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A COGNITIVE SEMIOTIC READING OF THE MODEL OF HOMO SEMIOTICUS

Master's Thesis

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I hereby declare that I have written the Master Thesis myself, independently. All of the other authors' texts, main viewpoints and data from other resources have been referred to.

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Introduction

The present work aims to argue that the findings from the analysis of Mehmet Rifat's 1993 work *Homo Semioticus* can be read as a cognitive study model. The theory presented in the book *Homo Semioticus* is in essence the expansion of Narrative Schema by A. J. Greimas (1983). We demonstrate how Rifat's theory is related to narrative analysis and the narrative schema, but also how it takes the discussion further on how to study the individual, named *homo semioticus*, as it carries out a semiotic analysis.

The discussion starts from the relation between meaning and cognition, on how we describe cognition based on meaning. Our model of cognition under study is closely related to Rifat's formulation of a reading act which is a semiotic analysis that makes systematic acquisition of meaning possible. To outline the general field of this work and to integrate the findings to a more concrete basis, we discuss certain approaches towards human meaning-making, cognitive semiotics and cognitive sciences, narratives as models, origins of narrative analysis and why it can be studied as a cognitive study model. In this chapter we come across some subtle differences between the fields of cognitive semiotics, cognitive sciences, linguistics, the traditions in semiotics, and so on. These subtle differences are secondary findings that come about in our research; however, providing a conclusive formalization from their differences was not attempted, since being able to observe these differences help us visualize where our input can be utilized.

In the second chapter, the discussion starts with introducing Mehmet Rifat and his philosophical concerns on how meaning can be studied, what his motives are for his theory as well as our own starting point for examining the problem of the study of meaning. Here we also first come across the notion of *homo semioticus* and give preliminary remarks on the model of it. The theoretical model presented in *Homo Semioticus* is deconstructed systematically in the next, i.e. third chapter, to create a clear visualization of the theory. This is done because the work of Rifat is written in a prose style which without a systematic reading might have unobserved insights. This theory follows a person who is conducting an analysis of any given text. His theory separates between *narration domain* (*essence of narration – style of narration*) and *content domain* (*essence of content – style of content*). According to Rifat's work, analysis starts from the *style of content* which constitutes *descriptive*, *methodological* and *axiomatic* levels. This analysis follows three methodologies; *discursive level analysis* where *deconstruction*, *denotation* and *dichotomy of themes* are present, *narrative level analysis* where *locating of utterances* (*basic, situation, performative*), transformative object and narrative program (*manipulation, competence, performance, sanction*) of A.J Greimas (1983) are present, and the *basic structure* (*logical – semantic*) *level analysis* where Rifat again utilizes Greimas' semiotic square. His theory also proposes if analysis is conducted from *discursive level* to *basic structure* (*logical – semantic*) *level*, it helps reveal the *meaning analysis process*, if it is conducted from *basic structure* (*logical – semantic*) *level* to *discursive level*, it helps reveal the *meaning creation process*.

The further step in Rifat's theory, as we mentioned, happens in the signification/cognition objects where the observation of the analysis takes place. He utilizes the process of *translation* as the creation of metatext, *encyclopaedic knowledge* as the sum of the analyst's knowledge, and five classifications of the mental disposition of the analyst, which we named the *cognitive aspects*. By analysing his theory we arrive at the conclusion that his theory, even thought it was intended as a theory of literary analysis, has a cognitive dimension.

In the fifth chapter we discuss how Rifat's theory can be read as a cognitive model. The roots of this theory and Rifat's own tendencies are compared, in order to arrive at the conclusion that cognitive semiotics should utilize every suitable model, and that in this case the model presented is eminently suitable for creating more developed and complete models for studying cognition.

The research questions of our thesis are:

- What are the relations between different approaches towards cognition?
- Can Rifat's theory of *homo semioticus* be read with its cognitive aspects?
- How does the theory of *homo semioticus* differ from Greimasian Narrative Schema (or narrative analysis in general)?
- Can cognitive study models be used as meaning study models?
- How does the findings that come about with the analysis of *homo semioticus* fit in cognitive semiotics?

These questions were not always dominantly present; however, they were always in the background, resonating with each analysis and discussion in the thesis. Answering these questions were conducted with the following method:

- Describing the approaches towards cognition, relating these approaches together, in order to demonstrate the possible continuation between these understandings.
- Dissecting Rifat's theory and systematically reconstructing it, in hopes of creating a clearer direction for this theory, finding the slight nuances that might go unnoticed in a casual reading.
- Expanding the notions that are used in Rifat's theory and finding their differences with its Greimasian counterparts, articulating and stressing both similarities and differences.
- Highlighting the cognitive aspects and arguing that even though these aspects were not meant to be cognitive in the first place, but rather aimed to provide a model for literary analysis, they offer great insights on the study of cognition as well.

By these answers, as per the last method, the attempt at highlighting the cognitive aspects of Rifat's theory is accomplished.

1. Approaches towards cognition

Let us start our discussion from the relation between meaning and cognition. To demonstrate our stance in a simple way, we can say that meaning is what is acquired through systematic reading (this reading is discussed later in the thesis, see *reading act,* p.28). Building on this, cognition is the act of meaning acquisition. We will later give a broader explanation of our understanding and direction of cognition (see chapter: *3.3.* p.34 *and 5.* p.47). We are mostly articulating the idea that a definition for meaning in its entirety cannot be given, however, we can create and study the models for cognition, which will in turn help us come to clearer terms regarding meaning.

Definition for meaning have been provided, by Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, in their work *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923). In this work, Ogden and Richards classify and dissect the main approaches towards meaning under three groups and 16 subchapters. This classification is done by discussing the context of each field that uses the word meaning. However, as Marcel Danesi also notes "As the literary critics C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards showed in their masterful 1923 work *The Meaning of Meaning*, there are at least twenty-three definitions of the word *meaning* in English, which of course adds to the confusion." (Danesi 2007: 12). This attempt to tackle the definition of the word meaning through its linguistic value and correspondence (Prior 1969) offers great insights and subtly hints to a direction for cognitive semiotics. But we should keep in mind that this approach does not provide us with a clear and certain model.

It can be argued that this work was created under the dominating influence of the linguistic turn, but then we must also remember that at the given time there are different spheres of thought. To follow the progression of the approaches towards cognition, we will discuss the structuralist thinker Levi-Strauss, who studied the problem of meaning and human meaning-making. From there we will turn to Göran Sonesson to see whether there are overlapping approaches in cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics. After that, we will examine Marcel Danesi's criticism of the computationist approach towards cognition, which outlines the differences between cognitive semiotics and cognitive sciences. Then, we will turn to Thomas Daddesio, who conceptualized the field of cognitive semiotics, keeping in mind that there have been earlier studies on cognition in semiotics and related fields. Daddesio tries to demonstrate his cognitive theory on the development of symbolic communication in children and he frequently discusses the functionality of sign (Daddesio 1995: 2). Lastly, on a related note to Daddesio, we explore Lev Vygotsky's understanding and the way he studies sign, cognition and models.

If we are to compare, employ, discuss and critique the approaches of structuralists, academics who lean on the side of (or offer to employ) cognitive sciences in cognitive semiotics, rather than 'pure' semiotic understanding in (meaning-making) cognitive processes, and/or the supporters of a cognitivist adoption/adaptation in semiotics (who base their ideas on a strong footing in humanities) – we are obliged to turn to the influential figures who worked in their respective fields with differentiating approaches. By employing and discussing the works of academics who studied under the structuralist methods (linguistic turn/understanding), we are trying to offer the necessary historicity for our theory (thesis) and how the turn of cognitivism (from structuralist – linguistic understanding) is becoming more relevant than before. When trying to discuss the boundaries of our study, it should be considered that we are trying to form a holistic view on cognition by considering these authors. There, the borders of our discussion can be rather found on a spectrum where particular points of interest or excursions into different fields are marked by the following authors and their works. In this sense, to map out the extent of our discussion we can use these authors as pointers to which fields are of interest for this study, namely, Claude Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Göran Sonesson in cognitive semiotics, Marcel Danesi on cognitivism, Thomas C. Daddesio in articulating the name of cognitive semiotics as a field, Lev S. Vygotsky in sign as a functional device and so on. Scientific theories are built on top of each other rather than demolishing their older counterparts (even though shifts in the Kuhnian sense do

occur in scientific theories, there are no indications that cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics are in a state of *crisis* in the Kuhnian sense – there is currently no stalemate in the progression of ideas and approaches), and here we aim to utilize the relevant understandings of these older works. Rather than trying to tackle the aspects that are central to our thesis with a completely innovative approach, we will try to build upon and transform the already existing understandings. By grounding our work on them, we aim to keep the continuity of older paradigms and hope to offer new horizons for cognitive understanding (in cognitive semiotics).

Considering the approach mentioned above, before moving on and exploring the ideas of Rifat and the notion of homo semioticus, it is important (and in part facilitating) to first take a look at some of the authors and their respective ideas that are relevant for the thesis and what will be used as directions to build further ideas upon. Let us carry on with the authors we will discuss.

1.1. Claude Levi-Strauss

The reason for Levi-Strauss to be taken into discussion is that, his works were aimed towards the definitions and explanations of human understanding through a fascination with structural linguistics, his studies of narratives, and his influence at its time and his works' historical effect. He states:

> The advent of structural linguistics completely changed this situation [methodological disparities]. Not only did it renew linguistic perspectives; a transformation of this magnitude is not limited to a single discipline. Structural linguistics will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for physical sciences' (Levi-Strauss 1963: 33)

This methodological leaning towards structuralism showed itself even before he admits this fascination, for we can see it in the binary oppositions Levi-Strauss proposes when studying cultural formations (see Levi-Strauss,1969). We will try to focus on Levi-Strauss' *two minds* (see Shore's quote below) by emphasizing the continuity in his works with insights offered by the cultural anthropologist Bradd Shore. In his anthology of anthropological works[1], Shore states that

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[1] The theory of psychic unity; a postulate first offered by Adolph Bastian, that regardless of race and culture, human beings share the same cognitive structure for meaning making. Shore says, 'It is easy enough to defend a simplistic notion of psychic unity by emphasizing the common design features of the human nervous system' (Shore 1996:16).

"Levi-Strauss's influential work *The Savage Mind* is a complex argument, part science, part poetry, for psychic unity defined in terms of a human desire for order through systematic classification" (Shore, 1996: 29). This 'human desire for order through systematic classification' should be emphasized and kept in mind as it will play an important role when covering the notion of *homo semioticus* (keeping in mind *Homo Semioticus* is a desire of such sorts).

