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Труды по знаковым системам

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Introduction:
Re-reading of cultural semiotics

In 2002 the Department of Semiotics of the Tartu University got 10 years old. Juri Lotman, the founder of the Department, would have turned 80 in the same year. This was a symbolic reason to invite from all over the world scholars respecting semiotic thinking and/or J. Lotman's scientific legacy to Tartu. So the international conference *"Cultural Semiotics: Cultural Mechanisms, Boundaries, Identities"* (25.02–2.03.2002) was born.

The conference worked in two major sections. One section was entitled *"Cultural semiotics and complex cultural analysis"* and its initial point was the situation of culture research disciplines in the beginning of the new century. Dialogue between different disciplines studying culture has been hindered by the absence of a unified theory of culture in world science. Cultural semiotics has the makings of becoming into such methodologically connecting discipline for these trends. Culture research is inseparable from the study of cultural contacts. The globalisation of the world and the integration of Europe make the problem of cultural contacts more and more important. In addition to political dialogue, dialogue between cultures is a theoretical, empirical, and didactic problem. Cultural contacts, cultural mechanisms, cultural boundaries and identities are simultaneously problems of cultural dialogue and dialogue between description languages of culture. It is important to bring together the diversity of contemporary cultural processes and the possibility of studying them from unified scientific positions.

The second section entitled *"Russian culture sub speciae Lotmanianae"* was, on the one hand, focused at one of the main principles of cultural semiotics according to which the criterion of precise analysis is explication of the viewpoint of researcher. On the other hand the organisation of this section was justified by J. Lotman's principle that any material of a certain culture can provide with impulses for the emergence of new research methods, and empirical analysis can thus bring along theoretical innovation. This does not concern the frames of merely an individual discipline. J. Lotman's activity has proven that the empirical experience of a literary scholar or of a historian can easily transform into theoretical knowledge that of a semiotician. At the same time problems of scientific methodology and the question of the relationship between modes of describing culture and the peculiarities of national cultures exist together for scholars of culture around the world.

In many disciplines the personality of a scholar and his/her creation as a whole turn into a driving force of a discipline long since a scholar has passed away. There exist scholars the re-reading and re-discovering of whom proves that the future of a science can sometimes wait its time in the past. Julia Kristeva's re-reading of Mikhail Bakhtin created in the 1960s the situation in which Bakhtin's 40 year studies occurred to be as sent from the future. Such re-reading probably waits for several scholars who, due to one reason or another, have not been enough distributed as translations in great languages. Of J. Lotman's predecessors an example of this can be M. Bakhtin's contemporary Juri Tynjanov.

A reason for re-reading can be a wish to get rid of the cultural layer and returning to the values of the original text that has turned into hardly comprehensible because of multiple interpretations. So has Jerzy Pelc expressed a wish to return to Charles Sanders Peirce: "I wish to find out what he actually had in mind. I therefore ask questions. And I would very much like to hear competent answers to these questions, but answers that are not formulated according to the rules of Peirce's style and poetics which his followers and commentators sometimes adopt as their own" (Pelc 1990: 4).

Roland Barthes can be an example of a recent re-reading; different parts of his legacy occur again innovative in the hands of several researchers. Jonathan Culler, for example, stresses the value of a theoretician and a semiologist in this "back to Barthes" movement: "It seems to me that the essential feature of Barthes's genius is to have discovered the heuristic function of systematicity and of the requirement of explicitness. [...] Systematicity is, first and foremost, a means of estrangement, *verfremdung*" (Culler 2001: 440). The innovative nature of R. Barthes is condensed in the notion of text. It is this notion that connects R. Barthes and J. Lotman, and J. Culler's following words might characterise both scholars: "A first consequence of this interdisciplinary reorientation was the positing of the methodological equivalence of different cultural products, whether literary works, fashion captions, advertisements, films, or religious rituals: all can be considered as text" (Culler 2001: 442). Since the concept of text is paired with the notion of work, J. Culler recognises two perspectives for R. Barthes' treatment of text. First, "work and text would be two different concepts of the object of study. [...] Alternatively, work and text could be two different classes of objects (roughly the traditional and the avant-garde)" (Culler 2001: 444). In contemporary methodological searches Barthes thus occupies an important place, although this does not concern all his works: "We may often need to read Barthes against the grain to preserve the theoretical and methodological gains that he himself risks dissipating or concealing in such slides into mystification or nostalgia; but this sort of vigilance is precisely what we can learn when we go "back to Barthes", or rather, back to the early writings of Roland Barthes" (Culler 2001: 445).

Re-reading from another viewpoint can take to the equalisation of semiology and sociology: "Barthesian semiology was inevitably and invariably a

sociology" (Polan 2001: 456). From the side of semiotics, however, an opposite attitude is possible. An example of that can be John Deely's fear in an argument with Umberto Eco, especially in connection with the bringing close together sign and sign-function: "As we shall see over the course of this discussion, this amounts to proposing the elimination of semiotics in the name of semiotics, or, what amounts to the same thing, the restriction of semiotics to the horizon of semiology" (Deely 2001: 705).

J. Deely's re-reading of Eco also takes to reformulation of the famous definition "the possibility of lying is the *proprium* of semiosis" (Eco 1977: 59): "This is well put, if one sided, since the possibility of expressing any truth is equally the *proprium* of semiosis. Since the sign is that which every object presupposes, and since semiotics studies the action of signs, perhaps the best definition of semiotics would be: the study of the possibility of being mistaken" (Deely 2001: 733). Viewing semiotics against the background of the distinction of the notions of discipline and field, or the theoretical and the applied aspects, J. Deely tries to defend the notion of the sign for the sake of holistic semiotics: "[...] the notion of *signum* is broader and more fundamental than Eco's notion of sign-function, and nothing is more important in the long run than a proper clarification and laying of the foundations for the enterprises of semiotics. [...] sign is the universal instrument of communication, within oneself or with others equally" (Deely 2001: 733).

The disciplinary importance of the problem is indicated by Jerzy Pelc's attempt to re-read works by Ch. S. Peirce and Ch. Morris, and to answer the same questions that bothered J. Deely. Viewing semiosis as sign process and semiotics as the science or knowledge of semiosis, J. Pelc presents an understanding of the object of semiotics: "The object of semiotics, in one meaning of this term, are semiosic activities and the products thereof, i.e., semiosis and signs together with their semiosics" (Pelc 2000: 431). Through re-reading Peirce and Morris J. Pelc also articulates the notion of semiosis: "I treat semiosis as activities which in some cases produce signs together with selected semiosic properties or semiosic relations thereof, and sometimes semiosics, i.e., the totality of semiosic properties of these signs or the totality of semiosic relations containing the signs as their elements" (Pelc 2000: 428). From another viewpoint J. Deely, for example, treats the same problems through the concept of intersemiosis: "[...] human understanding finds its operational existence initially in terms of the intersemiosis which perception makes possible as developing around a sensory core" (Deely 2002: 68).

These dissimilar re-readings reflect well the dependence of any discussions on metalanguages that are the means of communication and self-communication of those participating in the discussion. Thus science does not depend that much on culture a part of which it is. Even if discussion or dialogue goes on in the framework of one discipline, scholarly multilingualism is preserved, because the sources of metalanguage, including texts and authors re-read, are very diverse. At the same time (meta)linguistic identity problems emerge inside different traditions. Talking about the semiotics of

the new century, Umberto Eco brings an example from Russian literature. Lev Tolstoi's "War and Peace" is a work in which Russian common people speak common Russian, and a vast majority of nobility speak French. Tolstoi's semiotics of the own and the alien is also based on this linguistic difference. Yet what happens to this work at translation into French, loses as a separator of the dissimilar sociocultural worlds of natural language (Eco 2001: 291–292). The same holds true for metalanguages and scientific traditions. Innovation and innovation emerging via re-reading may gain support from metalinguistic dissimilarity, and may stay unnoticed in the case of the lack of strangeness.

Juri Lotman's legacy is not enough known outside the boundaries of Russian. However, his scientific potential is ever-growing in spite of him not being amongst us already for nearly ten years. Not all his conceptually important works are known in English and thus his more holistic treatment lays ahead in the future. A very good specialist of Lotman's work, Karl Eimermacher, cognised the importance of Lotman's semiotics for holistic study of culture already in the 1970s, and called this a semiotic version of integrative culturology (Eimermacher 1997: 229). Irene Portis-Winner has long and fruitfully sensed her ethnological and culturo-semiotic studies by the help of Lotman. In her last book she finds Lotman's notion of semiosphere as a creator of holistic perspective: "Lotman`s concept of the semiosphere subsumes all aspects of the semiotics of culture, all the heterogeneous semiotic systems or "languages" that are constantly changing and that in an abstract sense, have some unifying qualities" (Portis-Winner 2002: 63; cf. also Portis-Winner 1999).

Thus there are reasons to deal more actively with re-reading J. Lotman, and to identify his innovative potential. There already have appeared and are appearing studies based on systematic knowledge of J. Lotman's legacy. So Edna Andrews stresses the semiosic aspect of J. Lotman's concept of semiosphere: "The semiosphere may appear to be a semiotic unity at its highest level, but in fact it is a conglomerate of boundaries defining everchanging internal and external spaces. Thus, there can be no "language" or "memory" for Lotman without the guarantee of semiosis in the form of the semiosphere" (Andrews 1999: 13). From here Lotman's importance is seen: "Lotman's extensive work on the semiosphere and the semiotics of communication provide some invaluable concepts and categories that offer insights into the structural principles of semiosis" (Andrews 1999: 8).

Boguslaw Zylko stresses, from the perspective of Lotman's evolution, that the concept of semiosphere signifies transfer from static to dynamic analysis, and the basis of this transfer is understanding the relationship between holism and heterogeneity: "The shift, from the conception of culture as a bundle of primary and secondary modelling systems to the notion of semiosphere, is also a shift from static to dynamic thinking. If we took the former approach, culture would resemble a motionless unit made up of semiotic systems; whereas if we follow the semiospheric approach, culture

takes the shape of a heterogeneous whole bustling with multiple rhythms of development and transient dominants" (Zylko 2001: 400). Dynamism is stressed also by Floyd Merrell in his comparison of Peirce and Lotman and treatment of biosemiosphere: "Cultures are processes, never products; they are codependently arising becoming, not cause-and effect sequences; they are events, not things moving along like trains on a track; they are perpetually self-organizing into unseen and unseeable wholes, rather than predictable wholes and their parts in terms of static and statistical averages. They are semiosis at its best, though, unfortunately, occasionally at its worst" (Merrell 2001: 400).

In works by colleagues I consciously bring forward these aspects that point at the change in culture as a research object in connection with the methodological possibilities of a discipline. I would like to add another developmental trait in connection with history and evolution. In 1984 Walter A. Koch wrote in the foreword of his series of *Bochum Publications in Evolutionary Cultural Semiotics* on the notion of culture that it is "[...] a phenomenon whose true integrative potentialities have not yet been fully discovered or explored. For a semiotics thus conceived, structure and process are not different phases of reality and/or sciences but rather mere faces of a unitary field. In the view of this series, then, any fruitful attempt at semiotic analysis will be based on premises of macro-integration — or *evolution* — and of micro-integration — *culture*" (Koch 1989: v). In 1992 Lotman wrote in the foreword of *Sign Systems Studies* vol. 25 that was the last appearing in his lifetime: "During the past decades semiotics has changed. One achievement on its hard path was unification with history. The cognition of history became semiotic, but semiotic thinking obtained historic traits. [...] Semiotic approach tries to avoid the conditional stopping of the historical process" (Lotman 1992: 3). Lotman also concludes that "each generation has a language for describing yesterday and principally lacks a language for tomorrow" (Lotman 1992: 4). In between these there is today in which the description of culture is, on the one hand, a problem of metalevel, i.e. that of the level of scholarship or criticism. On the other hand culture works, as living through, on the level of self-description, be it the case of an individual or collective consciousness.

An important ontological feature of culture as a complex object of study is the coexistence of different description. As a result of descriptive processes this allows to talk about cultural self-models. Cultural self-description as a process can be viewed in three directions. Culture's self-model is the result of the first, and its goal is maximum approach to the actually existing culture. As a second result there emerge cultural self-models that differ from ordinary cultural practice and have been designed for changing that practice. A third result lays in those self-models that exist as ideal cultural self-consciousness separately from culture and have not been aimed at it. By this Lotman does not exclude conflict between culture and its self-models. At the same time it

is exactly the self-descriptions that allow to reach the notion of cultural unity (Lotman 2000a: 420). Cultural unity, in turn, points at personality.

Lotman views culture as a collective intellect and compares it with both individual and artificial intellect. The measure of intellect is formed by two main features — to create a whole out of a heterogeneous association and to create novelties. Both features are inseparable from the notion of personality: "A thinking structure must form a personality, i.e. to integrate oppositional semiotic structures in one whole" (Lotman 2000c: 573). In 1980s Juri Lotman described creativity, relying on Ilya Prigogine. The article "Culture as a subject and object for itself" maintains that: "The main question of cultural semiotics is the problem of the emergence of meaning. We call the emergence of meaning both the ability of culture as a whole and its parts to put from its "output" out nontrivial new texts. New texts are the texts that emerge as results of irreversible processes (in Ilya Prigogine's sense), i.e. texts that are unpredictable to a certain degree" (Lotman 2000b: 640).

In the article "The phenomenon of culture" (Lotman 2000c) Juri Lotman creates foundation for theoretical construction of the following years. He offers a typology that has not been yet properly sensed the best articulation of which that article is. The basis for the typology is distinction of the static and dynamic aspects of cultural languages. From the *static* aspect cultural languages divide into the discrete and the continual (iconic-spatial), and for Juri Lotman this forms the semiotic primordial dualism. In discrete languages sign comes first and meanings are created through the meanings of signs. In continual languages text comes first and meaning emerges through holistic text that integrates even the most heterogeneous elements. These are the two languages between which it is difficult to create translatability. Difficulties of translatability and the impossibility of reverse translation turn any mediating activity between these languages into creative and are thus the basis for creativity.

In *dynamism* the simultaneity of the two processes in culture is important. On the one hand in different fields of culture there goes on specialisation of cultural languages as a result of autocommunication and identity searches. On the other hand on the level of culture as a whole there emerges integration of cultural languages as a possibility of self-communication and self-understanding. Yet the dynamism of integration is revealed in the simultaneity of the two processes. From the one side in different parts of culture there are being created self-descriptions and alongside with them also metadescriptions or descriptions from the position of culture as a whole. This is integration though autonomies. From the other side their goes on diffusion, creolisation of cultural languages due to the communication between different parts of culture. Creolisation is a feature of dynamism and an intermediary stage at reaching a new autonomy or pure (self)description. Thus Juri Lotman has raised Juri Tynjanov's evolution model to a new level and created an understanding of culture not as static system but a collective intellect in

continuous development that is characterised by the need of cognising its identity and expressing itself, i.e. being creative.

I already hinted at U. Eco's example of the sociocultural role of the French language in L. Tolstoi's *War and Peace*. Russian and French signify different worlds and dissimilar identities and the impossibility of distinguishing between them in translation into French demolishes boundaries between these worlds. J. Lotman, however, liked to use another example from the same work: the scene in which a Russian ranker enters a dialogue with a captured French soldier and does it in an invented abracadabra language. The reason for that is his understanding of French as a spoilt Russian. And even though one of the languages used in that dialogue does not exist the dialogue is still successful. So do cultures exist by having autonomous languages communicating inside them as creolised complexes consisting of fragments of different languages. Communication itself creates the need to derive a new language of the creolised association, for the need for autonomy and identity increases when getting in touch with another autonomy and identity. Dialogue creates identity. If continuing the situation presented by Tolstoi, the meeting of French and the nonexistent or spoilt Russian would be followed by the gradual creolisation of French and Russian, mutual fragmentary translation that in the ideal case would lead to equal translatability of both languages. If need for dialogue decreases or disappears due to certain reasons, one of the partners can shift to the periphery, i.e. to become invisible in culture. This is what happened in Russia where the niche of cultural semiotics was taken over by the postmodern paradigm (see Torop 2001).

Studying culture is made difficult by the similarity of processes on the object level and different metalevels. Autonomy and creolisation are visible in relationships between different fields of culture, ways of self-description of different fields, and metadescriptive levels of cultural analysis. Thus it is regular to meet, for example, the notion of representation side by side with semiosis at trials of defining the object of semiotics. So, from the position of applied analysis, it has been stated that semiotics "is an autonomous science that aims to investigate *semiosis* — the capacity to produce and comprehend signs — and *representation* — the activity of using signs to make messages and meanings (Beasley, Danesi 2002: 32). Similarly characteristic is Göran Sonesson's statement that "the project of the semiotics of culture is a sociological project. In this sense, it may be seen as a foundation for that study of the life of signs in society, from which Saussure finally opted out; but also, more importantly, as a new start for the study of dialogicity uniting the ego and the alter, which was sketched long ago, in so many divergent ways, by the members of the Bakhtin circle" (Sonesson 1998: 108).

At the meeting of culture and disciplines studying it there emerge questions the new century must seek or reformulate answers for. The first circle of questions concerns culture as a complex research object and connects with disciplinary possibilities in culture research trends. Can culture as a complex object be transformed into one or several disciplinary objects of study? From

here emerges the quest for a coherent complex science. Françoise Rastier has raised a question of a universal trans-semiotics and distinguishes between two poles in connection with culture research: the pole of sciences of culture (sciences de la culture) is exemplified by Ernst Cassirer and the pole of se-miotics of cultures (sémiotique des cultures) by the Tartu school. In between the two poles there remain questions: one or many sciences? culture or cultures? (Rastier 2001: 163). The second circle of questions connects with relationships between disciplines studying culture. Is it possible to imagine culture studying disciplines in terms of hierarchy, can any of them, e.g., cultural semiotics, be in the role of a foundation discipline methodologically? I.e., culture-studying disciplines, their dialogue abilities with both the object of study and neighbouring disciplines ought to be objects of analysis separately. Thus there is to be answered the question what are connections between disciplinariness on the one hand, and multi-, trans-, inter-, and dedisciplinariness on the other. Culture as an object of study and culture research sciences as objects of study — in both cases it is suitable to recall the picture emerged as Umberto Eco's re-reading of Lotman: "If we put together many branches and great quantity of leaves, we still cannot understand the forest. But if we know how to walk through the forest of culture with our eyes open, confidently following the numerous paths which criss-cross it, not only shall we be able to understand better the vastness and complexity of the forest, but we shall also be able to discover the nature of the leaves and branches of every single tree" (Eco 2000: xiii).

The present volume mostly contains proceedings of the conference dedicated to the memory of Juri Lotman. There are enough of them also for another volume. However, side by side with presentations here are other works that have arrived the editorial as results of different dialogues. I would like to mention separately only one of them. In the beginning of cultural semiotics during 1960–70s the development of semiotics was importantly influenced by a general tension field that connected different regions and centres of semiotics that created dialogues primarily via translations, for direct communication was not always possible. The re-reading of M. Bakhtin's works in the world there was accompanied with interest from the side of the Soviet Union to Paris and especially works by Julia Kristeva. *Sign Systems Studies* is probably the first publication in the Soviet Union that started to introduce J. Kristeva's ideas. I have read J. Kristeva's and some other French colleagues' books in French at J. Lotman's home library. Today it is a pleasure to maintain that the old dialogue is continuing through J. Kristeva's contribution to *Sign Systems Studies*. In science time is not the essence. Far more important is phatic communication, readiness for dialogue, expectancy of dialogue even when years can take dialogue partners into different centuries. We remember J. Kristeva's obituary to J. Lotman (Kristeva 1994). It is all the more pleasant to once again assert that science is dialogue and neither is afraid of time.

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Peeter Torop

Thinking about literary thought

Literary theory has aroused much dismissal, a good deal of infatuation, and a growing number of misunderstandings. Some declare it "theoretical terrorism," while others try to restore in it the "common sense" of a "reading ego" trying to become a "popular ego," and try to convince themselves that "nothing interesting has been written in the last 20 years." To these rather restrained opinions, one must add the unremitting efforts of the media but also of academia — these powers and institutions are decidedly united — who aim to ridicule and discredit for ever more literary theory's encroachment, or attempted encroachment, of its authority on literature. It may seem paradoxical that such a sparing, abstract, or even, as they say, insignificant activity should elicit such an... eroticization. Why so much passion for such an elusive object? We must look back to the beginnings of theoretical thought in the area of arts and literature, in order to attempt to uncover the reasons for this apparent anomaly.

I would put forth two sources of literary theory. The first goes back to philosophy and to its metamorphoses since the end of the 19th century. The second goes back to the changes in how the imaginary is perceived, a change contemporaneous with the transformation of philosophy and of esthetics. But it seems to me that there is not enough emphasis placed on this second source of literary theory: we find it difficult to evaluate our century, with all its profound upheavals, while, on the eve of the third millenium, still more are promised that echo the past. I would first mention the following upheavals, to which I will return later: first of all Nietzsche, quoting Jean Paul: "God is dead"; second the words of Mallarmé: "We have touched poetry"; and I would ask you to remember that both these statements go hand in hand.

1. Among antecedents

Although a theory of literature has existed since the time of Plato and Aristotle (and therefore a theory of genres, style, author, model and imitation, and so forth), literary theory in the modern — and disputed — sense of the term is dependant on German philosophy and esthetics at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, and, more fundamentally, on Husserl's phenomenological revolution.

In his *Principles of Art History* (1915), Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945) abandons the exploration of singular cases, to uncover instead general traits in the evolution of art. The object of his analysis is not the *expression*, but rather the abstract *quality*, above all with respect to the following statement: the quality of style which is self-evident, the form of vision common to all artists belonging to a similar period, and a quality formulated as a "language about art" (*Kunstsprache*). This language is formed based on binary oppositions of mutually exclusive categories (hence: linear versus pictorial, two-dimensional versus three-dimensional, closed versus open, and so forth). But, far from being universal categories like those of Kant, they depend on the historical periods being contemplated (Renaissance, baroque, and Gothic do not belong to the same categories). Progressively, Wölfflin's thinking moves toward an assimilation of the problems of art with those of language and style.

At the same time as, but independently of Wölfflin, Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) discovered the essence of the "symbol," which expresses the invariable that underpins variation. All "cultural forms" (mythology, art, religion, as well as science) are reconciled insomuch as they occupy a "symbolic function" that they each execute differently. The primacy and the extension of the symbolic function, which covers all phenomena and which demonstrates meaning in the midst of sensibility, is not however negligent of context: the context constitutes the symbolic form, which, thus described, dispenses reality.

But it was Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) who founded phenomenology, inspired by his initial work on the epistemology of mathematical thought, and who appears to be the most radical instigator of the so-called "theoretical" approach in the areas of art and literature, as well as in the "social sciences". In his *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* (1913), and then in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) and *Logical Investigations*, he abandons the distinction between "form" and "content," denouncing the criteria upon which it is based as "psychological". Instead, he proposes a "logical" thinking in which each "given," which must be "distributed in the region of the being", is a result of experience. In other words, the irreducible "how" must be "contemplated". And so, "purely logical" studies of this "contemplation" are precisely those where we see that the word "logic" is Husserl's description of the Greek logos. A true turning-point in philosophical thinking, comparable even to that of Plato, Husserl's phenomenology illustrates the essence of "form of consciousness" as opposed to "matter of consciousness", discusses the distinction between formal laws and material laws, and re-establishes the "logical unity of the content of thought, that is to say the unity of theory".

We could establish, although I will not do it here, the phenomenological relationship of research in *Literaturwissenschaft* in Germany, which is dedicated to the study of literary as a carrier of specific content. From Vossler to Steinthal, Spet, Staiger and Spitzer, the particularities of poetic language as an expression of scientific thought are studied, moving from "dialectical stylis-

tics" to "poetic forms" of discourse and of genres, distinguishing "interior form", and separating the "signs of things" from the "signs of meaning," and so forth.

The development of Saussure's (1857–1913) theory of general linguistics, as well as of his work on semiology, but also the works of Hjelmslev (1899–1965), which tended more closely toward phenomenology, would later aid in identifying that significant and specific value attributed to literary formality, which had emerged from the work of the German theorists, to the system of language itself. Produced only in draft form by Saussure and by Hjelmslev, it was in Russian formalism that this linguistically inspired theoretical current was most clearly realized. In fact, the turning point carried out by Russian formalism pinpointed, in substance, binary structures in poetic and narrative thought, to the extent that they were a revival of the phonological duality which is a constituent part of the language system. B. Tomachevsky's book *Theory of literature*, written in 1925, is the most systematic version of this, and the main protagonists were thereafter known to all: Chklovsky, Vinogradov, Tynianov, and R. Jakobson. T. Todorov edited in France a compilation of Tomachevsky's works (*Théorie de la littérature*, "Tel Quel" series, Seuil, 1966): this was a starting-point for an extension of Lévy-Strauss' structuralism — which had until then been applied to genealogical structures and to mythology — to literary texts and to other esthetic objects (music, cinema, photography, and so forth).

Without trying to be exhaustive, I feel it is necessary to add to these German and Russian "schools" R. Wellek and A. Warren's 1949 "Theory of Literature." Seen as a branch of general and comparative literature, it is a reflection on the conditions of literature, literary criticism and literary history, and is described as "literary theory" in order to distinguish it from the "theory of literature" more easily identified with formalism. More empirical than the theoretical variations from the Continent, American "new criticism" merges historical and formal methods, and owes a great debt to comparative literature.

I will not delve further into this (inevitably schematic) reminder of the antecedents of modern and French literary theory. As essential as they may be, they do not explain its recent explosion in France and abroad, and, alone, they carry the risk of forming a scientistic and positivist isolation that would be unable to reveal the characteristics of the initially postulated literary thought, instead locking it up in a universalizing logical grid.

Another condition of the research we are undertaking today has come to light, adding itself to what has already been described: we forget that this investigation concerning *form as thought*, and not as a more or less secondary expression, which describes literary theory, is contemporaneous with a *unprecedented readjustment* of the *imaginary experience* in modernity. It is a readjustment which has placed habits of reception in a difficult position: it has stimulated a recourse to new approaches to these "languages", to these sur-

prising "forms", and it has literally turned upside down classical rationality, as well as moral standards and ideologies.

To sum things up, the literary experience of the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century appeared as the singular path for thinking about the subject in the world, calling into question the boundaries between conscience and language. Skimming these boundaries, that is to say these psychosocial pathologies, the imagination, thus deployed, presents itself as the more or less intentional accomplice in the Freudian revolution that discovers, at the same time, the unconscious. More radically still, this new regime of the imaginary appears as a rival to the inner experience, while at the same time trying to change social structures by modifying the relationship between the talking being and meaning, inasmuch as this relationship deeply codifies the social contract. After the *sacred*, where men celebrated meaning through rituals that juxtaposed sacrificed substances against that which is beyond forbidden, the sensible against the significant; after the *religious* which meditates on meaning as a dynamic between the forbidden and the transgression in the subject's formative revolt in the face of the Father; the *modern imaginary* confronted Meaning, which constitutes human conscience and social morality, challenging it under pressure from the Real, which forever remains impossible, but which the modern Imaginary attempts to explore by inscribing undisclosable truths.

2. The modern regime of the Imaginary

Because it is necessary to simplify things, I ask you to consider the following: in the last century, perhaps a little longer, an event has taken place which has profoundly marked the European literary experience: the meeting of literature and the impossible. Initiated by German romanticism, marked by the Schlegel brothers, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and even the tragic lucidity of Hölderlin, and clearly targeted by the journal Athenäum (Berlin, 1878), this bringing together of literature and the impossible took on its most radical form in the French language. Literature relinquished its role of beautiful language, of seductive beauty, of religion's younger sister. In making itself the explorer of each verb's resource — what to say? how to say it? what does "to say" mean? to make and to unmake meaning? — literature first enters into a radical debate, or into a face-to-face meeting (similarity, then dissociation) with religion and philosophy. Literature thus explores the impasses of the conscience and associates itself with madness. Finally, it collides with the resistance of social reality, not to disprove it but instead to no longer reflect it, and rather to disprove first of all the imaginary itself, and thus literature in aid of social reality — we are familiar with the tragedy of the poet who becomes a businessman, as well as that of the "politically committed" poet. Finally, literature demands another status for the imaginary: a path to truth and to transformation, both subjective and social. In France,

this encounter of literature and the impossible experienced three stages: the first was that of Rimbaud, Lautréamont and Mallarmé; the second, that of Surrealism; the third was that of *Tel Quel* (1960–1982).

A. For Rimbaud, I will remind you of some of his poetry in *A Season in Hell*, "Delirium II: Alchemy of the Word" (1870): "Never any hopes, / No *orietur.* / Science and patience, / The suffering if sure". And these lines, also from *A Season in Hell*, "Farewell" (1873):

> I who called myself magus or angel, exempt from all morality, I am thrown back to the earth, with a duty to find, and rough reality to embrace! Peasant! Was I wrong? Could charity be the sister of death for me?
> At least I will ask forgiveness for having fed on lies. Let us go now.
> But not a friendly hand! Where can I find help?
> Yes, at least the new hour is very harsh. [...] We must be absolutely modern.
> [...] I saw the hell of women down there. [...]

And finally, in *Illuminations*, "Morning of Drunkenness" (1871): "Elegance, science, violence! [...] We assert you, method! [...] Behold the age of Murderers". The *method*, you will understand, is violently outraged.

We must be absolutely modern, in this age of Murderers, for I saw the hell of women down there: this is a possible montage of Rimbaud's words. We could make others. But for me this one seems to reverberate with the reading that I will undertake of the Surrealists: the sudden acknowledgement of an antinomy between society and poetry, and more still between a certain spirituality (which both the family and Claudel would not cease to rediscover, or rather to impose on him the most conventional forms) and the affirmation of an elegant and cruel "method", which is none other than a certain way of thinking beyond judgment, of thinking with one's body and one's tongue. It is known that the experience of this rupture would lead Rimbaud to abandon poetic writing — the traveler would find in Abyssinia an activity as exotic as it was insignificant, and we are free to think that he ended up either repudiating the search for "rough reality to be embraced", or else on the contrary that he pursued it in silence. Nevertheless, before poetry confronted that particular impossibility, which was the renunciation of imaginary formulations, another impossibility unfurled itself magnificently in *Illuminations*: listening to that boundary-state where thought has recourse to the senses; not to the "good sense" which certain people think encapsulates sensibility, but rather, on the contrary, "to the disturbance of all senses", which is, in reality (if you think about it), the sign of thinking human beings, and which leads to the clarity of a dazzling language, rich and unusual, that one must indeed call an "illumination". It is the *fold* where a "soul" or, in other words, a subject who has touched in meaning and sensations his own contours, escapes in an exteriority that we can term a "voyage", a "path" or a "being" — but Rimbaud distrusts these "lies" too much to content himself with these conciliatory clichés of what appears to him to be, strictly speaking,

madness. Listen to him — there is no surrealism in these lines, a passage from *Illuminations* entitled "Lives": "I am a far more deserving inventor than all those who went before me; a musician, in fact, who found something resembling the key of love". [The union of music and the key of love would also appear later in the works of the Surrealists.] "I expect to become a very wicked fool". [We find ourselves here at the boundary of silence, but Rimbaud never ceases to compose with it.] "And now that I am so worthy of this torture, let me fervently gather in the superhuman promise made to my created body and soul. This promise, this madness!" [The ability to change styles in a new illumination is linked, if it exists at all, with dementia.] "Elegance, science, violence! [...] We assert you, method! I am not forgetting that yesterday you glorified each of our ages. I believe in that poison. I can give all of my existence each day". The exhortation, the exaltation, the dementia, the elegance, the science, the violence, these are the things that should give access to the new style.

And, from Lautréamont, at about the same time (1868, *Maldoror*; 1870, *Poems*):

> It is time to apply the brakes to my inspiration and to pause for a while by the wayside, as when one looks upon the vagina of a woman. [...]

> I shall set down my thoughts in orderly manner, by means of a plan without confusion.

Would the logic of the physical body and of musicality open another scene, at the very heart of the judgment that trivializes us in our social lives: another humanity, a "poetic" one so to speak, but which in reality would be another logic?

Lautréamont is the explorer of that path, another precursor to the Surrealists. Some of you are familiar with my reflections on Lautréamont in *La Révolution du langage poétique*, and I will admit to you that I am excited to revive this relationship with *Maldoror* and *Poetry*. They express the same necessity asserted by Rimbaud — to leave behind ornamental poetry, to combat romanticism, Parnassus, symbolism, empty rhetoric, the blind embellishment of pleasure or of pain, and to confront the experience of literature using philosophy and science. That led, in Lautréamont's *Poetry*, to a sort of writing in forms: forms, in effect, that aspire to a scientific and positivist exactness influenced by Auguste Compte — albeit in an ironic and blasphemous way — and that hark back to classical philosophy, because it is the maxims of La Rochefoucauld, Pascal, and Vauvenargues that the poet lightly knocks off balance in order to give them a more radical, more diabolical sense, more rebellious against classical enunciation.

The confrontation with the other is carried out on two fronts: on the one hand a rewriting of classicism and rationalism in order to unfold the tissues of the mind; on the other hand an exploration of the other sex as such. It is not only the violence, the unbearable, the disgust, but also the fascination and,

from there, the mobilization of language to take into account these states of ambivalent passion. Here then are some excerpts from the *Poetry*: "Great thoughts come from reason! [...] You who enter here, abandon all despair. [...] Each time I read Shakespeare it seems to me that I am dissecting the brain of a jaguar".

Lautréamont invites us to enter into the conflict, to locate the irreconcilable, to demonstrate the logic of violence and of ferocity that is the flip side of beautiful language, of the literary beauty associated with Shakespeare; of a violent act: to tear thought to pieces, thought which is the supreme power, to penetrate into this tyranny of the intellect, of which Kant had indicated the force, and which Lautréamont presents using the formidable and derisory image of the "brain of a jaguar."

This claim of radical thinking goes hand in hand with a penetration into the mystery of the "normal" that is the taboo of sexuality with the embellishment of the sexual act. And Lautréamont joins his revolt of logic together with a descent, through the female and the vagina, into the derisory hell of the species, of our animal nature: "It is time to apply the brakes to my inspiration and to pause for a while by the wayside, as when one looks upon the vagina of a woman".

If I have quoted from these two authors (Rimbaud and Lautréamont), chosen from among others, it has been to point out two elements of this meeting of literature and the impossible, which *Tel Quel* took up again, and which I will revisit in a few moments. On the one hand, literature in the face of a classical philosophical design, which one could almost call classicistic; on the other hand, the confrontation of literary enunciation and poetic transgression with the feminine side of man and the feminine of side of woman. This in fact refers to a transubjective reality that it more and more difficult to define. So much so that we look for it from a perspective which for some may seem dreamlike, but which may be the very foundation of things: in the realm of Chinese ideograms and their battle between gesture and sign, between reality and meaning.

B. The second meeting between literature and the impossible was that of Surrealism. In taking up Rimbaud and Lautréamont's message, the encounter knew not only the anti-lyrical rage and the fear of an objective discourse — which, as you know, exasperated the bourgeois — but also the voyage toward the impossible that I mentioned earlier, with its two variant forms: the feminine and the real. It was a voyage, however, which got bogged down in the cult of the providential woman ("the future of man is woman" being one of the most religious impasses of that misunderstanding) and in the adherence to a providential institution: for Aragon, it was the Communist Party. The fact remains that, from Breton to Aragon, with and beyond the war in which they fought, the awareness that *literature is anti-thought* was affirmed. That the writing dissolves the apparent coherence of the argument and opens up the dynamics of thought: the *anti*-thought, in order to better demonstrate that this

writing-thought presents a repressed logic, in opposition to the period of calm of metaphysical thought.

French literature is too used to beautiful language and too afraid of reasoning for one to dare advance with impunity on its territory, even as far as to consider that writing can be — not always, as bookstores are full of examples to the contrary, but it does happen — an act of thought. The surrealist revolt seems to me a radical one, insofar as it tried to describe the untenable nature of that variation of thought that human beings accomplish by writing against repression and standard. When Aragon affirms repeatedly what he calls the "will of the novel", let us not forget the profession of faith in *Paris Peasant* (1924–1926): "What concerns me is metaphysics". The "will of the novel" is a continuation — and, we could demonstrate, a mutation — of metaphysics when metaphysics is tuned in to poetry and to the senses. In paying too much attention to the "new world", which the surrealists predicted would be a social world — it is, in fact, an aspect of the project, and I will come back to this — we have above all underestimated the philosophical subversion represented by a writing that opposes "action" and "art" at the same time. Nevertheless, the modernity of that project is both indisputable and shocking. At the end of this century, even more clearly than during the surrealist period, we know that a rationality based on action does not exhaust the potentialities of the being.

The surrealist revolt took action first of all against a world where "action was not the sister of dreams", according to the words of Baudelaire. A world that was opposed simultaneously to contemplative thought and pragmatic reasoning, to explore that other realm that Freud had investigated since the end of the previous century. There is a thought at the boundary of that which is thinkable: an experience of language liberated from the shackles of a judgmental conscience gives access to this thought and gives evidence of its existence. It is perhaps a matter of another world (of thought) that modifies the (real) world.

The surrealist revolt calls for a new way of thinking that shatters the essence of thought: the poetry of the surrealists confirms a refusal of insignificant poetry, of ornamental poetry, and a refusal of the "pohème": "Attention [...] and then rhyme, syntax, and the grotesque", write Breton and Éluard who, with Apollinaire, want to "touch the essence of the verb". It is a question of continuing an investigation that consists of rejecting the ornamental, the poetic lace, the "pohème" to invent, from the perspective of the "scientific" or "experimental" ambition of precursors, the "event poem". It is what would develop in subsequent years in the form of a *happening*, with the participation of the audience, the participants, the readers acting as subjects, as bodies, as atoms in play, in a given place. "Lyricism is the development of a protest against the sentiment of reality" (Breton) we still read in his *Notes on Poetry*. Let us be realistic and bear in mind those things that surround us, but to better twist our necks at ordinary reality! Surrealism will not let go of the fine line between poetry and reality. The "[...]

transubstantiation of each thing into a miracle [...]" — that was the objective of the new poetry. Such is Aragon's proposal in his *Treatise on Style* (1927), in harmony both with Rimbaud's *Illuminations* and with the writings of Proust, who asked that the written word be made flesh through transubstantiation, the novel thus also becoming a physical experience. It was of course, to begin with, a question of achieving a sort of illumination, or fantastic state, through the cult of writing: from writing as a privileged, or even exclusive, act, to *anti*-thought. "I belonged, then, from an early age, to that zoological species of writers for whom thoughts are formed through writing", wrote Aragon in his belated preface, written in 1964, to *The Libertine* (1924), acknowledging that there are no other solutions to thought or to life, except writing; that only writing can legitimately rise up against watered-down opinion and art: that only writing is a revolt in aid of the miraculous and of the capture of a thought without any utilitarian compromise.

An intense sexuality is called for to support the language of enchantment so that it may rebel against the French language — obviously imaginary — perceived as rational, dull, resistant to enchantment. The French language is a "language of cashiers, precise and inhuman", complained Aragon in his *Treatise on Style*, before then proposing to create a new one using automatic writing, accounts of dreams, collages, and fragments. Eroticism was then mobilized to provoke the unusual and to inject new life into the imaginary. Such was the goal of *La Défense de l'infini* (1923–1927).

We thus arrive at this cascading, visual definition of verbal style, or of thinking about writing, of which the writer is but "second-hand": "I call style the accent that takes second-hand a man given the waves by him echoed of the symbolic ocean that universally mines the earth by metaphor". We can understand by this that style opens up language in such a way that each individual, each given man is the representative of the symbolic ocean, of the infinite nature of language to which we are led, if we really bear in mind the confrontation with the ephemeral, with humour, and with images. For the poet, these phenomena are not pretexts which open "an unending revolt", to be further translated as metaphors. And also to insist on accent, on music, on what I call semiotics, therefore on the unique experience which instills an insurmountable sensibility in community usage of language (of the universal "waves" which mine the "earth").

C. What stands out in my mind about *Tel Quel* is the still invisible third aspect of the meeting between literature and the impossible, and in which recent "literary theory" can be found. This aspect is still nearly invisible for almost the entire media world. Why? Because it is perhaps radical in other ways. And because it is not reclaimed by institutions (religious, partisan, secular, communist, academic, and so forth), it being understood that it is precisely this act of reclaiming that renders an experience visible, that renders visible the experiences of rupture; without this reclaiming these experiences of rupture would continue on outside the mainstream. Why is it radical?

Because we have taken on the legacy of the predecessors: the exhaustion of beautiful language, the desire to irradiate "universal reporting" (Mallarmé), gossip, popular literature. But, in addition, we have confronted that experience more clearly still with the history of philosophy, religion, and psychoanalysis. Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Freud — but also Augustine, Saint Bernard, Saint Thomas, Duns Scotus, and many others — became privileged references at the same level as Joyce, Proust, Mallarmé, Artaud, and Céline. *Tel Quel* was seen as a laboratory for reading and interpretation. Academics! some cried out. Terrorists! Accused the lazy, backing away. In these confrontations with philosophers, theologians or the writers mentioned above, it was a question of testing how far literature could go as a voyage to the end of the night. To the end of the night as a limit of the absolute, a limit of meaning, a limit of the being (conscious or unconscious), a limit of seduction and delirium. And this without the romantic hope of founding yet another community extolling the cult of Ancient Greece, for example, or the cult of cathedrals, or that of a brighter future. But, on the contrary, by confronting the men and women of today with their solitude and their disillusionment — solitude and disillusionment to a degree perhaps never seen before in the history of humanity — nonsense and emptiness.

The paradox — whence the accusation of terrorism — stems from the fact that this confrontation with the impossible takes on not the form of complacency with despair, but rather that of irony and vitality. Because, beyond the impossible, the imaginary is restored and asserted, whereas it had been put to one side and challenged, notably by certain trends in surrealism and existentialism. Pangs of love, values, meaning, man, woman, history, certainly; but I am not traveling to Abyssinia, I do not belong to the communist party, and if I go to China or to structuralism, I will return. I am taking a trip to the end of the night. This is called writing-thought. It isn't much, but without it, there is perhaps nothing. Such is the path of the samurais.

3. What theory?

We understand better now that, faced with the challenge of the contemporary imaginary experience, the reception of ancient texts just as much as modern ones finds itself invited — certainly not obliged, so implacable and inevitable is the weight of tradition! — to think about this *anti*-thought: to accompany it in its deconstructive radicality, but also to clarify it, indeed to judge it. One particular status of interpretation therefore imposes itself on this theory, confronted with the newly unveiled regime of the imaginary. It is a question of thinking of the height of the psychic-and-worldly experience of a writing which presents risks for *common sense* (for consensus, for repression) and which, for this reason, clarifies the *fragility* in it. In this context, and confronted once more with the question: "what is literature good for?", theory responds: for thinking and for making others think about the fragility of social

bonds and of shareable meaning — notably those boundaries where meaning and its subject can revolt to the point of abjection or ecstasy. Theory participates from then on in that thought of demolition and metaphysics — the *Abbau* of Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, the "deconstruction" according to Derrida — which psychoanalysis applies to the individual and which literary theory, for its part, attempts to apply to imaginary formations with a collective goal.

When literary theory is conceived of in this manner, the status of the interpretation that constitutes it is modified. We know how difficult it is to put our finger on it: Barthes tried to do so in *Criticism and Truth* (1966); in responding to the historicist empiricism of pedantic "good sense," and in taking the risk of confusing interpretation with the imaginary. In what follows, and to conclude, I will try to lead you, in my own way, into what seems to me to be a necessary balance between "thinking" and "judging" in the interpretation of literary texts.

If one were to distinguish the initiators of literary theory from the epigones, one would notice that theoretical advances take place in personal works where the neutrality of the interpreter is thwarted by his often required implication. Thus, Bakhtine, in his books on Rabelais and Dostoyevsky, proposes an interpretative model which is only readable in the context of a controversy between formalists and Marxists, and also based on the author's personal tastes for the ambiguities of the carnival, which he contents himself to follow right up until the modern novel. Thus, Barthes, in his *S/Z*, only proposes deciphering codes for Balzac based on a very personal reading, and which reveal his musings and his own sexuality. It is the same for me, whether I am writing about Lautréamont or Mallarmé, or even more still about Céline or Proust: "semiotics", the "abjection" or the distinction between the "character" of novels and "characters" are effects of *transferance* onto texts and authors, just as much as conceptualizations. The decentering of the conscious subject, which we have noted in modern literature, and which Freud explored, profoundly supports the interpretation which I espouse in literary theory — and which differs in this respect from "hermeneutics". Does this mean an abandonment of interpretation in favour of a generalized fiction which intensifies fiction?

In following the text by Céline, I am trying to accompany him in the logic of his language, of his conscious and unconscious themes, with the goal of questioning them. The linguistic, stylistic, psychoanalytical, and philosophical tools allow me to accompany him, but also allow me to uncover the author's and the text's shameful meaning, in ways that this meaning perhaps never appeared to the author, but such as it appears to me. A thinking me and a judging me. What's the difference?

Hannah Arendt, who followed Heidegger, though ironically, in the "wind of thought", put great emphasis on the interrogative reach of the act of thinking, which I would like to update in the theoretical context that pre-occupies us today. It is a matter of questioning, without complacency, every

identity, notion, value, meaning — to analyze them in the sense of dissolving them, turning them around, sending them back to their memory. I would say: to tackle them in revolt, to rebel against them. But this work of dissolving that it theoretical thinking ressembles analytical interpretation, and not enough for literary theory which, as a social act, is obliged to *judge*. Close on Kant's heels, Arendt adds to the liberty to *think* an obligation to *judge*. And, it is on *esthetic judgment* that she attempts to found a more general theory of judgment which applies to politics, and could interest us. For is it not for the readers, and therefore the public sphere, that our interpretation is intended, an interpretation which, for this reason, takes on an intrinsically political value?

Paradoxically, esthetic judgment, according to Kant and reread by Arendt, is based... on taste. This sense, among the most personal of senses, tributary of the pleasures of the mouth, oral pleasure alternating with distaste, is nonetheless susceptible to being transformed into the "duty" to correspond with an "enlarged mentality", none other than that of language (mentality and language for which all tables deserve the common name of "table"). Human beings, according to Kant and Arendt, are initially defined by their ability to transform pleasure into duty, meaning into language, immeasurable unique-ness into an enlarged mentality. Arendt wishes to shift the emphasis of this ability — which is the dawn of civilization, the boundary between pleasure and duty — from the limited field of esthetics to politics itself, and we can only dream of the benefits of such a social contract. The sublime and fragile ability, which Freud explored in his own way, and to which he assigned the less pleasant name "repression" (*Verdrangung*), a condition of language.

We know that this ability to share, when all is said and done, a policy which Hannah Arendt wanted to rehabilitate and restore, was broken by the Shoah. Herself a victim of this abjection, Arendt, with her rather particular religion, persisted in believing in the power of language to not become insane, but to be shared by a larger human community, originally founded on esthetical judgment as a starting point for political judgment.

A legitimate question remains, however, which applies not only to current events, but also to the meetings between the imaginary and the impossible which I touched on earlier. And what if the Shoah was not simply an accident in European history, but that, under certain historical circumstances, it caused an intrinsic potentiality of humankind to explode, that madness and that folly which art and literature treat in their own way, and in so doing, dismiss, keep in check, shift emphasis, to avoid outshining them? We should not forget that, in speaking of theory, we stand alongside this break. Georges Bataille, more catastrophic than Arendt, looked on the other side of that enlarged mentality: visionary of pleasure and disgust, great spasms which the speaking being has some trouble doing without when rationality and repression are broken, and which the writer intended for *literature*, so that it would accompany them in fantasy, and for *theory*, so that it would exhaust them in elucidation and laughter.

Neither a philosopher nor a writer, between Arendt and Bataille, neither an expert in repression nor a host for pleasure, Freud seems to sit on the fence. The interpretation which he proposes for the *anti*-thought of the unconscious, but also for writing, is a bet on meaning, inasmuch as Freud would be susceptible to elaborating the drive, but without end, and with uneasiness.

Attentive to analytical interpretation, I transpose it into the experience of writing, the objective of which, I will repeat, though unique, is nevertheless immediately social. When I *think* Céline's text, I bring her logic to the fore, but my questioning thinking does not in any way lead me to some sort of adherence. For the time being, I bet on the existence of a community, on a common sense inevitably stemming from repression (according to Freud), or capable of transforming pleasure and disgust into a shared value (according to Kant and Arendt). From then on, I am not only thinking: I am judging based on this blameless community to which I belong and at which I aim my reading and my interpretation. Having exposed Céline's logic leads me to judge it in depth: beginning with the depth of her experience, which I know to be contagious. I preserve its uniqueness; I reveal "who" speaks which truths, and at what risk. But I do not compare them any less with the communal judgment that he has destroyed through his invasive, rebellious, abject and exhilarating idiolect, which infects us and which allows us to live life to the fullest: on the boundary between the shared and the undisclosable. For such are the stakes of literature: after the time of the sacred (which was that of stains: of sensible as opposed to significant) and the time of religion (which was that of the forbidden and of transgression, of paternal symbolism and of the impossible real), the literary experience is situated at the junction of the singular and the shared. By questioning the identity of language, of the subject, and of social bonds. To open them, to abolish them, to renew them. Theory which listens to it, and which would want to remain contemporary with this epochal transformation, has to be in itself a revelation of the person who gets involved in it: by analyzing, just as much as by judging these confrontations with the impossible which is this paradoxical (I mean rebellious) experience which we still caH literature.

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How did the ideas of Juri Lotman
reach the West?

A memoir

During my first face-to-face meeting with the younger generation of the Tartu semiotics school during the Meeting of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in Dresden in 1999, Peeter Torop — now Lotman's successor in the chair of semiotics at Tartu University — asked me to write down my recollections about how I discovered Juri Mikhajlovich first two monographs on semiotic aspects of artistic texts (1964, 1970), and how I was able to bring these monographs to the United States and thereby to open them up for the world of Western learning. To this request I recklessly assented, not giving much thought to the difficulties inherent in this the task. The proposed memoir seemed so simple, and so wholly straightforward. Was it not a simple task of retelling something, which is an intimate part of my own personal experiences, my own recollections, my own intellectual biography? But, as I was to learn painfully when I sat down to prepare this paper, this was not at all the case. For what follows involves not just a piece of my lived life, but something which literally turned my scientific maturation on its ear, and was to become a vigorous compass for the direction of my further intellectual paths. So, as the Germans say: "Wer A sagt muss auch B sagen," here I am, trying to say B.

I was not entirely unprepared for my encounter with Lotman's work. But now the direction of my work, under the influence of Lotman's theoretical work, and that of his colleagues, B. A. Uspenskij, V. V. Ivanov, N. Toporov, and others, changed course in the direction of literary and cultural theory and especially of Lotmanian semiotics.

If I may be allowed to reflect on the most determining circumstances which have crucially influenced the development of my scientific literary-linguistic-poetic-semiotic *views*, I would name three guideposts terms of reference. They were the following.

That I entered literary studies from the angle of Slavistics, and especially from the viewpoint of a native Czech speaker. I had grown up in Prague during the 1920s and 1930s; and Prague was at that time a flourishing scholarly and artistic center, especially in the study of language in its broadest aspect beginning with empassioned concerns with the forms, functions, and

styles of the Czech language. For in the so-called historical crown lands of Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia, the Czech language had, since the defeat of the Czech Protestants in 1620 by the Holy German Empire under the dominance of the Austrian Habsburg dynasty, been forced into a subordinate position relative to German because of the Germanization policies of the Habsburgs, and the expulsion and execution of large numbers of Czech nobles and intellectuals. Consequently, by the early nineteenth century, Czech had basically ceased to be spoken among the upper and intellectual levels of the population in the Czech lands who spoke and wrote in German and sometimes in Latin, the latter especially for scholarly writing, creating thus a situation not unlike that in Estonia during the same time-span. The Czech language had found its shelter primarily among the peasants and the urban working classes. Consequently, when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the leaders of the Czech Revival movement (*národní obrození*) endeavored to restore Czech culture, they turned their attention first to the Czech language in this attempt to restore its use by establishing new norms for it and it is no wonder then that the Czechs became known as the nation of philologists. This linguistic disposition has been an important feature of Czech culture ever since the strivings of the Czech Revivalists to breathe new life into the Czech language, and one consequence of this historical fact was the emergence of two strikingly independent parallel dialects of Czech, written and spoken Czech, dialects which as the bifurcated system of modern Greek, create a radical differentiation between these two aspects if the language system. Questions as to where one or the other idiom was permissible, and where its use was proscribed, abounded especially since the end of the nineteenth century, when some writers used a mingling of the two grammatical and phonetic systems in neighboring positions in one and the same text as foregrounding devices. Such techniques became a device of great importance in the texts of the literary avantgarde of the second and third decades of the last century. In these decades, which coincided with those in which I was growing to maturity and young adulthood in Prague, such questions became acute creating a situation in which both linguists and writers cooperated in lively fashion; and this was also the situation in other European countries, notably in Russia, where the Moscow Linguistic Circle, in many ways a precursor of the Prague Linguistic Circle, joined in the work of the avantgarde poets in searching for new ways of expressing the essence of the nature of literature (*literaturnost'*). The literary-linguistic organization "The Society for the Study of Poetic Language (*OPOJAZ — obscestvo dlja izucenija poeticeskogo jazyka*), was launched in St. Petersburg in 1915 as the basis for such collaboration. For traditional linguists of the time, issues of poetics had been strictly out of bounds, a delimitation which was almost as strongly felt by the users of poetic speech, the writers of literary works. But by the second decade of the twentieth century it had become quite as acceptable, indeed tempting, for a linguist to be immersed in questions of poetic language, as for a poet to be absorbed by technical issues in linguistics.

That the Russian situation in the first three decades of the past century was very similar to that in Czechoslovakia during the 1920s and 1930s is epitomized by the fact that many Russian poets, especially Vladimir Majakovski and Velemir Khlebnikov, showed great interest in the work of the Moscow Linguistic Circle and, conversely, linguists like Roman Jakobson were bound by bonds of friendship with the poets of the time, and not only showed interest, but also participated, in the work of the OPOJAZ. Roman Jakobson, as is well known, even wrote himself futurist (*Baum*) poetry under the *nom de plume* of Aljagrov.

In 1920 an event of great import for Czech linguistics and poetics was the relocation of Roman Jakobson to Prague, first as press attache of the Soviet embassy; but after a few years as a permanent settler; and he lived in Prague and Brno until he was forced to flee from the German troops that occupied Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. The young Jakobson was full of enthusiasm for the new functional linguistics, and he soon took up contact with Czech linguists and poets; and in 1926, together with the Czech linguist Vilem Mathesius and others, he co-founded the Prague Linguistic Circle (*Prazsky lingvisticky krouzek*), whose Vice-President he was from 1927 until his escape in 1939. During his stay in Prague and Brno (he was appointed professor of Slavistics at the Brno University (later, Masaryk University). In Prague, he broadly extended the field of linguistics to the exploration of functional language in its relation to other domains, especially poetics. It was not surprising then that he soon established relations of close friendship not only with Czech linguists (Vilem Mathesius and Bohuslav Havranek) but also with the professor of aesthetics at Charles University Jan Mukarovsky and leading Czech and Slovak poets and personalities in other fields of literature (V. Vancura, V. Nezval, J. Seifert, L. Novomesky, and the theater producers and actors Voskovec and Werich). With his fellow Russian emigre Petr Bogatyrev, he studied the interaction between language and folk art in the broad field of semiotics; carried on a spirited battle against the representatives of conservative, puristic trends in Czech linguistics. His activities, together with the other collaborators in the Prague Linguistic Circle, were to have a powerful influence on European linguistics *and* literature; and in his famous essay on Czech verse and versification (*O cheshkom stihe,* 1923, repr. 1969), he demonstrated convincingly not only the fallacy of accentual metrics for Czech versification as elaborated by the Josef Kral school, but also demonstrated compellingly that the versification system of any language can never been examined without attending to the complex relationship between a given language system and its prosody (cf. Winner 1969: vii).

This was the artistic and scientific atmosphere of my youth and early adulthood. And when I arrived at Harvard on a Refugee Fellowship in 1939, I chose as my field of specialization that of Slavistics, which elicited considerable irritation by the then leading American Slavist, the late Samuel Hazard Cross, a man of unimaginative and pedestrian scholarship, who saw in this option only the sloth of a young man who knew at least one Slavic language

"anyhow," and, indeed, not one acquired by studious occupation with grammar books, but imbibed with the mother's milk. Needless to say, Professor Cross was frequently "cross" with his young student, and tried to hinder his academic maturation. Yet, I persisted; and when, after suspending my studies for service in the Second World War, I returned to Slavic studies in 1945, it was not to Harvard (for Cross had died and there were no Slavic studies then at that university) but at Columbia University under the benevolent eye of the late Ernest J. Simmons who told me at our first encounter that I simply must meet the new Professor from my own native Czechoslovakia, occupant the holder of the chair in linguistics and Czechoslovak studies. I rang the bell to Professor Jakobson's small and frugal apartment. The door opened and a man whose reddish hair stood up straight and whose strabistic eyes glared at me with some consternation. But the eyes and the entire face changed expression radically when I addressed him in Czech and explained my mission. I was immediately invited in, and from then on, this apartment was that of my teacher and, later, close friend. It was not only our common fascination with Czech and Russian literature, especially the poetry of these two languages, but also my growing interest in poetic theory, especially that of the Prague Circle, which fastened our affinity and *cameraderie* which was to last until his death in 1982.

I stated at the beginning of this essay that it was three points of reference which prepared me for my encounter with Juri Mikhajlovic Lotman, first with his works in 1966. And then with him personally in 1973. Looking back at my scientific career from the outlook of a mid-octogenerian, it is difficult not to see these three points of contact as a persistent gradation, where each new encounter, each new revelation, unearthes another piece of what seems like a straight line of extension, continually moving from my childhood in Prague to the *rencontre* with the Moscow-Tartu school. This is so different from the *curriculum vitae* of the "average" "Western" literary scholar, historian, and student of culture.

I feel compelled, at this juncture, to add to these experience a third *rencontre* that with the person who, for just sixty years this year, has been my closest collaborator and scientific confederate, my wife Irene Portis-Winner now, like me, a retired professor but one not of literature but a specialist in cultural anthropology. From her indefatigable boundary-crossings from culture to culture and from discipline to discipline, and especially from her fascination with the pertinence of her varied areas of research to semiotics of culture; from the fact that I was able to accompany her on all of her many research trips in the "field" and my ability to be an active part of the fieldwork process, have powerfully enriched, broadened, focused, and buttressed my approach to my own field, in its theories and application to actual literary texts.

For all these propitious encounters and turns not only in my scientific but also my personal life that attended me through the many difficult shoals of life, I had to negotiate in my long career, for all these, I am ever thankful.

* * *

Now to the *denouement* of the narrative of this part of my life.

It was on a crisp mid-winter morning in Moscow of the year 1967, one of those splendid cloudless, crisp almost windless winter days for which Moscow is known, that I mounted the snow-covered stairs of the Lenin Library (now the Russian State Library [RGB]), and went to my usual seat in the so-called professors' room. My books were already on my desk waiting for me to begin reading for my research which was, I anticipated, to lead to a book on the prose of the Russian writer Ivan Bunin. For I had received a research grant that would allow me to do research in the holdings of the Lenin Library and the Central State Archives for Literature (CGALI). After a few hours of absolute silence, with all visitors bent over their desks and busily taking notes, a bell sounded for the so-called "Hygienic Intermission" (*Sanitarnyj pereryvok*); everyone rose from their seats and went out into the hall to perambulate or to drink some tea or coffee in the near-by cafeteria, while the windows of the reading room were thrown wide open, allowing the clear sub-zero air from the outside to enter the room and to freshen the air which had grown somewhat stuffy with the clean and fresh air from outside.

The tables in the reading room were placed in close proximity, and each researcher occupied his or her own table. A young man was sitting at the neighbouring table, and what he was reading peaked my interest. As far as I could see from afar, the books title dealt with poetics and, more specifically with *structural* poetics. When all the readers were leaving the room, I sneaked a glance at the book which had aroused my curiosity. The very title elicited my compelling interest. It was called *Lectures in Structural Poetics (Lekcii po struktural'noj poetike)* and the author was Juri Mikhajlovic Lotman. I leafed briefly through its pages, and realized that my curiosity was justified. Here was, so it seemed, an attempt to treat literature not as an isolated fact of life, but as closely linked to other phenomena of a culture. I had time only to glance at the firs sentence of the introduction which stated:

> The contemporary development of scientific thought is increasingly characterized by a tendency to look not at separate and isolated phenomena of life, but at broad units, and to see how each of these even seemingly most simple events of reality turn out, at closer inspection, to be a *structure* consisting of even smaller elements *and itself is but a part of a more complex configuration.* With this is connected the deeply dialectical concept that for the understanding of a phenomenon it is insufficient to study it in its isolated nature, *one must also determine its place in the system.* (Lotman 1968: 1; italics supplied)

So here I was confronted with the profound structural principle that had been so inspiringly developed during the twenties and thirties in Prague, especially by Jakobson and Mukařovský, and that was continued by the later after the War in his projected "system of systems". Applied to the language sciences, linguistics and literature, this meant that in the examination of a literary text

the close reading of the American New Critics of the 1930s and the French structuralists of the 1960s was no longer adequate. For each text in the verbal arts not only consisted of elements on lower levels, but was itself part and parcel of a broader system, encompassing not only the system of a national literature, or a subsection of its history, but the structure of the language in which the text is written, and its relation to even broader levels, that of the totality of culture, for example.

That such theories were entertained by the Prague circle, I knew, but I had not encountered such broad thoughts elsewhere. And here I had seemingly stumbled over a true revelation. When the "sanitary intermission" was over, and the windows closed again, I engaged my neighbour who was reading the book in a conversation and we left the room to walk up and down the hallways and corridors to talk. I learned then that there was a school that interested itself in semiotics and structuralism in language and literature, and I also obtained the names of the major figures in this movement in the then Soviet Union of which we in the "West" had been profoundly ignorant.

When I attempted to order another copy of Lotman's lectures to read it at greater leisure, I was told that there was only one copy of it in the library, and that I would have to wait my turn, and that there were several other readers whose order for this volume had preceded mine. I learned then, with a great sense of consternation that this, seemingly so important, study had been published in the minuscule edition of 500 copies. While awaiting my turn for the Lotman book I scoured the Moscow bookstores. But it was all in vein. While all the booksellers whom I approached were acquainted with the name and reputation of Juri Lotman, the book was sold out with no chance in of gaining access to a stray copy.

When, after several weeks, it was my turn at the library, and I at long last was able to read Lotman's book, I almost drank it in, I was convinced that I had found a true treasure trove, and that it was my absolute duty to bring at least a photo copy to the United States, in the hopes of reprinting the monograph in the series *Brown University Slavic Reprints*, of which I had just become the editor-in-chief. But even this took an enormous amount of time and effort; for not only were the Lotmanian theses not popular with the Soviet *aparachiki*, I had also to deal with the Gogolesque phenomenon of the lower Russian bureaucracy, which feared anything out of the ordinary and placed ever more obstacle into my path.

But I succeeded and was able to bring the photocopied book to the United States, where it was published as a reprint a few months later with my introduction in which I attempted to lay out for my readers a little bit of the history and essence of the Lotman Tartu-Moscow school. And three years later, and three years wiser, I was able to obtain Lotman's next monograph, on a return visit to Moscow, and publish it also as a reprint, with an explanatory introductory essay (Lotman 1971; Winner 1971).

The door was now open, and my reprint was followed shortly by a series of translations by the American Slavists Henryk Baran (1976) and the many

reprints and translation by the Slavists at the University of Michigan under the editorship of Ladislav Matejka, Krystyna Pomorska, and others (e.g., Matejka, Pomorska 1971).

In conclusion I reflect upon and summarize some dominant points in our discussion of Lotman's contribution and his heritage which encompasses his revolutionary poetics, as contrasted to approaches to poetics in the West. As I have shown, the Prague school, which rejected the separation of poetics and linguistics and a synchronically guided study, and espoused the universal whether dominant or not, and also Russian formalism, contributed to Lotman's thinking. But these were primarily, though important, points of departure for Lotman in his dialogue with the masters of the past and present, energized by his own boundless creativity and foresight that pointed to the broadest future directions for the study of human culture in all its dimensions.

Meanwhile poetics in the west took its fitful paths, never severing fully its ties to Saussurean cognitive static structuralism which did not encompass aesthetics or subtleties of meaning, nor context and point of view. Thus it was not out of tune with positivistic or hermeneutic positions (for example the new critics in some American universities). Eventually this lead to what we might term the *reductio ad absurdum* where comparativism, and meaning were essential abandoned for deconstruction fathered by Derrida and evolving into the even more barren postmodernism. Meaning which had not been captured except in the Saussurean arbitrary cognitive mode becomes entirely subjective to the reader and unrelated to form or to context or the subtleties of aesthetic interpretations. Point of view from the inner and outer approach, history and context were all ignored for a form of sterile relativism abandoning all thought of any unifying underlying principles in human culture. Franz Boas's famous statement that we must only compare comparatives was dissolved, since indeed no text is comparable. Western scholarship had thus reached the point of no return which is not to say that the deconstructionist at least felt that they discovered some underlying assumptions that were buried, thus the search termed the hermeneutics of suspicion. But it need not follow that we must assume essentially meaninglessness on the obvious level to find deep hidden assumptions which according to the deconstructionists may not necessarily indicate any common qualities in texts that may be compared. On the contrary meaning exists on various levels and my be subtle or ambiguous but it always there to be interpreted.

To turn back to the Prague school, its rebellion rebellion against the Saussurean heritage was a milestone. The possibilities of a science of signs, foreseen by Saussure but not developed, was left to the Prague school. Bogatyrev was the first to apply a semiotic analysis to the nonverbal structure of peasant costumes. Most importantly, Jakobson rejected Saussure's exclusively arbitrary sign, and iconicity and the object were again recovered.

The great contribution of the Moscow-Tartu school was the development of a semiotics of culture and the position that underlying values, foreseen by Mukařovský, shaped culture. Lotman found that Prirogine's work in the exact

sciences and biology had significance for all scientific thinking because they "tackled the problem of chance in the sciences and [...] demonstrated the function of random phenomena in the general dynamics of the world" (Lotman 1990: 230). Thus the science of signs was dynamic and applied to the widest phenomena, to all signs verbal and nonverbal and body movements, and all the arts and particularly cinema (Eisenstein and the theory of montage), to everyday behavior and certainly history and context including physical and biological phenomena, and indeed to perception of time and space and the universe. In the later Moscow-Tartu school the signifier and signified were no longer split but in Peircean tradition the sign was a whole that pointed to an object and was interpreted through another sign, the interpretant, in an endless series and thus an infant regress. For Peirce interrelation of all phenomena meant continuity. Peirce was probably not read by Lotman since Peirce was published late and not translated, but there were strong intertexualities.

Clearly Lotman saw that human behavior and culture was continually interrelated but did not necessarily always change gradually, and thus his theory of cultural explosion and his understanding of the relativity of chaos, which for one culture may be order, but looking beyond the culture borders another culture might appear as chaos although to the culture bearers of that culture it is seen again as order. The interpenetrating character of all cultures, the dynamics of permeability of borders were essential assumptions.

To be so farsighted and free from conventional scholarship one must be courageous and imaginative, as was Lotman, looking beyond official knowledge to ask questions which do not already determine the answer. Thus Lotman became and continues to be an inspiration for more far-reaching research and creativity for writers, artists, musicians, anthropologists, ecologists, biologists, philosophers, linguists, psychologists and in fact for scholars and artists in all fields of inquiry.

The stage has thus been set for an immense program which will surely spread world-wide, helping us to explore and understand cultural variations and underlying similarities, and polysemic signs and their transformations of meaning, the pervasive norm-breaking and norm-perverting aesthetic function. It is useless to deconstruct the sign into meaningless empty signifiers. The sign can be variously interpreted but not infinitely, and always depends on point of view, culture values, history etc. Its meaning can be transformed but never obliterated. Levi-Strauss saw this in his mammoth study of transformation of myths, depending on all these factors and particularly ecological environment. A few decades ago Margaret Mead wrote foresightedly that the issue is differences and similarities in cultures.

When my wife and I met Lotman for the last time in a Munich hospital, he was already very ill. He enchanted us with his graciousness and old world ways. His charm and warmth were as sincere as were his searching works which laid out the farthest perspective for continuing, deepening and thought-provoking inquiries into the world of semiotics of culture. Lotman understood

interdisciplinary studies in the deepest sense, that is as the possibility of communication embedded in the most various forms, encompassing complex and continuous interrelations of all reality, the physical and biological world, even the universe, and human creativity, the basis for culture. All of which does not omit the ever-changing forms of order and chaos.

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Lotman and cultural studies:
The case for cross-fertilization

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Abstract. This paper[1] seeks to evaluate the extent to which Lotman's theoretical works could provide a conceptual articulation to the project of British and American cultural studies (CS). Just as CS, Lotman operates with an extensive concept of culture, albeit one mostly limited to nobility culture and focused on the past. His late works can be seen to articulate a semiotic theory of power: his emphasis on the relationship between center and periphery recalls the infatuation with marginality that underpins CS. Lotman shares the (post) structuralist premise about the primary role of discourse in founding reality. Yet his emphasis on the natural striving of culture toward diversity mitigates the subject's dependence upon discourse. Thus, subjects act on their striving toward autonomy by playing discourses against one another, recoding them in an act of autocommunication that generates novelty in the process.

Even though it denies the grand narrative, Cultural Studies emphasizes class, gender, and race differences. Lotman's concept of the semiosphere emphasizes the ad hoc foundation of group identities, their emergence out of an intrinsic recoding of extrinsic codes, and the circulation of texts and values among groups. Lotman doesn't privilege any sort of group identity and therefore offers a flexible framework applicable to a broader range of groups. In that sense he offers an alternative to Gramsci's notion of the rootedness of groups in class realities (which underlies early CS).

Lotman addresses many of the concerns of cultural studies, conceived both narrowly and broadly. Cultural studies emerged partly in respon-

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[1] A longer version of this article can be found in the introduction to a collective volume entitled *Lotman and Cultural Studies: Encounters and Extensions*, ed. by Andreas Schönle, to be published in the United States. I would like to express my gratitude to Helena Goscilo for her generous and invaluable feedback on matters of substance and style.

se to a single-minded focus on high literature in English Departments, and it rests on a definition of culture as the totality of cultural production, including mass culture in all its variety. Cultural studies has an integrative ambition: it seeks to work out the articulation, i.e. the mutual determinations and interrelations, among the various facets of life — political, economic, social, erotic, and ideological — that make up culture as a whole (Nelson *et al.* 1992: 14). In order to do so, it not only analyzes an extravagant variety of texts, from fashion and advertising to rock music and graffiti, but also approaches cultural production with an inter-disciplinary, contextualizing method. Lotman shares such an extensive purview, albeit in a different cultural and historical context:[2] his work on dueling culture, on the semiotics of dress, on aristocratic banquet and food culture, etc., testify to a principled broadening of the traditional notion of culture. Admittedly, he mostly limits himself to the study of nobility culture. Yet he addresses the relationship between high and mass culture theoretically (Lotman 1992a: 209–215) and he exhibits profound interest in folk and traditional culture — he values the specific act of reception presupposed by pre-modern texts and the creative recoding they invite (Lotman 1992b: 243–247).[3]

Cultural studies resists grand theories and meta-discourses that purport to explain everything across historical boundaries. It is contextually specific and strives to be descriptive, although at times it borrows generously from the theories of various contiguous disciplines such as psychoanalysis, sociology, or literary theory (Nelson *et al.* 1992: 7–8). Lotman's work ranges from the highly specific to the typological and has alternated between theoretical and historically contextual periods, but even his broad cultural typologies serve to undercut the applicability of such master narratives as marxism. In his latest pieces, Lotman repeatedly maintains that crucial binary opposi-

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[2] For reasons that will become clear below, cultural studies is primarily devoted to a study of contemporary culture.

[3] Cultural studies and Lotman have both called into question the binary opposition between mass and elite culture. In cultural studies this recognition emerged from the turn to a model of culture as a patchwork of separate communities, each articulating its own differences. See During 1993: 19. Lotman presents mass literature as purely a matter of sociological appreciation, rather than of semiotic structure, and points out the ways in which particular writers have moved in and out of mass literature at various historical junctures. Mass literature is a paradoxical product of a culture that wants to see itself as high (Lotman 1992a: 211–212).

tions need to be approached historically, rather than *a priori*, and that there is much to gain from focusing on the gradation between opposites, rather than on a mere logical dichotomy.

The second defining trait of cultural studies is its concern with power. As Tony Bennett puts it, cultural studies is "a term of convenience for a fairly dispersed array of theoretical and political positions, which ... share a commitment to examining cultural practices from the point of view of their intrication with, and within, relations of power" (Bennett 1992: 23). While Lotman is perhaps not as single-minded in his analysis of the nexus between cultural production and power, this collection discusses his conceptualization of the semiotic expression of power. His analysis of the relations between center and periphery echoes the infatuation with the margins of culture in cultural studies. Lotman is acutely aware of the fact that ownership of information confers power, and he discusses the ways in which groups fight for monopoly over information and develop special languages to keep other groups at bay (Lotman 2000a: 395). Even more pointedly, he underscores the intrinsic power (or energy) of signs, their ability to effect changes in their surroundings, so that the deployment of a particular discourse is in itself a form of power (Lotman 2000b: 9).

Two competing paradigms of culture underpin the project of cultural studies: a humanist "culturalist" concept of culture as a whole way of life that can be described empirically and a "(post) structuralist" perspective that posits a web of discourses that determine identity and meaning and that need to be analyzed semiotically or rhetorically. The former view focuses on the experience of subjects who generate their own meanings and adapt social institutions to their own needs. The latter view conceives of the autonomous human subject as an ideological notion peddled by discourse in order to obfuscate the real identity of the subject as an effect of text (Hall 1980: 57–72). This debate, fundamental to cultural studies, has played itself out in various forms, affecting the ways one conceives of hegemony, identity, and resistance. In the United States, cultural studies has tilted heavily towards a "(post) structuralist," i.e. textualist approach, which has diminished its attractiveness to the social sciences. Yet Communication Studies has urged that cultural studies be reoriented toward a critique of American positivism, of the grip of science on social policy, and of the idea of freedom as "our capacity to choose our ends for ourselves" (a kind of individualism that ultimately destroys the public sphere). Such critique would emphasize not the role of texts in determining identity, but that of rituals and institutions

in constructing forms of social relations and groupings based on a common search for identity, thereby funneling particular "ends" into "taste, style and form of life" consistent with the development of citizenship (Carey 1997: 8, 12).

Lotman's definition of culture as a "bundle" of semiotic systems, that may, but need not be, organized hierarchically (Lotman 2000a: 397), shares the (post) structuralist premise of the primary role of discourse in founding reality. For example, Lotman considers participants in communicative exchanges full-fledged subjects only when they accept a set of restrictions imposed upon them by culture (Lotman 2000c: 562). Yet at the same time, Lotman's emphasis on the natural striving of culture toward diversity (Lotman 2000c: 564), indeed, on the obligatory presence of diversity for a semiotic environment to function properly, mitigates the subject's dependence upon discourse. Thus, subjects act on their impulse to autonomy by playing discourses against one another, recoding them in an act of autocommunication that generates novelty in the process. Thus Lotman grants individuals the capacity to intervene in semiotic systems and thereby affect their cultural environment. In a way, this conception bridges the two paradigms intrinsic to cultural studies. It maintains the discursive nature of reality but empowers the subject to manipulate codes and wrest some measure of autonomy.

The approaches of cultural studies to power have depended upon their primary allegiance to either the "culturalist" or the "(post) structuralist" paradigms. Early approaches tended to glamorize resistance to the hegemonic political center mounted by various social subcultures. The main framework here was the interface between a single political center and oppressed social classes that secured autonomy by elaborating their own counter-cultures. Upon the influx of French sociological and post-structuralist thought, cultural studies ceased to vest the political center with power and, instead, affirmed its decentered nature as a system or grid cast over the entirety of social life and embodied in sociological organization or, even more abstractly, in the discursive underpinnings of reality. Power became so diffuse and surreptitious that the valorization of counter-hegemony collapsed. The interface between state and counter-culture yielded to a much more splintered view of communities organized around a shared identity based on sexuality, gender, or ethnicity. These groups were perceived as striving to develop their own values and ethics and interact with one another on the basis of a multi-culturalist respect for the "other." This embrace of alterity accommodated the valorization of difference,

but its tendency to reify identity prevented meaningful exchange across communities and often impeded the pursuit of a common political agenda.[4]

Even though it denies a grand narrative, cultural studies emphasizes class, gender, and race differences and cannot help but operate with binary oppositions, despite its stated goal to undercut dichotomies. Lotman's concept of the semiosphere emphasizes the ad hoc foundation of group identities, their emergence out of an intrinsic recoding of extrinsic codes, and the circulation of texts and values among groups. Lotman does not privilege any sort of group identity and therefore offers a flexible framework applicable to a broader range of groups. In this sense, he not only offers an alternative to Gramsci's notion of the rootedness of groups in class realities (which underlies early cultural studies), but also provides an answer to the dilemma between unity and decenteredness in the ways one conceives of the field of culture. For Lotman, culture is essentially both, for it evidences both centrifugal and centripetal forces, which play themselves out on various, coexisting layers (During 1993: 6). Boundaries that cultural agents put up should not lead to a fetishization of what is one's own (*svoj*) and what is alien (*chuzhoj*). In addition, Lotman conceives of identity and alterity, that is, of multi-culturalism, as a sphere of engagement rather than of awed respect. His notion of dialogue is one that leads to change, and hence to cultural flux, rather than to social fragmentation.

Auto-communication, as Lotman describes it, resembles what cultural studies calls hybridization, the process by which individuals or communities appropriate external cultural products by investing them with their own functions and meanings (During 1993: 6). At the same time, there are differences of emphasis in the two concepts. In an essay on popular culture, John Fiske theorizes the concept of distance — distance between an individual and the cultural production he consumes — as a key marker of difference between high and low culture (Fiske 1992: 154–165). High culture promotes decontextualized, depoliticized readings of cultural objects because it constructs culture as a sphere of disinterested beauty insulated from social processes. Popular culture, in contrast, is "concretely contextual" (Fiske 1993: 158). It makes cultural objects its own by embedding them in concrete uses, in its practices of living, identifying with them or

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[4] On this turning point in cultural studies and its political underpinnings, see During 1993: 11–14.

deriving sensual pleasure from them without any consideration of appropriate "distance". In short, cultural objects are transposed from the realm of discourse into the sphere of practice. To support his view of the use of culture in everyday life, Fiske quotes ethnographers who write of a "sacred inarticulateness" on the part of respondents who are unable to explain discursively the meaning they invest in particular objects or practices. Thus the meanings that result from hybridization remain opaque to the outside observer, who needs to develop to the greatest extent possible an ability to experience other people's ways of living from the inside (Fiske 1992: 158–159). This conceptualization of counter-hegemony as a non-verbal sphere of practice would be alien to Lotman, who conceives of auto-communication and translation as discursive phenomena and who would endow resisting subjects with much more semiotic creativity than is implicit in such a theory of the everyday.[5]

Auto-communication also offers an alternative to the ways in which cultural studies sought to incorporate marxist ideas. The relationship between cultural studies and marxism is too rich and complex to lend itself to a quick overview.[6] Yet Stuart Hall's 1983 essay on "The problem of ideology: marxism without guarantees" — one of his latest statements on the topic of marxism — speaks to the core of the issue. In a close reading of specific passages from Marx, Hall calls into question the traditional understanding of some of Marx's most seminal concepts. Thus, ideology is no longer a "distortion" of social reality, but a partial view thereof; the link between

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[5] Cultural studies has gone through several swings of the pendulum in the way it conceives of the semiotic creativity of the subjects of culture. Both communication studies and ethnography have moved away from a Foucaultian presumption of total passiveness in the face of cultural grids. Communication studies has coalesced onto an "active audience theory" premised on the idea that media texts are necessarily polysemous and that the audience always deflects dominant ideology to its own uses. Ethnography has emphasized micro-analyses and dialogic forms of writing to render the uniqueness of an informant's discourse and the inflections of his (or her) voice in a form unmediated by the analyst's conceptualization. For a critique of the impasse such positions have created, see David Morley 1997. Lotman's notion of double vision, the combination of an intrinsic and extrinsic perspective, as discussed by Mandelker, is consistent with Morley's prescription that it is, in fact, the responsibility of the analyst to propose an account of cultural behavior in terms different from those of his (or her) informants (Morley 1997: 130–131). In Lotman's terms, it is by translating or recodifing cultural discourse that scholarship drives culture forward.

