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An Analysis of the Effects of the Financial Crisis on the performance of Eurosceptic
parties in national elections

Bachelor's thesis

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1. Introduction

In the recent years, after a period of relatively high trust in the European Union, Europe has once again seen a rapid and widespread rise of Euroscepticism on the domestic level of politics, for the second time after the spike in Euroscepticism caused by the Maastricht Treaty. The citizens of European countries are growing more dissatisfied with the so-called eurocrats, the reasoning behind it being in many cases that the EU has substantial decision-making power and the national parliaments, therefore, have less say in, for an example, bailout packages. The countries of the European Union have responded to the crisis by moving towards more integration inside the EU by signing the European Stability Mechanism and the agreement on the reforms of the Banking Union amongst other methods to stabilize the economy. Still, since the crisis reached the European Union in 2008, the electorate in some of the creditor countries has become tired of taking responsibility for other countries' poor management of funds and spending, while they themselves have managed to cut back on government debt and in some cases have directly suffered worsening of everyday life standards, for an example, street lighting cutbacks during evenings. This was especially important during the financial decline when countries were struggling to uphold the standards set at the times of economical prosperity

On the other hand, citizens in the so-called „Southern periphery“ of Europe, i.e. Greece, Portugal, Spain and others, feel that there is no solidarity in the EU, that they are blamed and that is why their distrust in the European institutions has grown. The EU is seen as a bully who has taken away decision-making power from national democracies and is now exerting control of domestic policies by forcing austerity measures and cutbacks on pensions and raising taxes at the same time. *„In this new situation, governments come or go but policies remain basically the same and cannot be challenged. Meanwhile, in northern European countries, the EU is increasingly seen to have failed to control the policies of the southern rim. The creditors have a sense of victimhood that mirrors that of the debtors,“* (Torreblanca and Leonard 2013:1).

Another factor that divides Europe is the problem with migration, both inner migration and the waves of immigrants coming from Africa, Middle-East and other

developing countries that are not in the EU. On the foremost front of this issue are Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, on whose coastline thousands of immigrants land each week. From there, the immigrants mostly try to travel to the north. Concerning the inner-migration in Europe, people from the ex-Soviet republics try to make their way to the central and western part of the EU, where the living standards are higher, corruption is not felt that strongly in everyday life and in many cases, the climate is warmer. The natives in central-European countries in many cases feel as if the migrants are taking away their jobs and opportunities and that might be a reason to blame the EU. They feel as if it weren't for the EU and free market, there wouldn't be so many migrants in their specific country. On the other hand- Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal have expressed that they feel as if they have been left alone with the problem of the waves of immigrants landing on their shores each week and that this is demanding a great deal of financial resources from them. Requests have been made for the other European countries to accept asylum seekers and other immigrants as a measure of solidarity and on the side, other countries should support them with personnel and financial measures to deal with this.

This thesis argues that the financial crisis of the European Union and in the Eurozone has had an effect on domestic elections and that anti-European parties have gained momentum and seats in the parliaments of the countries. The author will test the hypothesis that the citizens of the European Union have, in their national parliament elections, started to vote more in favour of the parties that advocate anti-Europeanism publicly. The paper also argues that most of the Eurosceptic parties are on the right side of the traditional right-left ideological scale.

The thesis consists of four parts. The first part reviews existing literature on how to categorize parties that oppose, reject and/or would like to change the European Union or European Integration and also seeks an answer to what causes Euroscepticism. In the first part, a definition for this thesis will be provided to best characterize Eurosceptical parties in this thesis. The second part of the thesis will explain the methodology of the research and provide background information about the data, its origins and the use of it in this research. It will also more in-depth explain the different variables in this research, to better understand the results presented in the third part of the thesis for each country individually.

Finally, the fourth part will summarize the results and point out key issues that were found during the conduct of this thesis. It will also provide some topics that will be relevant in the future when more data is available. The analysis results will be presented separately for each country.

2. Definition and Determinants of Party-based Euroscepticism

2.1 Defining Party-based Euroscepticism

Historically, the roots of the term „Eurosceptic“ can be found in Britain. Harmsen & Spiering consider the term „Eurosceptic“ to be a successor to the British term „anti-marketeer“, which was coined in order to express the Britain’s opposition to the single and integrated market (Harmsen & Spiering 2005:16, 128). Coming from humble beginnings, the term „Eurosceptic“ now has a much broader meaning, which encompasses any and every opposition to any aspect related to the European Union. Defining Euroscepticism any further has been difficult and while there is a multitude of different definitions composed by a variety of leading European scholars, there is no perfect one as of yet. First and foremost, two different types of Euroscepticism are distinguished from one another, public Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism. This thesis focuses on party-based Euroscepticism. The most frequently used explanation of the term „party-based Euroscepticism“ expresses opposition against the integration of Europe (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002:9).

Taggart and Szczerbiak have further divided Euroscepticism into two categories: Hard and Soft. They define „Hard Euroscepticism“ as *„principled opposition to the EU and European integration [that] can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived,* (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002:7). Soft Euroscepticism is explained as *„opposition against specific EU policies, policy outcomes or institutional features and seek to reform the EU rather than abolish the entire project,“* (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:7). The approach presented by Szczerbiak and Taggart, however, has been constructively criticized by Kopecky and Mudde, who have pointed out a key weakness that Soft

Euroscepticism was defined over inclusively by Szczerbiak and Taggart, which leads to false positives, since every disagreement with policies of the European Union can be classified as being Eurosceptic and this will lead to categorizing either more or less parties as Eurosceptic, than there is in reality (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:300).

In addition to pinpointing the weakpoints of the theoretical framework presented by Taggart & Szczerbiak, Kopecky & Mudde also present an alternative way of dividing the Eurosceptics into categories. The scheme of Kopecky and Mudde differentiates between „diffuse“ and „specific“ support for European integration, where by under *diffuse* they mean support for general ideas of European integration that are the foundation of the EU. Under the term *specific* support they mean the general practice of European integration, alas, the EU as it is and the direction that it is developing. (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:300). In their work, Kopecky & Mudde further distinguish between Europhiles and Europhobes. Europhiles are found to believe in the ideas of institutionalized cooperation and surrendering some of their national sovereignty for the advantages that the integrated and liberal common market brings. Europhiles include federalists, whose idea of European integration is creating a supranational state and those to whom European integration is exclusively about economic terms, e.g. creating a free trade zone, but not surrendering any national sovereignty. (Kopecky & Mudde 2002:301). Europhobes on the other hand do not support and often oppose the general ideas of European integration. There is no rule of thumb that Europhobes, or Eurosceptics for that matter, have to be on a certain side of the linear right-left ideological spectrum, Europhobes may be nationalists, socialists, isolationists. (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:301).