Levi-Strauss' approach is anthropological and offers a systematization of human understanding. His distinction between two forms of rationality (primitive and modern) conceptualizes his approach towards the human mind. Levi-Strauss says:

> To say that a way of thinking is disinterested and that it is an intellectual way of thinking does not mean that it is equal to scientific thinking […] It remains different because its aim is to reach by the shortest possible means a general understanding of the universe and not only a general but total understanding. (Levi-Strauss 1978: 17)

This quotation clearly relates to his concept of the modern mind, and following this, Shore articulates Levi-Strauss' dilemma:

> Levi-Strauss is quite literally, of two "minds". In one frame of mind, both reductive and materialistic, Levi-Strauss seems to equate mind with its organism substrate in the brain or nervous system. In another frame of mind, Levi-Strauss goes so far as to claim that even mental capacities can be understood as distinct under different historical and cultural conditions. In this view, Levi-Strauss adopts and implicit conception of mind as an emergent property of the interaction of brain and organized experience. This is a radically different position from the materialistic conception of mind that underlies Levi-Strauss's understanding of psychic unity (Shore, 1996: 31)

In the light of this quotation, it can be argued that Levi-Strauss had two different models for human the mind, that are also separated into two. By observation, Levi-Strauss worked towards arriving at a clearer conceptualization of the human mind; however, there are inconsistencies in his formalization. We will take a look at this from the viewpoint of cognitive processes being studied under the scope of cognitive sciences. Levi-Strauss' dichotomy of *two minds* does not stem from precision, but rather from the impreciseness of examining the mental/cognitive capacity of humankind through empirical methods. Empirical research creates fluctuating results when it comes to defining *how* cognition works in social groups, and the theoretical background used cannot, in its entirety, produce meaningful results to create a model of understanding. In retrospect, it can be argued that empirical research falls short at combining its findings under a theoretical model (for the inconsistency of hypotheses, see Quine 1951). The creation of universal structures

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Shore also brings forward the criticisms towards this, however, there will be no attempt in this thesis to delve on those matters.

of cognition through empirical research, although ambitious and possibly tremendously useful, can cause inefficiencies.

Our argument here is that, extensive reliance on the empirical methods (or the observation thereof) to create models of human mind is quite differentiated from the methods of cognitive semiotics. We will try to highlight how certain cognitive semiotic methods and models operate, with the help of following authors.

1.2.Göran Sonesson

While we try to approach the problem of meaning inspected under cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics, their different approaches must be kept in mind before trying to formulate our own, since, their inner workings are *inherently* not parallel. "Cognitive science puts the emphasis on the place of the appearance of this world, the mental domain, and its characteristic operation, cognition; and semiotics insists on the transformations that the physical world suffers by being endowed with meaning." (Sonesson 2006: 136). Sonesson's quote gives us the necessary note of precaution when we are to approach a discussion with both cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics. We can relate this to the 'rhetorical questions' that we ask in the following chapter (Can the world exist for itself, by itself? Can the world exist in meaning without man-made designs?). Cognitive science in its own domain creates various discussions on how to create a system of models that aims to analyse and offer descriptions towards meaning, and this transdisciplinary approach on an empirical basis but offers fragmented insights when it comes to providing a unitary solution. This is due to the transdicsiplinary nature of cognitive sciences and as noted by Jordan Zlatev their methodology and concerns are different (see below, p.49-50).

The problem that arises when trying to further a discussion under the scope of both these domains, is classified neatly by Sonesson, as the topics cognitive science adopts and uses (even criticizes at some points) can be considered 'problematic'. Sonesson suggests the following discussion:

> The distinction between cognitive science and semiotics involves much more than the concepts of representation and sign […] much of the recent cognitive science has taken the form of a rejection of the very

notion of representation, just as some traditions in semiotics, from Eco to Greimas, early on rejected the notion of sign. (Sonesson, 2006: 139)

Here, he states that the use of the notion representation in cognitive sciences rather flimsily corresponds to sign in cognitive semiotics. In the continuation of this discussion, he emphasizes one of the major issues in semiotics, namely that "In both cases, as we shall see, the problem is how one can reject a notion which is not even defined, but simply taken for granted." (Sonesson *ibid*.)

If these approaches have clear distinctions, we should now look at the other side of the coin. In order to explain the cognitivist understanding in semiotics, we will use the ideas of Marcel Danesi, and will try to find the roots (or influences) of the cognitive turn in his works. Even though the cognitive turn cannot be entirely attributed to Danesi, his articulation of certain aspects of it have undeniably proven useful.

1.3. Marcel Danesi

When considering Marcel Danesi's ideas and their relevance to this thesis, it should be noted that the main focus will be shifted to the cognitive turn. In psychology, the turn from behaviourism to cognitivism came into being around the 1960's (Danesi 1995:28). From the points of view of Konrad Lorenz (1952), William Homan Thorpe (1961), and Nikolaas Tinbergen (1963), this turn focuses on animal behaviour and how it can be related to human understanding, creating a baseline of methods. Danesi traces it back to John Broadus Watson (e.g. 1929) and developments of Burrhus Frederic Skinner (e.g. 1938) such as the stimulus response theory. Following all this, stimulus-response theory might have paved the way toward a computationist view on how to approach cognition, since it dealt with simple motor and glandular processes (Danesi 1995: 28). The stimulus-response approach also earned criticism from Danesi;

The new impetus and momentum that this fallacy has gained has rekindled the mind-body problem: Is cognition a derivative of individual experience? Or is it inherent in innate mental structures independently of bodily processes and individual feelings? I share Gardner's enthusiasm for the potential that an integrated approach has for exploring the mind. But I am presently skeptical that any meaningful progress can be made within this scientific paradigm, given the computationist orientation it has taken. As Gardner (1985:6) himself has put it, the guiding assumption of mainstream cognitive science is that there exists ''a level of analysis wholly separate from the biological or neurological, on the one hand, and the sociological or cultural, on the

other'', and that ''central to any understanding of the human mind is the electronic computer''. (Danesi,1995:29)

Here however we should keep in mind that, the computationist turn itself, does not necessarily mean depicting human cognition as computational in tself, but rather, computational models that are useful for describing human cognitive processes. When crafting models of human cognitive processes, a possible side effect may emerge, namely, that the computational models are the most applicable ones when trying to create descriptions.

Danesi notes his skepticism of the input-output model of understanding, and we can also see this skepticism in Susan Petrilli's critique of cognitive semiotics (Petrilli, 1993) where she mentions the:

> […] ironical overtones of the 'postal package theory'. With this expression, Rossi-Landi underlines the inadequacy of approaches which describe communication in terms of message which, similarly to a package, are sent off from one post-office and received by another. In other words, Rossi-Landi criticizes the analysis of communication in terms of pieces of neatly formulated and univocally identifiable communicative intentionality. (Petrilli 1993:241)

Through the criticism of the Italian philosopher and semiotician Ferrucio Rossi-Landi', Petrilli provides an insight on how *not to* study aspects of communication (an approach where cognition is entirely overlooked). We can relate the notions of input-output, sender-receiver, stimulus-response to one another and note where they are used as exhaustive frameworks. By doing so, Danesi's criticism, a dismissal of computational processes when trying to understand complex mechanisms, such as cognition and meaning-making falls into place.

1.4.Thomas C. Daddesio

When discussing the historical accounts on how to *understand human understanding*, an attempt at crossing the rift between cognitive sciences and semiotics has been made by Thomas C. Daddesio in his 1994 work *On Minds and Symbols The Relevance of Cognitive Science for Semiotics*. Daddesio argues against the traditional semiotic understanding when it comes to meaning-making. Even though there are on going processes in semiotics to create a better theory of signs and human understanding, Daddesio suggests that methods from cognitive science and

cognitive understanding should have been more prevalent in semiotics. He openly criticizes the *pure semiotic* position, which he describes as follows:

> I will be arguing that the majority of contemporary theorizing in semiotics rests on the assumption that it is possible and necessary to construct a theory of signs without consideration of the neurological and psychological processes that mediate semiosis. This position is rarely explicitly formulated or justified by semioticians. It is apparently viewed as so central to the semiotic enterprise that there is no need to explore its foundations and implications, as if rejection of this principle would compel one to cease doing semiotics. At the heart of this conception is the distinction between structural relations that hold between the different elements that make up a sign, i.e., sign, object and interpretant, and the faculties that sign users must possess in order to encode and decode specific signs. The former properties are deemed to be unique to signs and are therefore though to form the proper object of study of semiotics, while the latter are considered nonsemiotic and, consequently, are relegated to other disciplines. As a result of this distinction, semiotic theorizing focuses largely on the internal structure of signs and excludes from its scope the processes that mediate semiosis. Since this conception of semiotics suggests that an adequate theory of signs should be cleansed of all nonsemiotic impurities, I will refer to this conception by the term "pure semiotics". (Daddesio, 1994: 19)

Thus we can conclude that, according to Daddesio, by putting its object of study 'the sign' at the core of its undertaking, semiotics results in a dismissive approach when it comes to employing any semiotic framework towards cognition. Semiotics operating on the peripheries of its own field (i.e., biosemiotics, sociosemiotics, zoosemiotics, phytosemiotics and so on.) and not being able to adopt a one 'universally accepted' core when it comes to the most elementary aspects of the study field (such as the *sign*) also creates a dispersed understanding. We can trace this back to the initial conceptualization of the field, in Saussurean and Peircean definitions of the sign, with these definitions creating a basis for contemporary semiotics, even though they (triadic relation and Saussurean structuralist understanding) themselves are not inherently parallel. However, this problem has been exhaustively discussed (even though there seems to be no unitary synthesis yet) and we cannot aspire to offer a solution of our own, considering that the current thesis, in fact, also operates on the periphery. Turning back now to the dismissal of other complimentary factors, i.e., neurological (and/or social, cultural) aspects: this may result in a breakdown of communication (Daddesio 1994:16). In his work, Daddesio puts forward the similarities in understandings of both semiotics and cognitive sciences, and he also employs much of John Deely's work when trying to create the synthesis which he called *cognitive semiotics*. (Even though he uses the notion clearly and creates a distinctive direction, cognitive approach in semiotics has also been used beforehand.)

> As such, cognition not only can be considered from a semiotic point of view but must be so considered if we are to arrive at an adequate understanding of what is proper to it, insomuch as it is equivalent to a process of communication by signs, or semiosis. (Deely 1982:94, cited in Daddesio 1994:41)

From Daddesio's position, there appears a legitimate criticism; his critique towards the 'uncertainty' of sign is valid and proves useful, however, semiotics as a field does not exclude any input from other fields when it comes to creation of mediation of semiotic processes. As examples we can mention the entire fields of biosemiotics, cybersemiotics, zoosemiotics and so on.

1.5. Lev Semonovich Vygotsky

When comparing these systematizations of cognitive processes, we can arrive at the distinction between the approaches towards 'sign'. Sign existing in absentia as opposed to sign being a functional device is discussed thoroughly by Lev S. Vygotsky (on the distinction of sign and tool):

> The invention and use of signs as auxiliary means of solving a given psychological problem (to remember, compare something, report, choose and so on) is analogous to the invention and use of tools in one psychological respect. The sign acts as an instrument of psychological activity in a manner analogous to the role of tool in labor. But this analogy, like any other, does not imply the identity of these similar concepts. We should not expect to find *many* similarities with tools in those means of adaptation we call signs. (Vygotsky, 1978: 52)

Vygotsky argues that the figurative meaning of 'sign' or 'tool' does not offer meaningful directions and equating tool with sign in their literal meaning diminishes the fundamental distinction between them, reducing the distinctive characteristics of both (Vygotsky, 1978: 53).