[6] See Larrain 1996 and Sparks 1996.

economic relations and their ideological representations can no longer be fixed, for language is multireferential (here Hall quotes Voloshinov); the idea of class determination is refined and the direct correspondence between "ruling ideas" and "ruling classes" is replaced with the notion of "tendential alignment" (Hall 1996: 42). Hall seeks to relax the rigid links Marx establishes between ideas and economic relations, but without lapsing into a post-structuralist notion of ideology as a free-floating representation divorced from underlying economic and social realities.[7] He therefore discusses not so much the structural determination of ideas by the socio-economic base, as the internalization of ideas, the reasons for which certain ideas catch on, while others are consigned to the dustbin of history. And here Hall calls on Gramsci to suggest that "ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, *connect* with a particular constellation of social forces", i.e. if their "coupling" with the ruling classes is secured (Hall 1992: 43–44).[8] While the nature of this connection is not entirely clear, it seems safe to assume that for Hall, ideologies are successful, i.e. become dominant, when they represent the ruling classe's view of social relations. Underpinning his discussion is the assumption that ideology has referential value, albeit, perhaps, a contested, plural, or ambiguous one.[9]

In his treatment of auto-communication, Lotman shows that when a subject internalizes an extrinsic discourse, the process of recoding weakens, if not entirely suspends, the referential force of language. As a result, ideology's relation to social reality need not be as pertinent or direct as Hall presupposes, and it may therefore serve a more disparate set of groups, not solely social classes. Ideologies become successful, i.e. articulate the identity of a group, because they tie in with, and reinforce, a group's meta-discourses, its discursive memory, despite the

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[7] For a retrospective discussion of marxism, which voices concern with the nearly exclusive turn toward the textuality of power in American cultural studies, see Hall 1992: 277–294.

[8] For a critique of cultural studies' lineage in Gramsci's notion of class, see Bennett 1992: 23–37. Bennett calls into question the kind of politics Gramsci's framework promotes when it ignores institutional or group specificities and operates with a notion of "the people" as unified agent.

[9] Starting in the 1980s, cultural studies abandoned its interest in marxism and, in particular, the notion of determination of ideas through social relations — a move called for in part by the need to address issues of gender and ethnicity in its analysis of contemporary societies. Yet, as a result, cultural studies "is regressing [...] to an essentially textualist account of culture", which differs from literary studies only in the range of texts it considers (Sparks 1996: 98).

fact that they may come from outside. Ideology, then, has neither a partial, nor distorted, but, rather, an imagined relation to social reality, one that sooner reflects a group's field of discourses, than its social experience.

The third defining trait of cultural studies is its stance of political engagement. Practitioners of cultural studies believe that their discourse matters or should matter (Nelson *et al.* 1992: 5–7) and they are continuously reflecting on their own institutional location, on the ways their discourse is embedded in institutional reality and contributes to the empowerment of disenfranchised minorities.[10] Obviously, Lotman could not agitate for his values as explicitly as cultural studies does. Yet, he shares the faith cultural studies has placed in the possibility of affecting its environment through its discursive practice. But the lack of militant rhetoric in Lotman stems not only from tactical prudence, but also from a more principled position as to the function of semiotic meta-discourse and, more broadly, from a faith in the emancipating potential of language. Indeed, the starkest difference between cultural studies and Lotman lies precisely in their respective conceptualization of the relationship between language and power. Cultural studies believes that language participates, wittingly or not, in power imbalances and thus contributes to social oppression, unless the speaker actively calls into question his or her position in a social or cultural field. As a result, cultural studies continuously feels inclined to expose the nexus between power and language, shedding light on this collusion even when language seems not to bear on issues of power. Thus cultural studies has developed a "hermeneutics of suspicion" that is embodied in its rhetoric.

In contrast, Lotman believes that language and art, in particular, add a level of reality to the existing world and thus free us from our entanglement in it. The same can be said of the semiotic meta-discourse, which provides a vantage point that enables us to exert some leverage on the reality in which we feel trapped. Accordingly, the goal of a semiotician, especially one working under totalitarian conditions and the homogenizing pull of the regime, is to expand the ranges of discourses available, so as to empower people to develop more differentiated identities, to enhance their "polyglotism" (Lotman 2000a: 397). Therefore Lotman's "hermeneutics of recovery of

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[10] For a useful discussion of the ethical commitment of cultural studies and its difference from Postmodernism, which "undermines the elaboration of an ethic", see Slack, Whitt 1992: 571–592.

meaning" derives therefore from a commitment to linguistic diversity that requires no militant rhetoric.[11] The past is a storehouse of discourses that in themselves can serve a liberating function when reinserted in the present. Likewise, the abstract discourse of the semiotician can help wrest us from reality. This conceptual difference between Lotman and cultural studies explains the most obvious disparity between the two: whereby cultural studies seems wedded to the synchronic analysis of contemporary society (partly, to be sure, because of its desire for its discourse to matter politically), Lotman is committed to the restoration of the past and increasingly interested in historical change, both conceptually and contextually.

And it is here that Lotman opens up a perspective that cultural studies seems overly quick to obstruct. Like an obedient Hamlet heeding the injunction of his father's Ghost ("Remember me"), Lotman commits himself to remembrance, rather than vengeance. His responsiveness to the generative powers of literary imagination makes him indifferent to the "hermeneutics of suspicion" for he wants to heed the generative powers of literary imagination. In this regard, he espouses a position that cultural studies may well rejoin, once it thinks through the process of self-reflexive suspicion.

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[11] Caryl Emerson introduces the opposition between the "hermeneutics of suspicion" (a phrase cointed by Paul Ricoeur) and the "hermeneutics of recovery of meaning" in her essay on the self as conceived by four important Russian thinkers (including Lotman). She discusses the fact that all four thinkers invest the word with an ability to change the environment. See Emerson 2000: 40.

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Юрий Лотман и Cultural Studies:
возможности взаимного обогащения

Цель статьи — определить, до какой степени теоретические работы Лотмана могли бы стать некоторой концептуальной основой для проекта американских и британских Cultural Studies (CS). Подобно CS, Лотман оперирует широким пониманием культуры, хотя он в основном ограничивает себя исследованием дворянской культуры. Его поздние работы выдвигают своего рода семиотическую теорию власти. Его анализ соотношения между центром и периферией напоминает присущую CS установку на маргинальность. Лотман разделяет (пост)структуралистскую предпосылку о первичной роли дискурса в обосновании реальности. Вместе с тем, его представление о естественном стремлении

культуры к разнообразию смягчает зависимость субъекта от дискурса. Путем разыгрывания разных дискурсов между собой и их перекодировки в акте автокоммуникации субъекты могут добиться некоторой автономности и создать новые значения.

Несмотря на то, что CS отказываются от сверхнарративов, оно делает установку на классовые, гендерные и расовые различия. Лотмановское понимание семиосферы акцентирует ситуативную основу групповых идентичностей, их возникновение из перекодировки существующих дискурсов. Лотман не оказывает предпочтения определенному типу идентичности. Он предлагает более гибкий подход, который применяется к широкому и меняющемуся разряду социальных групп. Таким образом его теория представляет собой альтернативу концепции Грамши (лежащей в основе CS) об укоренности групп в классовых отношениях.

Автокоммуникация имеет сходство с тем, что в CS называют гибридизацией, т.е. процессом освоения внешних культурных объектов, при котором этим объектам приписывается индивидуальное значение. Вместе с тем, существует разница между этими понятиями. Для CS сопротивление преобладающей власти происходит в основном на уровне невербального быта, в то время как для Лотмана автокоммуникация и перевод между разными семиотическими системами имеет место на дискурсивном уровне, что предоставляет субъекту некоторую творческую инициативу.

CS — это форма политической ангажированности. Лотман разделяет установку CS на трансформацию окружающей среды речевым поведением. Отсутствие политически окрашенного языка у Лотмана объясняется не только необходимой при советской власти тактической осторожностью, но и принципиальным положением о функции семиотического метадискурса. Если CS склонны к постоянному разоблачению причастности языка к социальной несправедливости, то Лотман верит в способность языка обосновать добавочный уровень действительности, с помощью которого человек может выйти из вовлеченности в мир. Таким образом, лотмановское стремление восстановить культуру прошлого и есть освободительный проект.

Juri Lotman ja *Cultural Studies*: vastastikuse rikastamise võimalused

Artikli eesmärgiks on määratleda, mil määral Lotmani teoreetilised tööd võisid olla teatud kontseptuaalseks aluseks ameerika ja briti Cultural Studies (CS) jaoks. Nagu ka CS, opereerib Lotman kultuuri laia mõistega, kuigi piirdub põhiliselt aadlikultuuri uurimisega. Tema hilisemad tööd esitavad oma-

laadse semiootilise võimuteooria, kus keskuse ja perifeeria vahelise suhte analüüs meenutab CS omast suunitlust marginaalsusele. Lotman jagab (post)-strukturalistlikku eeldust diskursuse esmasest rollist reaalsuse põhistamisel. Samal ajal pehmendab tema ettekujutus kultuuri loomulikust püüdest eripalgelisusele subjekti sõltuvust diskursusest. Mängides erinevaid diskursusi omavahel läbi ja neid autokommunikatsiooni aktis ümber kodeerides võivad subjektid saavutada teatud autonoomsuse ja luua uusi tähendusi.

Vaatamata sellele, et CS loobub ülinarratiividest, teeb ta panuse klassilistele, soolistele ja rassilistele erinevustele. Lotmani arusaam semiosfäärist rõhutab grupiliste identsuste situatiivset alust, nende tekkimist olemasolevate diskursuste ümberkodeerimise tulemusena. Lotman ei eelista teatud identsuse tüüpi. Ta pakub paindlikumat lähenemist, mida kasutatakse sotsiaalsete gruppide laia ja muutuva liigituse puhul. Seega kujutab tema teooria endast alternatiivi Gramsci kontseptsioonile gruppide juurdumisest klassisuhetes, mis on CS aluseks.

Autokommunikatsioon sarnaneb sellega, mida CS nimetab hübridisatsioon, st väliste kultuuriliste objektide omandamise protsess, mille puhul nendele objektidele omistatakse individuaalne tähendus. Samal ajal on ka erinevus nende mõistete vahel. CS jaoks toimub valitsevale võimule vastuhakk peamiselt mitteverbaalse olme tasandil, samal ajal kui Lotmani jaoks leiavad autokommunikatsioon ja tõlge erinevate semiootiliste süsteemide vahel aset diskursiivsel tasandil, mis jätab subjektile teatud loomingulise initsiatiivi.

CS on poliitilise angažeerituse vorm. Lotman jagab CS vaadet, et kõneline käitumine kujundab ümber ümbritseva keskkonna. Poliitilise värvinguga keele puudumine Lotmanil on seletatav mitte ainult nõukogude võimu ajal hädavajaliku taktikalise ettevaatusega, vaid ka põhimõttelise seisukohaga semiootilise metadiskursuse olemuse kohta. Kui CS kaldub pidevale keele osaluse paljastamisse sotsiaalses ebaõigluses, siis Lotman usub keele võimesse põhistada tegelikkuse lisatasand, mille abil inimene võib väljuda hõlmatusest maailma. Seega on Lotmani püüd taastada mineviku kultuur omalaadne vabastav projekt.

Spatial semiosis in culture

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Abstract. Lotman's conception of semiosphere opens the way to development of spatial semiotics as a special branch of sign theory. There are a lot of peculiarities in the spatial semiosis, which distinguish it from the temporal ones. These distinctions are connected with some special features of semiotized space, and they touch both upon the spatial texts and upon the spatial codes. The spatial syntax has its own specific structures, which can be reversed, non-linear and continual, created without discrete signs. The differentiation relates also to semantics of spatial signs and texts, which are mainly motivated by their denotates due to similarity or contiguity. There are some pragmatic peculiarities of the spatial semiosis: the greater connection with the praxis, on the one hand, and the greater ability for the preservation of the cultural memory, on the other hand. The mainly visual character of spatial texts in plane of expression can be also considered as its specific pragmatic property. These peculiarities give some special possibilities for the spatial semiosis and make necessary its participation in the various spheres of the culture, where diverse spatial codes interact in different ways between each other and with temporal codes as well.

1. The problem of particularity of spatial semiosis

The communication, which uses a space as its medium, is still not sufficiently investigated part of the semiotics. It has many specific features, a lot of them were noticed by Juri Lotman. The view of the scholar on the relationships between the verbal language and the spatial means of communication was changing in the development of his semiotic conception. The initial thought on a difference of the "primary" and the "secondary" sign systems was transformed into the conception of "semiosphere", where the interaction of minimum two types sign systems is necessary (see, particularly, Lotman 1992: 29–

31, 53–54). Systems like the verbal language, which combine discrete conventional signs, need in principle other semiotic systems as their complement. These complementary systems control the creation of continual texts without separate signs, and they tend to deal mainly with iconic and other forms of motivated signs. Both types of the systems mutually need each other as in culture as in consciousness, and they can equally be considered as the "primary" sign systems (see Lotman 1992: 11–24, 142–147).

Thus, as Juri Lotman has shown, there is an essentially other kind of semiosis, than semiosis of linguistic type. Its properties are presented most clearly in the sign systems, where the plane of expression is built by visible spatial forms and their relations. As it was repeatedly pointed out, the spatial canal of information is connected with visual perception, like the temporal canal is connected with hearing (see Jakobson 1972). So the peculiarities of the spatial semiosis are dependent on the properties of both the external structures of spatial objects and their internal reconstruction in visual perception. Both of them are the components of the joint visual-spatial information canal.

The specific topological peculiarities of spatial objects — their non-linearity, reversibility, diversity of relations between symmetry and asymmetry etc. — influence the abilities to create the specific structures in the *plane of expression*, like the linearity and non-reversibility of time influence the particular frames of speech chains. The tree-dimensionality of the spatial canal gives a possibility to build the syntactic structures in more various configurations. That is not only quantitative, but also qualitative difference, because it allows to appear some additional kinds of meaningful relations between the dimensions. The space thereby can be anisotropic in a different way and has diverse classes of symmetry. The symmetrical constructions are as natural in spatial semiosis as they are unnatural for the temporal ones (where, for example, the palindromes are exceptionally rare). Further, because the spatial structures are formed by relations of co-existence and have some stability in temporal stream, they can be reversible and allow both forward and backward order in relations of their significant elements. The continuity of space can play its role as well, because the visual-spatial canal gives more possibilities for the continual picture of a whole, where is not easily to find some discrete parts (which was also not once noted by semioticians — see Ivanov 1976: 138; Lotman 1992: 31; Ivanov *et al*. 1998: 13–15, 38–40). Therefore the spatial semiosis allows syntactic structures to be built in

an essentially other way, than the successive ordered chains of discrete signs, known for linguistics.

Specific properties of spatial semiosis depend not only on the external part of the visual-spatial canal, but also on the internal one — on the peculiarities of visual perception. Its simultaneous character gives to eyesight the ability to take in the diversity of relationships between the objects as a whole picture, which disappears by translating in the successive row of signs (see Arnheim 1974: 92–93). This whole impression received from all the complex of spatial relations precedes the dividing into separate parts — in contrast to the acoustic perception of successive signals, where the choice of parts precedes the taking in of the whole. The difference between the successive perception of the speech constructions and the simultaneous synthesis in the visual perception correlates with the ability of spatial syntactic structures be formed not only as a combination of the ready units, but also as a result of the reverse process of dividing of a continual whole into separate parts with its subsequent differentiation (for example, in pictures and related forms of representation).

The ways of semiotizing of space have also some peculiarities in the *plane of contents*. The sphere of meanings, which are communicated by visual-spatial forms, includes both verbal and non-verbal levels of psyche, and the lasts play their irreplaceable role in the activity of mind — what was repeatedly accented by Juri Lotman (see, particularly, Lotman 1992: 46–57, Lotman 1996: 296). The Lotman's ideas on an interacting of two types of semiotic systems in the processes of thinking are accorded not only with the investigations of neurophysiologists on a functional asymmetry of right and left hemispheres of the brain (for example Nikolaenko, Deglin 1984), but also with the conceptions of the psychologists, who consider the activity of thinking as a process of mutual overcoding of information from non-verbal simultaneous form to the successive verbal one and backward (see, particularly: Zhinkin 1964: 36; Vecker 1976: 134). The universality of this mechanism appear, particularly, even in formation of logical-grammatical constructions in the verbal speech, which cannot be build without using any spatial images. The disturbing of brain structures, responsible for its creation, lead to the loss of ability to construct the propositions and to understand the logical relations (see: Luria 1979: 184, 197–198). It is clear, that the thinking need using of the spatial schemes, because they give other possibilities, than the successive rows of signs.

2. The semiotization of space and the spatial codes

However, the peculiarities of spatial-visual canal of communication give only the general conditions to syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions of the spatial semiosis. The opportunities of this canal can be used in a different way. The physical existence of spatial sign vehicles, as well as the psychical systems of their perceptions and understanding are just the components the "substance of expression" (in terms of Hjelmslev 1961). It is not enough also to analyse a "substance of contents", which depends on the way of interpretation of spatial message in the frame of some sphere of culture. They open some specific possibilities for building of spatial signs structures, but they do not necessarily determine a semiotic "form" of spatial expression. The internal semiotic aspects of spatial communication are related to ways of organisation of connections between that, what in Hjelmslev's terms must be cold as "form of expression" and "form of contents". Only the presence of semiotic "form" allows separating the meaningful spatial relations from the other, non-relevant, spatial and temporal ones, as well as to distinguish between diverse types of significant spatial structures.

The own semiotic properties of meaningful spatial objects depend on a definite way of structuring and of interpreting of space, i. e. — on the fixed way of its semiotization. The *semiotization of space* is just the same act, which brings a definite semiotic "form" into a "substance" of some spatial carriers. Each of the ways determines in its own manner picking out of meaningful spatial elements and their structuring, its own norms of interpretation, and its own conditions of their use by interpreters. These, correspondingly, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic rules establish together a *spatial code* — a semiotic system, which regulates the acts of coding and decoding of information in the visual-spatial canal (cf. Morris 1983: 67–68).

There are different systems of semiotization of space and, thereby, the spatial semiosis is realised not through one only "language of space", but due to several diverse spatial codes. These codes use various psychological and semiotic mechanisms and establish different norms of interpretation and behaviour in the space (see more detailed: Tchertov 1997). Accordingly, the semiotized by these codes space can get different forms. It can appear as a "power field", by the means of an architectonic code, correlating visual spatial forms with feelings of mechanical forces. It can be treated as a space of instru-

mental actions, if it is semiotized with an object-functional code, which fixes the stable connections between constantly reproduced forms of the objects and its instrumental functions. It can be structured and interpreted also as a space of social behaviour, if its semiotization is regulated by a social-symbolic code, which correlates spatial relations of objects with social characteristics of subjects. The space of depiction appears due to using of a perceptographic code, which mediates a translation of some optical marks into a perceptual image of the visible world. The space of written text is subordinate to diverse systems of writing etc.

Some certain part of space, which is semiotized as a result of using one or more spatial codes, can be considered as a *spatial text* (cf. Toporov 1983). Any spatial text includes only the spatial relations, which are connected with the function to express the meanings according a system of code. So, the spatial codes and regulated by them texts are mutually connected, like the language and speech in linguistics. But the peculiarities of the spatial ways of the sense expression put own imprint on the spatial codes, and therefore the linguistic models are not very effective for analysis of many kinds of spatial texts.

The spatial texts subordinated to diverse codes can have a specific *syntax* with particular topological properties. For example, the space of a picture is non-linear, reversible and continuous in contrast with spatial structure of the one-dimensional, irreversible and discrete written text. Therefore, the description of spatial syntax needs working out its own theoretic models. These models can become the subject of a special part of spatial semiotics — of "*semiotopology*", which would be aimed at the research of topological properties of syntactic structures in spatial texts: discreteness and continuity, openness and closeness, homogeneity and heterogeneity, dimensionality and so on. These properties are important for semiotopology only as semiotic qualities — to the extent to which they are necessary for semantic and syntax and belong to the "form of expression" but not to its "substance". So, the semiotopology deals only with the meaningful structures of spatial texts, but not with the topology of physical carriers of information or of their mental images.

The semiotization of space establish together with its external structuring also its reverse side — the internal ordering of mental schemes, which regulate the ways of the perception and understanding of the spatial objects. Both the external arrangement of space and its internal frame are subordinated to spatial schemes, which are es-

tablished by a spatial code. So the cultural space is a product of the exteriorising of internal spatial schemes as well as these schemes are worked out in the result of interiorising of external spatial activity.

The interpretation of spatial relations from these schemes performs due to *semantic units,* which form the plane of contents of some spatial codes. These semantic units can be not the logical concepts and have other "psychological addresses". They may belong to diverse psychical levels: sensory, perceptual, apperceptual, conceptual, as well as to various motor and affective structures. For example, the object-functional code develops in the practice of instrumental activity as a parallel to verbal language, and it has in plane of contents instead the verbal meanings the "practical concepts" (in J. Piaget's terms) — the motor schemes of instrumental actions.

3. Genetic, functional and structural peculiarities of spatial codes

The spatial codes as semiotic systems have own peculiarities, which touch their origin, functions and structures. All of them are used in some way in culture, but many of them have still a *natural genesis,* which is independent of speech, and go back to biologic signal systems. So, not all of spatial codes relate to the verbal language as the "secondary" sign systems, and several of them, on the contrary, serve as conditions of ability to create complicated constructions in verbal syntax and in logical thinking. These codes are involved in the semiosphere of culture in another way, than the verbal language and similar systems. While the verbal language was formed in culture initially as a system of external communicative means between the subjects, the spatial codes were developed above all in the processes of subject-object activity (cognitive and projective) as an internal psychical regulator of human behaviour. Accordingly, while speech becomes the internal means of mind due to interiorization of inter-subjective communicative actions, these spatial codes are the cognitive means initially, and they get their communicative function in the opposite process of exteriorisation, where the mental actions are expressed through the outside spatial forms (cf. Vygotsky 1982: 356).

For example, the perceptual code has been originated as a cognitive system of visual decoding of optical signals. But its naturally formed means were reflected and exteriorized in the practice of

pictorial communication. So the culture reformed the intrasubjective perceptual code into its diverse intersubjective versions, each of them can be called as a "perceptographic" code. Another type of the natural codes — the synesthetic ones — serves as a basis for the architectonic code, which have been created in culture also as a result of the process of reflection and exteriorization of synesthetic and kinesthetic signals. In a similar way the means of natural mimic and pantomimic codes becomes in culture consciously and freely reproduced.

This role of spatial codes is connected also with specificity of their *functions*. Like the temporal means of communication, the spatial semiosis performs the functions of representation, of communication and of thinking, but in another way. The *representative* function can be performed, for example, due to iconic spatial models, which reproduce their objects *in praesentia* of text, but not *in potentia* of any semiotic system — in contrast with the language, where just the potential paradigmatics mainly realized the modeling function.

The peculiarity of *communicative* function in spatial semiosis is determined by its ability to connect the subjects, who belong to diverse moments of time — in the contrast to participants of verbal dialog, who are united by one temporal moment. If the moment of time joints all, what is "there" and "now", the space joints the moments "here" and "then"; so the space unites diverse temporal moments as well as it joints subjects, separated through temporal distance, whereas the time connects points, distanced in the space.

Many of spatial codes, like the verbal language, are able to serve not only as the means of the external communication but also as the tools of the internal processes of thinking. The *function of thinking* is performed due to means of the spatial codes on the other "floors" of the psyche, than the level of logical concepts. The visual or moving schemes of spatial thinking belong to non-verbal levels of psyche and to not theoretical, but practical intellect. However, as already was marked, the most abstract levels of thinking cannot function without the spatial images. The ability to build the synthetic mental picture allows to spatial thinking on all its levels more easy to grasp a whole.

The genetic and functional peculiarities of the spatial codes influence also some their *structural* particularities. While the acoustic signal systems tend to provide the maximum effect with the minimum length of the text in the time, the visual-spatial systems can mediate the decoding of information in another way. For example, the iconic spatial models serve not as a key for opening of the thesaurus full of collected knowledge, but they carry the main information in its own

structure. It is this structure of the text that mainly performs the model function, unlike the sign systems of verbal type, where the model function is performed rather by an implicit system of a code, than by an explicit text. Therefore the latter type of semiotic systems needs a preliminary "dictionary" of signs with ready meanings, whereas the former does not need it, and many of spatial codes have neither dictionary nor alphabetic units. Some of these codes belong to "grammatical", but not to "lexical" type of language (in F. de Saussure's terms). For example the system of linear perspective gives the principle of arrangement of visual indices of depth on a plate — a system of shortenings — and can be considered as an important part of a perceptographic code. However, neither the perspective, nor the perceptographic code as a whole do not have any "dictionary" of ready signs. Unlike the verbal language, their implicit structure gives a very poor model of space, whereas the explicit syntagmatic structure of the picture, built with their help, models a certain space much fuller than any verbal text.

Instead of an alphabet of discrete signs some of the spatial codes have continual fields of forms and colours. The sense-discriminating elements in these systems are subordinate not to "the principle of alphabet", but to "the principle of palette" (see Tchertov 1996). The latter allows mixing the elements in diverse ways, like the palette giving opportunities for various mixing of colours. Thus, instead of the controversy between "yes" and "no", the palette establishes a gradual flowing of sense-discriminating elements one into another according to the principle "more" or "less" (cf. Eco 1976: 176). Thereby the "principle of a palette", contrary to the "principle of an alphabet", allows to operate not only with contrasts of binary oppositions but also with nuances. This principle more correlates with the continuity of space, as well as with its non-linearity and reversibility — whereas the "alphabetic principle" is correlated with one-dimensionality and irreversibility of verbal texts. If the last principle makes possible the successive selection of discrete signs in time and their joining on the "axis of combination" (in Roman Jakobson's terms), the principle of palette is more relevant for simultaneous synthesis of many relations in a united whole, grasped before its separate parts are distinguished. This principle is valid for colours as well as for figures, and not only in the frames of the perceptographic code, but also of the architectonic or of social-symbolic codes.

4. Spatial semiosis as part of semiosphere

The ability of spatial codes functioning as the means of communication, representation and thinking lets them, along with the verbal language, be an important part of the semiosphere. These codes are included in different area of culture mediating in heterogeneous relations of the human towards the nature and society. But the structural and the functional peculiarities of spatial semiosis let it play a particular role in the semiosphere of culture.

A space is not only a medium of communication between the subjects, but above all an environment of their activity: moving, working etc. This environment consists of multitude of manifold areas and forms, which also can be considered as various syntactical and semantic types of spatial texts. A home, a street, a city etc. can be considered as different types of spatial text, regulated by different norms of space semiotization. These texts serve first of all as the means of regulating of a human behaviour — instrumental and social. There are also the separated spatial texts, which are intended special for communicative function (writings, paintings etc.). The latter are combined together with the former in a complex spatial hypertext. An example of such a complicated space was given by Juri Lotman as an illustration of his idea of "semiosphere": a museum hall, "where the exhibits of various ages are presented, together with writings in known and unknown languages, instructions on its decoding, the texts, explaining the exhibition, schemes of excursion routs and rules of visitors behaviour" (Lotman 1992: 53–54). The transit from one type of spatial text and its ways of semiotization to another is regulated with the help of special markers, which point out to the switching from one code to the other, and so function as indices of a spatial metalanguage. It is possible also, that the same spatial locus is semiotized by different ways and can contain spatial texts regulated by several codes. Then these codes can enter into various relations and between each other: to complement or to except one another, to be in crossing and excluding, coordination or subordination etc. The interaction of these codes in the various forms may be a subject of some "visual rhetoric", which appears where different codes take part together in making up some complex text with a total sense (cf. Lotman 1998: 611).

The spatial codes interact also with the temporal sign systems like the verbal language. The divergence of organization gives various opportunities for their interaction. There is a possibility to change the

audio-temporal plane of expression into the visual-spatial one — due to its new coding (as in phonetic writing) or due to its translation (as in ideography). In both cases the spatial elements and structures are subordinate to linguistic forms. However, if the spatial way of representation retains its own features, it is rather a re-organisation of some contents from the verbal speech into visual form, than a translation of them. A spatial way of expression allows to transpose paradigmatic structures of the language and of its secondary systems into syntagmatic constructions. The non-linearity of spatial texts provides a possibility to present for a vision some whole structures, which are given in the verbal language only implicitly. For example, icon-painting, which had to translate gospel narration into visual form, makes something different. Through the oppositions of top and bottom, left and right etc. it has opened for visual perception some hierarchic and value relations, which are only implied in the verbal narration, but are not explicitly presented in it. Generally, the spatial codes give also a visual basis for the development of invisible structures in diverse systems of culture: language, myth, religion etc. (cf. Cassirer 1923: 147–166; 1925: 107–132).

The spatial codes and texts arranged by them are very important for the sphere of art. The peculiarity of arts is not in the use of some special "languages of art", but, on the contrary, in the involving into them and in the special working out of codes, used also in many other spheres of culture. Like the arts of word organise the signs of everyday language in a special way giving them an artistic effect, the spatial arts work out the means of the everyday spatial codes. The semiotic means of these ordinary codes are arranged and rearranged in works of art being transformed into the means of artistic expression. For example, the figurative art can be considered as the art of exteriorizing the diverse means of the cognitive perceptual code, which are selected and reflected by artists, and turned out into the means of communicative "perceptographic" code.

Various kinds of arts are distinguished from each other due to the complexes of semiotic means being worked out by them. Although there is a dominating code for every kind of spatial art, each of them deals as a rule with several codes. So architecture deals not only with the means of architectonic code, but also with the means of social-symbolic and object-functional codes, as well as the representative arts work out the means of the different versions of perceptographic code together with some other spatial codes: object-functional, mimic, pantomimic etc.

5. Spatial semiotics as an autonomous branch
of sign theory

Thus, it is natural to suppose that the spatial semiosis can be the subject of a special branch of semiotics. It deals with the ways and the results of semiotization of space, i. e. — with the spatial codes and the spatial texts. The semiotics of space has to find its relations to other semiotic disciplines and, first of all, — its place in the system of general semiotics (what is important for least too). Particularly, it have to definite, on one hand, some common properties with others semiotic systems and, on the other hand, — some peculiarities, what separates it from them.

The spatial semiosis, as any ones, can certainly be described in the general categories of Peirce's and Morris' semiotics, which considers signs in syntactical, semantic and pragmatic dimensions. It can be described as well in some concepts of Sausurean semiology, which considers correlation between *signifiant* and *signifié* in whole sign systems, in oppositions of system and text, paradigmatical and syntagmatical aspects, synchrony and diachrony, etc.

But the analogies of spatial semiosis with other sign systems have the limits, beyond which its principial distinctions begin. The difference between spatial and temporal order of sign vehicles in diverse kindes of art is a subject of discussions, which are well known at least since Lessing's time (see Lessing 1957: 187). This subject is important not only for aesthetics, but for semiotics too. The spatial semiotics has to define its place in relationships to other, non-spatial, spheres of semiotic investigations. There are the grounds to consider the semiotic of space as a separate branch of semiotics, correlated with the temporal semiotics, presented first of all by the Saussurean semiology. The semiology of Saussure and of his followers appears in this relationship as a "chronosemiotics" — semiotics of temporal chains. In particular, the both main principles of the language, which Saussure had suggested — i.e. non-motivated semantic links of signs with its meaning and their linear order in plane of syntax — are non-valid for most of spatial codes and thereby not much applicable to description of spatial semiosis. So, the initial principles of his semiology — the principle of lineal ordering of significants — is the direct consequence of successive interchange of accustic signals in the time, and, as Saussure pointed out, the "whole mechanism of language" depends on this temporal order of signs (Saussure 1977: 103). Already this is enough

for a consideration of saussurean semiology as a "semiology of time", which needs the "semiology of space" as a parallel branch to be added. Also the other principle of Saussurean semiology — the arbitrariness of signs — is not relevant for the spatial semiosis. On the contrary, the last opens the most rich possibilities for variously motivated means of diverse spatial codes and, particularly, — more possibilities for iconic representation of objects.

Thus, the semiotic of space as an autonomous branch of sign theory cannot be described by a mechanical projection on the meaningful spatial objects of theoretical models, elaborated in linguistics or in temporal oriented semiology. Wereas its mechanisms depend on the temporal canal of communication, "all mechanism" of the spatial semiosis correlates with the possibilities given by spatial canal of communication and by its simultaneous perception. So far as the general semiology was being developed in a search of some analogies between the verbal language and other sign systems, so the particularity of temporal semiotics could remain unnoticed. But the more the spatial semiotics develops and its specific features are recognised, the more it gets the shape as a parallel branch of the sign theory, which deals with principally different ways of semiotization.

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Пространственный семиозис в культуре

Лотмановское понимание семиосферы и роли в нем пространственных способов смысловыражения открывает путь для развития пространственной семиотики как особой ветви теории знаков. В отличие от речи и подобных ей временных последовательностей знаков, пространственный семиозис имеет ряд особенностей, которые сказываются на структуре и функциях участвующих в нем знаковых систем и на свойствах построенных с их помощью пространственных текстов. Последние могут, в частности, иметь синтаксические структуры, обладающие такими свойствами, как обратимость, не-одномерность и непрерывность, связанная с отсутствием априори заданных дискретных знаков. Подобные свойства становятся предметом для особого раздела семиотики

пространства — семиотопологии, исследующей их соотношения в различных типах пространственных текстов. Особенности пространственного семиозиса затрагивают и семантику пространственных знаков и текстов, которые, как правило, в большей мере связаны со своим денотатом отношениями сходства или смежности. Свои особенности имеют и прагматические свойства пространственного семиозиса, важнейшим из которых можно считать преимущественно визуальный характер пространственных текстов в плане выражения. Особенности пространственного семиозиса делают необходимым его участие в различных сферах культуры, где разные пространственные коды взаимодействуют различным образом друг с другом и с временными кодами.

Ruumiline semioos kultuuris

Lotmani arusaam semiosfäärist ja mõtteväljenduse ruumiliste viiside osast selles avab meile tee ruumisemiootika kui märgiteooria eriosa arendamiseks. Erinevalt kõnest ja sellega sarnastest ajalistest märgijärgnevustest on ruumilisel semioosil rida eripärasid, mis kajastuvad selles osalevate märgisüsteemide struktuuris ja funktsioonides ning nende abil loodud ruumiliste tekstide omadustes. Ruumilised tekstid võivad näiteks omada süntaktilisi struktuure, mida iseloomustavad pööratavus, mitmemõõtmelisus ja pidevus, mis on seotud *a priori* antud diskreetsete märkide puudumisega. Taolised omadused saavad ruumisemiootika ühe osa — semiotopoloogia — osaks, mis uurib nende seoseid ruumiliste tekstide erinevates tüüpides. Ruumilise semioosi iseärasused puudutavad ka ruumiliste märkide ja tekstide semantikat, mis reeglina on oma denotaadiga seotud sarnasuse ja külgnevuse suhte kaudu. Omad iseärasused on ka ruumilise semioosi pragmaatilistel omadustel, milledest tähtsaimaks tuleks pidada ruumiliste tekstide peamiselt visuaalset iseloomu väljendusplaanis. Ruumilise semioosi iseärasused teevad vajalikuks tema osaluse erinevates kultuuri sfäärides, kus erinevad ruumilised koodid erineval moel suhestuvad üksteise ja ajaliste koodidega.

Is cultural logic an appropriate concept?
A semiotic perspective on the study
of culture and logic

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Abstract. It is argued that (a) the question of 'cultural logic' is a valid inquiry for disciplines seeking to comprehend and compare mental processes across cultures, and (b) semiotics, as the science of studying signs and signification, is an appropriate means of approaching the question of cultural logic. It is suggested that a shift needs to be made in studying reasoning across cultures from the traditional value-oriented methods of judgment to a meaning-oriented assessment. Traditional methods of cross-cultural comparison are suggested to be flawed in their attempt to develop a psychological account of why different cultural societies can draw different conclusions from 'similar' data, because they typically do not take into account the culturally-specific processes of 'meaning' and semiosis. These processes, it is argued, cause input data to develop differentially from one semiotic context to another. In other words, before reaching the cognitive processing level data is already shaped by the semiotic context, thus what is processed cognitively by two individuals in two cultural/semiotic contexts is no longer 'the same.' A semiotically conceived notion of cultural logic is therefore a crucial factor in any cross-cultural study of cognitive and psychological systems.

> *I do not, for my part, regard the usages of language as forming a satisfactory basis for logical doctrine. Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind may compel men to think is not the question; and the appeal to language appears to me to be no better than an unsatisfactory method of ascertaining psychological facts that are of no relevancy to logic.*
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> C. S. Peirce[1]

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[1] Quoted in Parmentier 1994: 12.

Reasoning is a process that occurs within linguistic, social, and cultural environments, and involves the employment of universal and/ or culturally specific meanings; and logic, or the process of "establishing necessary connections between these meanings", as Levi Strauss (1966: 35) once put it, is always defined by and bound within these linguistic, social, and cultural parameters.

If we consider reasoning as the fundamental element of logical processing, and if we agree that this fundamental element is conceived within and wrought by language and culture, then we can argue:

First, that the question of 'cultural logic' is a valid inquiry for disciplines such as cultural psychiatry, which seek to comprehend and to compare mental processes across cultures, and secondly, that semiotics, as the science of studying signs and signification, is an appropriate means of approaching the question of cultural logic.

In the following paper, I will argue that 'cultural logic' is an appropriate term, and that the notion of cultural logic establishes a legitimate question for cross cultural studies of psychological, cognitive and behavioral phenomena. Further, I will argue that semiotic analysis provides an advantageous method for sketching the shape of the 'logic' of a given culture.

Let me begin my discussions with an example of what I have in mind when I discuss cultural logic. This is an excerpt from an interview designed by a Western psychologist, American Michael Cole. The respondent is a Kpelle tribal leader, from Liberia, Africa (Cole, Scribner 1974: 162).

Interviewer: At one time spider went to feast. He was told to answer this question before he could eat any of the food. The question is: spider and black deer always eat together. Spider is eating. Is black deer eating?
Elder: Were they in the bush?
I: Yes.
E: Were they eating together?
I: Spider and black deer always eat together. Spider is eating. Is black deer eating?
E: But I was not there. How can I answer such a question?
I: Can't you answer it? Even if you weren't there, you can answer it. (Repeats the question.)
E: Oh, oh, black deer is eating.
I: Why?
E: The reason is that black deer always walks about all day eating leaves in the bush. Then he rests for a while and gets up again to eat.

When Cole himself explains this interview, he says the elder, though involved in an active process of reasoning, is struggling "to find a factual basis for arriving at a conclusion", and he points out as evidence the elder's demands for facts like whether the animals were in the bush at that time, or if they were eating together. To be sure, Cole is not one to go to such lengths as did some of his predecessors like Levy-Bruhl. In his book titled *How Natives Think* (which stands as a polite translation for "Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés In-férieures"), Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1926) proposed the idea of two basic developmental levels of logic: the pre-logical, as manifested by the "native mind", and then the logical, as manifested by the "adult white man". I will not get into details of this division here, but in looking at Cole's effort fifty years after *Les Sociétés Inférieures* to explain the method the Kpelle elder uses to infer his conclusion, it is hard to ignore the traces of Levy-Bruhl's, or specially Luria's[2] legacies. What Luria did to Levy-Bruhl's crude colonial grouping was to tone it down to a softer version. According to Luria's vision the world is divided between those whose reasoning process is bound within the concrete, immediate life experiences; and those who are capable of abstract conceptualization and reasoning within those abstract spaces. Needless to say, it so happens that the first group, the 'concrete thinkers', generally live in rural areas, while the second reside in 'modern' urban settings. This historical glance already puts a context around the example from Cole's work.

Of the people just mentioned here, Cole appears to be the gentlest of all, when it comes to drawing conclusions from differences between the West and the rest. This is specially more evident in his other works, like his comparing the reasoning styles of American college students and Kpelle subjects around a story about two men who go to find themselves wives, and the approaches they choose in convincing the girl's father[3]. We don't afford the luxury of details here, but let me quote what he says about the results of his comparative study. "The most interesting result of this study," he says, was that "the American college students and all the Kpelle groups had the same percentage of wrong answers — there were no group differences in errors. But the American college students exceeded all three Kpelle groups in the percentage of *correct* answers". (The word 'correct' is actually

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[2] See for example Luria (1971). Luria studied reasoning and cognitive styles of traditional societies in rural Russia, with Vygotsky in the 1960s.

[3] See Cole, Scribner 1974 for details.

emphasized in the original text). Cole then continues to explain that, "this seeming paradox is accounted for by the fact that fully one-fifth of the Kpelle replies [...] was irrelevant" (Cole, Scribner 1974: 167). To be fair, it is important to note that he does not rush to attribute this difference to some kind of deficiency of the Kpelles' pre-logical mind. Yet what he does is still significant, on two counts: first, his interpretation of the Kpelle elder's search for more information falls back on Luria's division of the concrete and the abstract styles rather than a more critical inquiry of either the process or the content of his interviews, and secondly, he appears fully oblivious of the questions of meaning and relevance when he simply reports a full one-fifth of the Kpelle replies were deemed 'irrelevant'. The absence of a critical, or even a non-critical evaluation of the notion of 'irrelevance' in Cole's text is quite striking, making it inevitable to ask the question of validity, specifically based on a semiotic inspection of the case.

Cole's interviews are effectively conglomerate signs, and any basic examination of them should consider at least two levels of analysis: the interview process and design as form (the setting, the presentation, the individuals involved, etc.); and the interview question and its components as content. Considered in terms of the form, the interview is a sign with complex culturally specified referents. The encounter in a North American college with an interviewer, typically in a lab or similar space, and being told 'you are going to be asked a question by an interviewer' signify a social action with pre-scribed meanings different from those in the encounter between Cole and the Kpelle elder. If the American treat the situation in abstraction, that is perhaps because innumerable form signs communicated prior to the actual content all have been packed historically, linguistically, socially, and culturally, to be decoded by the subject as: 'this is a situation where you are given a question and you are demanded to process that question in abstract terms and produce an abstract response to it'. The same message is not necessarily communicated to the Kpelle subject, however, when he is met by an interviewer who asks him to listen to the story of black deer who goes to feast with spider and answer a question about that story. The actual question as content, and the type of response elicited by it embody yet another culturally specific sign with culturally specific reference. For one thing, the understanding of the 'type' of question being asked has great bearing on the 'type' of response the person would provide (hence the critical importance of 'misleading' as a control measure in cognitive testing). If a question signifies an ethical inquiry, for example, the elicited response can be

quite different than if the same question stood for a political or a philosophical query. Further, the question-sign is composed of a series of signs including (and not limited to) spider, deer, a feast, going to a feast, going to a feast together, eating together, being in the bush, and so on. These multitudes of signs all have culturally specific meanings. It is not difficult to entertain the idea for example, that while the story of a spider who goes to feast together with the black deer may suggest a serious meaningful situation to the Kpelle respondent, to the American college student it is likely to signify little more than an abstract element within an abstract (though peculiar, perhaps) set presenting a standard syllogistic question. Consequently, while in the American mainstream version of reality it would be 'bizarre' to think of a spider going to feast together with a black deer in any terms other than abstract, in the Kpelle frame of reference there may be no need for such urgent abstraction. Whereas Cole's spider-and-deer question may be read immediately by the North American subject as a 'sign of' an abstract inquiry demanding an abstract response, there is no reason why it should signify the same to a Kpelle subject. If the elements of a question evoke different semiotic configurations to two persons, in other words, it should be hardly surprising to see them proceed differently with their responses to that question.

In addition to the obvious colonial arrogance, and the Eurocentric naivety inherent in the theories constructed by Bruhl or even by Cole, a fundamental technical problem with these methods of analysis is that they attempt to explain cultural processes in terms of intellectual and psychological faculties. This creates a critical problem, whether they start from the culture and end in the individual's psychology, as does Cole (e.g., 1971, 1974), or start from the psyche to define cultural complexes, as Levy-Bruhl seems to do. What is important is that a shift needs to be made in studying reasoning across cultures: a shift from the traditional value oriented methods of judgment to a meaning oriented assessment. The new discipline of cognitive anthropology seems also to slip when threading this slope, despite the more recent developments which tend to approach the question of meaning in their inquiries on culture and logic. The more recent literature contain notions borrowed from cognitive psychology such as scripts and cultural schemata (see D'Andrade 1995 for a review), as well as works in the tradition of Lakoff (e.g., Lakoff, Johnson 1980, or Lakoff, Turner 1989) which center around metaphoric thinking. Even though a more serious attention to cognition and meaning is evident in these new approaches, much of these inquiries don't seem to break

free from the old paradigm of searching similarities or differences between logical systems based simply on the hypothesis that different styles of mental functioning may lie behind such logical systems.

What lies at the core of my argument here is that any research designed to develop a psychological account of why different cultural societies can draw different conclusions from 'similar' data is already flawed. It is flawed because data, by the time it reaches the reasoning process level in each context, is already translated differently by having gone through different semiotic and semantic 'filters'. If we agree on this simple fact that the signification of any input is inevitably decided by the semiotic environment it is thrown in, it would then be clearly incorrect to assume that two subjects belonging in two different semiotic networks are processing similar data just because the stories they are told by the experimenter have been translated into their respective mother tongues.

James Hamill is another anthropologist who dedicated work to culture and logic more recently. In his anthropology of human reasoning, Hamill (1990) suggests that while philosophical logic, or textbook logic as he calls it, is abstract and does not refer to any specific human activity, it might be useful in providing a scale against which various culturally specific systems of reasoning can be compared, and universal and non universal styles of reasoning can be identified. While Hammill's approach may provide a useful model for comparative logics, what does not seem to be clarified in it is the fate of such diverse 'cultural logics' themselves. True, using a system of comparison may give us a scale to distinguish cultural logics according to their systems of reasoning. Such classificatory system, however, would not be able to explain *how* these differences have come to exist.

Hamill comes a long way from Cole and his predecessors. He admits that validity of arguments in a culture specific system of reasoning has to be judged within the context of the "patterns of meaning that people use to make their cases" (Hamill 1990: 19). He is quick of course, to point out that using meaning to contextualize arguments may in fact not be as simple a task, and that we therefore require "some principled means of reaching the meanings that stand behind what [we] see" (Hamill 1990: 19). Intriguingly enough, however, instead of going the remaining small step from this to calling on semiotics, he proposes that "the study of errors or mistakes provides that means" (Hamill 1990: 19). I have followed Hamill's line of discussion closely, because I tend to share much of it with him, almost all the way to the last point, on the utility of errors for depicting cultu-

ral logic, or as he calls it, ethno-logic. Using errors is an interesting idea of course, one which brings to mind on the one hand Freud's notion of parapraxes,[4] and on the other Eco's description of semiotics as "the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie" (Eco 1976: 7). But despite the attractiveness of an error based analysis of meaning, we clearly need a more comprehensive and reliable system of analysis. While errors might cause a 'rip', so to speak, in the discursive fabric and give us a glimpse of the network that binds the system of reasoning together, such accidental sparks can hardly substantiate a reliable or efficient method of analysis. What I would like to suggest at this point is that a methodical inquiry into the system of signification can give us that 'principled method of reaching the meanings' we discussed earlier. Semiotic analysis, in other words, may be the most appropriate means available for unearthing the patterns of meaning that engender a certain cultural logic.

So far I have argued that the advantage of a notion such as cultural logic is in that it allows for the validity of arguments produced by the subject to be decided in the context of the systems of meaning (in terms both of production and connectivity of these meanings) used to process those arguments. This was suggested to be an advantageous model, because in the context of studying cultures, specially as related to mental health, occasionally we arrive at a point where Western propositional logic seems to fail us, leaving us to select between the anxiety of confusion, or the naivety of a Eurocentric interpretation of the 'native' mind as illogical, inferior, or flawed. The notion of cultural logic extends our options by making it possible to include a sense of dimensionality in our configuration of what constitutes a valid process of reasoning. This inclusion is done by the admittance that patterns of production of meaning and the structures of connectivity between those produced meanings have a formative presence in what we normally refer to as the process of reasoning, or its product, logic. Needless to say, this is the point where the question of signification, or semiotics, becomes pertinent to this discussion.

To put this in another perspective, consider the fact that three main inquiries are conceivable for a semiotic examination of culture: The first would interrogate the act of signification, the process through which an object becomes a sign and thus endowed by the capacity of signifying another object; the second would study the act of representation, or the process through which a sign/object becomes linked

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[4] See, for example, Freud 1914.

to a referent/object; and finally the third inquiry would concern the inter-connectivity of the sign/objects within the system that represents those objects, and the production of the network to which we often refer as the system of signification.

The third question of this set, that of the system of signification, is a crucial question for a semiotics of culture. Culture has been described as an instance of a 'system of signification,' with the distinctive feature of being composed not simply of information, but also of formulations for processing and then connecting the components of that information (see, for example, Danesi 1999). As such, any inquiry of the nature of cultural logic must take into account not simply the pre existing network of meaning or the informational content of a cultural system, but also the auxiliary information that contains blueprints for processing and connecting new data and incorporating it within the existing nexus. This aspect is in fact where cognitive anthropology seems to become interested, when it asks the question of schemata. A semiotic approach would seem appropriate in studying this so called auxiliary information, since like any other communicated data, this information has to be communicated within the temporal, notational, and structural or operational parameters of dimensionality (see Danesi 1998, 1999). Of these three dimensions, the notational dimension pertaining to the connotative, the denotative and the annotative aspects of a sign, is perhaps the one with a greater contribution to cross cultural variability of 'logics', because it relates directly to the process of ascribing meaning to new input and situating it as signifier within the pre existing network. Deciphering this assimilative process would be vital to understanding the dynamics of a culture's brand of logic, specially since it is done in a more or less 'invisible' fashion, not necessarily reflected in the linguistic structure in an evident manner. Neither a syntactical, nor even a standard semantic analysis would necessarily depict this process of integration, because neither of these approaches. So while the instrumental role of language in this inquiry may not be denied, traditional linguistic methods of linguistic analysis appear inadequate, due to their inability in unpacking the semiotic content. Semiotic analysis, in other words, may be the most appropriate means available for unearthing the patterns of connectivity specific to a culture.

It seems only appropriate at this point to conclude my arguments by once again repeating Peirce's assertion, that logic concerns "The essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind may compel men to

think is not the question; and the appeal to language appears to me to be no better than an unsatisfactory method of ascertaining psychological facts that are of no relevancy to logic".[5]

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Является ли логика культуры подходящим концептом? Семиотический подход к изучению культуры и логики

В статье утверждается, что (а) рассмотрение «логики культуры» полезно в дисциплинах, которые ищут возможности для понимания и сравнения разных культур, и (б) семиотика как наука о знаках и значениях является подходящим инструментом при подходе к вопросу о логике культуры.

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[5] Quoted in Parmentier 1994: 12.

При изучении традиции мышления в разных культурах следует заменить традиционные ценностно-ориентированные методы решений созданием оценок, ориентированных на значение. Пытаясь развивать психологическое объяснение того факта, что разные культурные сообщества приходят к разным выводам при «похожих» исходных данных, автор обнаруживает, что традиционные методы сравнения культур являются некорректными, — зачастую не учитываются культурноспецифические процессы «значения» и семиозиса. Показывается, что эти процессы предопределяют разную интерпретацию входных данных при переходе из одного семиотического контекста в другой. Иными словами, еще до достижения уровня когнитивной обработки эти данные уже сформированы семиотическим контекстом, поэтому то, что когнитивно обрабатывалось двумя разными личностями в двух разных культурно-семиотических контекстах, уже не является «одним и тем же». Таким образом, семиотически оформленное понимание логики является решающим фактором при любом *кросс-культурном* изучении всех когнитивных и психологических систем.

Kas kultuuriloogika on asjakohane mõiste? Semiootiline lähenemine kultuuri ja loogika uurimisele

Artiklis väidetakse, et (a) "kultuuriloogika" vaatlemine on küsimusepüstitusena sobiv distsipliinide osas, mis otsivad võimalusi erinevate kultuuride ja nendevaheliste mentaalsete protsesside mõistmiseks ja võrdlemiseks, ning (b) semiootika kui märkide ja tähenduse uurimise teadus on sobivaks vahendiks kultuuriloogika küsimusele lähenemisel. Kultuuridevahelise mõtlemise traditsiooni uurimisel soovitatakse nihkuda väärtus-orienteeritud otsuste tegemiselt tähendusele orienteeritud hinnangute andmisele. Oma katsetes arendada psühholoogilist seletust, põhjendamaks, miks erinevad kultuurisootsiumid jõuavad erinevate järeldusteni "sarnaste" lähteandmete põhjal, arvatakse traditsioonilised meetodid kultuuride võrdlemiseks olevat ebakorrektsed — tüüpiliselt ei võeta arvesse "tähenduse" ja semioosi kultuurispetsiifilisi protsesse. Näidatakse, et need protsessid põhjustavad sisendandmete erinevat tõlgendamist üleminekul ühest semiootilisest kontekstist teise. Teisisõnu, enne kognitiivse töötluse tasemele jõudmist on andmeid juba vormitud semiootilise konteksti poolt, seega see, mis on kahe isiku poolt kognitiivselt töödeldud kahes erinevas kultuurilises/semiootilises kontekstis ei ole enam "sama". Semiootiliselt kujundatud arusaam kultuuriloogikast on seetõttu otsustavaks faktoriks kõigi kognitiivsete ja psühholoogiliste süsteemide kultuuridevahelises uurimises.

Eric Wolf:
the crosser of boundaries

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Abstract. The subject of this paper is an introduction to my assessment of the work of the late American anthropologist, Eric Wolf (1923–1999), whom I consider to be one of the greatest American anthropologist. I plan a monograph on his total work from a point of view, largely overlooked, emphasizing his sensitive, path-breaking, and poetic insights. I see Wolf's work as having three interpenetrating periods, which I call (1) Eric Wolf, the poet, focusing primarily on his work on Mexico, (2) the study of peasantry world-wide, emphasizing history, context, power, etc. (from the very beginning Wolf demolished the idea of static isolated cultures that anthropologists so loved to study; and in this respect, Eric Wolf changed anthropology forever), and (3) the third period, reaching to his death and never really finished, was Wolf the philosopher and crosser of boundaries.

Eric R. Wolf (1923–1999), the pioneer in anthropological studies of the peasant and the larger society, was a many-sided and imaginative scholar. He did not shirk challenges and complexities and never limited to expediencies the problems he investigated, thus facilitating easier but less useful solutions. Nor did his questioning mind stop exploring ever-widening and ever-changing theories. Shall we say that he was oblivious of turf guarding? He looked beyond official knowledge and the accepted span of anthropological concerns, thus rejecting the concept of closed and static societies and insisting on the importance of context and history, local and world-wide. I locate him, in the worlds of Franz Boas, and Margaret Mead, and intertextually also with that of with the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, and those of two important representatives of the aesthetics of the Prague Linguistic Circle, namely Roman Jakobson, particularly Jakobson's

theory of metonymic metaphors, and Jan Mukařovský, with whom he shared a far-sighted and expanding exploration of the interpenetration of cultures. I also see important intertextual relations with Juri Lotman, the leader until his death of the Moscow-Tartu school, particularly Lotman's theory of montage, history, myth, and semiotics of everyday behavior, and with M. Bakhtin notably his carnival, reversals of hierarchies and oppositions of official and unofficial levels of cultures.

Sons of The Shaking Earth (1959), Wolf's first book, and the primary example I discuss in this essay, strikingly demonstrates the poetic bent in Wolf's work, since the text is replete with tropes, and we find parallels to Lotman's explicit montage, that is the juxtaposition of oppositions which reveal new similarities as well as Lotman's conception of the hero of a narrative who crosses boundaries as opposed to those *dramatis personae* who remain essentially static and rule-bound. In Wolf's works the heroes are both the ethnologist and those boundary-crossing actors as conceptualized by the author. In his later works, the relation of Wolf's ongoing development of his theoretical stance and philosophical concepts to those to the above semiotic and pre-semiotic thinkers, is a fertile field to investigate which I can only touch on in this essay.

The above remarks are hardly the conventional assessment of Wolf, who has usually been classed as an economic, political and structural anthropologist with a bent toward Marxism, and is associated with Sidney Mintz, Marshall Sahlins, George Foster, Robert Redfield, and others, which was not inappropriate particularly in the mid-years of his career when he was attempting to analyze the structural changes of peasant societies, although he never omitted context, history, and dynamics. For Wolf the stimulating interplay of domains of culture, including complex meanings, symbolic and ritual performances, values, ideologies, and inner view of the members of the community studied were never to be ignored, and of focal importance were their interrelations with the economic and political structure, for Wolf was a never a reductionist or determinist. Indeed the traditional assessment of Wolf's work was not sensitive to the many implications of his sophisticated dynamic positioning of peasantry in the larger society and looking at the world through the point of view of the interlocutors and not just that of the author. Consider the parallels between Wolf's rescue of history, official and unofficial, for the study of cultures, and the interpenetration, not isolation, of cultures, in Lotman's and Uspenskij's semiotics of history (cf. Nak-

himovsky, Nakhimovsky 1985). Their works were translated only relatively recently and, as far as I know, were not studied by Wolf. Wolf wrote in his Preface to *Europe and the People Without History*:

> In 1968 I wrote that anthropology needed to discover history [...]. We can no longer be content with writing only the history of victorious elites or with detailing the subjugation of dominant ethnic groups [...]. We [...] need to uncover the history of "the people without history" — the active histories of "primitive" peasantries, laborers, immigrants, and besieged minorities [...]. [This] book strives to cross the lines of demarcation that separate the various human disciplines from one another, and to abrogate the boundaries between Western and non-Western history. It was written in the belief that a better understanding of our human condition was now within our grasp [...]. (Wolf 1982b: ix–x)

To some extent Wolf was attracted also to Foucault's writings on structural power though Wolf also always emphasized the concept of culture. Nor did he dismiss the entirety of the Enlightenment (Wolf: 2001: 384).

With these introductory remarks, I propose three main streams in Wolf's thinking, which are interpenetrating and only relatively chronological. (1) Wolf the sensitive poet, exemplar of which is his early study of Mexico, *Sons of the Shaking Earth* (1959). This first and never really absent strain demonstrates Wolf's fascination with the ambiguities of cultural meanings and cultural polysemy. (2) The second important aspect of Wolf's thinking was that of the economic political revolutionary anthropologist who abolished forever the notion of the isolated peasant village and, by implication, that of the isolated tribe. Context, time and space were not overlooked. (3) The third strain is Eric Wolf the theoretician and philosopher who considered power in relation to some semiotic concepts particularly in his last work, *Envisioning Power* (1999).

I shall return to the first strain in the concluding section of this essay when I discuss *Sons of the Shaking Earth*. But first let us assess Wolf the scholar and some recent articles considering him. Globalism which has become an ambiguous term is an extreme resolution of the path Eric Wolf took, but in so far as globalism dispenses with cultural differences and implies universal conformism to American commercialism and the values associated with it, it is hardly akin to Wolf's world-wide cultural universe. For Wolf the passive isolated peasant or village was replaced by peasantries situated in world history, often revolutionary, creative and interesting, and hardly Marx's contemptuous view of peasants as mere sacks of potatoes; although the peasant

was not necessarily idealized. Though Wolf wished to bring to the fore the often neglected underdog, he did not oversimplify since he never omitted the underlying socio-economic and cultural factors contributing to causes of conflict and revolution.

Let us look at an analytical essay by Wolf and some relevant discussions that elucidate the recent controversies concerning power and culture in his strong critique (Wolf 1988) of the conventional understanding of such terms as *society* and *nation*. Here Wolf held that the term "society" connotes a Western bourgeois and Marxist view of the modern nation state "which, through its power advantage, indoctrinates its members with the ideology of common social and moral values which then become the essence that cements the totality; and society is then conceived as a bounded and homogeneous whole made up of interacting units" (Wolf 1988: 752). This view does not satisfy Wolf, for it assumes that one society or nation necessarily shares a unified culture and history. Rather, Wolf argues that "from primitives on, intersecting and fluid networks created by various changing bonds are the more ambiguous, more complex, but also more realistic, phenomena that characterize societies" (Wolf 1988: 760). Decrying traditional architectural metaphors to describe "nexuses of interaction", Wolf invokes Lacan's "upholstery" (Lacan 1966: 502 in Wolf 1988: 757) that through its spaced buttons designates key points in chains of significations, a metaphor that exemplifies the kind of inventive leap that anthropologists might emulate.

While for Wolf the concept of society has "become a hindrance in our search for more knowledge since [it] sets itself up as an eternal verity" (Wolf 1988: 759), he warns that dissatisfaction with this concept as a total system should not lead to substituting for it the individual as a total system. I quote Wolf's following critique because it expresses very succinctly Wolf's temperament and his insightful critical mind. Wolf sees neither society nor the individual as a timeless essence. For Wolf the

> abstract individual is merely another monad, a timeless and reified essence like the conceptual entity it is supposed to criticize and oppose. Real-life individuals, in contrast, in the many different cultural settings that we know about, are differentially constructed out of ancestors, parents, kinsmen, siblings, role models, spirit guardians, power animals, prenatal memories, dream selves, reincarnated spirits, or gods taking up residence in their heads and riding them like divine horsemen [...]. We need to invent new ways of thinking about heterogeneity and the transformative nature of human arrangements and to do so scientifically and humanistically at the same time.

> The attempt to understand what humans do and conceive economically, politically, socially, morally, cognitively and emotionally all at once has always been a hallmark of anthropology, and the goal remains a usable and productive program. (Wolf 1988: 760)

Others have voiced more clear pessimism about success of writings in ethnology, and of course all this preceded the events of September 11, 2001. Thus how prophetic are the warnings of Hammel when he asks whether the disasters in the former Yugoslavia may spell the end of anthropology as we know it, and that perhaps Boas was wrong. Hammel writes:

> Our adherence to the antiracist principles enunciated by Boas and later by Mead, Kluckhohn, and others [...] may be on a collision course with the re-emergence of ethnicity (sometimes symbolized as religion) as the backbone of political and social organization [...]. The problem is thus [...] bigger than Yugoslavia. But it is also bigger than the convenient use of ethnic particularism as a replacement for universalistic rationality [...]. It raises some fundamental problems for us as anthropologists, especially in the important area of human rights. [...] It means that you can be a citizen based on where you live rather than on where you came from. [...] Cultural relativism is in my view a worthless concept when the issues are those of life and death, of personal degradation, of all of those values that are at the core of our own concepts of civil and human rights. [...] What if Boas [...] was wrong? (Hammel 1994: 48)

I do not suggest that Eric Wolf shared this drastic pessimism but surely his hope for cultural anthropology was tempered by such reservations.

As a general introduction to the recent and changing assessments of Wolf's work, I look at three recent articles by Wolf's colleagues, two written before his death, the first by Jane Schneider, the second by Ashraf Ghani both in a collection by Schneider and Rapp (1995) devoted to Wolf's influence on anthropological thinking. Thirdly, I look at a review article which appeared after Wolf's death, by Stanley Barrett, Sean Stockholm, and Jeanette Burke (2001) which assesses Wolf's last book, *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crises* (1999).

I examine these articles because they reveal a shift in the habitual use and understanding of Wolf's work. These essays attempt to clarify some common misunderstandings relating to Wolf's presumed reductionism and determinism, and the abstract character of his typologies, and take up Wolf's view of the autonomy and interrelation all domains of culture. These essays, while they are broad-ranging, are

not attuned to the metaphoric and poetic mode and aesthetic values and sign types, and ambiguities of the inner and outer point of view of, which I discern in various writings of Wolf, but nevertheless they account for a richer and more informative exposition of Wolf's oeuvre than most earlier treatments have.

I begin with Schneider (1995), noting her remarks most pertinent to our interests here in her "Introduction: The Analytic Strategies of Eric Wolf". According to Schneider, historical processes for Wolf "are preeminently political and economic, reinforced through ideology" (Schneider 1995: 3). Furthermore, "concentrations of power, however they might be achieved, will continue to act disruptively out of their location in a competitive, ever-changing and unevenly developed 'field of forces'" (Schneider 1995: 4). Schneider notes that Wolf has misgivings about the architectural term "structural power" because of its connotation of fixity, and prefers "metaphors from physics" such as vectors, forces, and fields of force (Schneider 1995: 3–4). These terms express his preference for dynamics over statics, "unpredictable, ever-changing moves of strategizing and self justifying power holders in 'a world of multi-tiered conflicts'" referring to Wolf's essay "Cycles of violence" (Wolf 1987, Schneider 1995: 4). Schneider points out, "this means that for Wolf ideational phenomena belong to the world of politics and economics; they are *not* its product or 'superstructure'" (Schneider 1995: 4). Religion is also a symbolic communication that effects politics and economics and may also generate vectors (Schneider 1995: 4). While Wolf has much to say about the desta-bilizing power of capitalism, he rejects the concept of powerless people since his emphasis on dynamics means that there are forces that enlarge "the possibilities of empowerment from below" (Schneider 1995: 5).

As Schneider notes, Wolf's *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (1969d) exemplifies these processes. Local and regional histories are significant. According to Wolf, knowing peasant histories is also a way "to recover a significant part of ourselves, so that we may gain more effective knowledge of the world" (Wolf 1983: 5, Schneider 1995: 7). Schneider holds that "occasionally Wolf has been taken as a 'world system' theorist [...] [but] he faults this approach for obliterating 'range and variety' of the micropopulations 'habitually investigated by anthropologists'" (Wolf 1982b: 23, Schneider 1995: 7). Schneider adds that it is this openness that most profoundly marks this dynamic, processual approach to what history is about" (Schneider 1995: 8). For Wolf French structuralism accounts for the

"'ongoing dialectical interpenetration' of social behavior and symbolic form" which have important reciprocal relations with "ecological, economic and organizational context" (Wolf 1986: 327, Schneider 1995: 9), Furthermore, Wolf finds misleading such dichotomies as: tradition/modernity, pre-capitalist/capitalist, pre-colonial/colonial, which do not take into account historical processes while modern/post-modern "collapses the processes of an earlier epoch into a seamless trajectory" (Schneider 1995: 9). Wolf strongly supports an historical comparative approach. I see Wolf as rejecting, as did Boas, arbitrary, evolutionary, unilinear evolutionary histories as opposed to local empirically backed histories, a project which portrays a new kind of world that does not omit the "people without history". As Wolf and Cole write, differences are accounted for by the effect of "the template of ideas for the ordering of social life" (Cole, Wolf 1974: 19, Schneider 1995: 11).

Schneider praises Wolf's emphasis on surprises, "anomalies [...] that do not fit into the pattern" (Schneider 1995: 11). His curiosity led him to see unpredicted cultural behavior. Such phenomena were often overlooked by traditional ethnographers anxious for the data to fit into their preconceived pattern. This recalls Peirce's "surprise" as the basis for the awakening of consciousness of self or secondness, leading to thirdness. In his simplest explanation, Peirce describes the surprise of an infant that touches a hot stove, leading the infant to awareness of self or as, Peirce writes, ego discovers non-ego. In fact, in his later life Wolf began to explore the relation of Peirce's thirdness to culture and power (Wolf 1999: 53–54, and private communications).

Wolf's work during what I have called some what arbitrarily his middle period of his studies focused on structural issues such as peasant coalitions, and patron-client relations, and circular religious and ritual duties organized by the local priest, but he made clear that such structural relations were not meant to be static. None were stable and unchanging. As Schneider notes, "contrasting examples are viewed as local and creative responses to divergent vectors or forces". For example, "such vectors helped to shape the *compadrazgo* (men linked in involvement of child's baptism) and fiesta systems in Mexico and other Latin American peasantries" (Schneider 1995: 15) and similar systems in other peasant areas.

Underlining the importance of differences, not only in smaller communities but in between nations shaped by the cultural patterns of each group, Wolf saw these relations as "represented by symbols standing for norms of relations between people or they may be

'symbolic pantomimes' (Veblen)" (Mintz, Wolf 1950, in Schneider 1995: 23). Pantomime was also an important form of symbolic behavior for Uspensky and Lotman. In a related statement Wolf cautioned that "to have effective results [...] requires a study of the things, peoples or relations to which they refer" (Mintz, Wolf 1950, in Schneider 1995: 23). We see that in his earliest writings Wolf rejected such concepts as empty or purely arbitrary symbols and upheld their relation to reality to which they refer, which of course was also a part of Peirce's program where symbols, always having an iconic and indexical level, were never purely arbitrary. Another important contribution to dynamics of symbols is Wolfs concept of the significant roles of "interstitial brokers" in Mexico which he "portrayed as catalysts in spreading the syncretic myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe" — a potent symbol of the 'salient social relations' of Mexican life as against the relationships to metropolitan Spain (Wolf 1958, Schneider 1995: 24). Brokers also established a symbolic frame at the time of the demise of the hacienda system. Such interstitial manipulators, as Wolf suggested are significant in complex societies and may account for cultural differences in spite of formal similarities (Wolf 1996 in Schneider 1995: 24). Additionally the role of intellectuals, often marginal in colonial regimes, takes on new roles under change as the dominant power takes over but this takes beyond the province of this discussion.

The second article we discuss is an assessment of Wolfs book, *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crises* (1999), reviewed by Stanley R. Barrett, Sean Stokholm and Jeanette Burke (2001). The reviewers hold that Wolf's "aim is to salvage culture by fusing it analytically to power" (Barrett *et al.* 2001: 468) and that ideas are fundamental to culture. Quoting Wolf, the reviewers note that by *ideas* Wolf means "the entire range of mental constructs rendered manifest in public representations" while *ideology* means "unified schemes of configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power" (Wolf 1999: 4, Barrett *et al.* 2001: 469). In a complex arguments the reviewers ask if Wolf accepts the idea that the concept of culture accounts for the universalism of the Enlightenment or does it involves the particularism and differentiation of Counter-Enlightenment. Wolf accepts the latter in modified form because of the relational value of culture, which brings together many different aspects of culture. (Wolf 1999: 67, in Barrett *et al.* 2001: 469). It is apparent that Wolf accepts some aspects of the Enlightenment as well

as its counter forces. We are caught once more in essentially false dichotomies.

The reviewers ask how Wolf salvages the concept of culture?

> The first step is to follow the critics by redefining culture to emphasize diversity, ambiguity, contradiction and imperfectly shared meanings and knowledge. The second step is to 'cure' or 'energize' culture by injecting power into it, rendering it robust and potent, finally capable of realizing lofty explanatory demands [...]. (Barrett *et al.* 2001: 469)

Wolf takes up three cases, the Kwakiutl, the Aztecs, and Hitler's National Socialism. While the reviewers feel these are not the best choices, for us the main issue in the test cases is Wolf's emphasis for the Kwakiutl of sacred time and the mythological as opposed to Benedicts theme of the bellicose. For the Aztecs, Wolf discusses the relation of power to ideas, public rituals and the perception of the cosmic. Pertaining to the Nazis inner Wolf looks to essence or *Geist* that pervades the violent ideology.

In the concluding theoretical discussion the reviewers note that Wolf eschews an attempt to produce a formal theory of power and opts for analyzing power after the fact, and they criticize Wolf's theory of cultural power as not complete, since his cases were all focused on power and there was no example of an opposing case, but they hail Wolf's argument that ideas, social relations and power are interdependent and that for him the materialist realm and idealist realm carry equal causal weight. He argues that ideas are the key feature to human existence (Barrett *et al.* 2001: 475). The fundamental assertion of Wolf is that it is not culture or power but culture and power. In spite of their positive evaluation of Wolf's theoretical approach, the reviewers remark that Wolf may be reducing culture to ideas. I believe this is a specious argument that clouds the issue, since in what sense are ideas not a part of culture? But this has been a murky area for much anthropological theory. In contrast the Lotman approach does not see ideas as separate from culture and it seems to me Wolf was moving in that direction.

We now turn to the third article by Ashraf Ghani (1995), entitled "Writing a history of power: As examination of Eric R. Wolf's anthropological quest". Ghani sees Wolf's "cumulative praxis is an endeavor to analyze the intersection of power and culture in the history of the present" (Ghani 1995: 31). Expanding this thought, Wolf calls for "the systematic writing of history in the modern world in which we spell out the history of power which created the present

day cultural systems and linkages between them" (Wolf 1969a: 10, in Ghani 1995: 32).

As Ghani points out Wolf, like Schneider, rejects architectural metaphors for web- like connections since he turns to metaphors that are more relational. As Ghani quotes Wolf, "once we look at pheno-mena as points of intersection between multiple vectors, we need to stress opposition as well as convergence, dislocation as well as cohesion, disintegration as well as integration, on the micro-level as well as on the macro-level of analysis" (Wolf 1977, in Ghani 1995: 32).

As Wolf expanded, "power is [...] never external to signification. [...] It inhabits meaning and is its champion in stabilization and defense.[...] [For] symbolic work is never done, achieves no final solution" (Wolf 1990: 593, Ghani 1995: 33). Here this thought echoes Peirce's notion of infinite regress (that is to elucidate meaning every interpret requires another one and there is no end), and while I do not know when Wolf began to investigate Peirce, I believe this is at least an example of parallel thought.

"Writing the history of the present" was also called for by Fou-cault, but Foucault did not involve culture as central, nor did he con-cern himself with processes and uneven developments in all aspects of culture as did Wolf. Reminding us of Mukařovský's insistence that cultures were forever being penetrated by changes from the outside, Wolf argues that "in the majority of cases the entities studied by anthropologists owe their development to processes that originate outside them [...] are affected by their demands and affect them in turn" (Wolf 1982a: 9, Ghani 1995: 35). We note that such a dynamic approach is far removed perceptions of closed communities, nor is it akin to the processes of automatic diffusion. As Levi-Strauss has shown in his tomes on mythology influences go both ways and are subject to transformations in terms of the particular cultural beliefs, and particular environments. The interrelation of cultures and the world outside is forever stressed by Wolf, for he sees a community not as closed but as a "local termini of a web of relations" extending from the community to the nation (Wolf 1956: 1056; Ghani 1995: 37).

Wolf's contribution to a dynamic study of peasantry can hardly be overestimated. As Geertz reflected, anthropology noticed the peasant only recently (Geertz 1961: 1, in Ghani 1995: 38). Wolf's assessment of peasant culture rejects Marxist economic determinism and confine-ment of culture to the superstructure and of course the lumping of pea-

sants as a sack of potatoes, although he interprets some Marxist insight, but with limitations.

Turning to *Sons of the Shaking Earth,* Ghani notes that for Wolf it is "an attempt to trace the life line of a culture" (Wolf 1959: vii; Ghani 1995: 42). The pattern of power relations is metaphorically described as "galactic systems" bringing villages and towns into the orbit of an expanding state, but galaxies may break up into solar systems (Wolf 1959: 256, in Ghani 1995: 43). This depiction does not imply time-lessness, for Wolf sees the ethnographic present as a battle ground between the past and the future, "and there can be no finish to this book, nor any prophecy" (Wolf 1959: 256, Ghani 1995: 43).

Describing focal features of the Mexican culture Wolf emphasizes the Mexican religious calendar that was controlled by the priesthood, which set the time for the various tasks of cultivation and these were geared to rituals and to cosmic time. The Spain rule changed the system radically. As Wolf wrote "[...] it would be a planned world, projected into reality by the royal will and its executioners. Thus utopia would become law and law utopia" (Wolf 1959: 162–163, Ghani 1995: 44).

The failure *of* this utopia is dramatized in Wolf's *Sons of the Shaking Earth* and Wolf's and Hansen's *The Human Condition in Latin America.* The attempt is to cede the voices other than the voice of the other a central place in the text" (Ghani 1995: 44). The oppressive conditions under the Spanish caused people "to rely on more intimate and more assured ties of kinship, friendship and personal acquaintances" (Wolf, Hansen 1972: 1200, in Ghani 1995: 44) which I note is an apt observation explaining the kinds of social relations in oppressive communist society where one compensation was the maintenance of warm friendships.

I conclude with a remark from Wolf's view of Mexico peopled by closed corporate communities that lapsed over time, a perspective that must not be mistaken for earlier anthropological descriptions of the static unchanging village. For Wolf's communities were not reified essences but could only be understood in dynamic interaction between community and nation and that interaction had a history (see Wolf 2001: 147–148).

Before proceeding to my own discussion of Wolf's first book, *Sons of the Shaking Earth,* I draw on the theme of George Steiner's Norton lectures at Harvard University, "Lessons in the Masters on the Art of Teaching", October–November 2001). Steiner's examples are drawn from Plato and Aristotle, Virgil and Dante, and Faust and Mephis-

topheles. Steiner's thesis was that the relation between the Master and the Disciple are ambiguous, fraught with danger and deception. But when the Master imparts in the dialogue the apogee, reaching the true and eternal, the art of teaching reaches its heights. And even more dramatic, the student may go beyond the master who opens wide areas to be further explored, never limiting him or herself to a particular design. Applying this to the scholar who is the subject of this study I believe Wolf is an apt exemplar of Steiner's far sighted model of teacher to student. I will not argue over Steiner's "true and eternal" except to say that unless we capitulate completely to the post modern mood, there must be some hope and goal that striving to reach some kind of understanding of humanity justifies the effort. It is my position that in Wolf's final book, *Envisioning Power* (1999), new channels were opened that had been potentially there to be discovered in many of the earlier writings.

I complete this essay by returning, as a striking demonstration of Wolf's originality and poeticity, to *Sons of the Shaking Earth* (1959), in which the story of Mexico is not only a history but a poetic narrative foregrounding scene after scene as we are provided with fresh perceptions of the environment and the inner life of the people, their struggles with war like powers, and the complex meanings of their behavior, beliefs and objects that are valued.

I preface my remarks, with the aphorism on the frontal page of Wolfs *Anthropology* (1974) which opens with "'Man be my Metaphor' — Dylan Thomas". I believe this was an underlining point of view in all Wolf's works no matter how subliminal. The Mexicans well exemplify the use of metaphor or myths, the importance of which cannot be over emphasized. Whether the peasantry continued to believe in them literally or not we cannot argue. Nor can we assert that the peasantry discerned one function of myths as control and obscuring of reality on the part of power holders after the early period of peaceful villages. The transformation of meanings and the polysemic and quixotic dramas of a particular myth as it travels from one group to another, and as it changes over time are all as shown by Lévi-Strauss to be typical in his vast studies of myths of South American Indians. I have already sketched in broad outlines the imaginative provenance of metaphors in Wolf's description of Mexican peasantry including utopia, galactic and solar systems and corporate communities.

We now look at the first chapters of the book primarily, taking us to the period of the Conquest, as space does not allow an analysis of

the entire monograph. As Wolf writes in his Preface, three chapters deal with the geographic setting, the biology of the people and their languages, four trace the pre conquest history and the final four are devoted to the effect of the conquest. But as a clue to the particular sensitive quality of this book, note Wolf's statement that "my aims have also been personal. Middle America has also been a personal experience; and in my writing I have attempted to convey something of the quality of this experience" (Wolf 1959: vii). It is my contention that he does admirably achieve this, a goal of which ethnologists today are coming to realize the importance, that is an accounting for the authorial voice and point of view is a part of the portrait and cannot be invisible. I quote in full the opening text that embodies the most sacred beliefs and philosophies that is ascribed to Hungry-Coyote (Netzahualcoyotl), King of Texcoco (1431–1472).

> Nothing is so perfect that it does not descend to its tomb.
> Rivers, rivulets, fountains and waters flow,
> but never return to their joyful beginnings;
> anxiously they hasten on to the vast realm of the rain god.
> As they widen their banks, they also fashion the sad urn of their burial.
> Filled are the bowels of the earth with pestilential dust once flesh and bone,
> once animate bodies of men who sat upon thrones,
> decided cases, presided in council, commanded armies,
> conquered provinces, possessed treasure, destroyed temples,
> exulted in their pride, majesty, fortune, praise and power.
> Vanished are these glories, just as the fearful smoke vanishes
> that belches forth from the infernal fires of Popocatepetl.
> Nothing recalls them, but the unwritten page.
>
> Netzahualcoyotl (as cited in Wolf 1959)

This is a poetic lament metamorphosing past deeds vanishing like smoke. We should note that it does not account for oral memories assuming the deeds were so long in the past that they could not be recalled, but we know that oral recollections can be powerful sources. However, the deeds described were those of the ruling elite and the memories of peasants have a different story to tell.

The chapters of this narrative are presented as ethnographic, historic and cultural studies but its language differs markedly from that of the traditional anthropological depictions. Wolf opens the story with striking myths painting the ecological geographic shelf under Mexico.

> Middle American rises out of the sea, its plateau forms one of the roofs of the
> world, the great volcanoes rise above the landscape clad in a mantle of snow
> as if they had relinquished their dark powers and fallen into eternal sleep. But
> the crust of the land is still unstable. It trembles even when asleep and over
> night a fiery monster may burst forth in a man's field [...]. (Wolf 1959: 1)

Chapter one describes the geographic setting and the pyramids erected
by the rulers employing the local peoples. As Wolf writes, "the
ancient prophets of this land spoke of five great period of time, each
destined to end in disaster" (Wolf 1959: 1). The fifth period, our own,
will end with a cataclysmic earthquake. Resembling the mountains,
massive pyramids were erected. The largest man-made pyramid in the
world, Cholula, is "banished into the foundations of the new
churches" and the old gods of Cholula now sleep banished by Pueblo,
the most Catholic town in the realm (Wolf 1959: 6). "The city of
Toluca itself, located at 8,600 feet above sea level, is the capital of the
state of Mexico and a great sprawling settlement into which the
Indians of the surrounding country breathe life once a week in the
great Friday market" (Wolf 1959: 7). Here "breath" may be seen as a
metaphor for the periodic changing market and it is also indexical for
the market itself. There are many other tropes in this chapter as for
example "the dusty villages cling to the mountainside with the tena-
city of the cactus and the prickly pear" (Wolf 1959: 10). The juxta-
position of the village and the prickly pear and the cactus, is a striking
metaphor.

