appears. According to Nye, soft power has to be perceived as being legitimate. In some cases this is proven to work, when Russia emphasizes values different of the West and other times it fails, by indicating some pragmatic or special interest, soft power is undermined.

---

<sup>246</sup> International expert no. 2.

<sup>247</sup> International expert no. 5.

## 4. CASE STUDIES

### 4.1. Russia's soft power in Moldova and Armenia

#### *Background*

Moldova is geographically a key state that serves as one of two overland routes connecting Eastern and Western Europe. If to turn to Russia's immediate influence in Moldova, it holds a firm control of Moldova's breakaway province of Transnistria. Moldova depends entirely on Russia for natural gas supplies. Russia is Moldova's most important trade partner and according to the State Chamber of Registration, 812 companies with Russian capital operate in Moldova<sup>248</sup> being also a key market for Moldovan goods. Recent developments like assigning Dimitri Rogozin as a special representative in Transnistria or assigning the new ambassador Farit Mukhametshin in Chisinau, who had previously headed the *Rossotrudnichestvo*<sup>249</sup> is regarded as Russia having special interest in the country.

Armenia's is also an important country considering the geography. It splits Turkey and Azerbaijan and also partially seals off Iran's influence in the Caucasus. Armenia is considered deeply interrelated to Russia and its sphere of influence. Today, its economy relies heavily on Russia. The Russian military stationed in the country is there to prevent potential hostility with Azerbaijan and at the same time to guard the border with Turkey. Russia is also mediating the issue of the disputed breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia is by far Armenia's strongest ally in the region<sup>250</sup> and the two countries are named strategic allies. Since the 1990's, a large number of Armenians have permanently emigrated from Armenia and joined the sizeable Armenian Diaspora in Russia, Ukraine, USA and countries of Western and Eastern Europe.<sup>251</sup> Russians make up a very small percentage (up to 0.5 %) of Armenia's population, but Russia has

---

<sup>248</sup>Minister urges more Russian investments in Moldova's economy. *Allmoldova news*, <http://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/economics/1249054719.html> (accessed 25 March 2013).

<sup>249</sup>Witold Rodkiewicz, *Russia's strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change?*, OSW Commentary, Issue 74 (Center for Eastern Studies, April 2012).

<sup>250</sup>2010. "Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras." *Stratfor Analysis* 4.

<sup>251</sup>Migration and Development. Armenia Country Study, ILO, 2009. (ILO Subregional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2009), [http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/migr\\_dev\\_study\\_en.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/migr_dev_study_en.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2013).

one of the largest Armenian diasporas in the world, numbering around 1.5-2,5 million. Russia also essentially owns all of the strategic energy, rail and telecommunications assets (among many others) in Armenia. According to the EaP country overview, Russia is the main investor and Russian capital mostly controls Armenia's key economy sectors as well as supplies of energy to Armenia.<sup>252</sup>

#### 4.1.1. Main results: culture

According to the interviewees, Russia's cultural presence is strong in both countries. This is especially evident in schools where Russian language is the main language. Cultural output and the interconnectedness was many times illustrated by the cultural exchange projects related to pop culture, the role of music was also emphasized (Jurmala song contest or *Slavianski Bazaar* was named very popular among musicians). High culture was mostly related to writers and classical music, which had an extremely positive connotation. One interviewee expressed that Russia should promote the availability of new Russian literature (for example in Nagorno-Karabakh) because the literature is not updated and soft power leverage is lost.<sup>253</sup> In Armenia, due to the fact that pop culture is also popular among the youth, pop culture plays much more significant role. Overall, the interviewees named different cultural icons (both historic and present time) and maintained that the icons or stars of today do have popularity. When asked the interviewees to name Russian brands (any kind of brand they could think of) that create some image of Russia and have either positive or negative connotations, the results were diverse. Firstly, the interviewer did not detect any major differences when it came to naming brands by interviewees who answered about only one or the other country, however there were country specific issues. For instance, in the case of Moldova, *Rospotrebnadzor* (department that controls the quality of wine) had very negative connotations due to foreign policy events. In the case of Armenia, *Armrosgazprom* as well as Russian electricity grid (United Energy Systems) were named with no specific (emotional) connotation. If to further address the issue of connotations, the perception of Russian brands were perceived as having less impact in Moldova than in Armenia. The most popular answer<sup>254</sup> was Gazprom and secondly

---

<sup>252</sup> Eastern Partnership overview. Country profile: Armenia, <http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/armenia> (accessed 02 April 2013).

<sup>253</sup> International expert no. 5.

<sup>254</sup> Approximately 3/4 of the interviewees named Gazprom as the first brand they can think of.

Putin or *Putinism*. Gazprom was related to energy supply but was not related to negative perceptions in an obvious way and the brand was even named as the formal soft power exporter sponsoring large scale projects or sports like football. When answering about Armenia, more emphasis was put on Russia's role in the energy sector because the gas is cheap but on the other hand, the fear of gas prices elevating is also present. "Brand" Putin was related to the region, where some people aspire to become a leader like him or he is perceived more as an authoritarian, but he is known very well. Patriarch of the Orthodox Church was also regarded as an important institution of Russia and the Eurasian Union as the "next possible brand" was also named.<sup>255</sup>

There were more specific example about Russia's brands in Armenia than in Moldova. For example, network provided by Russia such as beeline and MTS, banking sector, the capital of Russia and internet sites like *Odnoklassniki*, were named. Food products were more often mentioned to be a brand or something you can see in Armenia than in Moldova, yet this is explained by Armenia's weaker position in trading for example with the EU. With relation to Armenia, one interviewee noted: "*Russia is everywhere*"<sup>256</sup>. The "obvious" brands like *Vodka*, *Kalashnikov*, *Balalaika* were named, but there are not so many Russian brands that people consider to be known, except for Gazprom.<sup>257</sup> At this point, the author notes that Gazprom as a brand could be very influential in terms of positive PR, due to the fact that it is very well known and visible. As long as it is related to government action, cutting off supply, unpredictable prices, Russia does not have any significant leverage with the brand and positive connotation.

### *Moldova*

According to the latest available public opinion survey in Moldova, TV is the most popular media outlet (first source of information for 88% of the surveyed and most trusted media outlet as well- 67%).<sup>258</sup> However, the importance of it is the fact that Prime TV, which is the rebroadcast of the Russian Channel One (previously ORT)

---

<sup>255</sup> Other brands that were mentioned included Russian strong alcohol (Vodka) First Channel (*Первый канал*), the brand Lada, some food products, some equipment in infrastructure and technology. Also, events like Sochi Olympics and some Russian cities that are trying to position themselves on the map without the politics were named.

<sup>256</sup> Academic no. 1.

<sup>257</sup> NGO representative no. 1.

<sup>258</sup> Barometer of Public Opinion in Moldova, Institute for public diplomacy. <http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=624> (accessed 31 January 2013).

remains the most popular source of information, (49,4%) followed by Moldovan state TV channel Moldova 1 (45,6) and leads also the “most objective” TV source board (50,4%) followed by Moldova 1.<sup>259</sup> The popularity of Russian media channels are also confirmed by the interviewees, furthermore, the importance of media and Russian language exposure is significant in peoples’ everyday lives: “*Russian films and serials are very popular in Moldova, while the Hollywood movies most often are viewed in Russian translation. For example, all movie theaters in Chisinau except for one show movies translated into Russian.*”<sup>260</sup> However, some of the interviewees said that the exposure to Russian media has more influence among the Russian ethnic minority than among the ethnic Moldovans and Romanians and this is what seriously minimizes Russian influence.<sup>261</sup> When asked about media’s role in formulating people’s opinion, one interviewee talked about the bias that the Russian TV channels can produce: “*(...)it does create an image of (...) neighbouring countries that is not exactly correct...because there are missions or certain issues distorted and some things are not mentioned, so I would say yes [it is biased, as stated before-author] and it is used as a tool.*”<sup>262</sup>

Several times the issue of minorities and language was raised. The lack of willingness to know the official language in Moldova was emphasized and because a lot of people talk Russian, it is the second language of communication. What is more, all of the interviewees (answering about Moldova) had experiences when Russian language was more easy to use than any other language and as one interviewee summed it up: “*...and with Russian people, it is the only language of communication.*”<sup>263</sup> Russian language and minorities throughout the region have an important role in Russia’s soft power and according to one interviewee, people do not need to identify themselves as Russians, but identifying themselves as Russian speaking citizens is enough for Russia to have a soft power tool.<sup>264</sup> However, the very fact that language is used as the primary tool to promote Russia shows the one-sidedness of the approach as well as the danger of being dismissed due to negative connotations. This is evident in Moldova, where several

---

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> National expert no 3.

<sup>261</sup> Diplomat no. 2 and Student no. 1.

<sup>262</sup> Student no 1.