Another aspect that Kopecky & Mudde take into consideration is the support for European Union, where they distinguish between the EU-optimists and the EU-pessimists. The EU-optimists support the EU as it is because of the way it has been built or because they are optimistic about the direction that they see is developing towards in the future (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:303). The EU-pessimists, on the other hand, do not support the EU or European integration as it is in the moment or they are pessimistic about the direction of future development. The authors do defer, that not all EU-pessimists object EU membership. (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:302). It does mean,

however, that the parties categorized as such would ideally change some things about the European integration or the EU for better suitability to their own wishes.

The framework of Kopecky and Mudde leads to four ideal-type categories regarding parties' views on Europe, the EU and the European integration. The categories, from most support to the 3 aspects to the least, are as follows: Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatics, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects. This approach again has certain downsides. Firstly, in reality, the category Europragmatic is found to look good on paper, but in the real world there are very few parties that can be labelled Europragmatic and oppose the very idea of European Union but still support it as it is, just because there is no better alternative (Beichelt 2004:46). Secondly, this would cause unnecessary confusion and overlapping of categories in some parties' cases (Heinisch, Landsberger, Schlipphak 2011:11).

Other authors have also created different typologies by building on the theory first proposed by Szczerbiak and Taggart by adding more „boxes to cross the x into“, such as the one suggested by Conti and Verzichelli who came up with adding a „no interest in European Integration“ status and two variants for those who regard the EU and European Integration as a positive thing: „Functional Europeanism“ and „Identity Europeanism“ (Conti and Verzichelli 2002:48). Another theory to classify stances on the EU and European Integration was proposed by Flood and Usherwood, which is broken down to seven categories that are based upon the degree of support shown EU/European integration in general or aspects of it (Flood and Usherwood 2007:7). This further fragments the whole concept of Euroscepticism, which might be helpful in some cases to better understand, why a party takes a certain stance, but not for a quantitative research which includes election results because the categories would overlap in many cases and this would result in false positives.

All in all, there are numerous researches on this topic and a variety of different opinions on how to better break down Euroscepticism and define it to the fullest. The author concludes it is best to empirically find out how the parties themselves advocate for or against the European Union and European Integration. This means that instead of categorizing the parties as Hard- or Soft- Eurosceptics or in another way, there will be values shown for each party, based on content analysis of the parties' own manifests that were presented for elections, which show to what extent the parties are for or

against the EU and European Integration. The values that are provided aid in understanding if anti-European rhetoric helped the parties achieve better results or not. Together with a percentage value on how much of their manifests the parties dedicated to European Issues will give a better understanding of the salience of European Issues to the parties.

2.2 Determinants party-based Euroscepticism

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism has been carefully studied by a number of scholars and they have come to a number of different conclusions of as to what exactly fuels the it. Since different researches focus on different aspects, those conclusions vary from one another in a great deal, for an example, authors who focus on the economic aspects are likely to, and have also, found negative correlation between long-term GDP growth expectations and support for Euroscepticism (Nicoli 2015:20). On the other hand, Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia concluded that national identity is very strongly correlated to the rise of Euroscepticism, suggesting that support for extreme right parties means growth in support anti-European ideas and that confidence in national political institutions correlate negatively to Euroscepticism, meaning that if the trust for national political institutions is high, the support for Euroscepticism is low and vice versa. (Serricchio, Tsakatika, Quaglia, 2012:11)

Moreover, Nicoli has found negative correlation between unemployment and Euroscepticism, but suggests that this may be caused by the fact that of the countries with high unemployment rates in his panel (Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Greece), only Greece has a strong set of Eurosceptic parties and that the countries with a strong set of Eurosceptic parties, have low unemployment rates. On the other hand Nicoli has found, that youth unemployment correlates positively to Euroscepticism and also suggests that this may be due that the youth have less savings in comparison to older citizens, which might make them react more painfully to a sudden loss of income compared to older citizens, but he also notes that there might be other factors in play, such as differences in media consumption (Nicoli 2015:21). Interestingly, Nicoli in his research also found that long-term mistrust in the EU has the voters lose hope and not go to European

Parliament elections, thus correlating positively. Meanwhile, short term mistrust as a consequence of a temporary crisis such as the sovereign debt crisis, mobilizes the voters in hope of a better tomorrow, therefore correlating negatively. Moreover, Nicoli found that in the case of European Parliament elections voters tend to economically protest-vote, meaning that in case that the economy of a country is suffering, voters punish the governing parties and officials for it by voting for parties in the opposition or for the fringe-parties (Nicoli, 2015:21).

Another cause for Euroscepticism that is directly linked to economy is the rise or fall of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) has found that in the countries, in which the GDP shrank, Public Euroscepticism has taken a rise. More specifically, a 5% decline on average resulted in a 6,6% rise in Public Euroscepticism, thus very strongly negatively correlating. They also found that four of the five countries that received a bailout, lie in fact above the 95% confidence interval for their regression model, meaning that there must be other influences beside the very strong economic influence to the Euroscepticism of those countries. One theory presented by ISPI is that the public felt that the bailouts came with too many conditions for the respective countries (Italian Institute for International Political Studies).

Another cause for party-based Euroscepticism (logically if not correctly) is rooted in Public Euroscepticism, which is greatly linked with the economic cost-benefit aspect. If a country gains more from EU membership than it costs, the citizens are more inclined to be positively minded about the EU membership. Therefore the party-rhetoric of office-seeking parties will be positively minded as well. This might not be the case for goal-seeking parties, however. Szczerbiak & Taggart in their research found that goal-seeking parties will first and foremost evaluate if changing the stance on European integration and the EU serves the purpose of fulfilling their goals and serve the benefits of their supporters and/or targeted supporters and then, if this should be the case, they undertake the ideological shift (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003:19). On the other hand, Szczerbiak and Taggart evidently found no clear evidence that a party's ideology determines their position on Europe. Here they also find it relevant, if the party is office-seeking or goal-seeking, meaning for an example that right-wing extreme party will most likely be Eurosceptic if it is goal-seeking but again this might not be true if

the party is office-seeking and is willing to throw a small amount of ideological stance „under the bus“ (Szczurbiak and Taggart 2003:20).

The second aspect that Szczurbiak and Taggart point out that the EU and „European integration“ are very much open to interpretation, or as they put it- „*Malleable*“, and therefore different parties can interpret the ideas of Europe to suit their needs, wants and likes according to what the situation (pre- or post-election) needs. Hand in hand with this idea goes the amount of prominence the parties give to the European issues, which is from their viewpoint determined by a combination of electoral-strategic and coalition-tactical factors. Here, the most important matter is how much salience the current and potential target supporters give to the European issues (Szczurbiak and Taggart 2003:19).