Describing, in liberal use of metaphoric language, the changing
dominations of different centers during this early period (Teotihuacan,
Tula, Peten, etc) the most enduring of which was the valley of Mexico
(Wolf 1959: 19), central areas draw villages and town of the periphery
"like a magnet" (Wolf 1959: 20). Thus growing states emerge but the
process was reversible. In equally metaphorical language Wolf
concludes Chapter 1:

> Through widening conquests and widening trade the solar system of the
> favored area becomes a galaxy [...]. But the process is reversible. [...] The
> cohesion of the center depends [...] upon the pull of its center. [...] The
> satellite systems [may] slip again from their orbits. [...] In this way galaxies
> again yield to solar systems. [...] Thus, on the face of this land, human
> societies have grown and declined in continuous pulsations [...] in continuous
> tension between expansion and decay. (Wolf 1959: 20)

Chapter Two, entitled the "Generations of Adam" presents a survey of
the consequences of the Spanish conquest. A primary fact is that,
more than two-thirds of the Indian population died between 1519 and

1650 (Wolf 1959: 30). As a result the Indians became "mestizos" a mixture of Indian, African, Spanish, and to some extent other Europeans.

A new and very different society with many complexities emerged after the Conquest, the description of which begins in Chapter Eight, but before this chapter, Wolf, true to his fidelity to the importance of history, provides three chapters outlining the period before the Conquest from the earliest seed-planters, to the growth of life centered around villages in the second half of the second millennium as primitive farmers developed into a peasantry, when an emergent state controlled the communities.

However, as Chapter Five relates, until 900 the community remained the autonomous unit but such units were fundamentally altered in the years to follow. As Wolf wrote,

> Empires and conquests sweep over the land, cities arise, new gods announce salvation, but in the dusty streets of the little villages a humble kind of life persists, and rises again to the surface when the fury of conquest is stilled, when the cities crumble into ashes, and when new gods are cast into oblivion. (Wolf 1959: 68)

This description exemplifies Wolf's art of prose where the visual and the verbal complement each other bringing a panorama to life for the inward eye of a reader. Thus all signs tell us of the beginning of the end of this simple life in the village as the modern world "is engaged in severing ties [...] which bind people into local unity in commiting them to complete participation in the Great Society" (Wolf 1959: 68).

The remainder of chapter Five turns back to 900 B.C. and the changes that follow when the egalitarian life of the farming villager becomes more complex and a Middle American society emerged (Wolf 1959: 70). The priesthood developed a powerful and specialized role, large scale constructions are erected for religious purposes, artistic styles are evident. Important examples are the clay figurine and the jade jaguar. Wolf proposes that the jaguar "is a symbol of domination not only of the sacred orifices of the earth but also over their human counterparts" (Wolf 1959: 73). In the theocratic period the centers were temples and the metropolitan Teotihuacan. Priest rulers and specialists that organized labor and tribute and worship of the villagers were the powerful figures. The following passage again exemplifies Wolf's power of imagery and generalization that in a few lines encapsulates pages of factual information. Describing the character of early states he writes they were a combination of terror

and supernatural power and were responsible for upholding the balance of the universe. The rulers, kings etc had divine power. "They stood before their awed subjects in the splendor and terror of their godhead, but they also showered upon their subjects the benefits of peace and of a well-ordered social life, which was but an aspect of the well-ordered universe" (Wolf 1959: 79). This was a relatively peaceful period as compared to the later Militaristic period (A.D. 750–1519).

Continuing the theocratic period, Wolf brings the symbolism of the temple to life. The tiers of the temple equated with the tiers of the universe, the pyramid signifies the mountain of the sky or magical animals as the hummingbird and the jaguar. Other animals have other symbolic meanings. The accomplishment of the calendar systems "serve to bind [...] cosmic time, to domesticate it, as religion domesticates other aspects of the universe [...] reduced to the mere sequence of social time"(Wolf 1959: 87–88).

We know that time calculations were of focal interest to early civilizations and the metaphoric use of "domesticate", its juxtaposition to "time", bears relation to Lotman's assertion that poetic language has more information than ordinary prose. The theocratic period was one of florescence of art architecture and the high development of symbolism. Then followed The Militarist period beginning in 750 lasting to 1519, the onset of the conquest.

I limit myself to a few remarks about the Mexican narrative following our discussion of chapter Five, "Villages and holy towns". The remaining analysis laid aside for the longer study. Summarizing the dramatic story of Mexico, in his highly depictive and vivid and at the same time powerfully generalizing prose, Wolf wrote:

> Each age bears its own mark, and yet each age is merely a bridge between what is past and what is still to be. The Theocratic societies of Middle America are strongly characterized, and yet transient between the simpler societies that preceded them and the Militarist societies that replaced them. Every society is a battlefield between its own past and its future; it was such a conflict that opened the fissures in the Theocratic edifice. (Wolf 1959: 106)

Since this discussion does not pretend to be a history of Mexico although Wolf's book certainly is, but an interpretation of Wolf's a highly poetic and metaphoric style and potent generalizations all based on facts or beliefs of the people and Wolf's creative and imaginative mind, I limit myself here to a brief comment upon. The Mexicans empire builders and rulers of the "Mexica" domain. The following

passages exemplify Wolf's creative harnessing of myth of a people which provides sharp insight into their mentality.

Referring to the "Mexica" he wrote that

> According to their legends, they were led to the site by their Hummingbird-on-the-Left, who ordered them to settle where they saw an eagle sitting on a cactus devouring a snake, There the Mexicans would come face to face with their destiny. There they would fight a holy war in support of the sun, against the forces of night and evil. As each night the sun gave battle to the multitude of stars, so we Mexicans would capture prisoners of war and sacrifice them; each prisoner would represent one star. Fit astral food to sustain the sun in its perilous fight. Painted black and white and wearing a black mask to symbolize the night sky, each victim would mount a holy pyramid where his captors would tear the heart out of his living body so that the sun might eat and rise to fight again in the lagoon of Texcoco. Mythically equated with the Lake of the Moon, near the spring whose waters ran blue and red-symbolic of the glyph 'water-fire' [...] that stands for war-the Mexicans were to fill their mission as guardians the sun. (Wolf 1959: 131)

That this myth obscured and disguised reality is clear. The Mexicans were driven by their enemies to conquer the area of the myth. Yet we learn something of the justifying ideology of these people in their quest for power.

The tragic story of the Spanish rule for three centuries will have to await a longer study. But the Mexican myth that each age will end in disaster does not contradicted that prophecy. As Wolf concludes this book he asks whether Middle America will find its own voice or

> whether it will wither away as Indianism declines in the face of the new utilitarianism of the new occupants? Thus men still remain torn between yesterday and tomorrow and Middle America remains in travail [...] the rooster has cried a coming dawn, but in the grey daybreak the shadows still lie in dark pools about doorway and alley. Somewhere an Indian elder bows to the four directions and invokes the rain givers, the earth-shakers in their mountainous domains. The mouth of the volcano still yawns; the future is not yet. It lies in the walk of that man shielding his face against the cold; in the gestures of that woman, fanning the embers of her fire and drawing her shawl more closely about her sleeping child; in that lonely figure, setting a signal around the railroad track. There is still time until the sun rises, but men scan the sky; for their lives are mortgaged to tomorrow. (Wolf 1959: 156)

We recall that Wolf's book appeared in 1959 and today there is still no answer to Hammel's warning concerning the future of indigenous cultures.

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Эрик Вольф: пересекающий границы

Статья является введением к большому исследованию о творчестве недавно умершего американского антрополога Эрика Вольфа (1923–1999). Автор считает Вольфа одним из величайших американских антропологов и собирается составить монографию по всем его работам, подчеркивая его поэтический стиль и "первопроходство". Труды Вольфа располагаются по трем пересекающимся периодам: 1) Эрик Вольф как поэт: сюда относится в основном его книга о Мексике; 2) охватывающее весь мир исследование о земледельцах, где подчеркивается роль истории, окружения, власти и т.п. (причем, Вольф здесь разрушает идею о статических и динамических культурах — столь любимых исследовательских объектах антропологов, — и таким образом навсегда изменяет облик всей антропологии); 3) период, длящийся до его смерти и так и не закончившийся, — Вольф как философ и "пересекатель" границ.

Eric Wolf: piiride ületaja

Artikkel on uurimuse sissejuhatuseks hiljuti lahkunud ameerika antropoloogi
Eric Wolfi (1923–1999) töödest. Autor peab Wolfi üheks suurimaks ameerika
antropoloogiks ja kavatseb koostada monograafia kõigist Wolfi töödest
sellisest vaatepunktist, mis rõhutaks ta tundlikku, teedrajavat ja poeetilist aru-
saama. Wolfi töödes eristub kolm üksteist läbivat perioodi: (1) Eric Wolf kui
poeet, eelkõige peamiselt ta töö Mehhikost; (2) kogu maailma hõlmav
talurahva uurimus, mis rõhutab ajalugu, konteksti, võimu, jne. (seejuures juba
päris alguses lammutas Wolf idee staatilistest ja isoleeritud kultuuridest, mida
antropoloogid väga uurida armastavad, ning muutis sel moel alatiseks kogu
antropoloogiat); (3) periood, mis ulatus ta surmani ja kunagi päriselt lõpule ei
jõudnud — Wolf kui filosoof ja piiride ületaja.

Boundaries and identities
in religious conversion:
The mirror

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Abstract. Religious conversion revolutions the boundaries which delimit personal identity. Therefore, the main semiotic problem of mental and cultural representations of this religious phenomenon is to convey simultaneously a feeling of sameness and otherness, identity and change. In the present paper, mirrors are analysed as cultural mechanisms which enable representations to accomplish this paradoxical task. After a brief survey concerning literature on mirrors, some early-modern religious texts using these optical instruments as representative devices are analysed in-depth: a painting of the Magdalene's conversion by Artemisia Gentileschi, an engraving representing conversion from a 17th-century French book, a fragment from Sainte Theresa's spiritual autobiography, a passage from John Calvin's *Institution de la religion chrétienne*. In its conclusion, the paper underlines the importance of Saint Paul's metaphoric conception of mirrors for the cultural history of these objects, and tries to define the role which cultural semiotics should play concerning this kind of representative mechanisms.

In this paper of mine, I shall point out the way in which a particular object, the mirror, functions as a cultural mechanism, which allows a complicated dialectics between identities and their boundaries.

Personal and collective identities are guaranteed by the presence of some limits, borders, thresholds, boundaries, and so on. These terms are not synonyms, but can all be interpreted as words, which contribute to designate the semiotic shape of an object, especially in the case of human beings or groups of people.

This semiotic shape can be affected by different kinds of changes, which can be called troubles, improvements, decays, and so on, depending on which axiological evaluation is attributed to the change

itself. "Change" and "modification" are rather neutral terms, which do not imply any encomiastic or derogative judgement.

Certainly, religious conversion is an extremely important change in the life of a person. As an extensive literature on this topic has pointed out — literature to which it is not possible to refer on the present occasion — there are various types of religious changes, and different kinds of religious conversion (James 1902; Rambo 1982, 1993; Oksanen 1994). However, all these kinds give rise to problems of identity.

From a cognitive point of view, religious conversion is a paradigmatic form of change, since individuals cannot decide to which beliefs in general, and to which religious beliefs in particular, they want to believe. Conversion, as it has been represented in Christian culture, is quite independent from individual will.

As a consequence of this impossibility to totally control beliefs, religious conversion is very problematic for the feeling of personal identity. When one converts to another religion, one inevitably experiences a paradoxical status: the awareness of the change is fundamental for the identity of the converted person, yet at the same time this awareness is a severe obstacle for the perception of the wholeness of the self. Difference and similarity, otherness and identity paradoxically coexist in the representations of religious conversion.

This happens not only in the case of mental representations, but also in the case of cultural representations of conversion.

In particular, pictorial texts representing conversion seem to face the same problem as mental representations. *Mutatis mutandis*, they both have to use the present in order to represent the past and the future.

On the one hand, conscience works and exists only in the present tense, which a very long philosophical tradition has defined as a moment entrapped between the memory of the past and the expectation of the future (Ricœur 1983). On the other hand, as an abundant semiotic and esthetical literature has meticulously analysed (Calabrese 1985, 1985b), paintings cannot represent time in its extension, but must have recourse to various semiotic stratagems in order to give an effective representation of it. And, although both the nature and effectiveness of these stratagems may vary depending on visual cultures and their histories, this limit of paintings remains unchanged: time must be compressed into a single instant.

Therefore, when these different texts, painted or mental narratives, represent conversion, they must adopt some suitable cultural mecha-

nisms, which enable them to keep both otherness and identity in the same semiotic space.

As I shall demonstrate in my paper, mirrors, as used by consciences or represented by paintings, are just this kind of cultural mechanism.

Mirroring surfaces are very common in human history, in every time and in every culture, but it is especially after the technical invention of the modern mirror, that they have stimulated human imagination in many different ways. Unceasingly, from the beginning of early-modern history on, poets, writers, visual artists, philosophers, and so on, have represented mirrors and used them as metaphorical devices for their conceptual inventions. Literature on the cultural history of mirrors is particularly copious, but some contributions can be singled out: in 1994, Sabine Melchior-Bonnet published a very interesting essay, still considered one of the most important texts in this field, which borne the title *Histoire du miroir* (Melchior-Bonnet 1994). Another fundamental essay concerning the same topic is *The Mirror and the Man*, published by Benjamin Goldberg in 1985 (Goldberg 1985). In Italian, I can recommend the book by Andrea Tagliapietra *La metafora dello specchio*, "the metaphor of the mirror", particularly concerned with the philosophical implications of this fascinating object (Tagliapietra 1991).

Besides these major contributions, countless articles, from the most disparate points of view, have been written on mirrors, their uses and their representations.

Also, as all semioticians know, mirrors are very important in semiotics, as well as in other twentieth-century humanistic disciplines, such as psychoanalysis or hermeneutics. Umberto Eco's essay on mirrors, first published in 1985 (Eco 1985), was soon translated into many languages and became very popular. But Eco's witty considerations about mirrors, which he afterwards perfected in his most recent semiotic essay, *Kant e l'ornitorinco* (Eco 1998), concerned more the semiotics of their perception than their cultural relevance. Therefore, it is to another founder of contemporary semiotics, a semiotician more interested in the cultural semiotics of mirrors, that I shall refer in my paper. I am, of course, alluding to Juri Lotman, whose ingenious analyses are the prestigious inheritance of the semiotic school of Tartu.

In 1986, the semiotic school of Tartu organised a fascinating series of seminars about the semiotic relevance of mirrors. In 1997, a selection of articles on the semiotics of mirrors, originally published in the volumes 18, 20, 21, and 22 of the international journal *Sign Systems*

Studies (*Trudy po znakovym sistemam*), were translated into Italian and published with the following title: *Il simbolo e lo specchio*, "the symbol and the mirror" (Galassi and De Michiel 1997). In this paper of mine, I shall refer in particular to Lotman's brief but dense article "*K semiotike zerkala i zerkal'nosti*" (1988), which was translated as "*La semiotica dello specchio e della specularità*".

According to Lotman, since the dichotomy between the space which is internal to a given culture, and the space which is external to it, is a universal element in cultural semiotics, the boundary separating these two spaces is particularly meaningful. This explains why the semiotics of culture is interested in mirrors: mostly, they function as boundaries of semiotic organisations and as frontiers between "our" world and an "alien" world. So, it is argued by Lotman, the simplest mirroring effects, such as the switch between left and right, or internal and external, are signs of different forms of organisation, which are frequently stigmatised as "incorrect" or "disorganised". Therefore mirrors, in the history of culture, are semiotic mechanisms for the description of alien structures.

Lotman's semiotic conceptions about mirrors are a good point of departure in order to analyse the relation between identity, conversion and mirroring effects. According to Lotman, Lewis Carroll first pointed out the semiotic problem of the mirror in his preface to the novel *Alice through the looking glass*. However, I think that the most accomplished imagination of mirrors as traps for alien cultural structures is to be found in a short text by Jorge Luis Borges, entitled *Animales de los espejos*, "animals of the mirror", contained in *El libro de los seres imaginarios*, "The book of imaginary beings", written by Jorge Luis Borges and Margarita Guerrero in 1967 (Borges and Guerrero 1967). This beautiful text refers to a mythical époque, when "*el mundo de los espejos y el mundo de los hombres no estaban, como ahora, incomunicados*", "the world of mirrors and the world of men were not separated, as they are now". As the people of the mirror tried to invade the world of men, and were defeated, they were obliged to stay beyond the reflecting surface, and to mirror every human move. This mythical invention is perfectly suitable to function as a literary counterpart of Lotman's semiotic thoughts. Moreover, both the semiotics of Lotman and Borges's short text introduce the topic of mirrors as cultural mechanisms for the representation of conversion very well.

On this occasion, I shall analyse in detail an early-modern pictorial representation of religious conversion, "*La conversione della Maddalena*", "The conversion of the Magdalene" (Fig. 1), painted between

1615 and 1616 by the Italian painter Artemisia Gentileschi, one of the very few female painters of Italian modern art history, who was born in Rome in 1593 and died in Florence in 1653. The painting is an oil on canvas, and measures 146,5 cm by 108 cm. It is signed on the back of the chair "Artemisia Lomi"; Lomi was the real family name of Artemisia Gentileschi's father. The painting is normally exposed in the *Galleria Palatina* of the *Palazzo Pitti*, in Florence. It has been exhibited in New York and Rome. At the time of writing, it is part of the splendid exhibition about Artemisia Gentileschi and his father Orazio, host by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, in New York.

As countless historical essays have pointed out, in the ordinances of the Council of Trent, which took place between 1545 and 1563, and was to revolution the whole structure of the Catholic Church, attention was also given to the question of images (Jedin 1935; id. 1975: 235–270), which, especially in France, had undergone the attacks of Calvinist iconoclasts. The influence of the Catholic reformation, and the weight of the Catholic Counter-reformation on the art of the end of the sixteenth century and of the first half of the seventeenth century are difficult to overestimate. On this topic too, literature is extensive, and I shall not dwell on it on this occasion. Among the religious themes represented by artists in this historical period, the conversion of the Magdalene is particularly popular. From the beginning of Christian imagery, theological pamphlets, sermons, hagiographies, legends, novels, poems, dramas, engravings, popular visual texts, musical plays, sculptures, paintings and so on have represented the Magdalene and her fascinating life. However, the Magdalene's conversion was particularly represented in the early-modern époque, when the Catholic Church tried to instil a renewed religious fervour in Western Europe. The Magdalene, the sinful woman who had embraced Christian faith after a dissolute life, and was to become one of the dearest followers of Christ, ending her life in eremitic penitence, was a paradigmatic example for a Catholic civilisation shocked by the Lutheran Reform and endangered by heresy and secularisation. Therefore, the Magdalene was a paradoxical character, which expressed very suitably the contradictions of early-modern Catholic Europe. But the representation of this woman, especially her pictorial representation, inevitably implied a problem of ineffability. How was it possible to condense in a single image two opposite identities? What cultural mechanisms were to be adopted, in order to sew the disjointed boundary separating sinfulness and holiness? Let us analyse the way in

which Artemisia Gentileschi decided to solve this representative problem.

Figure 1. Artemisia Gentileschi, La conversione della Maddalena.

First of all, I would like to propose a brief verbal description of the painting, in order to point out which elements of it I am going to include in my analysis.

The body of the saint occupies the largest and most central part of the canvas, also being the main source of colour and light. Overall, the posture of the woman follows the traditional iconography of the Magdalene; the disposition of her limbs could be defined as chiastic: on the one hand, the right arm crosses the chest and grasps the left breast, expressing repentance and referring to the saint's carnal and sinful past. On the other hand, the legs of the woman are conspicuously crossed, embodying the same feeling of contrition and perhaps referring to the passion of Christ on the cross. Only the left arm of the woman holds an unusual position, which I shall try to interpret later. The hair and garments of the saint follow the iconographic tradition too: the golden colour of the robe, the elegant green of the edging on both gown and neckline, the sumptuousness of the material, the abundance of wide folds, the ampleness of the neck-opening and the ruffled tawny curls all refer to the Magdalene as courtesan. And, of course, contrition is also embodied in the lineaments of the saint's face. In my analysis, I shall not dwell on these transparent elements, but I shall give attention to four peculiar details:

(1) the inscriptions;
(2) the mirror;
(3) the skull;
(4) the pendant-earrings.

Two inscriptions appear in the painting, the first one from the left on the back of the chair, the second one on the frame of the mirror. Some art historians have claimed that probably these inscriptions are not original, and have been added to the painting (Spike 1991; Bissell 1999: 209–211). A tragic event in Artemisia Gentileschi's life is related to these inscriptions. The 6 May 1611, when Artemisia was not yet eighteen years old, she was raped by Agostino Tassi, painter and assistant of her father. After this event, which was to have huge consequences on Artemisia's both personal and artistic life, Agostino Tassi was brought to trial and banned from Rome. The acts of the trial prove that Artemisia was unable to write. Nevertheless, this does not demonstrate that the two inscriptions in the *Conversione* are not hers: she could have learned to write after the trial, when she moved to Florence with her new husband. Or, as it has been argued by other art historians, she could have asked someone else to write the two

inscriptions. However, from a semiotic point of view, this philological question is not very interesting. The meaning of the inscriptions is more relevant. As we have seen, the first inscription is the signature of the painter. The second one is a Latin quotation from the gospel of Luke, 10, 42. It is a reference to an episode, which has been represented obsessively by Western Christian art and concerns the complicated equilibrium between the *vita contemplativa*, "the contemplative life", and the *vita activa*, "the active life". I quote this passage from the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible:

> Now as they went on their way, [Jesus] entered a certain village, where a woman named Martha welcomed him into her home. She had a sister named Mary, who sat at the Lord's feet and listened to what he was saying. But Martha was distracted by her many tasks; so she came to him and asked, "Lord, do you not care that my sister has left me to do all the work by myself? Tell her then to help me." But the Lord answered her, "Martha, Martha, you are worried and distracted by many things; there is no need of only one thing. Mary has chosen the better part, which will not be taken away from her." (Luke, 10, 42)

The final sentence of this passage translates the Latin inscription in the painting: "*optimam partem elegit*", "has chosen the best part".

However, the inscription of this sentence in the context of the painting is problematic. First of all, from the Renaissance on, many theologians have denied that the woman represented in the biblical passage be the same as the converted Magdalene. The historical steps through which such a multiple identity has been built are very complicated and cannot be illustrated on this occasion. Nevertheless, the question remains to decide to which "part" the sentence "*optimam partem elegit*" refers. In the biblical passage, there are two "parts", the contemplative life and the active life. But the choice represented in Artemisia's painting is not between these two parts, but between sinfulness and holiness. The position of the inscription offers a solution to this dilemma. The parts to which the inscription refers are the two cultural structures separated by the mirror, as Lotman would have said. *Optimam partem elegit* does not mean just that the Magdalene has chosen the contemplative life, but also that she has chosen the right side of the mirror. It is now possible to interpret the position of the Magdalene's left arm, which does not follow the traditional iconography of the saint. The left hand of the Magdalene rejects the mirror as both a symbol of vanity and a separating surface beyond which the wrong part is entrapped, like the mythical enemy in Borges' short

story. But in order to reject this wrong part and the mirror, which both contains and entraps it, the saint has to touch the reflecting image. So the mirror is not simply a vehicle of a negative identity, but also an optical instrument of perfection, enabling a distinction between good and evil. Therefore, the mirror can function as a cultural mechanism of both conversion and identity, as a paradoxical device, which simultaneously permits change and continuity. Both functions, which frequently appear as fused in the same cultural relation between human beings and mirrors, refer to a very long tradition. But before briefly exploring it, I would like to finish my analysis, by giving attention to the content of the mirror. As Lotman has lucidly stated in his article, what the mirror inverts in its reflection is the wrong side of a cultural structure. In Artemisia's painting, this wrong side is the nape of the neck of the saint, which represents her sinful life, now behind her back, in her past; but it is also the earring-pendant hanging from her left ear. According to a long-established Christian axiology, often the left side represents evil. So, mirrors can function as a device of purification, inverting the left and the right side of an image. Pearls and jewels in general are a traditional symbol of vanity, especially of female vanity, but Artemisia's painting suggests also a more sophisticated dialectics between two different reflecting surfaces: the surface of the mirror and the surface of the pearls. The first one is clear and flat, while the second is opaque and convex. So, in a sort of semi-symbolical system (Floch 1995; Calabrese 1999), on the one hand pearls represent the imperfection of the soul (which a long religious tradition describes through the metaphor of the opaque mirror), but also the haughtiness of the soul (as is evident in many early-modern moral emblems, convex mirrors symbolise arrogance because they always magnify what they reflect);[1] on the other hand, the flat and clean surface of the mirror represents the state of moral awareness of the soul after contrition and repentance. The skull beside the mirror attests that the penitent soul has learned the mortal limits of its vanity.

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[1] Cf. the allegorical depiction of vanity painted in the same period by Angelo Caroselli (Rome, 1585–1652). This painting (Fig. 2) represents together a string of pearls, shown in the foreground by the vain woman, a mirror, offered to the young woman by her old servant as an instrument of vanity (right side of the canvas), and a convex reflecting surface (left side). The painting is kept by the Corsini Gallery, in Rome.

Figure 2. Angelo Caroselli, Vanità.

This painting is not the only example in which conversion and its paradoxical structure is represented through the paradoxical cultural dynamics of a mirror. Artemisia's *Conversione della Maddalena* was painted between 1615 and 1617. Just a few years later, in 1625, a book was published in Paris, bearing the title *Les triomphes de l'amour de Dieu en la conversion d'Hermogène*, written by the Capuchin Philippe d'Angoumois (Angoumois 1625). At the page 1170, the book contains a very interesting engraving (Fig. 3), which has been rapidly analysed by the art historian Michel Vovelle, one of the most distinguished experts of popular visual culture (Vovelle 1982).

The engraving represents a young man kneeling before an altar, who contemplates the image contained in a mirror held by an angel. The friar, who spies on the conversion from behind a column, refers to a very long iconographic tradition, according to which miracles and other marvellous events always need the presence of a hidden witness, who will be able to recount and describe what he has seen. The gar-

ments of the young man are very sumptuous, and are a customary reference to a sinful life, full of elegance and vanity. Also the posture of the convert is quite traditional, and refers plastically to both the crucifix on top of the altar and to the cross, interwoven in the altar-cloths.

Figure 3. An engraving from La conversion d'Hermogène.

The most interesting peculiarity of the scene is the mirror. Why should the flat surface held by the angel be called a mirror? Why, if it does not seem to reflect any object of the real world? Several elements can explain this phenomenon. First of all, there is a great resemblance between the converted person and the man tortured by devils in the supernatural image. Second, the angel holds this image as if he were holding a mirror, i.e. trying to enable the young man to see himself in the mirroring surface. Third, the sinner does not look into this surface as if he were observing a painting. From the way in which he bends toward the image, and looks into its depth, he seems to search for himself inside the frame, as one normally does in front of a reflecting image. In other words, in this scene of moralised narcissism, we do not perceive a reflection because there is a mirror, but we perceive a mirror because there is a reflection.

Furthermore, the way in which the sinner is tortured in the guise of his infernal alter-ego is a reference to the semiotic structure of the scene: the sinner is sawn by two monstrous devils, who propose a metaphoric image of a divided self. Again, Lotman's considerations about mirrors as cultural mechanisms are very useful: the mirror separates the young convert from the evil part of his soul.

At the same time, mirrors reflect and invert. As a consequence, they are instruments of both sameness and difference. In the two images, which we have just analysed, the reflected object and the reflected image are both equal and different. But the context of the mirror is a vehicle for a precise moral axiology: the reflected image represents an evil reality, or, as semioticians would like to define it, a "disphoric" structure. Yet now I shall slightly diverge from Lotman's consideration of mirrors, by arguing that in some texts this axiology is inverted. So, a positive connotation is attributed to the reflected image, which is seen as more perfect than the reflected object. The best example of this inversion is to be found in a text written a few years before the appearance of Artemisia Gentileschi's painting, and precisely between 1561 and 1562, when the Council of Trent had almost come to its conclusion. I am talking about the *Libro de las Misericordias del Señor, o de las grandezas del Señor*, written by saint Therese of Avila. The text was first handwritten by the saint in 1561 in order to satisfy the request of the saint's spiritual director, the Dominican friar Ibañez. Some new chapters were added in 1562. The text is now universally known as *Libro de su vida*, since it is a spiritual and mystical autobiography of saint Therese. The manuscript of this text, one of the highest achievements of Western Christian

spirituality, is still kept in the library of the Escorial, in Spain. I quote from the final chapter of the work, chapter forty:

> Once, when I was with the whole community reciting the Office, my soul became suddenly recollected, and seemed to me all bright as a mirror, clear behind, sideways, upwards, and downwards; and in the centre of it I saw Christ our Lord, as I usually see Him. It seemed to me that I saw Him distinctly in every part of my soul, and at the same time the mirror was all sculptured — I cannot explain it — in our Lord Himself by a most loving communication which I can never describe. (Teresa of Avila 1962, 341)[2]

This text contains several interesting elements. First of all, in the last sentence the saint expresses three important concepts:
(1) the relation between Jesus and herself is a relation of communication;
(2) this communication is a communication of love;
(3) this communication is ineffable (*"yo no sabré decir"*, "I shall not be able to say").

The mirror is the metaphorical device, which enables the saint to describe this communication. This time, the mirror is not pictorially, but mentally represented. The soul of Therese is like a mirror, which perfectly reflects the face of Jesus. So, the customary axiology of the mirrored image is inverted: the mirror does not entrap an evil structure, but absolute perfection. Yet, the mystical image invented by the saint is more complicated, since Jesus himself becomes a mirror, which reflects the mirror of the Saint's soul. This produces two paradoxical effects:
(1) both Jesus and the saint are simultaneously reflected and transfigured into each other;
(2) this reflection/transfiguration is infinite, like the infinite effect of mirroring produced by opposing two mirrors.

This is not the only text in which Therese of Avila uses the metaphor of the mirror. In the same chapter, she explains that sinful souls are like opaque mirrors, and that heretical souls are like a chipped mirror.

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[2] Here follows the original Spanish text: "Estando una vez en las Horas con todas, de presto se recogió mi alma, y parecióme ser como un espejo claro toda, sin haber espaldas ni lados ni alto ni bajo, que no estuviese toda clara, y en el centro de ella se me representó Cristo nuestro Señor, como lo suelo ver. Parecíame en todas las partes de mi alma le via claro, como en un espejo, y tambien este espejo, yo no sé decir cómo, se esculpia todo en el mesmo Señór, por una comunicacion, que yo no sabré decir, muy amorosa" (Theresa of Avila 1987: XL, 124).

Also, this same metaphor reappears in the final metaphor of the *Libro de su vida*, where the soul is compared to a mirroring diamond.

It is surprising to realise that the metaphor of the mirror is used in exactly the same way in a Protestant text, the *Institutio christianae religionis*, written by John Calvin a few years before the *Libro de su vida*, in Latin in 1535 and in French (*Institution de la Religion Chrétienne*) in 1541. As Éric Kayayan has pointed out in his essay *La portée épistémologique de la métaphore du miroir dans l'Institution de la Religion chrétienne de J. Calvin* (Kayayan 1997), the metaphor of the mirror is used thirty-two times in this text, and often in a way which is similar to saint Therese's, for example in the following passage: "Christ is like a mirror, in which it is convenient to contemplate our election, and in which we shall contemplate it without deceit"[3].

So, the tradition of the mirror as a cultural mechanism, which enables complex relations between identities and their boundaries to be expressed, is very long and articulated, and is relevant for two disciplines at least: anthropology and history. On the present occasion, I shall give just a few references about the most important contributions on this topic. From the anthropological point of view, the phenomena, which I have briefly analysed in my paper, have been included in the category of "portalling phenomena", i.e. the cross-culturally common mystical experiences of moving from one reality to another via a tunnel, door, aperture, hole or, of course, through a mirror (MacDonald *et al.* 1989). Literature on this topic is extensive, but a classic point of departure is the passage which Mircea Eliade wrote on mirrors in his famous book about shamanism (Eliade 1964: 153–155).

From the historical point of view, most Christian texts using the metaphor of the mirror directly or indirectly refer to Paul's famous passage on the mirror in the first letter to the Corinthians (13, 12): «For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face». The bibliography on the possible interpretations of this sentence, and on the gigantic tradition generated by it, is impressive. One of the best contributions on this topic, on which unfortunately it is impossible to dwell here, is the book by Norbert Hugedé *La métaphore du miroir dans les Epîtres de saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Norbert 1957).

The role that I think cultural semiotics should play concerning mirrors as mechanisms of identity, is to mediate between the different

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[3] "Christ donc est comme un miroir, auquel il convient contempler notre élection, et auquel nous la contemplerons sans tromperie" (Calvin 1911 [1541]: III.xxiv.5).

disciplines which study these objects, and to pinpoint what structures and representations are triggered by these fascinating metaphors. In this important activity of interdisciplinary mediation, Lotman and the school of Tartu have made a terrific contribution.

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Границы и идентичности в религиозном обращении: зеркало

Религиозное обращение производит коренную ломку границ, которыми очерчена личностная идентичность. Поэтому основной семиотической проблемой ментальной и культурной репрезентации этого религиозного феномена является одновременная передача ощущения тождества и различия, идентичности и изменения. В данной статье зеркала анализируются как культурные механизмы, которые предоставляют возможность изображениям разрешить эту парадоксальную задачу. Предпринимается более глубокий анализ нескольких религиозных текстов раннего Нового времени: картина Артемизии Джентилески, изображающая обращение Марии Магдалины; гравюра из французской книги 17-го века, представляющая обращение; фрагмент из духовной автобиографии Святой Терезы; отрывок из *Institution de la religion cretiénne* ("Наставление в христианской вере") Жана Кальвина. В заключении подчеркивается важность метафорической концепции зеркала Св. Павла для культурной истории этих объектов и предпринимается попытка определить роль, которую может играть семиотика культуры в связи с этим типом репрезентативных механизмов.

Piirid ja identiteedid religioosse pöördumise puhul: peegel

Religioosne pöördumine revolutsioneerib piirid, mis määravad isiksuse identiteedi. Seetõttu on selle religioosse fenomeni mentaalsel ja kultuurilisel representatsioonil põhiliseks semiootiliseks probleemiks samasuse ja erinevuse, identsuse ja muutuse üheaegne edasiandmine. Artiklis analüüsitakse peegleid kui kultuurimehhanisme, mis võimaldavad kujutistel lahendada seda paradoksaalset ülesannet. Põhjalikumalt vaadeldakse järgmisi varase Uusaja religioosseid tekste: Artemisia Gentileschi maal, millel on kujutatud Maria Magdalena pöördumine; gravüür XVII sajandi prantsuse raamatust; fragment Püha Theresa autobiograafiast; katkend John Calvini tekstist *Institution de la religion chrétienne*. Rõhutatakse Püha Pauluse peegli metafoorilise kontseptsiooni tähtsust nende objektide kultuurilise ajaloo jaoks ja püütakse määratleda kultuurisemiootika roll seda tüüpi representatsioonimehhanismidega seoses.

Two approaches to the myth of city foundations: Syntagmatic and paradigmatic

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Abstract. The paper discusses the myth of the founding of Vilnius as an example of a myth of city foundation. The myth has received two independent semiotic interpretations. Narrative grammar procedures are applied to the analysis of the mythical story and the semantic code generating the story in the paper "Gediminas' Dream (Lithuanian myth of city foundation: an attempt at analysis)" by Algirdas Julien Greimas (1971). The sovereignty ideology expressed in the myth, which describes religious and spiritual culture of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, is linked to the tri-functional model of the Indo-European social structure. The semantics of the Vilnius myth is seen as analogous with such Indo-European myths as king's accession to the throne and creation of a city-state. The Lithuanian myth of Vilnius is linked paradigmatically to the Indo-European mythology in the study "Vilnius, Wilno, Vil'na: City and myth" by Vladimir Toporov (1980). At the level of the signifier, phonological equivalents of toponyms of Vilnius are traced. At the level of the signified, transformations of the "core" Indo-European myth are identified. The myth of the city foundation can be read both as a figurative form of cultural expression and as an ideology narrated as a plot of a story. In this view, the paradigmatic and syntagmatic approaches complement each other.

The phenomenon of the city, which appeared as a result of the neolithic revolution, marks man's transition from beyond the cosmological natural existence into the historical existence. The fragile balance of the good and the evil is replaced in the city life by a series of disjunctions and conjunctions of the individual and society. The function of city myths is to reconstruct the contract between the man, who is in charge of his own living conditions, and the transcendental Addresser, and to re-assert the victory of cosmos over chaos.

The myth of city foundation, through a historically set plot, gives a miniature model of the world. In this respect it can be regarded as the underlying political myth of a nation and can be compared with the story of the fight between Thunder and his opponent, which is regarded by Vyacheslav Ivanov and Vladimir Toporov as the core Indo-European cosmogonical myth (Ivanov, Toporov 1974: 3, 164). In the Lithuanian political mythology, this position is taken by the myth of the founding of the city of Vilnius, which was first recorded in the sixteenth century *Annals*.

Lithuanian *Annals* (Jasas 1971: 71–72) contain a story of two hunting trips of Duke Gediminas. On his first hunting trip, Gediminas leaves the Old Capital Kernavė and finds himself in an oak forest on a beautiful hill, where he founds a city Trakai, and where he moves the Capital. On his second hunting trip, Gediminas leaves the Capital Trakai and finds himself on a beautiful hill by the river Vilnia, where he kills a huge taurus (the hill since then has been called the Taurus Hill). Gediminas stays for the night in the Šventaragis Valley, and in his dream he sees a huge wolf standing on the Crooked Hill, and inside the wolf there could be heard a howling of a hundred of wolves. The pagan priest Lizdeika (whose name derives from the Lithuanian word *lizdas*, English *nest*, because he was found in an eagle's nest) gives an interpretation of the Gediminas' dream: the Iron Wolf means that a Capital-City will be found here, and a howling inside the wolf means that the fame of the Capital-City will spread all over the world. The next morning the Duke Gediminas builds a *Lower Castle* in the Šventaragis Valley and an *Upper Castle* on the Crooked Hill. He gives the name of Vilnius to these Castles and moves the capital to Vilnius. As the *Annals* suggest, after founding Vilnius, Gediminas ruled the Dutchy of Lithuania for many years, was a just duke, won many wars, and was a happy ruler until his old age.

Another version of the myth, with a broader historical and religious commentary, is offered by the Polish chronicler Maciej Stryjkowski (1846: 369–373). In his story about the increasing worshiping of gods in the newly-founded Capital-City, he identifies three key places of cult. The first one is in the Šventaragis Valley, where eternal fire is burned by the mythical *Šventaragis*, the first Grand Duke of the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania, who established the custom of burning bodies of the deceased. This cult is compared by Stryjkowski to the cult of the temple of Vesta in Rome. The second one is the place of cult of the Fire of *Perkūnas* established by Gediminas. According to Stryjkowski, he "built a monument for Perkūnas: a figure, holding in

his hand a huge piece of flintstone with which priests produced fire; the eternal fire sacrificed to him was burned day at night and kindled with oak wood." The third place of worship set up by Gediminas is on the outskirts of the city: Gediminas "gives the dark forests to the gods and, following the pagan custom, inhabits them with priests so that they could pray for the souls of the dukes and breed and feed the Snakes as the gods of the Home". Lizdeika is announced the Chief Pagan Bishop of all the cults.

The myth of Vilnius foundation has received two independent semiotic interpretations. The first, an article by Algirdas Julien Greimas entitled "Gediminas' Dream (Lithuanian myth of city foundation: an attempt at analysis)", written in French in about 1971, has remained in its manuscript form. The Lithuanian translation of the article was published in 1998 (Greimas 1998). The second one, a study by Vladimir Toporov entitled "*Vilnius, Wilno, Vil'na*: the city and the myth", was published in 1980 (Toporov 1980). Greimas, at the time of writing this article, was not familiar with Ivanov and Toporov's investigations of Baltic and Slavic mythology. Toporov, in his own turn, was not familiar with Greimas' manuscript.

In Toporov's analysis, the point of departure is binary spacial opposition which correlates with value oppositions of *life* vs *death* and *sacral* vs *profane*. The historical existence of the city is given significance through the "heavenly blessing from the above and the blessing from down below in the valley". Toporov sees the myth of city foundation as a transformed version of the cosmogonical myth. In this view, positive forces from "the above" are associated with the god *Perkūnas*, the taurus, the horn, and the eagle; negative forces from the "down below" are associated with the opponent of *Perkūnas*, which in the myth appears as the Snake and the *Velnias* (the pagan ruler of the Underworld) as well as the element of water. The figure of the Wolf performs the function of the mediator. As a chtonic animal, the Wolf is associated with the bottom of hill (this is supported by the toponymy of Vilnius) and is opposed to the Eagle. However, in Gediminas' dream, the Iron Wolf appears at the top of the hill and thus signifies the military sovereignty protected by god *Perkūnas*.

Gediminas is seen by Toporov as an epic transformation of *Perkūnas*, and the blacksmiths who made the Iron Wolf are seen as the workmen of *Perkūnas*. In the value opposition of *above* vs *down below*, the role of the opponent of *Perkūnas* is given to the river *Vilnia*, which is compared to a wrigling snake. According to the logic of the myth (Thunder strikes dragon or the snake and kills it), the hero

who destroys the monster is the founder of a city (a new universe) and the creator of Cosmos out of Chaos. The river-snake analogue is also traced in reference to the Snakes which are worshipped by priests in dark forests.

Toporov looks for phonological counterparts of Vilnius toponymy in the mythological Indo-European terms. In the Indo-European root *vel-, from which the name of the river (*Vilnia*) and the city (*Vilnius*) derives, two semantic poles are identified: "the down below", chtonic, death vs "the abow", life, fertility, power. A mythical mediation of meaning takes place between these two poles.

The motif of the twins, characteristic of city foundation myths, is traced by Toporov in the double name of pagan priest *Krivè-Krivaitis*. A hypothesis is made that a double name indicates the presence of a twin-brother who was sacrificed in the name of the city. The pattern of twins is applied in order to reconstruct the social structure of the prehistoric Vilnius. A Slavic element is discerned in the toponymy of Vilnius, which is identified in the root of the word *Krivis*. It is linked by Toporov to the semantics and the magic function of *kreivas* (crooked) and *kairys* (left-handed). In the Vilnius myth, Toporov sees a synthesis of two opposite ethnic and social elements.

Algirdas Greimas in his analysis of the Vilnius myth, applies procedures of narrative grammar. The duplification of hero's departure and quest is considered to be a specific feature of the Vilnius story. The first trip resulting in the foundation of Trakai turns out to be insufficient. The second trip — the foundation of Vilnius — is successful due to an embedded sequence related to events such as the hunting of Taurus and the dream of Gediminas. The successful hunt of Taurus is interpreted as the *qualifying test* of the hero. The dream of Gediminas, as a message sent by the gods predicts the *decisive test*, that is, the founding of the city, and the *glorifying test*, that is, the future glory of Vilnius. The quest of the city founder turns out to be a quest for a contract with the gods.

The modal structure of the Lithuanian myth distinguishes it from analogical Indian or Roman myths, where the implicit approval of the gods is prior to the contract between the ruler and the nation. As he departs, Gediminas is already a sovereign. He founds the city of Trakai by his pragmatic *power* of an earthly ruler. But only through the hunting of the Taurus, the founder of Vilnius acquires the cognitive competence of the divine *knowing*.

The ideological content of the myth is discussed by Greimas in two respects: as the king's accession to the throne and as the creation of

the City-State. This distinction of the ideological content is evident in the distinction between the mythical figures: Greimas perceives the figurative language of the myth as a compromise between the individual freedom and the social need for communication (Greimas 1990: 30).

Greimas does not rely on the phonological counterparts and, therefore, looks for parallels between Lithuanian myths and the analogous Indo–European myths at the level of the signified. The thematic value of the *Taurus* figure is compared to the *Iron Cow* in a Lithuanian magic tale, as well as to the counterpart figures in the Roman myths (the *Imperial Cow*), the Indian myths (the *Cow of Plenty*), the Irish myths (the *Wooden Cow* of King Bress), all of which signify recognition of the King or disqualification of the King.

The figure of the *Iron Wolf* embodies the power of the future capital. It can be compared to the Roman *She-Wolf* who fed the future founders of the city. The change of the gender of the Wolf and the epithet "iron", which reminds us of the *Iron Cow* of the Lithuanian magic tale, implies that the *Iron Wolf* is not a simple genetic borrowing.

Like Toporov, Greimas recognizes a trace of the Twins myth in the Vilnius myth, but he gives it a syntagmatic interpretation. To give a mythical justification to the sovereignty of the ruler, it is necessary to have two brothers who are foundlings (this marks a new beginning) and one of whom is murdered to leave a "sole" ruler. In the Vilnius story, the mythical twin-brother of Gediminas is the pagan priest Lizdeika who was found in an eagle's nest, by the Duke Vytenis who brought him up like his own son. In the *Annals*, Gediminas is considered to be Vytenis' son. The motif of murder appears in the "Polish Chronicle" by Miechowita, which holds that Gediminas was Vytenis' horse–groom and that he came to power by killing his master. The two different versions of the myth, regardless of the "historical truth", appropriate patches of the "mythical truth" each in their own way.

According to Greimas, the meanings of the Vilnius story are articulated by crossing binary structures, characteristic of mythical reasoning and tri-partite division characteristic of the form of mythical narrative. The tri-partite division is established by the three marked narrative spaces (two hills and one valley), three mythical events (the hunting of the Taurus, the dream of Gediminas and the appearance of the Iron Wolf), and three places of cult within the boundaries of Vilnius. The binary structure, supported by the historical elements and

the narrative elements does not overshadow the tri-partite justification of the Holiness.

In the structure of the Baltic religion, Greimas recognizes a modified, tri-functional model of the Indo–European social structure. In his mythological research, the first function of Dumézil is divided into an independent *juridical sovereignty* (which takes the domain of the third function, that of wealth, fertility and health), and a *magical sovereignty*. Only the second — *military* — *function* retains its traditional mode (Greimas 1985: 129–135).

In the Vilnius myth, the heavenly *juridical sovereignty* is linked by Greimas to the God Moon who is later treated as a degraded form of *Andojas*, the ruler of the Water World, the real world. The God Moon's cult is practiced by the priests, aboding in the dark forest and protecting the Snakes. The *magical sovereignty* is linked to the cult of Eternal Fire in the Šventaragis Valley. Greimas discerns the figure of the underworld god *Velnias*, who is counterpart of Christian Devil, or the figure of *Kalvis* (Blacksmith), Lithuanian Volcano who replaced *Velnias* after the religious revolution (which established the sacrificial burning of the deceased bodies). (Blacksmiths, as suggested above, are considered by Toporov as workmen of *Perkūnas*). The *military function* is ascribed by Greimas, as well as Toporov, to *Perkūnas* whose cult was established by Gediminas.

The primary elements, *water* and *fire*, fall into tri-partite distinction as well. Linked to the spacial opposition of *above* vs *down below*, they are divided into *high waters* vs *low waters* and *high fire* vs *low fire*. All the waters belong to the domain of the Moon, therefore, *high waters* and *low waters* co-exist in harmony and cooperation. Whereas *high fire*, which belongs to the domain of Perkūnas, and *low fire*, which belongs to the domain of the Underworld Ruler, are in opposition and cannot be reconciled. Within the semiotic square, the Moon and the *Perkūnas* (which substitute one another) are seen in a relation of contrariety, while the *Velnias* and the *Perkūnas* (which annihilate one another) are seen in a relation of contradiction.

In terms of human powers, the *juridical sovereignty* is represented by Gediminas. The *Annals* describe him as a just Duke who ruled happily until his old days. Greimas, following Dumézil, ascribes the mythical Gediminas to the Lunar dynasties and opposes him to the Solar dynasties which include rulers living in "fury and blood". The *military sovereignty* is ascribed by the *Annals* to the mythical Goštautas whose name suggests that he ruled the nation (Lith. *gožti*

means to rule). The *magical sovereignty* and the cult of Underworld God is represented by Lizdeika.

The Vilnius myth found its way into the *Annals* and became popular most likely because it was in line with the political ideology of the 16th century Lithuanian nobility who tried to retain their power and independence. Moreover the writers of the *Annals*, allthough they were Christians, unconsciously recorded the pagan religious ideology which was alien to them. Within this ideology, Gediminas' sovereignty is a direct expression of the will of the old gods. A special attention paid by Gediminas to the caste of pagan priests demonstrates his efforts to establish a high status of the old religion after the religious and political unrest in the second half of the 13th century. In this respect, Greimas compares Gediminas myth to Indian and Roman myths, where founders of new kingdoms blame their predecessors for "destroying the castes" and breaching the rights of the religious class.

In their analyses of the same texts, Toporov and Greimas reach different conclusions. Binary classificatory logic enables Toporov to identify in the Lithuanian myth universal symbolic configurations, modelling the world structure and producing its various transformations. The Vilnius myth is read as a permanent struggle between Cosmos and Chaos and as a continuous chain of deaths and births. The events of earthly life find their reflection in the transcendental world, which has at its center the figure of *Perkūnas* — advocate of change and the keeper of the cosmic order. Gediminas appears as a wordly counterpart of *Perkūnas*, Lizdeika — as a pagan priest of *Perkūnas*, and the Taurus and Iron Wolf appear as zoomorphic metonyms of *Perkūnas*. This reading gives the myth features of a piece of art and produces a deep aesthetic impression. Binary logic is more difficult to apply to the historical epochs which are characterized by competition of various ideological forms. The presence of two ethnic entities in the prehistory of Vilnius, reconstructed by Toporov by linguistic instruments, is highly probable. However, what does it mean within the ideology of the myth?

Greimas approaches the myth of Vilnius as a syntagmatic narrative with a marked beginning and a marked ending. He combines the binary principle with tri-partite structure of the old Lithuanian religion. This radically changes the functions of both transcendental deities and their earthly counterparts. The militant *Perkūnas* ceases to be the only heavenly sovereign and gives the duty of protecting the founder of Vilnius to the deity of *juridical sovereignty*. The role of the earthly counterpart of Perkūnas is given to *Goštautas* (who was of no

interest to Toporov). An independent type of *magical sovereignty*, is represented by the pagan priest Lizdeika. The Indo-European context of Vilnius myth is described at the level of the signified, rather than at the level of the signifier. Figures are identified which in Indian, Roman and Germanic myths manifest the ideology of the king's accession to the throne and the power of the city.

Despite their common semiotic orientation, Toporov and Greimas use different methodological approaches. Behind the logic of binary classification is the view of mythology as an articulation of the general cultural philosophy. This view was established and developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss. In his analysis of mythologies of archaic communities, he discerns axiological systems and distinguishes basic oppositions, in terms of which a community reflects its own culture (Lévi-Strauss 1964–1971). On the other hand the approach to mythology as a syntactic articulation of values is linked to the name of Georges Dumézil. In his analysis of relatively developed Indo-European class communities, he looks in their myths, for an ideology, which enables the community to understand itself and its contradictory founding forces, as well as the relationship between the earthly sovereign and the godly one (Dumézil 1986). In this view, myth appears as an actant structure, which actualizes the values selected from a virtual axiological system and which gives these values a figurative form.

Lithuanian mythology can be read both paradigmatically, in the "American-Indian" way (following Lévi-Strauss), and syntagmatically, in the "Roman" way (according to Dumézil). From the ethnographic materials collected in the 19th century, mythologists are trying to reconstruct the customs and rituals, characteristic of a closed, archaic, rural community, and the relics of old beliefs covered by a Christian film of dust. However, there exists another layer of Lithuanian mythology, recorded in relatively few written sources of earlier times, which represents a religion practiced by a united Lithuanian community before the adoption of Christianity. This ideology of sovereignty, solid and stiff is likely to account for the expansion of the Lithuanian State in the 13th–14th centuries, something, which cannot be explained either by demographic or economic reasons.

Taking only one of the two methodological approaches makes it hardly possible to reconstruct a totality of the mythological images, of specific historical epoch, a totality which consists of contradictory heterogeneous elements. It is important to describe the ideology and culture of any historical epoch, as an autonomous semantic world. The

myth of the city foundation can be read both as a figurative form of cultural expression and as an ideology narrated as a plot of a story. In this view, the paradigmatic and syntagmatic approaches complement each other.

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Два подхода к мифу об основании города: синтагматика и парадигматика

В данной статье миф о создании Вильнюса рассматривается как образец мифа об основании города. Этот миф стал предметом двух самостоятельных семиотических интерпретаций. Альгирдас Жюльен Греймас в статье «Сон Гедиминаса (литовский миф об основании города: попытка анализа)» (1971) применяя процедуры нарративной грамматики раскрывает семантический код, генерирующий мифическое повествование. Миф, преставляющий религиозную и духовную культуру Великого Княжества Литовского, выражает идеологию суверенности, соотносимую с трехфункциональной моделью индоевропейской социальной структуры. Семантика Вильнюсского мифа сопоставляется с семантикой индоевропейских мифов, рассказывающих о восхождении короля на престол и о сотворении города-государства. В исследовании Владимира Николаевича Топорова «Vilnius, Wilno, Вильна: город и миф» (1980)

миф о создании Вильнюса соотносится с индоевропейской мифологией парадигматически. На уровне сигнификантов прослеживаются фонологические эквиваленты Вильнюских топонимов. На уровне сигнификатов отмечается трансформация «основного» индоевропейского мифа. Миф о создании города можно читать либо как фигуративную форму выражения культуры, либо как идеологию, поданную в форме повествования фабульной истории. В этом смысле парадигматический и синтагматический подходы дополняют друг друга.

Kaks lähenemist linnaloomise müüdile: süntagmaatika ja paradigmaatika

Müüti Vilniuse loomisest vaadeldakse siin kui linnaloomise tüüpmüüti. Seda müüti on käsitletud kahes iseseisvas semiootilises interpretatsioonis. Algirdas Greimas toob artiklis "Gediminase uni (leedu linnaloomismüüt: analüüsi katse)" (1971) narratiivse grammatika protseduure kasutades välja müütilist jutustust genereeriva semantilise koodi. Müüt, mis esindab Leedu Suurvürstiriigi religioosset ja vaimset kultuuri, väljendab suveräänsuse ideoloogiat, mis on ühildatav indoeuroopa sotsiaalse struktuuri kolmfunktsionaalse mudeliga. Vilniuse müüdi semantikat võrreldakse indoeuroopa müütide, mis jutustavad kuninga troonile asumisest ja linnriigi loomisest, semantikaga. Vladimir Toporovi uurimuses "Vilnius, Vilno, Vilna: linn ja müüt" (1980) seostatakse Vilniuse loomismüüti indoeuroopa mütoloogiaga paradigmaatiliselt. Tähistajate tasandil on jälgitavad Vilniuse toponüümide fonoloogilised ekvivalendid. Tähistatavate tasandil märgitakse ära indoeuroopa "põhimüüdi" transformatsioon. Linnaloomismüüti võib lugeda kui figuratiivset kultuuri väljendusvormi või kui ideoloogiat, mis on esitatud faabulaga loo jutustavas vormis. Selles mõttes täiendavad paradigmaatiline ja süntagmaatiline lähenemine teineteist.

Atomistic versus holistic semiotics

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Abstract. The paper is devoted on the foundations of semiotics. It examines the specific features of Peircean and Saussurean traditions and demonstrates that the basis of all the differences is the different conception of the nature of sign: Peirce proceeds from the substitutive concept, Saussure from the bilateral one. The substitutive construction is atomistic by its nature: it is based on a (single) sign which replaces a (single) object, while bilateral is holistic: it is based on the sign system which is divided into (single) signs. The differences of semiosis in atomistic and holistic approach will be pointed out.

Our conference consists of two main sections, one of them is more focussed on the semiotical theory, the other concentrates on Russian culture and literature. Therefore I have to keep in mind both the problematics, yet it will inevitably cause difficulties, since I have to tack between the so-to-say Scylla of banality and Charybdis of excessive specificity. The compromise will probably not satisfy anybody. My solution is that I try to illustrate some of the statements in the sphere of general semiotics with examples from, above all, Russian poetical culture, and, thus, I must apologize to semioticians for the retelling quite known statements and to theorists of Russian literature for the triviality of examples.

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When we observe the development of semiotic studies during the last 50 years, then, on the one hand, we can not disregard an enormous amount of practical researches, processing of a great scope of materials, but, on the other hand, an obvious stagnation in the sphere of semiotic theory. Moreover, when we compare the present situation

with that of the beginning of the 20th century, the theory of semiotics seems to face now even bigger obstacles. Peirce's outstanding contribution to the clarification of the nature of semiosis and systematization the types of signs and Saussure's prophetic intuitions in semiology did not yet meet with an actual material, which not only resists given approaches, but to a certain extent even contradicts them. The situation is even more complicated by the fact that schools which pursue their activities under the general heading of semiotics differ from each other not in details, but in their basics and it is almost impossible to find a compromise or common part between them.

Above all, we should distinguish the Peircean and Saussurean traditions. At first sight it seems that the contributions of the abovementioned scholars are not comparable to one another at all. Against Peirce's detailed, accurate and, last, but not least, extremely capacious treatment of signs we could counterpoise a few dozen of pages of Saussure's quite vague lines of thoughts, which, all the more, sometimes contradict one another. Wouldn't it be more expedient, then, to forget Saussure at all, as some of the Peirce's followers earnestly suggest? E.g., when I tried to discuss with Roberta Kevelson the problem of the arbitrarity of sign in Peircean and Saussurean works, then, regrettably, the discussion did not work out, since all my attempts ended with Roberta Kevelson's verdict: if Saussure had thought it through more carefully, then he wouldn't have said what he said, but would have understood that things are like Peirce has said. Thomas Sebeok was even more resolved in this matter. Even in his public lecture he expressed the differences between Saussure and Peirce, roughly, in the following way: if Saussure had drunk less, then he wouldn't have written all these obscure things and would have come to the ideas which can be found in Peirce's works. We can find variations in this theme in several other scholars, of which Roman Jakobson should be especially mentioned, because he was very close to the Saussurean tradition in 1930s, but later resolutely crossed over to the Peirce's paradigm.

As for my opinion, then I am absolutely convinced, that even if Saussure (who, by the way, was not a drunkard at all) had completely given up alcohol, he still wouldn't have reached the Peirce's concepts and even if Peirce had drunk a couple of bottles of wine everyday and used other mental stimulations as well, he still wouldn't have reached those, in my opinion, extremely important ideas which Saussure tried to express.

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Peirce's approach to signs could be called atomistic. In the centre of attention there is a (single) sign. From the standpoint of the Peircean semiotics, sign is elementary and, semiotically, the smallest element. Since the whole construction of semiotics depends on what sign is, he payed so much attention to the exact description of sign. There are 88 definitions of sign in Peirce's works which, in essence, are all variations in the same theme. The most famous of them is the following: "A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (2, 228).

Although the definition of sign is in both Peirce's and Morris' studies purely relativistic (the sign is formed by the system of relations), nevertheless, sign is semiotically an elementary object, it does not consist of any smaller components. I would like to emphasize that I mean namely semiotical, not, e.g., physical elementarity. Since sign can be any object (something), then it could have a quite complicated structure, but, semiotically, it is still elementary; it does not consist of smaller semiotically relevant components. Single signs constitute complex signs, expressions which in sum form a language. When, e.g., Noam Chomsky defined language as a complex of grammatically correct sentences (Chomsky 1957), then, without referring to Peirce, he proceeded from the same point of view. An utterance, as well as a language as a whole are in comparison with a single sign secondary and a lot more complicated objects. E.g., in generative grammar and studies close to this approach language is defined in the following way: $L = \{A, G\}$, where A is alphabet or lexicon $A = \{a_1, a_2, ..., a_n\}$ and G is grammar or the set of rules $G = \{r_1, r_2, ..., r_m\}$. Hence, a lexicon, which we could conceive, e.g., in the case of a natural language as a scope of linguistic signs, is closed and primary, while a language as a whole is open and secondary. Therefore, we should not wonder that for Peirce, language is in comparison with sign far less an important phenomenon: the correct description of signs guarantees the correct description of language.

Such treatment seems to be simple and logical. When we now turn to Saussure, then we notice a completely different and strange logic. For Saussure, an isolated sign does not exist at all. From his viewpoint the whole scheme of Peirce's semiotics is incorrect, a sign is formed not by its relation to an object or a user of sign, but with other signs which belong to the same sign system. Here we are dealing with an obvious paradox. The precondition of signs are other signs,

moreover, a sign system, a language, to where it belongs. Peirce's single sign is something clear and accurately defined, while language, being formed of signs, is in a way indefinite formation, at least a lot more complicated than sign. For Saussure, it is vice versa: language is a primary reality, with the clear structure which is divided into single signs with not so clear or elementary nature. Up to now, this fundamental fact, that for Peirce and Saussure, one and the same word 'sign' designates completely different objects, has not been explicitly pointed out. For Peirce, sign is a concrete object, it is a substitute which replaces another concrete object (I would rather not get into an argument now, whether such sign as 'abstract' is concrete or not, it is enough to point out, that, in my opinion, we are dealing in such cases as well with concrete objects and signs), for Saussure, sign is an abstract object which is realized in a concrete substance, and, what is most interesting, this realization in a way compromises its semiotic nature: the sign realized in speech is not, literally, a sign at all.

As it is known, Saussure divides the sphere of language (*langage*) into a language itself (*langue*) and speech (*parole*). In such distinction two circumstances seem to be the most important. First, language is an abstract system which is primary with regard to speech. Language is represented in speech, whereby in the latter only how and to what extent it realizes the structure of language is linguistically relevant.[1] Secondly, only language (and not speech) constitutes a sign system. The latter seems to be especially paradoxical: the speech signals (not only the single sounds, but full sentences as well) which are said and sensed are not signs by itself, they only represent signs of language. This can be expressed with the scheme on Fig. 1.

Figure 1. Saussure's concept of language and speech (reconstruction).

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[1] Saussure emphasizes it categorically: "As for all the other elements of speech activity, then linguistics could completely do without them" (Saussure 1982, 31).

For Saussure, there is no direct connection between the conceptual sphere and the voiced speech, between thought and acoustic matter, they are only related to each other indirectly, due to the fact that they both realize signs of language. The central part in this scheme belongs to the relationship which connects the signifier and the signified of a sign (later Louis Hjelmslev calls this relationship the sign function). Although usually there is no treatment of semiosis in the Saussurean tradition and this term is not in use, we could still say that namely the sign function is the basis for the formation of sign (i.e. semiosis). Hence, differently from that of Peirce, Saussure's sign is, first, abstract and, secondly, complex. The central problem of Saussure's semiotics is the relationship between the signifier and signified. To characterize the relationship between the signifier and signified, Saussure offers a scheme (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. The relationship between the signifier and signified, according to Saussure (1982: 158).

Saussure emphasizes two things: first, the symmetry of signifier and signified and that one can not exist without another, and secondly, the arbitrarity of their relationship. It seems that here we are dealing with an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, the sign of language is something certain, being determined by the system of language, on the other hand, the relationship between the components of sign is fully optional, arbitrary. To solve this dilemma, Saussure distinguishes meaning and value (*valuer*). Arbitrarity characterizes the meaning of sign, the absolute determination characterizes the value of it. Meaning arises from the relationship between the signifier and signified, value characterizes the position of an element in a system, i.e. value is the complex of all the internal connections of the given element in the given sign system. Saussure has illustrated this statement by a scheme (Fig. 3).

Figure 3. Value as the position of an element in a system (Saussure 1982: 159).

At the same time, Saussure emphasizes that the connections, which connect different signs, differ, in principle, from those, which create the correspondence between the signifier and signified: the connections, which connect signs, have determinative nature. The most problematical is here the linear alignment of signs. Probably we should not pay too much attention to it, since, obviously, we are dealing with the inertia of the linearity of speech.

Hence, differently from Peirce, for Saussure the proceeding-point is language and its structure which, to his mind, are fully clear and fixed, while the single elements of language, incl. the question of the sign of language, are problematical. While we called the Peircean approach to semiotics atomistic, then the Saussurean approach should be called holistic. The subsequent studies in the sphere of the semiotics of language showed that the Saussurean approach, regardless of its above-discussed paradoxicality, appears to be far more powerful and productive. One of the examples is the problem of meaning of grammatical categories. Especially remarkable is that the contemporary formulation was given to this problem by an outstanding American linguist Edward Sapir, who, as it is known, was not the direct follower of Saussure. Nevertheless, his conception of grammatical categories has been developed in the Saussurean, i.e. in the holistic spirit (Sapir 1921; also Whorf 1945). The complex of grammatical categories is one of the most important parameters of the description of language. These are individual for every language and what functions as a grammatical category in one language, does not have to do so in another language. E.g., the Estonian language in comparison with Indo-European languages "lacks" the categories of grammatical gender or future tense. This "lacking" can not be explained in Peircean terms through the relationship between the object and interpreter of sign, it is a parameter which characterizes the Estonian language as a whole. This "lacking" can be discovered only if we compare the Estonian language as a whole with some other language.

At the same time, Sapir shows the semiotic nature of grammatical categories. These are not only the schemes of conjugation or declination, but the conceptual network with which language creates its own world-view. It is a very important fact: at least part of the signs of language is not given in advance, but at the same time they are not an open set, as, e.g., words in a lexicon; grammatical categories are the signs which clearly represent the Saussurean *valeur*.

Proceeding from his idea of sign, Peirce creates a rather complicated typology of signs, of which the most important part constitutes what Peirce himself call the second trichotomy of sign: the iconic, indexical and symbolic signs. The basis of this classification is the nature of connections between signs and objects signified by them. When we approach this problem in the Saussurean spirit, then we have to mention that all what is discussed by Peirce, characterizes not language, but speech; the signs of language, in Saussure's opinion, are of the same type. As it was pointed out by Jerzy Pelc in a paper exclusively devoted to this problem, when we speak of iconic signs, it would be more correct to speak of the iconical usage of a sign, i.e. iconicity evolves in speech (Pelc 1986). Proceeding from the analysis of language by Charles Bally and especially Emile Benveniste, we could most certainly assert that the same applies to the indexical signs as well: there is no indexicality in language, it evolves in speech, in every certain speech act (Bally 1965, Benveniste 1966). But it would be inconsiderate to conclude, as does, e.g., Roman Jakobson, that only symbolic signs can be found in language, since symbolic signs can not exist without icons and indexes. What I intend to say, is that all the Peircean types of signs characterize only speech, as for the signs of language, then they are based on a principally different logic, which is grounded on the values of sign, not on its connections with objects.

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In comparison with natural language, the problem of sign is a lot more acute in these semiotic systems that in Tartu-Moscow semiotics are called secondary modelling systems. While in the case of language the intuitive concept of sign is somehow related to word, then in these systems it is often not clear even in intuitive level, what sign is.

Let us take, for example, poetry. On the one hand, a poetical text consists of words and sentences, e.g., of elements which have a status of sign in natural language as well. On the other hand, it is obvious, that, first, the problems of poetical signs are not solved with it, there

are several other elements which are connected with the semantics of text (verse metre, rhythm, rhyme, alliteration, etc), secondly, elements, which can be found also in language, in poetry as compared with prose text mean something else and do it in a different way. Michael Riffaterre even says:

> The language of poetry differs from common linguistic usage — this much the most unsophisticated reader senses instinctively. [...] To put it simply, a poem says one thing and means another. (Riffaterre 1978: 1)

Although this formulation seems simplified and overbidding: poetical text can be very straightforward in its expression, nevertheless, it is not necessarily always so and semiosis of verse has its own important specific features, Riffaterre refers to an actual problem, the more correct formulation of which is as follows: why can the same words and sentences mean something else and more in poetry in comparison with prose? Since everything that creates a semantic effect should have a status of sign, then a question arises: what is sign in verse?

Atomistic point of view offers here two alternatives, of which one could be called reductionistic, the other pansemantic. The reductionistic approach reduces all the elements of verse to natural language and all meanings to the meaning of language. According to this, all the signs in verse are signs of language. The fact, that in verse text we find more images and words used in a strange way, can be explained with the means of stylistics and rhetorics, i.e. we are not dealing with specific signs, but with the specific usage of signs. As for such elements which can not be found in language, as, e.g., the already mentioned verse metre, rhyme, etc, then, first, we are not dealing here with independent elements at all, verse metre is an abstraction which can be derived from the configuration of words and other linguistic elements, secondly, they are asemantic; verse metre, stanzaic form, rhyme, alliteration, etc, do not mean anything in itself. Only the words that constitute lines, stanzas, rhymes, etc, have meaning. Thus, e.g., the researcher of Russian poetical language Viktor Grigorjev distinguishes a semantical sphere in poetical text, which corresponds to linguistical semantics, and "wrapping-material", the usage of which has no semantical meaning, they just frame and keep together the semantically relevant material (Григорьев 1983).

The pansemantic approach, on the contrary, argues that all the elements of verse text have meaning, from words to the last comma. Cf., e.g., Claude Lévi-Strauss' and Roman Jakobson's analysis of the famous Baudelaire's sonnet "Cats" (Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss 1962).

The holistic point of view, on the other hand, proceeds from the idea that elements of poetical text, their nomenclature and semantics are not given a priori nor in natural language, neither anywhere else. They are function of the given concrete poetical language. Consequently, we can not declare that all elements have always an actual meaning, or that there are elements of verse text that have no meaning under any circumstances (wrapping-material), but that all the elements are related to meaning only potentially (and the amount of elements is not determined a priori).

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Further some other examples will be examined.

One of them is the problem of film language. On the one hand, it is absolutely clear that in case of film we are dealing with a sovereign semiotic system, which has its own regularities, on the other hand, the problem of film sign is not an easy one. What is film sign? E.g., Christian Metz treats this problem in a simple way: all what we see on the screen is sign (Metz, 1974). When we see a dog, then the dog is sign, when we see the tail of a dog, then the tail of a dog is sign, when we see the tail hair of a dog, then the tail hair of a dog is sign, etc. Since the object of filming can be anything, then the amount of film signs is open and potentially infinite. This means, apropos, that film does not have its own specific language, it depends only on the type of mimesis. Film sign originates only as a result of reflecting the reality. All this resembles a lot the reductionistic approach to the problem of poetical sign, but it is even more mechanical, since here is no semiotical mediator between the world and text. We can come across such approach as well in other studies devoted to the sphere of visual semiotics. Although the title of the book by Christian Metz is *Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema*, he does not really describe film language, but only single film signs.

However, such approach seems to be rather simplified: e.g., what means 'is on the screen?' Or 'in the frame?' What is frame itself? It is obvious, that here we are not dealing with the same type of element as, e.g., the tail of a dog. Figuratively speaking, nobody goes to the movies to watch frames, but namely the tail of a dog. But the tail of a dog in a movie differs from a real tail of a dog by being placed in a frame, it has become an element of a frame. Hence, in a movie we are dealing not with a tail, but with a tail-in-frame. But a frame is one of the elements of film language, its structure characterizes the concrete film language.

Not only what is in the frame is important, but also, as well as in the case of natural language, what is outside of it. We do not see an element, but we sense its absence. It is so-to-say the Saussurean zero-sign. Consequently, we can not speak of one universal film language, but of different film languages which have complicated relationships with one another. One and the same tail in different frames can mean completely different thing, i.e. they can be different signs.

The advantages of the Saussurean approach come forth especially clearly, when we analyse the language of music. In the Peircean spirit we could mention here the onomatopoetical phenomena in music (cf, e.g., the sounds of a cuckoo or some other animal in Camille Saint-Saëns' "Carnival of the animals", etc.), these are iconic signs in music, while in the so-called concrete music, where, e.g., a horn refers to hunting, the sound of a motor-cycle to a motor-cycle, we could speak of musical indexes. However, all the rest involves major problems for the semiotic analysis: perhaps we are not dealing here with signs at all? But what is music itself? The atomistic approach could proceed, e.g., from the objective qualities of sounds and try to build up from the musical phrases. But in the Saussurean holistic spirit primary is the language of music, e.g., Arnold Schönberg's dodecaphony, while the physical qualities of sounds are of secondary importance. What is an element in the given language of music, depends on language a lot more than on the physical parameters of sound. In that spirit the problem of the musical sign should be solved as well. To Boris Gasparov's mind in the musical language of Modern Europe not single sounds or notes function as signs, but motifs. But what should be considered motifs, depends on the concrete language of music.

Up to now we proceeded only from Saussure's view-point. However, the Saussurean approach has a series of qualities, which make it inconvenient for the semiotics of culture. Here I have in mind, above all, his superior attitude towards speech and all the empirically given phenomena. The Saussurean approach is platonistic, he is first of all interested in pure ideas and language is one of these ideas.

Saussure's followers — here I mean above all the Prague Linguistic Circle, but also Émile Benveniste, Roman Jakobson and Claude Lévi-Strauss, as well as the representatives of Tartu-Moscow semiotic school — so-to-say rehabilitate speech. First, it turned out that speech has also a semiotic nature, and — what is especially important for us, this nature is not an automatic consequence of realization of the system of language. Émile Benveniste emphasizes that speech has its own semiotic qualities, which are not derived from

language (Benveniste 1966). Secondly, speech can also be a closed and stable system. Such system was to be called text. Levi-Strauss analysed the ritual and mythological text in the way Nikolai Trubetzkoy analyses the phonological system of language. In the case of artistic text, Tartu-Moscow semiotic school has achieved analogical results. Hence, text is an immanent system, the elements of text form a structure and every element of text has its own certain value.

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I would now like to return to the semiotics of verse and illustrate this statement with some examples. The length of verse is a relative parameter. An iambic tetrameter, being surrounded with dimeters, is opposed to them as long, if it is surrounded with hexameters, then as short. The length or shortness of a verse is an important parameter. In the case we are dealing with stanzas which consist of verse lines with different length, then, e.g., in Russian poetry, clearly more preferred are such stanzas which, on the one hand, begin with a longer, and, on the other hand, end with a shorter verse. Especially obvious are the preferences of a shorter verse in the last position. Usually it is interpreted as an iconic sign of completion and incompletion. A shorter verse so-to-say puts an end to a stanza. In the case we are dealing with an alternation of masculine and feminine endings, then the stanzas which begin with a feminine ending and end with a masculine ending are preferred. Such is the general tendency. But in concrete texts it enters into complicated relationship with other codes, which are realized in this text, above all, with the verbal code. As a result, a shorter verse may acquire completely another, even the opposite meaning. Hence, Nekrassov's poem devoted to Tarass Shevtshenko's death has the following ending:

Но, сократить не желая страдания,	D4	A'
Поберегло его в годы изгнания	D4	A'
Русских людей провиденье игривое.	D4	B'
Кончилось время его несчастливое,	D4	B'
Все, что он с юности ранней не видывал,	D4	C'
Милое сердцу, ему улыбнулося,	D4	D'
Тут ему бог позавидовал:	D3	C'
Жизнь оборвалася.	D2	D^2

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[2] D2, D3, D4 — mean resp. dactylic dimeter, trimeter and tetrameter; A', B', etc. — mean different dactylic rhymes.

It is a long poem, written in the dactylic tetrameter which is contrasted by two shorter final verses. The whole poem is devoted to Shevtshenko's hard fate and tragic life, only at the beginning of the final stanza there is a brighter moment which is overbalanced right away. Two final verses have the following meaning: "at this point, god envied him: / the life was interrupted". The metrical change harmonizes with the ellipticity of syntax. But for us extremely important is the last verse. Shevtshenko's life is interrupted before its so-to-say logical end and this interruption is iconically expressed by the last, twice as short a verse: "life was interrupted" seems to be an interrupted verse. Yet this poem is not that simple and the tension between the completion and incompletion is far from being solved with that: metrically unfinished verse ends the poem and its metrical incompletion is in conflict not only with the compositional, but as well with the rhyme completion. The unfinished verse has not only a verse ending, but as well the rhyme of this ending, so that we are dealing with the so-to-say completed incompletion. We find a different example from the Alexei Apuhtin's poem – a self-murderer's farewell letter. It ends in the following way:

> Пусть мой последний стих, как я, бобыль ненужный,
> Останется без рифмы...

> Let my last verse like me, an needless bachelor
> remain without a rhyme...

Here indeed the final verse is not only shorter, but differently from all the previous verses, it is also without a rhyme. It is interesting, how the meaning of the poem, its images and verse structure amplify each other. The Russian word 'бобыль' has several meanings, in the context of this poem it means, above all, a person who is not needed by anyone. One of its meanings is also 'an unmarried man'. But 'unmarried' in the Russian poetical tradition is also an unrhymed verse (although it is never designated with the word 'бобыль'). The motif of an unneeded person and the non-ended end is expressed here in three different levels.

Hence, when we are dealing with some elements of the poetical text, then we can not quite successfully analyse their meaning proceeding from atomistic ideas. The semantics of a single sign depends on the meaning of the entire text. As even these simple examples suggest, the limits of the whole text will not be sufficient, we have to treat them in wider context, considering also the entire tradition and

culture. But how would it look like in practice? How can we analyse a tradition, before we have analysed all the single authors in it and how can we treat the entire creation of an author before we have analysed all his works? It seems, that we are dealing with such problems which appear to be more complicated in the theoretical level than in the actual analysis. As it is usual in the case of humanities, we are dealing here with one hermeneutical cycle, where in analysis of single phenomena the whole is being kept in mind, and vice versa, in analysis of culture and tradition, its complexity is being considered. I will give only one example: the Russian iambic tetrameter. In the 18th century it became an official odic verse metre. In Pushkin's time both its rhythmical and semantical structure changed. After Pushkin his successors canonized the rhythm and sound of Pushkin's verse. During the last half of the 19th century its meaning became official and was associated with the golden era of Russian poetry. In the beginning of the 20th century the new sounds and rhythms evolved, whereby some of them referred to the 18th century (Mikhail Gasparov calls them archaistic — Гаспаров 1974), and some of them to the Pushkin's tradition. Andrei Belyi, an outstanding poet and scholar, opposes in his poems different rhythmical types of iambic tetrameter and gives this opposition also the meaning. It was for the first time in Russian poetry, when the different rhythmical types of one and the same verse metre were brought into consciousness and semantisized (Тарановский 1966). In the contemporary Russian iambus there can be found very different rhythmical traditions, incl. Lev Rubinshtein's, again described by Mikhail Gasparov: Rubinshtein writes as if he were the first iambic writer in Russian poetry, whereby his iambs sound completely uniambic and unpoetical (Гаспаров 2000: 313–314). In the Saussurean spirit we could here speak of the zero-sign. An iambic tetrameter designates here non-poetry. To carry out such an analysis, we must consider the tradition of the whole Russian poetical development which, thanks to Kirill Taranovsky, Mihhail Gasparov and others, for the time being, it has been accomplished to great extent.

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Conclusion. In the contemporary semiotics we can see a certain disproportion between the semiotical theory and practical results. Using the offered terms, the semiotical theory proceeds above all from the atomistic paradigm, but the most important and interesting results

from the holistic one. Consequently, the practical task, in my opinion, is to develop the holistic semiotical theory. According to my convictions, the basic concept of the holistic semiotics has to be translation. First, the typology of texts and languages which is analogical to the Peirce's typology of single signs has to be created. Secondly, the theory of mutual influences and correspondences between texts and languages has to be worked out.

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Атомистическая и холистическая семиотика

Статья посвящена основаниям семиотики. Показывается, что несмотря на ряд потыток построения синтетической теории, расхождения между пирсовской и соссюровской традициями оказываются непреодолимыми. В основе различий лежит принципиально иная концепция природы знака: для Пирса знак — объект, заменяющий другой объект, становящимся значением знака (такую концепцию знака можно назвать субститутивной), для Соссюра — значение не существует вне знака; означаемое и означающее не могут существовать друг без друга (такую концепцию можно назвать билатеральной). Субститутивная концепция является атомистической: в основе ее лежит понятие (отдельного) эмпирически данного знака, замещающего (отдельный) объект, в то время как билатеральная концепция подразумевает холизм: в основе ее лежит понятие абстрактной системы знаков, разлагаемой на отдельные знаки. В атомистической и холистической семиотиках принципиально иначе должно рассматриваться и понятие семиозиса: в атомистической семиотике в основе семиозиса лежит процесс идентификации, в холистической — трансляции (перевода в семиотическом смысле).

Atomistlik ja holistlik semiootika

Artikkel käsitleb semiootika alusküsimusi. Vaatamata reale katsetele luua sünteetiline semiootikateooria, on lahknevused Peirce'i ja Saussure'i traditsioonide vahel osutunud ületamatuteks. Nende erinevuse aluseks on põhimõtteliselt erinev märgi loomuse kontseptsioon. Peirce'i jaoks on märk objekt, mis, asendades teist objekti, saab märgi tähenduseks (seda märgikontseptsiooni võib nimetada substitutiivseks). Saussure'i jaoks tähendust väljaspool märki ei eksisteeri, tähistaja ja tähistatav ei või eksisteerida teineteiseta (seda märgikontseptsiooni võib nimetada bilateraalseks). Substitutiivne kontseptsioon on atomistlik, sest ta põhimõisteks on (üksik) empiiriliselt antud märk, mis asendab (üksikut) objekti. Bilateraalne kontseptsioon eeldab holismi, sest ta alusmõisteks on abstraktne märkide süsteem, mida saab jaotada üksikmärkideks. Atomistlikus ja holistlikus semiootikas tuleb põhimõtteliselt erinevalt vaadelda ka semioosi. Atomistlikus semiootikas on semioosi aluseks identifikatsiooniprotsess, holistlikus semiootikas aga tõlkeprotsess.