<sup>263</sup> Student no 1

<sup>264</sup> International expert no. 1.

interviewees had personal experience of people not wanting to talk in Russian, even though they know the language. Cases when Russia uses this “leverage” to pressure other governments, can actually undermine the soft power tool of language.<sup>265</sup>

### *Armenia*

In Armenia, 90% of people consider the most important information source TV.<sup>266</sup> The three most viewed TV channels in 2011 survey were H1, Armenia TV and Shanti TV and Armenian channels are most often used for everyday information (87%) and Russian channels come second (51%). According to the survey and a study published in 2011, the Russian TV news popularity was almost half (49%) among the people watching Russian stations for news daily.<sup>267</sup> An interesting finding in the 2011 report was that the contents of the TV programs of Armenian and Russian are based on American or European shows (that are also available in translation) and that viewers felt that Russian soap operas were of the highest quality.<sup>268</sup> The Russian site *Odnoklassniki* is by far the most popular social network (80%) compared to *Facebook* (15%).<sup>269</sup> When it comes to Media, the Russian TV channels are available such as Channel One, RTR, NTV, RenTV, TNT. Several interviewees mentioned that the channel *Kultura* is the main cultural soft powers provider when to talk about Russia. When it comes to other channels, for example TNT, humor shows (KVN) are also popular. In Armenia, the language presence and knowledge is perceived much more positively. “*The knowledge of Armenian and Russian in history was taken so called by default.*”<sup>270</sup> In relation to Armenia, the fact that during Soviet time elite schools were Russian and people tried to get their children to Russian schools played an important role in formulating peoples’

---

<sup>265</sup> For example Latvian or Ukraine language law issue.

<sup>266</sup> Armenia 2011: Media Public Opinion and Preference Survey, Caucasus Research Resource Centers - ARMENIA A Program of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation, [http://www.crrccenters.org/store/downloads/projects/ArMedia\\_2011\\_Presentation\\_English.pdf](http://www.crrccenters.org/store/downloads/projects/ArMedia_2011_Presentation_English.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>267</sup> Armenia 2011 Media Public Opinion and Preference Survey. Caucasus Research Resource Centers - ARMENIA A Program of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. [http://www.crrccenters.org/store/downloads/projects/ArMedia\\_2011\\_Presentation\\_English.pdf](http://www.crrccenters.org/store/downloads/projects/ArMedia_2011_Presentation_English.pdf) (31.03.2013)

<sup>268</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> Katy Pearce. Armenian Media Landscape. Formative Research for the Alternative Resources in Media Program. October 2011. [http://www.crrc.am/store/armenia/CRRC\\_ArMedia%20Survey%20Report\\_FINAL%20KP\\_edited.pdf](http://www.crrc.am/store/armenia/CRRC_ArMedia%20Survey%20Report_FINAL%20KP_edited.pdf) (01.04.2013)

<sup>270</sup> National expert no. 1.

opinion. As regards the cultural influence but also influence *per se*, one interviewee brought out the fact that any kind of influence coming from Russia is not contested as it is in the case of some other countries (for example Estonia) and when it comes to language, the interviewee also thought it was an integral part of the country (Armenia), and the image of youth not speaking Russian that well is not that evident, when talking about personal experience.<sup>271</sup> The language also plays an important role due to the fact that it is mandatory in schools and this has an influence on the cultural ties. The interviewees noted about Armenia that the knowledge of Russian gives significant leverage for Armenians themselves and in this respect, any language (English and French are also popular to know and learn) is useful and the tool of knowledge of the language actually benefits both countries societies. With regards to pop culture, there are many artists coming to Armenia and they are popular, but classical music is also widely listened to. Several interviewees mentioned the cultural exchange years between Russia and Armenia as a significant cultural event enhancing Russia's soft power leverage.

#### 4.1.2. Main results: Values

With both countries, the Soviet time is not seen as something very bad, because the life-standard was much higher during Soviet time for the majority of people and this is what is remembered. Although current thesis addressed the issue of Soviet time in the context of culture, the analysis of the interviews showed that the Soviet time experience (and common history) was perceived mainly in the socio-economic standards of living. Soviet nostalgia was treated as a common value of a certain age group and was not regarded as a source of the cultural affinity. The interviewees stressed the fact that in terms of universal values, the countries (Russia, Moldova and Armenia) are not so different. The shared values were often emphasized by the fact that the region shares a common history and there were values such as the preference of strong or paternalistic state, especially when it comes to economy and social affair, meaning that liberal economic model does not look very appealing. "*State as the care-taker, rather than liberal-enabler,*"<sup>272</sup> was seen as a shared value. According to one interviewee, Russia

---

<sup>271</sup> International expert no. 4.

<sup>272</sup> International expert no 1.

tries to use the concept of conservatism (indicating to traditional European values that Europe itself has deviated from) to replace the previous technocratic approach.<sup>273</sup> Another interviewee noted that when it comes to “shared values” it is “*the „values” of this pseudo-civilization of transition which we call "Post-Soviet"*.”<sup>274</sup> The issue of political values was explicated as follows: “*The more westernized a country becomes, the more critical it becomes about Russia,*”<sup>275</sup> the interviewee stated that countries that are more Western oriented, such as Moldova, become more sensitive towards Russia’s policies at home and this is the underlying factor why soft power in Moldova does not work so well- different understanding of values and what a country promotes with its domestic policy either finds praise or criticism. Overall, the image of shared values had different connotations with different countries and connected more Russia and Armenia than Russia and Moldova. However, religion and church was a common denominator of Russia and Moldova. In Armenia, 98% of the population is considered to be members of the Armenian Apostolic Church<sup>276</sup> but in Moldova, an estimated 75% of Moldovans belong to the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is an autonomous church under the Russian Orthodox Church.<sup>277</sup>

### *Moldova*

The Soviet time cultural nostalgia was more related to the unpleasant memory of *Russification*. However, it had an impact on values and holidays or what people watch on TV (Russian films for example).<sup>278</sup> One interviewee named the politicians rather career oriented than having seriously nostalgic views about the Soviet Union.<sup>279</sup> All of the interviewees agreed that cultural nostalgia, if at all present, belongs to the older generation. According to the interviewees, the value gap is having political influence and is used by different parties and thus the election can be swung with different value oriented debates. One interviewee saw no interconnectedness in terms of shared values

---

<sup>273</sup> International expert no. 2.

<sup>274</sup> National expert no 3.

<sup>275</sup> International expert no 2.

<sup>276</sup> Official website of the president of Armenia. General Information about the Republic of Armenia. <http://www.president.am/en/general-information/> (accessed 5 May 2013).

<sup>277</sup> Popescu and Wilson, *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite*, p. 35.

<sup>278</sup> Diplomat no 1.

<sup>279</sup> Diplomat no. 1.

indicating to loose or non-existing Slavic ties.<sup>280</sup> One of the shared values that was named by several interviewees was religion and Orthodox church and the fact that the Moldovan Orthodox Church is under the Russian Orthodox Church (jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate) also, the old calendar of religious holidays is used.<sup>281</sup> The importance of religion and the role it play's was exemplified by one interviewee<sup>282</sup> about the segregation of the church, namely, the issue of Metropolitan of Bessarabia, which is under Romania, was accused by Russia in interference into the political life of Moldova during the dispute with the Russian Orthodox Church over the territorial jurisdiction.

According to the opinion polls, the EU scores on a "good" scale up to 75 % and 67% of people felt that the relations with Russia are good.<sup>283</sup> 54% of the people would vote for EU integration, if a referendum would take place, however, 55% of the people surveyed would vote for the accession of Moldova to the Customs Union, and if the people ought to choose, a slight advantage for the Customs Union is apparent.<sup>284</sup> Another Russian favoured example is the trust in political leaders of other countries, where Mr Vladimir Putin is regarded as the most trusted politician, 75% of people answer the question with very much trust or some trust.<sup>285</sup> With this, although EU integration is under active consideration, the Customs Union, Vladimir Putin and Russian media outlet are leading the popularity rankings under their categories. According to the interviewees, in the case of Moldova, Russian leaders are not seen very positive, rather, there is some distrust in how they are leading the country and authoritarianism was used to describe Russia's leadership several times. According to the interviewees, even though Russian leaders actions are viewed with great reservation, Moldova is striving for neutrality and does not want to condemn Russia's policies openly, however, paradoxically, some Moldovan political leaders try to imitate the Russian politicians and one interviewee

---

<sup>280</sup> Diplomat no. 2.

<sup>281</sup> Current thesis presents religion and the Orthodox church under the value section due to the fact that it was brought up by the interviewees when asked about shared values.

<sup>282</sup> Student no.1.

<sup>283</sup> Barometer of Public opinion, Republic of Moldova (Institute for Public Diplomacy, November 2012).

<sup>284</sup> 16% in favour of the EU and 22% for the Customs Union, yet 58% of people have not decided and do not know, what they would choose, of this were the case. Barometer of Public opinion, Republic of Moldova (Institute for Public Diplomacy, November 2012).