Thirdly, Taggart and Szczurbiak found in their research that some parties are ideologically more predisposed to be Eurosceptic than others, say right-wing extremist parties for an example, but they found no conclusive evidence that a party's position on the left right scale matters in so far that in example on the right side of the linear scale, Euroscepticism dominates, as the authors themselves put it, they found strange ideological „*bedfellows*“. They did however find that Euroscepticism is more likely found on both far ends of the linear scale, meaning that center parties which try to appeal to a wider range of electorate, are less likely to express Euroscepticism, the fringe parties on the other hand, which appeal to a more narrow set of electorate are likely to delve into Euroscepticism to catch the votes of people dissatisfied with the current political „regime“, or in other words, protest voters (Szczurbiak and Taggart 2003:9).

3. Empirical analysis of electoral performance of Eurosceptical parties

3.1 Methodology and measuring anti-Europeanism

In order to get a better understanding of the importance of Euroscepticism, this thesis will also include the aspect of saliency of the EU and European Integration in it

(common denominator „European Issues“ in this thesis). To best do this, this research will use The Manifesto Project Dataset that is a part of the MARPOR or Manifesto Research on Political Representation project, which is a content-analysis based dataset that „provides the scientific community with parties’ policy positions derived from content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos. The MARPOR project aims to substantively analyse the role of parties at different stages of the political process and it specifically examines the quality of programmatic representation. It studies the programmatic supply of parties, the relation between parties and voters, the role of parties in parliament, and the translation of party programmes into policy output,“ (MARPOR).

The main reason behind the authors’ usage of Project Manifesto Dataset and not an alternative like for an example Chapel Hill Dataset is that the data from Project Manifesto dataset is the most available, in .xls format, which does not require additional paid licences for programs, such as STATA. Secondly, in a similar research conducted by Heinisch, Landsberger and Schlipphak, which conceptualized the saliency of different matters in party manifestos, raised the issue of Project Manifesto Dataset not having the data for more recent elections (Heinisch, Landsberger and Schlipphak 2011:13). In this case, in the authors opinion, this is irrelevant, as the time-frame of the research is limited to the time of financial crisis plus one election and therefore, latest election data in the time window of 2010-2013 is sufficient. The second critique from Heinisch and Landsberger towards Project Manifesto Dataset is that the Project Manifesto Dataset measures the positions of parties presented by parties in advance to the European Parliament elections, which might overestimate salience parties ascribe to European or Eurosceptic matters, but this is irrelevant in the case of this thesis since it focuses on national elections and not European Parliament elections (Heinisch, Landsberger and Schlipphak 2011: 10-11)

In the Project Manifesto Dataset, the number of pro and con arguments to certain subject matters for each given party manifesto are listed. First of all, with this information it can be seen, if the party is pro- or anti-European in its rhetoric simply by adding the values. Pro- and anti-European statements are separately coded in the Project Manifesto Dataset, which makes it possible to just add the values. Anti-European statements will then be recoded to have negative values in order to add them together.

Pro-European values mean that there are N-number of positive values in the manifesto, for an example 7 pro-European lines in the manifesto would translate into a score of 7, exactly the opposite with the anti-European lines, 7 of these would translate into -7 and if added together, the outcome would be 0. By adding the two values, we get the sum, which define the overall attitudes of the party towards the EU and European Integration (which is labelled with „European Issues score“ in this thesis), if the sum of the two added values is positive, the party is considered pro-European, if the sum is negative, the party is considered to vocalize anti-European rhetoric.

For the saliency aspect, the author will add together the overall arguments (pro and contra) in regard to the EU and European Integration and calculate the percentage that the „European Issues“ make up of the whole manifesto, meaning that if the percentage is 25, then a quarter of a given partys' manifesto contains pro and/ or anti-European statements.

Since partys' attitudes towards the EU and European Integration are bound to somewhat change in at least the number of times that these issues are reflected in their respective election manifestos, then the „European Issues score“ will be calculated for each election separately, in order to see, if the rhetoric changes over time. At the same time, the author will present the election results that the party achieved with the given manifesto and how many places in the parliament that secured them, for each election that the party participated in the time-frame. The vote share percentage and places secured in parliament are also a part of the Project Manifesto Dataset, which is another reason to use it.

In the analysis, the author will compare the longitudinal election results for each Eurosceptic party to draw conclusions if Euroscepticism has gained foothold after the financial crisis or not, meaning the thesis focuses on the time period of, because of data availability, 2007-2013. This is to compare if the times of decline in economy and worsening of everyday life standards for citizens has had an effect on, first of all the rhetorics of parties, and secondly, the election results. The author will also see, on which side of the left-right spectrum the parties tend to find themselves at according to Manifesto Project Dataset and if Euroscepticism is more likely to be found in old or new member states of the European Union. The analysis will be conducted for all of the

members of the European Union with the exceptions of Latvia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus, the reason behind it being that there was not enough election data in the given time frame for these countries. The results for the countries will be presented in no particular order.

For categorization purposes, the elections held before the financial crisis reached Europe and the elections held in 2009, will be in one category and the elections held from 2010 and onwards, will be in the other. This is to prove or disprove that anti-European parties gained votes in the elections held after the financial crisis as to compared before the crisis. During the whole time period ranging from 2005 until 2013, 416 party Manifestos were analysed.

3.2 Electoral success of Eurosceptic parties

This chapter reviews the empirical data on the success of the Eurosceptic parties before and during the financial crisis. The chapter will also review how the parties' stance on European Union has changed in time, according to party manifestos for elections before the crisis and during the crisis. This chapter will also try to find a correlation between the parties' position on the traditional right-left scale and their take on the European Union and European Community.

Lastly, it will be examined in this chapter, if there is a correlation between the electorates' stance on the Euro-currency and the success of the Eurosceptic parties' election results. Latvia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus will be left out of the research, because there is data for only 1 or no election manifestos during the time period of 2005-2013 for these countries at the time of writing and therefore no comparisons can be made.

During the whole time period ranging from 2005 until 2013, 70 out of a total of 416 party election manifestos were found to be anti-European. In Romania, Croatia, Lithuania and Estonia, no manifestos were Eurosceptic. The average score of the European Issues of the 70 manifestos was -15,26. The most anti-European party, according to the Project Manifesto Database, is the French National front, that presented

a manifesto with a score of -72 for the 2007 elections, they achieved 4,29% of the total votes and with that result they got no seats in the parliament.

In 52 manifestos, out of the 416, the European Union nor the European Community was not mentioned at all, meaning this topic was not salient at the time for the party in question. Somewhat surprisingly, among the party manifestos of the „old member states“ of the European Union, there were more manifestos, in which the EU or European Community was not mentioned in any way, the tally being at 36 versus 16 in the countries that joined in 2004 and onwards.