Towards the semiotics of the observer

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Abstract. The problem of the observer and point of view is examined within the broad semiological and cognitive perspective. Structuralist narratology made an attempt of a formal-linguistic classification of points of view to avoid anthropomorphic-visual connotations inherent in narratological terminology. The alternative opportunity would be the usage of terms-metaphors as theoretical models. From the point of view of the observer, the process of text generation evolves in the double space of perception/conception and interpretation. Instead of comparing different media in terms of the privileged metalanguage, it would be more fruitful to base the comparison upon their immanent cognitive characteristics.

The turn of the 20th century is traditionally seen as a period of the great modernist rupture. The break with classical models of vision occurs in different spheres of culture thanks to the invention of photography, cinema and experimentation in painting. Philosophers and art theorists relate the modernist turn to the crisis of the Cartesian observer and the system of the linear perspective the latter embodies. It is clear, for example, that, while speaking of the "denigration" of vision and the crisis of the "ocularcentrism", Martin Jay exploits a figurative meaning of "vision" (Jay 1993). In this case "vision" refers to the relationship of either the ideal subject and object of knowledge or the ideal beholder and the system of linear coordinates, i.e. to the epistemological or geometrical model based on the analytical observation. On the contrary, *subjective* vision and its bodily aspects are central within the new paradigms of knowledge that emerge in the late 19th – early 20th century. In his preface to Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies*, M. Proust writes of "'the optics of minds' which prevents us

from absorbing knowledge from others" (Shattuck 1964: 11). Thus the knowledge is seen as an outcome of subject's perceptual experience. As compared to the Cartesian rational, detached and disembodied subject, the modernist observer is actively involved in the interaction with the world and is seen as a part of reality, through which reality manifests itself. Therefore its status is ambiguous. It is, paradoxically, both an autonomous individual unity and a mobile perceptual field. Mobile strategies of observation are shaped by the permanent exchange of information between the observer and the observed. The whole "matrix of identity, predicated on the separation of the interiority of the observer from the exteriority of the object world" (McQuire 1998: 18) is called into question.

The observation is "unconscious" in the sense Derrida employs while speaking of "the fundamental *unconsciousness* of language (as rootedness within the language)" (Derrida 1997: 68). Likewise, the ordinary observer is immersed into the world, into the "sign medium" (Bakhtin-Voloshinov 1993: 17). He is "unconscious" of his own observation and involved in the process of signification as articulation of "différance", i.e. inscription of the "outside" into the "inside" and vice versa. M. Merleau-Ponty underscores an asymmetry and a split between spontaneous experience of the world and consciousness as "the absolute certainty of my existence for myself". As far as reflection goes back to the subject, "it ceases to remain part of our experience and offers, in place of an account, a reconstruction" (Merleau-Ponty 1981: ix). The notion of the "unconscious" is, of course, polysemantic. It might be understood either as a suppressed and inaccessible or as a semiactive and accessible part of experience. If Freud is inclined to use spatial metaphors and defines the "unconscious" as a locus, e.g. an ancient city or a dark chamber, William James in his "Principles of Psychology" introduces the notion of the "fringes" of attention in contradistinction to its "focus" to underscore mobility of the perceptive field. Likewise, the Lacanian definition highlights both elusiveness and the constitutive function of the unconscious as a gap between perception and consciousness, as "the place of the Other, in which the subject is constituted" (Lacan 1994: 45). The Lacanian unconscious is "not so much a position as an *edge*, the junction of division between subject and Other, a process interminably closing" (Heath 1981: 78). The observer is permanently constituted through the transformation of the border between the self and the Other.

The modernist turn leads to a new allocation of borders between art, science, technology, and everyday life. According to Mukařovsky,

"any object and process, either natural or related to human activity, may become a bearer of the aesthetic function" (Mukařovsky 1984: 38). Scientific practices overlapping with art, e.g. optics, physiology, psychology, become involved in the sphere of art and endowed with aesthetic meanings. On the one hand, the conceptual frame of the modernist art is scientific. On the other hand, the nature of it is perceptual: it is deeply involved in what and how we see (Vitz, Glimcher 1984: 7). Therefore some critics are skeptical about the very notion of the modernist revolution. On J. Crary's opinion, the myth of modernist rupture "depends fundamentally on the binary model of realism versus experimentation. That is, the essential continuity of mimetic codes is a necessary condition for the affirmation of an avant-garde breakthrough". J. Crary believes that the site where the real change occurs is the observer (Crary 1992: 4–5). 19th century empiricist psychology discloses the role of perception in the constitution of the self and works out the philosophical grounds for sensory perception. J. Ryan argues that empiricist construction of subjectivity is a challenge for modernist writers and therefore a stimulus for new linguistic and literary practices (Ryan 1991: 9–12). The progress of physiological optics in the 19th century demonstrates that the world is to a certain extent "created" by the observer: such phenomena as colours or mirror reflections are devoid of autonomous physical existence and evoked through the observer's interaction with the external world. Every act of perception changes the reality (Gibson 1940: 40). Therefore, to continue the thought, every observer is a creator of an imaginary world and thus an "artist" in its own right. M. Merleau-Ponty highlights a creative aspect of attention: attention "is neither an association of images, nor the return to itself of thought already in control of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon" (Merleau-Ponty 1981: 30). The question is how separate, partial observations are related to the continual knowledge of the world if such an integrated knowledge exists at all. The narratological problem of point of view in fiction makes part of a much broader problematics, which arises simultaneously in relativist physics, psychology, painting, cinema and literature of the modernist age: every description is related to a certain "self", the observer whose observation shapes the observed. Such notions as Walter Pater's "moment" or Joyce's "epiphany" refer to a creative perceptual act, "a particular intensity of perception in which the vanishing away is temporarily stayed", i.e. vision, which is akin to art (Ryan 1991: 28).

Modernist art is highly self-reflexive and theoretical. Properties of the fictional space, the very condition of writing and relations between the author, narrator and character are modelled and explored by means of spatio-visual tropes (screen, mirror, window, lens, etc.) common for modernist fiction and theory. The notion of the observer is the focus where different trends of modernist thought meet. The history of this notion unveils tropological connotations inherent in contemporary semiotic and narratological terminology as well as its rootedness in the practice of art, philosophy and science.

Theory of the observer. Physical (Einstein) and linguistic (Whorf) relativity calls into question existence of a unique external reality and shows that observations of different observers, who use different frames of reference, result in mutually exclusive and irreconcilable, but equally valid pictures of the universe (*Weltanschauungen*) (see, e.g., Heynick 1983 on influence of Einstein upon Whorf). R. Jakobson points out some concordances between innovation in physics, developments of linguistics and ideas of artistic, literary and scientific avant-garde of the early 20th century. According to Einstein's own acknowledgement, his acquaintance with the "situational relativity" of the Swiss linguist Winteler inspired his future work. He found in Winteler "the indissoluble interconnection of the concepts *relativity* and *invariance*" (Jakobson 1985), which would become the corner-stones of relativity theory, modern linguistics and semiotics. The difference between invariance and variability overcomes the antinomy of the internal and external experience, the intelligible and the sensible: it "does not separate two domains from each other, it divides each of them within itself" (Derrida 1997: 64). Under the influence of Platonic tradition, the sign (as the unity of the idealized material form and sense) has been seen as an invariable inner copy of the variable external reality. As Derrida shows, this naturalizing-metaphysical understanding of sign is peculiar even to Saussure despite his notion of arbitrariness. In the Peircean triadic scheme, on the contrary, "the so-called 'thing itself' is always already a *representamen* shielded from the simplicity of intuitive evidence. The *representamen* functions only by giving rise to an *interpretant* that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the move. The property of the *repre-sentamen* is to be itself and another, to be produced as a structure of reference to be separated from itself [...] The *represented* is always already a *representamen*" (Derrida 1997: 49–50). The sign is an

articulation of the border between the "internal" and the "external". There is no "unbiased" immanent perceptual data: any perception is already "the meaning, the structure, the spontaneous arrangement of parts" (Merleau-Ponty 1981 (1945): 58). As Voloshinov-Bakhtin argues, quite in Peircean spirit, the sign does not belong to the internal, intuitively grasped sameness of consciousness: it is identified through correlation with other signs. The "sign material" is a medium, in which individual consciousnesses interact (Voloshinov 1993: 17). Bakhtin has recourse to the Husserlian notions of "intersubjectivity" and "appresentation" while speaking of the author and the character relationships (Bakhtin's manuscript of the 1920s "The author and the character in aesthetic activity"; Bakhtin 1979: 7–180). Totality of my own body is outside of my field of vision: I am on the border between the visible world of objects and the world of my inner experience. To translate myself from the language of inner experience into the language of external expression I need a transparent screen of the other person's reactions (Bakhtin 1979: 26–29). The other's role is that of the author: thanks to his "surplus" of vision in respect to myself I am placed into the world as a character among the other characters (Bakhtin 1979: 30). Likewise, thanks to my "surplus" of vision, I am in the author's position in respect to others. The other is given to me as an opaque body: it is my own inner experience, which turns him into a meaningful entity. My own self is always incomplete: the other is part of my experience (Bakhtin 1979: 22–24). Bakhtin's work belongs to the phenomenological-semiological tradition that concentrates on the problem of accessibility of subjective worlds. Both Husserl's phenomenological "Ego" and Uexküll's "Umwelt" denote the world of lived experience which is opaque for the outside observer and serves as a mediator for any perception and knowledge. The "Umwelt" is, paradoxically, both a closed autonomous system and a fragment of the "outside" reality. The sign "no longer signifies an object to a subject, but it signifies the reaction of a subject to an object" (Uexküll 1984: 192). Signification is seen as the articulation of the border between the observer and the observed. The participant observation means the observer must reconstruct a situation while observing its traces in the other observer's reaction and placing himself into the other observer's position (Husserl's "appresentation"). Merleau-Ponty highlights partial opacity of "private worlds" or the worlds of lived experience (Merleau-Ponty 1987: 10).

To summarize aforementioned approaches, human behaviour and mental acts are rooted in the subjective "worlds", i.e. biological,

perceptual, linguistic cognitive spaces. Contemporary constructivist narratology focuses on the problem of subjective domains or "individual perspectives" in fiction (see Nünning 2001: 209). Yet, as we have seen, the borders of the subjective world are unstable, they are continually displaced and transgressed. In the fictional text, the function of the "observer" is *variable* in relation to the *invariable* functions of the narration/ enunciation.

The problematics of the "subjective worlds" may be traced in modernist literature as the latter takes the "perspectival" turn and focuses on the representation of other's consciousness and perceptual world. Protagonist's illness in V. Nabokov's short story "Signs and Symbols" might be understood in the light of the "Umwelten" theory as a case of expansion of the "subjective-self-world" up to the limits of the physical world. The young man is given a diagnosis of "referential mania" since everything that happens in the physical world seems to him "a veiled reference to his personality and existence": "Everything is a cipher and of everything he is the theme" (Nabokov 1995: 599). He feels himself absolutely transparent as if his inner movements would be observed and repeated in the external world. In the beginning of Proust's "Du côté de chez Swann" the narrator depicts the process of adaptation the body undergoes to accommodate the borders of the perceptual self to the room until the objects (clocks, mirrors, door-handles, etc.) become invisible since the space of the inhabitation coincides with inhabitant's inner space. Voloshinov-Bakhtin labelled modernism "relativist individualism", according to the forms of speech interference or the incorporation of the "alien word" into the author's speech (Voloshinov 1993: 31). As shown in Käte Hamburger's *Logic of Literature*, the representation of consciousness is a distinctive feature of narrative fiction in general and produces illusion of "another" reality. As modernist painting explores means of representation of illusory depth of pictorial space, likewise modernist literature focuses on exploration of the illusory depth of the represented consciousness. Individual worlds of consciousness are opaque, inaccessible for the outside observer: the omniscient narrator's direct intervention is rejected as an artificial device. Modernist literature plays up an insistent, almost paranoiac desire to know "what is inside". It either hands the narration over to the suspicious narrator who attempts to imagine and prognosticate other people's opinions and reactions or introduces multiple perspectives without a complete synthesis of auctorial omniscience. As if summarizing the modernist quest for the object of knowledge, M. Merleau-Ponty writes about a

hypothetical "absolute object" which "will have to consist of an infinite number of different perspectives compressed into a strict co-existence, and to be presented as it were to a host of eyes all engaged in one concerted act of seeing" (Merleau-Ponty 1981: 70). Further developments of the *nouveau roman* are based, on the contrary, upon the viewpoint sliding along the surface and the world's optical resistance to the observer.

Problems of fictional form and point of view are closely scrutinized in literary theory of the turn of the century. Forms of the "alien" word and indirect speech in fiction or, otherwise, of the representation of other consciousness are the touchstones, where interests of major theorists meet and clash. D. Bordwell defines the two major trends in literary theory as the mimetic 'and the diegetic approach: "Henry James and Percy Lubbock proposed that the novel be analyzed as a theatrical or pictorial representation"; "Slavic theorists began to rethink fictional prose in linguistic terms". The latter tradition persists in continental structuralism and semiotics (Foreword in: Branigan 1984: XI). However, the two trends have never been fully detached due, first, to insufficiency of only spatio-visual or only linguistic analysis of the work of fiction and, second, to the tropological (iconic) constituent of literary terminology. It is true that the Formalist theory is based upon the linguistic criteria: the artistic speech is seen as a function of the ordinary language, a "creative deformation" of the latter. A new work of art is first and foremost a new form (Shklovsky 1929: 31). However, to motivate the "content" the Formalists resort to the mimetic criterion: the "content" is defined through the generic choice (*ustanovka*) and through the transposition of non-literary generic features (e.g. these of rhetoric or documentary genres, of the anecdote, diary, letter, oral speech, etc.) into the literary system. Thus, in his article "How Gogol's *Overcoat* is made", B. Eikhenbaum analyses Gogol's *skaz* as a system of "mimetic-articulational gestures", i.e. as a transfer of oral speech forms into the written text (Eikhenbaum 1986: 46). Bakhtin approaches the "alien speech" as a site of intersubjectivity and dialogism. On his opinion, the word is originally dialogical or "double-voiced" as a reaction, a response to the other's word or reflection of it: the language lives within the dialogue (Bakhtin 1994: 396–399). V. Vinogradov occupies a middle position between the formal-linguistic and phenomenological approach. Being himself a linguist, he defends poetics from the formalist linguistic totalitarianism and criticizes Eikhenbaum's formal analysis of Gogol's *skaz*. He regards text as the integral "whole", despite involvement of

its elements in different (linguistic, cognitive, cultural, historical, etc.) contexts. Analysis proceeds from the whole to the parts (Vinogradov 1980: 94). A formalist-structuralist tinge of Vinogradov's work is counterweighted by the principles of continuity, dynamics and interference of levels of the multidimensional textual whole. Instead of the linguistic grid, to which the text is subordinated in structuralist analyses, Vinogradov's model involves mobile planes of the synchronic/diachronic, socio-cultural/individual, object (*objektnye*) / subject (*subjektnye*) forms of speech. For Vinogradov, the "alien speech" is a constructive element of textual architectonics, i.e. its composition. While highly appraising Bakhtin's analysis of the "alien speech" in fiction, Vinogradov criticized his notions of "polyphony" and "dialogism" as applied to the relations between the author/ the narrator/ the character ("plurality of equal consciousnesses with their own worlds" — Bakhtin 1994: 14). On Vinogradov's opinion, neither the character nor the narrator is ever equal to the author or able to enter the full-fledged "dialogue" with the latter: the forms of the "alien speech" are manifestations of auctorial "masks", "agents" or "actors", which all belong to the author's consciousness. The discussion on intersubjectivity vs. intertextuality of the 1960–70s takes up the old argument between linguists and phenomenologists/ semiologists. On J. Lyons' opinion, intertextuality is inevitably to be supplemented by the extratextual information:

> Such writers as Kristeva (1969) and Barthes (1970) have insisted that what is commonly referred to as intersubjectivity should be more properly described as intertextuality, in that the shared knowledge that is applied to the interpretation of text is itself the product of other texts /.../. Up to a point this is true; and especially in so far as literary texts are concerned. But not all of the intersubjective knowledge that is exploited in the interpretation of texts derives from what has been previously mentioned [...] (Lyons 1977: 672–673; Lyons refers to Kristeva's "Semiotikè" and Barthes' "S/Z").

For Vinogradov, the narrator is only a metaphor, a manifestation of the relationship between the auctorial image and the fictional world (see A. Chudakov's commentary and excerpts from Vinogradov published and unpublished works in: Vinogradov 1980: 302–303, 327). "...the author's artistic world is presented not as objectively reproduced in the verbal medium ("v slove"), but as peculiarly mirrored in the plane of narrator's subjective perception or even transfigured within a series of strange mirror reflections" (Vinogradov 1980: 42). Therefore the narrator as well as the character of *skaz*-forms is a unique blending of subjectivity and objectivity. Both are only to a

certain degree differentiated or personified, serving at the same time as "shadows" or manifestations of the higher-order subjectivity (Vinogradov 1980: 328).

The Anglo-American narratological tradition descending from H. James exploits visual metaphors (focus, reflector) to describe indirect presentation through the character's consciousness. Early Anglo-American approaches are summarized in Norman Friedman's article (Friedman 1955). Bakhtin highlighted phenomenological and semiological aspects of the "alien" speech. Vinogradov focused on the compositional as well as cultural-linguistic value of the different speech forms. In the early Anglo-American narratological tradition, the centre of gravity shifts to the accessibility of fictional knowledge. Thus, on the one side, narratology concentrates on the cognitive and linguistic aspects of the author/ narrator/ character relationships. On the other side, a strong realist bias leads to naturalization (anthropomorphization) of the narrative instances in accordance to the naïve empathic reading. The narrative text has a double status of a written text and a fictional world. Thus, literary scholars sometimes make efforts to reconstruct missing information or to find the source of narrator's knowledge on commonsense grounds, i.e. to take the author's responsibilities and to expand or supplement the text. Visual connotations of narratological metaphors lead to the equating of the "point of view" or "focus" with physical vision. H. James' prefaces, for example his famous description of the "house of fiction", are rich in visual semantics and may provoke anthropomorphization of the narrative agents. The description is, of course, a complex metaphor. There is an apt analysis of it in (Jahn 1996). M. Jahn demonstrates that H. James' "window" is above all "the viewer's "consciousness" and its construction of reality" (Jahn 1996: 252). He argues that Jamesian poetics and structuralist narratology are anthitetical as "vision-centered poetics" and "textocentered" narratology (Jahn 1996: 262). However, as we have already seen, metaphor as a cognitive model links the "ocularcentric" and "logocentric" poles of narratology and erases their antagonism.

Contemporary Foucault-influenced critics, who practice the naturalistic approach to the literary text and ignore the tropological divergence inherent in the literary terms, blame the realist author for the police control he exercises over the characters by means of "panoptical vision". As Dorrit Cohn justly observes, Foucault's power relations exist only between acting subjects or "ontological equals". Their application to the narrative instances is unmotivated. Further she

points out that panoptical vision is a means of *external* manipulation: "The guardian /.../ can only perceive his subjects' manifest behavior, which he can punish or reward" (Cohn 1995: 9, 13). However, external manipulation or physical coercion is for Foucault part of the broader process of "normalization": power structures not only control the body, but are interiorized in the subject's mind as well. Cohn's attempt to refute the notion of auctorial/ narratorial "omniscience" to show, with the aid of Genette's theory, that narration is, on the contrary, a process of "restriction" of omniscience, is not fully convincing. Genette proceeds from the idea of "complete information" (Cohn 1995:12), i.e. diegetic information or the knowledge of the fictional world as the author's/ narrator's property, which is consecutively restricted through the acts of focalization, i.e. fictional characters' perception. The scheme indeed resembles the Foucauldian picture of control, the more so that novelists themselves often playfully underscore the character's dependence on the auctorial will. If, however, to place the text into a broader author's/ reader's cognitive perspective, the fictional world as an effect of "a revelatory vision that provides imagined beings with an imagined inner life" (Cohn 1995: 13) would be a means of "appresentation", participant observation or constitution of the Other as part of the self, which should lead to the extension of the cognitive perspective and the growth of knowledge.

To avoid visual and hence anthropomorphic connotations structuralist narratology worked out several formal typologies of narrative instances. Chatman emphasizes that the narrator is not really contemplating the scene he is reporting: the narrator is "a reporter, not an "observer" of the story world in the sense of literally witnessing it" (Chatman 1990: 142). According to M. Bal, the chief originality of Genette's work consists in separating the categories of narrative instance and point of view (Bal 1991: 75). The separation is already apparent in H. James' prefaces and works by German and Russian theorists. However, the point of view and the narrative instance, being separated, are also mutually dependent: the "alien word" is "alien" being contrasted with the other's speech. It is a phenomenon denoted as speech interference (Bakhtin), alternation of object (*objektnye*) and subject (*subjektnye*) forms of speech (Vinogradov), intersection of speaker's and hearer's speech spheres or "interlinguistic" bilingualism (Uspensky). Narration and point of view are inseparable. Genette brings them apart as two independent categories of mood (distance, focalization, perspective) and voice (the narrating instance, the narrative level and time of narration).

In Genette's description, the whole "package" of narrative information is limited or shared through the introduction of narrative instances according to the narrative levels and narrator's relationship to the story. Information is channelled through zero-, internal or external focalization (Genette 1980: 189). The linguistic term "mood" is employed to define a "degree of affirmation" correspondent to each narrative instance as compared to the indicative mood of the "full" story. The term denotes an amount of information available to the narrator or the character through the acts of perception. Genette retains visual and spatial metaphors, despite his will to stick to a stricter linguistic terminology, and links focalization to visual perception. The smaller the distance, the broader the perspective, the more information available: "as the view I have of a picture depends for precision on the distance separating me from it, and for breadth on my position with respect to whatever partial observation is more or less blocking it" (Genette 1980: 162). Thus, while using the term "focalization" "to avoid visual connotations", Genette loosely employs visual and spatial connotations to explain the term. He also does not make a clear distinction between the "point of view" (the observer), "field of vision" (the observed) and "focus". If internal focalization is equal to the description of what the character sees (Genette 1980: 192), a difference between the internal and external focalization is erased (on these and other inconsistencies see: Bal 1991: 83–86; Phelan 2001: 54). Further Genette digresses from his intention to equate focalization with the observed and defines it either as an act of physical perception or as emotional attitude. If focalization is restricted to physical perception (first and foremost visual perception, but also auditory, tactile, etc.) its value is purely thematical. Genette's ultimate aim is to separate the "information" from the "interpretation" (Genette 1980: 197). Yet perception is already cognition and thus shaped by observer's subjectivity. If focalization embraces cognition (as in Rimmon-Kenan 1986, who follows in Uspensky's footsteps), the distinction between the point of view and focalization is blurred: there is no need to duplicate the term. What matters is a difference between different points of view as centers of subjectivity organizing fictional space, not a difference between the narration and focalization. In that case there is no non-focalized narrative, i.e. a narrative not tied by the point of view or alternation of point of view. The alternation is itself the constitutive basis of the compositional architectonics of the fictional text, which is not identical to Genette's hierarchy of narrative levels. A description of the *forms of relationship* between the different points

of view, or otherwise "structures of composition" (Uspensky) or "narrative patterns", are more important than the problem of holding focalization and narration apart. Sometimes the narrator's point of view dominates over the "alien speech" embedded into his speech, or, on the contrary, he lets the alien point of view dominate while using the other's word and adopting the role of the reporter or transmitter. Sometimes the two voices merge, e.g. in the narrated monologue, in the psycho-narration or when the "omniscient" author/ narrator performs the editing function (Friedman's "editorial omniscience"). Uspensky uses Friedmann's notion to explain bilingualism in "War and Peace" as edited or constructed by the author (the bad French translated into the bad Russian, the auctorial speech translated into the character's idiom or vice versa). The first-person narration with internal focalization (Defoe, Proust, Camus), where the narrator is supposed to say "not more than any of the characters knows", involves a distance (temporal, spatial, psychological, etc.) between the narrator and the character. The narration vacillates between zero- and internal focalization: it contains the signs of omniscience and at the same time includes ellipses and prolipses, i.e. withholding of information un-motivated from the viewpoint of omniscient narrator. Since Genette closely scrutinizes Proust's narration, the latter proves to be an excep-tion of every rule Genette sets. Therefore new categories (polymo-dality, pseudodiegesis) are introduced. However, as it seems, the narrative peculiarities Genette discovers in Proust are rather usual in fiction, yet the categories of mood and voice are not flexible enough to describe them. Genette's system "does not take account of all the modes of the observer's presence [...], nor does it explain the constituting of partial cognitive spaces, characterized by the presence [...] of two cognitive subjects in communication with each other" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 121).

Uspensky's work is based upon the analogy between the literary and pictorial forms: the point of view is seen as a mobile centre shaping the "natural" architectonics of the work of fiction. Uspensky was probably first to describe the function of the deictic or expressed centre of subjectivity in fiction (his "Poetics of Composition", 1970) before R. Harweg (1975) and F. K. Stanzel (1977), whom M. Fluder-nik names as A. Banfield's precursors (cf. Banfield's "empty centre"). Uspensky shows how a single word is sufficient to turn the external point of view into the internal one or vice versa ("heterodiegetic" vs. "homodiegetic" in Genette's terminology). According to F. K. Stan-zel, it is the omniscient narrator, who is provisionally localized or

"figuralized" in the fictional space. As M. Fludernik argues, it is the reader who "takes an internal position on events (as if through a witness)" (Fludernik 1998: 390–391). Uspensky is not quite consistent in his classification of such centres of subjectivity: he either characterizes them as positions provisionally assumed by the author/ narrator or calls them "*operators*" (Uspensky 1970: 115). M. Bal (1991) also follows in Uspensky's footsteps, while admitting, that "focalization" is to be understood in the broad sense as cognitive "orientation". J. Fontanille (1989) overtly refers to Uspensky in his work, where the semiotic theory and narratological developments are combined to bring the "point of view" back to its cognitive function. He criticizes Genette's "focalization" as a pure technical or rhetoric device. Fontanille proceeds from Greimas' distinction between the cognitive, pragmatic and thymic agents delegated by the enunciator to control operations of the enunciatee (the reader, the hearer). The enunciation is then both a space of realization of the semionarrative or "mise-en-discourse" structures and an intersubjective space of communication between the enunciator and the enunciatee (Fontanille 1989: 6). The observer as the enunciator's agent is, according to Greimas, a cognitive subject "to exercise the receptive and [...] interpretative doing" (Greimas& Courtés 1982: 217). Fontanille introduces the notion of the subjective space of observation, which is oriented and stratified in respect to the observer: the observer is thus a pure actant, a "conceptual focus" or a "centre of orientation", not necessarily corresponding to a person (Fontanille 1989: 7). While avoiding anthropomorphic connotations, Fontanille retains the cognitive aspect of vision. He suggests the following semiotic typology of the observers in visual and verbal arts, where the first term denotes the pure cognitive actant and the second the same actant in the pragmatic dimension, i.e. an actant responsible for the material realization of the enunciation or a *performer*: (1) focalizer/ narrator: a (non-localized and non-personified) cognitive filter; (2) spectator/ relator: endowed by minimal spatiotemporal localization, a deictic centre or a centre of subjectivity; (3) assistant/ witness (e.g., the ancient chorus): a personified non-participant; (4) assistant-participant/ witness-participant (e.g., a detective in crime fiction): the thematized observer; (5) assistant-protagonist/ witness-protagonist. Thus, semiology takes the visual metaphor of the observer (or the point of view) at its face value to employ it as a *theoretical model* (in M. Black's terminology) to draw all possible inferences and to explore parallels between observation and conceptualization. The same process is going on in cognitive

linguistics that works with the figure/ ground, scope/ focus and other spatio-visual modelling notions. R. Langacker outlines a parallelism between perception and conception and equates the "*observer*" with a *speaker*, "whose "observational" experience resides in apprehending the meaning of linguistic expression" (Langacker 2000: 204). He underscores that certain aspects of visual perception constitute conceptual capacity. The minimal meaning-generative unit consists of two observers or interlocutors, who "accommodate their divergent perspectives, and negotiate the adaptation of conventional patterns to the idiosyncratic complexity of the immediate context" (ibid, 389).

Fontanille's typology of observers restores connections between the narration and point of view and separates them along the new lines: the "observer" is a metaphor for the cognitive function of narration and thus unifies the mimetic and the diegetic aspects of the narrative text.

As for Fontanille's scheme of the cognitive stratification of space, it is mostly based on spatial criteria. There are a lot of studies based on other spatial parameters as well: a choice depends on the specific objects and tasks of a research. In the case of fiction one should take into consideration semantic stratification of the observational space or "the clustering of intonation units into larger segments that express larger coherences of information" (Chafe 1994: 29), i.e. discourse topics and figures. As Chafe argues, fictional representation takes place in double perspective: it involves a *dissociation* of the represented or extroverted consciousness and the representing or introverted consciousness, which deals with representation through the processes of remembering and imagining of the data present in the extroverted consciousness. F. Kermode describes the double process of the narrative production as "a dialogue between story and interpretation" (Kermode 1980: 86). Therefore it is reasonable to speak of the double space of *perception/ conception* and *interpretation*. The work of interpretation is part of perception: it occurs through perspectivization, i.e. interaction of cognitive spaces ("frames of reference" in B. Hrushovsky's terms; see also Nünnig 2001). Contemporary linguists use the notion of perspective as a synonym for represented consciousness (Chafe 1994: 268–269; Sanders, Redeker 1996). It would be more exact to define perspective as a relationship of the embedding consciousness' (character's/ narrator's/ author's/ reader's) "surplus" of vision to the embedded consciousness. The term "perspective", in contrast to the Bakhtinian "dialogue", underscores *directionality* of the relationship: the "surplus" of vision is a background, against

which points of view are determined as articulations of the textual/ extratextual, diegetic/ extradiegetic, fictional inside/ outside spaces.

Perspectivization could mean either a simple juxtaposition of points of view or their figurative correlation. Directionality and the interpretative relationship are characteristic of trope or figure (see an overview in Grishakova 2001). The meaning of trope is open and context-dependent: "The knowledge, corresponding to the character of the metaphorical expression, resembles the "direction" contained in the characters of indexicals like "I". Both instances of characteristic information endow their respective types with a *power* or *potential* for further, future interpretation lacked by the characters of expressions (types) that are context-*in*dependent". By that means, J. Stern argues, metaphors are never linguistic types, "but interpretations (or uses) of expression *tokens in contexts*" (Stern 2000: 269, 179). The interpretative relationship between "figure" and "context" is established through a "split reference" (R. Jakobson's term; see Ricoeur 1997: 224): a figurative expression denotes an object or phenomenon of the fictional world and at the same time refers to a broader figurative meaning of it. Ricoeur employs the term "configurational act" to denote the cognitive operation of mental synthesis or "grasping together" (*prendre-ensemble*) of the heterogeneous elements (Ricoeur 1990, 1: 66). He argues that a configurative act carries out mediation between the pre-textual cognitive schemata and the narrative. We use the term "figure" (configuration or pattern) to denote the linkage of textual and extratextual elements as a unique and open semantic form. According to J. Lotman, trope is an equivalence established between a series of discrete units (signs) and continual semantic fields (images, dreams, memory, cultural symbols, social behaviour, gestures and actions, ritual practices, etc.). It is always based on approximation and displacement since discrete and continual languages are mutually intranslatable (Lotman 1981: 10). Hence the figurative pattern is not a sum of clearly delimited semantic units, but a vague entity with fuzzy boundaries. Meanings of the configured concepts are apprehended against the background of the vague semantic fields. Another important characteristic of trope is its experiential or perceptual basis. Any metaphor, even a dead one, encloses a trace of a perceptual act, which could be activated through the further figurative interplays to shape further perceptions: "...the particular *content* of a metaphor can be said to constitute an interpretation of reality in terms of mental icons that literally allows us to *see* what is being talked about" (Danesi 1995: 266). Thus, metaphor, in its broad sense as figurative speech in

general, has aroused the interest of many modern philosophers and scientists starting from Nietzsche thanks to its ability to link the realms of "pre-cultural" and cultural experience, to introduce primary perceptions into the sphere of culture. The majority of Lakoff's examples (Lakoff&Johnson 1981) are anthropocentric metaphors, where human primary experiences with physical objects are projected upon the domain of mental and spiritual processes. G. Lakoff has shown that spatial and visual metaphors belong to the core of human experience and are primarily connected with basic orientations in physical space. In certain periods visual and spatial metaphors are especially active as filters of cultural perceptions. They fulfil the modelling function in scientific and artistic discourses and shape a new cognitive experience of the modernist age.

The field of observation in interart studies. Interart studies mostly concentrate on the problem of translation of visual languages into the verbal language and vice versa (ekphrasis, the verbal transposition of montage, the camera eye, close-up etc.). However, as it is well-known, "cinematographic" devices such as montage or close-up existed in literature before the cinema was invented. S. Eisenstein borrowed the idea of montage from "Madame Bovary". "Sergei Eisenstein's essay, "Dickens, Griffith, and the Film Today", demonstrates how Griffith found in Dickens hints for almost every one of his major innovations" (Bluestone 1971:2). Often it is difficult to distinguish between the conscious verbal transposition of cinematographic devices and the visual transposition of literary devices, on the one side, and "the impressions left by thought structures" (Mitry 2000: 17) in both visual and verbal media, on the other side. In Mitry's opinion, there exist mental structures or operations underlying verbal and visual expression. However, the ways they are translated into the verbal and visual media are different.

"For in literature we see tracking shots, pans, close-ups, and dissolves when we observe quite simply the expressions of these same forms of thought, the same rhythmic associations and the same descriptive sequences — except that the means are different, means which try to give, in a roundabout fashion, what the cinema achieves directly" (Mitry 2000: 18).

Therefore the discovery of pre-cinematic expression "in the works of Virgil, Homer, Livy, Racine, Victor Hugo, Byron" etc. is devoid of interest not only from the film point of view but from the literary point of view as well: "the basic characteristics of film expression derive

from the thought processes to which language has accustomed us" (ibid, 17). The scholar is taking a certain risk while speaking of the impact of the cinema on literature even during the cinematic era unless there is a conscious rendering of the visual elements in the verbal media, for example in works of those writers who were actively involved in cinematography and screen adaptation. However, even in this case it is sometimes difficult to separate "cine-mimetic" and literary devices. Acording to A. Appel's testimony, V. Nabokov's "Camera Obscura" was written as a film imitation (Appel 1974: 258). However, a number of novel's devices classified by G. Moses (Moses 1995: 74) as cinematic (e.g. "the articulation of settings by means of camera position", "eyeline-shots") are identical to the usual narrative techniques (description, alteration of point of view, etc.).

The montage principle in literature is the classical locus of the interart studies (e.g. Timenchik 1989, Ivanov 1988). There is also a number of less explored or even unnoticed devices of transposition, such as the reproduction of the filmic mechanism of connotation. A film pattern may be organized by a recurrent visual or an acoustic detail whose meaning "extends over the denotative meaning, but without contradicting or ignoring it" (Metz 1991: 110), for example the pince-nez of doctor Smirnov who is thrown over the board in Eisenstein's "Battleship Potemkin" or murderer's whistling in Lang's "M". The detail is neither purely conventional nor purely symbolic. The pince-nez means simultaneously the absence of doctor Smirnov and the defeat of the ruling class. According to C. Metz, a value of such detail is increased by the additional meaning it acquires in film, although what the detail symbolizes is a situation, a part of which it is: "Thus the partial arbitrariness; thus the absence of total arbitrariness" (ibid). Such are, for instance, the knife and whistling in Lang's "M". The murderer whistles a melody from "Peer Gynt". The knife is used to peel an orange or to open a letter: the audience could only guess whether the knife has another function as well. The sinister "sardinnica" (the sardine-can) in Belyi's "St.-Petersburg" (see interesting remarks upon the linkage between the explosion, eating and sneezing topics in: Tsivian 1991: 217–218), light refractions in Olesha (Michalski 2000: 224–225), the yellow post in Nabokov's "Despair", whistling and the poster in "Laughter in the Dark" ("Camera Obscura") are other examples of the index details.

However, even in the case of intermedial transposition there occurs a re-creation and a new formulation of a visual message by literary means, i.e. its translation into literary poetics. Thus, cinematic

"Aesthetik des Fiebers" recognized by the Russian Symbolists as their own literary technique (Tsivian 1991: 127–128) could be traced in Gogol's and Dostoevsky's work irrespectively of any cinematic experience. Likewise, "the Anglo-Saxon novel with its achronological constructions and variations in time and space", indebted, in Mitry's opinion, to Griffith (Mitry 2000: 98), has had such precursors as Sterne and Romantic writers. There is a permanent dialogue and exchange between visual and verbal practices. Cinematographic "Aesthetik des Fiebers" accepted by the Symbolists as a reflection of an idea of illusory and distorted material existence has been re-valued by younger modernist writers as a fantastic aspect of empirical reality, expression of its mobility and elusiveness. Technical limitations of the early cinema (trembling, flashing, twinkling) were endowed with aesthetic meanings (Tsivian 1991: 126). In the cinema of the 1910s, unclear focus was exploited as a sign of either a sad emotion or vision of a drunk or a short-sighted person who had lost his glasses. Nabokov makes aesthetic experience available for his trite protagonist ("King, Queen, Knave"): thanks to the loss of glasses Franz finds himself in the fantastic colorful world of blurred contours, which is for him a source of uncertainty and anxiety. New spectacles bring back a feeling of comfort and peace. There is a similar episode in A. Remizov's autobiographical cycle "Through the Cut Eyes" written in the 1930–40s: the short-sighted boy quits the fantastic sound- and colorful world and finds himself in the dull, mathematical reality of well-defined, colorless objects after the doctor prescribes him glasses (Remizov 2000: 61–63). In the whole these developments may be seen as reverberations of the reversed romantic topic of "magic glasses".

It is clear from the aforementioned examples that modernist visuality is not so much a revolution but rather a re-grouping of different cultural elements and their relations, actualization of elements already present in culture. According to Hugo Münsterberg, cinema is an objectification of processes of our consciousness (attention, memory function, anticipation, imagination) (Münsterberg 1970 (1916): 24). Therefore, as it seems, it would be more productive, instead of comparing literature and the cinema in terms of the privileged metalanguage (either literary or cinematographic), to focus on the cognitive functions of both media. Movement and frame are, according to many theorists, two main cinematic invariables. They correspond to the narrative, i.e. a chain of events, and frame (see Ronen 1986) in the work of fiction. In what follows we shall try to define the variable

function of the observer in relation to these two invariables in modernist film and fiction.

The mirror double: identity vs. difference. The screen world of the cinema is perceived as "another" reality, the world of doubles. Three-dimensionality of the film space is deceitful. "Nevertheless, we are never deceived; we are fully conscious of the depth and yet we do not take it for real depth"; "we have reality with all its true dimensions; and yet it keeps the fleeting, passing surface suggestion without true depth and fullness, as different from a mere picture as from a mere stage performance" (Münsterberg 1970 (1916): 23). The same conflict of perception is typical of mirror images, which are actually seen at the plate surface but perceived as being at a distance behind the glass. "In fact, the mirror image is the antithesis of reality, because it too seems to occur within a world "on the other side". And it seems this way because it does not reflect reality but a "duplicate" of reality" (Mitry 2000: 79). On the one hand, the illusory spatial depth of the cinema is analogous to the illusory depth of consciousness in the modernist literature. On the other hand, the literary romantic theme of the double who is both the "I" and the "Other" is optically renewed in the early cinema, e.g. in Méliès' trick films with doubles. However, elaboration of the "double" and "another reality" topic in both the cinema and the fantastic-realist and science fiction of the 1920–30s is built not upon the mystical connotations as in Romanticism but rather upon the properties of space and the dialectics of incomplete identity and self-identification with the mirror image. The protagonist witnesses the double, whose story unfolds in the "parallel" space. Thus, in Bulgakov's "Diavoliada", space with its multiple identical and communicating cells, duplicating surfaces, mirrors, elevators, which, like magic boxes, are capable miraculously change their content, is a double-generating medium. However, identity of the doubles is incomplete, reverse or false: Korotkov-Kolobkov (referring to "Korobkov", i.e. to match-boxes), Kalsoner the bearded vs. Kalsoner the shaved. Likewise, Nabokov's mirror texts ("The Eye", "Despair") are built upon partial or false identity of the doubles. An encounter with a cinematographic unrecognizable double is leitmotival in Nabokov's prose. Ganin can hardly recognize his "sold" shadow on the screen ("Mary"). Magda is unable to make out whether it is her or her mother's image while looking at her caricature filmic performance ("Camera Obcura"). The child on the screen turns away from his

father: the real child is already dead by the time and the film is shown to compensate for his absence ("Bend Sinister").

Movement: the natural vs. the artificial, animate vs. inanimate. E. Panofsky and other art theorists believe that pleasure of motion lies at the core of cine-psychology. S. Kracauer argues that cinematic movement is a powerful physiological stimulator for the spectator (Kracauer 1974: 217). The protagonist of Nabokov's "Laughter in the Dark" ("Kamera obskura") dreams of bringing a well-known painting to life on the screen. French theorist Elie Faure voiced a similar view on the cinema as animated painting (Iampolsky 1993: 62–63). Portraits and statues coming to life as well as moving automatons, somnambulists and the dead are thematizations of cinema as "moving pictures" and also optical actualizations of certain romantic and neo-romantic literary cliches. The FEKS studio experimentation with automatic movement is well known. One of the fathers of cinema Georges Méliès was a professional conjuror and a creator of automatons. In France, Léger and Murphy set animate as well as inanimate objects to clockwork motion in their "Ballet mécanique" (1924). Such films as "Golem", "Homunculus", "The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari" or such works of fiction as "Carpenters", "Shields (and Candles)", "The Fifth Wanderer" by Kaverin or "King, Queen, Knave" by Nabokov render an ability of artificial objects to function as the animated ones or vice versa and involve analysis of the automatic motion.

Photogenics: statics vs. dynamics. The problem of movement is closely connected with photogenics. There was an obsessive idea of the static photogenic beauty in the early cinema. Greta Garbo's face became an object of worship. In the 1920s, a new understanding of "photogenics" was introduced into cinematic discussions by articles of Louis Delluc and Jean Epstein. Delluc argues that the aim of art is taking life "by surprise", a "theft", a snapshot, not a description of a model, a pose, i.e. petrified life of a wax figure. Not a "beauty" is interesting, but expression and individuality (Kino 1988: 80–88). The protagonist of Henry James' short story "The Real Thing" is faced with similar problems. An irreproachably elegant and distinguished woman, a "real thing" with "positive stamp", suggests her sitting for his story-books illustrations and sketches to earn money. But the artist feels she would better suit for advertising purposes of "a waistcoat-maker, a hotel-keeper or a soap-vendor" (James 1976: 111). She has often been photographed because of her capacity to be always the

same, which is exactly the reason of her uselessness for sketches: she "was capable of remaining for an hour almost as motionless as if she were before a photographer's lens. /.../ I began to find her too insurmontably stiff; do what I would with it my drawing looked like a photograph or a copy of a photograph" (James 1976: 119–120). By comparison with photographic fixation of the unchanging "essences", it is a unique and elusive movement that matters in art. Likewise, art is always a sleight-of-hand, a metamorphosis, an artistic "theft" for Nabokov. Any attempt to fix life results in a dead body ("Kamera obskura", "Despair", "Lolita", etc.). The elusive or metamorphosed object and the alternating point of view are the basic mechanisms of self-reflection in modernist art.

Poetics of the contrast: "saturation" of the frame. A number of critics develops the idea of the "primitive Manicheanism" (Mitry) and the mythological character of the early cinema. The contrast of black and white is thematized in the genres of melodrama and thriller as the conflict of good and evil. Blossom of aesthetics of mystery was stimulated by the colour range of early cinema. In "The Defense" by Nabokov, these contrasts form a dense network of meanings which controls interpretive strategies: black and white (chess, cinema), good and evil (freemasonry, detective and mystery fiction). The early cinema was called "the battle of black and white" (Abel Gance's article "Le temps de l'image est venu!" translated in: Kino 1988: 65). Jacques-Bernard Brunius founded the League of black-and-white in Paris in 1927 to defend the black-and-white cinema (Kino 1988: 290).

Defamiliarization: the close-up as internal movement or deformation. The structural parallel to the close-up is "defamiliarization", or a description of unusual perception of ordinary objects and phenomena as new and strange. Tolstoy's or Montesquieu's "estranged" descriptions of stage performance as seen by children or foreigners are examples of such perceptual shift: the naïve spectator pays attention to minor and second-order details irrelevant for theatrical poetics. However, in the Formalist theory, "the device of making strange" signifies also a new constructive principle which stimulates a new mode of perception: either a new visual technique or a new trope, new type of composition, new generic principle in literature, e.g. the Sternian novel as defamiliarization and "baring of the device" in relation to the traditional novel (Hansen-Löve 2000: 245–250). The cinematic device of close-up evokes both an illusion of observer's movement and an

effect of alienation. For the unprepared or conservative spectator of early cinema, the close-up was a monstrous distortion, which turned human figures into the aliens (see Tsivian 1991: 161–163). The French theorists of the "new sensitivity" paid special attention to the magnification of a detail as a means to intensify its expression and to emphasize its significance (Kino 1988: 204). It is interesting that in the early cinema the close-up was often motivated by the optical magnification, as in G. A. Smith's films: "In *At Last, That Awful Tooth*, he justifies the close-up of a decayed tooth by first showing the patient scrutinizing his tooth through a magnifying glass. This technique was to be copied in many other films, such as *Grandma's Reading-Glass, What We See through a Telescope*, etc." (Mitry 2000: 92). Owing to strong visual component in the early 20th century culture, the visual shift may serve as a metaphor for certain literary techniques. A "strange" or "shifted" detail plays the role of the "dominant" which transfigures the whole combination or the whole field of perception (Gestalt).

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К семиотике наблюдателя

Проблема наблюдателя и точки зрения рассматривается в широкой семиологической и когнитивной перспективе. Структуралистская нарратология пыталась построить формально-лингвистическую классификацию точек зрения и таким образом избежать антропоморфно-визуальных коннотаций, присутствующих в нарратологических терминах, которые по своему происхождению являются метафорами. Другая возможность — использование терминов-метафор как теоретических моделей, с извлечением всех возможных эвристических последствий. С точки зрения наблюдателя, процесс текстопорождения происходит в двойном измерении перцепции/ концерции и интерпретации. На этой когнитивной основе возможны более широкие и продуктивные интермедиальные сравнения.

Vaatleja semiootikast

Vaatleja ja vaatepunkti probleemi vaadeldakse laias semioloogilises ja kognitiivses perspektiivis. Strukturalistlik narratoloogia püüdis luua formaal-lingvistilist vaatepunktide klassifikatsiooni, vältimaks visuaal-antropomorfseid konnotatsioone, mis kaasnevad narratoloogiliste terminitega, mis oma päritolult on metafoorid. Teine võimalus on termin-metafooride kui teoreetiliste mudelite kasutamine, koos kõigi võimalike heuristiliste tagajärgedega. Vaatleja vaatepunktist toimub tekstiloomeprotsess kahes mõõtmes — pertseptsioon/kontseptsioon ja interpretatsioon. Sellel kognitiivsel alusel on võimalikud laiemad ja produktiivsemad intermediaalsed võrdlused.

On universalism in connection with the interpretation of magic in the semiotics of Juri Lotman

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Abstract. The article examines the first phase of the universalistic interpretations in Juri Lotman's semiotics, which is characterized by holism and maximalism derived from the Saussurean cultural concept. There is an analysis of Juri Lotman's 1967 lecture, previously unpublished, where universal status is accorded to text functions (including magic functions). Such an approach is a substantial revision of the Saussurean understandings of the relationship between language and speech. This interpretation of magic is compared with the examination of the same concept in Juri Lotman's 1981 article "*Contract and self-sacrifice* as archetypical cultural models", which substantially contradicts the concept developed in his 1967 lecture. Both these magic models produce a number of objections, and apparently seem to bear the deforming traces of their respective universalistic theoretical schema.

The aim of the present article is to provide an assessment of the first phase of Juri Lotman's universalistic endeavors using the example of the interpretation of magic. This task is particularly interesting for three reasons. Firstly, Juri Lotman has two conceptual schemas for magic, one of which was completed in 1967 (referred to as Mg 1), and the other (Mg 2) was published fourteen years later (Lotman 1993 [1981]), and the interpretation of magic in Mg 2 is notably different to Mg 1. Secondly, Mg 1 is one of the first attempts in the universalistic interpretation of culture in Juri Lotman's semiotics, and, thirdly, Mg 1 has never been published.

Mg 1 is actually a fragment of notes taken during the series of lectures held at the University of Tartu. I came across the notes in

1968.[1] The general title of the lectures was "The semiotics of the individual and society" (Lotman 1967c). In my opinion, these notes are an interesting source and description of the early notions of Juri Lotman on the universals of culture in general. The notes indicate that there were four lectures, and they were held in the 1967 autumn semester. A text critical comparison permits the claim that the second and probably also the missing third lecture reproduce fragments of an article, which was published just before December 1967 (Lotman 1967a: 34–38). This same topic — now in written version in the "Lectures" was also used by Juri Lotman in writing his article "The problem of signs and the sign system, and the typology of Russian culture, 11th–19th centuries" (Lotman 1970a). (The latter is dedicated to the study of the projective semiotic relationship between language and culture.) Mg 1, which can be found in the fourth and last lecture held on December 22, 1967, has rather a loose association with the first part of the lecture series (except for the first lecture). In Lecture IV, Lotman is feeling his way regarding the possibilities of creating a universal typology of texts and text functions. One of the "building blocks" for this typology is indeed magic. (An excerpt of Lecture IV is included as an Appendix to the present article.)

We need to begin with the central concept: *universal* and *universality*. According to the task set in this article, I shall attempt to shed light upon this concept in the way it was expressed in the semiotics of Juri Lotman, just prior to the creation of the Tartu-Moscow school. A detailed theoretical analysis of Lotman's universalism presumes systematic study of all the relevant writings by the scholar and his co-authors.

The ideas and conceptual principles of Juri Lotman's semiotics are dynamic, hard to grasp and to define. Regarding our present topic, we can see that although the universalism theme is present in some form or another throughout Lotman's semiotic heritage — either as an important motive, background or facet — no monographs with information on the development of this topic have been published by him.

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[1] The lecture notes were taken and given to me to read by Marju Lauristin. I rewrote them, without changing the punctuation or other characteristics of the language of the notes. According to Marju Lauristin, the original of the lecture notes no longer exists. Unfortunately it has not been possible (after initial enquiries) to find any notes from the third lecture, which Marju Lauristin did not attend.

There are also no other authors who have written a monographic critique of Lotman's universalism. These other authors of course include Lotman's co-authors, primarily Boris Uspenski, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Alexandr Pyatigorski, together with whom, or having being directly inspired by whom, the Tartu professor has written cultural semiotic works, where the universalistic treatment dominated or was substantially represented.[2]

At the 2nd summer school of semioticians in August 1966 at Kääriku, Juri Lotman formulated for the first time the need for a description of the universals of culture and the compilation of an applicable "cultural grammar" (Lotman 1966: 83). In the introduction to the compendium of the summer school's presentations, the organizers indicated the need to differentiate with particular attention "those most general elements whose universality may assist in the common description of the various systems to be modeled" (Zamechaniya 1966: 4–5). The need for such a task was argued by Juri Lotman in his 1967 article "On the Problem of Cultural Typology". The article was published in volume 3 of *Sign Systems Studies* (Lotman 1967a). In the editors' foreword to the collection, Juri Lotman wrote of a methodological foundation for a cultural grammar (Lotman 1967b). In this introduction he sets out his understanding of cultural universals in radical opposition to Hegel's philosophy of history. As Hegel believed, the concept of world is realized at each stage of its development in only one national culture, which at that moment, from the standpoint of the world's historical process, is unique. But a unique phenomenon, argues Juri Lotman, can have no special feature — this requires that there be at least two systems for comparison. This is why the Hegelian concept of history not only emphasizes but even makes the differences between the epochs absolute. Everything that is not a difference in the comparison of epochs is left unmarked, because it is

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[2] One of Juri Lotman's co-authors, Boris Uspenski, in his thorough theoretical work on the problem of universals, has remained within the limits of linguistics (Uspenski 1963; 1965; 1970). In implementing universalistic analysis in cultural semiotics, the joint work of Juri Lotman with Boris Uspenski which began in the 1970s is particularly noteworthy (Lotman, Uspenski 1971; 1973; 1975; 1982; 1994). With Alexander Pyatigorski he published in this context an important analysis of the semiotic relationship between text and function (Lotman, Pyatigorski 1968). The work by Vyacheslav Ivanov regarding the reflection of the psychophysiological functions of the left and right brain hemispheres in the basic codes of culture (Ivanov 1978) was extensively developed by Juri Lotman in his later articles (Lotman 1983; 1984; 1990) and elsewhere.

not noteworthy. Lotman postulates that this is why it is important in principle to not deny the existence of other, possible non-human civilizations. Only the imagined viewpoint of an external culture enables the development of a typology for human culture as a whole. "That which is common to all epochs and civilizations — such a neutral element, not containing information, changes the specifics of human culture to a source of information" (Lotman 1967b: 6). In the course of such study, it is unavoidably apparent that some of the typological characteristics of culture are characteristic for whatever human culture, but some do not suit the common typology. These "most general characteristics", which unify cultures and are characteristic for human culture as a whole, are described by Lotman, in his methodological introduction, as cultural universals (Lotman 1967b: 6).

In the already mentioned second publication of the same collection, Juri Lotman states directly that the task of cultural typology is

> [1] the description of such *basic types* of *cultural codes*, which form the basis for the languages of the various cultures and their comparative characteristics; [2] the determination of the *universals of various human cultures*, and as a result [3] the creation of a *unified system* of the typological features of the basic codes of cultures and a *general structure of the universal features of human culture*. (Lotman 1967a: 31; my emphasis and numbering, P. L.)

The described logic of research, in the opinion of Juri Lotman, would enable the creation of a "cultural grammar", and this would "hopefully lay the foundation for moving on to the construction of a structured history for culture" (Lotman 1967a: 34).

The object and the subject of this program, from the standpoint of the history of the Tartu-Moscow semiotic school, has quite a unique place.

Regarding the object of the research, the program can be described as a call to turn away from genre, compositional or other semiotic problems, specific to literature, folklore (myth) or religion, to the study of the major and general issues of culture — to *cultural semiotics*. (Nevertheless, the "special attention" of the second summer school was concentrated on texts, and limited to the examination of single problems; see Zamechaniya 1966: 4). At first glance it seems that *cultural* semiotic (text = culture) subject matter is primarily (?) the personal field of interest for Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski. Cultural semiotics became the common basic problem for the Kääriku group in

1970, when the work of the fourth summer school was concentrated on studying the "unity of culture" — cultural semiotics *par excellence* (Predlozheniya 1970: 3; cf. Chernov 1988: 13). And three years later, in 1973, the "Theses" was published, which was considered the policy document for the school (Ivanov *et al.* 1998),[3] and where cultural semiotics, which studies a certain unity of a person's informational activity, is termed "the study of the functional correlation of different sign systems" (Ivanov *et al.* 1998: 33). (It should be added that the introductory paragraph 1.0.0. of "Theses", which is quoted here, is to a great extent in accordance with both the content and wording of the aims of the Fourth summer school, which were probably prepared as an introduction to the summer school compendium by its editor Juri Lotman. This wording hints at the attempt to interpret cultural semiotics in a universalistic key.)

In the 1966/1967 policy positions, Lotman accentuates *universalism* with untypical maximalism and with laconic conviction.[4] The field and methods of his research into universalism changed repeatedly over the years, "grammatical" rigidity was replaced by a more flexible and dynamic approach, but the discovery of the "mechanisms" of culture, whereby human cultures are similar, remained a common subject in Juri Lotman's scientific works to the end of his life.

The starting point for universalistic research is for him clearly associated with Ferdinand de Saussure's holistic language concept (for more detail see Mihhail Lotman's article in this volume). This expressed the hope of also discovering in other modeling systems a stable identity for grammatical categories which is characteristic of natural language: "A system, which is not organized in this way, *is not* a language, this means that it cannot be used for the preservation and transmittal of information". Such a feature of secondary modeled systems, in Juri Lotman's opinion, makes it possible to speak of the

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[3] "Theses" — and this was not coincidental — was not published in the Soviet Union (not even in Tartu), but in the space of one year in Poland, the Hague, and Paris. The Brezhnev reaction had accelerated.

[4] To date, Lotman had examined / was examining two universalistic problems: the aesthetics of sameness and difference in an artistic text (Lotman 1994: 222–232), and the structural role of beginning and end in cultural texts (in culture) (Lotman 1966: 69–74). Boris Uspenski, and Alexander Pyatigorski, who joined him in 1967, moved in the direction of cultural typological "invariant schemas" (Zamechaniya 1966: 4) with their personological analyses (Uspenski 1966; Pyatigorski, Uspenski 1967).

existence of the "universal constants" of language (code), which guarantee its identity (Lotman 1967b: 6).

These methodological points of departure lead Lotman (together with some colleagues) to treat object-language and meta-language as phenomena of one and the same level, or (as characterized, after the fact — and as self-criticism — by Alexander Pyatigorski) "to the *naturalization* of culture, to treating culture as 'Nature'" (Pyatigorski 1994: 326). In Juri Lotman's eyes, this rebuke became rather a challenge, but the description of its later fate cannot unfortunately be included in this article.

The most extensive "naturalized" analysis of the universal constants characteristic of culture during the period under observation is presented in the article "The problem of signs and sign systems, and the typology of Russian culture, 11th–19th centuries" (Lotman 1970a) and "The semiotics of the individual and society" in Lecture IV (incl. Mg 1) (Lotman 1967c). In the former, the various types of Russian culture are examined as the historically changing realization of various cultural codes. The codes combine, form hierarchies and "infiltrate more and more the deep legitimizations of the structure of sign systems". In every culture, some (few) of the codes always become dominant. The dominance phenomenon is explained by Lotman, saying that "the communicative systems are also modeling systems and a culture, in constructing a model of the world, also creates a model of itself" (Lotman 1970a: 12–13).

In the second universalistic analysis, which is Lecture IV, Juri Lotman proceeds from the understanding that text and the immanent rules (code) that determine its structure are not sufficient to decipher the text, or are even useless. He introduces the phenomenon of function, which can change the meaning of the text completely. In Mg 1 he interprets culture as a collection of social functions. This however means leaving the immanent structure of the text. Lotman provides certain functions a universal status. According to him, function,

— is a permanent abstract construct which survives the texts (as is language in relation to speech)
— is autonomous regarding text
— is realized in texts as a relationship between *speaker* and *listener*. This is interpreted via expressive and illocutive terms, which permits the treatment of the *speaker-listener* relationship as a position of mutuality.
— is consequently typologically describable. However, space and time features are considered by Lotman as those "most general of elements, whose

universality may simplify the common description of various modeling systems" (Zamechaniya 1966: 4–5).

— in science and in practice (here as non-signed), it becomes apparent from the texts of the *speaker*; through the texts of the *listener*, the function becomes apparent in the form of religious or magical relations. (See excerpt of the IV lecture in the appendix of the present article; Lotman 1967c.)

Juri Lotman, in his Lecture IV, has thus interpreted magic, religion, science and (separately) art as social functions, which are realized topologically and communicatively. The noted functions as abstract constructs are of a universal nature, which generate cultures, and span the historic and geographical boundaries of cultures. Functions live longer than texts, and may in principle adapt to any text whatsoever. I consider this schema by Juri Lotman as a theoretical idea with great potential (despite the fact that in my opinion the religion and magic concepts in Lecture IV have been imprecisely treated).

The uniqueness of the 1966/1967 program is also apparent in another fact, which appears for the first time soon after Mg 1 was completed. On closer inspection, it can be seen that neither in the Third Summer School compendium (Letnyaya shkola 1968) nor in the Fourth Summer School compendium, which concentrated on cultural semiotics (not in the introduction (see Predlozheniya 1970: 3–5) nor in the compendium articles, including Juri Lotman's), are the terms *universalism*, *cultural universal*, *human culture* or the *basic code(s) of human culture* used any more.[5] In the 1973 "Theses" these terms are also missing; in the place of *human culture* there is consistent emphasis on the heritage of Slavic culture. The word *universal* appears in "Theses" only once — in the description of the recon- struction of Slavic texts there is an off-hand comment that the highest purely semantic level being reconstructed "in the final analysis we transfer to the language of certain universal notions" (Ivanov *et al.* 1998: 47). In Mg 2, there is a comparison of the Russian and the western European legal systems (the latter being based on the Roman tradition), and there is also no rising to the level of "humanity".

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[5] The adjective *universal* does however appear once in one of Juri Lotman's notes on the correlation between number and the types of culture, from which he says one can conclude that the paradigmatic structure of culture "encourages the transformation of number into a universal symbol of culture" (Lotman 1968: 107). By the way, in the Summer School III compendium there is no Foreword. Such an introduction (usually worded by Juri Lotman) usually emphasized the general goals and unifying concepts.

In this development logic, which may initially seem paradoxical, there are a number of converging facts. At first glance they seem to indicate that Juri Lotman was distancing himself from the study of universalism. But it is more likely that this was a quite sudden change to a more moderate position, but after a certain delay subsequent to the completion of Mg 1.[6] Lotman did not want to follow in the footsteps of those scholars who use "impressionism" on a higher level of research as a replacement for the precise study of text on an elementary level (Lotman 1969b: 480). He distances himself clearly from static models which had acquired a bad reputation in structuralism, and emphasizes that the internal and contextual (incl. energetic and dialogical) correlations of cultural texts demand a very thorough multi-level analysis of both the static and dynamic structures. The interpretation of the dynamics of the text results in conflict with the principle of "grammatical unity", which results in Lotman starting to search for more abstract universalistic features for texts (culture) (Lotman 1969b: 478–480).

In his article "On the metalanguage of a typological description of culture", Lotman undertakes an analysis which is in accordance with such criteria. He describes the typological features of the universal space models of culture (Lotman 1969a).

In the analysis of Mg 2, magic is already treated in the form of such a typological model, where the magical function is a higher-level text in relation to text(s) — in a way, a metatext (Lotman 1993). In the case of Mg 1, as I have already indicated, text and function were observed as phenomena on the one and same level: culture in such a case was transformed into a collection of functions, and the text(s) were derived from this (those) function(s) as elements of the same level (cf. Lotman, Pyatigorski 1968: 75).

If Mg 1 and Mg 2 are compared, not according to the method of study of culture, but according to the subject for the study of which the method is being implemented, then one is surprised by the fact that Mg 1 and Mg 2 contradict each other to a great degree.[7] But it is not

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[6]   To some extent we need to take into account that the planning and writing of two monographs on artistic texts (Lotman 1970b; 1972) in 1969–1971 apparently did not permit him to dedicate himself to the systematic study of the more general problems of culture.

[7]   Of course one needs to take into account, in the following comparison, the problems associated with a text critical assessment of the lecture notes in manuscript form.

possible to accept, without limited or greater reservations, the content of either interpretation of magic.

Mg 2 is characterized by four features. These are: (1) "bilateralism", i.e., both the parties in the magic act are in the roles of both subject ("speaker") and object ("listener"). (2) The parties enter into a "contract" relationship, which is characterized by (3) "compulsoriness" — both parties use power regarding the other, and (4) the "equivalence" (equilibrium) of conventional, signed relationships (Lotman 1993: 345).

In both Mg 1 and in Mg 2 there are the basic attributes of magic: the *subject* and *object* of the magic act, *communication* between them, its *signedness* (*decipherability*), the *act* and a certain *power*, the might which ensures the magic of the act.

As opposed to the "bilateralism", and the equilibrium of the "equivalent" exchange in Mg 2, the "magical situation" in Mg 1 is *unilateral*. One of the parties "thinks" that he is not able to "influence in a practical way" the other: he expects "an unexplained gift". He does create a "correlation" between himself and the "inexplicable power" "with some kind of act" in order to "deserve" it, but his hope is backed by an "opinion" that the intangible power cannot be influenced. This is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in criticizing James Frazer's understanding of magic remarked that "the expression of a wish in magic is *eo ipso* the expression of its fulfillment". An opinion may be "flawed" (therefore also deserving of suspicion). But a "religious symbol", as is claimed by Wittgenstein (I would add here the magic index as well), "is not based on opinion" (Tambiah 1999: 58–59).[8] It seems that placing a magic act in a rational context is not justified.[9]

The power controlling a magic situation, making something happen — the *agens* — is Mg 1's *speaker*, the "unknown power", in Lotman's terminology. The subject of the magic (the individual) is the *listener*. Lotman believes that a magic situation occurs only if the

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[8] The manuscript by Ludwig Wittgenstein about James Frazer's concept of magic was published by Stanley Tambiah for the first time in his monograph, to which I have already referred (see Tambiah 1999: 54–64).

[9] In the opinion of Edmund Leach, the magic act is an index used by the magician as a signal where the effect can be interpreted as a Pavlovian dog reflex (Leach, 1991: 30). Essentially, the same claim has been made by Boris Uspenski (in a conversation with this author in Tallinn, 10.09.2002), where he compared the magical effect with the reflex action occurring after the knee has been tapped with a hammer.

listener is not in control of the legitimacy, which is the basis for the speaker to "give" something that is "unexplainable". With his schema, Lotman deviates from the established traditions of the interpretation of magic (not to mention — although this in the future! — from his own Mg 2^{10}) (Frazer 2001: 35–52; Jakobson 1968: 355; Nöth 1986: 391, 392; Nöth 1990: 147, 148). Juri Lotman's claim in Mg 1 that to be a listener is not "a remnant from the past" is indeed applicable to religion but not to magic. Magic is the performative act of a subject (Tambiah 1999: 58, 60), where the content is always the object being influenced indirectly (communication) and/or instrumentally, and which is "manipulation" with certain "supernatural" phenomena (Clark 1997: 282–283, 214–215).

In seeing the *listener* in the subject, Lotman is partially right. As I have attempted to justify elsewhere (Lepik 2001: 208–211), the subject has both a *listening*-function as well as a *speaking*-function; the listening-function is associated with the mythological structure of the magic *agens*, but the performative speaking-function with the *agens*'s magic act itself. And the listening connects the *agens* with "history" — with the *patrum more* ritualized norms which the subject of the magic act must command.

This is the reason why, in analyzing magic, confusion can easily occur in defining the concept of the *magician*. One must also take into account that the concept of *magician* is on the one hand associated with something from the beyond, non-human (this is in accordance with Lotman's "unknown power"), but on the other hand, psychologists, culturologists and semioticians have indicated something that can be summarized by Tambiah's conclusion on Wittgenstein's analysis of Frazer: "Wittgenstein is claiming that 'civilized' man has within him the same symbolizing and ritualizing tendencies as the 'primitive'. This is synchronic and not an evolutionary posture (Tambiah 1999: 60).[11] Moreover, Jean Piaget indicates that long before a child in his second year learns to substitute an unseen object, or a non-

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[10] In one even later work, Juri Lotman associates the historic origins of speech with magic, thereby extending the performative *speaker*-role to the maximum (Lotman 1992: 20).

[11] However, J. Lotman, at the time and also later, did not confront the problem of the "beginning" of culture intentionally, although in his later works he provocatively claims that any "thinking" semiotic structure, in order to be launched, must definitely receive an impulse from another thinking structure: "Consciousness must be preceded by consciousness" (see Lotman 1990:399-400; Lotman 2000: 152).

sensory event, with icons and symbols, the child relates to the outside world with the help of indexes, including signals, which create conditioning conditioning (Piaget 1970: 717). Piaget has elsewhere compared certain characteristic forms of the manifestations of a child's thinking with magic acts, and treated these as a natural step of a child's "pre-logic thought" (see Nöth 1990: 159).

Who is it then that can in a magical situation fulfill the role of an *agens*? Can it only be a power, which is from the beyond or "signed" in the beyond, or can it be any actant who steps into such a role? In my opinion, one can find an answer to this question in Boris Uspenski's detailed study which is dedicated to the history of the formation of the structure and functions of Russian expressive phraseology (the Russian *mat*[12]). The cultural function of magic as *agens* became more profane and "democratic", analogously to the way in which the fertilization of the Earth-Mother by the Heavenly-Father (Lightning God), ended up as a ritual with magic functions associated with the antagonist of God — the dog. Subsequently, the ritual was degraded even further — into obscenity. Functionally, all actants on a microcosmic level have a magic role (Uspenski 1994: 99–104).[13] On the level of behavior, the magic features of the Russian *mat* are easily apparent, particularly to the "stranger". And the person turning on the television ends up immediately, as a victim of advertising, in the manipulating field of "magicians" (cf. Nöth 1990: 151–152).

Juri Lotman also contrasts magic and science as *listener* and *speaker* texts, emphasizing the procedural features of the speaker text. The procedural feature, however, is a determining characteristic of both structures, as has been consistently claimed in culturology, since the time of Tylor and Frazer (Frazer 2001: 54–55; Malinowski 1998: 76, 85, 86; Hoebel 1966: 470). The argument has only been about the magical procedures' *causality-non-causality*, *genuineness-falseness*, *naturalness-supernaturalness*, *rationality-esotericity* (Levy-Bruhl 1925: 42; Frazer 2001: 887–888; Malinowski 1998: 70–71; etc.).

The *path*-model, on which Juri Lotman bases his analysis of science, is analogous with magical proceduralism. For example, the

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[12] It should be added as explanation that the lexemes *mat'* = mother and *mat* must be kept separate. The latter signs in Russian a certain paradigm of expressive obscene expressions which have received their name from expressions where the object is *mother*.

[13] Boris Uspenski refers directly to magic relations on *one* level (Uspenski 1994: 103).

individual progress of a Sufi for unification with God is indeed termed
the *path* (ar. *tarīqa*). This word also signs the concepts of *method* and
procedure.[14] The *path* is a step-by-step series of increasingly esoteric
procedures (instructions) directed towards oneself, where each step is
associated with carrying out ritualized acts (procedures) intended to
achieve a certain goal. The relationship between the act and its goal
does not formally differ at all from the structure of any other magic
act[15] (Arasteh 1970). Oswald Spengler does not err when he considers
Islam to be a thoroughly magical culture![16]

It is also questionable to differentiate between magic and religion
according to the formulae "it is being done to me" — "I am being
given the truth". *Giving the truth* may simultaneously be *being done to
me*. And *being done to me* could also mean *giving the truth*. The
observed confusion or inconsistency of Juri Lotman (and many other
authors) in the identification of the (verbal) activity of magic (the
subject) is associated with the fact that the structure of the *agens* is
being looked at as being one-sided. It is usually not thought, as I al-
ready had reason to indicate previously, that a magician (subject =
speaker) in command of the *agens* is simultaneously engaged in two
dialogues (for more detail, see Lepik 2001: 206–211). As the actant of
the mythological structure of the *agens*, he is definitely associated
with *getting*. Bronislaw Malinowski already indicated that the magi-
cian appeals to "ancestors and the heroes of culture from whom the
magic has been *gotten*" (Malinowski 1998: 74; my emphasis, P. L.).
But this is only one side of the magic procedure. The denominator of
the other side could be considered to be *I am doing* and here the *agens*
is manifested as an effective power. Such a purposeful performative
activity has been described on the linguistic level by John Austin
(1962). Following his lead, this was brought into the description of

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[14] Franz Rosenthal, referring to al-Ghazali, writes "The views of various kinds
of Islamic religious thinkers do not essentially differ amongst themselves
regarding that which relates to practical methods and procedures (tariq al-'amal)"
(Rozenthal 1978: 177).

[15] Haljand Udam indicates that "in the Semitic tradition, which also includes
Islam, the word of God (*logos*) is grammatically in the imperative form and not a
neutral noun" (Udam 1992: 125). According to Roman Jakobson's semiotic
magic-schema, conatives are the elements that create the linguistic structure of
magic (Jakobson 1968: 355; see also Lepik 2001: 211–212). By the way: the Sufis
have understandably never described their views as "magic".

[16] It should however be noted that Oswald Spengler made his conclusions on
the basis of other characteristics.

magic by Roman Jakobson (1968: 355) and Edmund Leach (1991); see also Peet Lepik (2001: 211).

The dominate structural element of Mg 2 is considered by Lotman to be *contracturality* (Lotman 1993: 345). One must firstly note that *contracturality*, *bilateralism* and *equivalency*, as features characterizing magic are partially overlapping mutual concepts. It seems that the characterization of magic using particularly these features has tended to be influenced by the attempt to construct, for the comparison of Mg 2 and religious "self-sacrifice" a symmetric (4–4) and antithetic model (*bilateralism* (in magic) *contra unilateralism* (in a religious relationship); *equivalency* — its lack; *being mandatory* — its lack; *contract* — *unconditional (self)sacrifice*) (Lotman 1993: 345–346). But it is more important that contracturality does not unfortunately seem to be a mandatory feature of a magic act. Even using an intuitive assessment, one may be certain that the majority of magic texts are not contracts (with the devil). The opposite is also not confirmed by the tradition of magic study. In his article, Lotman does not argue the justification of this feature in the formal structure of magic as a universal relationship. He even avoids such a postulation of the question, and takes the analysis of magic into a much narrower framework contrasting the high value of contracturalism in Roman law with the low value of contracts in a Russian culture based on the spirit of Orthodoxy. The interpretation of contracts in the Russian cultural space could be considered most successful, original and interesting. The whole concept of the article seems indeed to be constructed on this analysis. The treatment of the Roman emperor cult as a magic-"contractural" system does however create serious objections.

As a point of departure, it must be stated that in the name of, on account of and because of religion, contracts have always been made in every culture. Certain social issues, such as the propagation, propagating, assessing etc of various confessions must be differentiated from the formal structure of religious communication. If a contract (say with the devil) can be considered an immanent structural feature for certain types of magical acts, then someone's contract with Roman authorities regarding the recognition of the emperor cult can only be considered a political instrument for the propagation of the emperor cult or a political agreement.

If the basis for the assessment of the emperor cult is taken from the court recordings of the Christian martyrs' cases, and the bureaucratic formalism of the emperor cult, which the Christians have always used for the promotion of the virtues of Christianity, then one could truly

be left with an impression of the contracturality of Roman emperor worship. The court recordings of the martyrs' cases are often compiled with an emphasis on the opportunity to be set free. The pattern is as follows: All you need to do is to "sign"/ "bring a sacrifice to the sacrificial altar" / "swear in the name of the god-like spirit of the emperor" / "sacrifice before the portrait of the emperor", by which you recognize the superiority of emperor worship (to Christianity), and you will save yourself and walk free! (Stauffer 1966: 205–207). "Thus the emperor worship was essentially not so much a matter of faith, as a matter of public order and discipline, a civil obligation for civilians and a service obligation for soldiers," is also Ethelbert Stauffer's summarization in the spirit of "contracturality", but as a convinced apologist for Christianity! (Stauffer 1966: 203).

The above conclusion must not lead us astray! Those people who had contact with the Stalinist cult remember all too well that in addition to the "service obligation" to worship Stalin, there was also a religious relationship which was strange and powerful, and which was responsible for the formation of the entire culture. This was clearly the case in Rome, if one reads carefully, for example, Ethelbert Stauffer's study, and takes into account Juri Lotman's words regarding the universality of the religious function. This is why it is not possible to agree with Lotman's 1981 conclusion that Roman emperor worship was not a religious but a magic system.

It is known from history that at least Caligula, Nero, Domitianus and Commodus actually considered themselves to be gods. Caesar's successor Octavianus received the additional name of Divi Filius (*son of god*). Henceforth the Roman emperor is called "Lord, our God", and he is considered, as is documented by Stauffer, the "bringer of grace", "godly Savior". Miracles are associated with the emperor, including the emperor "going to heaven" (Stauffer 1966: 201–202). In the throne room, "the gathering greets the 'countenance of the most holy emperor' as if it were a revelation from another world. When he opens his mouth, all listen as if to a voice from the heavens. This is how the senate procedures become procedures for the worship of a god. There is a kind of parliamentary liturgy." Announcements of imperial orders in the provinces were preceded by formulations such as "the godly decision by our godly lord commands" or "the heavenly regulations of the godly command thus order" or "the godly mercy of the all-holy emperor does will". In all the major towns of the country imperial temples were erected with statues and altars in front of them,

where sacrifices and incense were brought to the portrait of the emperor (Stauffer 1966: 202–203).

These features permit a description of the Roman emperor worship as also (or primarily?) a religious system which, according to all its characteristics, suits the "self-sacrificing" religious model constructed by Juri Lotman.

In conclusion, it could be said that the universalistic schema used in Juri Lotman's treatment of magic provide many promising analysis opportunities. But their specific implementation in the context of Mg 1 and Mg 2 bears some traces of deformation in the research process.

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Об универсализме в связи с интерпретацией магии в семиотике Юрия Лотмана

В статье даётся оценка первой фазе универсалистских штудий в семиотике Юрия Лотмана, характеризуемой холизмом, присущим соссюрианской концепции языка, и максимализмом. Проводится анализ поныне неопубликованной лекции 1967 года, в которой функциям текста (в том числе магической) приписывается универсальный статус. Такой угол зрения существенно переосмысливает соссюрианское понимание взаимоотношений между языком и речью. Эта интерпретация магии сравнивается с толкованием того же понятия в статье ""Договор" и "вручение себя" как архетипические модели культуры" от 1981 года, которое существенно противоречит концепции, выработанной в лекции 1967 года. Обе концепции вызывают ряд возражений и, кажется, явно носят деформирующие признаки соответствующих универсалистских теоретических схем.

Universalismist ühenduses maagia käsitusega Juri Lotmani semiootikas

Artiklis antakse hinnang Juri Lotmani semiootika universalistlike käsitluste esimesele faasile, mida iseloomustab saussure'likust keelekontseptsioonist pärit holism ja maksimalism. Analüüsitakse Juri Lotmani seni avaldamata loengut 1967. aastast, milles teksti funktsioonidele (sh. maagilisele) omistatakse universaalne staatus. Niisugune lähenemisnurk revideerib oluliselt saussure'likke arusaamu keele ja kõne vahekorrast. Seda maagia interpretatsiooni võrreldakse sama mõiste käsitusega Juri Lotmani artiklis "'Leping' ja 'eneseloovutus' kui arhetüüpsed kultuurimudelid" 1981. aastast, mis 1967. a loengus väljatöötatud kontseptsioonile oluliselt vastu räägib. Mõlemad maagiamudelid tekitavad rea vastuväiteid ja näivad ilmselt kandvat neile vastavate universalistlike teoreetiliste skeemide deformeerivaid jälgi.

APPENDIX

Semiotics of the individual and society.
Juri Lotman

Lecture IV, December 22, 1967 (excerpt)[17]

If we wish to use texts to study society or people, we must first clarify the nature of signs and the rules for their use (these depend on the culture types).

We are accustomed to easily being able to separate, for example, scientific texts from religious texts, etc. We act as if we know how to decipher them in different ways.

We study each of these different texts in different ways. We say that there are various types of signs:

1) natural language signs — we define [these][18] with the aid of grammar and dictionaries, or we compile these [i.e. a grammar, a dictionary]
2) myth — we assume that it is possible for us to create some kind of rules in order to clarify [= to interpret] the signs and grammar of mythological texts
3) scientific text — but here we do not implement the ways of studying myth.

This seems to be quite obvious. But it is not really the case. We could, for example, take a scientific text and show that in certain situations it could function as a religious text.

Even an everyday phenomenon can acquire the features of myth, or other uncharacteristic features. (Penicillin may function not only as a medicine but also as a mythological unit — as the Redeemer.)

If we make some kind of scientific discovery and start to treat it as the savior in all situations, [then the result is] religion.

It does not suffice to know the text. One must know its function in society. Different texts may fulfill the one function. (A religious function could be fulfilled by sport, war, science, medicines, etc.) There is a certain interdependence between text and function, but this is not a linear one.

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[17]   See footnote 1. Translated by Tiia Raudma.

[18]   The square brackets contain words added by me (P. L.), which were not present in Marju Lauristin's notes. Italics denote Russian-language words or sentence parts in the text.

Social function must be differentiated from social texts! If we say that science has replaced religion, this generally means the replacement of texts, because the function of religion has been preserved in society. (An article by a French doctor on the crisis in medicine: the relationship of the patient with the doctor must be religious. A critical relationship hinders the medical effect. It is difficult to be one's own doctor, teacher, adult. Here the relationship of trust [is valid], and this is not based on knowledge.)

[There are] a number of relationships of which some [are such where the individual is in a mutual relationship in the role of] a speaker, and others [where the individual is] in the role of a listener.