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

brought an example “*Lately, many politicians in the Republic of Moldova began to wear the watch on the right hand like Vladimir Putin.*”<sup>286</sup>

### *Armenia*

In Armenia, the socio-economic system of Soviet time (similarly to Moldova) was named as something that the generation longs for. One interviewee noted that the Soviet time cultural influence is indeed visible in Armenia, but whether it influences the image of Russia, was hard to say, due to the fact that Russia is firstly seen as the security guarantor.<sup>287</sup> At the same time, film classics and even Soviet time singers are very popular in Armenia. The political discourse is dominated by nationalistic discourse<sup>288</sup> and the policy of *complementarism*, seeking to have good relations with its friendly neighbours and international organizations. One interviewee noted the importance of differences in various paths that the Post-Soviet states took explaining that the historic development of Armenia and the time under the Russian empire is perceived as a positive time in history due to the fact that the nation started flourishing and to some extent freedom to evolve.<sup>289</sup> Overall, a positive view on the common history was named by a few interviewees as an important factor in shaping the views about Russia.

The interviewees indicated different views about the same values and how some are more emphasized than others such as conservatism or paternalism,<sup>290</sup> meaning that shared values in terms of the two countries do have a significant impact on how Russia is perceived. There was a definite differentiation between western liberal values and the ones Russia and Armenia share. The value of family, religion, spiritual values<sup>291</sup> and traditional values were most appreciated and commonly named. According to one interviewee, in the case of Russia, values such as patriotism or religion are often interpreted in their extreme, conservative values, nationalism becoming also more prominent.<sup>292</sup> One interviewee also mentioned the case of Pussy Riot and expressed that, most probably, if something like that were to happen in the west, the reaction would not be so radical but from the viewpoint of Armenian values, the role of religion

---

<sup>286</sup> National expert no 3

<sup>287</sup> International expert no. 4.

<sup>288</sup> National expert no. 1.

<sup>289</sup> National expert no. 1.

<sup>290</sup> National expert no 1.

<sup>291</sup> In Russian: *духовни ценности*.

<sup>292</sup> Academic no. 1.

is very important and hence the reaction of Russia is understandable.<sup>293</sup> The interviews established a number of similar value views, but there was a difference in how they were perceived. According to the interviewees, and they all held the same positions, Armenians are somewhat more committed to their values, especially concerning family and religion, also history played an important role in formulating the values. Even though Russian values were regarded as very similar, there were views about somewhat looser ties to morality by some interviewees. What is more, the western liberal values did raise some concern and were seen as something unacceptable.

In the case of Armenia, a more comprehensive overview of public opinion can be found since 2008, when relations with Russia were found good in total of 98% and with the EU 84% and Russia was by far the most important partner for the country (95%, whereas EU came after France and Iran with 29%). 51% of the surveyed thought that Armenia should stay with CIS and 30% that Armenia should join the EU.<sup>294</sup> According to one interviewee, Putin has a positive image in Armenia and the way he managed the country through hard times. *“I would even say that, to some extent, Armenia would like to have such Putin of their own (...) I think in the case of Russia or Armenia, a need for strong leader still exists.”*<sup>295</sup> Another interviewee used the term self-evident when explaining Russia’s influence in Armenia in different aspects meaning that for example the leaderships outspoken behaviour hardly irritates the majority of people in Armenia as it does in some countries.

---

<sup>293</sup> National expert no 1.

<sup>294</sup> Armenian National Study, International Republican Institute Baltic Surveys Ltd. <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2008%20February%2015%20Survey%20of%20Armenian%20Public%20Opinion.%20January%2013-20.%202008.pdf> (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>295</sup> National expert no 1

*Russia the EU and the “shared neighbourhood”*<sup>296</sup>

The issue of Russia and the EU in the region was emphasized regarding the importance of the results of the upcoming Vilnius summit of EaP and its effect on the prospect of future EU Integration. *“I think that the problem is with the decrease of the EU’s soft power, just because the EU is so much less impressive, so the bigger problem is not Russia’s soft power but EU’s self-inflicted crisis.”*<sup>297</sup> In the case of Armenia, the situation was viewed from a different angle: *“The thing is that Russia is there already. It is the EU that’s the alternative.”*<sup>298</sup> The interviewees also said that people are having hard time to see, what the EU is really offering; yet what it demands from the country is much more visible. The question of Ramil Safarov<sup>299</sup> was brought as an example to explain the EU’s inability to work as a unifying actor. The interviewees did not see Russia being used as an alternative for EU integration in the political discourse (in Moldova or Armenia). According to some of the interviewees, the “era” of sovereign democracy dates back to few years ago and has seriously lost its position in today’s political discourse, since the region is not “boiling”, referring to the colour revolutions. *“It was at that time when Russia tried to strike back with its own vision.”*<sup>300</sup> According to the interviewees (international experts in particular) the concept of sovereign democracy is not something that is used anymore, *“(…) Paradoxically, the West doing less democracy promotion, is better for the dictators in the region and there is no need to fall back on sovereign democracy.”*<sup>301</sup> Another interesting point about Russia’s model and the attractiveness was the following: *“It seems to me often times that it is actually Putin learning from long-standing dictators like Lukashenko or Nazarbayev.”*<sup>302</sup>

---

<sup>296</sup> Refers to a deeper analysis by Averre who concludes that argues a more conceptual and analytical framework is needed towards the shared neighborhood, which recognizes structural and normative elements in the policies of both the EU and Russia and that is prepared to reflect upon the rational basis for Russian approaches. Derek Averre, *Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighborhood’*. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61, No 10 (2009), pp. 1689-1713.

<sup>297</sup> National expert no 4.

<sup>298</sup> Academic no 1.

<sup>299</sup> He was extradited to Azerbaijan by Hungary, serving incarceration for murdering an Armenian officer and was later pardoned and greeted as a hero at home. Another interviewee doubted whether Russia had a role to play in this incident, but the official position of Russia was that Azerbaijan brought unnecessary tension to the region.

<sup>300</sup> International expert no 1.

<sup>301</sup> National expert no 4.

<sup>302</sup> International expert no 1.

This is not the case of soft power, but there is a clear distinction between elite model and society, which is also introduced in Nye's theory. The impression of Russia's socio-economic standards<sup>303</sup> was regarded as appealing to the target countries society. Some ultra liberal views exported by the West were also seen as enhancing Russia's conservative views. In Armenia, the interviewees saw Russia's interest in the country differently, but all of them confirmed that Russia has its own geo-political interests in the region. However, Russia as the security guarantor was the most important thing that was singled out as the purpose of Russia in Armenia. In this view, the perception of Russia's presence in the country is viewed as needed, whereas in Moldova, it is seen as something causing problems. One interviewee explained the ultimate alternative for ordinary people as low energy prices or visa free travel to Europe.<sup>304</sup>

The perception of Russia's concepts and the issue of protection of compatriots has been the subject of some political discourse in Moldova and the concept of sphere of influence is related to Transnistria and the special representative Rogozin. Russia has granted approximately 160,000 citizenships to Transnistrian residents and that is why it increasingly justifies its actions in this secessionist region. The legitimacy of Russian political discourse and their values are also influenced by how successful they are in other spheres of society. For example, as on interviewee named, the business and economic ties play an important role on how Russia's influence is perceived and whether it is seen as something legitimate or not.<sup>305</sup> Several interviewees mentioned that one of the prevalent issues is economy and how the society manages, hence leaving values and culture on the background.

In Armenia, Russia's actions are perceived as legitimate and there is nothing that is contested. But Armenians do have a problem with Russia's raising nationalism and the interviewees brought out some incidents when Armenians were attacked in Russia, which definitely have a negative impact, nevertheless, it does not discredit the Russian image as a whole. The issue of whether to join the EU or the Eurasian Union was brought up by the interviewees and the latter was evaluated as something not so complicated. Armenian leaders have not denied the option of EU integration and it is in fact a priority, but this is not against Russia. Russia remains in a military-political

---

<sup>303</sup> in particular, having higher salaries and living standards of Moscow.

<sup>304</sup> International expert no. 2.

<sup>305</sup> Diplomat no. 1.

relations with Armenia and this is something far more important, as some of the interviewees noted. As long as Russia remains the guarantor of Armenian security, the EU has some leverage, while the Eurasian Union is an abstract object. Although Russia plays an important role, the interviewees brought out a more diversified picture of Armenia's options: "*I think that we have the unique possibility of building a pro-Armenian country.*"<sup>306</sup> The same was emphasized about Moldova, that the country has its own agenda and dividing the countries under Russian or the EU's influence is not what the case studies in question strive for.

#### 4.1.3. Main results: Foreign Policy

##### *Migration*

The last section on foreign policy covers a variety of issues brought up by the interviewees. To measure Russia's attractiveness in terms of policies, the author first looks at a few statistical figures. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, emigration to Russia has drastically decreased since 2001.<sup>307</sup> However, labour force migration to Russia since 2006-2011 was around 200 thousand people<sup>308</sup>, which shows the importance of Russia's labour market and can contribute to the image of Russia. In the case of Armenia, labour migration to Russia is annually (in the 2009 report) about 60 thousand and a survey done by OSCE for the period 2002-2005 found that almost 90% of labour migrants surveyed went to Russia.<sup>309</sup> Migrants do have an effect (indirect effect of soft power) in how countries are seen and perceived. Some of the interviewees mentioned the relative travel ease and visa free movement and also Russian language as a common denominator. "*The reservations towards the EU, giving credit automatically to Russia, are related to the uncertainty of the EU accession*

---

<sup>306</sup> National expert no 1.