The saliency that parties show towards European Issues differs not only from party to party, but also for parties in time. Out of the 52 manifestos, that did not find the EU and/or European Community salient enough to include it, 27 were written prior to 2010, 25 were written in 2010 or later. There were only 3 parties, that did not include the European Union or the European Community in any of their manifestos in the time period of 2005-2013, 2 of them being Danish (V Liberals and Social Democratic Party, both participated in 3 elections during the time), and 1 from the Czech Republic (The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, participated in 2 elections during the time). All of the other parties left the EU/European Integration out only once. European Issues are held the least salient in Denmark, where the EU was left out of the manifests 10 times out of 25. In Austria, Estonia, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia the European Issues were mentioned in every party manifesto included in the research.

Overall the results for the countries, that were hit hardest by the financial crisis, are ambiguous. In out of the seven countries that were included in the research that had an unemployment rate of 10% and above in 2009 in three (Spain, Hungary and Ireland) the vote share for anti-European parties rose by the next election, in two of them it declined (Portugal and Slovakia) and in two countries- Estonia and Lithuania- there were no parties that had presented an anti-European manifesto (Eurostat). When viewing the results for the ten countries that suffered the most severe decline in GDP in 2009, there are four countries (Hungary, Finland, Ireland and Germany) where anti-European manifestos have won votes at the next elections; only in Slovenia has the vote share gone down. In four countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia), there

were no anti-European manifestos during any elections and there was no data on Latvia (Eurostat).

When viewing GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, in out of the 15 countries, where purchasing power had gone down in 2009, in 8 anti-European parties won more votes at the next elections, in three countries the vote share went down. In four countries, no parties had presented an anti-European manifesto and there was no data on the parties' manifestos from Latvia.

Sweden

For Sweden, there was data available for two elections- 2006 and 2010. The only party to present an anti-European manifesto for both elections was MP Green Ecology Party that is on the left side of the linear left-right spectrum. It had an European Issue score of -2 for both elections, in 2006 1% of the manifesto was dedicated to European Issues, in 2010 the percentage was at 0,8. In 2006 they achieved 5,2% of the total votes, which got them 19 of the total 349 seats. In 2010, 7,3% of the electorate voted for them and it resulted in 25 seats of 349. In Sweden, the V Left Party presented an anti-European manifesto for the 2006 elections, which had a score of -9 and it resulted in 5,9% of the votes and 19 seats, however in the next elections they presented a manifesto, which gave no importance to European issues at all and they got 5,6% of the votes and 19 seats in the Parliament. Interestingly, in comparison with the 2006 elections, in 2010 there was a newcomer in the face of the SD Sweden Democrats Party, that is positioned on the right side of the left-right spectrum, which presented a manifesto with the score of -9 and in which the European Issues made up 4,4% of the content, that got them 5,7% of total votes and 20 seats.

Denmark

For Denmark, there was data available on three elections: 2005, 2007 and 2011. In total there were 2 parties that presented signs of anti-Europeanism. The first one, EL Red-Green Unity List, which is a moderate-left party, has in time gotten less anti-European with the corresponding scores: -22 in 2005, -10 in 2007 and -3 in 2011, the respective

percentages for European Issues represented in the manifestos were 10%, 3,3% and 0,7%. The Party hasn't fared too well in the elections, in 2005 it got 3,4% of the total votes which resulted in 6 seats in the Parliament, in 2007 it was 2,2% with 4 seats but 2011 brought a slight improvement, with 6,7% of the total votes and 12 seats of the total 175. The Danish People's Party, which in opposite to Red-Green Unity List, finds itself on the right-side of the spectrum, participated also in all of the said 3 elections, the according EU-issue scores were: -3 in 2005, -4 in 2007 and -22 in 2011 and the respective percentages for European Issues in those manifests were 6,8 in 2005, 12,8 in 2007 and 6,3 in 2011. Interestingly the election results have stayed roughly the same, with the party getting 13,2% of the votes in 2005, resulting in 24 of the 175 total seats, in 2007 they fared slightly better, getting 13,8% of the votes and 25 seats and in 2011 it was 12,3% of the votes and 22 seats, meaning a slight decline.

Finland

For Finland, there was data on 2 elections, in 2007 and in 2011. Finland has only 1 party, that can be considered anti-European, the True Finns, which is a nationalist, right-wing party. In the 2007 elections, the True Finns got 4% of the total electorate votes, which resulted in 5 of the total 200 seats in the parliament. Astonishingly, the True Finns devoted about 11% of their total manifesto at the time to European Issues, which had a score of -64. In 2011, the True Finns managed a „surprise victory“, as they got the third best result in the countries' election, 19% of the votes and 39 seats in parliament. They did however tone their manifesto down a little bit- the score for it was -58 and this time it occupied „only“ 3,9 of their total manifesto.

Belgium

For Belgium, there is data on 2 elections- 2007 and 2011. The Flemish Interest, a right-wing party can be considered mildly Eurosceptic, since in the 2007 elections, it had a EU-issue score of -8 with 2,2% of the manifesto dedicated to European Issues, but that changed to a +2 for the 2010 elections, with 1,8% of the manifesto occupied by

European Issues. The Party did however receive 12% of the total votes in 2007 along with 17 seats but that declined to 7,7% in 2010 with 12 seats.

Netherlands

For the Netherlands, there was data on 2 elections- 2006 and 2010. There were 2 parties, that can be considered anti-European, however the Socialist Party went from a -28 score in 2006 to a neutral 0 stance in 2010. With the more anti-European manifesto in 2006, they received 16,6% of the total votes, which resulted in 25 seats of the 150 in the parliament, but in 2010 they declined to 9,8% share of the votes and 15 seats. European Issues were regarded in the manifestos with 2,5% and 1,7% of total lines. The second, Party of Freedom, which lies on the right side of the linear ideological spectrum, started out less anti-European, with a -8 score in 2006 but went to -36 in 2010, with the European Issues reflected in the manifestos 5,8% and 5,3% of the total lines respectively. In 2006, the Freedom Party received 5,9% of the total votes, which resulted in 9 seats. In 2010, they fared better and got 15,5% of the votes and 24 seats.

Luxembourg

For Luxembourg, there was data on 2 elections- 2009 and 2013. In Luxembourg, there is one party that can be considered anti-European in 2009 and more so in 2013- the centristic Alternative Democratic Reform Party. In 2009, it presented a manifesto with the score of -2 and in 2010 they had moved it up to a -44 and the saliency of the European Issues had grown within the manifesto as well, from less than 0,1% in 2009 to 2,3% of the total manifesto lines in 2013. In the elections, the party received 8,1% of the total votes, resulting in 4 seats of the 60 total in parliament. In the 2013 they fared slightly worse, with 6,6% of the votes they got 3 seats in the parliament.