NON-SIGNS[19]   *SIGNS*

I PRACTICE   II MAGIC
I am doing something   *Something is being done to me* [20]

III SCIENCE   IV RELIGION, BELIEF
I am obtaining the truth (procedure) *I am being given the truth*

Therefore, we have four functions:
I [Practice]. My activity takes place in the sphere of practical activity, not of signs.

II [Magic]. A situation where [you] yourself are in principle not able to affect anything in practice, you only receive. If you do not feel that the basis on which you are being given something is legitimate (for example, [the unexplained appearance of a] taxi), a magical situation is created.

A person creates a connection between himself and this situation, and with the activity, in order to be deserving of the arrival of the inexplicable gift. A person does much, which cannot be explained on a conscious level, and [which is] practically useless regarding having an effect on things which cannot be influenced. (When the taxi is late, we try "to speed it along" [by pressing our feet against the wall of the car]; [pushing

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[19]   It is probable that the classification takes into account that the practitioner (I) always has a relationship with non-signed reality, while the scientist (II) — of course, if he is a natural scientist — has this relationship most of the time. In magical and religious relationships, the individual always deals with signified structures. (Note by P. Lepik.)

[20]   If something is being done to me, which I could just as well do myself, then this relationship is invalid. (Note by the author of the lecture.)

up against the person in front of us in] the ticket queue before a performance.) <u>Magical function</u>: I <u>hope</u> that something beneficial for me will happen, which [is] inexplicable to me and is something I cannot influence. The activity has a <u>signifying</u> nature, so that [? = and] it demonstrates its <u>trust</u> regarding this unknown power.

III Science. It is assumed that as a result of some procedures, I am able to obtain the truth. Science begins where there is <u>procedure</u>. It is the start of formalism. If the procedure [is] incorrect, the result is not considered to be the <u>truth</u>. In science, it is not the truth that is that important, it is the way to the truth. The giver [is] unnecessary. Regarding giving, a critical attitude [is dominant], [a scientific relationship is characterized by] a <u>non-trusting relationship</u>.

IV Belief. Religion. [This is] <u>also truth,</u> but it is assumed that this [is] held by <u>someone</u> who has to actually <u>give</u> it. The subject is not capable of getting it himself. *<u>Truth here is an act of dedication</u>*. Activity here has another meaning than it does in science. <u>The giver</u> comes to the fore, the one who is indispensable, and with whom a special relationship of <u>trust</u> is created. [The situation presumes the question:] What should I do in order that I will be given something?

Why is that people [generally] are unable to believe — as in God. There are <u>various reasons</u>. In the case of God, [there is] unlimited trust, which in principle cannot be controlled. (In the case of science, since [the scientist is] <u>himself</u> active, esotericism is inconceivable.) Regarding religion, [it is a case of] a giving situation, [whereas] the question is immediately raised: who are the ones to receive, and who do not. [There is] a need for a particular <u>signed</u> action, in order <u>to be worthy</u>.

I (Practice) and III (Science) [are] speaker [texts]; II (Magic) and IV (Belief) [are] listener [texts].

We can observe how, for example, a scientific text becomes a religious one, or even magical one, how it changes from a speaker text to a listener text.

We can therefore say that on the one hand there is a certain historic typology in action, where [in a certain era] certain types of texts dominate, for example [in history] there are mythological periods, religious periods, scientific periods. [On the other hand, the functions under observation could be a combination:] prayer [can fulfill both] relig[ious] + [= as well as] mag[ical functions]; religious texts [have] certain scientific functions, etc.

To be a listener is not to be a remnant from the past. Science cannot fulfill all social functions. There are undoubtedly a number of texts, where a scientific approach can prove to be damaging. The reverse is also true: unlimited faith in some scientific concept gives it a religious function.

Previously [we observed instances, where] the text, in a certain function, always [has] the one meaning. The function of the text may change but it has only one function at a time.

There is a function which is different from the four [previous] functions, which [also] has its own texts.

A text which [is simultaneously] in two languages [has] two simultaneous functions:

1) [in] a play situation two behaviors (= text meanings) [are initiated] simultaneously. The game can be ruined in two ways:
   a) the children tend to see the chair covered in tiger stripe fabric as a genuine tiger — no play is initiated
   b) the adults are unable to imagine that the chair is a tiger — no play is initiated

2) in art. [Art] also unites at least two [behaviors simultaneously]

If art is interpreted as having a single meaning [we] are unable to comprehend it. We are then unable, based on this, to properly interpret, for example, society.

Why [does] mankind need such a multiplicity of meaning? (Not to be confused with allegorical multiple meanings. For the reader, this means [only] one!) But in the theatre, each [element has] at least two simultaneous meanings. If we believed that there was real life on the stage, the enjoyment of art would disappear completely, [the performance] would become the same as peering through the keyhole. In watching a movie, 1) we become involved just as if the events were real life, but 2) we do not interfere. If we perceive the same text as being religious, we would have switched to one [and only] behavioral system. When Lope de Vega lost consciousness when listening to a mass and imagining the sufferings of Christ, music was for him not art, but religion. Religious attitudes [are] disastrous both in art and in science.

Juri Lotman on proper name

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Abstract. The article treats the concept of proper name in Juri Lotman's semiotics, taking into account also studies in the same field by other authors of the Tartu-Moscow school (V. Ivanov, B. Ogibenin, V. Toporov, B. Uspenski). Focus is laid at three sub-topics: *name and myth, name and text, name and artistic creation.* One of the sources of treating proper name for both the program article by J. Lotman and B. Uspenski ("Myth — Name — Culture"), and works by several other semioticians of the Tartu–Moscow school is confidence in the connection between proper name and mythical (a-semiotic) thought: semiosis equals here with nomination. Proper name plurality, different re-namings affirm the continuing importance of mythical thinking in later culture. Proper names (such as personal names, place names) belong, in addition to natural language, also into a certain individual system, forming thus an interlinguistic layer located on the boundary of language. J. Lotman stresses that art has a specific power of uniting general and proper name (proper name characterized here by individuality, explosiveness). An artistic work is even doubly of proper name character: both the act of creation and its reception are by nature individual and unrepeated. In the opinion of the authors the treatment of proper name by the Tartu-Moscow school contains fruitful and promising standpoints for the analysis of contemporary culture that, however, have been applied unjustifiably little.

Lotman has turned to the topic of proper name in his works written at different times. Just as it is characteristic of Lotman's research method, proper name as a research object obtains a new meaning according to the context it is being inspected in and how it relates to the whole set of problems that is important for Lotman at a current moment. In Lotman's works the approach to the topic of proper names always remains particular and it is difficult to set it in the context of traditional logico-semantic studies. Though at the same time, and in

spite of being expressed in another conceptual system and from a specific viewpoint, Lotman's statements have touchpoints with, e. g., German logico-semantic scientific tradition (Frege, Wittgenstein, Cassirer's myth treatment). However, this theme definitely deserves special treatment that extends the frames of the current presentation. In this paper the concept of the *name* in Lotman's semiotics will be analysed in the context of other authors of the Tartu-Moscow school (V. Ivanov, B. Uspenski, V. Toporov, B. Ogibenin).

J. Lotman's conception of the proper name so as he has put it down with Uspenski in the article dating back to 1973 and entitled as "Myth — name — culture" is primarily connected with a certain kind of thinking, i.e. with mythical thinking and consciousness that must by its characterisation also provide with a better opportunity to understand peculiarities of poetic language. This is actually natural, since during exactly these years — in the beginning of the 70s — Lotman had elaborated a systematic treatment out of the semiotics of literary text.

The main standpoints of the mentioned article in a way conclude results of research on relations between the proper name, nomination, word and object that were carried out already during the 1960s by authors of the Tartu–Moscow school. This concerns especially examination of proper name in connection with myth and proper names as a specific differently organised system inside the language system.

1. Proper name and myth

In the mentioned work by J. Lotman and B. Uspenski, "Myth — name — culture" (Lotman, Uspenski 1992: 58–75), proper name is viewed as a bearer of mythological consciousness, and mythological object description, in its turn, is thereby given to the metalinguistic description via opposing. Thus proper name is understood through the traditional opposition *logos/mythos*, and equalised (with certain reservations) with one of these alternatives.

Myth and name are mutually conditioned: myth is personal (nominated), whereas name is mythological. Semiosis is here equalised with nomination. Thus:

Mythological; description of an object by proper name	*Non-mythological; logical*
metatextual	metalinguistic
monolinguistic	polylinguistic
understanding, recognition	description and interpretation
mythological untranslatable thinking	translation
semiosis = nomination	semiosis
mythical thinking operates with the hierarchy of objects themselves	logical thinking operates with words
nonconventionality of proper names	
a-semioticalness	
equalisation of word and denotation	

Mythical name opposes also the metaphor: according to the authors the latter is, strictly speaking, impossible in mythical text, just as synonymy as such is impossible in mythological equalisation. Referring to M. Altman's treatment of connections between myth and homonym it is stressed that while poetry is connected with synonymy, mythology realises itself through the contradictory linguistic phenomenon — the homonym. From this arises a conclusion about the contradiction of poetry and myth, and about poetry's impossibility on the mythological level (which of course does not exclude a mythical element in poetry). "Poetry and myth are as if antipodes, neither is possible without the other" (Lotman, Uspenski 1992: 72–73). Dissolution of mythical consciousness stands indeed in resemantisation of mythological texts as metaphoric in the developmental course of synonymy. Separation of a word from a thing is a precondition for the emergence of poetry. Free word opposes proper name as a bound word. Poetic thinking thus covers the intermediate zone in-between the mythological and the logico-scientific.

As a conclusion, the authors formulate that:

> From the semiotic aspect the durability of mythological texts can be explained so that, having been given birth by a specific nominative semiosis — when signs are not assigned, but recognised and nomination act itself equalises with the act of cognition — during later historical development myth became to be understood as an *alternative to thinking in signs*. (Lotman, Uspenski 1992: 69)

Thus proper name connects with a certain — mythological — consciousness, way of thinking (this conception is very close to J. Meletinski's description of mythological consciousness (Meletinski 1995)), that in turn allows Lotman to apply the feature of "proper nameness"

as a parameter in cultural typology (cultures oriented to mythical thinking — cultures oriented to non-mythological thinking).

Such a view on proper name, nomination is traditional for studies of the Tartu-Moscow school. The most direct treatment is given to the theme of name in Indo-European comparative studies, attempts to reconstruct the primary myth and working out a relevant methodology. The origin of name and establishment of name were questions the answers to which were searched for in the archaic texts of the Tartu-Moscow school (cf., e.g., Ivanov 1964; Ogibenin 1966; Ivanov, Toporov 1974).

In treatments of connections between myth and name an important predecessor was thereby O. Freidenberg (just as well as representatives of the school of historical poetics, A. Vesselovski and A. Potebnja). So has O. Freidenberg described exactly invocation, naming, calling by name, incantation as the most archaic ritual. "Their foundation is the effect of name: in archaic marriage and funeral customs we find a honoured god — calling the protagonist out by name, i.e. the act of re-creation of the inner nature that exists in his name" (Freidenberg 1997: 96). Similarity as a main category of the archaic consciousness is revealed by speech act repeating behavioural act, name is similar to the inner nature, calling by name reanimates the inner nature of the primordial man (Freidenberg 1997: 97).

In V. Ivanov's opinion, in the myth there are expressed ancient, presemiotic imaginations about the relationships between the name and the object. So, for example, when comparing *Rigveda*'s hymns, the author finds that while different objects were named here by men as the first of the wise who were under the protection of god, the Master of speech, then gods were named by the Master of speech himself. Ivanov also points out that in Plato's dialogues *Kratylus* and *Charmides* in which the topic of name is overwhelming, an alike mythological figure bearing the onomatic/onomatological function appears. Ivanov suggests that the topic of sameness of a name and its giver that is reflected in mythopoetic texts precedes semiotic discussions on the signifier and the signified of the linguistic sign of later centuries (see Ivanov 1998: 609). On the basis of *Rigveda*, B. Ogibenin assures in a study dedicted to Veda's onomastics, equalisation of the nature of a name and name giver, a certain correspondence between the structure of names of Veda's gods and the structure of god (denotation) as an element of Veda's pantheon that is characteristic of later brahmanistic texts. The author also indicates an ety-

mological kinship of word stems bearing such meanings as to "set", to "give name", to "name", to "create" (Ogibenin 1966: 218).

In connection with differentiating between *Rigveda*'s proper names another important methodological problem arises: how to distinguish between proper names in archaic texts, how to tell proper names from general names in Veda texts, when god's name equalises with his functions. Boundaries between them are vague and the usual differentiation criteria valid in language are here probably insufficient. This, in turn, affirms statements on mythical thinking as based on proper names outlined in Lotman's and Uspenski's article. "Studies in slavic antiquities" by V. Ivanov and V. Toporov (1974) also demonstrates this archaic syncretistic connection between general name and proper name.

An output of a certain tendency of mythologisation that always goes on in culture are, for example, re-naming, belief in that together with a new name new fate is obtained; the switch of general names to the sphere of proper names that can be approached as expansion of mythological consciousness (that can be compared with Frege's description of the emergence of such pseudo proper names as "public will").

Proper names as inherently non-signs should thus compose a certain non-semiotic zone in culture. As put by Lotman and Uspenski:

> In certain linguistic situations the behaviour of proper names is so different from the behaviour of words belonging to other linguistic categories that it inevitably leads to a thought that we are dealing with a certain other language ordered in another way, having however been incorporated into natural language. (Lotman, Uspenski 1992: 62)

What composes the proper name continuum of language and what is its position in text, in culture understood as text? Answers to these questions can be searched for at best from V. Toporov's works. His studies dedicated to toponomastics provide perhaps, so as based on the general views of the Tartu-Moscow school, the best comprehension of the treatment of proper name as a certain class of linguistic elements.

2. Proper name and text

First, what have been viewed as proper names, just as well as like in Lotman's works, are proper names functioning as such in ordinary language (e.g., personal names, place names). Toporov admits thereby

that for formal logic the extension of proper name is purposeful, switching into them also names possessing a relevant structure of signifying an object. Here the author refers to R. Carnap's and G. Frege's works as fruitful approaches to proper name in semantic-logical analysis. At this point it can be indicated that for example for G. Frege proper name is any name (a word, sign, complex sign) signifying a certain object, not a notion or relationship (Frege 1999: 27).

Asserting that proper names are characteristic solely of human socium, that in language they form the part necessarily participating in the formalised language of logic, and that the proper name variety testifies the level of differentiation and compositional structures of a human community itself (Toporov 1962: 3), the author at the same time pays attention to a certain feature of the proper name being a boundary phenomenon in relation to any system of natural language. In Toporov's opinion in cases proper names appearing in texts we are dealing with the so-to-speak intermediary elements so as compared with the system of ordinary language and the so-called "hieroglyphic" elements among which there belong e.g. certain symbols, abbreviations and foreign words that function in the frame of a given text as particular idioms. On the one side proper name is characterised by certain grammatical parameters of natural language (in extreme cases proper name may completely switch into the system of a given language), and on the other — they are connected with the "hieroglyphic" elements by the fact that for proper name a concrete given text is not, as a rule, primary (for topographic names such an "own" text can be e.g. a map). Thus, as a rule, proper name belongs into its own system and grammatical, even lexical description can not be the only ones for it.

Proper names thus form a particular interlinguistic layer in language; Toporov compares this to music or fine arts. Therefore they are very important also as an intercultural communication channel both in time and space (Toporov 1962: 5).

J. Lotman, in turn, has assigned the role of such a communication channel to the symbol. The proximity of the symbol in thus function to the proper name stands already in the fact that in culture they form a specific archaic layer that, so as compared with ordinary language, is difficult to describe as a system. In the case of proper name Toporov has stressed its syntactic independence:

> [...] the independence of proper name from textual elements [is revealed] already by that proper names use only a limited part of linguistic grammatical

possibilities (or at least not all the possibilities), thereby this part does not completely coalesce with what is grammatically allowed for other elements of a text in the language of a given period. Besides that it is noteworthy that in texts claimed primary for proper names, syntax is built quite differently from an ordinary text. This peculiarity is best illustrated by the syntax of toponymies in a geographic map or a sketch in which it is 'multidimensional' (at least by no means linear). It must be taken into account that the syntactic sphere of proper name is usually very limited, but this in turn makes the toponymic — and more generally the toponomastic — space discrete. (Toporov 1962: 5)

Alike features are outlined by Lotman at the description of the position of symbol in culture. A symbol may not switch into a syntactic chain, and even if it does switch, it thereby preserves semantic and structural independence.

It is simple to withdraw it from a semiotic context, and it switches into another textual environment just as simply. An important feature of it is connected with that: a symbol does not belong into a certain crosscut of culture, but it cuts vertically through that crosscut, coming from the past and heading towards the future. The memory of a symbol is always older than the memory of the non-symbolic context surrounding it. (Lotman 1992: 192)

Lotman stresses that, condensing different principles of signification, a symbol simultaneously leads outside the sphere of signs. It mediates between different spheres of semiosis, just as well as between the semiotic and non-semiotic spheres, between the textual synchrony and cultural memory. Symbol, not being homogeneous with the textual space surrounding it, is as if a deputy of other cultural epochs, a reminiscent of the ancient (= "eternal") foundations of culture (Lotman 1992: 198).

The above mentioned alike features do not exclude the essential difference, maybe even contradiction, between proper name and symbol. Symbol is the richer the more it "remembers", or in other words the more a symbol remembers, the more symbol it is. At the same time proper name is the more a proper name the less it "remembers", or the more it is simply a "denominator"/name giver. Toporov has stated that the less a proper name is motivated, etymologised, the less it carries additional information, the stronger is its "naming" function, "the more strongly proper name's feature of 'being a proper name' is revealed" (Toporov 1962: 8). Minimal motivation appears when a speaker is unaware of the actual denotation or when a known denotation bears possibly incomprehensible name unmotivated by internal form or analogous formations. Thus the contradiction

between proper name and symbol is appended by their function of taking mutually over each other's functions. Proper name then acts as a symbol and an unrecognised symbol as a proper name.

In social circulation the "naming" function of proper name weakens due to that the name obtains certain evaluative features, contains information about name bearer's social status, etc. B. Uspenski calls these processes "spontaneous semiotic differentiation of name" (Uspenski 1994: 152). In works by V. Toporov, J. Lotman, B. Uspenski, and other semioticians of the Tartu-Moscow school one can find numerous examples on how proper names that are called into being only to name, not to mean, in culture turn into meaningful.

Thus it can not be maintained that "proper name language" lies outside semiosis. While by Lotman proper name language that bears mythical consciousness belongs to the sphere of the "other" or the "alien" semiotics, it still participates in semiotic processes, because it is exactly the border of the semiosphere as a semiotically active area that the processes of "metaphoric translation" are going on. A comparative standpoint can be found in Frege's work who characterises proper name by its reference to a specific object. Frege, however, stresses the one-sided light of the proper name, the oscillation of its meaning at the same reference that together with subjective imagination makes proper name semiotically productive (Frege 1999: 24). (Similar standpoints can be found also in Barthes' treatment of denotation and connotation.)

3. Proper name and poetry/creation

Among lines about myth Lotman has stressed that its reading from the standpoint of later semiotic consciousness results in metaphoric constructions. Here we find also a statement according to which,

> In a number of cases mythological text, having been translated into the categories of non-mythological consciousness, is perceived as *symbolic*. A symbol of this type can be interpreted as reading a myth from the standpoint of later semiotic consciousness, i.e. reinterpreted as an iconic or quasi-iconic sign. (Lotman, Uspenski 1992: 67–68)

We can see that the symbolic meaning of a text understood this way is close to the metaphorical. The area in which the above mentioned notions — proper name, symbol, metaphor — approach each other, is indeed artistic creation.

For Lotman the topic of proper name remains bound with the need to understand the nature of aesthetic sign and artistic language. In an explosive model of culture (*Culture and Explosion*) proper name has clearly been dealt against the background of general name. Here proper name signifies the individual, personal, unpredictable. Lotman compares the world of proper names in its intimacy to the idea of the cosmic motherly womb. Proper name and general name are as if two registries that are united in their conflict. "The real speech flows freely from one sphere to the other, but the spheres do not melt into each other. On the contrary, by this their contrast is brought forward all the more" (Lotman 2000a: 104). Lotman writes: "Neither the world of proper names nor the one of general names can, if taken separately, include the world. We perceive reality through the dialogue of the two and this is one aspect making art inescapable" (Lotman 2000a: 119).

It is exactly individuality, choice that presumes the existence of space filled with proper names. The individual *ad hoc* created inherently metaphoric word, so as opposed to the general word, generates new meaning (thus proper name and metaphor do not oppose each other any more).

As known, the article "Myth — name — culture" was introduced by the statements "the world is substance" and "the world is a horse" whereby the first is an example of metalinguistic description and the latter illustrated such a definition of the object which is characteristic of mythological thinking that processes through an original object located on a hierarchically higher level. If we tried to bring an example of a later position, it probably would be enough to re-locate the second statement into the context of a poem where it would turn into an individual image in which the stated equality is not absolute any more. Poetic context excludes absolute tautology.

In connection with the above said, the notion of isomorphism obtains a new meaning. Earlier we talked about such isomorphism that is characteristic of mythical thinking and that exists between described world and descriptive language (between object and word). Let us remind that one of the most important feature of mythical conscious- ness and the proper name bearing it is isomorphy of the name and the object that thus should characterize the relevant asemiotic area. Lotman brings isomorphism forth also in the semiosphere, but this is the so-called vertical isomorphism that rules between structures located on different hierarchical levels. So the emergence of new texts presupposes surpassing this isomorphism: the most simple condition for semiosis is that the substructures participating in it do not have to

be isomorphic with each other, but that each must be isomorphic with a third element that is located on a higher level representing the system they belong to.

For example in the article "Culture as a subject and an object for itself" Lotman speaks about structural isomorphism between parts and the whole of semiosphere and between semiotic monads and semiosphere (Lotman 2000b: 639–647). Can we see here certain signification of the mythological element in the very conception of the author himself? Can we see here myth and art coming closer that amongst others is expressed also in the understanding of proper name? Compare, for example, the following statements:

> [...] 'the proper name language' and the mythological thinking connected with it impelled the power to apply similarities, analogies and equivalencies. [This advanced the idea of isomorphism that is] one of the leading conceptions both in contemporary mathematics and science in general. ("Myth — name — culture", Lotman, Uspenski 1992: 74–75).

> The influence of art lays in our power to perceive the dissimilar as the similar, to replace on the one hand the dissimilarity relations and on the other hand the similarity relations with the relations of isomorphism. [This turns art into] the supreme power of perception — the highest peak man can rise by possessing the hidden secrets of worlds surrounding him. ("The role of art in cultural dynamism", Lotman 1995: 22)

Hereby, when comparing with the article "Myth — name — culture", also innovative presentation of the problem of translatability and untranslatability is interesting. As remembered, for mythological consciousness translation is impossible, naming one thing in different ways is not possible without changing its essence. Lotman has frequently stressed the untranslatability of a literary text also from the aspect of the unity of the plane of content and expression. At the same time, when describing creative inspiration as an unpredictable moment of explosion, he writes about turning the untranslatable into the translatable: such a moment of explosion "makes the incompatible adequate, the untranslatable translatable" (Lotman 2000a: 29).

At the same time explosion does not create synonyms. Taken separately, this statement would contradict stressing the importance of the role of synonym at the emergence of free word and poetry. Inasmuch as in *Culture and Explosion* synonym obtains a conditional meaning, it rather opposes the original thought, the individual nonrecurrent thought:

From the viewpoint of a given culture *creation of no writer can be a synonym of another* (at least while we are dealing with original creation). Every of them means an independent, individual and unique path. This does not exclude their involvement in some generalising categories. (Lotman 2000a: 118)

In arts, Lotman's general viewpoint imposes a proper name meaning also on the pronoun "I". Here we can detect also certain polemics with statements referred to in R. Jakobson's article "The poetics of grammar and the grammar of poetics", and via Jakobson's article taking up a more general position in connection with as important a theme for Lotman as unique cultural practice and its generalising description, relations between the individual and the general. As known, in this article Jakobson cites, amongst others, also Stalin who writes about grammar in comparison with geometry that, abstracting from the individual and concrete, creates general laws and rules (cf. Lotman's example of the relationship between general and proper names describing a general talking about his soldiers, whereby the relatives, their own family has but a proper name without plural for them). From this standpoint pronouns are all over grammatical, relational, differing thereby from other words of autonomous nature. Words being and not being pronouns relate as if bodies of geometric and non-geometric nature. Jakobson observes that the function fulfilled by grammar in poetry is comparable with the function of geometry in fine arts. He demonstrates, via the analysis of "grammatical figures", how grammar may turn into a unique artistic means of expression in a poetic text (Jakobson 1981: 75–78).

Lotman makes a distinction between the pronoun "I" and the "I" as a proper name cultural phenomenon.

Thereby the structure of the pronoun "I" is much simpler, while the proper noun "I" is not a clearly definable linguistic sign. Its nature is best revealed in art:

Art is the most developed space of conditional reality. Exactly this makes it a "practice ground" of mental experiment and processes of intellectual dynamism in general. In connection with this we are interested in the power of art to connect the spaces of proper and general names. Whole wide areas of art the roots of which reach the most archaic layers are connected with the first person and represent the *Ich-Erzählung* — the narrative of the first person. However, at the same time this "I" occurs to be the bearer of the sense 'any other in my shoes'. (Lotman 2000a: 40)

From here we reach a central theme in Lotman's later works — the role of individual consciousness in cultural processes, and on the other hand — understanding cultural explosion moments through mecha-

nisms of individual meaning generation. While cultural explosion is connected exactly with the world of proper names, the world of general names in which elements are replaceable is more connected with continuing processes.

Thereby the explosive developments going on in art differ by nature from, e.g., scientific discoveries. At the description of the explosiveness of scientific discoveries, Lotman's viewpoint is similar to the way this problem was risen in phenomenological treatment, e.g., in Husserl's *The Beginning of Geometry* later amplified by Derrida (Husserl 1996). This is a question about the beginning of the general idea as it is first given in the consciousness of the creator, about the transformation of the unique into invariable. Husserl has written that "The Pythagorean theorem, like geometry, exists only once, be it however much expressed in different languages" (Husserl 1996: 215).

Against this background, for Lotman art is doubly proper name by nature: it is no only the act of creation, but also reception of an artistic work that has the essence of proper name. A literary work preserves, or more correctly reanimates its uniqueness in every act of reading. For example, when reading a novel, the reader enters the world of proper names perceived intimately.

> An artistic text turns this tendency into one of its most important structural element. It forces us to perceive any space as the space of proper names. We fluctuate between the subjective world known to us personally and its antithesis. In the artistic world the "alien" is always the "own", while at the same time the "own" is "alien". (Lotman 2000a: 105)

Lotman illustrates this peculiarity of art by the example of the novel. The novel creates the space of the so-called third person. By its linguistic structure it is given as located objectively outside the world of both the author and reader. However, at the same time, for the author, this world is lived as the one created by him/her, it is intimate, just as well as it is lived for a reader. Thus the "third person" in a novel obtains the emotional aureole that of the "first person". In the case of artistic text the message is relocated from the world of general names into the world of proper names (ibid., 105).

We dare to maintain that *Culture and Explosion*, called by Lotman also his mental testament, is a very personal book. In spite of its rich historical material it is simultaneously Lotman's reflection on his participation as a thinker in his contemporary cultural processes. Lotman's individual, personal thinking and experience, and its relation to the previous tradition and to the scientific thought emanating from

himself are comparable to the connection an artist creates between the space of proper and general names. At the same time it may be that *Culture and Explosion*, being centered at the proper name, makes it to a certain degree critical of semiotics. Yet semiotics deals, as a rule, with models organising reality and with self-descriptions assembling the diversity of life into an invariant. As stressed by Lotman, this is the basis on which his own culturo-typological descriptions have been created. In *Culture and Explosion* he tries, more than ever before, to bring closer together his approach to cultural processes as a historian and literary scholar (i.e. what pertains to proper names) on the one hand, and a semiotician (i.e. what pertains to general names) on the other. Maybe it is this why book can be called his mental testament. The present article aimed not so much at giving a thorough overview of the topic of proper names, as at pointing at the need to re-read works by Lotman and other authors of the Tartu-Moscow school in order to bring forward those potentialities and trends of thought that may sound surprisingly contemporary in today's cultural thought following poststructuralism. The authors are convinced in that treatments of proper names are one of the most perspective analytic keys to understand contemporary world, allowing to treat this topic much more flexibly than e.g. views emanating from Barthes' "contemporary mythology". Also it is exactly Lotman's relevant works that open novel possibilities to understand the nature of art and its inevitable integrity.

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Имя собственное у Юрия Лотмана

В статье рассматривается концепция имени собственного в работах Ю. М. Лотмана в контексте соответствующих разработок других исследователей Тартуско- Московской семиотической школы, — таких как В. В. Иванов, Б. Л. Огибенин, В. Н. Топоров, Б. А. Успенский. Статья делится по проблемам изучения на подразделы *имя и миф, имя и текст, имя и художественное творчество.*

Одним из основных положений при рассмотрении имени собственного в трудах названных авторов является его связь с мифом, мифологическим (не- или досемиотическим) мышлением. Оно легло и в основу програмного для нашей темы исследования Ю. М. Лотмана и Б. А. Успенского "Миф — имя — культура". Богатство сферы имен собствен-

...

ных, разнообразные переименования в более поздней культуре свидетельствуют о значимости в ней мифологического элемента. Имена собственные входят кроме естественного языка еще в свою собственную систему и тем самым образуют в нем пограничную зону, которую В. Н. Топоров рассматривает как интерлингвистическую по своей природе. Ю. М. Лотман в своих более поздних работах особо подчеркивает способность искусства объединять сферы имен собственных и нарицательных (имя собственное означает здесь индивидуальное, неповторимое начало, с ним связан культурный взрыв). Не только акт творения, но и акт восприятия произведения искусства индивидуален и неповторим, т.е. обладает природой имени собственного. По мнению авторов настоящей статьи теоретические положения Ю. М. Лотмана и других ученых Тартуско–Московской школы по проблемам имени могут оказаться неожиданно плодотворными для описания сегодняшней культурной ситуации.

Juri Lotman pärisnimest

Artikkel käsitleb pärisnime kontsepti Juri Lotmani semiootikas, arvestades ka teiste Tartu–Moskva koolkonna autorite (V. Ivanov, B. Ogibenin, V. Toporov, B. Uspenski) selleteemalisi uurimusi. Keskendutakse kolmele alateemale: *nimi ja müüt, nimi ja tekst, nimi ja kunstilooming.*

Üheks pärisnime käsitluse lähtekohaks nii J. Lotmani ja B. Uspenski programmilises artiklis "Müüt — nimi — kultuur" kui mitmete teiste Tartu–Moskva koolkonna semiootikute töödes on arusaam pärisnime seotusest müüdilise (asemiootilise) mõtlemisega: semioos võrdub siin nominatsiooniga. Pärisnimeline mitmekesisus, erinevad ümbernimetamised annavad tunnistust müüdilise mõtlemise jätkuvast osatähtsusest hilisemas kultuuris. Pärisnimed (nagu isiku-, kohanimed) kuuluvad peale loomuliku keele veel teatud oma süsteemi, moodustades seega keele piirialale jääva interlingvistilise kihistuse. J. Lotman rõhutab, et kunstil on eriline võime ühendada eneses üld- ja pärisnimelisust (pärisnimeline on siin mõistetud kui individuaalne, plahvatuslik). Kunstiteos on isegi topelt pärisnimeline: nii loomeakt kui teose vastuvõtt on oma olemuselt individuaalsed ja kordumatud. Artikli autorite arvates sisaldab Tartu–Moskva koolkonna pärisnime-käsitlus seni põhjendamatult vähe rakendatud viljakaid ja perspektiivseid seisukohti tänapäeva kultuuri analüüsiks.

Translation as translating as culture

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Abstract. The most common difficulty in translation studies has traditionally been the dilemma between the historical and synchronic approaches in the analysis and description of the culture of translation. On the one hand the culture of translation might be presented as the sum of various kinds of translated texts (repertoire of culture), on the other hand it might be described as the hierarchy of the various types of translations themselves. The first approach assumes plenty of languages for such description, in the latter one suggests only one language for the same representation. A cultural critic faces the same problems. In these perspectives the translation reveals important mechanisms of the performance of culture. First of all it is the semiotic inter-pretation of the theory of translation, introduced by the number of scientists beginning with R. Jakobson and including U. Eco who put together inter-linguistic, intra-linguistic, and inter-semiotic translations, so crucial for the further understanding of culture. As a result, the general notion of culture might be described as the process of total translation. And secondly, the other valuable contribution to the theory of translation has been made by both M. Bakhtin and J. Lotman in terms of the synthesis of two traditions in semiotics of culture resulted in juxtaposing such notions as dialogism and autonomy — creolization, polyphony, counterword, and translation.

Translating as an activity and translation as the result of this activity are inseparable from the concept of culture. The translational capacity of culture is an important criterion of culture's specificity. Culture operates largely through translational activity, since only by the inclu-sion of new texts into culture can the culture undergo innovation as well as perceive its specificity. After the expansion of the paradigm of postcolonial and the related field of gender studies into translation studies, the borderline between culture studies and translation studies has become fuzzier, yet at the same time, there has emerged a visible

complementarity. On the one hand, by the turn of the century, the understanding of the cultural value of a translation text has grown deeper, especially in respect to the importance of translations for the identity of the receiving culture. L. Venuti has called the identity-forming power of translations this ability of translations to participate, according to the necessity, both in ensuring culture's coherence or homogeneity as well as in activating cultural resistance or culture's innovation processes (Venuti 1998: 68).

On the other hand, culture theory, particularly in the area of cultural studies, has again begun to value the concept of identity through culture. Due to the activity of the topic of globalisation and the opposition of the global and the local, the understanding has been reached once again that no society wishing to enact its specificity can escape the consideration of cultural identity. The comprehension of the utmost necessity of cultural identity for the perception of political, social, economic and technological development has even been called the cultural turn: "The fact that cultural identity is the decisive factor in constructing the specificity of a certain society could be called the "cultural turn". It means a.o. that contemporary political and social developments, but also economic and technological developments, whether they have a global or rather a local nature, can only be understood via the concept of cultural identity..." (Segers 2000: 384–385).

Although there are several disciplines engaged in the study of culture, we can speak of neither a methodologically unified research into culture, nor of a general theory of culture. As an object of study culture allows for too many different definitions for this to be possible. In translation studies the possibilities of defining the object of study are considerably more limited, but the problem of unified methodology is bound to arise even here. Comparing the two fields, especially projecting the development problems of translation studies upon cultural theory, comes most naturally. Translation studies attempt to solve, although on a smaller scale, the same problems that have been facing cultural theory for some time already. This happens both on the object level and on the metalevel.

On the metalevel, attempts have been made in translation studies to regulate the specific metalanguage, as difficulties in understanding have appeared between different scholarly traditions of studying translation. Therefore calls have been made that works in translation studies be written in a generally comprehensible language, in the language of average scholarship, as it were. On the other hand, there have been attempts to create a situation of methodological translatability in

which different translation theories could be compared or possibilities of interdisciplinary synthesis could be searched for.

On the object level, the first problem is that of the secondary nature of translation. The difficulties arising in writing a translation history clearly show that proceeding from periods, translated authors, translated works or translators does not guarantee a description concerning the content. If the works of an author have been translated during a period of two hundred years and dozens of translations have been made of them, it seems possible to arrange them all along a scale between good and bad translation. However, the hundred years remaining between two translations do not allow us to compare them in such a manner. A typology is required, based on the distinction of different translation types according to certain characteristics. These characteristics can be external, but they can also be derived from a general model of the translation process.

Thus, the translation culture of a particular period can be viewed as a certain number of translated texts in one case, or as a hierarchy of translation types in another case. In the former case we can speak of the choice, cultural politics and cultural repertoire, the functioning of translated texts in a new culture. In the latter case we can discuss the translations themselves, translation methods and the translators' works. In the former case we can use very different languages of description, in the latter case we need comparative terms to denote types of translation, and thus a relatively unified metalanguage is required.

How is all this connected to the working mechanism of culture? The connectedness can be observed from two aspects. The first aspect derives from the fact that, thanks to Roman Jakobson's works, a semiotic turn took place on the borderline between translation studies and cultural semiotics. The scope of translation as a term widened and the methodology of translation studies started to change due to the differentiation between three kinds of translation activities. R. Jakobson distinguished intra-lingual translation or interpretation of verbal signs by verbal signs of the same language (sign system). The translation within a system of signs is related to paraphrasing, changing of genres and discourses. As a second type of translation R. Jakobson mentioned inter-lingual translation that means interpretation of verbal signs with the verbal signs of another language (sign system) and is thus translation in the ordinary sense. As a third type of translation R. Jakobson suggested intersemiotic translation or transmutation that means interpretation of the signs of a sign system with the signs of

another sign system. In this way, also translating literature into film or theatre productions, the translatability of word into picture and vice versa became visible to translation studies (Jakobson 1971).

To the three main types of translation, R. Jakobson's article adds the understanding of translation process as two processes taking place simultaneously, recoding and transposing. But the distinction between the changing and the retaining processes forms only the individual or individual psychological aspect of translation, although it is certainly impossible to create a model of translational activity without this aspect. However, also the general cultural or cultural psychological aspect is worth distinguishing. R. Jakobson stresses the semiotic value of all five senses in the human society ("All five external senses carry semiotic functions in human society" — Jakobson 1971a: 701), bringing thereby communication and autocommunication closer together. With respect to the study of communication processes, R. Jakobson stresses the importance of distinguishing between homogeneous messages, i.e. those based on a single sign system, and syncretic messages, i.e. those based on the combination of several sign systems. "The study of communication must distinguish between homogeneous messages which use a single semiotic system and syncretic messages based on a combination or merger of different sign patterns" (Jakobson 1971a: 705). Thus the differentiation of three translation types proceeds from R. Jakobson's general understanding of the communication process and the types of messages.

As a result of the semiotic turn several new conceptions arose within or on the borderline of translation studies. James Holmes introduced the concept of metaliterature in which all texts generated on the basis of one text were united into a single system (Holmes 1988). Anton Popovič developed his own theory of metatexts that also saw all secondary texts as a unified metacommunicative system. However, he observed the same processes both on the level of whole texts, as well as on the level of parts of texts. It is thanks to him that for instance quoting became analysable as a translation activity. Linking communication and metacommunication allowed him to create his own treatment of culture (Popovič 1975). Proceeding in the same direction the author has been expanding John Catford's notion of total translation and observed within this framework different translation types that can all be described on the basis of the model of a universal translation process. The types are textual translation or ordinary translation; metatextual translation or description via criticism, advertising and other texts of this kind; in-textual and intertextual

translation or transmitting or introducing a foreign word into a text, and extratextual translation or translating out of a text, using other semiotic material, for instance, in adapting literature to film (Torop 1995, complemented in Torop 2000).

The transformation of Jakobson's classification is also important. This was first done by Gideon Toury who restructured Jakobson's schema for the *Encylopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*. First and foremost, Toury differentiates between two types of translation — intrasemiotic translating and intersemiotic translating. Intersemiotic translating involves translating from language to non-language. Intrasemiotic translation can be divided into two subtypes — intrasystemic translating and intersystemic translating. Intrasystemic translation corresponds to Jakobson's intralinguistic translation and intersystemic translation in its turn answers to interlinguistic translation (Toury 1986).

The hitherto latest contribution to the development of Jakobson's classification has been made by Umberto Eco in his book *Experiences in Translation* (2001). Eco starts from Ch. S. Peirce's influence on Jakobson. On the one hand, Eco emphasises Peirce's statement "that *meaning*, in its primary sense, is a 'translation of a sign into another system of signs'" (Eco 2001: 69). On the other hand, he shows that the closeness of the concepts of translation and interpretation in Jakobson's case derives from the impressionistic quality of Peirce's metalanguage. Ch. S. Peirce "uses *translation* in a figurative sense: not like a metaphor, but *pars pro toto* (in the sense that he assumes 'translation' as a synecdoche for 'interpretation')" (Eco 2001: 69). Eco's own summary follows this logic — "translation is a species of the *genus* interpretation, governed by certain principles proper to translation" (Eco 2001: 80).

Eco's classification is, like that of Jakobson's, tripartite. Firstly, there is interpretation by transcription. This involves simple substitution of codes as, for example, in case of the Morse alphabet. Secondly, there is intrasystemic interpretation. This, in its turn, can be divided into three subcategories: intrasystemic interpretation within the same natural language (as, for instance, synonymy, definition, paraphrase, inference, comment etc.); intrasystemic interpretation within other semiotic systems (for instance, changing a piece of music from major to minor); and performance (for example, the performance of a musical score or the staging of a ballet). Thirdly, Eco introduces intersystemic interpretation that includes two types, one with marked variation in the substance, and the other with mutation of continuum.

Intersystemic interpretation with marked variation in the substance includes three subtypes: interlinguistic interpretation or translation between natural languages; rewriting (e.g., reworked versions of the same piece by the same composer, parody); translation between other semiotic systems or intersystemic interpretation with very marked differences in substance among non-linguistic systems (for instance, transforming a colourful oil painting into a black and white reproduction). Mutation of continuum includes parasynonymy and adaptation or transmutation. Parasynonymy can be illustrated by amplifying the phrase "that one over there" by pointing at the object with a finger. Adapting literature to film or to theatre belongs to adaptation or transmutation (Eco 2001: 100–128).

Several other, more local works, could be added to Eco's book that emphatically announce intersemiotic translation as radical translation to be the best means of lending meaning to any kind of translation activity. Intersemiotic translation makes implicit aspects of interlinguistic translation explicit. Methodologically the tradition that has its roots in Jakobson and in part also in Peirce has been characterized by bringing the concepts of meaning, interpretation and translation close to one another and viewing culture as a mechanism of translation.

Another aspect that can be linked to translation as a working mechanism of culture is that of semiotics of culture, but in a fairly specific sense. It is the points of contact between the traditions of M. Bakhtin and J. Lotman. Lotman and Bakhtin have been juxtaposed and contrasted to each other, and this has happened on different levels. In case of Bakhtin it is important that although he has not directly been concerned with translation problems as such, scholars still find reasons to write about him in connection with issues of translation (Emerson 1993, Robel 1995, De Michiel 1999). Leon Robel emphasises that Bakhtin attributes to the language of literature (and, at the same time, also the text) the capacity to operate as a metalanguage in translating from one sign system into another. For him, the text is a set of translations that differ in their meaning (Robel 1995). Margerita De Michiel, however, makes the translation text her basis and sees it as a place of multi-level dialogism in Bakhtin's system: "A translation text is a place where a dialogue takes place: between texts and practices, between empirical practice and theoretical practice, between science and ideology. It is a *dia*-logic place, for at least two different logics meet in it: those of two different languages" (De Michiel 1999: 695).

L. Robel and M. De Michiel implicitly express a most important dualism in Bakhtin's logic.

The treatise published under the name of Valentin Voloshinov *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* suggests that

> any element of an utterance that forwards a thought and is being fore-grounded, or even a full utterance is translated by us into corresponding context that is different and active. Any understanding is dialogic. Understanding is contrasted to utterance as a speaker's words are contrasted to those of another speaker in a dialogue. Understanding is looking for a counterword to the word of a speaker. Only understanding of a foreign word seeks for "a similar" word in the native language.
>
> [каждый выделимый смысловой элемент высказывания и все высказывание в целом — переводятся нами в иной, активный, отвечающий контекст. *Всякое понимание диалогично*. Понимание противостоит высказыванию как реплика противостоит реплике в диалоге. Понимание подыскивает слову говорящего *противослово*. Только понимание чужеземного слова подыскивает "то же самое" слово на своем языке.]
> (Bakhtin 2000a: 436).

Several scholarly works have been dedicated to the comparison of M. Bakhtin's and J. Lotman's dialogisms (Shukman, Lachmann, Danow, Bonafin), but the simultaneity of the dual understanding has not been stressed much. In essence, this is a situation in which understanding is a process that on the one hand creates differences (word and the counterword), and, on the other hand, similarities (word and its translation). And if the dialogism of understanding is borne in mind, we can in principle talk about two types of dialogue.

One of Bakhtin's central concepts to denote the unique status of Dostoyevski's novels in world literature is polyphony or polylogue. The characters of an ordinary novel are, according to Bakhtin's logic, objects of representation for the authors. Dostoyevski, however, frees the characters from the author's sway over them and makes them into independent subjects. This is accompanied by a multiplicity of different subjects that allows us to speak about the polyphonic novel as coexistence of several equal subjects and, by extension, also ideas, of a choir of different voices. Against the background of polyphony, Bakhtin has listed three interconnected phenomena as first discovered by Dostoyevski: firstly; a new way of representing people, according to which a human being is "an alien consciousness of full and equal rights and of full meaning that has not been set in the *finishing* frame of reality" ("полноправное и полнозначное чужое сознание, не вставленное *в завершающую* оправу действительности") and the

interpretation of which, accordingly, is a dialogic process. Secondly, the representation of the independent development of an idea that cannot be separated from personality not within the framework of a philosophical or some other system, but as a human event. Thirdly, dialogism as a particular form of mutual influences of consciousnesses with equal rights and meanings (Bakhtin 1996: 340–341). According to this, polyphony as a whole is an artistic "will to unite several single wills, a will to reach an event"("воля к сочетанию многих воль, воля к событию") (Bakhtin 2000b: 29).

From the point of view of cultural analysis it must be admitted that any culture is analysable in a polylogic manner or as a polylogue due to its heterogeneity. But already in Bakhtin's logic an important principle is revealed — the polylogue of a culture cannot be analysed as a sum total of monologues, for culture as a whole operates through dialogic relationships between monologues and a polylogue is thus an intertwined phenomenon. What is necessary to understand this intertwining is studying and understanding the space in which it takes place, the cultural space. And, within this space, it is necessary to understand the situation that creates dialogue or is accompanied by dialogue — to understand the event or the text.

Culture has its own sign systems or languages on the basis of which the members of the culture communicate. Thus, one possibility to understand a culture is to learn the languages of the culture, the sign systems operating within the culture. The languages of culture are, however, apt to change and their signs are ambiguous. Thus another possibility remains to approach the culture via events and texts that bind different sign systems, yet have a general meaning or theme that can be described.

Even on the level of an ordinary natural language Bakhtin already a long time ago brought forth the semiotic polarity of meaningfulness. He signified the poles with the notions of theme and meaning. Bakhtin called the theme the highest real boundary of linguistic meaningfulness, for only a theme is defined. Accordingly, he called meaning the lowest boundary of linguistic meaningfulness for meaning does not mean, but is a potential, an ability to have meaning within the framework of a theme (Bakhtin 2000a: 435–436).

Bakhtin's scholarly reception is related to these two poles as well. A polylogic approach to culture still gives priority to the coexistence of different (linguistic, cultural, semiotic etc.) autonomies and observes the differences of differences. A dialogic polylogism gives priority to links and mixing of autonomies; and, beside the differing of

differences, it also observes the differences between samenesses or the sameness of differences. This has been called "heterology" by Tz. Todorov who has declared in a fit of polemics, "heterology that makes the differences between voices audible, is necessary; polylogy is dull and empty" (Todorov 1982). One of the first people to introduce Bakhtin to the world at large, Julia Kristeva, has stressed the ambivalence of Bakhtin's system; considering the same poles, she juxtaposed the polyphonic novel with Menippean satire as a heterologic phenomenon.

To explain heterology as a concept we should return to the time when Bakhtin was most active. Some dozen years before Bakhtin introduced the concept of polyphony, a dictionary of musical terms *A Guide to Concerts* by B. Asafyev (1919) was published in Russia. This booklet, that has had considerable influence on the metalinguistic thought of its period, defines several concepts of the theory of music as general and theoretical ones. When it is read through the prism of Bakhtin's works that were to follow, also the notion of heterophony opens up in this way. Heterophony "is not yet polyphony in its developed (articulated) form, in which each voice has an independent meaning, but one of the stages in the transition to polyphony (in which all voices form an intricate horisontal complex that is moving and continuously changing)" ("еще не многоголосие (полифония) в развитом (дифференцированном, расчлененном) виде, когда каждый голос получает самостоятельное значение, а одна из переходных к многоголосию стадий [...] (когда все голоса образуют сложный подвижный непрерывный изменчивый горизонтальный комплекс)" (Asafjev 1978: 31–32). Thus, if we proceed from this logic, polyphony creates a vertical dimension, a dimension of diverse voices differing from one another.

An ethnological description of culture or one deriving from cultural anthropology is first and foremost polylogic, for it fixes the cultural languages that differentiate themselves intelligibly (i.e. can be described) and these are described in an autonomous way. This is what Clifford Geertz opposed. Semiotics of culture, however, started to fill an important gap — to describe the complexes, the intertwining of the languages of culture. J. Lotman drew distinctions between two different processes in his description of culture. One is the specialisation of languages of culture (e.g. as the autonomy in culture of photography or film as the result of new technical developments). Another is the integration of languages of culture, that can be marked firstly by the appearance of metadescriptions and autometadescrip-

tions (or culture's attempt to make itself conscious through criticism, theory, the media etc.); and, secondly, by creolisation (merging of cultural languages), starting from experimental cases (the transitions between literature- theatre-film) to the mergings on the levels of the high and the low, of style and stylelessness, of genre characteristics (Lotman 2000: 572–575).

Against the background of Lotman's synthesis, synthesis on a new level is important. The analysis based on the description of pure phenomena or polyphonic analysis, and the analysis based on impure (mixed) phenomena or heterophonic analysis complete each other. This happens both on the level of the culture itself, as well as on the level of describing the culture. It is no accident that U. Eco in his preface to J. Lotman's work titled *Universe of the Mind* that was published in the United States in 1990 mentioned that the most interesting moment occurred when Lotman took up analysis of the creolization of cultural codes.

Thus it is inevitable to have the two possible types of analysis continuously in mind. Restricting oneself to impure systems only will reach, in its extreme version, postmodernist simulacra, such as J. Baudrillard's concepts of transaesthetics (arbitrary reception of a work of art), transpolitics (differences between parties and ideologies that cannot be told apart), transsexuality (the loss of the sexual dominant in culture, approaching the state of a robot or a dummy etc), transeconomics (loss of accounting in economic processes) (Baudrillard 1990).

When Lotman wrote in *Universe of the Mind* that an "elementary act of thinking is translation" (Lotman 1990: 143), he also took the following logical step, stating that "elementary mechanism of translating is dialogue" (Lotman 1990: 143).

What I would like to contend is that the situation that has arisen in translation studies is in many of its aspects also a situation concerned with the theory of culture. This has been grasped in the semiotics of culture by introducing intersemiosis beside the concept of semiosis. This is not a tautology. Also, apprehensive attitudes are apparent in case of several scholars. M. Riffaterre who dedicated a whole article to the defence of intertextuality against hypertextuality can serve as an eloquent example. In the former notion he sees a programme and a system that can be made explicit, in the latter he notices but arbitrary links. His fear that a lack of system will be studied as a system is actually fear of complementariness (Riffaterre 1994).

The changing nature of boundaries within a culture requires two-fold competence from the scholar engaged in cultural analysis — the

ability to analyse autonomous phenomena and the ability to analyse creolisation, and mixtures, for it is the proportion between autonomy and creolisation that best explains the present state of a culture and its dynamics. In the discipline of semiotics of culture it comes naturally to say that culture is translation, and also that translation is culture. However, in the present context it should be added that translation activity is also an activity that explains the mechanisms of culture and that translation itself is a concept that is extremely loaded methodologically. Still, the fact that translation as a concept is loaded does not mean it is metaphorised. Translation and translating are concepts concurrent with an active culture and allow us in the situation of the scarcity of culture theoretic means to approach the essence of cultural mechanisms in a way that the analysis of both translation and translating as well as culture are enriched.

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Перевод как переводческий процесс как культура

В переводоведении традиционной трудностью является целостное историческое или синхроническое описание культуры перевода. С одной стороны, культуру перевода можно описать как сумму переводных текстов разного типа (репертуар культуры), с другой стороны — как иерархию типов перевода. Первый подход допускает обилие языков описания, второй подход предполагает существование единого языка описания. Те же проблемы стоят перед культурологом. Переводческая деятельность

раскрывает, таким образом, важные аспекты механизма действия культуры. Во-первых, для понимания культуры плодотворны результаты семиотического поворота в переводоведении от Р. Якобсона до У. Эко, т.е. сопоставимость интерлингвистического, интралингвистического и интерсемиотического перевода. В результате всю культуру можно описать как процесс тотального перевода. Во-вторых, в семиотике культуры ценен синтез двух традиций (связанных с именами М. Бахтина и Ю. Лотмана), приводящий к сопоставимости понятий диалогичность и автономность-креолизация, полифоничность и гетерофоничность, противослово и перевод.

Tõlge kui tõlkimine kui kultuur

Tõlketeaduses on tavaraskuseks tõlkekultuuri terviklik ajalooline või sünkrooniline kirjeldamine. Ühelt poolt võib tõlkekultuuri vaadelda eritüübiliste tõlketekstide kogumina (kultuurirepertuaarina), teiselt poolt tõlketüüpide hierarhiana. Esimene lähenemisviis võimaldab erinevate kirjelduskeelte kasutamist, teine eeldab ühtse kirjelduskeele olemasolu. Samade probleemidega seisab silmitsi ka kulturoloog. Seega avanevad tõlketegevuses kultuuri toimemehhanismi olulised aspektid. Kõigepealt aitavad kultuuri paremale mõistmisele kaasa R. Jakobsoni ja U. Eco töödest tingitud semiootilise pöörde tulemused, interlingvistilise, intralingvistilise ja intersemiootilise tõlke kõrvutatavus. Selle tulemusel võib kõigepealt kogu kultuuri kirjeldada totaalse tõlkeprotsessina. Teiselt poolt muutub väärtuslikuks kahe kultuurisemiootilise, J. Lotmani ja M. Bahtini nimedega seostuva traditsiooni süntees, mis asetab kõrvuti mõisted dialoogilisus ja autonoomia-kreoliseerumine, polüfoonilisus ja heterofoonilisus, vastusõna ja ja tõlge.

On psychological aspects of translation

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Abstract. Translation science is going through a preliminary stage of self-definition. Jakobson's essay "On linguistic aspects of translation", whose title is re-echoed in the title of this article, despite the linguistic approach suggested, opened, in 1959, the study of translation to disciplines other than linguistics, semiotics to start with. Many developments in the semiotics of translation — particularly Torop's theory of *total translation* — take their cue from the celebrated category "intersemiotic translation or *transmutation*" outlined in that 1959 article. I intend to outline here the contributions that the science of translation — following a semiotic perspective opened by Peirce and continued by Torop — can gather from another discipline: psychology. The "totalistic" approach to translation provided by Torop can be more deeply enforced by applying to it the consequences deriving from the psychological insight offered by the concept of "interpretant" as mental sign; the perceptual interpretation of the prototext; reading and writing as intersemiotic translation processes; unlimited semiosis as interminable analysis; primary and secondary process in dreams and in other kinds of translation; metaphor and disambiguation as mental processes; the defenses activated when translation criticism (review) and self-criticism (revision) are made.

> *There are days when everything I see seems to me*
> *charged with meaning: messages it would be*
> *difficult for me to communicate to others, define,*
> *translate into words [...].* (Calvino 1998: 55).

1. From psycholinguistics to psycho-semio-translation

Psycholinguistic approaches to translation traditionally focus on a behavioral analysis of translation. Translation is considered as a behavior, and the focus of analysis is "the problem of investigating translator-

behavior" (Bell 1998: 189). A translator is compared to a hardware component: "All text processing is, to a large extent, a matter of problem solving. Translators, just like other text-processors, encounter problems [...]" (Bell 1998: 187). One of the main issues is memory. As in the behavioural tradition, the translator is considered a "black box", out of focus, while the analysis is on the input and the output, cause and effect. Such an approach tends to consider translational behaviour on a large, objective, scale, rather than the subjective mechanisms underlying text interpretation. Moreover, "translation" means here just "interlingual translation".

After all a translator, and even more so a translation researcher, is induced to think in terms of passing directly from prototext to meta-text by the evaluative-oriented exercises occurring in his higher schooling; by the existence and use of bilingual dictionaries, that are presented not as temporary, tentative, incomplete and potentially misleading aids, but as lists of "equivalents"; by the existence of monolingual dictionaries, that are presented not as lists of partial and possible interpretations, but as lists of "meanings"; and by the low awareness of translation processes (also in terms of perception, reading, writing) in our culture.

I don't consider translation as a mental activity on its own, but as a set of specific operations ranging from reading to writing, from interpreting to reviewing, on which a vast psychological literature is available. I see each process — reading, for example — in terms of intersemiotic translation from one type of code to another — from verbal code to mental code, in this example.

Translators do not limit themselves to input-output, source-target transfer, like telegraph operators transcribing the dots and lines of Morse code into the Latin (or other natural code) alphabet characters. Language, being used more or less efficiently to communicate with other individuals, does not contradict the subjectivity of the individual's linguistic experience: it undergoes another passage, i.e. the translation from inner speech into the outer world when we want to be understood by another person.

If Freud guessed the existence of an entity — the unconscious — that revolutionized the concept of human and free will, contemporary psychology, postulating the existence of an inner language of which we are unaware but we continually use, revolutionizes the way to think of sign-object relations and, in translation studies, prototext sign — metatext sign relations. The active (but often unconscious) participation of the translator's mind in interpreting and reworking the

text, and the consequent unavoidable infiltration of the translator's personal, private material (affects, sensations, feelings, memories, experiences, traumas, idiosyncrasies, just to name a few) make the translation process an unaware, unwilling manipulation (apart from any willing, outer, ideologically-driven manipulation of which the translator is aware). Reconsidering the not so fortunate spatial-ballistic metaphor of the translation as a path, the translator's mind is another of the places — beyond "source" and "target" — in which translation occurs, all the more interesting and potentially insidious because it is neglected by most arguments on translation. A place of perdition, a Dantean *selva*, meaning that here occurs the fatidic loss of a part of the message's content that, according to Torop's total translation view, can be recovered only by means of a metatextual translation.

The focus shifts from objectivity to subjectivity, from behavioural psychology to depth psychology — from *e*ffects to *a*ffects — and from linguistics to semiotics. I use the Peircean approach to the notion of text (everything is a text that is read as a text), the depth-psychology approach to the concept of psyche (subjective affects playing a major role in it), Jakobson's notion of "intersemiotic translation" (everything is a translation that has a prototext and a metatext), and Torop's notion of "total translation" (translation as a key concept in semiotics; everything must be translated) to stir new reflections in the semiotics of translation.

2. Peirce and translation

The term "translation" was often used by Peirce referring not to interlingual translation, but to the extraction of meaning from texts. To Peirce the "interpretant" (or "interpretant sign") is that mental sign, that thought, that representation, serving as a mediating tool between sign and object.

> Everything may be comprehended or more strictly translated by something: that is has something which is capable of such a determination as to stand for something through this thing; somewhat as the pollen-grain of a flower stands to the ovule which it penetrates for the plant from which it came since it transmits the peculiarities of the latter. In somewhat the same sense, though not to the same degree, everything is a medium between something and something. (Peirce 1982, 1: 333)

The mental representation of something (in Peirce's simile, the representation of the pollen-grain to the plant) is a sort of mental *translation*. In other words, the interpretant is also a "translatant" and, in some scholars' opinion, it could be legitimately called by either term without difference. The perception of something (object or sign) *translates* the perceived thing into a mental representation, or interpretant. Every following perception-translation-interpretation is a recognition, i.e. new interpretation and clarification of the mental representation. "We are capable of understanding representations only by having conceptions or mental representations, which represent the given representation as a representation" (Peirce 1982, 1: 323). A mental representation (interpretant) is such only on condition that it also implies the awareness of being a representation. There is a level of representation (signs) and a level of meta-representation (meta-signs). Meaning is built through a less and less uncertain process of truth seeking (Gorlée 1994: 119), progressing from perception to conception to meta-conception: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object" (Peirce 1982, 3: 266).

Every read word evokes a quick series of subjective associations, so quick that it often goes unrealized. This process translates the read signs into translatants. Human thought progresses and evolves through a series of translations. As far as such evolution occurs within an individual, translations have interpretant signs both as a prototext and as a metatext, and are then intralingual translations (in this case meaning by "language" the mental subjective language). When the evolution of thought passes from one person to another, interpretants need to be translated into understandable texts (verbal language, body language, etc.); then single receivers must retranslate them into interpretant signs. A double intersemiotic translation occurs. "But a sign is not a sign unless it *translates* itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed. Thought requires achievement for its own development, and without this development it is nothing. Thought must live and grow in incessant new and higher *translations*, or it proves itself not to be genuine thought" (Peirce 1931–1966, 5: 594).

Each of these thought translations is a step higher than the previous one; it is not supposed to be a "faithful" translation, but an enrichment of the previous sign. A sign is a body, whose interpretation is the soul. Every sign must have an interpretant, otherwise it is not a sign. "A *sign* must have an interpretation or signification or, as I call it, an

interpretant. This interpretant, this significations simply a metempsychosis into another body; a **translation** into another language. This new version of the thought received in turn an interpretation, and *its* interpretant gets itself interpreted, and so on, until an interpretant appears which is no longer of the nature of a sign" (Peirce, quoted in Gorlée 1994: 126).

Translation — the very process characterizing reading and, in the following phases, the evolution of the material read — is a fundamental link of semiosis, or sign translation. Some maintain that semiosis is unlimited. Peirce maintains, on the other hand, that the ultimate aim of translation is to reveal the ultimate signification of the sign (Gorlée 1994: 127). Since, however, he doesn't tell if or how it is possible to arrive at this "ultimate" result, Peirce leads us to believe that there is always room for further translation-interpretation-reading: semiosis, reading, translation never end, it is always possible to enrich interpretation with new elements.

3. Inner speech

The language in which we think, the language in which we dream, is not a natural code. Of course, it *is* "natural", but not as this is meant in linguistics. True enough, we sometimes hear people saying things like: "After two weeks at the Tartu congress, I started to dream in Estonian". This does not mean that the dream language *is* Estonian; rather, that in a dream some words in any form may be present and that these words are in that natural code. A dream, in itself, has its own idiosyncratic language, and this explains why it is so difficult, afterwards, putting it into words. It is a "multi-code" language, because it can involve all the senses simultaneously. The verbalization of its contents is an intersemiotic translation.

The speed of thought is far higher that the speed of verbalization. Thought is a sort of inner discussion in an inner code understandable only within that framework. Words come into play only when it is necessary to express thoughts outwardly. Vygotsky saw this ability in the infant, who is able to translate outer and inner stimuli into his own inner language and to connect them, to acknowledge (semiotize) them long before learning to actively use the outer language made of words.

Any attempt to reduce the relations between words to mathematic symbols, any attempt to treat the linguistic code as if it consisted of isomorphic signs, even if we do not take into account all the problems connected to the differences between cultures, is intrinsically ruinous owing to the intrinsically inconsistent nature of the individual-word relationship. Being a product of subjective mental experiences, such relation is also diachronically variable as a function of the progressive enrichment of personal experience.

4. Text perception

"The very existence of texts [...] can not only be freely interpreted but also cooperatively generated by the addressee (the 'original' text constituting a flexible *type* of which many *tokens* can be legitimately realized) [...]" (Eco 1995: 3). The first act of reading is connected to the perception of the text. Different mental materials, different interpretants, may be linked, in each of us, to a word; consequently, the perception of a word is an interpretive act.

The first stage concerns the interpretive act implied in the very perception of the prototext, i.e. in the first, albeit superficial, reading of the original text. The scanning activity consists in observing parts of a sequence in succession in order to extract meaning, be it a verbal or non-verbal text (Gibson 1983: 250). Even if while reading one seems to get a series of successive optical stimuli, perception actually spans both spatial and temporal order; one can single out not only little fragments, but also complete invariant elements. The initial perception provides an approximate distinction between "same" and "different". Perceived sequences already contain the whole scene: the sequences are converted within the perception of the whole (word, utterance, text; Gibson 1983: 262).

Interpretants, once entered the mind, continue to be modified, producing chain-effects in which they change into signs for further signification processes using as objects other material in — or outside — the mind, and producing new interpretants. Reading, when the text is fertile to the reader, produces long-term reactions.

A translator is reading and, at the same time, has to keep track of all the inner and outer balances the utterance has in connection with the whole text: numerous synthesis and analysis operations are carried out — without the same pressure of the time limitations imposed on

an interpreter — which force her to focus on the structure as a whole and not only on individual perceptual units (Gibson 1983: 270).

Language has *predication* capabilities. It has syntagmatic association capabilities, beyond paradigmatic combination capabilities. The endless combinability of words, despite the (supposed) finiteness of each word, greatly increases the predication capabilities and, consequently, the expressive and interpretive potential. Having perceived an object, the observer grasps the *affordance* of each object, she does not limit herself to the fixed, denotative meaning, she also perceives the connotative, contextual, environmental meaning.

If observer and observed environment are part of one context, it is impossible any kind of objective, detached observation "from without", in the same way as a fixed, cold, unrepeatable reading. According to Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, absolute and precise measurements are impossible, due to the interference to the measured quantity, which is inevitably introduced by the measuring instrument. In other words, the observer is part of the environment surrounding her as well as the text she is reading, so that each reading, each textual perception is, at the same time, a self-analysis.

5. Meaning as generalization

In concept formation, the role played by words is fundamental: first, the infant learns the relation between an object, a situation or a single action and a word. In an experiment, subjects were presented with elements of different shapes, sizes and colors, "experimental blocks", behind which some meaningless strings of characters were traced. The task consisted of establishing conceptual links between shapes, sizes, colors and "new words". Vygotsky concluded that "The formation of the concept is followed by its transfer to other objects: the subject is induced to use the new terms in talking about objects other than the experimental blocks, and to define their meaning in a generalized fashion" (1965: 57)".

Generalization occurs by way of a sort of perception-word-perception-word... chain (i.e. analysis-synthesis-analysis-synthesis...) through which new perceptions induce the formulation of new words to describe them, which induces the systematization of perception so that it will be possible, given a finite number of words, to express infinite perceptions, since two identical perceptions do not exist. Word becomes a means for the formation of concepts (Vygotsky 1965: 59).

Here's why two readings, even if accomplished in different times by the same person on the same text, are never identical. The meaning of a word is a consequence of the generalization of a concept, of the synthesis of many perceptive experiences: it is an act of thought. Thoughts, words, and meanings are tightly interwoven, and it is probably more interesting to study them as a single system rather than try to isolate components and obstinately demark their limitations (Vygotsky 1965: 120). There cannot be any elaboration of concepts without (at least inner) language and there can be no language without an intense thought activity. But the fruit of such intellectual activity is never fully mature, never truly results as conclusive. Just owing to this back-and-forth play between analysis and synthesis, between perception and generalization — interpretants becoming signs of further Peircean triads —, meaning is an ever-evolving process. The meanings of words are dynamic formations changing with the individual's development and with the various ways in which her thought functions. The relation between thought and word is not a constant but a process, during which changes can be considered "as development in the functional sense" (Vygotsky 1965: 130).

6. Automatisms

Ogden and Richards show a more explicitly mental version of Peirce's interpretant that defines the three factors playing a role in any uttering: mental processes, symbol and referent. Between thought and symbol there is a symbolization relation, between thought and object a reference relation, while between symbol and object there is no direct relation, just an *implied* relationship. The sign-object relation is mediated by the subjective, idiomorphic mind of the person who codes the utterance or decodes it. It is variable, individual, inconstant, indirect.

Reference can be the mnemic effect/s of a stimulus. In this view, reference is a consequence of the adaptation to a psychic context, and "the meaning of A is that to which the mental process interpreting A adapts itself. This is the most important sense in which words have meaning". These effects are *introspective judgments*, i.e. interpretations of a given type, sometimes-nonverbal judgments, "obscure feelings accompanying the reference". Sometimes such feelings are expressed with words, but that is not always the case: sometimes

words are not appropriate for the reference they must symbolize (Ogden, Richards 1960: 205–206).

While recognizing a sound, or a shape, as such, involves a context consisting of similar, previously experienced sound and visual sensations, recognizing a sign "as a word requires that it form a context with further experiences" other than sounds or graphemes. Without realizing it, one learns to classify the occurrence of a given word as a sign, linked to a reaction similar to those elicited by the associated experiences. Interpretation is unconscious, if no difficulties arise; otherwise, the perceptual automatism can get stuck and conscious interpreting procedures come into play. The fewer difficulties in understanding words, the less consciousness of the processes used in order to do so, and the less preparation to address a marked utterance.

Once a sound is mentally identified as a word, its importance as a sound is not placed in the background. Some phonic (tone, volume, speed, timbre, intonation, musicality) and graphic features (typeface/handwriting, spacing, dimension, layout, graphics) become part of the message content and, as much as two encounters with the same word can prove to be different, they must share that common character necessary to identify them as occurrences of the same word. Only thanks to this shared part the two words have a similar psychic context, and hence can be perceived in a similar way. Such psychic contextualization occurs, particularly in the first, simpler stages, in an unconscious way. Difficulty in understanding generates the re-emergence of non-conscious levels (Ogden, Richards 1960: 211), and focusing onto such usually automatic mechanisms, which distracts from the interpretation of the message at a pragmatic, functional, outer level.

7. Metaphor and free associations

Language learning is not a simple matter of acquiring synonyms or alternative expressions, but to learn the nuances of many senses and particular connotations created by the context. Such endless activity of identification of affinities and differences continually refines abstraction capabilities, teaches to use metaphors, "the primitive symbolization of abstraction". Metaphor is the application of a single verbal expression to a group of objects that are different but share something. The use of metaphor helps the identification of a similar relation in

another group. Metaphor is a signification relation that appropriates the context of another relation.

The abstraction capability necessary to get to the metaphor is just the same as that necessary to put an adjective near a noun, or to use prepositions or verbs. And the metaphorical aspects of a great part of language show that, the higher the level of education of an individual, the more words acquire a context through other words. The down side of such sophisticated acquisition of meanings lies in the fact that meanings, built on such abstract references, are bound to muddle our minds more often.

Unlike numbers, words express the attitude of the speaker toward objects. "A word is nothing but a metaphor for an object or, in some cases, for another word" (Rabassa 1989: 1). An implicit comparison implies a peculiar way of expressing the indicated object, not a "neutral" expression of it.

Rabassa recalls a passage from the *Gulliver's Travels* in which, at Lagado Academy, the problem of the margin of misunderstanding is resolved in a very original, if not very practical, way: everyone carries every object he wants to "talk" about and, instead of talking, shows the object. While in our reality the two triangles sign-interpretant-object of interlingual translation face one another, with the translator in an uncomfortable position between the two signs, in the case of Lagado's academics, the interpretive triangle formed by object, interpretant, sign in the prototext would share one vertex with the relative interpretive triangle of the metatext: the object vertex. Borges, in order to stress the inadequacy of words, proposed one of his translators not to translate what he said, but what he meant to say. Since a writer does nothing but choose the metaphor that best becomes the sense of what he wants to express (Rabassa 1989), and since, evidently, metaphors are all but scientifically formed, the translator must abductively reconstruct the process that induced the author to use given metaphors and then she has to understand the author's presumed communication intention: a psychological task.

8. Reading as translation

While reading, one doesn't store the words read in her mind as happens with data entered by keyboard or scanner into a computer. After reading, there is no photographic or auditory recording of the text read.

There is a set of impressions. A few words or sentences are remembered precisely, while all the remaining text is translated into mental language. The first act in translating the translator must carry out is intersemiotic, not interlingual. The words are transformed into mental material. Far from being an *objective* reaction to the graphic sign, a standard bio-chemical reaction equal for all the readers dealing with the perception of any given word, the *interpretant* is a subjective psychic sign, produced by the whole experience accomplished by the individual with words, objects, concepts or feelings linked, by any means, to the word in question. An interpretant is subjective because the experience each of us has is subjective.

Experiments were carried out on readers in order to explain how syntactic and semantic ambiguities may be solved during the act of reading. Some of the examples on which the experiments were carried out are based on the completion of incomplete utterances.

1) Henry forgot Lila...
   a)   ... at her office. (direct object interpretation);
   b)   ... was almost always right. (sentence complement interpretation).
         (Trueswell 2000: 327)

When faced with ambiguities like the one in the first utterance, experiments indicate that readers tend to resolve ambiguities. In the quoted example most readers opted for the (a) interpretation. A theory of sentence processing has been created that emphasizes the integrative nature of interpretation: ambiguities are resolved, having considered a wide range of sources of information, based on restraints that prevent different interpretations.

As much as a polysemic word has meanings that are dominant when compared to others — i.e. meanings that are considered more probable *a priori* out of context — ambiguous words can have *a priori* dominant and/or subordinate syntactic structures. Experiments show that the fact that a structure is or is not dominant changes from one instance to another, from one word to another. And probably it varies from one culture to another too, even within the same natural code, and from one speaker to another (Trueswell 2000: 331–332).

Two kinds of restraints — how frequent the experience with a syntactic structure has been and the presence of the semantic and co-textual information — do not occur in sequence, but simultaneously, in a reciprocal interaction. This was controlled based on the pre-supposition that, when one of the limiting factors contradicts with the other, the time required to resolve the ambiguity increases. In order to

know the odds that a given syntactic pattern or a given semantic value will be used within a given speaker's community, textual corpora were used containing millions and millions of 'real' utterances. When readers come across the clue that lets them think of a very probable structure that, however, develops in an unexpected way, they take much more time in the process of resolving the ambiguity.

9. Writing as a translation process

Researchers dealing with text generation agree on the fact that it is a translation process — within the wider interlingual translation process — and to describe it spontaneously use the word "translate" and its derivatives: "Text or discourse production basically consists in determining, organizing and *translating* content [...], the *translation* of a conceptual structure (message) into its corresponding linguistic form" (Zock 1997: 317). The human mind processes language by taking it apart — unconsciously: it's all too fast for a conscious control to be active — into "translation units", conceptual chunks that may correspond to nominal groups, propositions, but never single words (Zock 1997: 318). Word-for-word elaboration can block sentence formulation: not knowing *from start* what persons are the subjects/objects of the action it is often impossible to go on formulating the sentence.

The length of the chunks used by the single individual as a processing unit depends, on the complexity of the concepts and on the technical competence. An interlingual translator is no exception to this rule: the more expert, the greater the text chunks. Mental chunks are translated into words, each of which has syntagmatic and paradigmatic properties. The cognitive process on which verbalization is based tends to be repeated as it is, resulting in verbal habits (Zock 1997: 323). A first lexical draft of the mental content to be expressed is sometimes realized in this way, looking for approximate matching between previous writing experiences and what needs to be expressed. This pattern matching produces a first approximate draft, comparable to what Freud calls "primary process" referring to dream lexicalization. Such first stage implies, especially in the more expert and skilled writers, a second stage of reviewing and adjusting ("secondary process") (Freud 1900: 525). Due to limitations in short-term memory, sentences are built gradually, interpolating execution and planning

stages. While one part of the speech act is actualized, the next one is planned. There are many affinities between language and perception: they are both compositional devices, both must satisfy good-form and completeness (Gestalt) conditions (Zock 1997: 328).

If the text-generation process is considered in terms of inter-semiotic translation from the mental into the verbal, and if applying words to mental content generates content, then the translation process is complex, bi-directional, and manifold. If the selection of given words alters the content of the message to be expressed, such selection has an impact both on the structuring of that message and on all revisions before the final draft.

There is no describable correspondence between words and the mental subjective meaning aura: choosing a word (or combination) alters not only the way in which content is expressed, but the speech act's content as well. Such a view supports the Russian Formalists' point about indivisibility of form and content. This is also because verbal language proceeds along a paradigmatic-syntagmatic line, while thought is more similar to a hypertext.

Speaking of metatext drafting in terms of translation from the mental into the verbal, I give an approximate, general idea. Going into details one realizes that, actually, there is a series of micro-translations that, like shuttles, move in the two ways from verbal to mental and vice versa. After the first approximate translation of mental material into lexicon, the semantic fields of the selected words, together with their syntactical combinability, the connotative meanings of these words for the writing person, the cognitive experiences connected to the use of such words by the subject determine an informational feedback (from verbal into mental) that influences the selection of other words and the completion and/or modification of syntactical structures (from mental into verbal).

Both the stage in which the text of a translation is drafted, and the stage in which the metatext is revised, add up to a continuous work of micro-translation from the mental into verbal and vice versa that ends only with actualization.

10. Interminable/terminable (text) analysis

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed

sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representation. (Peirce 1931–1966, 2: 228)

One object, depending on the ground on which the consideration lies, has different interpretants. Eco focuses on getting to a wider context in which it is possible to explain why two speakers usually can understand each other, at least partially, while their communicative capacity is based on subjective instances. "[...] A ground is an idea in the sense in which an idea is caught during the communicative intercourse between two interpreters" (Eco 1995: 183). Although the interpretant is subjective, there exists a pragmatic use of words that, taking into account the actual communicative relation between two persons, relies on that part of the interpretants that can be presumably shared. The meaning of a sign is null in itself, it only becomes something in the relation with the pragmatics of communication, it becomes something only in translation. Meaning "[...] is, in its primary acception, the translation of a sign into another system of signs" (Peirce 1931–1966, 4: 127). "[...] the meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be translated into" (Peirce 1931–1966, 4: 127). The sign-interpretant-object triad thus does not contemplate the notion of "meaning" until the semiotic process is not actualized. The meaning of a word is representable as a network of features regarding that term (Eco 1995: 187). Following Peirce, unlimited semiosis is apparently a strict consequence of the semiotic theory, but it eventually takes on the form, in some of its representations, the anguished aspect of the interminability not only of the analysis of meanings, but also of the search for understanding, like in this passage:

The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object as its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handled along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (Peirce 1931–1966, 1: 339)

In Eco's opinion essentially the interpretant produced by an object has a double nature. On one hand there is the affect that constitutes the link between an object and a sign. Interpretations, within affective interpretants, have consequences within the framework of representations,

without altering anyone's behavior. The "energetic interpretant" is, on the other hand, the one producing a change of habit (Eco 1995: 194). When this apparently endless series of representations of representations leaves the mental context to enter the practical sphere, causing a different behavior, "our way of acting within the world is either transitorily or permanently changed" (Eco 1995: 194).

The semiotic process ends when the translator chooses a concrete translatant, but it would be an illusion to pretend that this is the end: "[...] the repeated action responding to a given sign becomes in its turn a new sign, the representamen of a law interpreting the former sign and giving rise to new processes of interpretation" (Eco 1995: 195). The translating text sets an end to the otherwise unlimited semiosis of the prototext, but sets in motion a new chain of unlimited semiosis based on new signs, new texts, new interpretations.

As in psychoanalysis, where the question posed is "terminable or interminable analysis?", in translation we also face a supposedly endless series of interpretations. And the more fertile a text is, the easier to ascertain such interminability. "Explorations of semantic structure very soon raise the problem of infinite series. Wittgenstein asked where, when, and by what rationally established criterion the process of free yet potentially linked and significant association in psychoanalysis could be said to have a stop. An exercise in 'total reading' is also potentially unending" (Steiner 1992: 8). Language evolves with historical, but also subjective, time. Moreover, the metalinguistic assertions about language are destined to modify the very language one is talking about; our subject is therefore very plastic and difficult to catch in a moment of stasis. "When we think about language, the object of our reflection alters in the process" (Steiner 1992: 18). Each word or locution carries also with it its history, so that a full reading (Steiner 1992: 24) evokes not only immediately accessible meanings, but also other vague allusions.

But, Steiner argues on Wittgenstein's footprints, the moment in which the analyst — for any reason — interrupts the patient is arbitrarily chosen. In much the same way, the moment in which the translator actualizes the prototext in the metatext is arbitrarily chosen.

11. Translation and Freudian psychoanalysis

The dream theory has a strong potential as a contribution to understanding the mechanisms of translation, of reading in particular.

"It is impossible as a rule to translate a dream into a foreign language and this is equally true, I fancy, of a book such as the present one" (Freud 1900: 104). Freud himself is the first to lay the basis for the total translation view with this extended metaphor of a dream as a text. The dream is one of many types of text, its interpretation is one of many kinds of translation and, to be precise, it is a multiple translation.

First the dreamer — dealing with often fragmentary memories of images, sounds, sometimes conversations in many languages sometimes invented, scenes occurring without any evident logic, smells, tactile sensations — verbalizes this material in order to be able to report it. Secondly, the therapist translates the dreamer's report and abductively reconstructs the dream thoughts. The dream thoughts and the dream's content present themselves as two versions of the same subject in two different languages. The content (patient's telling) is a sort of transcription (*Übertragung*) of the dream thoughts in another expressive mode. Comparing prototext and metatext, the translator (psychoanalyst) must understand characters and syntactic laws of the dream, with an abductive process. What in textology is considered the author's strategy, that the translator-critic tries to unveil starting from the text (result), here is the strategy of the manipulation of unconscious thoughts (latent content), that the psychoanalyst tries to unveil starting from the manifest content of the dream (result).

