Orsi, Francesco, juhendajaAguisoul, YoussefTartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkondTartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond2021-06-282021-06-28202120.03.01 AGU 01http://hdl.handle.net/10062/72731Are finally valuable states of affairs intrinsically good (good in themselves) or extrinsically good (good for us)? G.E. Moore argues that finally valuable states of affairs are intrinsically good. I do not believe that this is the case. Against Moore, I argue that finally valuable states of affairs are good for us on the grounds that states of affairs involving human beings have a function, namely, to ‘place’ human beings into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world, and that the good state of affairs is that which places the involved individual into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world in a good way, in a way that is beneficial to the individual. Therefore, finally valuable states of affairs are beneficially good, good for us, rather than good in themselves.engopenAccessAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternationalphilosophymagistritöödfilosoofiaThesis