<sup>307</sup> In 2001 there were over 2500 people emigrating to Russia whereas in 2011 the number of people who emigrated to Russia was 860. National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova. Emigrants who leaves aboard for permanent or temporary resident on the territory of another state. <http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/database/EN/databasetree.asp> (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>308</sup> National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova. Labour force migration. Population aged 15 years and over, working or looking for work abroad by country of destination, level of education, age groups, level of education, sex and area. <http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/database/EN/databasetree.asp> (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>309</sup> Migration and Development. Armenia Country Study, ILO, 2009. ILO Subregional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2009. [http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/migr\\_dev\\_study\\_en.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/migr_dev_study_en.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2013).

prospects, the difficulty of visa liberalization with the EU and the uncertainty of European labor markets opening (to get to work to Russia, Moldovans (for now) need only 50 USD for the ticket) and to mistakes of the current government.”<sup>310</sup> Also, the importance of people’s direct experience, as explicated in the third chapter as well, was singled out: “The families live in two cultural areas, women and children here [Armenia-author], and men as a rule in Russia, and obviously, the cultural influence is coming from there as well (...).”<sup>311</sup>

### *Compatriots policy*

The compatriots program was approved by the president of Russia in 2006 (with some amendments in 2010) for a continuous period until 2012 in order to stabilize Russia’s population, especially in regions of strategic importance for the country.<sup>312</sup> In general, applicants must speak Russian and be comfortable with the country’s society and culture.<sup>313</sup> The number of compatriots who moved to Russia in 2007 was 682 compared with the target of 23,000 for 2007. In 2008, 3,000 compatriots returned to Russia. By 2009, about 10,000 people had taken advantage of the repatriation program. The Deputy Chief of the Russian Ministry for Regional Development stated that by 2010, 23,000 Russians had moved back to Russia using the state repatriation program.<sup>314</sup> The program was first launched in Armenia in 2009 and during the past four years the program had a total of 26,000 applicants, of whom 1,500 have given up their Armenian citizenship and moved to live in Russia.<sup>315</sup> Nearly 10 percent of the participants who filled out questionnaires of the program in the first quarter of 2012 were residents of

---

<sup>310</sup> National expert no 3

<sup>311</sup> International Expert no 4

<sup>312</sup> President of Russia. Executive Order On Implementation of the State Programme to resettle compatriots living abroad to Russia, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4416> (accessed 31 March 2013); Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, [http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR\\_RDI/RIR\\_RDI.aspx?id=453657&l=e](http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?id=453657&l=e) (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>313</sup> The New York Times. 21 March 2009. Clifford J. Levy. "Its Population Falling, Russia Beckons Its Children Home." “ <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/world/europe/22believers.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>314</sup> Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. [http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR\\_RDI/RIR\\_RDI.aspx?id=453657&l=e](http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?id=453657&l=e) (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>315</sup> Julia Hakobyan. ArmeniaNow. End of “Compatriots”? : Government says Russian immigration program unacceptable for Armenia. [http://armenianow.com/society/40234/russian\\_program\\_compatriots\\_concerns\\_armenia\\_labor\\_migration](http://armenianow.com/society/40234/russian_program_compatriots_concerns_armenia_labor_migration) (31.03.2013).

Armenia.<sup>316</sup> Despite the “merits” of the program, it has been criticized for its bureaucracy and ineffectiveness as well as the fact that the program is not open to just any descendants of Russians. Russia’s “compatriots” program with which citizens of post-Soviet republics are enabled to become permanent residents in remote provinces of the Russian Federation, is not seen as something positive, rather, the fear of further migration is an increasing problem and was not favoured by the Armenian government.<sup>317</sup> The policy is an example of how soft power has been undermined by government action also in the case of Armenia. The intentions of these activities are not clear and they cause distrust and the project is seen as something that Russia uses to exploit the minority and shed bad light on other countries. The question arises, was the aim of the project to do just that or is it a problem of poor communication that created negative image and undermined the soft power project. Yet, the fundamental problem is not knowing how to use soft power in order to enhance communication and interaction with other countries in a way that is perceived either neutral or positive.

#### *Student exchange*

Many people got their higher education during the Soviet times from Russia and this was emphasized by the interviewees as having an important role in formulating people’s views. Also, cheaper studying conditions can also be the reason why people go studying to Russia. Russia awards less scholarships to Moldovans with comparison to Romania: *“Russia awards annually about 100-200 students’ scholarships for Moldovans, usually granted to the young people in Transnistria, Gagauzia and those of Russian ethnics. Romania, on the other hand, for the academic year 2012-2013, awarded 5,000 scholarships for Moldovan students and pupils.”*<sup>318</sup> One interviewee brought out the importance of student exchange and the location where they study, but even though the Armenians who went to study to the US, read the Russian literature and know the language, hence the value paradigm is an important part of soft power.<sup>319</sup> Especially in the case of Armenia, the diasporas were noted by all of the interviewees and how they

---

<sup>316</sup> Ibid.

<sup>317</sup> Julia Hakobyan. ArmeniaNow. End of “Compatriots”?: Government says Russian immigration program unacceptable for Armenia. *ArmeniaNow*, [http://armenianow.com/society/40234/russian\\_program\\_compatriots\\_concerns\\_armenia\\_labor\\_migration](http://armenianow.com/society/40234/russian_program_compatriots_concerns_armenia_labor_migration) (accessed 31 March 2013).

<sup>318</sup> National expert no 3

<sup>319</sup> Academic no. 1.

have the potential to influence the image of a country via its family, friends and acquaintances in Armenia. In Russia, the Armenian diaspora consists of various people including work migrants but also people who went to live there. In terms of studying, Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University in Armenia was named by several interviewees and was something very positive in what it can offer to students. The University gives out Armenian and Russian diplomas at the same time. Of course, other influential universities that relate to the big diasporas as well are US and France. Increasingly, youth is looking towards the EU and the West, but it is not easy to go there. In the case of Moldova, the interviewees did not regard studying in Russia as something popular, rather, Romania and other EU countries were the primary destination.

#### *Russian NGO's*

In Moldova, Russian NGO's are not so visible, but according to the interviewees they are more visible in the eastern part of the country (Transnistria). Yet, it is hard to establish, what are the specific interests of the NGO's. Mostly, the embassy is having some projects, and youth activities were most commonly named. For example, the Russian Center for Science and Culture was opened in Chisinau in February 2009 and has become very active in Moldova. One interviewee saw the NGO sponsoring similar to the 1990s, where the people who receive the money have not really changed, but the sums have risen. Russia's NGO's however concentrate on the minority. As one interviewee noted, "Russian youth league" activities are mainly attended by Russian-speaking youth and another example is the Russian Orthodox Church and the "orthodox" NGO's like "Pro-Orthodoxy", which attracts some Moldovans but not very many.<sup>320</sup> Overall the image of NGO's was hard to establish due to the fact that the interviewees had hard time naming and differentiating them and their activity.

As regards Armenia, one interviewee noted that Russia has started to put more resources in opening different centers all over the world but for example in Armenia, out of 200 active NGO's, only 4 are known to be Russian.<sup>321</sup> One of them is *Russkiy Mir*, whose chairman of the board is Russian political scientist and State Duma deputy Viacheslav Nikonov, also in close relations with Kremlin. One interviewee explained

---

<sup>320</sup> National expert no. 3.

<sup>321</sup> National expert no. 1.

the fact that there are not many NGO's of Russian origin due to the fact that Russia is extremely present anyways.<sup>322</sup> On the other hand, this shows the potential of expanding its NGO activities in the country. Overall, Russia's NGO's have not actively initiated different projects and engaged wider public in their activities in Armenia.<sup>323</sup>

#### *Bilateral relations: Moldova*

Moldova and Armenia do not have a common border with Russia. The foreign policy of Moldova towards Russia pursues clear and friendly relations as with all the other countries,<sup>324</sup> but “*We do not want to have big brother effect.*”<sup>325</sup> It was said by three interviewees that the near abroad approach brings about more protest moods than positive connotations. Moldova is split in terms of political parties and this was named by some interviewees, namely that the elections can still be swung both ways, although the pro-European alliance is in power for now, the governmental crisis and hard times in Europe and economy has been a test for people's views on pro-EU mindedness. Several interviewees mentioned embargo on Moldovan wine imposed by Russia as something that had very bad consequences for the image of Russia's soft power. What is more, the interviewees said that such bans were actually beneficial for Moldova as the companies had to find new markets and redirect their products export. This is an illustration of a policy having double backfire: firstly, with the image and secondly, trading and economic relations.