The unconscious uses a sort of 'incomprehensible translation' to express repressed mental material — as it is inconvenient for Ego functioning — in the shape of symptomatic acts, dreams, inexplicable behaviors. The metatext of such incomprehensible translation is called "manifest content" and the psychoanalyst's aim is to back-translate it into "latent content". Anyone attempting to understand one's own dream using an interpretive key founded on the existence of the unconscious and of its dream expression finds herself in the same position as the critic-reader of a translation trying to understand, from the result (metatext), what translation strategy was adopted, without the possibility — granted to the critic of the verbal translation — to compare the metatext to the prototext: a real abductive process.

Persons desiring to learn to interpret dreams are polyglot translators facing a text aware of their ignorance of the code both in lexical

and in syntactical terms. It is maybe comparable to someone wanting to listen to the dialogue of two unknown persons randomly encountered whose code must be abduced in order to make sense of their dialogue's content.

In dream theory, the primary process is the translation of the prototext into words, while the secondary process transforms the words — metatext of the previous operation — into a new prototext, and its aim is to produce a second metatext that, more than being made of words, has a textual coherence and cohesion. The secondary process intervenes to fill gaps in the syntax in the primary text's understandability. The former element has the goal of changing the message code, the latter to make it usable. The risk is that readability corrupts the prototext's (dream's) meaning. Textual cohesion that in the metatext derives from secondary processing is not always matched by textual cohesion in the prototext. Sometimes such cohesion is produced by the translator's (or dreamer's) over-mediation.

The extension of total translation to the mind/verbal expression, dream/interpretation dialectics is both coherent with the spirit of such theory and productive on the plane of reciprocal enrichment of psychological theory and translation studies, in particular, the theory of reading.

12. Defenses

The translator of the official English version of Freud's works, James Strachey, seems to have overlapped to Freudian view and its expression an ideology more typical of the British psychoanalysis of Jones, tending to 'science-ize' the metaphorical and evocative form of Freudian concepts. The translator runs the constant risk of working like Strachey did, manipulating the text according to her views, when different from the author's. "If ... the translator is not fully aware of the important yet sometimes subtle differences — professional, political, and social — between his views and those of the person translated, various ideological distortions are bound to creep into the secondary text. The more complex the source text is, the more the translator should be self-aware of his own different positions and their contaminatory potential" (Mahony 1994: 321–322).

Psychology can make an essential contribution to translation science also in the last stages of the translation process: the metatext's

revision by the translator and, when applicable, by the editor or a critic, in the latter case meaning a review.

In the light of the passage of the text through a stage of psychic material, the difficulty of self-correction, of maintaining a self-critical attitude toward the previous draft is understandable. The equilibrium of the ego is safeguarded by defenses censoring certain aspects of reality to the advantage of the stability and functioning of the individual. Since it can be very distressing for a translator to realize that a former product of his efforts — as it may well sometimes happen — is awkward, clumsy, not fully coherent, i.e. not completely a text in the etymological sense, mechanisms may kick in that alter the perception of such a text causing the translator to see it as better than it really is, to the detriment of self-criticism abilities. Since interpretants are continually evolving, allowing some time to lapse between the first draft and revision helps increase self-critical ability, detachment: a text that some time ago was perceived as one's own, is now perceived (mostly) as other's, and therefore it is more easily criticized.

As to revisions of translations by editors, the problems are multiplied owing to the subjective perception of language. Idiosyncrasies and personal preferences for given expression modes, different textual experiences, sometimes even different communicative purposes can determine irreconcilable differences between translator and editor, resulting in compromises in which the mediation possibilities are a direct function of power relationships existing between translator and editor (or publisher represented by the editor).

In the field of translation reviews, the fact that a text is translated from another language is often completely neglected, as is implied in the translation approach dubbed "acceptable" by Toury. Such a translation therefore emerges as a fiction within fiction. But also for translations whose identity as metatexts is self-evident, the review often neglects to mention all the aspects concerning the translation, limiting itself to a review of the original. This line of thinking neglects not only the way the translation mediates between transmitting culture and receiving culture, but also represses the question of the receptivity of a culture to given alien texts, taking for granted that the acceptance of the metatext in the receiving culture is the same as in the culture that produced the prototext. In this field, psychology is, therefore, helpful for understanding the reasons why any given culture tends to confine the existence of the "system of translated literature within the literary polysystem" (Toury) to a wholly or partially unconscious

existence, and to understand the possible interaction between the translator's hermeneutics and the critic's.

13. Didactic spin-off

Since such contributions of psychology to translation radically modify the view of translation activity, it is important to acknowledge them right from the first stages of the translator's education. For this reason, in the courses of translation propaedeutic (and in the book I have published under the same title) — for the first year of university translation courses — I devote an important part to these problems.

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О психологических аспектах перевода

Переводоведение переживает этап самоопределения. Статья Якобсона "О лингвистических аспектах перевода"(повлиявшая и на заглавие данной статьи), несмотря на ориентированность на лингвистику, открывает в 1959 г. дорогу для изучения перевода другими дисциплинами, включая семиотику. Многие направления в семиотике перевода, особенно теория тотального перевода Торопа, исходят из примененного в той же статье 1959 г. понятия "интерсемиотического перевода или трансмутации". Я хотел бы отметить возможное влияние на переводоведение — в духе семиотической перспективы, открытой Пирсом и продолжаемой Торопом, — другой дисциплины, психологии. "Тотальный" подход к переводу, предложенный Торопом, может быть дополнен применением психологического подхода в рассмотрении понятия "интерпретанта" в качестве ментального знака; в перцептивной интерпретации прототекста; в рассмотрении чтения и писания как интерсемиотического процесса перевода, а безграничного семиозиса — как бесконечного анализа; в наблюдении первичных и вторичных процессов в сновидениях и в других видах перевода; в рассмотрении метафоры и конкретизации как ментальных процессов; в описании защитного механизма, активизируемого в ходе критики перевода (обзор) и самокритики (ревизия).

Tõlkimise psühholoogilised aspektid

Tõlketeadus on läbimas oma enesemääratlemise etappi. Jakobsoni artikkel "Tõlkimise lingvistilised aspektid", mille pealkiri kajastub antud artikli pealkirjas, avab 1959. aastal, vaatamata viitamisele lingvistikale, tee tõlkimise uurimisele teiste distsipliinide poolt, semiootika kaasa arvatud. Mitmed arengusuunad tõlkesemiootikas, eriti Toropi totaaltõlke teooria, lähtuvad samast 1959. a. artiklist pärinevast kuulsast "intersemiootilise tõlke ehk transmutatsiooni" mõistest. Ma tahaksin siin osutada mõjutusele, mis võiks tõlketeadusesse — järgides semiootilist perspektiivi, mille avas Peirce ja mida on jätkanud Torop — tulla teiselt distsipliinilt, psühholoogialt. "Totalistlikku" lähenemist tõlkimisele, mida Torop esindab, võiks täiendada psühholoogilise lähenemise rakendamine seoses mõiste "interpretant" käsitlemisega mentaalse märgina; prototeksti pertseptiivse interpreteerimisega; lugemise ja kirjutamise vaatlemisega intersemiootilise tõlkeprotsessina; piiritu semioosi käsitlemisega lõputu analüüsina; primaarse ja sekundaarse protsessiga unenägudes ja muudes tõlkeliikides; metafoori ja konkretiseerimise käsitlemisega mentaalse protsessina; kaitsemehhanismiga, mis aktiviseerub tõlkekriitika (ülevaade) ja enesekriitika (revisjon) käigus.

Механизмы переложения
"на наши (русские) нравы"
итальянских оперных либретто

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Abstract. *Stefano Garzonio*. **Mechanisms of adaptation "to our (Russian) customs" of Italian opera librettos.** The paper deals with the history of poetical translation of Italian musical poetry in the 18th century Russia. In particular, it is focused on the question of *pereloženie na russkie nravy*, the adaptation to national Russian customs, of Italian opera librettos, cantatas, arias, songs and so on. The author points out three different phases of this process. The first phase, in the 1730s, coincides with the reign of Anna Ioannovna and it is linked to Trediakovsky's translations of Italian intermezzos, comedies and to the first *opera seria*, *La forza dell'amore e dell'odio* ('The force of love and hate', 1736) by F. Araja and F. Prata; the second phase, in the period 1740–1770s, is characterized by a very varied production of translations and imitations, which undoubtedly influenced the general developing of Russian musical and dramatic poetry. It is during this period that *pereloženie na russkie nravy* is introduced into dramatic genres and sometimes it is findable in musical poetry as well. The third phase, in the 1780–1790s, is linked with the activity of such poets-translators as Ivan Dmitrevskij, Michail Popov, Vasilij Levšin and is characterized by the new practice of performing operas in Russian translations. In the paper the different forms of *pereloženie na russkie nravy* are pointed out, starting from the formal niveau of metrics and stylistics up to the adaptation of themes, places and realia.

В истории русской культуры XVIII века становление синкретического жанра оперного либретто тесно связано с усвоением иностранных художественных моделей и конкретных иноязычных текстов. В данном процессе одновременно переплетались как чисто художественные цели, так и официально-исторические и бытовые требования.

Становление оперного искусства в России осуществилось как новая форма художественного выражения, позаимствованная у Запада и связанная с коренными изменениями послепетровской России, для которой музыкальное и поэтическое искусства должны были исполнять новую официальную функцию. Итак, в течение краткого исторического периода музыкальная драматургия (мелодрама, опера-буфф, кантата и т.д.) вместе с торжественными формами словесной поэзии стала занимать центральное место в культурной жизни страны, как при дворе, когда музыкальная драматургия отмечала самые торжественные события, так и в жизни русских дворян, которые завели собственные городские и усадебные театры. Впоследствии оперные спектакли стали исполняться в публичных театрах, как в двух столицах, так и в провинции.

Вопрос о переводе итальянских оперных либретто в России касается, с одной стороны, становления оперной модели русской музыкальной драматургии и, с другой, конечно, распространения конкретных текстов итальянской музыкальной драматургии. Процесс развивался неровно и противоречиво, что обясняется и природой жанра, а также его назначения. Во-первых, перед нами синкретическая форма текста, в которой равноценно выступают музыкальный и словесный пласт, во-вторых, сама природа жанра зависит от его функционирования в культуре. Исполнительский момент оказывается структурообразующим.

Из всего сказанного ясно видна вся трудность определения механизмов "склонения на наши (русские) нравы" (дальше ПСНН) итальянской музыкально-драматической модели и конкретных оперных текстов.

Уже давно отмечено, что две фазы внедрения итальянских оперных либретто в России обусловили и две фазы их перевода на русский язык. Пока иностранные оперные труппы, в том числе и итальянские, исполняли свой репертуар на иностранных языках (это обычно бывало при дворе и на официальных мероприятиях), русские переводы носили чисто практическую функцию подстрочника для зрителей. Когда иностранный репертуар перешел к русским (обычно крепостным) труппам, и вообще, благодаря открытию публичных театров, оперы стали исполняться по-русски, проблема перевода иностранных текстов приобрела совсем другие черты (Левин 1996: 61–62). С одной стороны, ставился вопрос

о ритмическом соотношении музыкального и словесного переводного текста, с другой, вопрос о культурной адекватности перевода и, следовательно, о том, как он вписывается в процесс "склонения на русские нравы", который установится в русской культуре послепетровского периода, начиная, по крайней мере, с 1760-х гг. Как известно, концепция о склонении на русские нравы получила развернутое теоретическое изложение в творчестве В. И. Лукина и чуть позже в работах А. Ф. Лабзина (Дерюгин 1995: 61–64), но анализ истории перевода итальянских оперных либретто может раскрыть небезынтересные проявления этого культурного феномена.

Как отмечено выше, история перевода оперных либретто, в том числе и итальянских, на которых мы остановимся, складывается из нескольких фаз: на первом этапе это передача текстов подстрочником, а затем настоящий их перевод в новое культурное пространство. Несколько лет назад, учитывая разный характер переведенных текстов и разные подходы переводчиков, я предложил следующую периодизацию (Гардзонио 1988: 308–309):

Первая фаза — это появление итальянских музыкальных интермедий в комедийном репертуаре итальянских театральных трупп при Анне Иоанновне. Для истории русской литературы эта фаза интересна тем, что Тредиаковский, переводя итальянские либретто прозой, арии старался передать стихами, накапливая таким образом ценный материал для создания русской легкой поэзии. Кроме того, не следует забывать, что данные переводы обогатили традицию народно-театральной поэзии.

Вторая фаза (1740–1770-е гг.) самая долгая и менее однородная. Это неровный процесс утверждения итальянского придворного театра, обеспечиваемый службой итальянских поэтов при русском дворе (Бонеки, Кольтеллини) или знаменитыми опера-буфф и опера-сериа славнейших итальянских либреттистов (прежде всего Метастазио и Гольдони). В этот период итальянская музыкальная поэзия несомненно повлияла, пусть даже и поверхностно, на развитие русской национальной поэзии и не только в зарождающейся опере (опера-сериа Сумарокова и комические оперы 1770-х гг.), но и в жанрах легкой поэзии и *стихов на случай*.

В следующем десятилетии, в 1780-е гг., ярко выраженное стремление к созданию русского национального оперного театра (Княжнин, Матинский, Николев) дало повод для нового и более

серьезного интереса к итальянской опере. Именно эта третья фаза и является предметом нашего выступления. Она и есть фаза *склонения на русские нравы* иноземных опер, именно в этот период русские переводы итальянских музыкальных текстов становятся частью русской литературы, потому что они уже не просто сопровождают итальянский текст, а сами становятся текстом *исполняемым*.

Как уже упомянуто, итальянские либретто начали переводить во время царствования Анны Иоанновны, и первым значительным переводчиком выступил В. К. Тредиаковский. Его переводы интермедий и комедий точно отвечали требованиям подстрочника, однако, как я уже старался показать (Гардзонио 1995: 50–60), перевод либретто *Сила любви и ненависти* (*La forza dell'amore e dell'odio*, 1735) явился опытом уже другого характера, в котором переводы арий стремятся к некоторой оригинальности и охарактеризованы некоторой степенью *русификации*.[1] Это значит, что в данных текстах можно отметить некоторые элементы "перевода со склонением на наши нравы", аналогичные элементам ПСНН, указанным А. А. Дерюгиным в кантемировских переводах из Анакреонта.

В этой связи интересно, например, отметить присутствие среди переводов Тредиаковского нескольких текстов, относящихся к морской теме: *Кормщик боязлив в море корабль правя* (№ 4), *Кто отведал штурм, хоть и убегает* (№ 19), *Кажет тишину, бурюж тая море* (№ 20). Тема морских путешествий была очень популярна в песенниках (см. анонимную песню *Буря море раздымает*) и часто встречается и в оригинальной поэзии Тредиаковского (Позднеев 1958: 88). Переводы Тредиаковского прекрасно вписываются в эту специфическую традицию русского канта XVIII века.

Кроме того, почти все переводные арии можно отнести к жанру любовной песни. Как изестно, именно в этом жанре Тредиаковский уже в книге *Езда в остров любви* старался создать новый поэтический язык и, в частности, эквиваленты французской

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[1] Как давно установлено, оригинальное либретто принадлежит поэту-дилетанту, последователю Метастазио Франческо Прата. Тредиаковский перевел либретто с французского перевода, однако текст сопровождает итальянский подлинник, и нетрудно предположить, что стихотворные вставки учитывали итальянский текст. В самом деле, в русском издании либретто читаем: "Речи переводил с французской прозы, и в ариях приводил токмо в падение без рифм В. Тредиаковский" (Тредиаковский 1736: 7).

галантной фразеологии. В этой перспективе Тредиаковский нашел в переводе импульс для создания новых поэтических выражений и сочетаний, стремясь передать шаблонные поэтические формулы итальянского оригинала: *жестокость любит, отдай страстям вольность, сердцем трепещу с страха, киньте свою страсть, не могу любить вас* и т.д.

Конечно, данные переводы не много добавляют к поэтическому портрету Тредиаковского, но свидетельствуют о том, что поэт пользовался даже практикой подстрочника для личного поэтического эксперимента и, следовательно, на данные переводы надо смотреть не просто как на переводы-подстрочники, но как на элементы русской национальной стихотворной традиции.[2] Если пока трудно говорить о "переводе со склонением на наши нравы", то, до известной степени, можно выявить в переводе Тредиаковского некоторые черты "жанрового обрусения песенных текстов". Как подчеркивала Т. Ливанова, русская знать, которая слушала итальянскую оперу Арайи, знакомилась с содержанием оперы "через посредство Тредиаковского и его литературной манеры" (Ливанова 1952: 52). Именно литературная манера перевода определила жанровый характер текста, его обрусения, как, например, в случае следующей арии, которую прекрасно можно отнести к форме любовного канта русской бытовой поэзии:

> Бедной горе мне! Вся крушусь без меры,
> Равно как всегда горлица печальна,
> Друга что ища узрит что пойман.
> Так иду искать и я мужа в узах.
> Горлица всегда, он где, прилетает,
> А потом опять к своему жилищу.

Конечно, мы не знаем, жили ли такие тексты самостоятельной жизнью и исполнялись ли отдельно (сам факт, что они не встречаются в песенниках свидетельствует о том, что вряд ли они вошли в обиход песенной традиции), но стремление к этому очевидно.

Дальше стоит обратить внимание на перевод либретто *Титово милосердие* Метастазио. Перевод относится к 1742 году и при-

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[2] К сожалению, точными данными о предназначении перевода мы не располагаем и, например, заманчивое предположение В. Чешихина (1905: 42), согласно которому *Сила любви и ненависти* исполнялась и на русском языке (тогда перевод Тредиаковского можно было бы считать первым образцом *opera-seria* на русском языке) не нашло серьезных фактических подтверждений.

надлежит Ивану Меркурьеву.[3] В своем переложении Иван Меркурьев применяет силлабический стих: александрийский стих с парной рифмовкой в тексте драматического действия, разные силлабические размеры в ариях.

Что касается тринадцатисложника, то Меркурьев строит свой стих по образцу кантемировского стиха, далеко от силлабики итальянского оригинала и в то же время далеко от реформированного героического стиха Тредиаковского (Гардзонио 1989: 113).[4] Стоит, например, отметить присутствие разноударных рифмовок (велИкого-такОго, Образом-рАзом). Рифмовки эти ближе стиху XVII века и точно придают стиховорному переводу определенный архаизованный характер, но безусловно в русском духе. Что-то в роде перевода "со склонением на на наши *старинные* русские нравы". Данное обстоятельство явно указывает на то, что и метрический уровень прекрасно вписывается в поэтику "склонения на русские нравы". Не случайно многие отрывки перевода Меркурьева перекликаются со стихотворной традицией русского барокко, что обусловлено, как ни странно, самой античной тематикой.

Но разнородный характер такого типа переводов предоставляет и другие элементы склонения на национальные нравы совсем иного порядка. Приведу интересный случай. Меркурьев переводит арии разными силлабическими размерами, а хоры разносложными безрифменными стихами. Тут он применяет что-то вроде "дольника" *ante litteram*. Вот любопытный пример:

> Храните о боги стражие!
> Благополучье римско.
> В Тите правдимом. Сильном
> Честь нашего века.
> Вы бессмертные Лавры
> На Цесарской на главе,
> Вы берегите в Риме
> Всякое счастье его.

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[3] Опера *Титово милосердие* с музыкой немецкого композитора И. А. Гассе была поставлена в Москве 29 мая 1742 года по случаю коронации императрицы Елисаветы Петровны (Mooser 1948: 187–197). Об Иване Меркурьеве (ум. в 1748 г.) см. статью В. П. Степанова (1999: 285).

[4] В статье приводятся данные о ритме и цезуре стиха Меркурьева в сравнении с данными по русскому силлабическому стиху XVIII века, полученными М. Л. Гаспаровым (стр. 126).

В данном тексте стоит обратить внимание на стих "*На Цесарской на главе*", где повтор предлога *на* кажется подсказан фольклором. Перед нами явный прием ПСНН. Напомним, что традиция переводить хоры тоническим стихом утвердилась позже и с этой точки зрения перевод Меркурьева является интересным антецедентом.

Как уже отмечено, перевод Меркурьева служил лишь подстрочником для высокопоставленных зрителей спектакля. Он не получил никакого прямого применения в постановке оперы Гассе и, следовательно, не относится к сфере функционирования словесно-музыкального текста и его перевода в другое культурное пространство, что на самом деле является определительной чертой приема ПСНН. Однако, в связи с постановкой оперы *Титово милосердие* можно отметить любопытный случай ПСНН, который я бы назвал "переводом со склонением на русские буквы". О постановке *Титова милосердия* рассказывает Якоб фон-Штелин в своих *Известиях о музыке в России*:

> При первой оперной репетиции мне показалось смешным, что император Тит должен сам петь со своими друзьями и 3 остальными действующими лицами [...] встречающийся по ходу действия хор или хвалебную песнь своей собственной доброте. Когда императрице было представлено неприличие такого положения, она приказала взять придворных певчих в оркестр для того, чтоб они пели встречающиеся хоры. Так это и было исполнено. Итальянские слова были подписаны русскими буквами под 4 голосами, и более 50 избранных певцов обучались на репетициях оперы пению этих хоров необычайной силы и прекрасного действия [...]. (Штелин 1935: 111)

Эпоха расцвета итальянской опера–сериа в России связана с возвращением Ф. Арайи в 1742 году — он уехал было из России в 1738 г., — когда композитор привез с собой новых певцов, инструменталистов, либреттиста Дж. Бонеки и декоратора Д. Валериани. За время своего пребывания в России Дж. Бонеки сочинил 6 либретто к операм Арайи для русского двора. Все его либретто переводились на русский.

Именно с этими переводами, по мнению И. З. Сермана (Серман 1963: 117 и сл.), связана полемика Ломоносова во II части *Риторики* 1747 года (*О изобретении витиеватых речей*) против "нынешних" писателей, которые "меньше стараются о важных и зрелых предложениях, о увеличении слова чрез распространение или о движении сильных страстей, нежели о витийстве". Как отмечает Серман, в рукописи ломоносовской *Риторики* после

слова нынешние следовало, потом зачеркнутое, "италиянские", что и привело ученого к выводу, что Ломоносов выступал именно против итальянских поэтов на службе русского двора. Напомним, что все либретто Бонеки *Соединение любви и брака* (1745), *Сципион* (1745), *Митридат* (1747), *Беллерофонт* (1750), *Евдоксия венчанная* (1751), кроме одного, *Селевк* (1744), переведены прозою (скорее всего А.В.Олсуфьевым). Поэтому, перевод *Селевка* приобретает особенное значение. В нем впервые итальянские тексты переведены силлаботоникой, ямбом и хореем, что с очевидностью, как отмечает Серман, соотносит перевод с известным спором 1743 года об эмоциональном превосходстве одного из двух главных размеров силлаботоники. С этой точки зрения, перевод *Селевка*, который Штелин приписал Сумарокову (хотя Новиков в своем *Опыте Исторического словаря о российских писателях* указал на Олсуфьева), занимает особое место в поисках возможностей функциональной передачи силлабического стиха в русской стихотворной культуре. Проблема эмоциональной окраски метра, его стилистической природы тесно связана с проблемой передачи национального русского духа. В этом смысле перевод *Селевка* носит характер ПСНН, тем более, что стилистика текста перевода явно соотносится с ранними трагедиями Сумарокова (Серман 1963: 131–132).

Итак, в первой фазе истории усвоения итальянских либретто в России элементы ПСНН можно отметить лишь в стремлении передать функционально, а не формально, фонологические и языковые принципы строения текста, от метрики до стилистики. В самом деле, пока главная черта ПСНН: замена реалий оригинального текста русскими — почти не встречается (за исключение некоторых деталей в интермедиях и комедиях переведенных Тредиаковским в 1732–1733 гг.).

С другой стороны, до начала 1780-х годов переводы итальянских либретто продолжают служить подстрочником для зрителей, так как оперы-сериа и оперы-буфф все время исполняются на итальянском языке. Это не значит, что сами переводы не носят элементов русификации, но, очевидно, присутствующие элементы русификации не касаются функционирования текстов в культуре. Необходимо отметить, что и итальянские композиторы кое-где пробовали внести в свои музыкальные сочинения элементы русской музыкальной культуры (мелодии, песни, танцы и т.д.), что придавало исполняемому на итальянском языке тексту некоторый характер ПСНН. По этому поводу стоит привести

известный отрывок из мадригала Сумарокова, посвященного Франческо Арайе и его музыке первой оригинальной русской оперы *Цефал и Прокрис*. Поэт утверждает:

Арайя изъяснил любовны в драме страсти
И общи с Прокрисой Цефаловы напасти
Так сильно, *будто бы язык он русский знал*,[5]
Иль паче, будто сам их горестью стенал.

Тут важно подчеркнуть, что в то время как для драматического театра ареной для ПСНН была комедия, для музыкальной поэзии (и не только итальянской) ареной для применения ПСНН стала опера-буфф. Очевидно трагедия и опера-сериа с их жесткими историческими рамками и торжественно-патетическим тоном не допускали приема русификации. Это, конечно, не исключает того, что в оригинальном творчестве вскоре стали появляться русские аналоги знаменитых иностранных пьес, но это уже проблема другого порядка и относится скорее к трагедии, а не к опере-сериа, которая в России не получила особого самостоятельного развития.

Наоборот, как в комедии, понимаемой в трактовке Лукина и Лабзина, так и в опере-буфф, в ее переводах и переделках, отмечаются многочисленные примеры ПСНН. Это касается в первую очередь итальянской оперы-буфф, хотя потом, как мы знаем, в России в оригинальном творчестве русских поэтов-либреттистов утвердилась скорее всего французская форма *comédie melée d'ariettes*, а не итальянская *opera buffa*, правда с некоторыми исключениями. Данное обстоятельство не исключает того, что итальянские оперы-буфф переводились и исполнялись на русском языке, и что даже в определенных кругах именно жанр опера-буфф котировался больше, чем сама национальная форма комедии с ариями.

Конечно и в этой фазе, связанной с творчеством таких переводчиков как И. А. Дмитревский, В. А. Левшин, И. Виен и др., проблема переложения текстов на русское культурное пространство касалась по большому счету фонологического и стилистического уровней. На этом фоне следует указать на самый главный элемент ПСНН, а именно: применение русских реалий как приема полного культурного усвоения переведенных текстов. С точки зрения вопроса ПСНН итальянских либретто значитель-

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[5] Курсив — мой, С. Г.

ную роль играли переводы "комических драмм" К. Гольдони,[6] связанные с деятельностью антрепренера Локателли, хотя с художественной точки зрения все эти переводы не особенно ценны. Действительно, их ролью было ознакомление русских зрителей с интригой и характерами действующих лиц, но в ходе переложения переводчики старались как можно более приблизить текст к вкусам и восприятию русского зрителя.

Данный процесс явно совершается в комедиях, которые исполнялись уже на русском языке. Приведу пример. В переводе комедии *Домашние несогласия* (*I puntigli domestici*, 1752), изданной в Санкт-Петербурге в 1773, переводчик переносит действие комедии из Неаполя в Москву и превращает итальянских аристократов в русских помещиков (Горохова 1967: 336–339).

Поэтому неслучайно настоящий ПСНН либретто отмечается именно тогда, когда сами оперы стали исполнятся на русском языке и не столько в придворных театрах, сколько в репертуаре публичных и частных (городских и усадебных) театров.

И этот процесс связан с именем Гольдони, но также с одним из создателей русского национального театра, Иваном Дмитревским, который в 1782 перевел оперу-буфф *Добрая девка*. Опера эта была поставлена на русском языке в Кусковском театре князя Шереметева в том же году (Морков 1862: 33).

Последующие переводы итальянских оперных либретто делались для их постановки на русском языке. Переводы должны были, с одной стороны, отвечать ритмическим требованиям музыки (простой подстрочник был уже недостаточен), с другой, старались перенести весь культурный комплекс реалий действия и характеров в новое, русское культурное пространство.

Здесь я бы хотел привести некоторые примеры из рукописных материалов, мною изученных и описанных в предыдущих публикациях. Возьмем перевод Дмитревского оперы-буфф Андреи-Саккини *L'avaro deluso* (Обманутый скупец).[7] Перевод, — о нем упоминает А. Каратыгин в своем "Театральном Журнале"

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[6] О русских переводах из Гольдони в XVIII веке см. Горохова (1967: 307–352).

[7] Перевод хранится в разных московских и петербургских архивах. Я пользуюсь здесь рукописями, хранящимися в отделе рукописей РГБ в Москве (ф. 11 Апраксиных музыкальный), в архиве Центрального государственного музея Музыкальной культуры имени М. И. Глинки (ф. 187 фонд Воронцовых) и в отделе рукописей НГБ в Санкт-Петербурге (ф. 550). Ср. Гардзонио 1996: 223–225.

(Всеволодский-Гернгросс 1923: 118–119), является интересным примером ПСНН, начиная с переложения имен персонажей. Опера пользовалась большой популярностью: первый раз в русском переводе она была поставлена в Петербурге труппой Российского театра 25 мая 1789 г. в Деревянном театре, в 1792 в Москве в Петровском театре (Келдыш Ю. В., О. Г. Левашева, А. И. Кандинский, 1985: 392, 394).

Русский переводчик переделывает текст оригинала, прибегая к некоторым обычным оборотам русской комической оперы и к русскому просторечью по образцу либретто Аблесимова, Матинского и Княжнина. Вот, например, как русифицируется, почти в духе державинской оды, следующее описание итальянской кухни. Итальянский текст:

Signor Oste non crediate,
Che in un po' di refezione
La metà delle mie entrate
Qua vogli'io sacrificar.
Due grasse zuppe; erbaggi, e pasta?
No signore, che una basta.
Sei piccioni in fricassè!
No signor non fan per me,
Due capponi? Basta un pollo.
Signor Oste a rompicollo
Mi vorreste fare andar.
Beccafichi e buone orfelle
Ah, ch'io vedo, che la pelle
Mi vorreste scorticar.[8]

В русском переводе текст превращается в забавное противопоставление русской и французской кухни:

Нет, хозяин, нет не мысли,
Дураком меня не числи,
На излишнюю еду [...]
Денег тратить не хочу.
Как три супа и три жаркие
Все излишни то пустые.
Пять рагу, пять фрикасе
Не здорово это все.
Сладки торты и пастеты,
Сладки торты и конфеты,
Студень с квасом и щи да кашу,

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[8] Цитирую из *Il don Calandrano*, Dramma in musica di A.Sacchini, Firenze, 1781, p.11.

Да еще хоть простоквашу,
Должен к ужину подать.
Фрукты, груши и ананасы,
Знать ты хочешь за припасы
Кожу всю с меня содрать [...].[9]

Еще пример совсем другого порядка, но тоже весьма красноречивый. Арии популярных переводных опер Да Понте *Дианино древо* (1792) и *Редкая вещь* (1792) (музыка принадлежит Солеру-и-Мартин, переводчик — опять И. Дмитревский), благодаря включению в песенники, стали переходить в быт и в городской фольклор. Но тут ПСНН пошел еще дальше, благодаря перестройке их функционирования в культуре. Имеется в виду примечательный случай *Самого новейшего отборнейшего Московского и Санкт-Петербургского песельника, собранного из лучших и ныне употребительнейших песен* (Москва, 1799, 1803[2]), изданного купцом С. И. Комиссаровым. Тут арии двух опер сопровождены указаниями об их повседневном, домашнем исполнении. Вот некоторые примеры:

Из оперы *Дианино древо*, для тех, кои бывая в отсутствии с любовницею, вспоминают ее красоту. Поется страстным голосом: *Сердце все...*

Сила любви для тех, кои ничего в свете важнее любви не почитают, голосом веселым: *Все в свете мученье...*

Сею песнею можно любовникам обещать скорее соединение. Поется голосом, надежду обещающим: *Луч ясный щастья...*

Для девушек зрелых лет, голосом означающим нетерпеливость: *По моим уж зрелым летам...*

Для тех, кои борются с страстями. Приятность сей песни заключается как в голосе, так и в словах; она поется смятенным, дрожащим голосом: *О боги! Я в смятеньи!...*

Для такого любовника, кой все ласки истощил пред своею любовницею тщетно. Отчаянным голосом и показывающим печаль, поется. *Не сердце, камень носит твердый...*

Ария жалоба на наклонность любовницы, тихим и унылым голосом: Рок! *Почто ко мне нещастну...*

Такого случая не случится никогда, и для того будто ее и употребить нельзя.Употребляйте; она поется очень весело: *Оплеуха! В день самой свадьбы...*

Для девиц красивых и богатых, имеющих несчастье не быть замужем, голосом унылым: *Странна вещь и не щастлива...*

Переход оперных текстов в быт и в полуфольклорные жанры и их изменение в этом процессе до неузнаваемости свидетельствует об

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[9]   ГРБ, ф 11 муз, п. 19, № 1–2, лл. 49–53.

их полной русификации, об их полной перекодировке в новом культурном пространстве. К данному случаю относится знаменитая песня *На толь, чтобы печали*, которая встречается в рукописных песенниках до конца XIX века (Финдейзен 1905: 8) и которую включает И. С. Тургенев в роман *Новь* (эпизод супругов Субочевых). На самом деле перед нами популярная ария из оперы Паизиелло-Паломбы *La Molinara* "Nel cor più non mi sento" (*Мельничиха*). Анализ оригинального и переводного текстов, итальянского и русского, показывает полное ритмическое совпадение и явную тематическую схожесть при совершенно вольной передаче текста. Таких случаев в истории русской музыкальной поэзии много. Напомню уже относящийся к последующей эпохе случай романса *Не любил он!*:

> Он говорил мне:
> Будь ты моею,
> И стану жить я.
> Страстью сгорая.
> Прелесть улыбки,
> Нега во взоре
> Мне обещают
> Радости рая….

На самом деле перед нами перевод известной итальянской песни *Non m'atava* (авторы Дел Прете-Гуерчия). Романс исполнила В. Ф. Комиссаржевская на сцене Александринского театра, как романс Ларисы Огудаловой в пьесе А.Островского *Бесприданница* (1896) а потом Н. Алисова в фильме-экранизации пьесы Я. Протозанова (Петровский, Мордерер 1997: 314).

Практику ПСНН, переделок и подражаний следует соотнести и с историей оригинальной русской комической оперы. Тут много интересных случаев тематической цитатности и совпадения. Стоит, например, отметить явную тематическую и формальную схожесть известной комедии М. Матинского *Санкт-Петербургский Гостиный двор* (1779) с переводным текстом либретто *Венецианская ярмарка* (1791, перевод из *La Fiera di Venezia* — авторы Салиери-Боккерини). Переводчик итальянского либретто (скорее всего врач Иван Виен) в ходе перевода на русские нравы имел перед глазами опыт и успех пьесы Матинского.

Здесь разные товары
Ступайте бояры
Угодно ли что
Выбирайте у нас.
Здесь дешево все
Не обманем мы вас...
Бауты, браслеты
Ранеты
Бисквиты с корицей
Шиньионы, фуфайки с петлицей...
Лимоны, отласы
Вот шпаги...Здесь часы...[10]

В заключение хотелось бы добавить, что вопрос о ПСНН музыкальных либретто не может быть досконально изучен, не уделив особого внимания синкретическому характеру этих текстов. Здесь проблема функционирования текстов в культуре тесно связана с их исполнением. Любое суждение без учета музыкального оформления текстов не является полным. Из этого следует, что дальнейшая цель изучения переводных либретто — это их соотношение с музыкальным текстом и, в частности, вопрос о ПСНН данного музыкального текста. Так опять возникает давний вопрос о сотрудничестве литературоведов и музыковедов, без которого настоящий культурологический подход невозможен.

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[10] ГРБ, ф 11 муз, п. 28, № 1, лл. 15об–25.

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Itaalia ooperilibretode "oma (vene) kommetele vastava" ümberpaneku mehhanismid

Artiklis on vaatluse all itaalia muusikalise luule tõlkimise ajalugu Venemaal 18. sajandil. Põhjalikumalt käsitletakse itaalia ooperilibretode, kantaatide, aariate, laulude jms. *oma kommetele vastava ümberpaneku* küsimust. Autor eristab selles protsessis kolme faasi. Esimene faas hõlmab 1730-ndaid aastaid, mil Anna Ioannovna valitsemisajal tõlkis Trediakovski itaalia intermezzosid, komöödiaid ja esimese *opera seria* "Armastuse ja vihkamise jõud". Teine faas kätkeb perioodi 1740–1770-ndad ja sellele on iseloomulik erinevate tõlgete ja imitatsioonide voog, mis kindlasti mõjutas vene muusikalise ja dramaatilise luule üldist arengut. Just sel perioodil kandub *oma kommetele*

vastav ümberpanek draamažanritesse ja on täheldatav ka muusikalises luules. Kolmas faas haarab 1780–1790-ndaid, on seotud selliste luuletõlkijatega nagu Ivan Dmitrevski, Mihhail Popov, Vassili Levšin, ning seda iseloomustab ooperite uus transformeerimispraktika vene tõlgetes. Artiklis eristatakse *oma kommetele vastava ümberpaneku* erinevaid viise alates meetrika ja stilistika tasandist ning lõpetades teemade, tegevuspaikade ja reaaliate adapteerimisega.

Интертекстуальный анализ сегодня

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Abstract. *Mikhail L. Gasparov*. **Intertextual analysis today**. The paper provides a discussion about recent results and perspectives of intertextual analysis — the method that has been a contemporary with Tartu-Moscow school. The connections between the classical philological methods and intertextual analysis are described, together with specifying the concept of intertext and emphasizing the need for the correctness of a researcher, because such an analysis always carries a danger of overinterpretation. Several examples are used to illustrate how the imagination of a researcher can create arbitrary allusions that are not based on the original text and are usually misleading. As a result, the text under study will not become more clear, vice versa, it turns to be less understandable.

Интертекстуальный метод в исследовании словесности — сверстник тартуско-московской школы. Как она, сложился в своей нынешней форме в конце 1960-х гг. И, как она, подводит сейчас итоги своего первого возраста. Собственно, об этом здесь следовало бы говорить не мне: гораздо содержательнее о его проблемах рассказали бы О. Ронен или И. П. Смирнов. Но я буду говорить о нем не как теоретик, а как потребитель, как комментатор–практик: что я от него имею и чего я от него жду для понимания смысла конкретных произведений поэзии.

Не все помнят, что в начале изучения интертекстов был опыт классической филологии. В изданиях поздних латинских авторов внизу строки, над текстологическим аппратом всегда давался свод параллельных мест, "стих такой-то, ср. "Энеида", такие-то строки". Когда началась разработка интертекстуального анализа стихов Мандельштама и других акмеистов, я не увидел в этом ничего нового: что такое известная книга О. Ронена "Approach to

Mandelstam" (Ronen 1983)? Исполински разросшийся средний ярус издания классика. Я был неправ. Оказалось, что каждый осколок этой россыпи параллельных мест при надлежащем внимании может стать опорной точкой для проникновения в текст. Дата рождения Мандельштама совпадает с датой первого снега в "Онегине", "в январе на третье в ночь": казалось бы, случайность. Но когда О. Ронен цитирует "Стихи о неизвестном солдате" — "в ночь с второго на третье января, в девяносто одном, в ненадежном году", — то это "в ненадежном" благодаря пушкинскому контексту приобретает конкретность и яркость.

Я сказал: каждый осколок этой россыпи может стать опорой для интерпретации, — преувеличил я или нет? Полагаю, что преувеличил. Каждый может послужить интерпретации, но в разной степени.

О. Ронен в послесловии к Тарановскому пишет: "Чем же ощущение подтекста [...] углубляет понимание? Ответ на этот вопрос, в общих чертах, напоминает проблему девяти точек. Для того, чтобы понять внутреннюю связность частного и отдельного, надо взглянуть на него извне, с точки зрения более общего и целого. Неудивительно, что новые, основанные на подтекстах примечания к "трудным поэтам" так разительно отличаются от прочих: метод возвращается в родное лоно комментирования и оплодотворяет его" (Тарановский 2000: 424). Я боюсь, что сказанное справедливо только наполовину. Действительно, внутренняя связность темных стихов проясняется "с точки зрения общего и целого": например, загадочные "Восьмистишия" Мандельштама осмысляются, будучи вписаны в рамку философии Бергсона и споров вокруг неоламаркизма. Но новые примечания к трудным поэтам разительно отличаются от прежних далеко не всегда. Сплошь и рядом справки вроде "Мандельштам, "Стансы", "Еще пожить и поиграть с людьми", ср. "Евхрастия", "Все причащаются, играют и поют", ср. Тютчев, "Играй, покуда над тобою еще безоблачна лазурь" [...]" лежат мертвым грузом и не складываются в осмысленную систему.

Дело в том, что интертекстуальный метод дает и требует от филологии *гораздо больше*, чем интерпретацию отдельных стихотворений. Перед нами не попадание в цель, а дальний перелет. "Взглянуть на предмет извне, с точки зрения общего и целого" — это значит прежде всего реконструировать то общее и целое, в которое вписывается предмет, то есть отдельное стихотворение. А это не что иное, как вся исполинская совокупность текстов,

складывающихся в культурный мир, к которому принадлежит данное произведение. Если угодно, интертектсуальное литературоведение — это прикладная история всемирной литературы, как психоаналитическое литературоведение — это прикладная психология, а социологическое — это прикладная социология и т.д. Это чтение не столько текста, сколько за текстом: стихотворение здесь — как бы прозрачное окно, через которое исследователь заглядывает в большой мир автора и его современников, и чем это стекло прозрачнее, тем лучше.

Конечно, о том, как выглядит одна культура в глазах другой культуры, писали много раз. Но обычно при этом все перспективные линии сходятся на объекте, а не на субъекте восприятия: "Цицерон в культуре столетий". А интертекстуальный метод побуждает опрокинуть эту перспективу, сделать ее обратной: "Культура столетий в сознании Цицерона" (или Пушкина, или Мандельштама). Возьмем именной указатель к собранию сочинений Пушкина и выстроим эти имена в порядке частотного убывания, чтобы естественным образом ближний Вяземский упоминался во много раз чаще, чем дальний Гомер, — скажет нам что-нибудь такая всеохватывающая перспектива? Не знаю. Представляем ли мы во всех пропорциях образ мировой культуры в сознании Мандельштама — от Гомера до Павла Кокорина и Дмитрия Фурманова? Вероятно, лишь немногие, а не описал ее пока никто. Вот к построению такой картины и подводит нас интертестуальный метод анализа — это такая его заслуга, которую трудно переоценить.

Но если же мы переносим наще внимание на само произведение, то мы должны будем, так сказать, сосредоточиться не на перспективном виде через стекло, а на самом стекле, на его оптических особенностях, деформирующих этот мир. В иерархии интертекстов наиболее важными будут те, которые увеличиваются этой стркутурной оптикой произведения, наименее важными те, которые отсеиваются ею, а остальные расположатся в промежутке.

Есть подтексты структурные и орнаментальные. (О. Ронен предпочитает говорить "семантические и поэтические", то есть относящиеся к плану содержания и к плану выражения.) Они могут быть ключевыми, когда без них непонятен весь текст; могут быть факультативными, когда текст понятен и без них, но с ними смысл его обогащается; могут быть противопоказанными, когда они отвлекают внимание от смысла текста в ложном на-

правлении. Что значит "противопоказанные подтексты"? Представим себе восприятие литературы по аналогии с восприятием языка. При чтении художественного текста мы воспринимаем краем сознания художественные подтексты каждого словосочетания точно так же, как дополнительные значения каждого отдельного слова. Мы читаем строку "Где стол был яств — там гроб стоит"; какие значения мы воспринимаем в слове "стол"? Прежде всего — угощение, "почестен стол"; во вторую очередь — вещественное значение, "четырехногий стол", оно хотя бы не мешает первому; в третью очередь — стол–престол, "стол великого княжения", это значение уже отвлекает в сторону; в четвертую очередь — стол как отделение канцелярии со столоначальником во главе, это значение уже решительно мешает восприятию читаемой строки, и чем меньше о нем вспоминает читатель, тем лучше. Точно так же, когда поэт пишет стихотворение, например, 3-стопным анапестом в расчете на читательскую память о 3-стопных анапестах Блока, то ему будет мешать читательская память о 3-ст. анапестах Некрасова и наоборот. Дать отчет себе и другим читателям, какие подтекстовые семантические ассоциации слов, образов, ритмов являются для общего смысла стихотворения необходимыми, какие вспомогательными, какие нейтральными и какие вредными, — в этом и состоит главная задача интертекстуального анализа.

Самый известный пример выявления структурного подтекста — это статья Вяч. Вс. Иванова (1967) о хлебниковском "Меня проносят на слоновых…" — стихотворение, казавшееся рассыпающимся набором слов стало вдруг понятным, когда его прочли как описание посторонней картинки. Другой пример: когда К. Тарановский указал на стихотворение Державина об умирающей и воскресающей ласточке, то сразу прояснился смысл образов слепой ласточки в стихотворениях Мандельштама. Третий пример: когда О. Ронен указал на малоуважаемого Фламмариона как на подтекст "Стихов о неизвестном солдате", то подбор образов, который раньше казался вдохновенно-произвольным, стал осмысленным и оправданным. Но вот иной случай. У Ронена же в его большой книге среди огромного количества интереснейших подтекстов мандельштамовского "1 января 1924" особенно замечательными кажутся два: во-первых — что образ умирающего века с глиняным ртом и глиняными обидами опирается на книгу Даниила и на дантов "Ад", где говорится об исполине на глиняных ногах; во-вторых — что образ щучьей косточки из ундервуда

опирается на "Поэзию как волшебство" Бальмонта, где напоминается, что в "Калевале" из щучьих костей Вейнемейнен сделал волшебные гусли. Какой из этих подтекстов важней? Больше бросается в глаза и запоминается первый подтекст. Однако структурным является скорее второй. Образ исполина из книги Даниила ничего не добавляет к образу умирающего века, кроме наглядности; более того, умирающий век Мандельштама — образ положительный, представленный сочувственно, а исполин Даниила — образ резко отрицательный, и читатель, включая этот подтекст в поле своего сознания, должен переосмыслять его на ходу. Образ же гуслей из щучьей косточки осмысляет весь сюжет стихотворения: больной герой едет по переулочкам, скворешням и застрехам и обретает исцеление только когда извлекает щучью косточку из ундервуда — т.е. когда в злом мире открывает возможность поэтического текста.

Знание подтекстов, (более важных и менее важных) включается в более широкий круг предварительных знаний (пресуппозиций), необходимых для понимания любого произведения. Чтобы понять стихотворение Мандельштама "Notre Dame", необходимо, во-первых, знать, что Notre Dame — это готический собор в Париже (без этого стихотворение непонятно целиком); во-вторых, иметь представление о готической архитектуре как системе контрфорсов (без этого непонятна II строфа); в-третьих, знать, что он стоит на острове Сены, где во времена Римской империи была резиденция властей (без этого непонятна I строфа). Когда я говорил об этом с Омри Роненом, он добавил: "и знать, что писал о силе тяжести Вл. Словьев". Я согласился, но про себя подумал: "ну, это, пожалуй, в-четвертых". Разумеется, я не настаиваю именно на такой последовательности четырех ступеней, но что какая-то их иерархическая последовательность существует, кажется несомненным.

Не будем забывать, что кроме осознанных или полуосознанных интертекстов есть и невольные, возникающие спонтанно, просто оттого, что число словосочетаний., укладывающихся в стихотворную строку, ограничено, и частичные повторения неизбежны. Когда у Пушкина Татьяна лелеет "свои мечты, Плоды сердечной полноты", то мы законно видим здесь контрастную отсылку к собственной элегии 1821 г. — "одни страданья, Плоды сердечной пустоты" — и через нее еще дальше, к Карамзину в "Послании к Плещееву", "адские мечты, Плоды душевной пустоты": содержание образа углубляется. Но когда о любви Татьяны

говорится "так в землю павшее зерно Весны огнем оживлено", уверены ли мы, что Пушкин оглядывался на своего "Руслана", "где рощи и долины Весны огнем оживлены", и углубляет ли это образ? У Пушкина об Онегине говорится: "Пред ним roast-beef окровавленный", а у Лермонтова об Измаил-бее — "Пред ним фазан окровавленный": будем ли мы это считать отсылкой к Пушкину, и если да, то как она окрашивает лермонтовскую сцену, не издевательски ли?

Может быть, поэт сам иногда сигнализирует читателям, что за его текстом стоит подтекст? У Мандельштама в стихотворении "На каменных отрогах Пиэрии" (с которого началась современная интертекстология) это заведомо так: имя в строке "Обула Сафо пестрый сапожок" прямо побуждает искать в этой и следующих строках реминисценции из фрагментов Сапфо, и античники, уверяю, замечали их еще до Пшибыльского и Тарановского, но не придавали этому значения. Вероятно, и здесь возможна иерархия — от таких прямых указаний, как здесь, до почти неразличимых. Важность этого знают исследователи такого явления, как ирония: об иронии в тексте мы имеем право говорить лишь тогда, когда автор сам намекает на свою несрьезность (обычно — снижением стиля), иначе исследователь мог бы заподозрить иронию где угодно, и этого нельзя было бы ни доказать, ни опровергнуть (этим любят пользоваться деконструктивисты). Может быть, это существенно и для значимости подтекстов.

Сейчас, по-видимому, наступает конец героической эпохи интертекстуальных разысканий, когда исследователям приходилось опираться только на собственную начитанность, хорошую память и талант неожиданных сопоставлений. Когда вся мировая словесность вот-вот будет переведена в распоряжение компьютеров, то поиск любых текстовых параллелей станет неизмеримо легче, а осмысление их — гораздо ответственнее. Переходя в руки нового поколения исследователей, интертекстуальный метод рискует расшататься и стать субъективной игрой. Характерным сигналом конца эпохи бывает появление автопародий. Такой автопародией можно считать недавнюю книгу Г. Амелина и В. Мордерер о междуязычных подтекстах у Мандельштам и других поэтов (Амелин, Мордерер 2000): за словом "орел" стоит адмиралтейская игла, потому что орел — это eagle, хотя английского языка Мандельштам не знал. Понятие междуязычных подтекстов возникло при работе над текстами Набокова и для их поэтики было, действительно, важно и плодотворно. Но как только его

превратили в универсальную отмычку, оно стало для интертекстологии орудием карнавального самоубийства: если обращаться к иноязычным паронимама, то заведомо у каждому слову текста в каком-нибудь языке да найдется пароним. Любой текст таким образом более или менее изящно превращается в проитиворечивую бессмыслицу — обычно во имя борьбы с надоевшим авторитарным смыслом. Цель ученого, пользующегося интертекстуальным методом во всей его научной потенции, — объективно воссоздать субъективный культурный мир Мандельштама или иного поэта: то, с чего начался этот разговор. Цель художника от науки — заменить этот мир фрагментом собственного культурного мира. Первое — традиция структурализма, второе — тенденция поструктурализма. Смешивать два эти ремесла есть тьма охотников; я надеюсь, что мы не из их числа.

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Intertekstuaalne analüüs tänapäeval

Artiklis arutletakse intertekstuaalse analüüsi, mis on Tartu-Moskva koolkonna kaasaegne, praeguste saavutuste ja tulevikuvõimaluste üle. Tuuakse välja selle analüüsimeetodi seosed klassikaliste filoloogiliste uurimismeetoditega, täpsustatakse interteksti mõistet ja rõhutatakse uurijapoolse korrektsuse hädavajalikkust, kuna taolise analüüsiga kaasneb pidevalt üleinterpreteerimise oht. Artiklis on toodud värvikaid näiteid selle kohta, kuidas uurija mõttelend on võimeline tekitama meelevaldseid allusioone, mis ei lähtu algtekstist ja on enamjaolt eksitavad. See viib selleni, et uuritav tekst mitte ei selgine, vaid muutub veelgi arusaamatumaks.

Author, landscape and communication in Estonian haiku

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Abstract. Present article tries to give insight into the ways in which Estonian haiku models its author and communicates with the reader. The author thinks that while Japanese haiku is a predominantly autocommunicative piece of literature, where even a fixed point of view is not recommended, Estonian literary conventions are oriented towards openly communicational texts, which convey a fixed axiology and rely on abundant use of pronouns and rhetorical questions, addresses and apostrophes. While there is a considerable amount of Estonian haiku that depend on Estonian literary conventions, most of the Estonian haiku texts, however, are oriented to the Japanese model. These texts have been labelled "the catalogues of landscape", as they are constituted by naming different landscape objects without developing a line of narration. Thereby every landscape element in poetry is granted its own voice, and through this multitude of voices inside the text, the reader is forced to enter an autocommunicative process of remodelling him/herself.

The problem of communication in poetry

Every piece of poetry can be considered an act of communication by virtue of being written and read by someone, either another person or the same person at a different instant of time. Therefore functioning of a poetic work can be depicted according to the communication schema proposed by Roman Jakobson in his famous "Closing statement: Linguistics and poetics" (1966), where a poem is a message sent by the author to the reader. The message (poem) presupposes a context, seizable to addressee, a code (poetic language) and a contact, "a

physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee" (Jakobson 1966: 353). Each of these elements is connected with one of the basic functions of language.

As Juri Lotman has eloquently proved in a number of his writings, this schema of communication applies to a very limited number of texts in any given culture, and is certainly inadequate in describing artistic texts (e.g., first section of Y. Lotman 1990a). Although Roman Jakobson himself was very far from a simplistic view of the matters and asserts that all the six language functions are represented in every single text, including works of literature, still the very fact that his analyses of literary texts foreground the element of message itself (i.e. the poetic function), brings us to the question about the role played by other elements of an act of communication in a poetic text.

From this point of view there surges the rich scholarship on the problem of author in literature, the relation of author with reader's interpretation, and the process of reading (e.g. *Rezeptionsästhetik*). As a rule, these writings complicate the issue of text's outer communication even further, introducing the notions of "model reader" and "model author". "Model reader" signifies a model of a possible reader foreseen by the author of the text, according to which the author chooses the code and other textual elements (Eco 1984: 7), the text's orientation towards a certain type of memory (Y. Lotman 1990a: 64). "Model author" is an authorial image constructed by the reader according to the textual hints carried by the text. The author becomes "a textual strategy establishing semantic correlations and activating the Model Reader" (Eco 1984: 11); author is a function, "the principle of unity of writing" both at the level of stylistics and world view (Foucault 1989: 204). Also Yuri Levin, whose view of communication in lyric poetry will partly be taken as a point of departure in further discussion, differentiates between three levels of communication in poetry: the real and the implicit reader/author, and the internal communication (Levin 1973).

These theories have sought to overcome the disadvantages of the classical model of communication by splitting text into several categories and layers, whereas the real author has been either dismissed altogether from the discussion or has been treated as a more or less coherent sender of a poetic message, which then later diversifies by itself, building multifarious images of reader and writer.

For Juri Lotman, communication is a fundamentally different phenomenon, because neither the text nor the other participants of the act of communication precede it: "they become such only in course of

this act" (M. Lotman 2001: 102). What is most important here, is that not only the text is not identical with itself, but also the addresser and addressee are split into several personalities and an act of communication can be directed from a person to him/herself. In an act of autocommunication the carrier of information remains the same, but a secondary code is introduced into the message, thereby changing the information content of the message, "and this leads to a restructuring of the actual 'I' itself" (Y. Lotman 1990a: 22) As Juri Lotman puts it,

> My ego may be regarded as a semiosphere. It represents a collection of addressees. When I address myself I am addressing one of these addressees and I identify myself with him. [...] I identify with my multifaceted personality, with my polysemiotic personality, with some single language, with one addressee, and in this manner my own self has undergone a transformation. (Lotman, Broms 1988: 120–121)

For Lotman every text comprises both the elements of 'I' to 's/he' and 'I' to 'I' communication, although one of the systems is usually dominant. In a poetic text the autocommunicative elements are prevalent already by virtue of metre and rhythm, which force the reader to take a poem as a code and not as an informative text (Y. Lotman 1990a: 29–34). Yuri Levin asserts similarly that heightened autocommunicative functioning is inherent to poetry because as poetry is usually built in monologic form, it can be regarded as author's dialogue with him/herself (Levin 1973: 177–178). He also thinks that autocommunicativity is also projected into the act of reception, where a text becomes a reader's dialogue with him/herself (Levin 1973).

Evidently, the complexity of communicational activity surrounding a piece of poetry as it is described above will leave its trace to the communicational relations inside the text. If we are to agree that "an artistic model in its most general form recreates the image of the world, i.e. it models the relations of the person and world for a given consciousness" (Y. Lotman 1990b: 159), and if we consider the "author" as a principle of unity or a subject for a given artistic model, we have to admit that the way how author and communicational patterns are represented in a text is one of the most important textual strategies altogether. At that, we have to remember that in a literary text "the readership image and its attendant pragmatic aspects do not automatically determine the type of text, but become elements of a free artistic game and consequently acquire supplementary significance" (Y. Lotman 1990a: 64).

Haiku in Japan and Estonia — texts and specifics

Before continuing with the analysis of concrete texts, it is important to mention the nature and specifics of haiku poetry[1] in Japan and Estonia, and to give a short account of the texts analysed.

Haiku poetry in Japan came to be considered an elevated form of art only with the poetry of Matsuo Bashō (1644–1694). Before that it was mostly considered a little frivolous amusement, which was most often composed in groups as a collective pastime. Bashō, who was deified within hundred years after his death, laid the grounds and requirements of the haiku form, which remained unquestioned until Meiji Restoration (1868–1912), a time of extensive European influence in Japan. As it is neither possible nor relevant to cover the whole haiku history and all the aspects of the form, the following analysis will limit itself only to the remarks about the haiku of Matsuo Bashō, and only to those aspects directly connected with their communicational functioning.

Haiku started to be written in Estonia in 1960ies, and although the artistic quality and the importance of the form have declined over the years, it is still very much a living poetic form. It is complicated to map the exact process of adoption of the form for multifarious reasons, but more or less we can say that for an average Estonian haiku writer haiku means a poem about nature with 17 syllables split into three lines.[2] The Estonian haiku texts analysed in the present article are taken from all the authorial collections of poetry published after the WW II in Estonia until the year 2001. Altogether it is 1455 texts by 97 authors from 127 collections of poetry.

The stand of poetry in classical Japanese culture and in post-war Estonia has some crucial differences.

In classical Japanese culture, poetry was not a meagre object of aesthetic pleasure, but it became socially institutionalised. This applies first and foremost to earlier *waka* poetry, composing which was an

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[1] Term 'haiku' can cause some confusion as it was adopted only by the reformer of haiku literature, Masaoka Shiki, in the end of 19th century to designate an independent verse of 17 morae, which was not meant to start a renga sequence. Earlier both these and the first verses of longer renga sequences had been called 'hokku' or 'starting verse'. In the present article I use the term 'haiku' for independent verses both before and after Shiki. Apart from the mora-count haiku has many other requirements, only a few of which will be discussed later.

[2] For a general description of Estonian haiku, its importance in Estonian literary context and the most important patterns of adoption see Lindström 2001.

obligatory skill for every Japanese courtier, but also haiku poetry had its social functions. Developed initially from the first verse of a renga sequence it had to contain a greeting to the host of the sequence,[3] and the host replied with a second verse, expressing his gratitude on visit. A poet, visiting somebody, presented the host with haiku, even if no renga sequence followed. Collective haiku composing was common at instances of moon-viewing or when appreciating cherry blossoms, but also haiku competitions were held, where people composed haiku at the spot on a given topic. While some authors consider this social function irrelevant to a poem's analysis, because Bashō often remade his greeting poems or presented the same haiku to several different hosts (Kawamoto 2000: 49–51), the others think that the "greeting spirit" is essential to understanding haiku. A haiku can greet not only humans, but it can be composed to greet a famous place, known from earlier poetry (Shirane 1998).

It would be simplistic to think that such communicative functioning has no impact to a poem's structure, and in fact, as it is shown by Horikiri Minoru, communicative textual elements in classical Japanese poetry (including *waka*) are more frequent during the periods when social poetic interaction was tighter (Horikiri Minoru 2002: 129–130). Moreover, he considers haiku (esp. Bashō's haiku) an especially communicative form of poetry, because the ratio of haiku containing communicative expressions[4] is relatively high compared to *waka* (16.8%) (Horikiri Minoru 2002). Half of the texts among this 16.8% are written either as greetings or are a part of a longer piece of haiku prose (*haibun*).

Evidently, this is not the way poetic interaction is organised in Western poetic context, which departs from Romanticist assumption that a poetic genius cannot possibly create a masterpiece on demand. Although we can probably imagine some congress among the circles of amateur poets, who are also ardent haiku writers, it is safe to say that this kind of social functioning is alien to Estonian haiku. Parado-

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[3] A renga sequence consisted of 36, 60 or 100 verses and was composed by two, three or more authors, who took turns in composing alternative verses of 5-7-5 and 7-7 mora. Classical renga had extremely complex rules as to how the preceding verse can be capped, the most important of which forbids the development of one and the same lyrical topic through more than three consecutive verses.

[4] 'Communicative expressions' is an inaccurate equivalent for '*yōkyū hyōgen* 要求表現', which comprises expressions of imperative, prohibition, volition (esp. *mu, mogana*) and rhetorical questions.

xically enough, as we see later, it is the Estonian poetry, which tends to use more communicative expressions: among the 275 poems listed in a collection of Estonian nature poems "Eesti looduslüürikat" (Vaarandi 1980), there are only 235 (85.5%), which use communicative elements.[5] Among Estonian haiku, which draw simultaneously from Japanese and Estonian conventions, there are 555 texts (38%), which are openly communicational.

Key to the issue lies probably in the way both literary traditions see author.

Estonian literary tradition and its clichés surge from the Neo-romanticist poetry in the beginning of the 20th century. Such literature, as the romanticist literature proper and modern European literature until postmodernism in general, takes the author as a centre of axiology. The truth of the author coincides with the truth of the text, while the text itself is presented to the reader as ready-made, i.e. with relatively clear implications, topics and values. Such an author needs to be abundantly expressed through pronouns, rhetorical questions, exclamations and addresses etc to ensure that the reader will receive his/her unique message.

For Japanese literature, despite of, or rather, because of its communal character, the author's intention is not the primary category. Japanese literature can be regarded as code-oriented literature rather than text-oriented, which means that "code becomes one of the most important levels of interpretation of a poetic text, and a background mechanism that directs the creation of new poetic images" (Raud 1994: 18). The range of objects and situations that are appropriate for use in a poem at a certain occasion are catalogued and endowed with poetic essence (*hon'i*), which the interpretation and value of the poem relies on. Emotions appropriate for expression belonged to code and to the poetic essence of an item as well, rather than to the poet who uttered them (Keene 1971: 49). Bashō wrote his texts not as Bashō *hic et nunc*, but as a Poet in the spirit of the ancients, who has a certain (prescribed) fate, tasks and characteristics (Keene 1971; Katō 1997: 154). "Model author" is always an "ideal author", and "model reader" an "ideal reader".

Individualism together with the subject-object opposition came to Japanese culture (and haiku) after the Meiji Restoration (Beichman 1986: 68–73, Karatani 1993). At that, if the author does not have an

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[5] Exact subtypes of what is called a communicative element here will be discussed in further sections.

individual character, which could be treated as a single coherent whole, i.e. as a subject, s/he does not have an individual truth to be expressed with individual means either [6]. The nexus of truth is located outside both the author and the reader, which means that the reader can readily be entrusted with interpretative initiative, as the truth is not dependent on either of them. Such an author feels no particular need to manifest his/her particular individual position and the text becomes open, "validating (or at least not contradicting) the widest possible range of interpretative proposals" (Eco 1984: 33), up to the point where even a poem's real topic ('solitude', 'voidness') is up to the reader to decide (Konsihi 1999: 85–87). The whole Bashō's poetics has been subordinated to the ideal of impersonality (Ueda 1991, Keene 1971) and, as a matter of fact, the openness of those seventeen syllables can be regarded as one of the reasons why haiku literature has survived as a form of full value regardless of its brevity (Kawamoto 1993).

As discussed above, transferring textual activity from writer to reader and treating a text as a code, rather than a message, is characteristic of cultures inclined to autocommunication. Therefore we can state that the Estonian haiku author, when modelling communicational relations in text, must choose between two radically different attitudes: communicational and autocommunicational.

Communicative perspectives in Estonian haiku texts

Texts with pronouns

Pronouns are signs, which do not have a meaning in lexicon, but whose meaning is established by the very act of communication, marking the deictic zero of the utterance. Thus it is the use of pronouns, which will betray the projection of communicational force into the text first.

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[6] It is significant that an idea of purposeful deviation from haiku's mora-count comes to the fore only with the influence of Romanticism. The unimportance of author can also be exemplified by the fact that classical Japanese literature did not know authorial collections of poetry: poems were published according to schools or gatherings, where the texts had been composed, following the order of seasons, i.e. according to the code.

The analysis here will depart from two theories: the theory of communication in lyric poetry by Yuri Levin (1973) and the theory of communicative perspective by Mihhail Lotman (1989). Both of these authors depart from the assumption that heightened communicativity inherent to poetry is amply revealed by tendency to express every object described as an act of communication, introducing characters unmotivated by plot and addressing objects, who are incapable of communication. At that, texts, which contain no pronouns, are considered either objective or void of communication.

Yuri Levin (1973) analyses what relation the character marked by pronoun has with the author or the addressee, differentiating three different types of 'I' (personal, strange, generalising) and four types of 'you' (personal, impersonal, generalising and autocommunicative)[7]. In practical terms it means the orientation of one or other character to author's or reader's position.

Mihhail Lotman (1989) takes a different approach. He asserts that every poem is reducible to a situation or an outcome of a situation. Constructing such a model meaning of a poem, he determines the function of the pronominal characters in this situation according to the theory of deep cases by Charles Fillmore. An 'I', 'we', 'you' or 's/he' or 'they' can be an agent (who causes the action), patient (on whom the action is imposed), or object (minor character in the situation). To those Fillmorean cases he adds that of a witness. A character referred to by pronoun can as well be only rhetorical or fictitious, which means that it exists only in text, but not in the situational meaning model. He derives various combinations: the character of 'I' as an agent and 'you' as a patient, 'you' as an agent and 'I' as a patient, 'I' as an agent and 'he' as an object etc., and creates a rather comprehensive typology of perspectives of communication in poetry.

If we combine these theories, we can certainly achieve a rather satisfactory method for communicational analysis of a poem, the model situation of what can be constructed easily enough and at least some of the characters are designated by pronouns. Haiku texts containing pronouns are altogether 366 (25%).

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[7] Personal 'I'/'you' — when the explicit 'I' is identifiable with the author or 'our' little group, where the author belongs to, or when 'you' is identifiable with the real addressee. Generalising 'I'/'you' refers to the whole humankind or larger group. Strange 'I' — if author is not identifiable with the character designated by 'I'. Impersonal 'you' — the addressee is clearly incapable of receiving the message, e.g. is not a living being. Autocommunicative 'you' — when 'you' means 'I' (Levin 1973: 182–184).

For example, in Venda Sõelsepp's haiku

Olen kui ämblik
lahkuvat suve püüdes
taban vaid sääski

I'm like a spider
Catching the leaving summer
Mosquitoes are all I get

the 'I' catching the spiders is an agent of the situation. Analysing the text according to the relations between the external and the internal level of communication, we see that both the implicit and the real author can be regarded as coinciding with the 'I'. This means that a reader may construct the external communication in two ways: as a confession by the author to him, or he can side himself with the author and the spider in the model situation and take the text as an act of autocommunication.

On the other hand in Eda Voll's

lubamatus unenäos
sajab valgust ja sina
matad mu lumme

In an impermissible dream
The light falls and you
Bury me into snow

we can see that the action is directed from 'you' to 'I' and thereby the communicative force is different from the verse analysed above.

While the pronouns are undoubtedly strongest in their communicational intensity when compared to other possible expressions of communicational force, there exist also different degrees of intensity among them. The intensity can be further strengthened by additional use of rhetorical questions and apostrophes in the same verse.

The strongest among the pronouns is personal 'you', especially when expressed by a verb in imperative or accompanied by a rhetorical question or address (41 out of 67 occurrences). Such a 'you' is always identifiable with the reader, and the addresser of the utterance is automatically identified with the implicit author. For example, a haiku by Ivar Ivask

Vala veel õlut
õngeritvade varjus
liigutas koha

Poor some more beer
In the shadows of fishing rods
a pike perch moved

In this text the reader is offered an actantial position of the addressee, who is ordered to poor some more beer to the main character.

General 'you' (18 texts) has also strong communicational impact, although here the autocommunicative mechanisms start to manifest themselves more acutely, as the author is also part of that 'you' as a member of human race. On the other hand, the impersonal 'you' (29 texts) is mostly autocommunicative, as the reader can by no means place him/herself into the position of this character. Most often the 'you' in these poems is a natural object, an animal, a bird, an insect, a plant or an inanimate object of landscape, e.g. 'cloud', 'wind', 'chrysanthemum', etc.

Similar technique is common to Bashō's haiku as well. Horikiri Minoru lists addresses to fictional addressees (inanimate, supernatural or natural objects) for the sake of artistic impressiveness and as an expression of poetic madness[8] as one of the five main functions of Bashō's use of communicational devices (Horikiri Minoru 2002). As the Japanese verb never indicates the grammatical category of person or number, and the use of pronouns is extremely rare, we cannot say that the instances listed by Horikiri are exactly equal to the Estonian usage of imperative or rhetorical address towards an inanimate object, which is expressed in second person. In fact, the Japanese language has a predilection to omit the subject altogether, if it is deducible from the context. On one hand this grammatical peculiarity can of course be considered a linguistic inevitability, but on the other hand every inevitability acquires secondary meaning in a poetic text. Moreover, it has even been stated that this very grammatical feature in Japanese language has certain ontological implications. For example Sakamoto Hyakudai states that "by omitting the subject, we [Japanese] try to

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[8] *Fūkyō* or poetic madness is a category in Bashō's poetics, which underlines the wish to dedicate oneself to eccentric haiku life. Kawamoto Kōji holds principally the same opinion (Kawamoto 2000: 96–97), considering all the instances of communicational elements (in my sense) to be an expression of *fūkyō*, and a subtype of oxymoron, which to his mind, is one of the main devices for meaning generation in haiku.

unify subject and object", and that "the disposition which governs the Japanese sentiment is to annihilate ego, or to melt ego into the object" (1989: 1564). Be as it may linguistically, the tendency to address inanimate objects (with or without the use of pronouns) nevertheless reveals one of the main poetic principles in both Estonian and Japanese haiku, which is expressed in the communicational functioning of a poem, but also in the way tropes and figures are used: treating the natural objects as equals to the humans or diminishing the humans to the level of the smallest natural objects, to the likes of stones, grass, leaves etc. The landscape is not a background for human thoughts, but an equal living being.

That tendency is to a certain extent inherent to Estonian nature poetry in general. In the aforementioned collection of Estonian nature poetry (Vaarandi 1980), one can often meet a pattern where the authorial character or 'I' of the poem addresses nature objects or homeland either in words, thoughts or actions as if it was human, and very often this object is expressed by 'you'.

The combination of 'I' and 'you' is comparable to the personal 'you' in its communicational activity, in case both pronouns are either personal or general, because in such a situation both reader and writer have been appointed fixed actantial positions in the text, and the direction of communicational force is also indicated. In most occurrences 'I' functions as the agent and 'you' as the patient of the poem, and contentwise they are mostly love poems, like the haiku by Eda Voll above. Despite the fact that confessional expression of love is alien to Japanese haiku poetry (although in earlier, pre-Bashō haiku word plays on frivolities can be found), it is still of quite a considerable frequency in Estonian haiku, encompassing also many texts with personal 'you' as agent or patient. Love haiku is common also among other Western haiku literatures, and for example the Brazilian haiku are said to combine extremely personal expressions with explicit eroticism (Lobo 1995).[9]

However, most of the texts using pronouns use the 1st person pronouns 'I' and 'we' (206). This is to be expected as these pronouns mark the deictic zero, which the tradition of Western lyric poetry

[9] Interestingly enough, Luiza Lobo proposes that this specificity of Brazilian haiku is a remnant from how the aboriginal forms of short poetry functioned: it was typical for them to be accompanied by guitar and sung out loud (Lobo 1995). This would be another example of the impact of outward communication to the inner communicational functioning of the text.

prefers to demarcate. Even more so, because haiku in Western cultures, including Estonia, is often considered to be poetry of fresh and immediate sensation of the moment. Consider for example a quotation from the poet Jaan Kaplinski: "In haiku I expressed something, which might be called meditative experience. Some calm moment, when you are alone with your experience, your surroundings, and it all somehow resonates together: the poet, his feelings, his memories, his surroundings."[10] In his criticism of Estonian haiku Rein Raud states that "while Japanese haiku tends to depict first and foremost the echo of the inwardly in the outside [phenomena], then in Estonian haiku the tendency seems to be the opposite" (Raud 1984). It is clear, that such a cognising self, whose perception and understanding of a particular and ephemeral moment is depicted, demands special attention in the text and is bound to be indicated.

On the other hand, the effect of 'I' in poetry is ambiguous: a personal 'I' makes a text more personal, as it excludes the reader from the text, pretending to depict author's internal thoughts or his actions. Like for example in Jaan Kaplinski's

Oma südame-
lööke jään kuulatama
vihmasabinas

My own heart-
Beats I stop to listen
In the spatter of rain.

Here, the reader as if reads the confession about the author's affairs and how he listen to his own heartbeats. At the same time, a text with 'I' provides the text with a certain nexus, where the reader can locate him/herself, identifying with 'I' and thus raising the autocommunicativity of the poem — it can also be the reader who listens to his/her heart. 'We' in these cases is even more aggressive, as it already includes a position for a reader by itself. It is interesting to note, that while in the collection of Estonian nature poetry one can repeatedly find a construction, where 'I' is in the function of patient (or witness) to whom the activities of the landscape objects are directed: the sights open to him/her, the winds beat, the flowers smile etc, then in case of haiku we can find only 17 texts with 'I' as a patient. In more than half

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[10] The quotation is taken from Jaan Kaplinski's answer to my questionnaire about haiku habits in Estonia, and dates 03.03.2002. The questionnaire was sent to major haiku poets in Estonia to explore the background of their haiku writings.

of the cases, 'I' is the agent, and surprisingly enough, altogether at 60 cases it is in the function of object.

Using pronominal characters in the function of object deserves a special note here. It is evident that in case of texts, which are analysed by Yuri Levin and Mihhail Lotman, i.e. in case the texts are long and explicit enough for creating a model situation, it does not constitute a major difference if at one instance the pronominal character is expressed in another function on the surface level of the text. However, as haiku demands utmost economy of expression, most pronouns occur only once, and the way they are expressed on the surface level of the text acquires considerable importance. For example in Ain Kaalep's haiku

> Su kleidi lilli
> väldib mesilane, sest
> aimab mu kiivust.

> The flowers of your dress
> The honey-bee avoids, 'cause
> It senses my jealousy.

the situation is very clear — "I am jealous of you" — but in the text both 'I' and 'you' are expressed only as possessive attributes, and the agent is the bee. We can observe the similar tendency in a considerable amount of texts (among 'I'-'you' poems even up to 70%). The activities are performed by other objects connected with 'you' or 'me' and not by ourselves. It is evident that these texts are reducing the communicational force of the otherwise strongly communicational pronouns, and thus we can consider this tendency a means to approach the Japanese model of projecting communication into text. In addition to that, the communicational force can be reduced also by the elliptic use of pronouns, or using short pronominal forms instead of the longer ones,[11] or alternating the point of view.

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[11] In the Estonian language, a category of person can be expressed in three different ways. The personal pronouns have two different forms, the longer and the shorter one, which can alternate freely, the main argument towards the use of the longer form being stress (e.g., *'mina* teeksin', *'ma* teeksin' = 'I would make'). Person can also be expressed only by verb endings ('teeksi*n*' = 'I would make'). It is clear, that as the stress laid on the subject is different in all three cases, the communicational impact of the poem is also different. In an unpublished study conducted in 1998, I found that in spoken Estonian the elliptic use of pronouns (the pronouns are omitted in the sentences where their use is grammatically correct) makes up roughly about ¼ of all the occurrences analysed. For example

The texts with a free actantial position

As Umberto Eco indicates, the author as a textual strategy may be expressed in a text by an actantial role (Eco 1984: 10), which means that it does not necessarily take a pronoun for the author to make him/herself manifest in the text. Therefore, the fact that there are no pronouns in the text, does not make this poem void of communication *a priori*, as proposed by the theories of Yuri Levin and Mihhail Lotman. Of course, again the problem might not arise with the kind of texts they analyse — the romanticist and symbolist poetry —, but considering the brevity of haiku poems, it is evident that not all the actantial roles might be expressed explicitly. Depending on a poem, this gap in the information about the model situation can become an active trigger mechanism in the communicative situation.

For example in the haiku by Juhan Viiding,

Jaapan on kaugel
eesti on kaugemal veel
ütlevad tuuled

Japan is far
Estonia is even further —
The winds say,

for the winds to say something, there must be someone to say it to, but this someone is not deducible from the text. The author here has created an empty position in the model of the text, in this instance, the receiver of the message sent by the winds. The reader can easily place him/herself in the middle of the model situation, whereas in case of objective texts the only possible position for the reader would be that of the witness outside the situation.

Such texts are altogether 93 (6.4%) and most of them (59) are connected with the verbs of perception, directional verbs (verbs of motion, but also 'smile', 'say to' etc), and reflexive verb forms; there are also many verses featuring a part of human body ('arm', 'forehead' etc 20) and spatial relations ('further', 'closer', 'up' 'down' etc — 14 texts).

Failing to mention the character explicitly enhances autocommunicational processes in the reader, as s/he, when forced to supplement

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in the haiku texts with 'I' the elliptical use of pronouns (subject is expressed only by verb endings; the cases with implicit subject cannot be included here) makes up 66%.

the missing character and interpreting this position usually as an 'I'-character, has to remodel him/herself according to the situation. Textual activity passes on from the writer to the reader.

Similar reading pattern is common also to Japanese haiku, especially because the Japanese language does not indicate the subject if it is deducible from the context. Therefore, often the most logical reading is to interpret the text through 'I', although the text does not contradict the other patterns. For example in Bashō's

(755) 瓶わる〻夜の氷のねざめ哉
kame waruru yoru no kōri no nezame kana[12]
The jar crackles/ that icy night/ when waking up

the typical reading would be to say that 'I' wake up, and not somebody else.

Texts with rhetorical questions and apostrophes

Another type of texts in the transition zone between the explicitly communicative texts of haiku and the so-called "catalogues of landscape" are the texts, where the picture of landscape is accompanied by or given through a rhetorical question (51) or an apostrophe (37). These questions and exclamations have no addressee, thus they tend to trigger the autocommunicative activity both on the part of the reader and the author. The questions either contain an answer or are not meant to be answered at all.

For example in Aime Piirsalu's haiku

Kumb kumma kaissu
tormavad meri või maa
Jäämineku aeg

Who rushes to embrace whom
The sea or the land
The time of breaking up the ice,

the author gives us a picture of ice, which is melting on the sea and is washed ashore by the waves. The role of the question here is to

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[12] The Japanese haiku texts are taken from the Bashō poetry volume of Nihon koten bungaku taikei (Bashō 1974). The number in front of the text signifies the number of the text in this edition. All translations are mine (K. L.).

strengthen the image by stimulating the autocommunicative activity in the poem.

The communicational force of the apostrophe is even lower than that of the rhetorical question, because in the former, the author does not even create a fictitious dialogue. In any case, also in these texts the author's position and his attitude to the object are defined, and thereby the readers are provided with a position inside the model situation of the poem. Thus we can say that even though these texts are less intense in their communicative potential than the texts with pronouns, the landscapes here are still openly communicational.

"Philosophical" texts

A border case between the openly communicational texts and the objective texts on one hand and the catalogues of landscape on the other, are so-to-say "philosophical" texts, which resemble epigrams and are relatively didactic. They contain aphorisms or maxims, sometimes witticisms based on word-play. Although these texts do not contain communicational devices discussed above, they are by no means objective, because the author's presence is most manifest. The author presents his/her assertion and what is left to the reader is to agree or disagree. Most of the 124 texts here are written by amateurs, but a special group is formed by surrealistic haiku texts.

Objective texts

As it was mentioned above, Mihhail Lotman considers a text objective or void of communication, if there are different characters in the model situation constructed after the text, but the text itself is written in the third person (M. Lotman 1989). And indeed, there is a considerable amount of Estonian haiku, which do not contradict this approach. These are texts, which usually consist of one sentence or at least maintain the same agent all through the poem. We must note here, that this agent is not designated by a pronoun in the text, therefore the author's point of view is not manifest. Of course, the choice of words and the use of imagery always tell us something about the author's preferences, so the objectiveness here is strictly the lack of communicative activity in the model situation of the text and nothing else.

For example Ly Seppel's haiku

Hall varblaseklutt
ei mõelnudki lahkuda
paljaks jäänud oksalt

Grey sparrow urchin
Didn't even think of leaving
The branch grown bare

can be called objective in this sense, because here we are offered a description of the actions of somebody else (the sparrow), without a smallest possibility to place ourselves into the situation described. Objective texts are altogether 63 (4.3%).