France

For France, there was data on 2 elections, 2007 and 2012. One party, the National Front which, as its name says, is a nationalistic right-wing party, can be considered anti-European. For the 2007 elections the National Front presented a manifesto which had a score of -72, by 2012 they however toned the anti-EU rhetoric down quite a bit, resulting in a score of -15. The saliency percentage lies for 2007 at 5,9% of the total lines in the manifesto and 5,1% in 2012. The National Front did not fare very well in the 2007 elections in which they got 4,3% of the votes and no places in the 577 seats strong parliament. They did somewhat better in 2012 however, when they got 13,6% of the total votes and 2 seats in the parliament.

Italy

For Italy, there was data on three elections- 2006, 2008 and 2013 but curiously, there are no parties that had shown signs of Anti-Europeanism before 2013, in the 2013 elections there were four: Civil Revolution, Left Ecology Freedom, Labour and Freedom List and Brothers of Italy- National Center-Right, the first two are left-wing, Labour and Freedom List being left-center and Brothers of Italy-National Center-Right as its name says, is center-right. Their combined significance, although, is very little, with the left and center-left parties gaining a combined vote share of 5,7% and 38 seats of the 630 in parliament. The European Issues percentage in their respective manifestos ranged from 0,5% to 1,6%. Brothers of Italy- National Center-Right gained 1,9% of the total votes and won 9 seats in the parliament, however, it only assigned 0,2% of its manifesto for European Issues, with a score of -7.

Spain

For Spain, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2011. In Spain, there are two parties that showed anti-Europeanism in their respective manifestos. The United Left party showed a score of -6 for European Issues in 2008 and -13 in 2011, the overall significance of the European Issues was rather low, though, with about 1% of the manifesto in 2008 dedicated for European Issues and less than 0,1% in 2011. The party

achieved 3,8% of the vote share in 2008, gaining 2 of the total 350 seats in parliament. In 2011 they achieved better results with 7% of the votes and 11 seats in parliament. The second and smaller party is the Galician Nationalist Bloc, which scored -21 in 2008 and -17 in 2011 on the European Issues, with the percentages of European Issues mentioned in the manifestos being 0,4 and less than 0,1 respectively. The party achieved 2 seats in both parliament elections, with 0,8% vote share in both elections.

Portugal

For Portugal, there was data on two elections, 2009 and 2011. There were 2 parties, that can be considered slightly anti-European and both lie on the left side of the ideological spectrum: Left Bloc and Portuguese Communist Party. The Left Bloc scored a -29 on the European Issues in 2009 and -21 in 2011 and they dedicated 2,9% of their manifesto to European Issues in 2009 and 3,4% in 2011. The Left Bloc achieved 10,1% of the votes and 16 seats out of 230 in 2009. In 2011 they did not fare quite as good, with the vote share achieved being at 5,4% which got them 8 seats in parliament. The Portuguese Communist Party scored -29 in 2009 and -16 in 2011 on the European Issues, with 2,5% of the whole manifesto being dedicated to European Issues in 2009 and 3,4% in 2011. Their election results were fairly stable, in 2009 they achieved 7% of the votes and 13 seats and in 2011 it was 7,2% and 14 seats in the parliament.

Germany

For Germany, there was data for three elections- 2005, 2009 and 2013 but anti-Europeanism was only found amongst the parties that ran for office in 2013- The Pirate Party, which is considered to be on the left side of the ideological spectrum according to its manifesto through the Manifesto Project Database¹. The Pirate Party scored -8 on the European Issues and 1,1% of its election manifest was dedicated to the European Issues. In total they achieved 2,2% of the total votes but that did not earn them any seats

¹ Siia manifesto website link.

in the parliament. The Alternative for Germany is a far-right-populist party, it scored -9 on the European Issues and it devoted 15% of its manifest to the matter. The Alternative for Germany got 4,7% of the total votes in 2013 but failed to secure a seat in the parliament with this result.

Great Britain

For Great Britain, there was data for 2 elections- 2005 and 2010. Sadly, the Manifesto Project Database has not coded United Kingdom Independence Party, which got 2,2% of the votes in 2005² and 3,1% in 2010, but failed to secure representation in the parliament with the result³. However there is data on the Conservative Party, which scored -6 on European Issues in 2005 and -5 in 2010 with the percentage of the manifesto dedicated for European Issues in 2005 being at 4,1 and 2,3 in 2010. The Conservative Party got a total 32,4% of the total votes which resulted in 198 seats in the parliament in 2005 and 36,1% of the votes in 2010, which in turn resulted in 307 of the 649 total seats.

Ireland

For Ireland there was data on 2 elections- 2007 and 2011. One party in Ireland can be considered anti-European, Ourselves Alone or Sinn Fein. In 2007 it scored -20 on the European Issues with the percentage of the manifesto dedicated to European Issues at 1,5. The party achieved 6,9% of the votes and 4 of the total 166 seats in the parliament. In 2011 the party scored -1 on the European Issues, with less than 0,2% of the manifest dedicated to European Issues. The party won 9,9% of the vote share in 2011 and secured 14 seats in parliament.

² http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/167891/UK-Parliament-elections-2005-Electoral-data-Report.pdf

³ http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/excel_doc/0020/105725/GE2010-constituency-results-website.xls

Bulgaria

For Bulgaria, there was data on three elections- 2005, 2009 and 2013. One Party, the National Union „Attack“ can be considered to be anti-European, as it scored negatively on European Issues on two occasions- for the 2005 elections, they presented a manifesto which scored -2 and for the 2013 elections one that scored -24. For the 2009 elections, they presented a manifesto, which gave no prominence to European Issues at all. In the election manifesto presented for the 2005 elections, 5,2% of the whole was dedicated to European Issues and in 2013, 1,4%. The party has been fairly stable at the elections, with 8,1% of the votes going their way in 2005, resulting in 21 seats of the 240 in total. In 2009, they again got 21 seats with 9,4% of the votes and in 2013 they scored 7,3% of the votes, which secured them 23 seats in the parliament.

Croatia

For Croatia, there was data for two elections- 2007 and 2011 but no parties can be classified as anti-European because of their manifestos. Interestingly, no negative lines about the European Issues have been written in any of the manifestos presented by any party for the two election periods, little importance has been given to European Issues overall as well, with the highest percentage of lines being 6,7 by the Independent Democratic Serbian Party presented for the 2011 elections.