This analogy between sign and tool comes to be as a means of mediation according to Vygotsky, it can be argued that it is aimed towards an empirical convenience, to classify the conditions in a child's cultural (cognitive) development (Vygotsky 1978: 54). These conditions are; "[the] first pertains to the analogy and common points of the two types of activity, the second clarifies their basic differences, and the third attempts to demonstrate the real psychological link existing between one and the other, or at least to hint at its existence." (*ibid.*). What does this mediation provide for us? The mediation and the basis of this analysis leads up to a very key point in cognitive processes. Conceptualising the sign as a tool, relying on its pragmatic function creates an adaptation which can be used to place the sign in an empirical framework.

> I shall not define further the relation of these jointly subsumed concepts to each other, or their relation to the more generic concept of mediated activity. I should only like to note that neither can, under any circumstance, be considered isomorphic with respect to the functions they perform, nor can they be seen as *fully* exhausting the

concept of mediated activity. *A host of other mediated activities might be named; cognitive activity is not limited to the use of tools or signs.* (Vygotsky, 54-55 emphasis added)

From this quote we can argue that cognitive processes cannot be reduced to a pragmatic dimension, they are complex and diverse, the use of signs itself cannot be reduced to its functional aspect (the computationist explanations also deal with the value of functionality). In order to integrate methods of cognitive sciences (and/or in this case *computational models*) onto the plane of signs, semiosis and semiotics, we must preserve the understanding of a multi-layered sign action.

If we are to approach cognition and the way in which cognitive processes operate, it is (from our position) vital to have stronger roots in the humanities. Our modelling efforts must adhere strictly to the field of humanities, to be able to come to a synthesis with the empirical field. This strong belief that we should base our work strictly on the humanities, is not just for the sake of the field we are working in, but it is rather based on the understanding that if and when we try to connect the dots in lines of thinking, such as we have tried to depict here, the main aim of cognition was brought back into the studies and to the core of interests by approaches that rely on the humanities (see p.49). The attempt to observe complex phenomena only through the approach of *what you see is what it is* not only fails to create desirable models, it creates a (possibly non-existent) monopoly on ideas and also influences, treating the field of humanities as non-science, and deductive and introspective methods as deceptive.

1.6.Algirdas Julius Greimas

Now, we will try to set the context for our own understanding, so that at this point we will introduce the notion of narrative. In order to do so, we shall first turn to Algirdas Julius Greimas, who Rifat was influenced by when shaping his own theory and then supplement our stance with input from Peer F. Bundgaard's work.

In order to demonstrate the relevance of Greimas' thought to our own thesis, it is important to take note of *Structural Semantics,* where Greimas outlines the boundaries of a theory of semantics which will help locate the formation of meaning structures in sign systems (Greimas, 1983). To be

able to articulate these relations, Greimas proposed as a method *the narrative schema* (see 3.2.2. Narrative Schema, p.32). We will discuss this theory in depth further on. What we propose here is that, the examination of narrative structures and semantic structures is an examination of meaning in its widest sense. As such, these examinations can be adapted (expanded) for the study of cognition. This belief that the narrative schema is a cognitive model is also articulated by Peer F. Bundgaard. He states:

> […] if we return to our question concerning the origin and cognitive import of the narrative schema, we may justify our claim that the narrative structure in its primitive form is a deeply entrenched cognitive schema, since *recognizing movements as intentional is tantamount to recognizing basic narrative programs*, that is to say, such programs that plain narratives are made of. (Bundgaard 2007: 253)

The second part of the quotation refers to the study done by Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel in 1944, where subjects were asked to make sense of geometric shapes (see Heider,F; Simmel, J. M. 1944, as cited in Bundgaard 2007: 251). Bundgaard proposes that, subjects create narratives to make sense of the "quite poor prompts" (*ibid*, 252) because creating narratives are a basic feature of everyday cognition (*ibid*, 253).

In this chapter, we have taken a look at the approaches towards cognition and how cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics differ from each other. The subchapters about Levi-Strauss as well as those about Greimas and Bundgaard also hinted at the notion of narratives. At this point, we will turn to Mehmet Rifat and his work *Homo Semioticus*. The theory contained in this work is an expansion of narrative analysis and roots itself in the Greimasian semiotics.

We introduce who Rifat is and have a slightly philosophical monologue on meaning because it is necessary to emphasize the importance of studying meaning and cognitive semiotics. After that, we will dissect and explain Rifat's theory.

2. Why Mehmet Rifat?

Mehmet Rifat Güzelşen (b.1949) is a Turkish semiotician, whose interests include the fields of semiology, critical theory, literary criticism, French literature, linguistics and translation theory. A prolific writer with 27 original works between 1976-2009, and also 17 translations of key semiotic works from Plato to Propp to Barthes, Ricoeur and Todorov. His theory and thought makes him one of the two pioneers for Turkish semiotics (the other being Tahsin Yücel, 1933-2016). Being a scholar of the French school of semiotics shapes most of his interests and ideas, however, his theory has a wide reach from structuralism, post-structuralism, semiology, semiotics and with his latest works, cognitive semiotics. At first glance, his works read as prose, however, after careful study and analysis, the systematic nature of his thoughts is revealed.

Our interest in his theory and work comes to life at this point, as the work *Homo Semioticus* is a very resourceful model that expands on its previous counterparts such as narrative schema by A. J. Greimas and J. Courtés (1982). The theory put forward in this work is narrated in a unique way – the book itself exemplifies the theory explained. Although not very ample in size, *Homo Semioticus*[2] can be systematically deconstructed and analysed, only to reconstruct it in order to bring forth new aspects of the theory that might elude the reader at first glance, and to explicate valuable points that requires a careful reading. Rifat is an academic that operated and formulated his ideas under the tutelage (and with the influence) of well-known structuralist (linguistic turn based) authors such as Roland Barthes and Algirdas Julius Greimas. We can see these influences in Rifat's use of Greimas' square[3] within his basic structure (logical-semantic structure) analysis

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[2] The book title is in capitals *Homo Semioticus*, and the concept itself will be in lower case: *homo semioticus*.
[3] First presented by A.J. Greimas in *Semantique Structurale* (1966), a semiotic square is an attempt of modelling the relations between contradiction and implication. Rifat uses this as; 'to depict both the relation types and their logical relations' (Rifat 2007:44)

(where he offers definitions for *homo semioticus'* processes of cognition/analysis) and the notion of 'joy' (in the most Barthesian sense) when it comes to the aims of a given *homo semioticus*.

2.1. **Why *Homo Semioticus*?**

The meaning processes that surround humankind and the relations that create meaning, although comprehensible and/or perceptible, are not always explicit, easy to analyse, effortlessly observable and agreed upon without debate. Meaning creation relations/processes are complex enough for them to be analysed further in their own merit. Meaning does not only constitute what a speaking, writing, living person said, wrote, or how they behaved and the reactions they got in return. In other words, what one hears and sees are not the only factors of what creates meaning. There are spheres of influences in thought/meaning that should be taken into account. Meaning is also over, under and around of what is explicitly put forward. Culture, way of living, ideology, physiological conditions etc., are some of these influential factors that hold a paramount importance over how meaning comes to be and what meaning is.

Therefore, each human being simultaneously has both a subjective and a collective experience, in a way that will lead them further from surface, solid notions to arrive at a deeper, a more exact grasp per se. This more exact grasp/understanding of notions is not at all reaching for the unmodified, untouched, unbiased *pure notion*. It is about clarifying the forces behind the notion; about being able to see the influences and systems that result in a notion, in order to fully grasp the notion in its entirety. The path of meaning is not linear, it is a branching set of relations that expands to all directions and dimensions, a visualization would be a fabric that stretches on all sides towards the universe of meaning, and this expansion should be analysed further.

In this light, there are questions (which can be seen as borderline rhetorical questions) that should be asked to conceptualize this expansion: What is the thing that carries and conveys meaning in a sign system? Is it the level or mode of signification? Or else, specifically that system itself? Does a sign system, a meaningful whole, carry meaning because it reflects the *truth* or does

it do so because it reconstructs, rearranges and creates the meaning of truth? For instance, does natural language, which for humans makes it possible to communicate, carry meaning because it signifies something that is not a part of the natural language system, or is natural language precisely what creates the meaning in itself? This can be discussed in Saussurean terms, namely in *langue, parole;* however, the main point of interest is rather distant from these distinctions.

The aim is to ask 'can the world exist for itself, by itself? Again, can the world exist in meaning without man-made designs?' Marcel Danesi proposes that "The raison d'étre of semiotics is, arguably, to investigate whether reality can exist independently of the signs that human beings create to represent and think about it." (Danesi, 2007: 163). Does the meaningful whole that is analysed by semiotics revolve around the subject or the observer—*the* human?

This analysis is also regulated by certain approaches. First, the structure of the system at hand must be perceived, then, a deconstruction of various elements takes place from that, and later their relevancy to the so-called 'raison d'étre' is investigated. As a starting point, the structure of a system has to be understood, since the meaning that is created will be a part of the same system and it will therefore reflect the mechanics of the given system. This deconstruction of notions creates the possibility for more than a superficial understanding. What we mean by deconstruction of certain elements can be illustrated by the following: any given notion comes into existence with its historical background, its ideological understandings, its relationship with what it refers to(correspondence), its aim. These elements must be discretely analysed, in order to 'place' the notion both within its intention and nature. Intention must be clear for an analysis, as it provides the necessary context, and so does the nature. When these are carried out, a notion, a sign can be observed with their values in the sign system they come from, and they can be visualized, bare of their complementary aspects, to be seen as a fundamental part of their own disposition, core of the unit that comes together to become a sign. This methodology reflects Rifat's notions and influences, since he was a student of Roland Barthes and Algirdas Julien Greimas, the structuralist and post-structuralist undertones in his writing shine through.

Rifat places this deconstruction and locating the relevancy of one notion to its surroundings as the 'classification' that humans make when trying to understand and create meaning (1993:17). Notions are investigated depending on how they are placed in a certain given sphere of meanings and other notions. This is to say in really simple terms that *a thing can only be classified with what*

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it is not, how it relates to its surrounding sphere of influences and meanings, how it locates itself in the general sphere of meaning, how it becomes a metalevel phenomenon, if it does so. Classification also requires the location of descriptive relations of meaningful wholes into discrete chapters and subchapters, with great focus on their respective systems and qualities; by this it also analyses the system.