Catalogues of landscape

The biggest amount of Estonian haiku texts (713), however, do not belong to any of the types analysed above. They do not contain pronouns, do not contain rhetorical figures like rhetorical question and apostrophe; they refuse the reader any kind of place inside the model situation, yet they do not belong among the objective texts, because there is no line of narration. These texts consist of naming a number of landscape objects, and the model meaning of the text is a picture or a concept, like "spring morning", "passing of time", "like in Japan", etc. None of the theories mentioned so far (Levin, Lotman, Eco, Foucault) would find communication or indices of authorial function in these texts. Can we say that these texts are finally the ones void of communication? Is there a communication in a piece of landscape?

In the analysis of those texts there surges the question of personification in one-syntagma verses. On one hand, the a text like Venda Sõelsepp's

Kraavid kannavad
rõõmsalt lauldes õlgadel
hangede laipu

The ditches carry
On their shoulders, merrily singing,
The corpses of [snow]drifts

clearly depicts a picture of a quick-flowing water in a ditch, full of snow patches, which float down the current. On the other hand, this is

written exactly in a form of a description of a situation (and not in some other way), where the agent (ditch), albeit fictitious, performs a certain action (carrying and singing), and therefore it could be classified as objective text.[13] However, this is not the approach taken here, especially in the light of the text group yet to be analysed below. The fact, that a landscape object is given through a strong personification imposes authorial interpretation more than it would be in case of mere naming, and the construction in general betrays strong influence of Western poetic patterns, but still we can find the similarities with the rest of the catalogues of landscape in their functioning: they search to endow the landscape with its own communicational force.

One of the main requirements of Bashō-style haiku is its dyadic structure, even the most important in the opinion of many of his students (Shirane 1998). This has been taken the main principle of haiku's poetics also by many modern scholars (e.g., Kawamoto 2000). A haiku must consist of at least two independent parts, which are separated by a cutting word or *kireji*. Bashō is recorded to have said the following:

> 發句の事は、行きて歸る心の味也。たとえば「山里は萬歳遲し梅の花」といふ類也。「山里は萬歳おそし」といゝはなして、梅は咲りといふ心のごとくに、行きてかへるの心發句也。[...]
> 先師も「發句はとり合物と知るべし」と言るよし、[...]。
> *Hokku* feels like a heart that goes and returns. For example: "Mountain hamlet/ manzai dancers are late/ plum blossoms". Having said "mountain hamlet, late manzai dancers" and then going to the blooming plums — that's what is a haiku with a mind that goes and returns. [...] The teacher said as well: "Know, that a *hokku* is combining things [...]." (Bashō 1966: 211)

This means that a classical Japanese haiku must inevitably comprise at least two different points of view, and can not maintain the same agent through the poem, like the last kind of Estonian texts analysed above. By focusing in one verse equally to big and small, eternal and transient, or just juxtaposing two things from totally different spheres of existence, the author is supposed to give a picture of the whole universe. Using too similar entities is considered to be of bad taste. Haruo Shirane compares a dyadic haiku to *ikebana*, saying that similarly to a flower arrangement artist, who ""cuts" the flower, opening up space that the audience can enter into with his or her imagination" (Shirane 1998: 83), the cutting word in haiku "opens up a space that

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[13] When a text consist of two syntagmas, i.e. describes the actions of two independent fictitious characters (landscape objects), the question does not arise, because there is no possibility to reduce such a verse to one model situation.

the haikai reader occupies metonymically or synecdochically, by moving from a detail or part to an imagined whole, filling out the scene or narrative [...]"[14] (Shirane 1998). Makoto Ueda argues that that the cutting word is the key to haiku's impersonality, as by cutting the verse all personal emotions and feelings in it will turn into universal and thereby impersonal by themselves (Ueda 1991: 1555).

Avoiding overt emotion and personal feelings is essential to haiku, as it is exemplified by many passages in Bashō's teachings. Konishi Jin'ichi claims that if a *waka* poet wrote about the darkening sea and a duck, s/he definitely added a comment on how it feels: sad, nostalgic, funny etc (choosing from among the emotions permitted in the item's poetic essence, of course). But Bashō, turning away from this tradition, wrote simply

(801) 海くれて鴨のこゑはほのかに白し
Umi kurete/ kamo no koe ha/ honokani shiroshi
The sea darkens/ A wild duck's call/ Is vaguely white. (Konishi 1999: 84–85)

Zen-influenced haiku criticism (e.g., Blyth 1978; Yasuda 1995; but also Konishi 1999, and others) considers haiku to be an expression of *satori*, it is, an expression of intuitive insight into the true nature of things and phenomena, it is a spiritual fusion with the surrounding world, which demands absolute egolessness from the author. In order to write, the author must give up his impressions and prejudices and dissolve into its subject matter.

The largest amount of texts, altogether 456, among Estonian haiku can be regarded as this kind of descriptive catalogues of landscape objects. Estonian haiku, having developed in the cross-influence of European literary conventions and ambiguous laconism of Japanese haiku, obviously do not conform uniformly to these Japanese rules, which demand the absolute disappearance of the author from the scene. In many cases the extensive use of rhetorical figures leaves no space for the reader's interpretative activity, limiting the possible range of meanings to minimum. Also we can see that the landscape, which the verses depict, is different with Bashō and Estonian authors. According to Karatani Kōjin, Alan Watts and others, Bashō's poetry and Zen poetry in general is by no means representative. Rather it tends to depict an ideal, conceptualised nature, it is, the landscape as

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[14] In the same book, he likens the mechanism to a film montage, where a close shot can be followed by a long shot etc, where the different parts can be related like in a metaphoric or a metonymic montage in Eisenstein's fashion (Shirane 1998: 98f).

such. (Karatani 1993; Watts 1990) At the same time Estonian haiku prefers to describe a real landscape and the real objects in a given moment.

However, these differences do not change the way these catalogues of landscape work in regards to their communicative activity. The author gives us only pieces of landscape, which the reader has to put together into a picture, moving from one object to another. Unlike in Japanese literature, a haiku here can also comprise more than two different points of view, and there are texts, where there exist even up to five different entities. That this is a feature of haiku mentality, and not of nature poetry in general, can be seen from the fact that in the collection of Estonian nature poetry (Vaarandi 1980) there are only 25 poems, which could be labelled a catalogue. Moreover, we can observe the similar tendency to combine multitude of objects, i.e. to present a catalogue, also among the texts which contain communicational elements and were analysed above: 327 poems out of 610 alternate the point of view in the course of the poem, giving different aspects of the same situation or giving background and situation separately.

For example, a haiku by Mart Raud:

> Pakatab koidik.
> Kerge virvendus järvel.
> Kuldkalad koevad

> The dawn bursts.
> Slight ripple on the lake.
> The goldfish spawn.

Also a haiku by Jaan Kaplinski:

> Esimene jälg
> esimesel lumel öö
> latern kirsipuu

> The first print
> On the first snow night
> A lantern a cherry-tree.

Sometimes the very topic of the haiku, i.e. the concept of its model meaning, is already mentioned inside the text as one of the entities.

For example, a haiku by Väino Vesipapp:

> Lume soojusest
> tedred paiskuvad lendu.
> Pakasehommik.

> From the warmth of snow
> The grouse flush.
> The morning of frost.

In this last instance, the reader can feel the author's presence in a more imperative manner than with haiku, where the reader has to decide the topic by him/herself. Nevertheless, this does not change the principal way in which these verses function from the communicative point of view.

In one of his most famous teachings, Bashō has explained how to write a good haiku as following.

松の事は松に習へ、竹の事は竹に習へと師の詞のありしも、私意をは
なれよといふ事也。此習へといふ所を己がままにとりて、終に習はざ
るなり。習へといふは、物に入つてその微の顯れて情感ずるや、句と
成る所也。

Learn [the way of] pine from the pine. [The way of] bamboo — learn from the bamboo. These are teacher's words. It means: move away from your own thoughts. If you do this learning after yourself, you do not learn anything in the end. Learning is to go into the things, to feel the core of their essence, and this becomes a verse. (Bashō 1966: 175)

Principally this teaching means that the author should sacrifice his own self, dive into his object and let it do its own talking.

This is exactly the way the catalogues of landscape function. The author is dead, in the sense that s/he has dissolved into several points of view, which in the texts are expressed by different elements of landscape. The pieces of landscape assume the control of the author and the author gives each of them its own personal voice. Thus we can hear the voice of a potato, the voice of a crow, the voice of a falling leaf, all at the same time. Once again we see that a poetic device elevates landscape object to an equal, if not more than equal partner for a human being. In a sense these texts become the ideal triggers of autocommunication, as through multitude of voices and an extreme activity demanded from a reader to fill up the space provided by a cut in the poem, the text becomes a code to remodel the writer's/ reader's self. But is that a communication in other senses, is hard to say. Rather, in the sense that the sum of all the different colours is white, we can say that the sum of all the voices of all the elements of the

landscape is non-communication, i.e. the noise, which has resided into silence.

Conclusion

We have seen that Estonian haiku uses different patterns of projecting communication and authorial relations into a poem, deriving both from Estonian literary conventions and the tradition of Japanese haiku. On one hand, Estonian haiku uses communicative elements like personal pronoun, rhetorical questions, addresses and apostrophes and free actantial positions relatively frequently, but on the other hand we have seen that the devices used tend to enhance the autocommunicational activity of the poem, rather than enforcing communicational relations in the manner of Romanticist poetry or also Estonian nature poetry in general. It is also clear that the question of communicativity in a piece of poetry is not a meagre amusement of the scholars of poetics, but carries significant ontological implications. For Estonian haiku, and haiku in general, communicative perspective is one of the most important means to convey its poetic principle: to animate landscape, to impose communicational activity on the elements of nature, to treat nature as an equal for humans and annihilate ego by fusion into landscape objects.

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Автор, пейзаж и коммуникация в эстонском хокку

В статье предпринимается попытка найти ответ на вопрос, каким образом в эстонском хокку моделируется образ автора и осуществляется коммуникация с читателем. Автор полагает, что хотя эстоноязычные хокку очевидно носят следы влияния западной литературной традиции и авторская позиция в них отмечается с помощью различных коммуникативных стратегий (личные местоимения, риторические обращения, вопросы и восклицания, свободные актантные позиции), — тем не менее, большинство текстов опирается все же на японскую литературную модель. Такие тексты, как «каталоги пейзажей» представляют читателю ряд объектов пейзажа, не развивая при этом линию рассказа. Каждому элементу пейзажа дается свой «голос», и посредством разнообразия таких голосов читателя вынуждают вступить в автокоммуникативный процесс моделирования себя.

Autor, maastik ja kommunikatsioon eesti haikus

Artikkel üritab leida vastust küsimusele, kuidas eesti haikukirjandus modelleerib autori kuju ja kommunikeerub lugejaga. Autor leiab, et ehkki suur osa eesti haikudest on kantud ilmselgelt lääne kirjandustraditsiooni mõjudest ja märgib autori positsiooni erinevate kommunikatiivsete strateegiate abil (personaalpronoomenid, retoorilised pöördumised, küsimused ja hüüatused, vabad aktantilised positsioonid), siis enamus tekstidest on siiski selge jaapani kirjandusmudeli mõjuga. Sellised tekstid, nn "maastikukataloogid" esitavad lugejale rea maastikuobjekte, jutustusliini arendamata. Igale maastikuelemendile on seeläbi antud oma "hääl" ning sellise häälte mitmekesisuse kaudu sunnitakse lugejat astuma autokommunikatiivsesse enesemodelleerimise protsessi.

'Infernal' subtexts in Brodsky's poem
The fifth anniversary

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Abstract. This essay explores the intertextual relationships of Joseph Brodsky's poem *Пятая годовщина* — an occasional verse dedicated to the fifth anniversary of the poet's enforced emigration from the Soviet Union. As is common in Brodsky's poetics, the text is imbued with allusions to other texts, not only from Russian, but from Western *belles lettres*, as well. Through reminiscences of *La Divina Commedia* the lost homeland together with the beloved native city of Leningrad is paralleled with Dante's "lost and accursed" Florence as well as with the lost St.Petersburg of Mandelshtam and Akhmatova, among others. The Dantean undertones are exposed not only on the semantical level of the examined text but in the metrical and structural aspects of the poem, as well.

The poem *Пятая годовщина* (Бродский 3: 147–150) was written on the fourth of June in 1977 as we can read from its title. It is a rare case in Brodsky's poetry that the exact date of writing is put down by the author, to say nothing of placing of the date right in the rubric. This gives us reason to assume that the date has a special semantic function in the text. The date works here as a device for decoding the content of the poem. In Minc's typology of the 'secondary' semantics of dates in literary texts, Brodsky's use of the date not only orients the text in the extratextual, historical time, but it stands for a metonymic sign representing the text in its entirety, as well (Минц 1989: 147).

We can say with certainty, that June 4, 1977 in Brodsky's poem refers to a concrete event in the poet's life. Five years exactly have passed at the time of writing of the text, from the day that he was compelled to leave the Soviet Union. Partially due to the date, marking off the significant turn in the history of the poet's personal

life, a change which endows the whole text with a certain vantage point, *The Fifth Anniversary* could be called an occasional poem — a memorial written for the lost homeland by a poet in exile.

In *The Fifth Anniversary* the situation of the poet in real, historical time and space finds its reflection in many aspects of the text. The position of the poet in enforced migration recalls Dantesque undertones which, in fact, are abundant in Brodsky's poem. Consequently, my presentation is devoted to the study of intertextual relationships of *The Fifth Anniversary* with a focus on Dante's *Divine Comedy* as one of the main subtexts of the poem.

What then relates "PG"[1], a poem picturing life in the Soviet Union in the 1960's and the early '70's, to Dante's *Divine Comedy*? We can take formal aspects of the poem as a starting point. It goes without saying that the appearance itself of *terza rima* is meant to put the reader in mind of Dante. Brodsky employs regular sets of triple rhymes — three-line stanzas with triple feminine rhymes AAA BBB CCC, each section consisting of three tercets.[2]

In addition to the Dantean *terza rima*, Brodsky's use of Dantean numerology is quite obvious in "PG". As we can observe from the following, the symbol of the Holy Trinity — number three — occurs frequently in relationship with the strictly regular stanzaic and metrical form of the poem: each line has 13 syllables, and consequently, each triplet consists of 39 syllables[3]. Each section includes three triplets. Furthermore, "PG" is composed of 32 tercets althogether, whereas Dante's *Inferno, Purgatorio* and *Paradiso* are comprised of 33 cantos each. By this figure Dante alludes to the number of years of Christ's earthly life. By adding one canto as a prologue to *Inferno,* Dante made the total of the cantos amount to the holy number of 100 symbolizing perfection in the medieval mind. Brodsky's 32 "cantos" are not without symbolic significance either. The number indicates the age of the poet, five years back, at the moment of his banishment.

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[1] Hereinafter *Пятая годовщина* is referred to in the text and in the footnotes as "PG"

[2] Dante, like Brodsky, employs only feminine rhymes in his *Divine Comedy*. Dante's rhyme structure ABABCBCDC... suggests a continuity which is lacking in Brodsky's use of rhymes.

[3] with three exceptions only, all of them consisting of 14 syllables — in Section Two: "Неугомонный Терек там ищет третий берег", Section Three: "Там мучает охранник во сне стыка трехгранник" and in the concluding section: "эпоха на колесах нас не погонит, босых".

As we can see, the Dantean content is present in the very "substance of the verse", to quote Efim Etkind's[4] expression; not only in the web of semantic relations manifested in the meanings of sentences, but also in the metrical and structural aspects of the poem, as well as in the poet's use of grammatical forms and intonational and sound patterns.

The initial theme of the poem as such, a look back at the lost homeland from the perspective of five years of exile, assigns archetypal Dantesque tones to the "PG". The perspective is set in the first three-line stanza which is graphically separated from the first section which consists of three triple stanzas. Like the above-mentioned prologue added by Dante to the "DC"[5], it serves — together with a similar isolated *terzina* in the end of "PG" — as an explanatory frame to the visionary voyage back to the native soil:

Падучая звезда, тем паче — астероид
на резкость без труда твой праздный взгляд настроит.
Взгляни, взгляни туда, куда смотреть не стоит.

The motif of a star is familiar from the "DC". Dante closes each section of his three-level universe with the word *le stelle* — the stars. For him they represent the familiar coordinates that emerge after his gloomy wanderings in *Inferno* and *Purgatory*. In the end of the "DC" it is the stars that are moved by the real living force of love.[6] Brodsky's other 'Dantesque' poem *December in Florence,* echoes this particular passage of Dante's *Comedy*.[7] Brodsky's star, the fall of which the lyrical "I" is

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[4] See Loseff 1989: 194.

[5] Hereinafter *The Divine Comedy* is referred to in the text and footnotes as "DC".

[6] *Inf.* 34: 136–139: "/.../ salimmo sú, ei primo ed io secondo, /tanto ch'io vidi de le cose belle / che porta il ciel, per un pertugio tondo;/ e quindi uscimmo **a riveder le stelle**." ("We mounted up, he first, I following,/ till of the lovely things that heaven bears / I beheld some, through a round opening; and thence we emerged **to re-behold the stars**"). *Purg.* 33: 142–145: "Io ritornai da la santissim'onda / rifatto sí come piante novelle/ rinnovellate di novella fronda, / puro e disposto **a salire a le stelle**." ("From that most holy wave I came away / refashioned, like new plants no blemish mars,/ made new again with new leaves: pure as they,/ and ready now for **mounting to the stars**").

[7] *Par.* 33: 141–145: "A l'alta fantasia qui mancò possa; / ma già volgeva il mio disire e il velle / si come rota che igualmente è mossa/ **l'amor che move il Sole e l'altre stelle**." ("The high-raised phantasy here vigour failed;/ but rolling like a wheel that never jars, / my will and wish were now by love impelled,/ **the love that moves the Sun and th'other stars**."). Compare to Brodsky's lines in Stanza VII of *Декабрь во Флоренции*: "/.../ **неправда, /что любовь движет**

witnessing has something ominous in it, although he is thus given a chance to make a wish upon a shooting star[8]. The seeing of a celestial light of a falling star or a planet provides him with a visionary power of having a look, though a reluctant one, to the remote place which he left five years past. The distance between "here" and "there" is shortened by the sharp-eyed vision of a banished poet. His reluctancy can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that atmospheric phenomena, comets in particular, are commonly thought to portend disaster.

But his clarified vision echoes also the imagined vision of a poet-seer *à la* Dante, endowed with insight into the truth of things that are far both in terms of space and time. In fact, the prologue in "PG", as part of the composition of the poem, is characteristic of visionary poetry of the Middle Ages. It usually begins with a rendering of how the author either in a dream or in a vision was offered an opportunity to experience the things, often transcendental or supersensual by nature, which he subsequently depicts in his poem. The vision or the dream with its "fantastic", transcendental aspects serves as a frame for the following representation, raising it often to the level of allegorical symbolism.

The perspective and subject matter of *Пятая годовщина* — an insight into the lost homeland — may be conceived as incorporating in a way typical of Brodsky some common motives of medieval visionary poetry, such as a visit to a supersensual state or to the Underworld, or a search for a lost beloved, which in this particular case is replaced by the lost homeland. The empty gaze of the lyrical subject begins to fill up with successive visions of landscapes that from his present point of view belong to "the distant elsewhere". True enough, one can always assert that the clarity of the poet's vision is not due to any supernatural powers but inherent in the very distance between the object and the observer[9].

звезды (Луну — подавно),/ ибо она делит все вещи на два — /даже деньги во сне. Даже, в часы досуга,/ мысли о смерти. Если бы звезды Юга /двигались ею, то — в стороны друг от друга." (Бродский 3: 113)

[8] The motif of a falling star appears also in the poem *В озерном краю,* written in Ann Arbor in the year of Brodsky's emigration from the USSR (Бродский 3: 25). It, too, seems to escape the wishes of the lyrical persona: "/.../И ежели ночью /отыскивал звезду на потолке, / она, согласно правилам сгоранья, /сбегала на подушку по щеке / быстрей, чем я загадывал желанье."

[9] Radyshevsky, examining the main themes of Brodsky's poetry in the light of Buddhist philosophy, argues, on the contrary, that the vision, and the desire of the lyrical persona to look "where there's no use to look at", testifies to the fact that

There is one more aspect in the composition of "PG" that recalls Dante's "DC". It is the word "there" ("там") which occurs 40 times in Brodsky's poem, 24 times in the position of an opening word of a line, of which 13 times beginning a *terzina*. Dante, too, often began a number of successive stanzas with the same word [10].

Anaphoric words like "there", "here", "then" and "when", repeated at the beginning of two or more successive lines often emerge in literary texts in which the paradise myth has been used as a rhetorical structuring principle. According to Lessing Baehr (1991: 7–8), in messianic or prophetic narratives describing a future paradise, spatial adverbs "here" and "there" or chronological adverbs "now" and "then" have often been sufficient to mark the opposition between paradise and hell. The prophetic pattern is distinguished by its use of a first-person variant of the descriptive pattern like "There I saw" or "I saw", frequently used by Alighieri, as well. Since the prologue to "PG" sets the focus and perspective of the poem, emphasizing the fact that all that will follow are perceptions of the eye (although those of the mind's eye), Brodsky does not have to repeat the verb "to see" in the following stanzas.

Section One begins with a familiar Dantesque *locus* — the wood which was the scene of the prologue in the "DC". Only this time it is not the hero that has lost his way in the murky wood of errors, but the train in the second line pushing ahead on the plain in search for a destination:

> **Там хмурые леса стоят в своей рванине,**
> Уйдя из точки "А", там поезд **на равнине**
> стремится в точку "Б". Которой нет в помине.

Brodsky's choice of the words picturing the forests which "frowning", "stand decked out in their rags and tatters"[11] gives a human shape to the trees. If the forests are perceived not only as referring to the vast

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he has reached the condition ascribed to the illuminated, which the masters of Zen call the "inertia of memory", i.e. that you are already aware of the truth, but it is your old "I" who wants to take a look back (Радышевский 1997: 304).

[10] See Bickersteth's introduction to the "DC" 1965: xxxv and, e.g. *Inf.* 5: 100–108 or 13: 1–9, *Purg.* 12: 25–63; here Dante begins four consecutive stanzas with the word "*vedea*" ("mine eyes saw") in describing the life-like sculptures on the tombstones. See also *Par.* 19: 115–147 or 20: 40–70. In *Par.* 19: 114–123 Dante uses the word "*li*" meaning "there" to open three successive *terzine*.

[11] The translation of "PG" in Brodsky's *Collected works in English* is made by the author, see Brodsky 2000: 241–244.

Siberian woodlands, but as depicting the masses of citizens comprising the "unanimous" population of the former fatherland of the author, (as we can witness in the poem *Laguna*[12]) it cannot escape the attention of a reader, tuned to read the poem in the light of *The Divine Comedy*, that the scene might as well be taken from Dante's *Inferno*[13]. Furthermore, Brodsky's dark, cheerless forests sound astoundingly similar to the "дремучий советский лес" of Mandelshtam in *Четвертая проза*.[14]

Both of the presented *loci*, forests and plains cover vast areas of the Russian territory. They bear symbolic significance since they are often conceived as characterizing some main aspects attached to the mental landscape of the so-called "Russian soul". Russian soul, ´shirokaja dusha´ or ´shirokaja natura´ with its breadth, depth and openness, is said to correspond to the Russian landscape mirroring the unlimited, boundless space. This idealized image of the national soul is promoted by the Russian self-stereotypes.[15]

However, the space that reigns supreme does not only have positive impacts on its inhabitants. Medvedev (1999: 16–18) argues, quite convincingly, that Russia's space is not just quantitatively vast, but that it is also qualitatively infinite, amorphous and contradictory. Furthermore, endless space is seen as undemanding, forgiving and thus contributing to the irresponsibility of its inhabitants. Medevedev

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[12] A trope of the same kind can be found in Brodsky's poem *Лагуна* where few readers would fail to recognize under its Venetian disguise allusions to the Soviet Union: "[...] Звук отрицает себя, слова и /слух; также **державу ту, /где руки тянутся хвойным лесом** /перед мелким, но хищным бесом /и слюну леденит во рту." (Stanza VIII, Бродский 3: 45)

[13] As for the Siberian woods, it would be tempting to combine the "forests in rags" with the falling asteroid in the prologue. As is known, the brightest fireball — a meteor of considerable duration and brightness — ever recorded fell on Tunguska, Siberia in 1908 causing the destruction of forest over an area about 2000 square kilometres, leaving behind forests "standing in rags". As construed, the train would evidently be the Trans-Siberian railroad. Furthermore, the forest can be read as referring to a constant opposition of 'Russia — The West' manifesting the geographical or geopolitical theme in Brodsky's poetry expressed paradigmatically in opposing sets of images, such as 'The Wood — The Sea', 'Cold — Heat' and Stagnation – Movement', see Loseff 1991: 27.

[14] "In mezzo del cammin del nostra vita — на середине жизненной дороги я был остановлен в дремучем советском лесу разбойниками..." (Мандельштам 1994. Т. 3 : 176).

[15] For Russian soul and its relation to Russian space, see e.g. Hellberg-Hirn 1999: 56–57,61, Pursiainen 1999: 72.

even asserts that Russian space with its amorphousness and vastness possesses a great destructive potential. Distances are too great to be grasped, nor are natural boundaries of its vast territory delineated. Both of these facts account for a culture with a vague spatial sense.

Examples of the limitless, undiscriminating space are to be found in "PG"; in Section VI, for instance, Brodsky describes the landscape as missing distinctive landsmarks. The puddle in the yard in stanza II, as big in area as two Americas together, could be taken as Brodsky's parodic hint to the grand scale of everything in Russia. But the most cryptic of the signs attributed to the dimensions of the represented space are the lines about the stray train quoted already above:

> Уйдя с точки "А", там поезд на равнине
> стремится в точку "Б". Которой нет в помине.
>
> Начала и концы там жизнь от взора прячет. [...]

If the lines are construed — as was suggested above — as being a metaphor of the vastness of the territory which in its endlessness is beyond the limits of the human mind to comprehend, one could easily discover here a variant of a trope, common in Brodsky's poetry, evoking a vista with a railtrack — two parallel lines that vanish in the horizon — leading nowhere.[16]

The dynamics of "PG" actually arise from a certain dualism that marks the poem in its entirety. The text seems to be constructed on oppositions or extremes. The dualism starts with the points "A" and "B" that the train fails to connect to each other, and it continues in the opening line of the following *terzina* which claims that "there" life conceals from sight beginnings and ends. Being reminiscences of other poems, on the level of textual space, both of the lines refer beyond the boundaries of the intra-textual space of this particular poem; "A" and "B" are allusions to Mandelshtam's poem *Нет, не спрятаться мне от великой муры...* while "beginnings and ends" recall *The Fifth Elegy* of Akhmatova's *Northern Elegies*.

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[16] This could be construed as a continuation to the theme of superiority of everything. Quoting Medvedev "Russia possesses the longest roads which lead nowhere, the greatest number of seas on which no one sails, and the longest frontiers on which no one lives and hardly anyone crosses" (1999: 16). Batkin has found another interpretation for the train in "PG". In his view the train moves from point "A" to point "B" which stands for void, i.e. towards a place without time, since for an exile time is replaced by space (Баткин 1997: 278–279).

When examined in the context of the mentioned subtexts together with some self-referential allusions to his own works,"A" and "B", "beginning" and "end" elevate the dualism of the text to a metaphysical level. Mandelshtam's poem is first and foremost about the meaninglessness of life in expectation of the impending destruction of culture, as well as about the fear of both physical and spiritual death under the pressure of totalitarianism:

> Мы с тобою поедем на "А" и на "Б"
> Посмотреть, кто скорее умрет [...]

Akhmatova's *Northern Elegies,* as another obvious subtext of Brodsky's "PG", in its turn, continues the theme of distortion of natural, genuine proportions and the original directions of the flow of life. The most obvious allusion, as was noted, is the one to *The Fifth Elegy* concerning the veiled knowledge about "beginnings and ends"[17] of our lives:

> Мне ведомы начала и концы.
> И жизнь после конца, и что-то,
> О чем теперь не надо вспоминать.

In Akhmatova's text, the poet is the chosen one who is given knowledge of things that one normally has no access to. She, like Dante, is shown what life beyond can be all about. Furthermore, the opening lines of Akhmatova's *Fifth Elegy* resonate in Brodsky's text as well:

> Меня, как реку,
> Суровая эпоха повернула.
> Мне подменили жизнь. В другом русло
> Мимо другого потекла она,
> И я своих не знаю берегов.

The reversed by force flow of the river is a metaphor for a sudden unexpected change in life which finds a counterpart in some of Brodsky's tropes that symbolise the unsolvable puzzle of one's own

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[17] In addition to Akhmatova, Brodsky's line "Начала и концы там жизнь от взора прячет" recalls also the opening line of the Prologue in Blok's *Возмездие*: "Жизнь — без начала и конца." The association with paradise/hell as well as the outstanding gift of an artistic eye to catch and evaluate the essential in life is also present in Blok's *poema*: "[...] Но ты, художник, **твердо веруй / В начала и концы. Ты знай, / Где стерегут нас ад и рай**. / Тебе дано бесстрастной мерой / Измерить всё, что видишь ты. / Твой взгляд — да будет тверд и ясен..." (Блок 1999: 21).

fate.[18] It is reflected in Section One of "PG" in the line which simultaneously alludes to the lines of Akhmatova, quoted above, as well as to Pushkin and Lermontov[19]:

Неугомонный Терек там ищет **третий берег**.

According to Lev Loseff, "the third shore" signifies an absurd, useless endeavour referring in Russian to the expression "fifth corner". [20] Similar efforts to escape one's fate, to find an exit from the unexpected turn of life, doomed to fail, are implied in the last line from Section VII which, in its turn, is a paraphrase from *The Divine Comedy,* a fact that seems to have escaped the attention of Brodsky-scholars:

Там думал и умру — от скуки, от испуга.
Когда не от руки, так на руках у друга.
Видать, не рассчитал. Как квадратуру круга.

"Squaring the circle"[21] in the "DC" is a metaphor for a problem which cannot be solved. In the end of *Paradiso,* Dante compares himself to a

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[18] Not only his own, but the same metaphor applies to his parents' life, too. See Brodsky 1986: 481–483; "Had they looked for a motto for their existence, they could have taken a few lines from one of Akhmatova's "Northern Elegies": *Just like a river / I was deflected by my stalwart era* [...] A deflected river running to its alien, artificial estuary.[...] **I am a tributary of a turned, deflected river**. [...]".(bolding mine — *M.K*). Brodsky cites the above-quoted lines of Akhmatova also in an interview made by A. Mikhnik where he also describes the consequences of the sudden turn in people's lives in an abrupt, blunt manner: "В России произошло явление, которого никто не понимает. Когда мы говорит (*sic*) о преступлениях режима, мы не говорим всей правды. Речь не только о том, что истреблены тысячи людей, но также о том, что жизнь миллионов на протяжении нескольких поколений шла по-иному, чем должна была идти. Как писала Ахматова: *Меня, как реку* [...] **Человеческая жизнь потекла другим руслом. И что не прошло бесследно** (bolding mine — MK). Родились иные инстинкты. Россия сегодня — антропологический зоосад. Разговор с русским может быть интересен, если ты антрополог. Но не тогда, когда ты занимаешься политикой или философией" (Михник 1998: 11).

[19] For discussion of allusions to Pushkin in "PG" see Ранчин 1998b: 38, for allusions to Pushkin and Lermontov see Polukhina 1989: 221.

[20] "Fifth corner" in Russian police jargon is what the interrogating policemen invite the suspect to find in order to escape the beating (Brodsky 2000: 520, 526).

[21] It is worth noting that Brodsky does not use this expression in his English version of "PG" but instead he writes: "Today I see my error. / I see that I was wrong [...]." The word "error" is, of course, an allusion to the "DC", only not to Paradise, but to the prologue of Hell — which makes a difference.

geometrician facing the unsolvable puzzle in a vision of Christ whose changing appearance inside a circle suggests his two natures in one person:

> Qual è 'l geomètra che tutto s'affige
>> **per misurar lo cerchio,** e non ritrova,
>> pensando, quel principio ond'elli indige,
> tal era io a quella vista nova (Par. 33: 133–136)

> As geometrician, trying as best he can
>> **to square the circle,** but without the clue
>> he needs to guide him, ends where he began;
> so I before that marvel strange and new [...].[22]

This effort to square the circle is as futile as the train's striving to reach its destination in circumstances where the flow of life in its reversed absurdness entails a rupture in the logic of thought and, consequently, in the relationship of cause and effect.

"PG" is yet another example of Brodsky's strategy of textual poly-genesis. His reference is not only in Akhmatova's, or Mandelshtam's poetry, nor is it merely an allusion to his own works. Similar contemplation on the ignorance of man's soul of the origin of life as well as his knowledge of the next life can be found in John Donne's poems *The First Anniversary* and *The Second Anniversary*. As the similarity of the titles indicates, Brodsky's commemoration of the fifth anniversary thus expands beyond the borders of Russia and its writers. Donne

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[22] The exact translation of Dante's expression "*misurar lo cerchio*" would be "to measure a circle". After reading A.M. Vandelli's commentary to the passage in question in *La Divina Commedia* it becomes clear that by measuring Dante refers to the very problem of squaring a circle; Dante compares his efforts to those of a geometrician who tries to find a solution to the problem of squaring a circle, but he does not manage to resolve it because he does not have the knowledge of the exact relation of the diameter to the circumference. Dante yearns to understand something which is beyond comprehension of the human mind: "Dante si forzava di vedere, così come il geometra, tutto tutento a tentar di risolvere **il problema della quadratura del circolo**, non riesce a trovare il dato che gli bisognerebbe, cioè l'esatto rapporto tra il diometro e la circonferenza. Dante voleva comprendere ciò che mente umana non può." (Dante 1979: 923). It is evident that Brodsky's first acquaintance with the "DC" was through Lozinsky's translation. Lozinsky employs the expression "измерить круг" instead of "квадратура круга", see Данте Алигьиери: *Божественная комедия*. Перевод Лозинского (Серия "Всемирная литература". Изд. Художественная лит-ра. Москва 1967: 524).

writes in his *Second Anniversary. Of the Progress of the Soule* as follows:

> [...] Poore soul in this thy flesh what do'st thou know.
> Thou know'st thy selfe so little, as **thou know'st not,**
> **How thou did'st die, nor how thou wast begot**.
> Thou neither knowst, how thou at first camest in,
> Nor how thou took'st the poyson of mans sin. [...]
>
> $\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ (254–258, Donne 1985: 361)

In the last two sections of "PG" reminiscences from Akhmatova are simultaneously reminiscences from two other St.Petersburg poets — Pushkin and Mandelshtam[23]:

> **Скрипи, мое перо,** мой коготок, мой **посох** [...]

> Мне нечего сказать, ни греку, ни варягу.
> **Зане не знаю я, в какую землю лягу**
> **Скрипи, скрипи перо! переводи бумагу.**

Compare to Akhmatova:

> **Перо скрипит, и многие страницы**
> Семеновским припахивают плацем. [...] (*Первая элегия*)

> "**Я не в свою, увы, могилу лягу**" (*Пятая элегия*)

The ignorance of both Akhmatova and Brodsky about the place of their death-to-be or about the name which will be inscribed on the tombstone is compensated by their knowledge about the fact that the life of a poet — his/her poetical identity embedded in poems — is not submissive to the laws of nature, it will go on living no matter which land will cover the corpse of the author.[24]

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[23] For discussion of the recurrent motif in Brodsky's poetry of "скрипящее перо" and its allusions to Pushkin and Hodasevich, see Ранчин 1998a: 85-86 and Ранчин 1998c: 74. Words referring to Mandelshtam (and Dante) are those in rhyming position; "посох" and "босых" picturing two barefooted poet-pilgrims provided with the ability to see to the truth of things. See e.g. Mandelshtam's *Посох:* "Посох мой, моя свобода — / Сердцевина бытия, / Скоро ль истиной народа / Станет истина моя? /.../" (Мандельштам, т. 1 1993: 104). Brodsky is referring here to Akhmatova's poem *Данте*, as well, and to its two addressees.

[24] The poetical identity is a way of creating oneself existence beyond life. It provides a counter argument to Donne's contemplation on man's ignorance which we quoted above and which continues as follows: "Nor dost thou, (though thou knowst, that thou art so) / **By what way thou art made immortall**, know. /.../" (J. Donne: *The Second Anniversary*, lines 259–260, see Donne 1985: 361).

While the first six sections of "PG" can be read as an allegory of the USSR, depicted in infernal, rather than paradisal, terms although not without a touch of irony — ironic deferral is a narrative constant in Dante's pilgrimage as well, especially in *Inferno*[25] — the last four sections together with the epilogue comprise, if not entirely without some self-irony, a serious contemplation of the lyrical substitute's fate as a poet with its astonishing turns and unforeseen consequences. The pilgrimage of the eye around the lost homeland prefigures a variant of an earthly hell. Since the perspective coincides with that of the expelled Dante to his cursed Florence we have good reason to start again the examination of the last part of the poem from the more or less obvious allusions to Dante that emerge in Section Nine.

> [...] Ну что ж! **на все свои законы:**
> я не любил жлобства, не целовал иконы,
> **и на одном мосту чугунный лик Горгоны**
>
> **казался в тех краях мне самым честным ликом.**
> Зато столкнувшись с ним теперь, **в его великом**
> **варьянте, я своим не подавился криком**
>
> **и не окаменел.** [...]

The head of a Gorgon on a certain bridge which seemed "there" "the truth's most honest version" has been located by Lev Loseff[26] to indicate to the Engineers' Bridge in St.Petersburg which bears images of Perseus's shield. Nevertheless, they are not the only ones in the St.Petersburg space. The shields with the head of a Gorgon line the fence around the Summer Garden on the side of the Moyka, as well. There is a whole constellation of The Gorgon Medusas in and around the Summer Garden.[27]

The myth of Perseus is a myth about the impact of looking on something as well as that of being looked at by someone. The lyrical subject emphasizes the fact that he has acquired resistance to the

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[25] For a discussion of allegory's relation to irony see e.g. Kelley 1997: 5.

[26] See Brodsky 2000: 520.

[27] For sculptures of Medusa in St.Petersburg, see Раков 2000: 162–165. Rakov describes the Gorgons on the iron grille of the Summer Garden as follows: "Острые пики ограды чередуются с овальными щитами, в центре которых, поверх скрещенных мечей, — маска **горгоны Медузы.** Широко открыты глаза Медузы, в них застыли одновременно злоба и страх. Устрашающе извиваются змеи на голове. Подобные изображения можно видеть и **на перилах расположенного поблизости 1-го Инженерного моста, и на торшерах соседнего с ним моста Пестеля** [...]."

power of its mortifying eyes. He is not gorgonized even when he — in his present life, beyond the boundaries of his homeland — comes across its "huge variant".

Dante encounters the three furies who summon Medusa to turn the unexpected visitors to stone in the Ninth Canto of *Inferno*. There his experienced guide Vergil covers the eyes of his ignorant companion in order to prevent him from seeing Gorgon's glance and gives him instructions:

> 'Volgiti in dietro e tien lo viso chiuso;
> > **chè se il Gorgòn si mostra e tu 'l vedessi,**
> > **nulla sarebbe del tornar mai suso.'**[28]

But what is Brodsky referring to with the "gigantic variant"of the Medusa which he came upon in his present milieu of life? The answer lies in his poem dedicated to Dante's hometown. In the last stanza of *Декабрь во Флоренции* which has both Florence and St.Petersburg as its doubled object of representation, Brodsky lists the details of the two cities:

> [...] И
> там рябит от аркад, колоннад, **от чугунных пугал;**
> [...]

The Florentine counterpart of the Petersburg iron scarecrow is Cellini's famous sculpture picturing Perseus holding up the severed head of the Medusa.[29] The colossal bronze statue stands in *Loggia dei Lanzi* on *Piazza della Signoria*. Thus the Gorgon is yet another link connecting the accursed and desired native cities of the two expelled poets. However, we can find a mediator that joins the two cities even closer together, adding to the unity an inkling of the literary environment of the present "new life" of the lyrical subject of "PG". The literary joint is Robert Lowell's poem *Florence* (Lowell 1977: 13–

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[28] *Inf. 9: 55–60;* "'Turn thee about: **thine eyes, quick, hide them, hide; / for, if the Gorgon's face by thee were seen, / no return upward hence could e'er betide**.'

[29] There is, however, another work of art illustrating the head of the Gorgon in Florence — the no less famous painting by Caravaggio depicting Perseus's shield. The painting, much smaller in size than the statue by Cellini, is located in the Uffizi Gallery.

14)[30], which explains Brodsky's recall of and sympathy for the iron monster.

Lowell turns the good and evil upside down in his poem; the so-called winners over the evil forces, bloodstained heros are depicted in terms of murderers.

> **Pity the monsters!**
> **Pity the monsters!**
> **Perhaps one always took the wrong side —**
> Ah, to have known, to have loved
> too many Davids and Judiths!
> **My heart bleeds black blood for the monster.**
> **I have seen the Gorgon.**
> [...]

Like Lowell, Brodsky, too, has gazed into the eyes of the Gorgon without feeling fear or without being deprived of his conscience. For him, too, this personification of evil — reified into a piece of art — represents the archetypal form of evil. In the surrounding reality the falsehood disguises itself as good, or worse still, as the "common good", whereas the face of the Gorgon displays the evil unmasked.

The last three sections of the poem ponder upon the present absence of the lyrical substitute from his native city. The experience of absence is conveyed by negation — "I am no longer there" — **"Теперь меня там нет"** which gives an impression that the whole poem was written for this statement. The intensity of the experience is such that it can be compared only to the final absence, to death[31].

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[30] Brodsky mentiones *For the Union Dead* together with *Quaker Graveyard In Nantucket* and most part of *History* as Lowell's best collections of poems (Бродский 2000: 552).

[31] It seems to recall a line in Hardy's poem *Your Last Drive* — "**And be spoken of <u>as one who was not</u>**" on which line Brodsky dwells in his essay *Wooing the Inanimate:* "In [this line — MK] one detects the sense not so much of a loss or unbearable absence as that of **all-consuming negation. "One who was not"** is too resolute for comfort or, [...] for discomfort, and **negation of an individual is what death is all about**. [...]" (Brodsky 1995: 357). The overwhelming sense of a loss may result from the fact that, in Brodsky's view, contrary to Western Europe, in Russia everything is for life, be it the apartment, the town or the country. (Brodsky 1986: 477). Moreover, Brodsky's words on Hardy's poems could be applied to his own *Fifth Anniversary*. They explain the polarity of the impersonal tone of the first part and the intensive, personal anxiety of the last part of the poem: "[...] For all its riches of detail and topographical reference, the cycle has **an oddly universal, almost impersonal quality, since it deals with the extremes of the emotional spectrum**." (Brodsky 1995:361).

Notwithstanding the constant consciousness of absence from the place where one, in all likelihood, should have been even at the moment when writing the poem, Brodsky's lyrical "I" does not deny the reality of his banishment, but creates himself an alternative reality on a sheet of paper. Poetry represents for him the absolute space where he "does not need a guide", i.e. unlike Dante, "here", in his own realm of writing, he can manage without the help of a Vergil:

Предо мной — пространство в чистом виде.
В нем места нет столпу, фонтану, пирамиде.
В нем, судя по всему, я не нуждаюсь в гиде.

If in the end of Akhmatova's *First Elegy*, like Leiter (1983: 123) concludes, the generalized "Dostoevsky's Russia" has narrowed to a single ominous St.Petersburg landmark — that of the Semyonovsky Square — Brodsky's generalized "Soviet Russia" is shrunken to a mere sheet of paper. Anyhow, the dimensions of it are infinite. It is not just a flat surface, but a reality of its own with immense depth. The language — the *Logos* — is the origin and measure of its dimensions in the absolute.

In the final analysis, notwithstanding many details that point to the allegoric genre, the poem as a whole cannot be reduced to an allegory of an earthly, materialized hell, if only because of the last stanzas. The Word, the mother tongue included, remains uncorruptable. It provides the poet with tools for seeing with disillusioned clarity to the essence of things. It does not make the poet immortal, as we can read from the final lines of "PG", but his verses may thus have a chance to outlive their author.

Мне нечего сказать **ни греку, ни варягу**.[32]
Зане не знаю я, в какую землю лягу.
Скрипи, скрипи перо! переводи бумагу.

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[32] The expression "ни греку, ни варягу" is a paraphrase from "путь из Варяг в Греки" meaning the transcontinental water way from the northern Baltic Sea down to the Black Sea via the Neva, Volhov, Lovat, Dvina and Dnepr rivers. In the spiritual sense these "poles" represent the two elements that formed the basis of the old Russian state and culture; Varangians, the Northmen, who under Rurik established a dynasty in Russia in the 9th century, brought with them the "northern pagan barbarism", which then merged into the "Hellenistic — Christian sprituality" of Byzantium brought in from the south. The establishment of St. Petersburg in the mouth of the Neva river was conceived as a new opening of this legendary water route described already by apostle Andrei Pervozvanny in his chronicle *"Пути из Варяг в Греки"* (Лебедев 2000: 62). For Brodsky the Varangian and the Greek have become plain geographical coordinates of a country which, in all its vastness, is indifferent to the fate of its bard. At the same time

Although the poet does not know his final destination, Brodsky's opinion about the wished-for fate of all Russians, himself included, in the life beyond can be read from his notebook concerning the year 1970 (Бродский 1990: 8): "Страшный суд — страшным судом, но вообще-то человека, прожившего жизнь в России, следовало бы без разговоров помещать в рай."

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they represent yet another pair of opposites, of non-meeting ends, characteristic of the literary space of "PG" as a whole.

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"Инфернальный" подтекст стихотворения
Бродского "Пятая годовщина"

В данной статье изучаются интертекстуальные связи стихотворения Иосифа Бродского "Пятая годовщина", посвященного пятой годовщине вынужденной эмиграции поэта из Советского Союза. Как это свойственно для поэтики Бродского вообще, текст насыщен аллюзиями на другие тексты, как из русской, так и из западной художественной литературы. Реминисценции из "Божественной комедии" создают параллелизм между потерянной родиной с любимым родным городом Ленинградом и дантовской "потерянной и проклятой" Флоренцией, а также с Петербургом Мандельштама, Ахматовой и др. Дантовские полутона наблюдаются не только на семантическом уровне анализируемого текста, но и при рассмотрении метрических и структурных аспектов стихотворения.

Brodski luuletuse "Viies aastapäev" infernaalne alltekst

Artiklis uuritakse Jossif Brodski luuletuse "Viies aastapäev", mis on pühendatud poeedi sunnitud emigratsiooni viiendale aastapäevale, intertekstuaalseid seoseid. Nagu see on omane Brodski poeetikale üldiselt, on tekst küllastatud allusioonidega teistele tekstidele nii vene kui ka lääne kirjandusest. Reministsentsid "Jumalikust komöödiast" loovad parallelismi, ühelt poolt, kaotatud kodumaa koos armastatud kodulinna Leningradi ja, teisalt, Dante "kaotatud ja neetud" Firenze vahel, aga ka seoseid Mandelštami, Ahmatova jt Peterburiga. Dantelikke pooltoone võib täheldada mitte ainult analüüsitava teksti semantilisel tasandil, vaid ka luuletuse meetriliste ja struktuursete aspektide vaatlemisel.

Маска в художественном мире
Гоголя и маски Анатолия Каплана

Юрий Лотман[1]

Abstract. *Juri Lotman*. **Mask in an artistic world of Gogol, and the masks of Anatoli Kaplan**. The paper deals with an intersemiotic problem — how it is possible to represent a verbal image by the means of sculpture. It was written as an afterword for a German edition of N. Gogol's *Dead Souls* (illustrated by photos on mask-sculpures by Anatoli Kaplan) thus using a style meant for general reader. However, it includes a deep analysis and several important conclusions about the fancy worlds of Gogol and Kaplan, and about the possibilities to create connections between them. It is stressed that the very artistic illustration is possible only due to its independence, due to the subjective seeing of the author.

Мысль иллюстрировать текст поэмы Гоголя «Мертвые души» скульптурными портретами необычна и парадоксальна. Можно ли иллюстрировать литературное произведение вообще? Можно ли иллюстрировать Гоголя? Можно ли иллюстрировать словесное произведение искусства средствами скульптуры? Сомнения в возможности положительных ответов на эти вопросы высказывались достаточно авторитетными исследователями. Ю. Н. Тынянов писал:

> Конкретность поэтического слова не в зрительном образе, стоящем за ним, — эта сторона в слове крайне разорвана и смутна, она — в своеообразном процессе изменения значения слова, которое делает его живым и новым. Основной прием конкретизации слова — сравнение, метафора — бессмысленен для живописи. Самый конкретный — до иллюзии — писатель, Гоголь, менее всего поддается переводу на живопись. (Тынянов 1977: 311)

Для нас особенно интересна ссылка Тынянова на В.Розанова, писавшего:

> Ничего нет легче, как прочитать лекцию о Гоголе и дивно иллюстрировать ее отрывками из его творений. В слове выйдет красочно, великолепно. А в лепке? — Попробуйте только вылепить Плюшкина или Собакевича. В чтении это — хорошо, а в бронзе — безобразно, потому что лепка есть тело, лепка есть форма, и повинуется она всем законам ощутимого и осязаемого. (Розанов 1914: 279)

Таким образом, мы имеем, с одной стороны, весьма авторитетные теоретические рассуждения, доказывающие невозможность скульптурной иллюстрации к Гоголю, а, с другой, не менее весомый факт существования скульптурных масок Анатолия Каплана, пластическая адекватность которых художественным образам Гоголя очевидна каждому, кто имел счастье созерцать эти поразительные скульптурные миниатюры.

Разгадка этого парадокса, видимо, кроется, с одной стороны, в особенностях художественного мира Гоголя, а, с другой, в специфике артистического новаторства Анатолия Каплан. Только разобравшись в точках соприкосновения этих двух художественных миров, мы убедимся и в том, что Тынянов прав — Гоголя иллюстрировать невозможно, если понимать под словом «иллюстрация» нечто привычное: жанровую сценку, бытовую картинку, преподносимую читателю в качестве зрительного образа сложных метафорических смещений словесных масс в прозе одного из самых смелых фантастов XIX века. Но Тынянов (и цитируемый им Розанов) неправы, когда они возводят ограниченные возможности частной, исторически локальной бытовой иллюстрации в непреложный закон иллюстрации как таковой.

Чтобы понять, почему столь далекие друг от друга искусства, как литература и скульптура, со столь далеко разошедшейся спецификой, в данном случае соприкоснулись, надо остановиться на некоторых чертах художественного мира Гоголя, схваченных А. Капланом с глубоко проникновенной интуицией.

* * *

В центре гоголевского мира стоит не высказанный почти нигде автором прямо мир добра и красоты. Это мир потенциальных возможностей человека, его гармонической природы. Именно гармония составляет главный признак этого утопического идеала: гармония между соразмерными частями человеческого тела, гармония между душевными и телесными свойствами, гармония между неподвижной античной скульптурной красотой отдельного человека и музыкальным динамическим единством народной массы. Мир этот скульптурен и музыкален одновременно, подвижен и неподвижен, разделен на отдельные прекрасные человеческие личности и слит в единый прекрасный народ. Неподвижность и движение слиты в едином прекрасном гармоническом идеале. Воплощение такого единства Гоголь видит в архаическом обществе гомеровской эпохи и в народной жизни современного ему Рима. Скульптурная красота человека и радость народного карнавала слиты в единую жизнь-праздник. В незавершенном отрывке «Рим» Гоголь так описал римлянку Аннунциату:

> О нет, такой женщины не сыскать в Европе, об них только живут предания да бледные бесчувственные портреты их иногда являются в правильных созданиях художников. У, как смело, как ловко обхватило платье ее могучие прекрасные члены, но лучше, если бы оно не обхватывало ее вовсе. Покровы прочь, и тогда бы увидали все, что это богиня. (Гоголь 1938, III: 476)

Главное в этом «прекрасном человеке» — нераздробленная душевная целостность, полнота жизни и единство наполняющей эту жизнь страсти:

> Никогда римлянин не забывал ни зла, ни добра, он или добрый, или злой, или расточитель, или скряга, в нем добродетели и пороки в своих самородных слоях и не смешались, как у образованного человека, в неопределенные образы, у которых всяких страстишек понемного под верховным началом эгоизма. (Гоголь 1938, III: 243)

Полнота жизни «прекрасного человека» выливается в музыкальном динамизме народного праздника. Гоголя привлекает римский карнавал, однако те же черты он придавал и воинственной утопии романтической Запорожской сети: «Это было какое-то беспрерывное пиршество, бал, начавшийся шумно и потерявший

конец свой» (Гоголь 1938, II: 64). Движение для Гоголя — синоним раскованности и свободы человека:

> Вся толпа отдирала танец, самый вольный, самый бешеный, какой только видел когда-либо мир. [...] Только в одной музыке есть воля человеку. Он в оковах везде. Он сам себе кует еще тягостнейшие оковы, нежели налагает на него общество и власть везде, где только коснулся жизни. Он — раб, но он волен только, потерявшись в бешеном танце. (Гоголь 1938, II: 300)

Миру «прекрасного человека» у Гоголя противостоит мир «страшного человека» и не-человека. Враждебное человеку зло имеет у Гоголя два лица. Это стихийные, страшные силы хаоса, колдовские чары, врывающиеся в жизнь человека. Они текучи и подвижны, постоянно меняя обличия (лиц у них нет). Этот мир динамичен, но, в отличие от динамизма погруженного в музыку «прекрасного народа», он лишен гармонии: здесь все может перейти во все и сочетаться со всем. Описание нечистой силы, врывающейся в «Вие» в заброшенную церковь, кажется пересказом сюрреалистической картины: предельная конкретность деталей сочетается с нарочитым расположением их в невозможных сочетаниях и пропорциях:

> Он видел вначале только множество отвратительных крыл, ног и членов таких, каких никак не в силах разобрать был объятый ужасом наблюдатель. Выше всех возвышалось странное существо в виде правильной пирамиды, покрытое слизью. Вместо ног у него были внизу с одной стороны половина челюсти, с другой другая; вверху, на самой верхушке этой пирамиды, высовывался   длинный язык, беспрестанно извиваясь. Почти под образом уселось белое, широкое, с какими-то отвисшими белыми мешками вместо ног, вместо рук белелись эти мешки, вместо глаз висели тоже белые мешки. Из них возвышалось какое-то черное, все покрытое чешуею, со множеством тонких рук, сложенных на груди, и вместо головы вверху у него была синяя человеческая рука. Огромный, величиною почти с слона, таракан остановился у дверей и просунул свои черные усы [...]. (Гоголь 1938, II: 576)

В этом мире фантастического зла постоянна лишь дисгаромния — внешние облики ее непрерывно меняются. Так, в том же «Вие» панночка-ведьма вбегает в виде собаки, но тотчас «это уже не собака, а панночка. Да притом пускай бы уже панночка в таком виде,» как ее всегда видели, «но вот вещь и обстоятельсвто: что она была вся синяя, а глаза горели как уголь» (Гоголь 1938, II: 204).

Figure 1. Чичиков.

Figure 2. Жена Манилова.

Figure 3. Собакевич.

Figure 4. Прокурор.

Однако есть другой мир зла, для Гоголя не менее страшный. Это зло обыденное, каждодневное, незаметное, пропитывающее окружающую повседневность. Если, вступая в мир космического зла, человек оказывается подхваченным все уносящим вихрем, то здесь он застывает, превращается в маску, мертвое подобие человека. Движение сменяется неподвижностью или механическими, прыгающими жестами автомата. Любимое выражение Гоголя для определения человека в таком состоянии — «окаменел». Окаменели чиновники в «Ревизоре» и в последнем акте сценического действия превратились в огромную скульптурную группу. В специальном разъяснении этого трудного для постановки места пьесы Гоголь писал: «Последняя сцена не будет иметь успеха до тех пор, пока не поймут, что это просто немая картина, что все это должно представлять одну окаменевшую группу, что здесь оканчивается драма и сменяет ее онемевшая мимика.» (Гоголь 1938, V: 103).

Разные формы окаменения, застывания, кукольности заполняют бытовой мир Гоголя. Герои его перестают быть людьми — это манекены, самые движения которых — лишь псевдодвижения: скачкообразные переходы от одной неподвижности к другой. Эту особенность гоголевского «реального» мира отметил еще А. Белый: «Гоголем был осознан прием умерщвления движения с переходом жеста в застывшую мину» (Белый 1934: 161–162). Тот же автор указал на созвучность такого видения мира художественному сознанию XX века: «Атом жеста, окаменев, превращает героя в неподвижную деревянную куклу, которою Мейерхольд заменил живого актера: душа превращается в мертвую, как от удара молнии; окаменевшие мертвецы присутствуют тут же при агонии» (там же).

Таким образом, в самом художественном мире Гоголя — причем именно в мире его бытовых персонажей — скрыт момент пародийной скульптурности. Его герои соотносятся с застывшими и неподвижными трехмерными образами. Но эти образы — не статуи: они лишены монументальности и обощенности, свойственных скульптуре. Это манекены и куклы, образы гротескные, притворяющиеся скульптурами, но сохраняющие всю ничтожность «существователей» и «небокоптителей» — гоголевских мертвых душ.

Скульптура неподвижна. Но ее неподвижность лишь делает категорию движения наиболее значимой в структуре искусства ваяния. Неподвижность античной скульптуры отображает жизнь

в ее панхронных, предельно обобщенных проявлениях: моментальное снято и отброшенно как не имеющее подлинного бытия, вскрыто долговременное и вечное. Скульптура барокко создает неподвижный облик подвижного объекта. Это напряженная борьба между динамизмом художественной конструкции и неподвижностью материала. К скульптуре барокко более всего подходит гениальное высказывание Якоба Бёме, что «движение — это страдание /Qual/ материи».

«Портреты-маски» Анатолия Каплана, иллюстрирующие «Мертвые души» Гоголя, исключительно самобытны. Связь их с художественном миром Гоголя гораздо более органична, чем обычные отношения иллюстрации к иллюстрируемому тексту. «Портреты-маски» Каплана включены в существенное для скульптуры семантическое поле «движение – неподвижность». Однако место их в отношении к этим категориям исключительно своеобразно. Статуя барокко — это скульптурная пародия на живое тело. Несоответствие материала и объекта таит возможность целой гаммы значений — от трагических до иронических. Скульптура как бы приобретает интонацию, доносящую до нас отношение творца к своему творению.

Каплан вводит в эту систему еще один компонент: куклу, игрушку. Керамические иллюстрации Каплана — произведения сложного и необычного жанра: это скульптура, которая притворяется игрушкой, и кукла, возведенная в степень скульптуры. Между двумя крайними членами отношения «скульптура – человек» оказалась помещенной кукла. Человек превратился в куклу, и скульптура имитирует не движение, пластику, теплоту и текучесть человеческого тела, а неподвижность, угловатость, застылость, одеревенелость бывшего человека. Ирония того, что в человеке видна кукла, а в кукле — человек, порождает столь же ироническое просвечивание игрушки в скульптуре и скульптуры в игрушке. Такое художественное решение глубоко сродственно образному миру Гоголя. Тынянов и Розанов были правы в том отношении, что иллюстрация бытового текста Гоголя с помощью традиционных бытовых средств изображения невозможна: дело не только в несоответствии словесного и иконического знаков, их взаимной непереводимости, — дело в том, что быт у Гоголя только притворяется бытом, простота и наглядность его мнимая. Этому сдвинутому, рассеченному, пронизанному авторской сатирой миру может соответствовать столь же сдвинутый и необычный мир пластики. Куклы-маски Каплана корригируют Тыня-

нова. Не в первый раз художник показывает, с какой осторожностью должен строить теоретик свое утверждение, когда желает доказать, что та или иная сфера бытия находится вне искусства, недоступна средствам данного искусства или должна быть из области искусства исключена. Одна из особенностей искусства, постоянно подтверждаемая его историей, состоит в перенесении себя в чуждую ему сферу.

Внутренняя адекватность мира масок Каплана и мира гоголевской сатиры побеждает непередаваемость слова изображением. Возникает та невозможная возможность, которая и составляет сущность искусства.

«Бытовые» персонажи Гоголя — не люди, а «как бы» люди. Поразительно в них не то, что они отличаются от людей, а то, что утратив полностью человеческую сущность, они сохраняют еще известное человекоподобие. Это человекоподобие подчеркивает их глубокое отличие от гармонического идеала «прекрасного человека», который живет в душе автора, и не скрывает, а обнажает нечеловечность «мертвых душ». Собакевич настолько же похож на человека, насколько мебель и дрозд в его жилище похожи на Собакевича. С этим связана знаменитая метонимичность образов Гоголя. Гоголь не дает подробного описания внешности своих героев: он выделяет нос или бакенбарды, усы, талии и прочее. Перед нами проплывают не люди, а разрозненные члены, черты внешности, части тела. Часто мы склонны считать, что Гоголь как экономный художник называет характерное во внешности своих героев, предоставляя нам додумывать остальное. Так Л. Н. Толстой не описывает полностью внешности Пьера Безухова или Анны Карениной, а дает нам толщину и очки одного и непокорные завитки волос на шее у другой. Деталь у Гоголя имеет иной смысл: если упомнинается нос, который «с выражением величайшей набожности молился», то все лицо, вся фигура этого персонажа состоит у Гоголя из одного носа — кроме носа, у него нет ничего. Если в «Мертвых душах» упоминаются «тонкие» чиновники, которые имели «обдуманно и со вуксом зачесанные бакенбарды или просто благовидные, весьма гладко выбритые овалы лиц», то очевидно, что у чиновников этих на лице ничего, кроме бакенбард или овалов, не имееется. Это не должно удивлять: ведь речь идет не о людях, а о человекоподобных существах. Ведь только одного какого-либо признака, черты внешности достаточно, чтобы придать человекоподобие той или иной бесформенной куче, подобно тому, как намек на нос, глаз

или торс придает сходство с человеком какому-либо прихотливо изогнутому дереву или камню. Выше мы приводили описание безобразного чудовища в «Вие» («какое-то черное, всё покрытое чешуею»), человекоподобие которого состоит в одной лишь детали: «Вместо головы вверху у него была синяя человеческая рука». А вот вполне «бытовое» описание из «Мертвых душ»: «В окне помещался сбитенщик с самоваром из красной меди и лицом так же красным, как самовар, так что издали можно было подумать, что на окне стояло два самовара, если б один самовар не был с черною, как смоль, бородою» (Гоголь 1938, VIII: 8). Чтобы получить внешность своего сбитенщика, Гоголь не нуждается в такой детали, как человеческое лицо: он берет самовар, приклеивает к нему лишь часть человеческого облика — бороду, и человекоподобие достигнуто.

Именно на этой особенности образности Гоголя Тынянов основывал мысль о невозможности иллюстраций к нему. Но именно это роднит словесные «портреты» Гоголя и терракоты Каплана. Каплан не вылепливает всех деталей: тот или иной признак человеческой внешности торчит у него из обожженной глины, фактуру которой он тщательно подчеркивает. Иногда это какой-то ком, наделенный человекоподобием, иногда какой-то кирпич, который с помощью какого-то художественного чуда одновременно оказывается и «как бы лицом».

Скульптуры Каплана, однако, совсем не карикатуры из обожженной глины. Они сродни древнему искусству, известному разным народам, — искусству игрушки из глины. От народной игрушки у них какая-то мудрая наивность, смягчающая резкую сатиру образных сдвигов. Анатолий Каплан — художник большой и органической доброты, сатира как таковая не типична для его творческой манеры. Смягчение сатиры наивностью также роднит его с Гоголем, который отличался от сатириков типа Скалтыкова-Щедрина тем, что глубокая вера в примирительную силу патриархальности, наивной мудрости, идущей из глубины веков, парадоксально уживалась в нем с взглядом художника, который видел «какие-то свиные рылы, вместо лиц» (Гоголь 1938, IV: 93).

Родственная связь между скульптурами Каплана и культурой глиняных игрушек проявляется и в том, как следует смотреть эти маски-иллюстрации. Их надо рассматривать, вертеть в руках. Тогда происходит нечто неожиданное: мягкие тени, бегущие по грубым человекоподобным комьям лиц гоголевских персонажей,

если их смотреть, разными сторонами поворачивая к свету, как бы оживляют их лица, прибавляют им человечности. Страшное отступает, вперед выдвигается смешное.

Слияние страшного и смешного, отчаянья и надежды создает еще одну точку пересечения между текстом Гоголя и иллюстрирующими его масками Каплана.

Конечно, соотнесение *разных* видов искусств условно. Совпадение здесь подразумевает и расхождение. И это не недостаток, а условие существования текстов этого рода. Всякий залог успеха подлинно художественной иллюстрации связан с ее относительной самостоятельностью. Она всегда несет в себе субъективность иллюстратора. Это полностью относиться и к каплановским маскам. Это Гоголь, прочтенный художником с ярко своеобразным лицом. Такая субъективность сродни субъективности режиссера, который тем ближе к автору, чем смелее выявляет *свою* позицию.

Ф. М. Достоевский называл свой творческий метод «фантастическим реализмом». Этот фантастический реализм корнями своими уходит в творчество Гоголя. Маски Каплана ему созвучны.

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Mask Gogoli kunstilises maailmas ja Anatoli Kaplani maskid

Artikkel käsitleb intersemiootilist problemaatikat — kuidas on võimalik verbaalset kujundlikkust edasi anda skulptuuri vahenditega. Publikatsiooni suunatus laiale lugejaskonnale (kirjutatud järelsõnana saksakeelsele N. Gogoli "Surnud hingede" väljaandele, mis oli illustreeritud fotodega A. Kaplani

mask-skulptuuridest) määrab ära stiili. Kuid probleemi analüüsitakse põhjalikult ja jõutakse oluliste järeldusteni, mis puudutavad nii Gogoli ja Kaplani kujutlusmaailmade omapära kui ka võimalusi luua nende vahel seoseid, tehes sellega võimalikuks esmapilgul võimatuna näiva. Rõhutatakse, et tõeliselt kunstiline illustratsioon on võimalik ainult tänu selle iseseisvusele, autori subjektiivsele nägemusele.

The abstract structure of the aesthetic sign

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Abstract. Walter Benjamin foreshadowed many of the aesthetic theories, currently playing a fundamental role in the production and interpretation of art. By emphasising the role of the expressive character of art, or rather the category of expressivity itself, Benjamin defined art as a language. His aesthetics was characterised by the continuous interaction of two almost reciprocal projects: the theoretical critique of art which is based on an understanding of historical processes, and the understanding of historical processes which is formed by the critical experience of art. We find a fundamental similarity between Benjamin's dialectical character of the aesthetic sign and Lotman's double-sidedness of the artwork. In classifying the system of art as a language, both theoreticians space out the structure of art and determine it as the intersection of the synchronic and the diachronic aesthetic discourse. The paper follows the traces of the transition of modern painting from its representational status to an autonomous signification, that is, from being a symbolic expression to a discourse in the grammatological meaning of *écriture*. Parallel to this transition which resulted into the process of abstraction in painting, there can be observed a shift in the cultural values of art which had its critical bearing upon the world secured not by connections of likeness, but by virtue of the very independence of its values. The abstract form of the modern painting has been the declaration of the language of art as an exemplary realm. What must be expressed and experienced within this realm was (1) the critical reflection on the human condition, and (2) representing the society in so far as art maintained a moral independence from those conditions. This dialectic between the autonomous and social character of art has left deep impacts on the language of painting, a complexity, which has been made transparent through the various semiotic analytic approaches of the aesthetic sign. The paper discusses the processual character of the modern painting and demonstrates briefly the deficiency in the structural analysis of the painting language, encouraging its synthesis with the dynamical character of cultural products as we find it in the Lotmanian culture theory.

> *All kinds of human intellectual expressions could be under-*
> *stood as a sort of language, a point of view that opens a wide*
> *scale of new approaches. We can speak of a language of*
> *music and sculpture, of a language of law, that has nothing to*
> *do with the languages in which the German or the English law*
> *is written, of a language of technology that is not primarily the*
> *language of the technician.* (Benjamin 1974 [1916]: 140)

> *In this sense, we can understand not only the Russian, French,*
> *Hindi etc. as languages, not only the artificial constructed*
> *systems within the different scientific forms that are used for*
> *the description of certain groups of manifestations, but also*
> *traditions, rituals, trading forms or religious thoughts. In the*
> *same sense we can talk about a "language" of theatre, film,*
> *painting, as well as about art in general, as a language that is*
> *organised in a specific way.* (Lotman 1972: 20)

The form in absentia

Painting is one of the many forms of cultural expressions. It presents a special expressive form which invokes simultaneously our intellectual and emotional dispositions, the conscious and the unconscious at a time. On the one hand insists modern painting, as an image, on being comprehended and on the other hand it rejects every form of imme- diate manifestation and determination. The various methods of dis- cussing abstraction in art demonstrate that the modern art, in its abstract form, puts a challenge of the systematic analysis of the work of art. In order to analyse the specific aesthetic character of abstract painting and to infiltrate the complexity of the art object, art-history or art-theory needs analytical modi that offer a certain flexibility, allowing to adjust themselves to the demands of the given art work.

The most common questions of the methodological perspectives of the traditional art-history belong to questioning categories like: *what is painting?* or, *What does the work of art represent?* Approaches that operate with such questions show a fundamental deficiency analysing the abstraction of the image-expression, for they lead inevitably to the reduction of the abstract form to a void corpus, existing in an artificial vacuum, disconnected from its signification system. Moreover, the reduction of the abstract work to a mere representational level fails to catch the very idea of the modernity in its structure which is: the

rejection of art being defined through a representational and a communicative role of the painting-art within an artificial sign-system.

One of the unprecedented achievements of the modern abstract painting was its linguistic turn, that is, its defining painting as a language and doing so demonstrating its own textuality.

Thus an adequate approach to abstraction can be considered on a metalinguistic level which allows the reflection on the discursiveness, the boundaries and the topology of painting as art, encouraging questions like: *on which level does painting begin? when can we determine it as art?* or, *how does it show itself as an abstract art?* Parallel to questions concerning the defining features of the language of the painting expression, art-theory has to consider also the social dimension of the aesthetic expression. Artworks are both autonomous entities and forms of social expression; consequently, the reflection about abstraction in art can not be seen disconnected from the abstract state and the impacts of abstraction on the social life.

The parallels in time and place between the mass industrialisation and the outbreak of the classical modern art show that the process of cultural abstraction found its authentic form in works of art whose interpretation consequently leads to the interpretation of the cultural status in the industrialisation age. The impact of the modern condition was being primarily felt in Europe, having Paris as the pre-eminent centre of the avant-garde such as the cubism. None the less an avant-garde in the painting art developed also in the German-speaking world in centres such as Berlin, Dresden and Vienna, where a characteristic inflection towards the expressive and subjective could be observed. A third avant-garde impact is to be found in those urban centres which came as a later phase of modernisation in Italy and Russia, representing the distinctive rhythms of the modern status.

The response to the modern condition was experienced in two opposed directions. On the one hand, as a deep pessimism at the increasing control of human life by the machine, a sense of loss of freedom; on the other hand an almost hysterical exhilaration towards the mechanical achievements, speed and machinery. However different they may have been, the responses of depression and exhilaration were actually responses to the effects of modernisation having the common denominator the cause of the modern world. This became with the beginning of the First World War a dominant motif of art, understanding modernisation not only as a technological fact but also as a social fact, marked by the production of new social relations.

Art understood itself on the one hand as the servant of an emancipatory social movement and on the other hand as an hermetic art like the cubism, making the picture and its language to a thing for itself. Cubism established itself as a paradigm for subsequent avant-garde art, with its unprecedented technical innovation performing modernity as the structure of the artistic work itself. The shift in technical priorities of the art work expresses a fixing upon the materiality and a specific form of opacity of the medium through which the world is represented.

Once this emphasis upon the means of representation was achieved, remaining unchanged in a permanent changing world, art secured its archaic role. On the one hand it understood itself as a sphere that decodes the modern world and even participate in changing it. On the other hand undergoing itself through a fundamental transformation. This problem of the relation of an autonomous art to wider social change has remained constitutive of the art in the modern period.

Painting as language

A very general and fundamental determination of painting is its being an expressive form that falls under the general category of visual language. The modern abstract painting is not only a product of the visual and pictorial language, it is also the reflection on it. Semiotically speaking: abstract painting as a sign is its *signifié* and *signifiant* at a time.

Within the aesthetical semiotics-tradition, such as in the Lotmanian sign-theories, the aspect of the double-sidedness has been declared to one of the essential conditions of the aestheticity. As the various semiotic surveys show, the moment of the double-sidedness proves to be very productive for the analysis of the abstraction. It is very important for the aesthetic sign that its form and content reciprocally represent each other. As Lotman (1972: 28) writes: *the expression level is not only an essential factor of the sense, it is the construction scheme of the meaning.*

Artworks can be defined as signs through the synthesis of all their components. The aesthetic sign can function as a vehicle of meaning through the whole structure of the aesthetic text. As Lotman emphasises, the particularity of the meaning of the aesthetic sign resides in its resistance against being translated through other sign systems. The

meaning of the modern work of art has to be sought within the work itself, in the *poeticity* of the work.

Through the analysis of the painting as a language we approach the product of that language with its own means: painting explains itself through its own language.

Nevertheless, the language character of the painting does not contribute to an easier structural analysis; on the contrary, it unfolds a new dimension of complexity, for there exist various modes and theories of what we situate under the category of language. The problem is, that the different definitions of the language do not represent a homogenous discipline. The philosophical definition of the expressive language or the representation, determines the work of art through its semantical and representational aspects, whereas the syntactical categories are rather classified as secondary. The semiotic definition, on the other side, analyses the syntactical aspects of the paintings with the intention of reaching to a semantical explanation of the work. The methods of definitions vary between a synchronical or a diachronical strategy, that is, between the analysis of the form and the analysis of the content.

During the last twenty years there has been an encouraging development of the semiotics of the pictorial language; the different methods had developed themselves in different directions. This discrepancy results to a certain extent from the different definitions of the concept of languages and from the lack of distinction between the language of the spoken word — understood as a language with a closed sign-system, a vocabulary inventory and a grammatical system, characteristics which are inconsistent with the aesthetic character of art works — and the pictorial or visual language. Even semiotics, especially in its structuralist tradition, that has always insisted on the importance of the syntactical rules of a given text, could not develop adequate methods of the analysis of the aesthetic language of paintings.

The language of pictorial art

Painting as a language system is constructed by different ordinance than those of the word-language. For the interpretation of the art of painting we need a multiperspective analytic approach that considers the art-historical, the perceptual, the sociological, the physiological

and the aesthetical point of views. Exactly through its multidisciplinary character is semiotics, in its semiological and culturological tradition, predestined for the explanation and interpretation of such complex phenomena. The productivity of semiotics of pictorial language does not lie primarily in the results of the semiotic investigations but rather in the unfolding of the analytical *parcours*, in the process of its methodological discourse.

The following example intends to verify this concept. For the analysis of the abstract painting semiotics offers a particularly interesting motive which is the concept of *semiosis*. As we know, semiosis is an event in which a thing will be transformed to a sign. It consists of three factors: A an interpretation, B an object or a quality of a relation or a state and C the meaning that A gives B. A interprets B as the representation of C. The different definitions of this relation and of the term *sign* build in their turn different semiotic methods. The logical semiotic tradition of Carnap and Morris defines B as the sign, the linguistic tradition of Saussure and Hjelmslev defines the relation between B and C as the sign, whereas the Berlin semiotic school defines A as the interpretant, B as the sign and C as the meaning. Despite of the fact that semiotics considers all this positions as complementary parts of the signification system, the concept of semiosis has not been represented as the entireness of the sign, but as a process in which signs are produced. Considering this concept and the development of the abstract painting we could say, that abstract painting could be defined in so far as a sign, if the concept of semiosis presents the totality of A, B and C. A theoretical point of view which we find explicitly discussed in the Lotmanian culturology, especially in his definition of the aesthetic sign.

The dominance of the category of the form in the concept of abstract works facilitates its interpretation as a language and as a sign. Abstraction is the manifestation of such dimensions that can primarily be read by our perception. The structure of the language of painting manifests itself on this very physical and material level. It has to be stressed that, as the various movements of the modern art like the cubism, the surrealism, the informell, the conceptualism and others prove, it was the achievement of the modern art itself and not the theory of art, to emancipate its language from its instrumentalisation and converting it to a fundamental part of the art conception and the theoretical reflection.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of abstraction has shown a direct correspondence with the technical and scientific development and its

impacts on the perception. Abstract images do not necessarily mean the transition of the image to *pictorial things* which are either empty signifiers or denotations of vague images. Abstract figures build images that, in presenting modes of comprehending abstract phenomena, train our perception to see and read abstract structures on a more general level. Also the theories of the optic and the psychology of perception explain the development of the perception from a mere receptive to a perceptive status, in which the perceiving subject reads images not only as representations but also as ways of conceiving complex structures.

Like every complex cultural phenomenon, it is difficult to determine the exact period of the outbreak of abstraction. For the concept of semiotic approach to the language of abstraction it is more important to follow the traces of its impacts on the language of the work than determining its beginnings. Impressionism is known to be the turning point for the art of painting, regarding its achievement in freeing the image from its mere representational position as a means of communication. The traces of the acceleration of the cultural development was also evident within the space of art; the permanent changes in styles and theories made it difficult to distinguish between the different positions in the field of art-production of the modern world. Another dimension of abstraction could be observed on a metalevel caused by speed of the cultural and social development. The constant changes in the field of art lead to a constant defragmentation of the form of its language, a phenomenon which paradoxically contributed to the manifestation of its language-form. Abstraction proved itself to be the impulse of the manifestation of the form-language of the art of painting.

One of the important components of this development was the concept of the spectator and its new position in the formation rules of the art-work. The modern artist made the perception to one of the constitutive moments of the work structure, as we can see in the works of surrealism. All these theoretical positions played an important role in the construction of a grammar of the language of painting.

The concept of a grammar of the language of painting does not necessarily oppose to the concept of the aestheticity of the art work, as long as grammar is not understood as a predefined and closed system of rules and categories for the production of aesthetic works. The goal of a grammar-concept of visual semiotics is not to display a series of changes of aesthetic elements, but to compose a grammar of the visual language, that can support the understanding and analysing the system

of images. Hence, for the comprehension of abstraction, it is very important to distinguish between the tradition of a historical grammar — such as in the tradition of Alois Riegel — and the semiotic grammar concept, just like the Lotmanian distinction between the language of art and the traditional form-concept. Whereas the intention of the historical art-grammar was primarily the documentation of the changes of the artistic pictorial elements for a better understanding of the historical changes, a strategy that had neglected the important role for the reception and understanding of the works, focuses the semiotic grammar concept its attention explicitly on the categories of perception and production of works of art, such as styles, image-field etc.

In the semiotic tradition developed by Fernande Saint-Martin, in the mid 80s, a genuine semiotic grammar of the visual language has been formulated, continuing the interrupted tradition of Max Raphael. One of the important achievements of Saint-Martin's grammar concept proved to be her combining art-historical components with biological, physical and semiological categories. Saint-Martin declares the category of *dynamics* to the central characteristic of the visual and pictorial language, with the full awareness of its restrictive moment, that it is impossible to determine the limits and the final categories of this language, a difficulty such as we see with the example of defining the colour itself. The search for fixed categories replaces Saint-Martin instead with the search for *energy-centres*, a terminology that she has taken from the domain of physics. Saint-Martin (1987) calls the smallest element of such an energetic centre the *coloreme.*

A coloreme represents a constant energy which has the same dynamic origin as our ability of visualising things. Hence, the grammar of the visual language is the sum of the perceptive elements and the modes of combining the variables of the coloremes. It has to be mentioned that other than the word-language-system, the individual structure of the elements of the visual language differ from the structure of the visual language as a whole, which means that even if we can distinguish between the structures of different coloremes, we cannot guarantee an exact identical reproduction of the different coloremes.

The idea of a grammar of the artistic expression built also a relevant part of the Lotmanian art theory. Lotman understood the language of the art-work as a certain given volume or quantity of elements that preexist each individual work of art and which is equivalent for the both poles of the act of communication. Semiotics

substituted the idea of perception of the traditional form-aesthetic with the concept of sign. Painting was then defined as a sign-system, that among other qualities was also understood as the documentation of the perceptive act. The reading and apprehending of the images was subsequently considered as directly attached to the social decoding-abilities. The semiotic tradition criticised the notion of experience through art, arguing that experience as an individual activity, could not consider the social moment of the art-work, whereas the concept of sign could achieve this through its communicative moment.

The semiotic concept of the sign-character of the art-work, as we find it in the Lotmanian semiotics of culture, thinks the art-work as a discursive work that arises from the middle of the society. The artist uses the social codes and produces through them new sign-combinations, that on their part preserve the dynamics of the innovative energy without which the very existence of culture could be endangered. This shows that the definition of the art work as a sign fulfils the very idea of the dialectic work, which was considered by the aesthetics of the critical theory of Benjamin and Adorno as the central idea of the modern abstract art.