Czech Republic

For the Czech Republic, there was data on three elections- 2006, 2010 and 2013. The Civic Democratic Party of the Czech Republic, which is a center-right party, can be considered to be anti-European, although for the 2006 and 2010 elections they presented manifestos, that were overall positive of the European Issues- scoring 6 and 11 respectively. For the 2013 elections the manifesto presented scored -6, however. The election results for the Civic Democratic Party have been on a steady decline. In 2006 they achieved 35,4% of the votes, securing them 81 seats of the 200 in the parliament, thereby winning the elections. In 2010, they got 20,2% of the votes, which got them 53

seats in the parliament, being the second best result. In comparison, with the more anti-European manifesto in 2013, they got 7,7% of the votes and 16 seats in the parliament. Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy, a right-wing populist party, participated in only the 2013 elections and for this election they presented a manifesto, which scored -6 on the European Issues, with 1,7% of the manifesto being dedicated to European Issues. They got 6,9% of the electorates votes, which resulted in 14 seats in the parliament.

Hungary

For Hungary, there was data on two elections- 2006 and 2010. In 2006, no parties which achieved representation in the parliament, presented anti-European manifests. For the 2010 elections, Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary presented a manifesto, which scored -39 on the European Issues, with 3% of the manifesto being dedicated to European Issues. With this manifesto, the far-right party scored 16,7% of the votes, securing them the third-largest representation in the parliament with 47 out of the 386 seats.

Lithuania

For Lithuania, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2012. However, no parties in Lithuania have presented a manifesto, which could be considered anti-European during the two election periods. Little importance has been given to the European Issues during the two election periods by the parties in Lithuania, with one exception being the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in 2008, which dedicated 9% of its manifesto to the positive sides of European Issues with which they achieved 11,7% of the votes, resulting in 25 of the 141 seats in the parliament.

Estonia

For Estonia, there was data on two elections- 2007 and 2011, however no parties with an anti-European manifesto achieved representation in the parliament. Three parties in

Estonia presented a manifesto for the 2007 election periods, in which more than 4,5% of the whole was dedicated to European Issues, those three parties secured a total of 56 seats of the 101 in parliament.

Poland

For Poland, there was data on three elections- 2005, 2007, 2011. In Poland, there are two parties that can be considered to be anti-European, the PiS Law and Justice party, which is a right-wing, national conservative party and the League of Polish Families, that is also a right-wing, national conservative party. In the manifesto presented for the 2005 elections, they gave little importance to the European Issues, with them being mentioned only three times, which made up 0,9% of the whole manifesto that scored 1 in the test. In the election, they got 27% of the electorates' votes, which resulted in 155 of 460 seats in the parliament. The party has grown more anti-European over time, though. For the 2007 elections, they presented a manifesto which scored -4 on European Issues, with the percentage of the European Issues represented in the manifest being at 1,84. In those elections, the party won 32,1% of the votes, resulting in 166 seats in the parliament. During the 2011 election period, the party grew even more anti-European, with their manifesto scoring -34 and the European Issues 1% of their manifesto. The party achieved 30% of the votes and 157 seats in the parliament. In the 2005 elections, The League of Polish Families participated with their manifesto, in which European Issues made up 2,4% of the whole and which scored -4, which got them 8% of the total votes and secured 34 seats in the parliament. The party failed to achieve representation in the 2007 and 2011 elections and it seems plausible, that PiS Law and Justice gained votes because of that.

Romania

For Romania, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2012, however no parties have presented a manifesto, where the European Issues have been mentioned negatively. Overall, no party in Romania, has dedicated more than 2,3% of their manifesto to the European Issues.

Slovakia

For Slovakia, there was data on three elections- 2006, 2010 and 2012. There are two parties which can be considered anti-European in Slovakia- Slovak National Party & Freedom and Solidarity, which are both right-wing parties. Only Slovak National Party participated in the 2006 elections, for which they presented a manifesto, that scored 11 on European Issues and which had dedicated 1,9% of the whole to it. As far as the election results go, the Slovak National Party got 11,7% of the votes, which resulted in 20 of the 150 seats in parliament. For the 2010 elections, the Slovak National Party presented a manifesto, which scored 7 on European issues and in which 3,8% of the whole, was dedicated to those. The party only achieved 5% of the votes, though, which got them 9 seats in the parliament. For the 2012 elections, the Slovak National Party presented a more critical approach to European Issues in their manifesto, which scored -18 and in which 12,1% of the whole was dedicated to the European Issues. The election results did not get any better because of that, though, and the party achieved 4,6% of the electorates votes and failed to uphold representation in the parliament. The Freedom and Solidarity, which was founded in 2009, presented a manifesto for the 2010 elections, that scored -17 and had dedicated 1,7% of the whole to European Issues. With it, they achieved a 12,1% of the votes in their first elections and secured 22 seats. For the 2012 elections, they presented an even more anti-European manifesto, which scored -36 and in which 3,7% of the whole was dedicated to the European Issues. They did not win any votes with that, with the 5,9% of the electorate voting their way, which gave them 11 seats in the parliament.

Slovenia

For Slovenia, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2011. Only the Slovenian National Party has made any anti-European claims in their manifestos during the two election periods. For the 2008 elections, they presented a manifesto, which scored -2 in the test on European Issues and in which 1,5% was dedicated to those, with that they secured 5,4% of the votes and 5 seats of the 90 in the parliament. In 2011, the Slovenian

National Party failed to uphold representation in the parliament, with 1,8% of the votes going their way. For the election, they had presented a manifesto, which scored -4 and had dedicated 0,8% of their manifesto to European Issues.

Overall the results for the countries that were hit hardest by the financial crisis are ambiguous. In out of the seven countries that were included in the research that had an unemployment rate of 10% and above in 2009 in three (Spain, Hungary and Ireland) the vote share for anti-European parties rose by the next election, in two of them it declined (Portugal and Slovakia) and in two countries- Estonia and Lithuania- there were no parties that had presented an anti-European manifesto (Eurostat). When viewing the results for the ten countries that suffered the most severe decline in GDP in 2009, there are four countries (Hungary, Finland, Ireland and Germany) where anti-European manifestos have won votes at the next elections, only in Slovenia has the vote share gone down. In four countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia), there were no anti-European manifestos during any elections and there was no data on Latvia (Eurostat).

When viewing GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, in out of the 15 countries, where purchasing power had gone down in 2009, in 8 anti-European parties won more votes at the next elections, in three countries the vote share went down. In four countries, no parties had presented an anti-European manifesto and there was no data on the parties' manifestos from Latvia.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the results are ambiguous. There is about an even number of cases where an anti-European rhetoric has won votes after the financial crisis and *vice versa*. When viewing the countries, that were hit the hardest by the financial crisis in the sense that they had to be bailed out, in Spain and Ireland anti-Europeanism has won more votes at

the next elections, in Portugal the votes declined. There was no manifesto data available for Cyprus and Greece, however.