Articulating more on this, a human being carries on with their 'classification' effort, almost subconsciously (*ibid.*) in their daily life. On this basis, classification is a way of understanding, the foundation of meaning creation and analysing systems. With these given, there emerges a description by Rifat, named *homo semioticus*, someone who carries out these understandings more self-consciously. In his words:

> Homo semioticus is the meaning-maker, the individual who questions how meanings come to be, how they create new meanings through linking to other meanings, the individual who not only describes the personal, societal, cultural sign systems but also restructures their creation processes. Homo semioticus is the individual who tries to grasp the meaning/s of 'both the world carries for mankind and mankind carries for mankind', is the individual who positions the generation processes of meaningful wholes in discourse and reinterprets. Homo semioticus is the individual who reads, names, interprets and does all so in a 'game' where he both creates and has 'joy'. (*ibid*.)[4]

As a meaning- maker, *homo semioticus* is faced with a wide variety of systems. This comes from the fact that the universe of meaning is not linear, meaning does not occur in a direction, it is almost always supplemented and structured, deconstructed and reconstructed with influences of other spheres of meanings and systems. Therefore, each meaningful system that engulfs *homo semioticus* can only be grasped by the capability, intention, and interest of that *homo semioticus*. These capabilities, intentions, interests lead them to analyse the process in which the sign system becomes meaningful, both to them and in itself. According to Rifat, the aim of a *homo semioticus* is "to approach with a consistent methodology, even if partially or temporary, to the sign systems and meaningful wholes, […] and pave the way with creating a model or a system of models, for those who are in the effort of approaching to analyse these systems." (1993: 18) Here we can see how the definition of a modelling system theory is relevant and proves very useful. The metalevel

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[4] Homo Semioticus anlamlandıran insandır; dünyadaki anlamların oluşumunu, birbirine eklemlenerek yepyeni anlamlar yaratmasını sorgulayan insandır; çevresindeki bireysel, toplumsal, kültürel gösterge dizgelerini yalnızca betimlemekle yetinen değil, bu dizgelerin üretiliş sürecini yeniden yapılandıran insandır. Homo semioticus, '' hem dünyanın insan için hem de insanın insan için taşıdığı anlamı/anlamları'' kavramaya çalışan ve anlamsal bütünlerin üretiliş aşamalarını bir söylem içinde yeniden anlamlandıran insandır. Homo Semioticus okuyan, adlandıran, anlamlandıran ve bütün bu işlemleri bir ''oyun'' oynayarak, yani hem haz duyarak hem de haz vermeye çalışarak yapan insandır. (This and other translation from Rifat are by the author)

definitions that are to be given by *homo semioticus,* according to Rifat, can only become possible if *homo semioticus* himself/herself can understand their level of relevancy. It is safe to postulate from this definition that modelling system theory could have been influential for Rifat. This definition points towards a direction for the description of *homo semioticus*. This directs the description towards a *homo semioticus* that is either a semiotician and/or academician; since they are interested in creating models of understanding for further development.

In this sense, Rifat's definition of a self-aware researcher/student becomes more than a sole meaning-maker, they become a regulator for models that they are working to create. These models aim to create pathways in understanding for the semiotically inclined to follow.

In this light, we should discuss the processes of modelling in Rifat's understanding. The first and foremost condition of being able to create consistent, overarching theoretical models and systems that will analyse meaning-making processes is to gradually put forward concepts that will reconstruct the object of analysis (*object language*). During this creation of concepts that will reconstruct the object language, the homogeneity and functionality of concepts in the net-like structure of thought, the homogeneity and functionality, should be preserved. Homogeneity in this sense refers to similitude and functionality refers to progressive values (developmental values).

Rifat argues that a *homo semioticus* should believe that in order to work on a meaningful whole the theorizing process must have consistency (1993:20). To virtually entertain and articulate any idea as progressive while working on a sign system is born from inconsistency, and to achieve consistency the boundaries of theorizing process should not be aimless. Given their conduct, we can name linguistics and semiotics as scientific fields that work towards creating a metalevel of studies for readers and researchers to achieve consistency in their theorization efforts.

The emergence of differences in interpretation does not mean that each and every idea can be entertained when working on a sign system. The differences in interpretation can occur, based on the theoretical framework that analyses the sign system and the levels of the system at hand. The differences are natural occurrences. However, we should ask, can different conclusions be drawn when analysing the same level of a sign system using the same theoretical framework? If such conclusions can be drawn, does this mean that anything can be said while operating under a theoretical model during analysis? Or that one of the researchers working on the sign system has

deficiencies in their understanding of the theoretical framework they are using or their deconstructive tools?

These all are only relevant if we are to follow Rifat's posed direction for a semiotically inclined person (who is, in Rifat's case, more interested in linguistics and literary theory, since, Rifat comes from this tradition). The process of creating models for further development, deconstructing elements to make them more refined for studying should not be under the patronage of academics or semioticians when it comes to life sciences and cognitive semiotics. Each and every human being becomes a meaning-maker, although their level of influence and intention varies. Even if it is vague, they create spheres of influence that are the base of human cognition. If we are to postulate that every human takes part in modelling activity, we should turn to Yuri Lotman:

> Modelling activity is human activity in creating models. In order that the results of this activity could be taken as analogues of an object, they have to obey certain (intuitively or consciously established) rules of analogy and, therefore, be related to one modelling system or another.
>
> […]
>
> a modelling system is a structure of elements and rules of their combination, existing in a state of fixed analogy to the whole sphere of the object of perception, cognition, or organization. For this reason, a modelling system may be treated as a language. (Lotman 2011: 250)

The effort of modelling depends on the intention of the researcher (in this situation, student) based on their sphere of thought and their field. The processes of modelling are similar in both Rifat's and Lotman's thought, however, Rifat's ethereal boundaries (where he utilizes the classification of *homo semioticus* strictly to academics which he deems influential) come solely from the fact that his thought and ideas revolve around literary theory – this means that his efforts were not strictly in the sake of cognitive semiotics, rather, this classification can be read more of a continuation of a *model reader* (see Eco 1979).

"The intersections of semantic spaces which generate new meanings are linked to individual consciousness" (Lotman 2009:19). Following along this understanding that creation of meaning occurs at every level of human life, in the expansion of the notion each human becomes a *homo semioticus*. They create and recreate meaning, they try to grasp the meaningful whole and the systems that are at play. Being extremely self-conscious in the efforts of semiotic understanding is more of a discussion about meta-level systems and their creation, rather than

being able to take part in semiotic activity. The decoding of meaning in signs is done by every single human – be it consciously or subconsciously – , and this opens up ways of further study for the classification of *homo semioticus* that will undoubtedly work towards further definition of human understanding.

In the next chapter, we will try to demonstrate the model presented in *Homo Semioticus*. We will do so, by carefully dissecting the work and applying the theoretical model presented onto the work itself.

3. The Theoretical Model

In this chapter, we will deconstruct and analyse the theoretical model presented in *Homo Semioticus*. For this, we have taken a certain approach: each and every chapter will try to set Rifat's ideas into a more systematic structure. These chapters are presented by Rifat in his work; however, as we mentioned before, they take a form of prose, his writing has an essayistic style.. From this systematization, it is our hope that we can demonstrate the theory clearly. Our input, the expansion of notions and analysis is present under each sub-chapter. If we are aiming to arrive at a clear understanding of Rifat's theory and work, it is necessary to include every single detail and thought process that might be overlooked at first glance. Even though there might not be comments and expansions in some minor subchapters, these chapters still contribute to the general context.

Semiotics should not only be considered as a study of signs. It deals with meaning (indirectly) through signs. It deals with meaning, signification/cognition, meaning-making and semiosis. According to Rifat, textual analysis should be separated into two domains. They are:

- *Narration domain* (words, sentences, linguistic and stylistic aspects)
- *Content domain* (the meaning of text)

Rifat believes that semiosis is to be found in their relation. It is possible to arrive at the content domain only through the analysis of the narration domain. However, Rifat's semiotics (cognitive semiotics) does not operate in and study the relation between the signifier and the signified. This is because his cognitive semiotics proposes that the *Narration domain* (signifiers) and the *Content domain* (signifieds) are separate in their structuring.

As such, cognitive semiotics makes the distinction between:

- *Essence of narration* and *Style of narration*
- *Essence of content* and *Style of Content*

And therefore, it concerns itself with the *style of content*. Rather than linguistic and stylistic structure, the style of content analyses the following:

- Structure of meaning,
- Organization of meaning   therefore,
- Creation of meaning.

Thus the analysis is aimed at the style of content and it amounts to a scientific method that is 'hypothetico-deductive' (Rifat 2007, 29-30 From two types of text analysis to this point)

It is called hypothetico-deductive because, semiotics is a "theoretical game" (ibid.) that is played on the field of creating models. A game of finding the necessary hypotheses and putting them forward, studying these hypotheses with deductive logic (by analysing all study objects), affirming them, and, through these affirmations always developing the theoretical models and scientific theories.

When analysing a text, a homo semioticus utilizes the models of theoretical analysis that were created before his/her analysis. However, he/she keeps in mind that the new meanings that come to be while conducting the analysis of a text with the given theoretical model are not just by-products, they are used to develop the same theoretical model in the end.

On this note, homo semioticus consistently improves the scientific theory s/he is using by creating and discovering new meanings with every analysis they do and have done. If every studied topic is novel, the new meanings created develop the model and the scientific theory.

There the *game* of semiotics has two dimensions:

1. When trying to construct a theoretical model, also develop the already constructed scientific theory,
2. And with that purpose, apply the hypotheses (models/designs) onto man-made system or natural world, by analysing them.

However, the process of analysis itself is not the main aim for homo semioticus. It is a secondary aspect when trying to develop the hypothesis through theoretical models.

An analysis for a *homo semioticus* is to create a general, abstract, universal and plain(absolute) consistent, *fait social total* (see Marcel Mauss 1901) theory and/or model. (Rifat 2007: 30)

It is a humble and an assertive game at the same time (*ibid*.). It is humble; it limits itself to the content of its analysis[5], only refers to extratextual notions if they are present (i.e. mentioned) in the text[6] since it tries to discover the meaning in the text. Also, the content of a text stands upon the demarcation of meaning objects, and therefore to grasp the meaning of a text comes from the analysis of the separation of units[7].

It is assertive because when trying to reconstruct the meaning world in the analysis of systems and text, it tries to create a scientific method/model to clarify the aspects of both static and dynamic human thought, and their relations.

A semiotician's theory, theoretical model, the always developing attempt at a scientific theory is therefore a metalanguage. This metalanguage is to recreate the webs of meaning and display their relations in the object language (the system under analysis). It is a metalanguage that is 'artificial' and 'scientific', separate from the everyday language used to communicate.

This metalanguage consists of three self- and inter- regulating logical levels. These are (Rifat 1993: 31-33):

- Descriptive level: the level where concepts that describe (unit, class, category, etc.) and processes (identify, demarcate, substitute, change, etc.) reside.
- Methodological level: the level that constitutes the consistency of the notions used in the descriptive level
- Axiomatic level: the starting point for methodological and descriptive levels. An axiomatic system is at play in this level.

When trying to analyse a text, a semiotician (*homo semioticus*) tries to see what the text is trying to say (plane of meaning) and the style of what is said (style of content). They also try to establish a system or a model of systems to reconstruct (reinterpret) them. In other words, semiotic

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[5] Meaningful whole, system structure.
[6] This adheres to principle of immanence.
[7] This adheres to principle of structurality.

analysis approaches a text, leaving the narration domain (linguistic structures/aspects) aside, and tackles the style of content domain.

A semiotician also acknowledges that the 'style' of content domain is structured in three parts and can be analysed accordingly. From the surface to the core, these can be called:

- *Discursive level*
- *Narrative level*
- *Logical-Semantic level*

(Rifat 1993:35-36)

These levels can be studied under two processes (*ibid*.):

- Process of creation,
- Process of analysis.

The study through the process of creation is as follows:

A start from the *logical-semantic level* (where meaning creation is based, notions are abstract) to the *narrative level* (where basic meaning structures take their place in the narrative structures and turn into functional units, functional agents/actants[8]) and from there to the *discursive level* (where functional agents transform into individual entities that take their place in time and space). After this level, there exists a surface language level or what is called *narrative domain* (Rifat 2007:33), the *textualization* (ibid.).