The issue of Transnistria and Russia using its influence through the region is extremely important in the two countries interaction. For example, two interviewees named the fact that pensions in Transnistria are paid by Russia and this has an image building effect. Russian presence in Transnistria is having an extremely negative image in Moldova. The policy that Russia uses in the case of Transnistria is counterproductive for Russia and does undermine the trustful relationship of the two countries. “[Russia's role in Transnistria influences its image] *very much and in the worst and most radical way. All of this media and other stuff is incomparable when it comes to the issue of*

---

<sup>322</sup> International expert no. 4.

<sup>323</sup> National expert no. 2.

<sup>324</sup> Diplomat no.1.

<sup>325</sup> Diplomat no 1.

*Transnistria (...)*.<sup>326</sup> Interviewees explained that people living in Transnistria are warned against the possibility of Moldova and Romania uniting. Another interviewee said that in the case of Transnistria, such Russia's "soft power" is very successful, because people are afraid that unification with Moldova means they have to start speaking Romanian.<sup>327</sup> The lack of activity in the 5+2 negotiating format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, US, EU, Chisinau, Tiraspol) from Russia is also one example of the continuation of the problem; maintaining the status quo is something that seems to suit the Russian side. Some of the interviewees also brought out the fact that Russia is blackmailing Moldova to pay the debt of Gazprom supplied gas on credit to the separatist Transnistrian region (thus ensuring its existence). However, the fact that Gazprom wants its money cannot be threatened by means of cutting of supply, because in essence that would mean leaving the separatist region without "the same hand that feeds them". With this, it is actually the case of Russia having trapped itself in. Overall, all of the interviewees indicated Transnistria as the most important problem facing the two countries' relations. Two interviewees referred to the incident of one Moldovan killed by a Russian peacekeeping soldier at the border checkpoint but there is no final court decision and Moldovan authorities do not even have a full overview of what happened. Russia can sometimes be interpreted as irrational actor because it is not understandable what it stands for in Transnistria. The issue of territorial integrity versus supporting separatists is undermining the foundation of a trustful relationship. Also, Russia's military presence was defined as illegal "*There is two kinds of Russian military presence in Moldova. One is legal- and it's called Russian peacekeeping forces (...). But we have the second- and this is called the remains of 14<sup>th</sup> Russian army (...) and they are illegally there without our country's consent.*"<sup>328</sup>

When asked about the perception of Russia's objectives in Moldova, one interviewee described the relationship as dualistic, meaning that while official policy recognizes Moldova as a partner, the discrepancy that the actions do not always live up to what has been declared is visible.<sup>329</sup> Another interviewee perceived Russia's ambitions in a more radical way stating that Russia wants to have power over the country as much as

---

<sup>326</sup> Diplomat no 2

<sup>327</sup> Student no.1.

<sup>328</sup> Diplomat no. 1.

<sup>329</sup> Student no.1.

possible describing it with “the marionette doll” situation.<sup>330</sup> Some of the interviewees believed Russia has some power over decision-making with various means such as economic relations or cheap gas. However, as is seen in the past, these carrots can quickly become sticks and have in turn negative effect. In Nye’s view these are not means of soft power. The interviewees were sure that Russia has some political decision-making leverage in the sense that Moldova is a neutral country and the issue of irritating or provoking Russia does influence to some extent political decision-making. The interviewees did not see the benefits of closer relations with Russia but at the same time thought that the country should commit to neutral relations.

#### *Bilateral relations: Armenia*

Armenia’s position towards Russia and other countries follows the *complementarism*<sup>331</sup> policy and Russia is also a strategic ally. Armenia in Russia’s “near abroad” was seen as something that Armenia was forced to accept due to some unfriendly neighbours. Some of the interviewees saw Russia’s ambitions to create a Eurasian Union as something that falls in line with hard power; also, some analysts in this regard have named Russia’s ambitions as “soft coercion”<sup>332</sup>. In view of the carrot and stick method, Russia is using the Eurasian Union as a carrot for enhancing further cooperation. However, the “pushy” rhetoric might be counterproductive in terms of soft power. It is crucial for soft power to use the methods as alluring and building on attractiveness, but currently it is not clear, how the Eurasian Union will “actually” work, giving ground for both positive and negative speculations. *“It has two sides. One of them, from the nationalist perspective, obviously Russia dominating Armenia or dictating to some extent the fate of Armenia, it can be perceived as negative. On the other hand, Armenian nationalism is not directed at Russia. It’s on the opposite- it is directed at, you know, the regions or countries for which it perceives there are threats as threats, like Turkey or Azerbaijan, and in that way Russia is perceived as Armenian’s security guarantor, so the nationalism at that point does not work against Russia (...).”*<sup>333</sup> The near abroad concept was treated more as a neutral term but at the same time, it was perceived as something that unites the two

---

<sup>330</sup> Diplomat no. .2.

<sup>331</sup> Having good relations with Russia and Europe among others.

<sup>332</sup> Agnia Grigas, *Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States*, Briefing Paper, (Chatham House, August 2012).

<sup>333</sup> Academic no 1.

countries taking into account the military presence, economic relations and cultural affinity.

In the case of Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement negotiations are held in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, USA, France).<sup>334</sup> Most concerns about the negative Russian role in the conflict resolution efforts are connected with the perceptions of Russia's pursuit of underlying geopolitical interests.<sup>335</sup> The skepticism of Russia "sitting on two chairs" having a close economic and military alliance with Armenia and a pragmatic partnership with Azerbaijan is illustrated by the fact that Moscow has been capitalizing on the conflict by becoming the main arms supplier to both sides: in 2007-2011 it provided 55% of Azerbaijan's and 96% of Armenia's arms imports.<sup>336</sup> An analysis of the conflict refers that Russia's power rests thus in the neutrality of the conflict and maintaining *status quo* concluding that Russia lacks real soft-power practices and incentives that could perhaps prove a valuable tool combined with its general clout in the region.<sup>337</sup> The impact of Russo-Georgian war for Armenia was more perceived in the sense that South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognized by Russia and this gives somewhat conformation about the issue in Nagorno-Karabakh and the possible resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, the border with Georgia during the war was closed and the trading stopped as well, so the issue did concern Armenians and the war itself was nothing that people wanted. The interviewees noted that the two frozen conflicts are extremely different in terms of Russian position in them. The relations are determined by the fact that Russia is there to secure Armenia. *"There is no alternative because no-one can offer similar help."*<sup>338</sup> One of the interviewees said the following *"I would even sum it up that Russia does not have to make many efforts in terms of soft power as it has established its presence in Armenia very strongly in many areas, beginning with very tight cultural ties and ending with military and political cooperation."*<sup>339</sup>

---

<sup>334</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic of Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh issue. <http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/#a4> (02.04.2013)

<sup>335</sup> Anahit Shirinyan. Assessing Russia's role in efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: From perception to reality. February 1, 2013. Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation. <http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/assessing-russias-role-in-efforts-to-resolve-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-from-perception-to-reality/> (02.04.2013)

<sup>336</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>337</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>338</sup> Academic no 1.

<sup>339</sup> International expert no. 4.

The interaction between the two countries is constant and high level meetings take place regularly. But, as some of the interviewees mentioned, the fact that Russia sells weapons to Azerbaijan brings confusion among people. Armenia's foreign policy does not want to be in confrontation with the "big" powers: the willingness to communicate with all actors is visible. The interviewees saw the Russian objectives differently; some of the interviewees saw Russia's main interest in having Armenia in total dependence of Russia, whereas others saw Russia as the sole protector and thus having legitimate objectives. According to the interviewees, the influence in decision-making is visible in all military or defence related matters. Perhaps the issue of Russia not criticizing Armenia about the EU or not trying to stop the integration in an obvious way is related to the fact that Russia has its own and extremely important interest with regards to the EU, for instance visa freedom, as one interviewee noted.<sup>340</sup> The limitations of what Russia could ask from Armenia as its strategic ally might not be as far-reaching as the common knowledge is (to say more bluntly, Russia controls the country's economy and is militarily present *ergo* it dictates the country's political decisions). For example, Russia has not stopped Armenia from participating in the EU's EaP initiative. Armenia is not part of the Customs Union. None of Russia's closest allies, even Belarus for that matter, recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia. There is a certain sympathy towards Russia that is fixed in the society and people perceive Russia as well as Russian related things attractive, familiar and uncontested. When it comes to Armenian diasporas living in Western countries, a certain shift in values as well as perception towards Russia is evident hence, there are mixed views among Armenians towards Russia. However, Armenians see Russia's image far more appealing and positive than Moldovans.

#### **4.2. Different impact of Russia's soft power**

Every country will remain unique and the power sources a country possesses determine to a great extent how soft power is used or how the resources are conveyed into soft power behaviour. However, the subject and how soft power is perceived is equally important in determining Russia's soft power outcomes. As long as the imposed image of Russia is not what people perceive the country to be, soft power is limited. The fact is, however, that Russia has both the resources and the means to influence countries via

---

<sup>340</sup> International expert no. 2.

soft power; the question is rather, in which way the resources are being utilized. While Russia tries to impose its “specific” restrictions on something that is intangible in essence, the fundamental idea behind soft power is that it can only be controlled to some extent. Although the theoretical framework took into account the same power resources, the fact was that the resources were not equally imposed due to the social environment and the context of the relationship hence, a different impact was seen.