When viewing countries with the highest unemployment rates in 2009, in three of them anti-European parties fared better at the next elections, two did worse. When turning attention to the ten EU-countries with the most severe decline in GDP in 2009, in four countries anti-Europeanism won votes at the next elections and in only one the vote share went down. In the other countries, there were no anti-European parties or data was missing. Also, when viewing GDP per capita in purchasing power, in 8 out of 15 countries, where purchasing power went down, anti-Europeanism won votes and in 3 the votes declined. In four countries there were either no anti-European parties or data was missing.

All in all, there were 18 cases, where the election result of a party advocating anti-European rhetoric has improved during or after the financial crisis in Europe, but there were also 11 cases, in which the election result of such a party has declined, this is not enough to draw any definite conclusions, but it should sound some alarm bells in our heads, that should there be another supra-national crisis which affects the European Union and European Integration, the results might climb to be more worrisome, this also proves that anti-Europeanism is not insignificant, since in many countries, the rise was not something that one could look away from, such as the cases in Hungary, where Jobbik rose from a marginal party to one of the biggest seat holders in parliament. Secondly, the case of Finland, which expresses nicely, how tired the citizens of Finland have grown of a supra-national institution taking away the decision-making power and quite frankly, commanding the funds of Finland in an indirect way. Perhaps not as marginal as Jobbik was before the financial crisis, the True Finns have gained just as much influence in Finland. Perhaps not as extreme of a party, but still anti-European still, are the Conservatives in the UK, which has also seen a rise in support from 32,4% of the votes to 36,1%, which does not perhaps make huge and worrisome headlines all over the world, but still gives a sign, that anti-Europeanism might be getting more popular. In today's society, where information is easy to find and spreads at great speeds, knock-off parties in other parties are bound to come to life, since the societies in Europe are similar enough for these ideas to gain foothold also in the countries that they have not yet thus far.

Out of the parties under study, 22 were found to be on the right side of the linear ideological spectrum, 11 of them were on the left. This, in the authors' opinion, proves that anti-Europeanism is more likely to be found among the right-wing parties, even more so amongst the right-extremes. On the other hand, anti-Europeanism is not limited to those advocating a nationalist view, rather it is found at least on both far ends of the ideological spectrum and sometimes even in the middle. This points out, that this is not something extraordinary anymore, for a person or a party to have and express anti-European views. Of course the goals that find themselves at both of the ends of the ideological spectrum are different, but nonetheless can an anti-European be right- or left-wing or even a centrist.

In the new member states of the European Union (countries that joined the EU after 2004), anti-Europeanism had gotten better results at elections during or after the financial crisis than before it 5 times. In 4 cases, in new member states of the European Union, anti-Europeanist parties got worse results during or after the crisis, than they did beforehand. In the old member states, 14 times parties got better results during or after the financial crisis than before it and in 6 cases, parties got worse results during or after the crisis, than before it. The old member states were represented with 24 parties in the research and the new member states with 9. It is somewhat surprising that in Estonia and Lithuania, the countries that suffered some of the worst GDP declines, there were no anti-European lines in the election manifestos.

In the old member states, out of the 24 parties, 13 were found to be on the right side of the ideological spectrum, 11 were found to be on the left. Out of the new member states, all of the 9 parties that advocated anti-Europeanism were found to be right-wing parties. This is fascinating and it might be due to a number of reasons, for an example, it could be that in the old member states, parties feel the need to differentiate themselves from other parties and therefore express anti-Europeanism while in the new member states, this might not be the case since firstly, there are less parties. Secondly, the leftist parties (and the electorate for that matter) that have experience with the EU for a longer period of time, might be disappointed in the way it functions and seek reform and therefore advocate anti-Europeanism more strongly. This needs more research to give a definite answer to.

Most of the time, the results from the elections during or after the crisis did not differentiate from the ones held before the crisis hit too much, but there were some cases, where the anti-Europeanists have risen more strongly, for an example in Finland, where the True Finns effectively rose from a minor party to a substantial force in the domestic political landscape and expressed rather curious and extreme views in the media after the win. Also, the Conservatives win in the United Kingdom is not insignificant, they managed a growth of 3,7%, which in the United Kingdom resulted in 109 more seats than previously, the popularity of this success story might pave way to newcomers, such as the UK Independence Party, which holds much more extremist and stronger anti-European views. Also in Germany, where anti-Europeanism was not widespread before the crisis, two parties have gained from it, albeit not securing representation in the parliament this time, chances are that they will grow their electorate even more with time.

Of course it is not all one-sided, anti-European parties in Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovenia for an example, have lost the most support but these cases might be circumstantial and there might be a number of different reasons behind these cases of decline, this would need more research to make definite conclusions.

All in all, the author is aware that the thesis still has room to improve, further research is required to tie party-based anti-Europeanist voting together with the public levels of Euroscepticism, this will be the next step in this series of the research and will be conducted in the future. Another dimension, that would be fascinating to study, is how the migration crisis has affected the national- and supra-national level of politics and while some research could be conducted already, the author feels that it still too early and we have not seen the last of the migration crisis, therefore this will be put off to the future when at least two more rounds of elections have been conducted to simply have a broader sample of both national and European elections to analyse.

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6. Kokkuvõte: Analüüs finantskriisi mõjust Euroskeptiliste parteide valimistulemustele rahvuslikel Parlamendivalimistel

Kokkuvõtlikult võib öelda, et tulemused on mitmetähenduslikud. Tulemustes on umbes võrdne arv juhtumeid, kus anti-Euroopalik retoorika võitis valimistel pärast finantskriisi rohkem hääli ning neid kus hääli kaotati. Kui vaadelda riike, mis said finantskriisi mõjul enim kannatada, eriti selles võtmes, et neile eraldati abipakett või mitu, siis Hispaanias ja Iirimaal võitsid anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteid järgmistel valimistel senisest enam hääli, Portugalis samas sellised parteid kaotasid hääli. Kreeka valimiste kohta ei olnud piisavalt andmeid.

Vaadeldes riike, millel oli 2009. aastal kõrgeimad töötuse määrad, siis kolmes riigis võitsid anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteid järgmistel valimistel hääli, kahes neist kaotati hääli. Pöörates tähelepanu kümnele riigile, mis kaotasid enim sisemajanduse kogutoodangust, siis neljas riigis võitsid anti-Euroopalike manifestidega parteid hääli juurde ja ainult ühes langes häälatesaak, teistes riikides polnud anti-Euroopalikke ideid oma manifestidesse kaasanud riike või puudusid andmed. Samuti, kui vaadelda riike, kus sisemajanduse kogutoodang elaniku ostujõu standardi järgi langes, siis kaheksas riigis 15-st tõusis anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteide häälatesaak, kolmes neist langes antud parteide häälatesaak ning neljas sellises riigis ei olnud kas anti-Euroopaliku manifestiga parteisid või puudusid andmed.