The study through the process of analysis takes the opposite direction:

The analyst starts with demarcating the *narrative domain* to be able to reach the *discursive level* (the place of individual units in time and space) to move on to the *narrative level* (where they evaluate the functions of individual units in narrative structures) to arrive at the *logical-semantic level* (where they analyse the basic structures of meaning).

With the formulation above, semiotic analysis is what Rifat calls 'a reading act' (1993: 36). This reading does not correspond to a common reading. Common or ordinary reading stops at the obvious meaning of the text, the expected outcome of the text at hand. A semiotic reading act

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[8] See Tesniére 1969 for this definiton..

requires an intensive, careful and systematic approach. It breaks down, analyses and reconstructs the given text (deconstruction and reconstruction). With these, each analysis of novel texts provides an opportunity to develop the scientific theory and models. An analysis only becomes meaningful if there is an untapped vein of meanings that are present in the text that is being studied. With each analysis of this sort, a semiotic analysis becomes more than a *formula* (a strict methodology that investigates only its given aspects that produce expected results) that can be applied to every text; rather, it becomes a dynamic and ever-developing model of research.

Rifat names the methodologies of the analysis of these three levels as;

1. Discourse analysis,
2. Narrative analysis,
3. Basic structure (logical-semantic structure) analysis.

In order to understand the process, we should further discuss and conceptualize these methodologies.

3.1. Discourse Analysis

About discourse, Rifat says:

If a text is a product of language, there exist a bundle of systematic relations between its units. If any analysed text is created with a natural language (i.e. Turkish), words have relations with other words, sentences have relations with other sentences, utterances have relations with other utterances. If we name the observation of these relations that help the *actualization* of a text as 'discourse', reading [analysing] a discourse is observing the relations of discursive units— groups of units. (Rifat 1993: 37)

This means that Rifat's use of discourse is not parallel to a general understanding of discourse, since, the general understanding of discourse comes from a contingent reality, the presupposition that the reality we live in exists in pre-set postulates.

3.1.1. Deconstruction

In Rifat's opinion, a deconstruction is necessary in order to be able to clarify a text from its state of 'pile of words' (ibid.) It is needed in order to see the general structure of a text that is not apparent at first glance, to be able to start at the path of analysis on the plane of meaning. To him, this deconstruction starts from classifying the notions that exist in the text. (*ibid*.)

3.1.2. Denotation

After the deconstruction of notions that is carried out, Rifat's theory follows the denotation of themes and linguistic structures that exist in a text. This denotation between themes (a theme might refer to the general context, which is rather vague in Rifat's explanation) puts forward the differences that exist in them. As per Rifat notes,

> Finding the differences between the stages explicates the narrative agents(units) and where, when, in what state and of what action they gain value in context. In other words, finding the differences between states means finding the transformation of themes, and this transformation leads to the configuration(segmenting) of meaning. (Rifat 2007:38)

3.1.3. Dichotomy of themes

This level of discourse analysis deals with the already denotated themes and how they are grouped in certain axes of meaning.

> After the deconstruction of hypothetical individuals (units of meaning) and denotation of themes and concepts, the dichotomy of themes helps to clarify the meaning axis that these separate units gather around. Such as: living/dead, active/passive, speakers/listeners, ruler/ruled, believer/non-believer, strong/weak and so on. If there is attention to the aspects of

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'solid influence' on these dichotomies the layers of discursive level become more visible. (*ibid.*)

These themes exist in the same context, and their relation to each other is not one of opposition, but rather that of existing in the same text on a spectrum, which is not a dismissive quality. Viewing these themes as such helps us in visualizing their dispositions.

3.2. Narrative analysis

Aside from its discursive structuring, each text has something to say, an element of meaning that it is carrying. This is why Rifat proposes that "narrative analysis must be paired with discourse analysis" (2007: 38). To carry out this narrative analysis, Rifat turns to Algirdas Julius Greimas' model of *narrative schema*, utilizing and transforming the aspects of it. We will discuss this model in the subchapter 3.2.2.

3.2.1. Locating the utterances

According to Rifat, the dichotomies of themes occur mostly at the transformation of the content plane in a text, and this means that the dichotomies of themes discovered in the discursive level are the places where the narrative transforms (Rifat 2007:38). The brief structure of utterances are as follows:

Basic utterance, the place where syntactic functions can be located. Basic utterances consist of Situation utterances and Performative utterances. Situation utterance is the conjunction and disjunction between subject and object, whereas the Performative utterance is where a situation utterance transforms into another (opposing) situation utterance. To make this transformation happen, there should exist a Transformative object. Transformative object is the agent (a unit of meaning) that makes possible the transformation between situation utterances (*ibid.*).

3.2.2. Narrative Schema (Greimasian)

The observation of this entire process is named the *narrative program*.

A semiotician who aims to analyse the syntactic structure of the narrative domain should first determine the situation utterances, and then observe their transformations. This is because a narrative program only exists when Subject effects another Subject to transform its situation into another situation. A narrative program has four levels. (Rifat 2007:39)

In the following subchapters, we will discuss the four levels of the narrative program. First, however, we should note that Rifat's formulation of the narrative program is based on Greimas' concept of narrative schema, it follows its main understandings; however, there are deviations from the narrative schema. These deviations happen, because Rifat indicates towards a more cognitive reading of the narrative schema, and a careful reading in Turkish reveals that if Rifat used *schema* with its Turkish counterpart *şema* the meaning of the concepts would only be limited to a *formula* (see p.29), however, the concept is a *program* that is created for an analyst to follow. Rifat's usage of program includes the analyst, the subject of cognition.[9]

3.2.2.1.Manipulation

The forming of a narrative program begins by locating the subject –an agent that carries out the act of transformation, either with the effect of another actant (*having to*) or on its own accord (*wanting*) (ibid.). The manipulation level is about the relation between the signifier (in this case it relates to actant) and the subject.

We can see here that the dyadic relation of sign has started to show inefficiencies for Rifat to explain (even though he is only expanding the notions used by Greimas) the processes of narration.

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[9] Not in the sense of Greimasian *cognitive subject*. This subject of cognition is *homo semioticus*.

3.2.2.2.Competence

We can inspect this level in parts. The first part would be the acquisition where the subject that is manipulated to perform an act has to acquire the necessary talents or qualifications. The subject might possess these talents and qualifications that are regulated by the given program (the qualifications necessary to carry out the narrative program), and the quality of inherently possessing the ability to carry out action forms the second part: the competence.

At this level 'the signifier completes its function, the subject tries to acquire the necessary qualifications (*capability* and *knowing*) through various trials (if, no doubt, they do not possess these inherently)' (Rifat 2007: 43).

The inherently possessed qualifications and talents Rifat puts forward are a subject of debate between cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics. We can relate these inherently possessed qualifications to innate structures that are put forward by Noam Chomsky, namely in the sense of *universal grammar*. We tried to shed light on whether these innate structures can or cannot exist through a debate over them in the chapter on the approaches towards cognition of our thesis.

3.2.2.3.Performance

At this level, the subject possessing the qualifications (which it has acquired or already had previously) performs the act of transformation that makes the narrative program possible.

3.2.2.4.Sanction

In this level, the subject's acquisition (competence) is evaluated by the actant (signifier) that manipulated the subject into performing the narrative act. If the subject carried out the

performative act by itself (wanting) the evaluator is again, itself. We can look at this level as a self-regulating loop, where the actant controls and observes the entire narrative program.

A narrative program helps determine the functions of meaning and syntax. Acquisition/competence and performance levels create the pragmatic domain, whereas, manipulation and sanction levels create the cognitive domain of the narrative program. During the manipulation level, the process of moving the subject takes place, and this happens through the establishment of *Believing*. During sanctioning, there is an analysis of acts. Here we can explain these relations with Brandt's understanding of how cognitive semiotic structures can operate:

> […] a surface structure would be *pragmatic*, i.e. functionally determined, whereas a deep structure would be *semantic*, i.e. functionally undetermined but cognitively constitutive as elementary ideation, thinking, and thus only determined by the universal design of the formats of 'meaning production', in other words: of cognitive conceptualization.

> (Brandt 2003: 4)

Brandt's distinction between levels also reflects the general understanding in Rifat's work. Surface levels are first in line as the object of study—they are pragmatic, whereas deeper structures reveal their meaning and value through an analysis. In the next level of methodologies, the distinction between surface and deeper level will be made more apparent. With believing and analysis present, the methodology of analysis turns to its final level: the basic structure analysis.

3.3. Basic structure (logical – semantic structure) analysis

This level is named *basic structure*, but it would be more accurate for us to treat it as the *base structure* rather than basic, because the word basic in itself might have the connotations of being simple and plain. This structure is the most abstract and deepest level in the meaning plane and as such treating it as plain and simple might be misguided. The basic structures in this level, however, create the basis for meaning creation, the potential for units (in this case, when not studied, observed, analysed, they are stagnant and solitary). The aim for a researcher, who is analysing this level, should be to try and figure out the abstract logic that regulates or formulates the relations in

the narrative and discursive levels. We can rephrase this level's main object as the "core structures of meaning-making" (Rifat 2007: 45).

The analysis of this level is as follows: the relations that make the syntactic structure possible are detected, and the way their interrelation occurs is analysed. The manner of these relations "contrast, contradiction, inclusion, complementation" (*ibid.*) is exhausted to find their logical "transformation such as negation, affirmation" (*ibid.*). To understand these relations, Rifat turns to Greimas' semiotic square (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Greimas' Semiotic Square. (Hebert 2011)

Rifat uses this square with a little more adaptation (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Rifat's adaptation (Rifat 2007: 45)

With this formalization, while determining the logical abstract relations between syntactical units, the main units of meaning in the systematization of logical-semantic structure are also found. In Rifat's words "The purpose is to observe what the primary meaning values which are 'loaded' onto abstract-logical (in other words, purely functional, arbitrary – in the sense of empty) units." (*ibid.*)

This analysis carries itself out in this direction, from discursive, narrative to logical-semantic structures, as it is necessary to locate the surface layers and their formalization; the core meaning units that are attempted to be observed in the logical-semantic structure analysis make up and 'bestow upon' the function/signification of the surface levels. Their arbitrariness only ends and they only become actual after the meaning values are carried out (in the narrative level by a subject and at the discursive level by an actant). In this sense the entire analysis moves from actualized structures to the deeper structures that make it possible for them to exist in the first place. This movement is made in hopes the of arriving at the "meaning core of a text/sign system" (Rifat 2007: 46).

To summarize, Rifat's *reading act* has three layers: analysing the discourse, analysing the narrative and analysing the basic structure. During this analysis, each level is deconstructed and

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reconstructed in a way that each of their units that contribute to meaning are made apparent. We should also keep in mind that during these analyses and reconstruction, the semiotician (*homo semioticus*) also adds to the meaning creation with new findings (the first dimension of Rifat's semiotic game). This comes from the fact that semiotic analysis does not analyse texts as finished products, rather, they are designs that exist so that they can be analysed and interpreted over and over again to reach their meaning creation processes.