Russia does not need to do much in Armenia, but in Moldova, the perception of Russia is hindered by more negative connotations. When it comes to cultural affinity, the region in itself is versatile. In the case of Moldova, Romania clearly plays a very important role in terms of influence. Russian culture has a positive image and people do not reject the language, but the problem is that the Russian minority does not speak the official language. In Moldova, Russia’s soft power image in terms of culture is mostly related to the historical relations of the forced imposition/assimilation of the Soviet culture and values, the Russian Orthodox Church presence, Russian high culture, some sentiment of “sovietism” and Russian media presence enhanced by Russian language. In Armenia, due to different circumstances with its neighbours and the fact that Russia is seen as a strategic ally in the region, the country is regarded as more perceptive to Russia’s soft power. However, Armenia is a distinct case due to its very strong national identity that was emphasized by most of the interviewees. Yet, Russia has an important role in facilitating Armenia’s identity by being its ally. As regards Armenian, Russia’s culture is something very close and the language factor is very important in maintaining Russia’s soft power. In terms of shared values, Armenian nationalism is seen as something unique and distinctive even though the country is closely linked to Russia. Russia is most successful in communicating and promoting its interest among the Russian minority but this does not explain Russia’s soft power influence in Armenia, where Russian minority is about 0,5% of the entire population. In Armenia, the cultural ties are deeply interconnected within the majority of the society, where Russia’s presence is uncontested and the receptivity is supported by the context of the relationship.

With regards to Russia, there is a huge migrants’ inflow from specific countries and the image of Russia in the eyes of migrants (and there is a significant number of Moldovan and Armenian migrants in Russia) is as important on the inside as what it is trying to

export. Namely, the indirect effect of soft power transcending from society to society or diaspora to diaspora experience is a crucial element of people's perception. The author of the current thesis sees the issue of Russia imposing its ideas without explanation, acceptance and fitting into the social environment as the fundamental difference in the two case study countries. Russia is confusing the society in Moldova more than in Armenia due to the fact that its objectives, especially in the case of Transnistria, are not acceptable. Russia's culture as well as values are shared and fit into the society (more so, with the older generation) and language is a big part of promoting its soft power resources. At the same time, the effect is severely undermined and contested by its policy towards the issue of Transnistria. In the case of Armenia, culture as well as values play an even more important role in uniting the two countries and they are supported by the fact that the military presence and economic dependence is not viewed as hostile action towards Armenia's self determination. What is more, the perception of Russia as the security guarantor is one of the crucial elements of Russia's soft power in Armenia. Hence, the overall image of Russia's foreign policy is crucial in determining the perception. It has been made very clear from the research that although culture and values, but also economic and military resources (especially in the case of Armenia), are having a positive or at least neutral image (values), this is undermined by the third resource- policy behaviour. Although the research focused more on its foreign policy behaviour, domestic policy has proven to have a crucial impact as well. As long as Russia undermines its soft power potential by imposing harsh measures (hard power) on the target countries and at the same time neglecting the situation and problems at home, it has a limited opportunity in enhancing its soft power. Also, there is no point in trying to artificially create a more positive soft power image because the interaction does not take place in a closed space or society. Russia is treating soft power in an agent-centric view, whereas the concept emphasizes the importance of subject centric view and the context of the relationship.

## CONCLUSION

Soft power is the ability to get what one wants through attraction rather than coercion. In order to study the effect of soft power, it is important to take into account the agent as well as subject and the context of the relationship. The aim of the thesis was to identify, if and how does soft power affect Russia's influence in Moldova and in Armenia, how do these two cases vary in the same framework and what might be the reasons. The thesis concluded that it is more common to explain the bilateral relations in terms of tangible resources and political issues derived from foreign policy than it is to study the intangible resources that are also rooted in perceptions and receptivity.

The author firstly analyzed how and from where Russia gets its soft power resources. The research focused primarily on high and pop culture exposure and consumption, language, media exposure and consumption, branding, (cultural) nostalgia and the overall assessment of the given resource as well as for values and foreign policy. Russia's soft power resources are deeply embedded in its culture, values and policies. What is distinct in the case of Russia is the fact that much soft power comes from hard power resources. However, the policies of government are the crucial element in how Russia's soft power is perceived in the target country. The main finding of the current research is that Russia uses its soft power resources in a way that does not utilize its full potential and with a special incentive to influence the Russian speaking minorities in former Soviet countries (where it is regarded as sometimes working better than the EU's soft power). At the same time, Russia holds significant leverage when it comes to culture and media consumption and culture promotion is at the core of Russia's soft power.

Values were measured as perceived values of Russia as well as shared values of the target countries. Also, leadership and elite interaction and image, types of governance and alternative image of Russia, political discourse concepts, attractiveness of doing business and studying in Russia was analyzed. There was a distinct difference in how Russia's values were perceived. There were a set of values such as religion and church, conservatism, traditional values (opposed to liberal western values) but also paternalism that founded Russia's values. While the analysis of values focused also on political

discourse and political values, these proved to have marginal effect in target countries. The two case studies had a clear distinction; Moldova was seen as being largely part of the Western value paradigm (and striving for EU integration) whereas Armenia was relatively close to Russia. Traditional values, conservatism, the importance of religion and family were emphasized and a great deal of importance was given to the issue of Armenian diasporas and how this shaped the image of Russia in Armenia.

Although Russia's culture is highly appreciated, it has been left aside when promoting its "real" influence in target countries like cheap gas or foreign policy statements. Foreign policy was evaluated on the basis of Russia's foreign policy concepts and perceived objectives, its NGO activities, bilateral relations and events that had a significant impact on the interaction. Both case studies had some Russia's influence on their policy-making but also strived to benefit from EU's Eastern Partnership initiative. In the case of Moldova, the foreign policy was labelled *neutrality*, in the case of Armenia, it was named *complementarism*, both of which pursued positive relations with Russia. In both cases, foreign policy activities that undermine Russia's soft power were named. This was the core issue of Russia's direct involvement in Transnistria and to some extent selling arms to Azerbaijan. However, while Russia's presence in Transnistria is having a negative impact on Russia's image, in Armenia, Russia is perceived as the security guarantor and the context of the relationship is enhancing Russia's soft power.

In Moldova, Russia's soft power was seen as going hand in hand with hard power. Russia's soft power in Moldova is made up from smaller "pieces" that are combined in a larger soft power "pool of meaning". In Armenia, Russia's soft power is founded on its hard power presence, but overall, the Soviet time nostalgia and cultural affinity is also a significant factor. What is more, values play an important role on how the west is perceived; Russia's and Armenia's closeness in more "layers" than one is therefore established. The analysis suggests that Russia has significant leverage in influencing target countries. However, the methods used to enhance its' soft power are dominated by stick-carrot approach. The thesis confirmed the importance of image and perception and the distinction of how soft power is used: when soft power was used and perceived as controlled, soft power *over* someone type of way, it had a more undermining effect than when soft power was used to contribute to the *empowerment* of someone.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

All about Olympics, Russian Profile, [http://www.olympic.it/english/country/id\\_RUS](http://www.olympic.it/english/country/id_RUS)  
(accessed 24 March 2013)

Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index,  
[http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice\\_areas/roper\\_pam/nbi\\_index/index.en.html](http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/index.en.html)  
(accessed 2 March 2013)

— Simon Anholt/GMI General Report 2005 fourth quarter (Global Market  
Insite, Inc, 2006)

— Anholt – Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index 2006

— Anholt – Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index 2008

— Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index: SM Methodology and Quality  
Control for the 2009 NBI Study, September 2009,  
<http://www.simonanholt.com/Publications/publications-other-articles.aspx>  
(accessed 19 March 2013)

Armenia, country profile: Human Development Indicators,  
<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ARM.html> (accessed 24 March 2013)

Armenian National Study, International Republican Institute Baltic Surveys Ltd.  
<http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2008%20February%2015%20Survey%20of%20Armenian%20Public%20Opinion,%20January%2013-20,%202008.pdf> (accessed 31  
March 2013)

Armenia 2011 Media Public Opinion and Preference Survey, Caucasus Research  
Resource Centers - ARMENIA A Program of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation.,  
[http://www.crrcenters.org/store/downloads/projects/ArMedia\\_2011\\_Presentation\\_English.pdf](http://www.crrcenters.org/store/downloads/projects/ArMedia_2011_Presentation_English.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2013)

Atkinson, Carol, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student  
Exchange Programs 1980–2006,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6 (2010), pp. 1–22

Averre, Derek. Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighborhood',  
*Europe-Asia Studies*, 61, No 10 (2009), pp. 1689-1713

Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton, “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical  
Framework,” *American Political Science Review* (September 1963), pp. 632–642

Barometer of Public Opinion in Moldova, Institute for public diplomacy. <http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=624> (accessed 31 January 2013)

Conley, Heather. A. and Gerber, Theodore, P. *Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An examination of Russian compatriot policy in Estonia*. A report of the CSIS Europe Program. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011)