Kokku oli 18 juhtumit, kui anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga partei võitis järgmistel valimistel hääli ning 11 juhtumit, mil hääli kaotati ning kuigi seda ei ole autori hinnangul piisavalt, et teha lõplike järeldusi, näitab see siiski mõningal määral üleüldist tendentsi. Järgmise riigiülese kriisi puhul, millesse puutub Euroopa Liit ja Euroopa Integratsioon, võivad tulemused tõenäoliselt muutuda senisest veel murettekitavamaks. Samuti näitab antud tendents seda, et anti-Euroopalik retoorika parteide esituses ei ole vähetähtis, kuna mitmes riigis ei saa häältevõitudest enam mööda vaadata nagu esiteks Ungaris Jobbiki puhul, mis tõusis marginaalse häälatesaagiga parteist üheks suurima parlamendi-esindatusega erakonnaks. Teiseks Põlissoomlaste juhtum Soomes, mis näitab selgelt, kuidas soomlased tunnetavad, et rahvusülene institutsioon võtab rahvuslikult tasandilt ära otsustuspädevust ning *de facto* kontrollib finantsressursse.

Ehk mitte nii äärmuslik erakond, kuid siiski selgelt anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga, on Suurbritannia Konservatiivid, kelle tötus on kasvanud kriisieelselt 32,4%-lt 36,1%

peale. Antud juhtum ei leidnud suurelt äramärkimist ajalehtede ja teiste meediaväljaannete esikülgedel murelike pealkirjade näol, kuid andis siiski selge signaali, et anti-Euroopalik retoorika on muutumas populaarsemaks ning tänapäeva ühiskonnas, kus informatsioon liigub kiiresti ja on lihtsasti leitav, on tõenäoline, et sarnaseid parteisid hakkab juurde tekkima, kuna Euroopa riikide ühiskonnad on piisavalt sarnased, et samasuguse retoorikaga ka teistes riikides toetust võita.

Kõikidest anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga erakondadest, mis uurimuse käigus vaatluse all olid, olid 22 lineaarselt parem-vasak ideoloogia skaalal paremal poolel, 11 neist olid vasakul poolel. See tõestab autori arvates, et anti-Euroopalikku retoorikat võib suurema tõenäosusega leida parem-poolsete parteide hulgast ja veelgi enam paremäärmuslaste seast. Samas ei piirdu anti-Euroopalikkus ekstreemsete rahvuslastega, vaid seda võib leida parem-vasak skaala mõlemas ääres ning vahel ka keskel, muidugi on skaala mõlemas ääres erakondade eesmärgid üksteisest kardinaalselt erinevad, kuid siiski võib üks anti-Euroopalik isik või partei olla parem- või vasakpoolne või hoopiski tsentrist. See viitab asjaolule, et anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga samastumine ei ole enam midagi erakordset.

Euroopa Liidu uutes liikmesriikides (riikides mis liitusid aastal 2004 ja hiljem), saavutas anti-Euroopalik retoorika valimistel pärast majanduskriisi viiel korral paremaid tulemusi kui enne seda, neljal korral tulemused halvenesid. Vanades Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides saavutasid anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteid valimistel pärast majanduskriisi 14 korral paremaid tulemusi kui enne ning kuuel korral tulemused halvenesid. Vanad Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigid olid uurimuses esindatud 24 erakonnaga ning uued liikmesriigid üheksaga. On mõnevõtta üllatav, et Eestis ja Leedus ehk riikides mis kaotasid finantskriisi ajal suurima osakaalu oma sisemajanduse koguproduktidest, ei leidunud partei-manifeste, mis oleksid väljendanud anti-Euroopalikkust.

Vanades Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides paigutusid 24-st erakonnast 13 parem-vasak ideoloogilisel skaalal paremale poolele, 11 vasakule. Uutes liikmesriikides oli pilt ebavõrdsem, kõik üheksa erakonda paigutusid skaala paremale poolele. Põhjus võib peituda näiteks selles, et vanades Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides tunnevad parteid suuremat survet teistest eristuda ja väljendavad seetõttu tugevamalt anti-Euroopalikke ideid, uutes liikmesriikides võib see vastupidine olla seetõttu, et parteide koguarv on väiksem. Teine põhjus võib peituda selles, et vanade liikmesriikide vasakpoolsetel parteidel ja ka valijaskonnal on pikem kogemus Euroopa Liiduga seoses ja seetõttu

ollakse rohkem pettunud EL'i funktsionaalsuses ja väljendatakse soove reformideks vastavalt hääletades, siiski vajab see rohkem uurimist, et ammendavat vastust anda.

Enamikel juhtudel ei erinenud kriisieelsed ja –järgsed valimistulemused üksteisest väga tugevalt, kuid leidis juhtumeid, kus anti-Euroopalik retoorika on tugevamalt tõusnud, näiteks Soomes, kus Põlissoomlased tõusid väike-partei staatusest suureks jõuks kodusel poliitmaastikul ning on pärast seda meedias üsnagi huvitavaid ja ekstreemseid vaateid väljendanud. Samuti ei ole Konservatiivide võit Suurbritannias vähetahtis, nemad suutsid tõetust kasvatada 3,7% ning said seetõttu 109 kohta parlamendis rohkem kui enne. Sellised edulood võivad sillutada teistele uutele ja veelgi ekstreemsematele tulijatele, näiteks Suurbritannias Iseseisvusparteile. Samuti ka Saksamaal, kus enne finantskriisi ei olnud anti-Euroopalik retoorika laialt levinud on kaks parteid sellest siiski võitnud ning hoolimata sellest, et kriisile järgnenud valimistel ei suudetud kindlustada kohti parlamendis, on tõenäoline, et oma valijaskonda kasvatatakse aja jooksul.

Siiski ei ole kõik päris ühepoolne. Anti-Euroopalikke vaateid väljendanud parteid Tšehhi Vabariigis, Portugalis ja Sloveenias näiteks on kaotanud suure osa oma toetajaskonnast, kuid antud languste taga võib olla erinevaid põhjuseid, mis vajaksid rohkem uurimist, et midagi kindlat järeldada.

Autor on teadlik, et antud uurimistöö on arenguruumi, põhjalikumalt tuleks uurida ning rohkem andmeid on vaja, et teha järeldusi anti-Euroopalikku retoorikat väljendavatele parteidele antud häälte ja avaliku Euroskeptitsismi seoste kohta, sellest saab antud uurimistöö järgmine samm ja teostatakse lähitulevikus. Teine aspekt, mille kohta puuduvad senini põhjalikud uurimused, rändekriisi ja rahvusliku ning rahvusülese poliitika seoste kohta, aga kuigi mõningane uurimistöö oleks juba praegu tehtav, oleks autori arvates otstarbekas oodata ära veel kahed valimised, et oleks rohkem andmeid valimistulemuste osas, mida analüüsida.

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