In conclusion of this chapter, we should give some directions. From the theory presented, we arrive at certain closures for Rifat's systematization. We followed Rifat's theory and its approach, where the text analysis starts from *style of content,* the motion from discursive to basic structure level (meaning analysis) leads us to the core structures of meaning. In *Homo Semioticus* the analysis stops there, the movement towards the other levels of text analysis are not described. However, this is not because of Rifat's theory or his work ends there, the style of the work *expects* the reader to continue their own analysis. Once we try to meet these expectations, we realise that the core structures of meaning are fundamentally the *essence of content*. These core structures help to create the *style of narration* since they are by definition the cornerstones of narration (without the *essence of content* the *style of narration* cannot be formalised). When formalised, the style of narration also regulates the *essence of narration* with set structures, the style and elements of meaning respectively. Therefore, the text analysis comes a full circle, when the study is carried out from the *process of meaning creation* towards the *actualization* of text.

This method and model is first and foremost a systematization for a *semiotic reading,* and it helps in structuralising and systematically demarcating any given text. At this point, we arrive at cognition. Our model of cognition is not perception, not understanding, not classification, but rather, with all of the complementary aspects presented (see *notion*, p.19), an exact *grasp* and systematic acquisition of meaning.

4. Signification/Cognition objects

In order to provide examples for meaning-making processes, Rifat turns to translation and uses a translator to put his notions into perspective. This formulation, as is the case with his theories and the structure of our thesis, again follows the process of first arriving at the theoretical model. First two subchapters in this part leads up to the conclusive third subchapter where the entire outline of the *Homo Semioticus* model is drawn.

4.1. Translation

"A *homo semioticus* proposes that analysing meaning is both to translate and create meaning" Rifat states in the opening sentence of the chapter where he discusses translation (Rifat 2007: 51). Reflecting back to what we have discussed in prior parts of our thesis, we tried to conceptualize the *game of semiotics* to the point of *metagame/metalanguage*. For the findings that a *homo semioticus* arrives at after carrying out their analysis to become *meta*, there needs to be a process of translation. Translation process is necessary, since the process of conducting an analysis or examining a given text creates the metatext. This created metatext uses the object language to build upon. This is why Rifat calls this creation process translation. Rifat conceptualizes a translation process in two parts, the first is analysis and the second reproduction. He often utilizes the example

of a translator who is carrying out an interlingual[10] translation process to make his conceptualization clearer.

> A translator must know the source text they will be recreating in another language *well*. For this reason, before moving on to the translation(/transition) process, they first try to grasp the plane of meanings the given source text possesses and figure out the relations of meanings in this plane. However, to conduct such process, aside from knowing the source language *well* it is also necessary to know *well* the source culture, from which the source text derives from. (Rifat 2007: 53-4)[11]

At this point, the example of the translator does not only refer to someone who is carrying out an interlingual translation, rather, the subject he discusses here is someone who has to make use of the analysis that was presented before, and therefore we will rely on that process of analysis rather than to go over the process again (see p.29-37). In doing so, their end product (be it an analysis, a text etc.) will be thorough. Here, we will also make use of the second level of the narrative schema, namely competence (see p.33 3.2.2.2. Competence). Whoever carrying out their analysis must possess the necessary qualifications and talents that are required (in this case knowing the source text, in Rifat's words, *well*). The subject that is carrying out the analysis becomes the translator of object language to a metatext. During the analysis in the translation process, the translator must also be very well immersed in the source culture, which we will relate to discourse in general, since Rifat uses culture in the sense of a bundle of systematic relations, which he used to describe discourse before (Rifat 1997: 37). Having the necessary qualifications for an analysis is not only possible through having proficiency in the object language but understanding the constraints that the sphere of influence has in any given text is vital as well. If we are to give an example, we might think of two analysts who are examining, let's say, a painting, and the one who has a better understanding of the source discourse will precisely and thoroughly conduct their analysis. On the other hand, the one who has a clear understanding of the source language but not the source discourse, might face certain problems such as overinterpretation, underinterpretation (see Eco 1990), or a complete misinterpretation of cultural values, references, etc.

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[10] Jakobsonian notion of interlingual translation: interlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language. Jakobson, R. 1966 [1959]:233. On linguistic aspects of translation. In: Brower, Reuben A. (ed.), *On Translation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 232–239

[11] Çevirmen bir başka dilde yeniden üreteceği bu kalkış metnini 'iyi' tanımak zorundadır. Bu nedenle dönüş(tür)üm işlemlerine geçmeden önce, söz konusu metnin, 'içinde taşıdığı anlamlar evreni'ni incelemeye, bu evrenin ilişkiler ağını kavramaya çalışır. Ama böyle bir etkinliğin yerine getirilebilmesi için de kalkış metninin dilini 'iyi' bilmenin yanı sıra bu metnin, içinde yer aldığı, onunla bütünleştiği kültürü de 'iyi' tanımak gerekir. (translation by the author)

4.1.1. Reproduction

After conducting the first level under translation process, the analyst turns to reproducing the object under analysis. This can again be visualised very clearly with the example of a translator; however, we will try to employ our own example we used before, to demonstrate the encompassing nature of the translation process. In order to create a meaningful and precise reproduction of a painting they analysed, the analyst must utilize the findings they have come up with in the analysis process, and put them together in a way that will show the relations of systematic structures, here we can also relate this to the third level of the narrative schema: the performance (see p.33 3.2.2.3. Performance). For a painting these might be (without stepping into the field of visual semiotics too far) the artist's intention, vision, the painting's point of view, composition, compositional meaning so on and so forth. This reproduction can be in any medium, it does not necessarily have to be a written text. As an example, we can look at Marcel Duchamp's controversial 1912 painting *Nu descendant un escalier* (*Nude Descending a Staircase, No.2*) which was inspired by Eadweard Muybridge's 1887 cronophotography work *Woman Walking Downstairs*, and later inspired art pieces such as *Ema* by Gerard Richter (1966), *Nude Duck Descending a Staircase* by Chuck Jones (1991) and so on.