Dahl, Robert, "Power," in *Power: A Reader*, by Mark Haugaard, (Manchester University Press, 2002)

Democracy index 2012. *Democracy at a standstill* (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012)

Eastern Partnership overview. Country profile: Armenia. <http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/armenia> (accessed 02 April 2013)

European Journalism Center, an overview of Russia's media landscape. [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/russia/](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/russia/) (accessed 18 March 2013)

Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, World Economic Forum, <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013/> (accessed 25 March 2013)

Agnia Grigas, *Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States*, Briefing Paper, (Chatham House, August 2012)

Guzzini, Stefano, "The concept of power: a constructivist analysis", in *Power in World Politics* ed. by Felix Berenskoetter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007)

Hakobyan, Julia. ArmeniaNow. End of "Compatriots"?: Government says Russian immigration program unacceptable for Armenia. *ArmeniaNow*, [http://armenianow.com/society/40234/russian\\_program\\_compatriots\\_concerns\\_armenia\\_labor\\_migration](http://armenianow.com/society/40234/russian_program_compatriots_concerns_armenia_labor_migration) (accessed 31 March 2013)

Haugaard, Mark, *Power: A Reader*, (Manchester University Press, 2002)

— *The Constitution of Power* (Manchester University Press, 1997)

Hill, Fiona, "Moscow Discovers Soft Power," *Current History*, 30, no. 2 (2006), pp. 341–34

Human Development Report 2013, *Explanatory note on 2013 HDR composite indices*, Russian Federation, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/RUS.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2013)

- Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, [http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR\\_RDI/RIR\\_RDI.aspx?id=453657&l=e](http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?id=453657&l=e) (accessed 31 March 2013).
- International Federations of the Phonographic Industry Digital Music Report 2013, [http://www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/publikationen/DMR2013\\_Germany\\_FIN\\_AL.pdf](http://www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/publikationen/DMR2013_Germany_FIN_AL.pdf) (accessed 20 March 2013)
- Jackson, Nicole J., “The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rule: a case study of Russia’s influence on Central Asian regimes”, *Contemporary Politics*, 16, no. 1, (March 2010), pp. 101–118
- Johnston, Andrew Michael, *Powerplays in a de facto State Russian hard and soft power in Abkhazia*, Master Thesis (The University of Texas at Austin, August 2011)
- Kaljurand, Riina, *Russian influence on Moldovan politics during the Putin era (2000-2008)*, Analysis (International Centre for Defence Studies, November 2008)
- Kelle, Udo & Laurie, Heather, “Computer Use in Qualitative Research and Issues of Validity” in *Computer-aided qualitative data analysis Theory, Method and Practice*, ed. by. Udo, Kelle, Gerald Prein and Katherine Bird (London: Sage Publication, 1995)
- Keohane, Robert O. and Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)
- Leonard, Mark and Popescu, Nicu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russian Relations*, ECFR Policy Paper (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007)
- Kozlov, Vladimir, Piracy still a hurdle, but online music has bright future, *The Moscownews*, <http://themoscownews.com/business/20130125/191174530.html> (accessed 20 March 2013)
- Krasnoboka, Natalya, Media Landscape- Russia, European Journalism Centre, [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/russia/](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/russia/) (accessed 19 March 2013)
- Kurt, Natasha “Russian foreign policy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society* ed. by Graeme Gill and James Young. (Routledge: London and New York, 2012)
- Li, Junjie, ZHU, Konglai & WANG, Xiang, “Study of Cultural Soft Power under the Construction of New Rural Areas”, *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 8, no. 1 (2012), pp. 52-55

- Lock, Edward, "Soft power and strategy: developing a 'strategic' concept of power" in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. by, Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (Routledge, 2010)
- Lukes, Steven, "Power and the Battle for the Heats and Minds: on the Bluntness of soft power," in *Power in World Politics*, ed. by Felix Berenskoetter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007)
- Lukyanov, Fyodor, Uncertain World: Why Russia's Soft Power Is Too Soft, 31.01.2013 *RiaNovosti* <http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20130131/179153876.html> (accessed 02 March 2013)
- McCann, James G., *The Global Go To Think Tanks Report 2011* (United Nations University Edition, 2012), <http://www.gotothinktank.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2011GlobalGoToThinkTanksReport-UNEditionWITHOUTLETTER.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2013)
- Matthews, Owen, "Softer Russian Power", *Newsweek Magazine*, 31 of May, 2008, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/05/31/softer-russian-power.html> (accessed 1 June 2012)
- McClory, Jonathan, *The New Persuaders* (Institute for Government, 2010)  
 —*The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power* (Institute for Government, 2011)
- Medvedev, Sergei and Jackson, Linda "Sovereignty or Interdependence?," in *At the Crossroads of Post-Communist Modernisation: Russia and China in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Christer Pursiainen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)
- Migration and Development. Armenia Country Study, ILO, 2009 (ILO Subregional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2009), [http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/migr\\_dev\\_study\\_en.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/migr_dev_study_en.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2013)
- Minister urges more Russian investments in Moldova's economy. *Allmoldova news*, <http://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/economics/1249054719.html> (accessed 25 March 2013)
- Moldova (Republic of), Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MDA.html> (accessed 24 March 2013)

National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Emigrants who leaves aboard for permanent or temporary resident on the territory of another state. <http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/database/EN/databasetree.asp> (accessed 31 March 2013)

- Labour force migration. Population aged 15 years and over, working or looking for work abroad by country of destination, level of education, age groups, level of education, sex and area. <http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/database/EN/databasetree.asp> (accessed 31 March 2013)
- External trade of the Republic of Moldova with CIS countries by countries and groups of products, 2001-2011. <http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/database/EN/databasetree.asp> (accessed 31 March 2013)

Nixey, James, *The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia*, Chatham House briefing paper June 2012 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2012)

Nye, Jr., Joseph S., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990)

- “Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age,” in *Re-Ordering the World: the Long-term Implications of September 11<sup>th</sup>*, ed. by Mark Leonard (Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) London, United Kingdom, 2002)
- „Notes for a soft-power research agenda,” in *Power in World Politics*, ed. by Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London and New York: Routledge, 2007)
- *Power in the global information age: from realism to globalization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004)
- “Public diplomacy and soft power,” *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, 616, no. 1 (2008), pp. 94-109
- *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (Public Affairs, 2004)
- “The Benefits of Soft Power,” *Compass: A Journal of Leadership*, 8, no. 2 (2004)
- *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011)

- *The Powers to Lead* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- “What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what\\_china\\_and\\_russia\\_dont\\_get\\_about\\_soft\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_dont_get_about_soft_power) (accessed 30 April 2013)

Nobel Prize winners, [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/lists/all/](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all/) (26 March 2013)

Official website of the president of Armenia. General Information about the Republic of Armenia. <http://www.president.am/en/general-information/> (accessed 5 May 2013)

Ottens, Nick, Putin Rallies Against Soft Power, Humanitarian Interventions. *Atlantic Sentinel*, <http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/03/putin-rallies-against-soft-power-humanitarian-interventions/> (accessed 20 October 2012)

Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, democratic government indicator, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=47&country=181&response=Democratic%20form%20of%20government> (accessed 29 March 2013)

— good democracy indicator, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=48&country=181&response=A%20good%20democracy> (accessed 29 March 2013)

— country confidence indicator, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=49&country=181&response=Confidence> (accessed 29 March 2013)

Pkhaladze, Tengiz (ed.), *Soft Power''- the new concept of the Russian Foreign Policy Towards Georgia (August 2008 Postwar Period)* (International Centre for Geopolitical Studies Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 2010)

Popescu, Nicu “Russia’s soft power ambitions”, *CEPS Policy brief*, no. 115 (October 2006)

Popescu, Nicu and Wilson, Andrew, *The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighborhood* (London: The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009)

President of Russia. Executive Order On Implementation of the State Programme to resettle compatriots living abroad to Russia, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4416> (accessed 31 March 2013)

Puddington, Arch, *Freedom in the world 2013: Democratic breakthroughs in the balance*, Freedom House,

[http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web\\_0.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web_0.pdf) (accessed 25 March 2013)

Putin congratulates Russia's Eurovision top winners, *Global Times*, May 28, 2012, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/711593/Putin-congratulates-Russias-Eurovision-top-winners.aspx> (accessed 3 June 2012)

Putin, Vladimir, Russia and the changing world, *Russia Today*, <http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/> (accessed 04 March 2013)

*Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index*, Ernst & Young in collaboration with The Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO (Ernst & Young's Emerging Markets center, 2012)

Rodkiewicz, Witold, *Russia's strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change?*, OSW Commentary, Issue 74 (Center for Eastern Studies, April 2012)

Rukavishnikov, Vladimir, "Russia's "Soft Power" in the Putin Epoch," in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. by Roger E. Kanet (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

Roberts, Sean, *Russia's pressure politics*, FIIA briefing paper, 118 (the Finnish institute of international affairs, December 2012)

Russian Profile, [http://russiaprofile.org/culture\\_living/38517.html](http://russiaprofile.org/culture_living/38517.html) (accessed 18 March 2013)

Russian Federal Statistics Service. Foreign students enrolment in public and municipal higher education institutions of the Russian Federation, [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-11.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-11.htm) (accessed 26 March 2013)

— Most popular public channel in Russia (2010), [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/10-05.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/10-05.htm) (accessed 18 March 2013); [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12\\_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/19-07.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/19-07.htm) (accessed 18 March 2013)

Russian Olympic Committee official website, <http://london2012.olympic.ru/scheduleandresults/awards/countries/> (accessed 24 March 2013)

"Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras." *Stratfor Analysis* 4 (2010)

Ruskiy Mir Foundation, Russian Centers,  
<http://www.ruskiymir.ru/ruskiymir/en/rucenter/catalogue.jsp?pager.offset=0&pageIndex=1&pageSize=15> (accessed 29 March 2013)

— Ruskiy Mir Cabinet,  
<http://www.ruskiymir.ru/ruskiymir/en/rucenter/kabinet.html> ((accessed 29 March 2013)

*Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence*, REP Seminar Summary 31 of March, (Chatham House, 2011),  
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109675> (accessed 12 April 2012)

Sun, Henry H., “International political marketing: a case study of United States soft power and public diplomacy,” *Journal of Public Affairs*, 8, no. 3 (2008), pp. 165–183  
Surkov, Vladislav, "Sovereignty is a political synonym for the ability to compete," speech to the Center for Partisan Study and Preparation of the Staff of Unified Russia, February 7, 2006, <http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=11114> (accessed 4 March 2012)

TANG, Daixing LI, Xiaoping & YANG, Xingyu, “Research on Soft Power and Its Discipline Orientation”, *International Business and Management*, 4, no. 1 (2012), pp. 18-27

The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation 2000,  
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm> (accessed 29 March 2013)

— The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12, 2008,  
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml> (accessed 15 December 2012)

— Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013, English unofficial translation,  
[http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument) (accessed 29 March 2013)

*Times Higher Education* World Reputation Rankings,  
<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013/reputation-ranking> (accessed 26 March 2013)

- World University Rankings in 2012-2013, <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking/region/europe> (accessed 26 March 2013)
- Tsyganov, Andrey P., “If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin’s Foreign Policy”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58, no. 7, (November 2006), pp. 1079 – 1099
- UNESCO World Heritage list, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list> (accessed 21 March 2013)
- Vuving, Alexander L., “How Soft Power Works” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, September 3 (2009)
- Weber, George, “The World’s Ten Most Influential Languages” *Language Monthly*, 3 (1997), pp. 12-18
- Wilson, Andrew and Popescu, Nicu, “Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 9, no. 3, (September 2009), pp. 317–331
- Wilson, Jeanne L., *Soft Power: A Comparison of Discourse and Practice in Russia and China* (August 22, 2012), [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2134457](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2134457) (accessed 30 April 2013)
- World Bank Worldwide governance indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> (accessed 25 March 2013)
- World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness Report (2012-2013), <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013/> (25 March 2013)
- World Tourism Organization, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, Compendium of Tourism Statistics and data, *Index Mundi*, <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/russia/international-tourism> (accessed 21 March 2013)
- Russian language based sources:
- Казанцев, А.А., и В.Н. Меркушев, Россия и постсоветское пространство: перспективы использования «мягкой силы». *Полис* 2 (2008), <http://www.mgimo.ru/publish/document34174.phtml> (accessed 30 April 2013)
- Межгосударственная программа инновационного сотрудничества государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств на период до 2020 года. <http://rs.gov.ru/taxonomy/term/185> (accessed 30 March 2013)

Народная дипломатия: эпоха инструментария «мягкой силы».  
<http://rs.gov.ru/node/33009> (accessed 30 March 2013)

На пространстве СНГ. *Россотрудничество*. <http://rs.gov.ru/taxonomy/term/17>  
(accessed 29 March 2013)

Россотрудничество, <http://rs.gov.ru/> (accessed 29 March 2013)

“Русская церковь объединяет свыше 150 млн. верующих в более чем 60 странах - митрополит Иларион,” ИНТЕРФАКС (2 марта 2011), <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=39729> (Accessed 04. April 2013).

Приход миссии: Россия нашла себе место в турбулентном мире: остров стабильности. Газета "Коммерсантъ", №237 (5022), 14.12.2012

Указ «О мерах по реализации внешнеполитического курса Российской Федерации» от 7 мая 2012 года No 605, р 48 [http://www.rsr-online.ru/doc/2012\\_06\\_25/6.pdf](http://www.rsr-online.ru/doc/2012_06_25/6.pdf) (accessed 04 March 2013)

С позиции "мягкой силы" Газета "Коммерсантъ", №6 (5037), 16.01.2013  
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2105575> (accessed 25 March 2013)

## **Appendix 1**

Interview question set:

**Introductory question: How would you define Russia's soft power?**

### **1 SOFT POWER: CULTURE**

- 1.1. Do you think that culture plays an important role in Russia's image in the given country? Why?
- 1.2. In your opinion and perspective, how would you evaluate Russia's cultural output<sup>341</sup> in the given country?
- 1.3. In your view, is Soviet time cultural nostalgia having an impact in the given country in formulating people views and opinion of Russia? Why?
- 1.4. Are Russia's cultural icons (singers, writers, actors etc) popular in the given country? Can you name them?
- 1.5. How popular is Russia's culture (high and popular culture) in the given country?
- 1.6. Which commercial brands, in your opinion, have an impact in the given country and are closely related to Russia? Are they considered to have positive or negative connotations? Why?
- 1.7. In your view, is Russia's media outlet having a significant impact on forming people opinion of Russia? (In negative and positive way)
- 1.8. How would you explicate Russia's image in its near abroad<sup>342</sup> and the countries in question?
- 1.9. What kind of positions does the Russian language possesses in the given country in terms of its overall image? Why?
- 1.10. Do you consider Russia's image in the country more positive or more negative in terms of culture? Why?

---

<sup>341</sup> i.e. cultural export of Russia's cultural trade and cultural activity, TV, media and network communications, movies, books, high and popular culture export, music and artists exposure in the given country.

<sup>342</sup> Refers to post-Soviet states in the Russian political discourse after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. President Vladimir Putin has also called the region Russia's "sphere of influence" that is strategically important to Russia especially in terms of foreign policy and value promotion

## Appendix 1 (continued)

### 2 SOFT POWER: VALUES

- 2.1. How well do you consider the countries are connected in terms of shared values? Which do you consider to be shared values?
- 2.2. Do you see Russia's leadership as something that the given country looks up to or dismisses? What about government action?
- 2.3. Do you consider the perception of Russia as an alternative to western type democracy a commonly used discourse in the political language of the given country? Why
- 2.4. Are the concepts of Russia's political discourse like sovereign democracy, sphere of influence, protection of compatriots abroad being used in the given countries political discourse? If so, in what context
- 2.5. Are Russia's values perceived as legitimate, having an influence and building common ground in the country? Why?
- 2.6. How attractive is Russia compared to the EU in the given country? Why?
- 2.7. How popular is the mobility of students between Russia and the given country?
- 2.8. How interconnected are the two countries in terms of doing business i.e. is doing business in or with Russia more common and acknowledged than with the EU countries? How comfortable do companies feel doing business in Russia?
- 2.9. Is Russian language predominant language in doing business<sup>343</sup>?
- 2.10 Do you consider Russia's image in the country more positive or more negative in terms of its value promotion? Why?

---

<sup>343</sup> According to literature, Russian language is the predominant language of doing business in the region

**Appendix 1 (continued)**

**3 SOFT POWER: FOREIGN POLICY**

- 3.1. Are Russian sponsored NGO's visible in the given country i.e. are they actively initiating projects that engage people in their activity
- 3.2. How does the frozen conflict (Transnistria or Nagorno-Karabakh) affect the relations between Russia and the given country?
- 3.3. How trustful do you see the relationship between the two countries?
- 3.4. What are the most significant events in your view, starting from 2000-2012, between Russia and the given country that have had a crucial impact on the interaction between the two countries
- 3.5. What do you consider to be Russia's foreign policy objectives in the given country?
- 3.6. How is Russia's military presents seen in the given country? Why?
- 3.7. In your opinion, how much political decision-making is influenced by Russia (leadership) in the given country? Please explicate
- 3.8. Do you feel that the given country would benefit from closer relations with Russia? Why?
- 3.9. How would you describe Russia's foreign policy towards the given country?
- 3.10. Do you consider Russia's image in the country more positive or more negative in terms of foreign policy? Why?

**Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public**

I, Kristina Liik (48806024217)

1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to:
  - 1.1. reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making available to the public, including for addition to the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the copyright, and
  - 1.2. make available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the copyright,

“Russia’s Soft Power: the Case of Moldova and Armenia” supervised by Kristian L. Nielsen and Margit Säre

2. I am aware of the fact that the author retains these rights.
3. I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the intellectual property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection Act.

Tartu/ 16.05.2013

---

*(signature)*