For the reproduction, the analyst (translator) must go through the logical, narrative and discursive levels that the object language went through in its actual production process (for a visualisation, see figure 3).

```
M                                                              M
E    LOGICAL-SEMANTIC LEVEL (Deeper meaning level)            E
A    - The structures where meaning is based on (logical, abstract, arbitrary)   A
N                                                              N
I                                                              I
N    NARRATIVE LEVEL                                          N
G    - The locating of functional narrative units that will set the motion of   G
     narrative.
C                                                              A
R                                                              N
E    DISCOURSIVE LEVEL                                        A
A    - The definition of (placing/locating) functional narrative units in the base of   L
T    individual, time and space. Emergence of themes and figures that make up   Y
I    themes.                                                   S
O                                                              I
N                                                              S
     SURFACE LANGUAGE LEVEL
P    - The 'textualization' of themes and figures in any medium (also the   P
R    emergence of text, the relations between utterance, sentence, syntax, style.)   R
O                                                              O
C                                                              C
E                                                              E
S                                                              S
S                                                              S
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
Figure 3. Meaning creation/analysis processes (surface language level is added for convenience)

The process of translation is one of the first notions that separates Rifat's theory from the Greimasian Narrative Analysis and methods of narrative analysis. Traditional narrative analysis and the field of narratology itself deals with creating the models that are pertinent in literary analysis (for references see Cullum-Swan, Manning 1998; Bal 2009; Rimmon-Kenan 1983; Lemon, Reis 1965; Todorov, Weinstein 1969; Propp 1968; Levi-Strauss 1984) even though narrative analysis is being discussed today with how suitable it might be in a general analysis of any given phenomena (see Bundgaard 2007, Herman 2000) the adaptation of a model for literary analysis to a model of general cognitive model has not been decisively made. The aspects of cognition in undertaking an analysis of narrative structures are apparent in this level of Rifat's theory. Narrative schema and narrative analysis deals with the object language and does not reflect back upon the model used entirely; however, in Rifat's theory, the process of analysis itself is also emphasized, to visualise a step further from the object of analysis (and the methods of analysis) to the meaning-making processes, metatext creation, and cognition.

As we have mentioned before, for an analyst to start the process of translation, they must first possess a wide array of knowledge and information. Rifat calls this step of knowledge gathering and information forming the 'Encyclopaedic acquisition'. We will discuss this in the next chapter.

4.2. Encyclopaedic acquisition and encyclopaedic discourse

This aspect of cognition makes up the glossary of knowledge an analyst must possess when they are on the path of conducting an analysis. We will discuss encyclopaedia following Rifat's approach; however, his discussion starts from etymology, i.e., the distinction between a dictionary and an encyclopaedia. This discussion will not add much to our own outlook since it gives no insights on how this aspect has cognition embedded in it, therefore, we will stick to the classifications of "encyclopaedia as a glossary of human knowledge" and "encyclopaedic discourse" (Rifat 2007: 60). To understand the notion of encyclopaedia as a glossary of human knowledge, we must turn to this quote from Rifat:

> 'Every text has their own cultural world and system of knowledge that it refers back to. This system of knowledge is what the entirety of humanity has thought, said, lived and made possible before. Based on this, every human—and therefore every reader, […] approaches any sign system with their own ideology. (Rifat 2007: 62) [12]

Rifat's use of the word ideology must be clarified here. He refers to ideology as the structures that regulate meaning-making and cognitive capabilities of mankind (düşünyapısal: thought (düşün) + structural (yapısal)). These structures are not imposed neither they are related to power, they are just spheres that set the boundaries in their respective fields.

The system of established "knowledges" are what Rifat classifies as the encyclopaedia as glossary (Rifat 2007: 63). These pre-established systems consist of necessary information for an analyst who will carry out their analysis. Because of this, the analyst must turn to them, in the hopes of gathering knowledge that is vital for their analysis. In addition to this, the analyst must

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[12] Her metnin kendi anlamsal dizgesine bağlı olarak gönderme yaptığı bir kültür dünyası, bir bilgi dizgesi de söz konusudur. Bu da bütün insanlığın daha önce düşünmüş, daha önce söylemiş, daha önce gerçekleştirmiş olduklarıdır. Buna bağlı olarak her insanın, dolayısıyla her okurun, bir ansiklopedik bilgi yükü vardır: Her okur bir metne ya da bir gösterge dizgesine kendi düşünyapısal bakış açısına göre yaklaşır. translation by the author.

also keep in mind that every encyclopaedic knowledge adhere to the discourse that created them, and we will discuss this next.

4.2.1. Encyclopaedic discourse

If we acknowledge encyclopaedia as the glossary of human knowledge, we must quite naturally acknowledge that there is a "didactic and educational" (Rifat 2007: 61) discourse that creates the sum of knowledge that is contained in this encyclopaedia. This encyclopaedic discourse is separated from, if we turn back to Rifat's discussion on dictionaries and encyclopaedias, the discourse of a dictionary. We will try to explain this in the following manner: when dictionaries are created, there is no concern over how the set of meanings come together to form the linguistic sign. Dictionaries contain the linguistic sign and its explanation in the same language that it resides in, and so the set of relations are quite simple. However, in an encyclopaedia, the meaning presented is regulated by the sets of structures that make this meaning come to life, how this particular meaning is organised, and how it can be put into context. The explanations are not only definitions, they also give the reader the necessary context to be able to understand and analyse the notion. As such, encyclopaedic discourse is not a simplistic explanation of a given linguistic sign, but rather it is made up of a metalanguage that exists to provide the necessary formations of knowledges of the notion they present.

Here we can now observe more clearly why Rifat chose 'encyclopaedic knowledge' rather than simply calling the sets of information that an analyst needs 'definition' or 'explanation'. To be able to cognize, there needs to be a certain level of deeper understanding, an exact grasp of a given notion that is not only presented with a description, but with sets of relations that makes this notion a whole and complete model. Thus, to read texts requires the reading act as classified before, not just a regular reading, *per se*. For an analyst to conduct the acquisition of meaning through the encyclopaedic discourse and do their analysis, there should be what we will call cognitive aspects, which are frames of mind and cognitive dispositions.

4.3.Cognitive Aspects

Rifat classifies these cognitive aspects as wanting, knowing, capability, believing, and having to. From our reading of his theory, he classifies these notions in this manner since he hopes to completely depict the frames of mind of the subject (analyst, *homo semioticus*). We will also be following each of these notions, both with Rifat's definitions and our own understanding and input. This is because, when Rifat presents these notions, he does not openly refer to their cognitive aspects, or them being cognitive at all. His theorization is a step towards the cognitive aspects from the general study of narratives, but in his works he does not clearly elaborate the aspects of cognition, which only reveal themselves to us if we discuss and employ Rifat's ideas in the general field of semiotics with the influences and shifts of cognitivism.

> To do an inspection, an analysis, a research, a critique on sign systems that reflect the beliefs, disciplines and ideologies of an era, a society, a class requires the person who will conduct such efforts to have linguistic and cultural knowledge, a worldview, a methodology, a theoretical model for analysis and an experience for such an analysis. Moreover, such efforts also require the person who will conduct them to be free from fear.[13] (Rifat 2007: 65)

In this small but loaded quotation from Rifat, we can find some of the aspects of this subchapter. "To do" in this quotation is first and foremost related to Wanting: having a desire to conduct such analysis, research, etc., "an experience for such analysis" is related to Knowing: having the background knowledge to conduct such an analysis, research etc. We will come back to 'fear' after these first notions.

Wanting to conduct an analysis might at first glance seem like a non-factor, merely a technicality in the bigger picture when it comes to processes of analysis. However, for Rifat's theory and our own reading of it, it is quite important. This aspect clearly integrates 'human' into Rifat's theory, which as we mentioned before is based on Greimasian narrative analysis, where the impact of the 'individual' is not stressed or outright ignored. A desire to conduct an analysis is the

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[13] Bir döneme, bir topluma, bir sınıfa özgü düşünce, inanç ve öğretileri yansıtan bir göstergeler dizgesindeki anlam evreni üstüne konuşmak, bu konuda bir incelemeye, çözümleyeme, eleştiriye girişmek bu etkinliği yapacak kişi açısından dilsel ve kültürel bir bilgi birikimi, bir dünya görüşü, bir yöntem, bir kuramsal çözümleme modeli, bir çözümleme deneyimi gerektirir ama bunun dışında da söz konusu kişinin her çeşit 'korku'dan arınmış olmasını zorunlu kılar. translation by the author.

starting point for any given effort, and Rifat categorizes and integrates this desire as 'wanting' into his theory.

Rifat's theory is very interrelated and dependent upon its own notions, and here the case is the same. We will explain Rifat's knowing with its relation to wanting. Put simply, the individual who has the desire to conduct an analysis (wanting) will need to possess "a linguistic and cultural knowledge, a worldview, a methodology, a theoretical model" (Rifat, ibid.) which as we mentioned before will be made up of encyclopaedic knowledge (see encyclopaedic acquisition/discourse). This sum of knowledge the individual possesses is for Rifat 'knowing'. Rifat conceptualizes this notion in the example of a linguist who is going to carry out an analysis of a written text on the level of linguistic structures, and therefore when evaluated a linguist will have the knowledge to conduct a linguistic analysis (Rifat 2007: 68).

Now that we have established what Rifat means with wanting and knowing, we can turn our attention to 'capability'. Rifat very simply formulates capability as having both wanting and knowing (*ibid.*). We will try to explain this a bit further by expanding how 'having both wanting and knowing' leads up to capability. The necessary qualifications that an individual requires to conduct an analysis makes up their capability of conducting the aforementioned analysis. The desire to take part in the activity of analysis, inspection, and so on combined with the encyclopaedic knowledge that we have mentioned before, will set the basis for the individual. However, having the necessary dispositions to conduct an analysis might not in its entirety be sufficient for an analysis. Up until here, the cognitive aspects of the individual are related with their desire (wanting), sum of knowledge (knowing) and qualifications (capability). Furthermore, comes to life also with, as Rifat touched upon, the impact of 'fear'.

This fear might be of an 'actual or imaginary' nature (Rifat 2007: 65). Rifat never gives an explanation for this fear but clarifies it with an example of a linguist who is trying to conduct an analysis of a novel of cultural importance.

> [Let us assume] in a country, a linguist is aiming to conduct an analysis on the deeper meanings of a novel. After a while, however, with the emergence of fear through actual or imaginary threats, he/she abandons the analysis of the deeper meanings and turns to the analysis of sentence structures of the same novel, which

he/she deems will create a safer (threat-free) field of work for himself/herself and publishes a book on this topic (Rifat 2007: 67).[14]

Even from here, the definition of this 'fear' is not quite clear. Nevertheless, it is enough to speculate and theorize over. This impact of fear can be caused by an authoritarian regime that censors works, or even more mildly, the imposing influences of a school of thought that is prevalent in this assumed country. What we must keep in mind is how once again this formulation of fear takes into account the individual and their own processes of analysis.

At this point, the individual 'believes' that there will be sanctions (from ostracization to mild scolding if we follow Rifat's line of thought) by the impact of fear. This belief will regulate how the individual will carry out their research, what they will omit or not, what they will unwillingly but secretly ignore, and all in all their own mind (there is a policeman in our heads, after all).

Lastly, the individual who believes that there will be a backlash to their work, turns to the field that they deem will create a safer space for them. This shift, according to Rifat, is not conducted willingly, but is instead born from being pressured into it, and the individual has to (*having to*) create works under this domain (Rifat 2007: 68).

What all these aspects provide for us, aside from being insightful on the frames of mind of an analyst, is that they take into account the individual who is carrying out the analysis, the work. Rifat's theory differs from narrative analysis, because it inadvertently delves into the mind of the individual. As we can see *homo semioticus* becomes, by its etymological value, a model of human cognition (see chapter 5), Rifat never mentions the place of cognition in his works. We believe this comes from the fact that his sphere of interest was distant from cognitive sciences, and because what he called sign study (Göstergebilim in Turkish, which is the dictionary definition of Semiotics) was ever so closely tied to structural semiology.

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[14] *[*Diyelim ki] Bir ülkede, bir dilbilimci, bir romandaki anlamlar evreni üstüne bir çalışma yapmayı amaçlıyor, / ama bir süre sonra beliren gerçek ya da hayali tehditlerin yarattığı korkular nedeniyle / anlam boyutunun incelenmesini bırakıp / kendisi açısından tehlikesiz bir alan oluşturacağına inandığı / aynı romanın tümce yapılarını incelemeye geçiyor ve bu konuda bir kitap yayımlıyor. translation by the author.

5. How to do a cognitive reading?

After closely reading Rifat's theory we can clearly understand why he chose to name the semiotic analysis a *game*. If a text is a design that exists as a meaning-creation tool that can further the theory/field itself, a *homo semioticus* creates and has joy in this process. Pleasure of text exists, because *homo semioticus* finds it pleasurable-enjoyable. (Barthes 1973, cited in Rifat 2007)

Before we move on to the objects of cognition and how Rifat formulates them, we should clarify what the *process of cognition* means at this point, both for the *homo semioticus* model and if/how it can be significant for cognitive semiotics. According to Rifat the process of cognition lays the foundations to how semiotic analysis should take place rather than how it *does* take place. A systematic approach on any given sign system has more value than a common reading. On the basis of the model, we can draw a parallel between *homo semioticus* and *cognitive subject*:

> The cognitive subject is that which is endowed by the enunciator with a knowing (partial or total) and installed by it in the discourse. Such an actant allows the communication of knowing to be mediatized between the enunciator and the enunciate in quite variable forms, depending on whether that actant is supposed to know or to be unaware of many or of a few things. At the actorial level, the role of the cognitive subject can be manifested in syncretism with that of pragmatic subject; inversely, the cognitive subject can be different from the pragmatic subject and give rise to the appearance of an autonomous actor such as the informant. Finally, in certain cases, it is simply recognizable, as at least an implicit position, in the form of the observer. (Greimas, Courtés, 1982: 33-34)

Of course, for Rifat, being a student of Greimas, at first glance *homo semioticus* appears to be an extension of the *cognitive subject*, however, just by its etymological value, in a group of *homo hermeneutics, homo academicus, homo aestheticus, homo poeticus, homo linguisticus, homo symbolicus*, etc. it gains another dimension. It becomes a model, not only of literary theory, but also of human knowing.

What does this extended model offer for the field of cognitive semiotics and cognitive sciences, and how does it lean towards the side of one of them? We tried to distinguish between these approaches in the chapter on approaches towards cognition. It by its very nature should lean on the cognitive semiotics/humanities side, even though the methods presented can be applied to an analysis and drawn conclusions from (taken to the empirical side), it is rooted in semiological understanding, nourished by anthropocentric influences (in philosophy), and formalized in contemporary semiotics.

What can it offer? Put simply, it offers us a model for studying how humans study sign systems. The theory itself contains guidelines, but we should not only observe it on its face value. We should, on a deeper level, try to figure out what all of the processes presented can create for cognitive semiotics. We should take part in the first level of the semiotic game, when analysing the semiotic game. A metagame, if you will.

The reasons for why we accept or acknowledge Rifat's semiotics as cognitive, or even semiotic rather than semiological come from particular points. First of all, in contemporary semiotics the field of semiology has been abandoned when it comes to the study of meaning making or cognitive processes. This abandonment is not declared or official, there are of course studies and works conducted under the rubric of semiology, but semiology has come to be studied as a field that offers historical overview when it comes to sign studies. The sheer volume of work that is conducted over the definition or functionality of sign weighs heavily towards C.S. Peirce's work, and as such triadic formalization of the sign is more widely accepted when it comes to contemporary semiotics. Of course, there are numerous critiques of both conceptions of sign studies. As an example, we can take Mihhail Lotman's critique of atomistic versus holistic semiotics (Lotman 2002) in which he places Peirce's paradigm of signs as the atomistic conception, replete with exhaustive definitions, and Saussure's conception sign as the holistic, encompassing signs and sign studies as systematic wholes. The problem arises from not having a *complete* model of the sign, even in contemporary western semiotics.

We accept Rifat's semiotics as cognitive, because there is a distinction in cognition – or cognitive semiotics for that matter— as well. Cognitive semiotics is not only interested in observing and analysing meaning-making (according to our approach, it should not be). In the approaches towards cognition chapter we tried to make evident that certain approaches, namely

stimulus-response or the behaviouristic view on meaning-making, assume that there is a link between meaning itself, its place, its creation and its perception. The shift from human understanding to animal understanding itself created a more innovative field, where these methodologies are more prominent. The field of zoosemiotics is where the adoption of empirical methods is more applicable, hypothesizing results are more comprehensible, so to speak. But assumptions do not completely reflect on how animal studies can relate back to human knowing – if we are to acknowledge that the separation of studies on human and animal cognition happened with the aim of applying the findings in the study of animal mind onto human mind. If we cannot find similarities in human language (a model of human mind) and animal communication/semiosis (animal mind), how are we supposed to find parallels? Models created in the field of animal studies and zoosemiotics only relate back and reconstruct the field itself, the bigger motion of circling back to general semiotics is in our humble opinion quite little. This is not due to the fact that these fields are in any way inferior, but rather, the methodological constraints are quite different from each other. It is important to also note here that our approach is in no way a dismissal of the methods and findings of these fields. Jordan Zlatev conceptualizes how these methodological constraints come to be quite impactful (see figure 4).

> From the perspective of cognitive semiotics, the problem with the "classical" humanities have been a resolute rejection of third-person methods in the study of cultural world as, at best, limited, and at worse as "objectivist" and distorting of the phenomena. While much can be said in favor of such a critique, the steady progress of the sciences, including the study of the mind/brain, has given such an attitude a distinctly old-fashioned – if not reactionary – flavor. (Zlatev 2012:14)

Table 2. The central task of Cognitive Semiotics: integrating methods, derived from one of the three perspectives, in the study of particular semiotic phenomena, along with their interrelation.

Perspective	Methods	Usually applied to
First-person ("subjective")	* Conceptual analysis * Phenomenological methods * Systematic intuitions	* Perception * Mental imagery * Norms (in language)
Second-person ("intersubjective")	* Empathy * Imaginative projection	* Other persons and "higher" animals * Social interaction
Third-person ("objective")	* Detached observation * Experimentation * Brain imaging * Computational modelling	* Isolated behaviours (e.g. spatiotemporal utterances) * Biochemical processes

Figure 4. Zlatev's methodological triangulation (Zlatev 2012:15).

For cognitive semiotics to be wholly cognitive, its findings should relate back to the theoretical models that are being used and carry the theory – the system of models further. This requires using every suitable method to exhaustion, in order to to figure out whether they can provide new insights. As Zlatev also notes:

> The challenges to success in practicing such non-reductive unification of knowledge are many – not the least institutional. CS runs the risk of being caught it the crossfire between the traditionalism of the humanities and the hubris of the sciences. But on the positive side, cognitive semiotics could make a contribution to "mending the gap between science and the humanities": the subtitle of the last book of the evolutionary scientist Stephen Jay Gould (2003). (*ibid.*)

Meaning that the base of human understanding and thought cannot be observed as an 'object' that is excluded from the human mind.

In this case what can we do? How do we find the middle ground between two different approaches to signs? First, the separation of semiology from cognitive studies must be overcome. The models that semiology provides (although they are mostly theorized over language and literary theory) can be adapted and used in creating models that analyse the human mind. Our work stands on this line, part revitalization of older theorems, part adaptation into the general field of sign studies.

Second, the balance between semiotics and semiology must be made apparent, because in our adaptation efforts, we attempt to draw semiotic notions into semiology. We described above how semiology (Rifat's expansion of the narrative program in discussing the process of manipulation) needs more than just the unidirectional objects of study. Signifier and signified required an actant a transformative subject to start the process of sign action (semiosis).

Finally, we have to bear in mind not to overreach while theorizing meticulously. These two approaches to sign systems are separated for a reason. When we turn back to Deely and his take on Thomas A. Sebeok's efforts in overcoming the *pars pro toto fallacy* in sign study enterprise, we get a more complete view why these approaches are separate.

> The greater part of Sebeok's professional life had been devoted to exposing and overcoming what has come to be known as the "pars pro toto fallacy", according to which the doctrine of sign finds its adequate foundation on a linguistic, not to say verbal, paradigm. Such was the thesis, well known to this audience, of Saussure's proposal for 'semiology'. By contrast, Sebeok promoted from the first that the doctrine of signs must be rooted directly in a study of the action of signs, the distinctive manner in which signs work, for which action he accepted from Peirce the name ''semiosis''. But if the doctrine of signs concerns first of all the action revelative of the distinctive of being signs, then the proper proposal for its development is not the term 'semiology' but rather the term 'semiotics', which expresses the ideal of a paradigm not language-bound but refers to the actions of signs as larger than, surrounding, and indeed presupposed to the action of signs as verbal. Semiosis, Sebeok said early on, [15] "is a pervasive fact of nature as well as of culture." Semiology he always saw as having a legitimate place in semiotics, the glottocentric part of the larger enterprise, as he put it, but impossible to be the whole.

(Deely 2009: 188-189)

Now, considering the historical impact and the manner of implementing theories in the side of semiology, Deely's articulation of Sebeok's ideas in the turn of sign studies are well placed. However, the claim that semiology is the sole paradigm that defines sign studies is not (cannot be) acceptable. The different approaches of the Paris School and the American School of Thought do not define which approach takes the dominant role and carries the flag of sign studies. If the turn of cognitivism is to happen in sign studies, it is better to evaluate how it can happen (influence) both in semiotics and in semiology. Without dismissing or completely blending the approaches of both paradigms, we must try to arrive at a further (better) understanding in human knowing, cognition, meaning-making and all in all what we will call cognitive semiotics.

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[15] Sebeok 1977: 183. cited in Deely 2003.

Conclusion

It is demonstrated how the study of cognition is carried out in differentiating approaches, how these approaches relate to each other, and that when studied extensively, the continuation of understandings shines through. By employing the selected authors in the chapter on approaches towards cognition, it is shown that this continuation is not only an assumption, but a strong possibility. This strong possibility makes the cognitive reading of Rifat's theory legitimate. Rifat's theory has been laid out clearly for inspection and analysed, with each analysis and discussion providing the meaning structures, and how acquisition processes made clear. The dissection of Rifat's theory has shown clear resonations with the field of cognitive semiotics. We discussed and set our understanding of cognition at this point, without repeating it extensively, in short it is a systematic acquisition of meaning. The discussion of Rifat's theory in terms of its historical counterpart, Greimasian narrative schema is conducted. The notions that Rifat utilizes are based on Greimasian semiotics, however, Rifat takes his theorisation efforts further, describing the actual process where the individual (the subject, the *homo semioticus*) employs narrative schema in their analysis, with complementary aspects such as analyses of discursive level and logical-semantic level. Rifat's further theorisation becomes clearer in his conceptualisation of the objects of signification/cognition, where he also classifies the inner workings of the individual's mind. We also discussed and analysed how these conceptualisations are relevant for our cognitive semiotic reading of Rifat's theory.

During the discussion of Rifat's theory, and in the discussions of the thesis in general, we see that Rifat's theory is a theory specifically designed for literary analysis. This however, does not negate the fact that Rifat himself inadvertently delves into the cognitive semiotic domain, offering a model that can be utilized to study meaning acquisition. We believe that the reason why

Rifat did not take his theorisation efforts further on the field of cognitive semiotics is merely due to his personal interests. He has continued studies of narratives after first publishing the book *Homo Semioticus* in 1993. We have used 2 versions of this book, the first one from 1993, which is purely about *homo semioticus* and the expanded 2007 version where Rifat discusses some general problems in the enterprise of sign study. This was followed by his work *Gösterge Avcıları* (*Sign Hunters,* 200) and *Açıklamalı Göstergebilim Sözlüğü* (*Expositional Semiotic Dictionary,* 2013). However, he does not refer in neither of these books to an effort towards cognitive semiotics.

The employment, or rather the attempt at conducting a cognitive semiotic reading of this theory comes from two points. The first one is that when the analysis was made, the cognitive aspects of the theory were apparent, the second is following the thought processes of Bundgaard, Brandt and to some extent Stjernfelt's works on the cognitive import of narrative schema. As said before, the present thesis stands for partly revitalising older theorems and partly adapting them into the general field of sign studies. With the theory read as a cognitive semiotic device, it is hoped that this revitalisation and adaptation would be deemed successful.

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HOMO SEMIOTICUSE MUDELI KOGNITIIVSEMIOOTILINE TÕLGENDUS

KOKKUVÕTE

Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on väita, et Mehmet Rifati *Homo Semioticuse* analüüsi tulemusi võib tõlgendada kognitiivteadusliku uurimise mudelina. Oma olemuselt on *Homo Semioticuse* teooria Algirdas Julius Greimas'i Narratiivse Skeemi laiendus. Näidatakse, kuidas see teooria on seotud Greimas'i mudeliga nagu ka narratiivi analüüsiga, ning seejärel rõhutatakse homo semioticuse eripära.

Töö algab aruteluga tähenduse ja tunnetuse vaheliste seoste üle. Arutelu all on teatavad lähenemised inimeste tähendusloomele, kognitiivsemiootika ja kognitiivteadused, narratiivid kui mudelid, narratiivi analüüsi algupära ja miks on võimalik seda uurida kognitiivteadusliku uurimise mudelina. Selle käigus ilmnevad mõned peenemad erinevused kognitiivsemiootika, kognitiivteaduste ja lingvistika vahel. Need erinevused võimaldavad näidata seda välja, kus analüüsitav mudel on rakendatav.

Kui on lahti seletatud suhted tähenduse ja tunnetuse vahel, eri lähenemised tunnetusele, ning näidatud ära rakendatavuse väli, toob töö sisse Mehmet Rifati ja tema filosoofilised huvid sellest, kuidas tähendust saab uurida ja mis tema teooriat motiveerib. Esitatakse homo semioticuse esialgne mudel, ning järgmises peatükis laiendatakse seda esialgset mudelit. *Homo Semioticuse* teooria järgib isikut, kes viib läbi ükskõik millise teksti analüüsi. Teooria eritleb narratiivi valla ja sisuvalla, ning toetub tugevalt sisu stiili analüüsile. Sisu stiili analüüs järgib kolme metodoloogiat. Esiteks, diskursiivse tasandi analüüs, kus kasutatakse dekonstruktsiooni, denotatsiooni ja dihhotoomiat. Teiseks, narratiivi tasandi analüüs, kus toimub lausungite (põhimiste, situatsiooniliste ja performatiivsete) kindlaksmääramine, ning kus ilmuvad transformatiivne objekt ja A.J Greimas'i (1983) narratiivne programm (manipulatsioon, kompetents, esitus, sanktsioneerimine). Kolmandaks, põhimise struktuuri (loogilis–semantilise) tasandi analüüs, kus Rifat taaskord kasutab Greimas'i semiootilist ruutu. Rifati teooria eristab end narratiivi analüüsist signifikatsiooni/tunnetuse objektide abil. Ta rakendab tõlkeprotsessi kui metateksti loojat, entsüklopeedilist teadmist kui analüüstiku teadmiste summat, ja analüütiku vaimsete kalduvuste viiest klassifikatsiooni, mida töös nimetatakse kognitiivseteks aspektideks.

Rifat'i teooria analüüs toob välja uued tulemused. Ehkki see teooria on mõeldud kirjanduslike tekstide analüüsiks, on tal ka tunnetuslik mõõde. Selle teooria pakutud tähenduse analüüs asetatakse kognitiivsemiootika konteksti, ning töös väidetakse, et kognitiivsemiootikal tuleks kasutada igat sobilikku mudelit inimeste tähendusloome uurimiseks. See argument esitatakse viiendas peatükis ning põhineb Zlatevi, Konderaki, Brandti ja Bundgaardi arusaamadel.

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