Models of semiotic analysis

Within the science of semiotics, we find different approaches to the phenomenon of abstraction of the image. The various methods have opened new dimensions for the science of art concerning the interpretation of abstraction. The art-works which had been analysed by those methods vary from classical modern to monochrom painting. The different semiotic methods, known as the structural analysis, the work-inherent analysis, the generative analysis and the topological analysis show, that the semiotics of the visual language can unfold its analytical properties not necessarily through producing new theories about the visual language but through its critical reflection about the forms of discourse about art.

However, the semiotic approaches do not simplify the task of analysing the works of art. On the contrary, every direct work-analysis follows its own definition of the concept of sign and sign-systems which has to be considered in the conception of the sign-study.

One of the important researches in the field of the visual language of art has been done by the Greimasian school. In their efforts to prove

a certain universality of the Greimasian linguistic theories, Jean-Marie Floch and his colleagues analyse some abstract modern paintings, such as the works of Wassily Kandinsky. They not only take the pains to transpass all the different levels of several works of Kandinsky, but also add to it a diachronical analysis of Kandinsky's *oeuvre* and compose a formula illustrating the semiotic discourse of Kandinsky's entire work (Fig. 1).

expression			*contenu*
syntagmes			**énoncés**
chromatiques	type 1	type 2	
	:		:: /combat/ : /jouissance du bonheur/
linéaires	type 1	type 2	

Figure 1. Kandinsky scheme.

The Greimasian semiotic scheme of Kandinsky's work divides the painting field in two levels: the expression level and the content level. On the expression level we see two syntagmas of the chromatic and linear levels that are marked as type 1 and type 2, translating the representations of war and happiness. On a second step it discusses the dichotomy of the chromatic level with the equivalents non-expression /expression and the linear level with the equivalents dryness/non-dryness which on their turn represent the meaning war and happiness.

The following application of the Greimasian method on two paintings from Gerhard Richter, a German contemporary painter, intends to illustrate the deficiencies of the analytical method. Nevertheless, the splitting of expression and the content levels into further sub-contents and sub-expressions contribute to the manifestation of the complexity of the painting-language. From this analytic strategy the abstract painting unfolds its different layers of meaning production.

One of the important achievement of the work of Gerhard Richter is its dialectical reflection on the language of painting and representation. With the category of visuality, of the visual expression and reception painting imposes its autonomous realm composed of figuration/abstraction, neutrality/expression. The wide scale of Richter's paintings since the sixties presents not only a strong evidence of the power and possibilities of the art of painting after the so called

death of the art of painting, but also the important role of the image discourse especially in the era of its digitalisation.

The picture "Seestück (See-See)" from the year 1970 (Fig. 2) and "Stadtbild Paris" from the year 1968 (Fig. 3) represent two completely different concepts of aesthetic positions. Whereas the painting "Seestück (See-See)" belongs to a series of Richters works which can be understood as an interpretation of the romanticism, the picture "Stadtbild Paris" connotes the very idea of urbanism and the technological development. A semiotic analysis of the pictures reveals its critical discourse between the language of its representation and the romantic idea of representational painting, as well as the peculiarity of the syntactical dimension of the presentation form.

Further reflections on the semiotic structure and the comparison of the meaning construction of the two pictures coded in their different layers lead to further levels of the rhetorical statements. The shift in the styles and motifs from realistic to impressionistic, from the natural scenery of the sea to the cultural scenery of the metropolis, opens a space of a new textuality. The photographic precision of the romantic scenery comments the representational role of painting, whereas the impressionistic manner of the urban scenery stresses the central idea of the modernity in art. Further considerations of the photographic work of Richter show further dichotomies in style and meaning. We can see for example the category of colour in the photographic representations connoting an opposition to the absence of colour in oil-paintings.

This shows that, in order to reach the complex levels of meaning production we have to transcend the deconstruction of the language structure and proceed with a reflection on the conditions as well as on the *parole* of the language of painting, its mode expression. The methodological construction of the different positions, such as in the Greimasian model, remains reduced, despite its very rich terminology, either on the meta-level of the language system or on the text-level of the analysed work.

A complete understanding of the language of the art-work can only be achieved, if both levels of the analysis are combined to a general analysis of the work of art. This remaining a substantial precondition to distinguish the particularity and the aestheticity of different work-signs. The analysis methods of visual semiotics still show a certain deficiency in this topic.

Figure 2. Gerhard Richter, 'Seestück (See-See)', oil-painting, 200x200 cm, 1970 (Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Nationalgalerie).

Figure 3. Gerhard Richter, 'Stadtbild Paris', oil-painting, 1968, 200x200 cm.

A short comparison of the various image-semiotic methods with the Lotmanian positions shows not only the actuality of the Lotmanian culturological work, but also proves his wider horizon in exploring the work of art. The system-analytical method examines the *system* in which signs occur, the text-analytical method examines the *sign* and describes the system accordingly. The Greimasian concept of meaning differentiates between the *natural meaning* which is produced with the sign and the *artificial meaning* which is preformed meaning, whereas Lotman talks about an *artistic system* which produces always new meanings with the production of the sign itself, like the aesthetic sign and *artificial sign* which in his definition includes all the sign systems.

Through all his works Lotman insisted on the polyglottic character of culture, defining culture as the sum of different expressive forms or languages, not only within a given culture, but also as a transcultural form of expression. The elements of the cultural system understood Lotman in a constant interaction with each other, forming and reforming the cultural texture and producing its dynamical condition. With his concept of the text extends Lotman the semiotic boundaries beyond all of the mentioned methods. The text in its Lotmanian definition becomes a space of endless possibilities on and in which the human being experiences himself.

Also his contribution to a methodology of exploring the aesthetic sign Lotman has gone beyond the mentioned methods conceptualising the visual language of the art-work. He saw at least two levels of the work-interpretation, the definition of the elements of each sign-system and the definition of the relation of those elements to each other, which were of coarse meant as the starting point for the endless task of interpretation. Just as a work of art presents itself as the dialectical relation between the form and the content, between the *techné* and the idea declares Lotman aestheticity to the essence of every cultural production, to its dialectical moment of coding and decoding itself and sees the importance of the semiotic reflection in decoding those moments.

Hence, in its attempt to build a general theory of signs semiotics must avoid to neutralise the specificity of the different language-forms, of each cultural product and cultural form and of each aesthetic sign. More than a science of general sign-theory, semiotics can use all its theoretical facilities and utilities to develop itself to a *science of forms in their diversity*.

Exploring the condition of the aesthetic sign means exploring the boundaries of culture itself. The very idea of the aesthetic production

has its cradle on the boundaries of our cultural identity: it is at the same time the definition and the extension of the cultural identity in its determination of the boundaries. In the age of the hypertexts and cyberworlds and their total dematerialisation more than ever, we need ways of outlining the features and the images of our abstract cultural state.

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Абстрактная структура эстетического знака

Немецкий философ Вальтер Беньямин заложил основы нескольких более поздних эстетических теорий. Подчеркивая экспрессивный характер искусства, Беньямин определял искусство как язык. Для его эстетики характерно взаимодействие двух противоположных направлений: с одной стороны — художественная критика, опирающаяся на понимание исторических процессов, с другой — понимание критического опыта искусства в качестве оформителя исторических процессов. В этом проявляется фундаментальная близость в теориях эстетического знака у Беньямина и художественного произведения у Лотмана. Оба теоретика определяют искусство как язык и пересечение синхронического и диахронического эстетического дискурса в его структуре. В статье рассматривается изменение функции современного художественного произведения из репрезентативной в автономно сигнификативную, или из статуса символического выражения — в дискурс (в смысле грамматологического *écriture*). Параллельно с этим изменением имел место и сдвиг в культурном значении искусства. Критическое отношение искусства к миру обеспечивалось не подобием, а независимостью ценностей. Современная живопись декларирует язык искусства как сферу, позволяющую, с одной стороны, критическое отображение человека, а с другой, — репрезентацию общества, в той мере, в какой искусство является морально независимым от этих условий. Диалектика автономной и социальной природы искусства глубоко повлияла на язык изобразительного искусства, на что указывалось и во многих работах, репрезентирующих семиотический подход к изучению эстетического знака. В статье рассматривается процессуальный характер современной живописи и указываются недостатки структурного анализа языка изобразительного искусства, настаивается на необходимости синтеза структурного анализа с анализом динамической сущности продуктов культуры (как это осуществлялось в лотмановской теории культуры).

Esteetilise märgi abstraktne struktuur

Saksa filosoof Walter Benjamin visandas mitmed hilisemad esteetilised teooriad. Rõhutades kunsti ekspressiivset olemust, defineeris Benjamin kunsti kui keele. Tema esteetikat iseloomustab kahe vastastikuse suuna interaktsioon: ühelt poolt ajalooliste protsesside mõistmisele tuginev kunstikriitika, teiselt poolt kunsti kriitilise kogemuse mõistmine ajaloo-protsesside kujundajana. Selles osas on Benjamini esteetilise märgi ja Lotmani kunstiteose teooriates fundamentaalne sarnasus. Mõlemad teoreetikud määratlevad kunsti keelena ning selle struktuuri sünkroonilise ja diakroonilise esteetilise diskursuse lõikumisena. Artikkel vaatleb nüüdis-

aegse maali funktsiooni muutumist representatsioonist autonoomse sig-
nifikatsioonini ehk sümboolsest väljenduse staatusest diskursuseks (gram-
matoloogilise *écriture*'i mõttes). Paralleelselt selle muutusega toimus nihe
kunsti kultuurilises tähenduses. Kunsti kriitilise suhte maailma tagas mitte
sarnasus, vaid väärtuste sõltumatus. Nüüdisaegne maal deklareeris kuns-
tikeele valdkonnana, mis võimaldab üheltpoolt inimese kriitilist peegel-
dust ja teiseltpoolt ühiskonna representeerimist sel määral, kuivõrd kunst
on neist tingimustest moraalselt sõltumatu. Kunsti autonoomse ja sotsiaal-
se olemuse dialektika on sügavalt mõjutanud maalikeelt, millele on viida-
nud ka mitmed semiootilised lähenemised esteetilisele märgile. Artikkel
vaatleb kaasaegse maali protsessuaalset iseloomu ja näitab lühidalt maali-
keele strukturaalanalüüsi puudusi, viidates strukturaalanalüüsi sünteesi
vajalikkusele kultuuriproduktide dünaamilise olemusega (nagu näeme
Lotmani kultuuriteoorias).

Pure visual metaphor:
Juri Lotman's concept of rhetoric
in fine arts

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Abstract. Salvador Dalí's oilpainting *Hallucination partielle. Six apparitions de Lénine sur un piano* (1931) has been considered to be one of the most difficult works to interpret. O. Zaslavskii has analyzed it, using the sound of the words in title and the items depicted on the masterpiece, "the phonetic subtext". Obviously, Zaslavskii's interpretation is based on Osip Mandelstam's poem "Grand piano" (1931), that in the context of Russian language associates the piano (*рояль*) with the French Revolution. Nevertheless, Zaslavskii's final conclusion of the connections between Dalí's painting and the French Revolution turns to be accurate, because it is possible to find iconographic parallels between Dalí's "Partial hallucination..." and Jacques-Louis David's "The death of Marat" (1793). On at least four most significant oil paintings from the beginning of Dalí's surreal period we can observe his "emblem of love and death" as the combination of *fellatio* and bleeding. Obviously, he understood in the same code also Marat's murdering by the knife of a woman. This allows us to insist, that Dalí was inspired to paint "Partial hallucination..." by "The death of Marat". The shadow of a grand piano on his painting "Diurnal illusion: the shadow of a grand piano approaching" (1931) directly bears the meaning of "terror" and "fear". In such motif combination and graphic parallel, the complex cultural metaphoric relations of these two paintings can be viewed. This complex can be considered as rhetorical in the sense of Juri Lotman's conception. But it is evidently a case of "pure visual metaphor", not an illustration of verbal metaphors.

In his article "Rhetoric" (1981)[1] Juri Lotman presents a thorough overview of the essence of this concept in several scientific paradigm and amends it with his innovative approach to rhetoric as a science with a specific object.

We are interested in following of his theoretical distinctive characters. First: rhetoric is a "science of generating a text", "a compilation of rules, a generating mechanism", which has a practical (pragmatic, applied) orientation. Second: such rhetoric of "open text" that includes creation or generation of a text can be distinguished from the "closed text" rhetoric — poetics of a text as a whole, where texts are being analyzed in their entirety, "text as an *entire* semiotic *unit*" (Lotman 1992: 167).

The last can be possible because rhetoric as poetics of *figurative* word-text "melts together" the smaller units of the text. In such case, text as the bearer of the essential meaning is primary. In its nature, text is not discrete in its nature but continual. The meaning of a text as a whole is not shaped by the linear position of its segments or timeline but exists in a diffuse way in the text's n-dimensional semantic space (on a painting's canvas, on the stage, on screen, in ritual act, in social behavior or dream). In such kind of texts the meaning is conveyed by the very integrity of the text, whereas distinguishing single component marks is complicated and often artificial. In another language (i.e. continual figurative text) the "word text's" discrete and precisely specified unit corresponds to a vague meaning-spot that gradually is changing its meaning. And even if there is a *sui generis* segmentation, it can not be suited with the discrete articulation type of the source text (i.e. the word text) (Lotman 1992: 167).

## Salvador Dalí's "Partial hallucination. Six apparitions of Lenin on a grand piano"

Spanish artist Salvador Dalí's works are clear in their form but complex in their essence. It can be felt that the author is trying to express something meaningful, but he does it in his own figurative language that is easier to notice than to understand. The audience standing in front of this master's artwork must feel as Polonius, when he mentioned to Hamlet: "Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't".

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[1] See Lotman 1992: 167–183.

Salvador Dalí's oilpainting "Partial hallucination. Six apparitions of Lenin on a grand piano" (Fr. *Hallucination partielle. Six apparitions de Lénine sur un piano,* 1931; see Fig. 1) has been considered to be one of the most difficult works to interpret because it apparently combines several figures that were developed in Dalí's works during 1920/30.

Figure 1. Salvador Dalí: 'Partial hallucination. Six apparitions of Lenin on the Grand Piano' (1931).

Art historians have been incapable here. On one hand, they have reached a precise correspondence of the elements, which is not characteristic to art and its multiple meanings: the cherries represent "the secret of branching"; the ants climbing up the music-book symbolize mortality, etc. On the other hand, the analysis of this artwork has been replaced with anecdotes of S. Dalí's life — the artist confessed to have seen the busts of Lenin on the piano during a walk at dawn. This neither has anything to do with art theory.

Oleg Zaslavskii's literary interpretation

Oleg Zaslavskii from Harkov University has analyzed Dalí's painting "Partial hallucination. Six apparitions of Lenin on the grand piano", using the sound of the words in title and the items depicted on the masterpiece, "the phonetic subtext", including anagrams and similarities of the sound-components, as the key to decipher it (Zaslavskii 1999).

One has to admit that due to Russian-language background, at times O. Zaslavskii tends to come to arbitrary conclusions.

(a) For instance, in his interpretation Zaslavskii does not focus on the French word *piano* in the original Dalí's title but its Russian equivalent *рояль* that associates it with royalism.

(b) He bases on the Russian word *галлюцинация* instead of the French *hallucination* and accordingly claims the connection with gallicism (although in the source language the initial *h* is not pronounced at all, not to mention the already gutturalized pronunciation) and based on the same word derives an anagram *гильотина* ("guillotine").

(c) Based on a Russian word *черешня* ("cherries") he suggests an English equivalent *cherish*, that has a completely different meaning.

(d) Presumably background of English (not French) language allows him to easily unite the French words *porte* ("door"), pronounced [port], and *part* ("part"), pronounced [pa:(r)t] in English, but [pa:r] in French.

As a result of his interpretation, O. Zaslavskii comes to an understanding that Dalí's painting depicts revolutionary terror.

Based on sound similarities, he forms following associative relations:

Rus. *рояль* ("piano") → Fr. *royal* ("royal"),

Fr. *partielle* ("partial") → party → Royalist party → pianist as royalist → the French Revolution → execution of the emperor→ Russian Revolution → Lenin as the person who executed the czar → royalist sitting opposite to a revolutionist,

Rus. *галлюцинация* ("hallucination") → Rus. *гильотина* ("guillotine") → heads separated from bodies → piano lid as a guillotine,

bugs on the music → termites → Thermidor (collapse of Jacobin government),

Rus. *партия рояля* ("piano work") → Royalist party,

single bug apart from the others as well as single berry on the chair → disassembling head from the body,

red berries → blood,

napkin attached to a man's shoulder with safety pins (rus. *английская булавка*, Fr. *épingle anglaise* — "English needle") → English Revolution → beheading of Charles I,

Engl. *napkin* → Engl. *nape* + Engl. *king*,

Charles I → engl. *chair* → chair with the berries → throne,

Engl. *chair* → Engl. *cherry*,

person sitting (pianist) as a king (Louis XVI or Charles I) → head of state → V. I. Lenin as a head of a revolutionary state,

sixteen berries → Louis XVI,

1 single berry → Charles I,

6 apparitions of Lenin ← 16 without 1,

6 apparitions of Lenin ← 7 notes in an octave → seventh head of Lenin missing → beheading,

halation around Lenin's head→ fruit's flesh around the bone → "fruits of revolution",

napkin on the shoulders of the sitting person instead of the king's gabardine → Engl. *linen* → anagram: "Lenin",

Fr. *porte* ("door") → Fr. *part* ("part") → Fr. *partielle* ("partial") ← door partially open.

Obviously, such an interpretation by Zaslavskii is not originally based on Dalí's work but on Russian poet Osip Mandelstam's writings, specifically on his poem "Grand piano" (1931; Mandelstam 1999: 142):

> РОЯЛЬ
>
> Как парламент жующий фронду,
> Вяло дышит огромный зал,
> Не идет Гора на Жиронду,
> И не крепнет сословий вал.
>
> Оскорбленный и оскорбитель
> Не звучит рояль-Голиаф,
> Звуколюбец, душемутитель,
> Мирабо фортепьянных прав.
>
> Разве руки мои кувалды?
> Десять пальцев — мой табунок!
> И вскочил, отряхая фалды,
> Мастер Генрих, конек-горбунок.
>
> [...]
>
> Чтобы в мире стало просторней,
> Ради сложности мировой,
> Не втирайте в клавиши корень
> Сладковатой груши земной.
>
> Чтоб смолою соната джина
> Проступила из позвонков,
> Нюренбергская есть пружина,
> Выпрямляющая мертвецов.

This is a complicated text with deep and actual biographic background. The poet's mother was a musician, and literary historian Zara

Grigorievna Mints has described the respect of piano in the Mandelstam family (they were not allowed to place anything as profane as newspapers on the piano). The text is also dated (as it was a habit of poets in 1930s): April 16, 1931.

What exactly happened on April 16 is irrelevant from the aspect of S. Dalí's painting. What is important is that O. Zaslavskii's interpretation is — perhaps unconsciously — guided by O. Mandelstam's poem, that in the context of Russian language associates the piano (*рояль*) with the anti-royalist history of France (*фронду* — "Fronde") and the French Revolution (*Гора* — "Mountain", *Жиронду* — "Gironde", *Мирабо* — "Mirabeau").

Led by O. Mandelstam (and his death in a Siberian forced labor camp during Stalinist terror period), O. Zaslavskii concludes that with his painting S. Dalí "condemns totalitarianism from aesthetical positions".

However, O. Zaslavskii's political interpretation can not be backed up by claims about Dalí's knowledge of English and Russian language nor his alleged anti-totalitarian views.

Dalí was likely to represent contrary views, total or totalitarian artist concept — he saw himself as the art monarch of XX century (Fig. 2). Louis XVI (1643–1715), the notorious Sun King who validated absolute monarchy in France, was a great raw-model for Dalí (Fig. 3).

Figure 2. Salvador Dalí with a crown.

Figure 3. Hyacinthe Rigaud: *Roi soleil* Louis XIV (1701).

"The Sun King" is depicted on S. Dalí's watercolor (see Fig. 4); also, his perfume for men and women bears the name "Le Roy Soleil" (Fig. 5).

Dali is obviously in favor of absolute monarchy and totalitarianism, not condemning it. This allows us to reject O. Zaslavskii's interpretation.

**Figure 4.** Salvador Dalí: 'Le Roy Soleil' (ca. 1944).

Figure 5. Perfume bottle of "Salvador Dalí: Le Roy Soleil".

Iconographical key: Jacques-Louis David's "The death of Marat" (1793)

Nevertheless, O. Zaslavskii's interpretation must be recognized as the most prominent attempt to date to find an intentional center of the depicted objects, a central idea towards which the seemingly incoherent objects of the painting are gravitating.

His final conclusion of the connections between Dalí's painting and the French Revolution turns to be accurate, because it is possible to find visual parallels between Dalí's "Partial hallucination..." and "the revolutionary court-artist" Jacques-Louis David's "revolutionary icon" — "The death of Marat" (1793) (Fig. 1 and 6, Table 1).

Figure 6. Jacques-Louis David: The death of Marat (1793).

Table 1. Comparison of the paintings' iconography.

S. Dalí "Partial hallucination…"	J.-L. David "The death of Marat"
blank back wall	blank back wall
arc of the piano lid	arc of shadow on the back wall
empty floor	blank faceplate of the podium
right arm in the foreground	right arm in the foreground
a mummy-like person	dead person
blonde helmet haircut	headscarf
napkin on the back	a towel
music book on the piano	letter in left hand
open piano	a bath tub
a chair	a podium
(blood-red) berries	pot of ink (which is used for writing bloody or passionate revolutionary regulations)
Lenin's images on the piano	money note (assignat) on the podium (compare to Fig. 7)

Figure 7. A bank note with V. I. Lenin's portrait.

If taking into consideration the similarity of the greenish-brown colour that is even matching occasionally (back wall, floor and podium), the connections of the Socialist October Revolution and the French Revolution on S. Dalí's painting can be verified visually, not by just verbal associations.

The meaning field of a metaphor

Such comparison is explained with S. Dalí's motif story in 1929/1931, where the combination of *fellatio* and bleeding becomes his "emblem of love and death" and the grand piano is featured in a specific meaning.

We can observe these motifs on at least four S. Dalí's most significant oil paintings from the beginning of his surreal period:

"The great masturbator" (1929, Fig. 8),
"The enigma of desire: my mother, my mother, my mother" (1929, Fig. 9),
"Vertigo" (1930, Fig. 10), and
"Diurnal illusion: the shadow of a grand piano approaching" (1931, Fig. 11).

Figure 8. Salvador Dalí: 'The great masturbator' (1929).

Figure 9. Salvador Dalí: 'The enigma of desire: my mother, my mother, my mother (1929).

Figure 10. Salvador Dalí: 'Vertigo' (1930).

Figure 11. Salvador Dalí: 'Diurnal illusion: the shadow of a grand piano approaching' (1931).

Figure 12. Salvador Dalí: 'The Great Masturbator' (detail).

The upper right part of S. Dalí's "The great masturbator" depicts the beginning of a fellatio act (Fig. 12). The red blood marks on the man's thighs are probably scratch marks, which associate the woman's nails with knives.

In "The enigma of desire: my mother, my mother, my mother", painted the same year, a female figure embracing a man's lower body on the background of the painting, is holding already clearly identifiable knife (Fig. 13).

Figure 13. Salvador Dalí: 'The enigma of desire: my mother, my mother, my mother' (detail).

The connection between fellatio and stabbing becomes even clearer with "Vertigo" painted the following year with its group of people on the background on the right (Fig. 14).

Figure 14. Salvador Dalí: 'Vertigo' (detail).

Fellatio combines death with hate-like love, a complex that S. Dalí was focused on during that period. He probably understood the stabbing motif in J.-L. David's "The death of Marat" in the same key, as the stabber was a woman — Charlotte Corday. Iconographic isomorphism allows us to insist, that S. Dalí was inspired to paint "Partial hallucination..." by "The death of Marat".

Another iconographic parallel from S. Dalí's same period can affirm that argument. "Diurnal illusion: the shadow of a grand piano approaching" painted the same year as "Partial hallucination...", depicts the instrument as something horrible, huge, grand and heavy threateningly nearing, with the scared people looking for support from each other. The "shadow" here bears the meaning of "terror" ("fear"), that definitely is a part of J.-L. David's painting, dating back to the Jacobin terror (tyranny) period and which also applies — due to graphic similarities — to S. Dalí's painting "Partial hallucination...".

In such motif combination and graphic parallel, the complex cultural metaphoric relations of S. Dalí's "Partial hallucination. Six apparitions of Lenin on the grand piano" and J.-L. David's "The death of Marat" can be viewed. This relationship is spread on the painting as a whole through single isomorphisms (S. Dalí's painting is a metaphor of J.-L. David's painting) and has to be considered rhetoric in the light of Juri Lotman's rhetorics concept.

Juri Lotman already pointed in the year 1973 to the habit to see in verbal communication the main or even the only form of the communicative contact and to equate the picture text with the verbal one (Lotman 1973: 382–386). S. Dalí's "Partial hallucination..." can be seen as a case of pure visual metaphor, not a figurative illustration of verbal metaphors.

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Чистовизуальная метафоричность. Риторическая концепция Юрия Лотмана в изобразительном искусстве

Картина «Частичная галлюцинация. Шесть явлений Ленина на рояле» (1931, см. иллюстрацию 1) считается одной из самых труднообъяснимых в творчестве Сальвадора Дали. Олег Заславский предпринял ее анализ («Образно-языковой анализ тоталитаризма в двух «ленинских» картинах Дали», *Sign Systems Studies* 27: 168–180), исходя из «фонетического подтекста» как слов заглавия, так и словесных обозначений вещей, изображенных на картине. Но из-за русскоязычного фона он опирается не на слово *piano* во французском оригинале, а на его русскоязычное соответствие *рояль*, что позволяет ему ввести параллель с роялизмом. Видимо за этим стоит цитируемое им стихотворение Осипа Мандельштама «Рояль» (1931), которое прямо связывает рояль с антироялистским движением во Франции (“Fronde”) и еще более — с Великой французской революцией (“Гора”, “Жиронда”, “Мирабо”).

Тем не менее, вывод Заславского о связи картины Дали с французской революцией оказывается верным, так как можно провести иконографические параллели между “Частичной галлюцинацией...” С. Дали и “Смертью Марата” (1793) Жак-Луи Давида (см. иллюстрацию 6): пустынный фон, дуга поднятой крышки рояля — дуга тени на задней стене, на первом плане правая рука, мумиеподобный сидящий — мертвец, светлая шлемеподобная прическа — полотенце вокруг головы, салфетка на спине — банница, нотные страницы на пианино — письмо в левой руке, открытое пианино — ванна, стул — пюпитр для писем, изображения Ленина на пианино — денежная ассигнация на пюпитре. Если еще учесть похожесть и частичную совпадаемость зелено-коричневого колорита (задняя стенка, пол и пюпитр), то связь Великой октябрьской революции с Великой буржуазной французской революцией на картине Дали кажется вполне оправданной, исходя из визуальной стороны картины.

На пороге 1920/30-х годов Дали еще в трех известных картинах (“Великий мастурбатор”, “Загадка желания — моя мать, моя мать, моя мать”, “Вертиго”) изображал комплекс любви-ненависти, связывая фелляцию и смерть. Видимо, в этом же ключе он понимал и пронзенного рукой женщины Марата. Это позволяет утверждать, что Дали при создании “Частичной галлюцинации” вдохновлялся именно “Смертью Марата” Давида. Прибавим, что тень рояля на его картине “Дневное видение. Приближающая тень большого рояля” (1931) связывается прямо со страхом и террором.

В таком мотивном сосуществовании и графическом параллелизме проявляется сложная культурологическая метафорическая связь двух картин, которую можно считать риторической в свете риторической концепции Юрия Лотмана. Но в данном случае мы имеем дело со случаем чистовизуальной метафоричности, а не с иллюстрацией вербальных метафор.

Puhtvisuaalne metafoorsus:
Juri Lotmani retoorikakontseptsioon kujutavkunstis

Õlimaali "Osaline kangastus. Kuus Lenini ilmumit tiibklaveril" (1931, Joon. 1) on peetud üheks Salvador Dalí kõige raskemini seletatavaks teoseks. Oleg Zaslavskii on analüüsinud seda, võttes teose võtmeks nii pealkirja kui ka pildil kujutatud asju tähistavate sõnade kõla, "foneetilise allteksti". Emakeelse tausta tõttu ei lähtu ta aga mitte prantsuskeelse originaalpealkirja sõnast *piano*, vaid selle venekeelsest vastest *рояль*, mis annab talle seose rojalismiga. Ilmselt on selle taga Ossip Mandelštami luuletus "Tiibklaver" (1931), mis otsesõnu seostab klaveri (*рояль*) Prantsusmaa antirojalistliku ajalooga ("Fronde") ja lähemalt Suure Kodanliku Prantsuse revolutsiooniga ("Mägi", "Gironde", "Mirabeau").

Kummati osutub O. Zaslavskii lõppjäreldus S. Dalí maali seotusest Prantsuse revolutsiooniga õigeks, sest võimalik on leida ikonograafilisi paralleele S. Dalí "Osalise kangastuse..." ja Jacques-Louis Davidi "Marat' surma" (1793) vahel (Joon. 1 ja 6, Tabel 1): lage foon, klaverikaane kaar — varjukaar tagaseinal, esiplaanil parem käsi, muumialaadne istuja — surnu, hele kiiversoeng — rätt ümber pea, salvrätik selja taga — vannilina, noodilehed klaveril — kiri vasakus käes, avatud klaver — vann, tool — kirjutuspoodium, Lenini näopildid klaveril — rahatäht (assignaat) poodiumil. Kui arvestada veel rohekaspruuni koloriidi sarnasust ja kohatist kattuvustki (tagasein, põrand ja poodium), siis paistab Suure Sotsialistliku Oktoobrirevolutsiooni seos Suure Kodanliku Prantsuse Revolutsiooniga S. Dalí maalil põhjendatud pildiliselt.

1920/30. aastate vahetusel kujutas S. Dalí veel kolmes tuntud teoses ("Suur masturbaator", "Iha mõistatus — mu ema, mu ema, mu ema", "Vertigo") vihkamisseguse armastuse kompleksi, seostades fellatsiooni ja surma. Ilmselt mõistis ta sellessamas võtmes ka Marat' pussitamist naise käe läbi. See lubab väita, et S. Dalí'd inspireeris "Osaliseks kangastuseks..." just J.-L. Davidi "Marat' surm". Lisagem, et klaveri vari tema maalil "Päevane heiastus. Suure klaveri liginev vari" (1931) seostub otseselt hirmu ja terroriga.

Säärases motiivikoosluses ja graafilises parallelismis ilmneb kahe maali keeruline kultuurilooline metafoorsussuhe, mida tuleb lugeda retooriliseks Juri Lotmani retoorikakontseptsiooni tähenduses. Tegemist on aga puhtvisuaalse metafoorsuse juhtumiga, mitte verbaalsete metafooride illustratsiooniga.

Organic codes: Metaphors or realities?

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Abstract. Coding characteristics have been discovered not only in protein synthesis, but also in various other natural processes, thus showing that the genetic code is not an isolated case in the organic world. Other examples are the sequence codes, the adhesion code, the signal transduction codes, the splicing codes, the sugar code, the histone code, and probably more. These discoveries however have not had a significant impact because of the widespread belief that organic codes are not real but metaphorical entities. They are supposed to lack arbitrariness and codemakers, the two qualifying features of real codes. Here it is shown that the arbitrariness issue can be solved on an experimental basis, while the codemaker issue is dependent on our theoretical description of the cell and can only be solved by a new concept. In order to appreciate the reality of the organic codes, in short, it is necessary to have not only a more critical evaluation of the experimental data but also a new theory of the living system.

Introduction

From time immemorial it has been thought that codes, or conventions, exist only in the world of culture. The discovery of the genetic code, in the 1960s, came therefore as a bolt from the blue, but the reaction was rather strange. The discovery of one organic code should have suggested that there could be more in nature, but what happened was the exact opposite. The genetic code was immediately declared a *frozen accident*, and any mention of other organic codes was ignored. Edward Trifonov, for example, has shown since the 1980s that there are at least three sequence codes in addition to the classic triplet code, but in vain. The situation started to change only in the late 1990s. In

1996, Redies and Takeichi described an *adhesive code* in the development of the nervous system, and in the year 2000, Gabius provided evidence for a *sugar code*, while Strahl, Allis, Turner and colleagues discovered a *histone code* (Table 1).

1	THE GENETIC CODE	(1954–1966)	*Gamow, Niremberg, Khorana*
2	THE SEQUENCE CODES	(1988–1999)	*Trifonov*
3	THE ADHESION CODE	(1996)	*Redies, Takeichi*
4	THE SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION CODES	(1998)	*Barbieri*
5	THE SPLICING CODES	(1998)	*Barbieri*
6	THE SUGAR CODE	(2000)	*Gabius*
7	THE HISTONE CODE	(2000)	*Strahl, Allis, Turner*

Table 1. Organic codes, and their describers.

These announcements, however, have barely raised an interest. Today, the existence of other organic codes is no longer ignored as it was in the past, but it is not seen as anything special. This response may appear surprising, but is not unfounded. It is the natural consequence of a widespread and deep-seated belief that all organic codes, including the genetic code, are only useful *metaphors*, not real entities. Molecular biology has borrowed many words from ordinary language, because they have an intuitive appeal and avoid long periphrases, but they are not meant to be literally true. The genetic code itself is given the name "code" only because this term is metaphorically appropriate, but deep down most biologists are convinced that it is nothing more than a good metaphor. And this for two basic reasons. The real codes that we are familiar with have two outstanding features: they are *arbitrary* rules, and they are made by a *codemaker*. These are the key entities: *arbitrariness* and *codemaking*. No code can be a real code without these qualifying features, and most biologists are convinced that organic codes simply do not have them. This is the crucial point: why do people believe that organic codes do not have those two qualifying features?

The codes' fingerprints

A code is a set of rules that establish a correspondence between two independent worlds. The Morse code, for example, is a correspondence between combinations of dots and dashes with the letters of the alphabet, and — in the same way — the genetic code is a correspondence between combinations of nucleotides and amino acids. From the point of view of the definition, there is no difference between them. Why then do people believe that the Morse code is real and the genetic code is not? One reason, as we have seen, is *arbitrariness*. We know that the Morse code is arbitrary because we have built it ourselves, and we are certain that there is no necessary link between dots and dashes and the letters of the alphabet. But ask a biologist if the same arbitrariness exists between nucleotides and amino acids, and you are likely to get a very different response. Many would deny it out of hand, others would say that the two codes are not comparable, and some would reply that we still need more data.

One of the most common arguments against the arbitrariness of the genetic code is the determinism of protein synthesis. Every single step of the translation process is perfectly deterministic, in the sense that a chain of nucleotides is translated into a chain of amino acids with a precise sequence of reactions. This is the most popular argument, probably because it has a strong intuitive appeal, and yet it is not a valid one. The same determinism, in fact, is present even when cultural codes are implemented. When the mental image of an apple is formed in the visual cortex and we pronounce the word "apple", there is a precise chain of neurological reactions between the two mental images. A neurologist would say with no hesitation that the neural connection between the visual area and the speech area of the brain is perfectly deterministic, and yet the connection was established by a linguistic code that is perfectly arbitrary. The implementation of the rules of a code, in short, is deterministic in all codes, even in the cultural ones. The arbitrariness comes in only when a code is created or modified, not when it is implemented.

We need therefore positive evidence in order to obtain reliable conclusions, and it is the very definition of the codes that tells us what to look for. Since a code is a bridge between two independent worlds, an organic code necessarily requires organic molecules that perform two independent recognition steps. These are the "adaptors", the name that Francis Crick proposed for the molecules that today we call

transfer RNAs. All codes need molecules that perform equivalent functions, and so all these molecules can be called adaptors. The adaptors are catalysts that have two different recognition sites, and what qualifies them as adaptors is the fact that there is no necessary connection between the two sites. The site which recognises the objects of one world can be associated with any of the sites that recognise the objects of the other world, and this means that a connection can only be established by an arbitrary choice, by a "natural convention". The adaptors, in short, are the "fingerprints" that reveal the presence of an organic code.

In the case of the genetic code, it has been possible to prove that the nucleotide site is independent from the amino acid site by actually changing the rules of the code *in vitro*, and a similar experiment has been performed *in vivo* by some micro-organisms. This should have settled the arbitrariness issue for good, but ingrained opinions are hard to die, and so we still hear the claim that the association between nucleotides and amino acids is not arbitrary, because some regularities have been discovered in the genetic code. This is true, but it has nothing to do with arbitrariness, and in fact regularities also exist in cultural codes. In the Morse code, for example, the most frequent letters of the alphabet are associated with the simplest combinations of dots and dashes, but nobody would dream to conclude that the Morse code is not a true code for that.

In the case of the genetic code, furthermore, there are also other factors in favour of its arbitrariness. The number and the types of the amino acids, for example, could have been different, because many other amino acids exist in nature, and the same is true for the nucleotides. In the genetic code, in short, we find arbitrariness not only in the rules of the code, but also in the choice of the objects which are coded by those rules. And this is perfectly equivalent to what happens in the linguistic codes, where arbitrariness exists not only in the rules of grammar, but also in the number and in the type of letters which are chosen to make up an alphabet.

The arbitrariness of the organic codes, in conclusion, can be demonstrated by a variety of experimental facts, and above all by the existence of adaptors (it was the presence of adaptors in signal transduction and in splicing, that allowed me to conclude, in 1998, that these processes are based on organic codes). Arbitrariness alone, however, is not enough, because it could be the result of an extraordinary number of coincidences. A real code requires arbitrariness and codemakers, and the existence of a codemaker is an issue where

theory plays an even greater role than experiments. It is also to theory, therefore, that we need to turn our attention.

The third party

The extraordinary thing about codes is that they require a new entity. In addition to energy and information they require *meaning*. For centuries, meaning has been regarded as a spiritual or a transcendental entity, but in reality it is a perfectly natural entity because we can define it with an operative procedure just as we do with all physical quantities. *Meaning is an object which is related to another object by a code*. The meaning of the word *apple*, for example, is the mental object of the fruit which is associated to the mental object of that word by the code of the English language. More in general, a cultural meaning is always a mental object which is associated to another mental object by a convention. But the operative definition of meaning need not be restricted to the mental world because it applies equally well to the organic world. The meaning of a combination of dots and dashes is a letter of the alphabet, in the Morse code. And in the same way, the meaning of a combination of three nucleotides is usually an amino acid, in the genetic code (from which it follows that the meaning of a gene is usually a protein).

We are well aware that it is man who gives meaning to mental objects — in the realm of the mind he is the *codemaker* — but this does not mean that a code of correspondence between two independent worlds must be produced by a conscious activity. The only logical necessity is that the codemaker is *an agent which is ontologically different* from those worlds, because if it belonged to one of them the two worlds would no longer be independent. A code, in other words, requires three entities: two independent worlds and a codemaker which belongs to a third world (from a philosophical point of view this is equivalent to the triadic system proposed in semiotics by Charles Peirce).

The problem is that the cell is described as a dualistic system of genes and proteins, genotype and phenotype, software and hardware, and in a dualistic system there is no third party that can act as a codemaker. This is why I proposed, in 1981, that the cell is not a duality of genotype and phenotype but a trinity made of genotype, phenotype and *ribotype*. The ribotype was defined as the ribonucleo-

protein system of the cell, and it was underlined that it represents *a new cell category*. As phenotype is the seat of metabolism and genotype the seat of heredity, so ribotype is the seat of genetic coding.

It is an experimental fact that the genetic code is implemented by ribonucleoproteins, and this strongly suggests that the ribotype is the codemaker of the genetic code, but it does not prove it. Only a theory can establish the ontological status of the ribotype as an independent cell category. We have therefore before us two very different concepts: the cell as a duality (*the genotype–phenotype theory*) or the cell as a trinity (*the ribotype theory*). The problem is how to choose between them.

The origin-of-life metaphors

The evaluation of theories is a complex affair, in general, but there are theories which can be illustrated by metaphors, and in these cases the metaphors should be discussed first, because their intuitive appeal often takes priority over rational thinking. In our case, a theory of the cell can be illustrated by a metaphor on the origin of life, because the nature and the origin of a system are two faces of the same problem. If the cell is a duality of genotype and phenotype, for example, the problem of the origins is understanding whether it was the genes or the proteins which came first. The genotype–phenotype theory, in other words, corresponds to *the-chicken-and-the-egg* metaphor on the origin of life. In this framework, it doesn't even make sense to speak of three categories, and so the ribotype theory had to be illustrated by a totally different metaphor. More precisely, by *the-cell-as-a-city* metaphor, where the proteins of the cell are compared to the houses of a city, and the genes to their blueprints (Barbieri 1981; 1985). In this framework, it is the chicken-and-the-egg problem that makes no sense, because it would be equivalent to asking if it was the houses or the blueprints which came first, and either answer would be wrong. What came first was a third party, the inhabitants, i.e. the intermediaries between houses and blueprints in a city which correspond to the intermediaries between proteins and genes in a cell.

Our theories of the cell are illustrated therefore by different metaphors on the origin of life, and it may be worthwhile to examine them in some detail. As a matter of fact, as soon as we take a closer look at *the-chicken-and-the-egg* metaphor, we realise that there is

something wrong with it. The egg and the chicken are not the two faces of one duality. They are two dualistic systems in different stages of development. Each one of them is a complete genotype–phenotype entity, and it is pure fiction to say that one represents the genotype and the other stands for the phenotype.

We do indeed need a better metaphor, and *the-cell-as-a-city* does have a certain intuitive appeal. But this metaphor has not become anything like as popular as *the-chicken-and-the-egg*, and it is highly instructive to understand why. The crucial point is that in a city only the inhabitants are alive, whereas houses and blueprints are not. The city metaphor, in other words, implies that *genes and proteins are molecular artifacts, just as blueprints and houses are human artifacts*. And this seems a preposterous idea. How can one accept that genes and proteins, the very molecules of life, are inanimate manufactured objects? That probably explains why the ribotype theory has not attracted the attention of the origin-of-life people. And yet it has never been proved that the preposterous idea is false. It may be interesting therefore to take a look at it.

Copymakers and codemakers

There was a time when atoms did not exist. They came into being within giant stars, and were scattered all over the place when those stars exploded. There was a time when molecules did not exist. They originated from the combination of atoms on a variety of different places such as comets and planets. There was a time when polymers did not exist. They were produced when molecules joined together at random and formed chains of subunits. There was a time when all the polymers of our planet were random molecules, but that period did not last forever. At a certain point, new types of polymers appeared. Some molecules started making copies of polymers, and for this reason I call them *copymakers*. Other molecules made coded versions of the copies, and I refer to them as *codemakers*. On the primitive Earth, the copymakers could have been RNA-replicases and the codemakers could have been transfer-RNAs, but other possibilities exist, and so here we will use the generic terms of copymakers and codemakers. All that matters, for our purposes, is the historical fact that copymakers and codemakers came into being and started producing copied molecules and coded molecules.

Now let us take a look at these new polymers. The formation of a random chain of subunits is accounted for by the laws of thermodynamics and does not require any new physical quantity. But when a copymaker makes a copy of that chain, something new appears: the sequence of subunits becomes *information* for the copymaker. In a similar way, when a codemaker takes a chain of monomers of one kind to produce a chain of monomers of a different kind, something new appears: the second chain becomes the *meaning* of the first one. *It is only the act of copying that creates information, and it is only the act of coding which creates meaning*. Information and meaning, in other words, appeared in the world when copymakers and codemakers came into existence and started functioning.

The appearance of copied polymers and coded polymers was a major event also for another reason. Up to that point, all molecules formed on the primitive Earth had one thing in common: their structure was entirely determined by the assembly properties of their atoms, i.e., *from within*. In the case of copied and coded polymers, in contrast, the order of the subunits was determined by external templates, i.e., *from without*. In everyday language, we distinguish between *natural* and *artificial* products in a straightforward way: the objects which are formed spontaneously are natural, while those which are shaped by external agents are artificial. And that is precisely the distinction that exists between random polymers on one hand and copied or coded polymers on the other. I conclude therefore that copied molecules (genes) and coded molecules (proteins) are indeed, in a very deep sense, *artificial* molecules. They are artificial because they are produced by external agents, because their primary structure is determined from without and not from within, because their production involves outside processes based on information and meaning.

There was a time when the world was inhabited only by *natural* molecules, but that period did not last forever. At a certain point copied and coded molecules appeared, and the world became also inhabited by *artificial* molecules — by *artifacts made by nature*. And that was not just another step toward life. It was the appearance of the very logic of life because, from copymakers and codemakers onward, all living creatures have been artifact-makers. In a very fundamental sense, we can define life itself as *artifact-making*.

The handicapped replicator

The *cell-as-a-city* metaphor suggests that proteins and genes are artificial molecules, and we have just seen that, deep down, that is precisely what they are. The metaphor also suggests that modern cells are to primitive cells what large cities are to small villages, and this is not an unreasonable analogy. Modern eukaryotic cells, for example, contain millions of ribosomes, like the inhabitants of large cities, while prokaryotic cells have only hundreds or thousands of ribosomes, like the inhabitants of villages.

The metaphor can also be extended to earlier stages of evolution. If the origin of the first cells is likened to the origin of the first villages, we can compare the age of precellular evolution to the period of history in which villages did not exist. The interesting point is that this metaphor allows us to take a closer look at today's most popular model on precellular evolution: the model of the naked gene as the first replicator (Dawkins 1976).

Dawkins has readily admitted that genes are not doing any replication, but since they code for the molecules that replicate them, he finds it legitimate to call them "replicators" in order to avoid long periphrases. Michael Ghiselin (1997) has pointed out that this is confusing the "object" with the "agent" of replication, but Dawkins' use of the word has stuck, and today most biologists seem to be taking for granted that genes are replicators. This is why I have avoided that word altogether and I have used the term *copymakers*. The distinction between copymakers and copies is still alive and well, and so there is no danger of confusing what is copied with what does the copying. Whatever one's choice of words, however, the real point is the substance, not the terminology.

The substance of the replicator model is that *all that matters in life is information, and all that matters in evolution is the replication of information with occasional mistakes.* But at the heart of life there are two fundamental entities, not one. Information and meaning are two independent entities, copying and coding are two independent processes, and the codemaker between genes and proteins must be a third party because otherwise there would be no real code. The replicator model is not wrong, but incomplete (or handicapped), because what matters in life is *replication and coding*, not replication alone (I prefer to speak of *copying and coding*, but the message is the same). The replicator model would be right if the cell were a von Neumann

automaton where the hardware is completely described by the software, and information is really everything, but nature has not taken that path. And probably for very good reasons, because that path was seriously undermined by the error catastrophes.

One could still argue, however, that a "naked gene" phase should have preceded a phase of "copying-and-coding", and this is where the cell-as-a-city metaphor can help us. The metaphor suggests that before cities there were villages, that before villages there were humans living in the open, that before humans there were ancestral hominids, and so on. The point is that in all stages there were "agents" not just "objects". There has never been a time in precellular evolution in which copied molecules (genes) could exist without copymakers, or coded molecules (proteins) without codemakers. It was copymakers and codemakers which came first, because they were the first "agents" in the history of life. The first molecules of the ribotype world were produced by random processes and the chances of getting copymakers or codemakers (for example, RNA-replicases or transfer-RNAs) were not substantially different. Any one could have appeared before the other, without making much difference. What did make a difference was the appearance of both of them because only their combination created a renewable link between genes and proteins. It was a ribotypic system containing copymakers and codemakers that started life, because that was the simplest possible *lifemaker*, i.e., the simplest *agent*. Admittedly, a naked gene would have been a simpler system but it would not have been an *agent*, and that makes all the difference. As Einstein once remarked, *"things should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler"*.

Conclusion

There are experimental facts (the adaptors) and theoretical concepts (the ribotype) which show that organic codes have the two qualifying features of all real codes (arbitrariness and codemakers). But adaptors and ribotype are still largely ignored, and so it is not surprising that most biologists continue to believe — in perfect good faith — that organic codes do not really exist out there. Which is rather reassuring, in a way, because it shows that even in this age of high technology what we see in nature is what our theories allow us to see.

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Органические коды: метафоры или реальность?

Характеристики кодирования найдены не только у синтеза белка, но и в ряде других процессов живой природы. Это доказывает, что генетический код не является чем-то исключительным для органического мира. В качестве примеров можно привести коды последовательностей, адгезивный код, коды трансдукции сигнала, сплайсинг-коды, сахарный код, гистонный код, и еще ряд других. Эти открытия все же не имеют пока заметного влияния из-за широко распространенной предпосылки о метафорическом характере этих кодов, об отсутствии у них арбитрарности и образователей кода. Последние считаются необходимыми характеристиками реальных кодов. В настоящей работе показано, что свойство арбитрарности можно доказать экспериментально, а проблема образователей кода зависит от нашего теоретического представления о клетке и решается, следовательно, с помощью нового понятийного аппарата. Итак, для признания органических кодов требуется не только более критическая оценка экспериментального материала, но и новая теория живой системы.

Orgaanilised koodid: metafoorid või tõelused?

Kodeerimise tunnuseid pole leitud ainult valgusünteesis, vaid ka mitmetes teistes eluslooduse protsessides. See tõendab, et geneetiline kood pole erandlik juhtum orgaanilises maailmas. Teisteks näideteks on järjestuskoodid, adhesiooni kood, signaali transduktsiooni kood, splaissingu koodid, suhkrute kood, histoonide kood ja ilmselt veelgi. Neil avastustel pole siiski olnud märkimisväärset mõju laialt levinud uskumuse tõttu, et orgaanilised koodid pole mitte tõelised, vaid on pigem metafoorsed. Arvatakse, et neil puuduvad arbitraarsus ja koodi moodustajad — kaks reaalsete koodide tunnust. Käesolevas töös näidatakse, et arbitraarsuse küsimuse saab lahendada eksperimentaalsel alusel, samas kui koodi moodustaja küsimus sõltub raku teoreetilisest kirjeldusest ning on lahendatav vaid uue mõisteaparaadi kaasabil. Niisiis, orgaaniliste koodide tunnustamiseks on vaja mitte ainult eksperimentaalse andmestiku kriitilisemat hindamist, vaid ka elussüsteemi uut teooriat.

Biorhetorics:
An introduction to applied rhetoric

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Abstract. This paper is an introduction to the new field of biorhetorics. Biorhetorics is an applied form of rhetoric that evolved from the study of classical rhetoric, particularly Aristotelian. The author illustrates the stages of development necessary for the creation of a species-specific rhetoric: by (1) formalising rhetoric so as to create a functional rhetoric, (2) then reducing this to a symbolic rhetoric that can be used in conjunction with the collected data of an organism's Umwelt (including its genome) to form (3) a species-specific rhetoric. The paper draws upon the latest research on bacterial and viral communication to show the possibilities of biorhetorics. In the course of discussing the nature of biorhetorics the author distinguishes it from argumentation theory and rhetoric/s of biology, and positions alongside other fields used in the life sciences such as biosemiotics, information theory, game theory, etc.

In 2001, Kalevi Kull published a short article on the new discipline of biorhetorics (Kull 2001). Here, I would like to avail myself of an opportunity to respond and set out something about my own theory of the discipline.

1. Biorhetorics and rhetoric/s of biology

Biorhetorics is an applied form of rhetoric for actual usage in the life sciences, while rhetoric/s of biology is in the main a study of rhetoric that is both analytical and deconstructive in nature. Rhetoric/s of biology is political and concerned with the practices of scientists; the inequalities made evident in their usage of rhetoric. In the develop-

ment of my own conception of biorhetorics I have sought to create a rhetoric that can be applied to universal communication situations involving all forms of life. There have been several stages to this development, firstly creating a functional rhetoric from classical rhetoric, secondly moving onto a symbolic rhetoric, then thirdly creating a species specific rhetoric based on the Umwelt of the organism or audience in question. In my primary case study I have used a virus (the bacteriophage *M13*) and its host (the *Escherichia coli* F-pilus) since they represent a real challenge as their rhetorical competency and cognitive levels are extremely low and obviously controversial. However once the reader realises that biorhetorics can be used with such lower forms of life, they will then see the potential for all life forms regardless of their state of evolution.

2. Classical rhetoric

Rhetoric belongs to a classical triumverate of Aristotelian argumentation, namely, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical. Of these three rhetorical argumentation differs from the others because its objective, status of premises, deduction are all rooted firmly in the cogent and the audience is integral to its usage (see Eemeren *et al.* 1987: 59). Rhetoric can be defined as the art/techne of persuasive eloquent speech/writing. In traditional rhetoric one requires the rhetor or orator to be an articulate human capable of penmanship. I have argued below that competency runs along an experiential and evolutionary axis.

2.1. The branches of oratory

There are three traditional branches, these being: *genus iudicale* (forensic), *genus deliberativum* (legislative/political), *genus demonstativum* or epideictic (demonstrative). Each of these branches according to Aristotle is associated with a particular time (past, present, future), has a particular purpose with a binary structure: to *accuse/defend*, to *exhort/defend* and to *praise/blame*. Each of the branches has particular topics or *topoi* drawn from the canon of invention. Of the three branches, the demonstrative or epideictic is capable of being pared down into a general functional rhetoric as the other two are more rooted in human society.

2.2. Five canons of rhetoric

Rhetoric is traditionally subdivided into the five canons, of invention (*inventio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memory (*amamnesis*), and delivery (*actio*). Invention is the preparation for the speech and involves seeking suitable *topoi* or topics drawn from a classical database of topics of invention (i.e., definition, relationship, etc.). Arrangement is the order or structure of the speech, classically an *exordium* or introduction using *ethos* to appeal to the audience, a *partitio* or division which is an outline of the speech, a *confirmatio* or proof based upon *logos* or logical reasoning, *refutatio* or refutation, then finally a *peroratio* that uses the persuasive appeal of *pathos*. Style determines the nature of the narrative and is inextricably linked to the nature and composition of the audience. There are levels of style, high, middle and low, and vices and virtues to the use of style. The choice of level is important, for example use of a high style might offend one kind of audience. Memory is important in rhetoric because it aids the composition, the memory of a figure or a classical line used in a previous *kairos* "context" could make all the difference in a speech. The speech is articulated and delivered to an audience, a poor performance can ruin a good speech, and subsequently many rhetoricians have devoted energy to creating manuals of how to deliver a speech. The Victorians had many popular books that detailed the kind of voice and body language used in making a good speech.[1]

2.3. Proofs and argumentation

In the development of an argument, the rhetor or orator needs to provide evidence or proof to an audience that his argument is a good one. Unlike logic which requires strict adherence to a set of rules, rhetoric can deviate from true logical reasoning, as its teleology is a good rather than a truth. To persuade an audience to change their minds about a particular subject, the rhetor can draw upon a whole array of figures of reasoning and proofs, but one which for the purposes of biorhetorics is of greater interest, is the enthymeme, a figure that uses syllogistic reasoning with a suppressed premise to be

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[1] For this section I am indebted to Gideon O. Burton, *Silva Rhetoricae* (http://humanities.bye.edu/rhetoric), Brigham University (1996–2002).

supplied by an audience.[2] Biorhetorics is closer to demonstration than Perelman's (1982) conception of argumentation in the following: it uses calculation, mathematical symbols and syllogism albeit enthymetic, and has non-human or impersonal elements to it. But it does also emphasise and begin with the notion of audience agreement, has a sense of communality, and aims toward a good.

2.4. Macrostructural and microstructural figures

In introductions to rhetoric, critics often divide rhetoric either synoptically or into trees. One moves from the large structure to the microscopic. From the tree, to the branch, the twigs, and to the flowers (see Burton, footnote 1). According to Georges Molinié author of the *Dictionnaire de rhétorique* (1992), macrostructural figures would include larger narrative sequences such as an *allégorie* and *ironie*, while the microstructural would be figures to do with smaller narrative sequences, such as *hypozeuxe*, *metonymie*, etc. In the development of a functional and symbolic rhetoric it would be important to insist upon a hierarchical structure, even if in some cases the figures are mavericks that cross over.

2.5. *Kairos*, decorum and audience

The kairos is the context of the speech or the situation; it is important for deciding the type of speech required. If, for example, it is a speech after the September the 11th 2001 in front of New York firefighters it would require some mention of their colleagues deaths by way of respect and to win sympathy for the speech. The apt manner and delivery of the speech, the decorum, changes according to the audience, so it might be possible to use humour of a more robust and chauvinistic form in front of the firemen than another audience, indeed Presidents often make use of homosocial bonding to get their policies across to predominantly male groups, such as the armed forces and emergency services. *Kairos* can be as in biosemiotics equated with the *Umwelt* of a species (Uexküll 1973).

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[2] See comprehensive bibliography in Poster, Carol 2002. The enthymeme: An interdisciplinary bibliography of critical studies. *The Journal for the Study of Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament* (http: //rhetjournal.uor.edu/Enth.html).

3. Functional rhetoric: Preamble

Given the enormity and scope of classical rhetoric the project of reducing it to a functional rhetoric seems daunting, nevertheless I feel it is necessary as I believe rhetoric like its sisters, logic, and dialectic has great potential, even more so in the age of computer communication.

Rhetoric is vulgarly seen as a superior form of sophistry, a prejudice that dates back to Plato and the death of Socrates, or as a pedagogical tool useful in the composition of dreaded essays or at the writing up stage of a thesis, rarely is it seen as something that might be useful in science proper. Over the years variants of logic have prospered and some are used in animal behaviour studies, an area in which biorhetorics will be of great use, such as semiotics, pragmatics, cybernetics, information theory, game theory, cost-benefit analysis and so on. What however is not so obvious is that in the course of the development of these variants of logic, rhetoric played a significant part. Charles Peirce was greatly interested in rhetoric and his conception of semiotics owes a lot to his studies of rhetoric. Indeed, in the entire history of modern logic one realises that logicians nudged closer and closer to the territory of rhetoric. This is not surprising because Aristotle, the father of natural sciences and logic, insisted upon an intimacy between logic and rhetoric and wanted rhetoric to have the same rigor. His book on rhetoric represented a "platonic" counterattack against the school of Isocrates which was more popular than the academy and had strongly featured rhetoric in its curriculum. Aristotle gave rhetoric a firm logical underpinning, and though often he contradicts himself or is unnecessarily repetitive, the basis of a functional rhetoric can be discovered in his writings.

3.1. Functional rhetoric: Definitions

In the development of a functional rhetoric, those in the humanities, especially those in the departments of classical rhetoric and speech composition will question how is it possible to have a non-human rhetor/audience? Surely rhetoric the art/techne of speech requires that the rhetor to be a penholding, articulate mammal, and that the audience be competent to read or listen to the speech and respond in an intelligent manner. An objection voiced by friend of mine was that how can one argue with a dog? Wave a bone and say sit down? The

divide between instinctive and non-instinctive behaviour and between verbal and non-verbal communication is too great. This however is a misunderstanding of what biorhetorics is about, I do not intend for scientists to read out Winston Churchill's speeches to Wister Lab rats. But this notion of competency and definition of what an audience is, can be a productive springboard.

3.2. The audience is life

Contemporary definitions of life have moved the goal posts, so much that one could almost bring in crystals as a life form. As definitions of life are contingent upon the science or prevailing episteme of the day, it would seem far better to see life on an evolutionary continuum or axis. The divide between non-life and the divide between instinctive and non-instinctive behaviour should also seen on an evolutionary and experiential axis.

3.3. Rhetorical competency

Let us consider by way of a case study a simple life form a helical caspid like a filamentous phage the bacteriophage *M13* that uses host cell machinery for replication, in this case the bacteria *Escherichia coli* F-pilus. How could we use rhetoric in this case, and how on earth could one talk of rhetorical competency? The agent in the rhetorical act uses language to move an audience. The success of the argument used is dependent upon a shared linguistic and cognitive knowledge base. Perelman (1982) with an eye to legal persons, requires the audience to be reasonable and competent people. The efficiency of the argument increases and decreases according to whether it is understood, or indeed received. It would be rather Monty Pythonesque to sit in front of a microscope slide with a few thousand *M13* as an audience and expect something to happen. But on the other hand if that audience were higher up along the evolutionary axis, one might in a moment of anthropomorphism be persuaded that it is possible to communicate and argue effectively with a group of dogs or chimpanzees: on an emotional rather than a neological level people believe that they do communicate and sometimes argue with animals. At what point can we say that an audience is competent, and what are the tests? We could as has been done already — see analogous rhetorical

systems in animal communication and discuss competency in terms of those systems — but this would be different from what I had in mind. What we can do is create something akin to B. F. Skinner's room, Jakob von Uexküll's room, and in this room we could put different combinations of rhetors and audiences of higher, middle, and lower cognitive levels. If we use simple set theory we will then realise that there are fields of competency and comprehensibility that are determined by the cognitive base of each party, and that different percentages of the argument are understood. For example if the rhetor and audience are from the same class background, use the same language, are of the same gender, then it will be easier to move that audience from their current position or course of action to a desired one. If on the other hand the audience is Italian and the rhetor is English there might be problems, only part of the verbal argument could be understood, and a fair percentage of the nonverbal. Still more difficult would be an aboriginal audience as their cultural templates and values are different, but even here, we can say that there are cardinal emotions that can be read by all members of humanity (Darwin 1872) and even here we can talk of a degree of rhetorical competency. We can then move across the species barrier to animals that are instinct driven, and still we can see that at the stage of delivery, the tone of the voice and the nonverbal language can be followed by domestic animals such as cats and dogs. Without being ridiculous we could descend down this line all the way to the simplest form of life like the bacteriophage I mentioned above. Each life form can be said to have a degree of competency, one which would clearly not satisfy the traditionalist or those hell-bent on language game rules: Austin would talk of infelicities. Nor would the cognitive and neuroscientists be pleased at the notion of according lower life forms the cognitive skills to be able to follow a rhetorical argument.[3] But as with the question of cognition, rhetorical competency can be said to be dependent upon the level of the rhetor and audience. It is perfectly acceptable to talk of a continuum of rhetorical competency, just as we talk of an axis of language evolution, or as Konrad Lorenz does the phylogenetic ascent of human rituals such as peace pipe smoking from established habits and rituals in instinctual behaviour (Lorenz 1970: 67, 73, 74).

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[3] I would like to have elaborated on the problem of Chomsky's language organ or faculty and the nature of the competent rhetor/audience.

4. Towards a species-specific rhetoric

If we wanted to address the problem of rhetorical competency we could say the problem lay not in the audience, but in the rhetor, it is up to the rhetor to understand the *kairos* and decorum connected with his/her particular audience. If that audience is a bacteriophage, then he must understand that organism's mode or system of communication. How does a bacteriophage communicate and understand its environment? How does it move to the *E. coli*, and is there any communication between them? Both organisms are on a low level cognitive plane, but both within their biological parameters are capable of quite sophisticated modes of inter/intra species communication. They are aware of their immediate environment, their individual state, able to recognise their immediate neighbours and cooperate and coordinate, show altruistic behaviour, locate predators/prey and hosts and communicate with them (Primio *et al.* 2000). The bacteriophage through molecular recognition seeks out its host for attachment at the F-pilus end. The genes responsible for this and the complex of proteins involved have been identified (*g3p* and *g6p*), since the bacteriophage has played an important role in genetics and in technologies associated with it. The *M13* has ten essential genes (Cann 2001). There has been a great deal of work done on the communication systems of the *E. coli* too. It has a flagella with a motor and this is linked to the stresses of stimulation in its environment. Cellular proteins responsible for transduction of chemical signals and coordinate the flagella movement into a tumbling and nontumbling mode have been identified as *CheA*, *CheW*, *CheY*, *CheZ*, *CheR*, and *CheB*. Once excited by a chemical attractant the bacteria will respond to the gradient levels of the chemicals. If it is a rich area then it will move less and go into a pre-stimulant mode. The chemotaxis is quite a sophisticated system involving three control levels, lateral, motor and metabolic (Grebe, Stock 1998). Suppose we wish to see how the bacteriophage and its host might respond to different situations we could simulate the results using a programme based on biorhetorics. Below I have pared down classical rhetoric to its bare essentials.

4.1. Rhetoric

Rhetoric can be defined as the art/techne of persuasive eloquent speech/writing.

4.2. Rhetorical situation (*Kairos*)

I have reduced the kairotic situations of legal, political, and ceremonial to the following. Usually before the composition of a speech there is an apriori situation that can be reduced to the following: audience (A) is at position (Y). The position (Y) can also be a course of action, i.e., (A) is doing (Y). Biorhetorics operates in a similar manner to argumentation theory the movement is from agreed premises to a conclusion.

4.3. Rhetor

The rhetor or orator is the rhetorical agent. He/she/it uses rhetoric to persuade (A) to move from position (Y). The "move" corresponds to that used in dialectical argumenation and in argumentation theory.

4.4. Audience

The audience is the listener or receiver of the speech. This could be the audience as an individual, as a group, or as a set of groups. There is an indirect audience (I) who might also be involved in the rhetorical situation. For example (A) is hitting (Y) a dog (I).

4.5. Argument

From the above we can create a simple diagram.

$$(R)\text{---->}(A)\text{====>}(Y) \text{ or } (Z)$$

The rhetor argues with the audience trying to persuade them to stop hitting the dog. We can see that in geometrical terms the force of the argument (X) will be the equal to the force required to move the audience from position or course of action (Y) to the desirable position (Z). It follows that the argument can be measured in the success of a probable outcome. Since the argument proper is measurable in these terms, it also follows that topics and the macro/microstructural elements of rhetoric such as figures and tropes can evaluated similarly.

4.6. Ethical teleology

Aristotle instituted a good as the teleology of the argument.

(R)---->(A)====> (Y) or (Z) if (Z) then A equal or greater than A
(benefit)

4.7. Explanation of the terms

R----> A ====>from Y to Z

R is the rhetor
A is the audience (organism in this case)
Y is the current action or position
Z is the desired or preferable action or position
X is the force (move) of the argument and the distance between Y and Z

The force of the ethymetic argument runs along an axis that is equal to the distance between Y and Z, in other words we can create an equilateral triangle with one of the sides being X. It also follows that the components of the argument created by the rhetor must be evaluated according to the successful outcome, divisible by X. So if for example that in the argument we used a simile, "white as snow", that particular simile would be weighted according to a probable success and in terms of actual success. If we were to use this with classical rhetoric we would evaluate the various hierarchies and perhaps use matrices drawn from informatics to display the values of each hierarchy. A particular branch of oratory would have more success than another, and it would be possible given the situation "*kairos*" to weigh each branch, and indeed sub-division, going down to the microstructural such as the above simile. Given that the "language" or systems of communication of the *M13* are different from human and classical rhetoric it is necessary to convert these hierarchies and their components into symbolic relations. In the case of the bacteriophage the language or communication system is chemical. The *M13* recognises itself, other bacteriophages, potential host *E. coli* through molecular recognition and reception. One could then identify the chemicals in question and use them as a simple *topoi* or database to draw upon. The environment and the genomes of the

two species involved provide the *kairos* and decorum. At its simplest the simile is to do with the following relation:

A has the same degree of something as *B*.
White is an attribute of snow. It is not snow.
(*W*/*A*)*S*. White is an attribute of *A* to the power of *S*.

If we say that her face was white as snow, then (white/face) snow would be the order of relations. If we could measure the whiteness of snow according to a spectrometer or colour calibration system, we could gain, e.g., (white/face) 32888. The *M13* and the *E. coli* would not relate to whiteness but perhaps the degree or concentration of the pheromone produced by the other organism and to ones that are either opposite or similar in composition. We could translate a simple functional biorhetorical argument into their "system" of communication so as to meet the criteria of rhetoric that the speech be between two parties of equal or shared cognitive abilities.

4.8. Audience dynamics and boids

As in the case of Chaim Perelman's seminal work on new rhetoric (Perelman 1982; 1984), the audience is central to the theory of biorhetorics, and especially its dynamics when we think of animal communication studies and the distribution and decoding of signals and their systems. Audience dynamics is especially important in biorhetorics as there can be a great divergence in the responses ranging from an individual member of a species, responses of a family, a clan, a large group, and millions. If we watch the performance of an orator we will note that he/she picks up on the subtle changes in the audience's mood, and will target one member who is more susceptible or more powerful in the audience. If it is in front of a king, the mood of the king will have a profound effect on his subjects: if he laughs he will cause others to do so. The dynamics of large audiences requires the technology used in flocking so as to anticipate a possible response in an audience. The boid technology used in the cinema industry but based on zoological experiments could be part of the programme. While it is somewhat easier to identify the movement and responses of mammals and other higher order organisms, it would be difficult to see how this can be done with minute organisms like the *M13*. Yet even here we can say the position and awareness of an individual *M13* or cluster of *M13*s in one position will differ from those further away.

Distance is an important factor in the dynamics of microorganisms which require molecular reception to detect each other and their hosts. Moreover, the composition of an individual *M13* can differ in age etc as well. Given essential information regarding the *M13* and its host we could then run a programme that could simulate responses in many different situations and with different audience numbers.

4.9. Probability and enthymemetic reasoning
in functional rhetoric

In the development of a biorhetorical argument, one realises that as Plato and most rhetoricians knew, the argument is grounded in the probability. If I am delivering a speech to an audience of three hundred and one journalists about the need for greater control over recycling and follow up, where exactly do those plastic bottles go? I am not likely to be successful if I use technical language with them unless they are specialists, but at the same time I must take into account that among those three hundred and one journalists one or more is going to be a specialist. Each time I say something I get a feedback in terms of applause or sounds of approval, disapproval, or at the end by the nature of questions asked. This would be the initial feedback, but the actual success could be measured by if the press help change the minds of the government and public at large, since the media plays such a profound role in shaping policies. Speechmakers and those in government have spent millions refining their pr campaigns and speeches. Every detail is important; witness how Margaret Thatcher and Hilary Clinton groomed themselves, adopted different stances, and modified their body language and their voices. This can be done in a programme that works on probability modelling. Simulating the stimuli and responses in communication acts, and rhetorical acts. In animal communication several methods are employed that use Bayesian probability for an array of modalities (visual, auditory, chemical, and electric, measuring the pay-off and benefit of these modalities. I believe that biorhetorics can organise several approaches at once, structure the simulation so that it will provide researchers with better models of how an organism reacts to different sets of situations.

The use of enthymemetic reasoning is dialogical and dynamic, requiring the organism to supply the missing term, by doing so we can test the cognition and communication systems of the organism, as well

as measure the outcome of different interventions. Science by the way is not descriptive, but interventionist. The scientist who claims to be a dispassionate observer of phenomena forgets that the act of observation requires the marshalling and selection of facts.

5. Argumentation theory and biorhetorics

Biorhetorics like Toulmin's argumentation theory (Toulmin 1958) is unashamedly cross disciplinarian. But its model differs in many aspects from Toulmin's six-point model that is legalistic in nature, as is Chaim Perelman's 'new rhetoric'.

Toulmin	classical rhetoric/biorhetorics
data	same (*topoi*) (part of X)
claim	Z conclusion
warrant	proofs/figures of reasoning (part of X)
backing	*arête* or nobility of the speaker in biorhetorics the credentials of the speaker
rebuttal	enthymemetic reasoning takes into account of the audience biorhetorics includes a feedback loop the force of the argument is changed accordingly
qualifier	included in the counter response calibrated to take into account of success of the argument

The elements of both Toulmin's and Perelman's argumentation theories are the result of focusing on forensic oratory and seeped in quasi legal notions of self, tests of competency, agency, responsibility, and are expressly concerned with humans, who have minds, property and a sense of justice. One might claim the same for other life forms, and indeed one does uphold rights to self determination, life etc., for a whole variety of animals, but this is done within human terms, and the starting point is not at the level of the organism in question, which has a different instinctual concept of what this or that is. Moreover like those working in cognition studies, those in argumentation theory studies are operating from a privileged position even if they have reduced classical rhetoric to six points or so, they require the rhetor and audience to be reasonable, and to have a mind, which many life forms cannot be and do not have. A bacteriophage cannot even be

allowed through the back door of emotionalism because it simply does not have emotions and is so small that it cannot mimic human emotions or moods. Argumentation theory is an attempt at formalising rhetoric, yet wishes to distinguish itself from formal logic which it sees as being impersonal and rooted in strict mathematical rules, it has also sought a path away from Aristotle's teleology of a good, instead it nestles uncomfortably between rights derived from jurisprudence and general ethics. Biorhetorics seeks more rigour, using inferences and modes of calculation drawn from the life sciences, it uses science and mathematics, and the good/benefit aimed at is one, which is useful for the rhetor in changing the audience's position. The laws of rhetorical competency are based upon the knowledge of the audience in question, and do not discriminate in terms of whether it can pass this or that cognitive test or the "reasonable man" test of law.

6. Conclusion

In the writing up of this paper I have taken time to consider some of the philosophical ramifications of biorhetorics as a new methodology and approach. If we consider the simile above "white as snow" and the "German declarative sentence 'Der schnee is weiss'" (Quine 1986: 1) we can see that the simile has some correspondence to the nature of the truth predicate in Tarski's paradigm and its relation to "real snow",

> 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white (Quine 1986: 12).

The problem of truth and meaning has preoccupied philosophers and logicians for a long time, it was one that William Ockham dealt with in the Middle Ages. For our purposes the problem of truth is one that is connected to the drive to reduce and formulate. If we decide that we can do away with this proposition or that statement it makes it easier to apply logic in other fields, and of course greatly benefits computer operations. Whether truth is in the predicate, the parts or outside the speech marks seems to be one of those questions that philosophers of logic love, yet seems easily resolvable by the layman. "Snow is white" is language and snow is white is reality. But then we come to the problem of what is reality and is that reality predicated by language and so forth. Whatever the outcome of looking into the truth of such statements, it is clear that the relationship of a simile to the "real snow" is one of amplification, or extension, and greater than the rela-

tionship of a declarative statement to snow. The difference between logic and rhetoric can be characterised in spatial terms; rhetoric occupies greater conceptual and perceptual space than logic. From this we could conclude that logic in its general form is more manageable than rhetoric. If we apply William Ockham's razor, the outcome would be the same. However, if we consider the nature of science itself and mathematics, and look how problems are solved, we see that the discovery of the double helix and the solution to Fermat's Last theorem were done with the aid of mixed modelling, and if we visualised these solutions as streets, then the architecture would higgedly-piggedly and completely heterogeneous. The approach I have in mind is accommodating; it starts with the questioning element of a hypothesis, how, what if, etc. The question is the situation or kairos, which is used as the basis of argumentation modelling. Let us take malaria. First we can decide upon the audience. Is it to be Man, the Mosquito, or the Plasmodium? What is the problem? Define the *kairos*. Seek out the *UmWelt* and the environmental and epistemological boundaries of the species involved. If we decide upon the plasmodium then we can draw upon its genome, which has been completed, and our knowledge of its life cycle, modes of movement and communication through that life cycle. Here we can decide at what "age group or stage" we are interested. We can consider the indirect audience on a cellular level or below to include the gut of the mosquito and the humans involved. Using the basic biorhetorical argument we can then construct an argument at the level of classical rhetoric, one at a higher level comprehensible to ourselves, this is the working model of argumentation, from this we derive a functional architecture and translate using symbolic rhetoric the various data derived from the science of the day, and then create the species specific rhetoric. The argument can be formulated thus in a sophisticated manner, one, which could have a human audience in mind. This is like a draft or model. Then onto the functional which is strictly mathematical in nature and programmable. Each of the terms and components of the argument would be weighted according to the responses or results of the research. As stated above one could using data from the plasmodium and other species run a simulation of the probable outcomes and responses given this or that stimuli. Biorhetorics represents a comprehensive methodology that is firmly based on strict rational approaches, but allows for the variables within each organism's Umwelt whether they be human or bacteria.

Biorhetorics is a tripartite rhetoric derived from classical rhetoric, beginning with functional rhetoric and it moves onto symbolic rhetoric, and finally arrives at a species-specific rhetoric. It does not represent a closed door. It is a project. The above rather than a definitive introduction should be seen as an approach. As can be seen by the process of refining the terms, definitions and scope of biorhetorics, it is interdisciplinarian. The applications of biorhetorics are innumerable. One can see it used in conflict of interest situations, such as the encroachment of land, either by man, or say the polar bear. One can use it in situations where anthropomorphism is evident, as in bear ceremonialism or the daily exchanges between humans and domestic pets and in animal behaviour studies, especially communication. For the development of new AI models. In medicine in combating diseases. In genetics, if we move the goalposts to allow for proto-life structures, we can see the issues and problems at the molecular level. As I stated before, biorhetorics is not rhetoric/s of biology, it should stand on its own, and take its place alongside biosemiotics, bioinformatics and cybernetics.

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Биориторика: введение в прикладную риторику

Статья представляет собой введение к новой отрасли науки — биориторике. Биориторика является прикладной формой риторики, которая образовалась из классической риторики, прежде всего — аристотелевской. Автор иллюстрирует этапы развития, необходимые для возникновения риторики специфичекого вида: (1) формализация риторики с образованием функциональной риторики; затем (2) редуцирование этого к символической риторике, которую можно использовать вместе с данными, собранными об Umwelt (а также о геноме) организма, чтобы разработать (3) риторику специфического вида. В ходе дискуссии о природе биориторики автор отличает ее от теории аргументации и от риторики биологии, полагая, что биориторика должна стоять в одном ряду с такими отраслями науки как биосемиотика, теория информации, теория игр и др.

Bioretoorika: Sissejuhatus rakenduslikku retoorikasse

Artikkel on sissejuhatuseks uuele valdkonnale — bioretoorikale. Bioretoorika on rakenduslik vorm retoorikale, mis kujunes välja klassikalisest, eelkõige Aristotelese retoorikast. Illustreeritakse uurimistöö etappe, mis on vajalikud liigispetsiifilise retoorika loomiseks: (1) retoorika formaliseerimine, luues sellega funktsionaalse retoorika; (2) viimase redutseerimine sümboliliseks retoorikaks, mida saaks kasutada koos organismi omailma (ja samuti genoomi) kohta kogutud andmetega, et välja töötada (3) liigispetsiifiline retoorika. Artiklis tuuakse näiteid hiljutistest uuringutest bakterite ja viiruste kommunikatsiooni vallast, et demonstreerida bioretoorika võimalusi. Arutledes bioretoorika olemuse üle, eristab autor seda väiteteooriast ja bioloogia retoorikast, ning paigutab bioretoorika kõrvu selliste eluteaduse aladega nagu biosemiootika, informatsiooniteooria, mänguteooria, jt.

Copenhagen, Tartu, world:
Gatherings in biosemiotics 2002

What is studying life cannot be placeless. The international annual meetings in biosemiotics, as an initiative of the Tartu and Copenhagen biosemiotic groups, started with the first Gatherings held in May 24–27, 2001, in Copenhagen,[1] and followed by the second Gatherings in June 14–17, 2002, in Tartu. After a decade of numerous biosemiotic sessions under the cover of various bigger meetings either in semiotics or biology, this independent series of symposia intends to be a regular framework for discussions and scholarly exchange of ideas and views in semiotic biology.

The aim of the Gatherings in Biosemiotics is quite ambitious — to work for formation of the biology that would use as a basic approach the methods of semiotics. The importance of this project comes from the understanding that the inclusion of the problems of organic sign processes, including that of the origin of sign, as well as the analysis of meaningful communication in living systems into life science, will require a more general methodology than that of, e.g., biophysics. Thus it can be seen as a paradigm in theoretical biology. Even more — it is a developing of theoretical framework for both semiotics and biology.

The meeting of 2002 included three days of intensive talks and creative discussions in Tartu, a visit to Karl Ernst von Baer House, a session in Puhtu Biological Station (the place of work of Jakob von Uexküll in 1930s), brief walkings on an Estonian wooded meadow and on a raised bog, and the final session in Tallinn Zoo. There were about 40 participants from 15 countries (Kotov, Kull 2002).

The papers were presented by Jesper Hoffmeyer (why the genome is so small), Marcello Barbieri (organic codes[2]), Anton Markoš (adressee of the genetic text), Stefan Artmann (Jacobian biopragmatics), Frederik Stjernfelt (the core hypotheses of biosemiotics[3]), Kalevi Kull (biosemiosis and intentionality), Wolfgang Hofkirchner (*differentia specifica* of biosemiosis and a theory of evolutionary systems), Yagmur Denizhan (semiotics and metasystem transition theory), John Collier (information expression and cohesive levels), Claus Emmeche (biosemiotics and experiential biology),

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[1] A report on the First Gathering see Emmeche 2001. A collection of papers of the event has been published in *Sign Systems Studies* vol. 30(1), 2002.

[2] See his paper in the current issue.

[3] See his paper in *Sign Systems Studies* 30(1): 337–345.

Tom Ziemke (affordance vs. functional tone: a comparison of Gibson's and Uexküll's theories), Donald Favareau (collapsing the wave function of meaning: the contextualizing resources of talk-in-interaction), Toshiyuki Nakajima (construction of umwelt to control probabilities of events in living), Tommi Vehkavaara (an outline of basic semiotic concepts for bio- and robosemiotics and the emergence of umwelt), Andres Luure (the role of relations in semiotics), Sergey Chebanov (bilateral biosemiotics: a problem of sense on a super-triplet level), Elisabeth Johansson (biosemiotic perspectives in gasflux models), Edwina Taborsky (a pansemiotic architecture), Søren Brier (the third culture), Luis Bruni (the global phenotype), Alexander Sedov (part-whole interactions), Myrdene Anderson (neoteny and its role in taming and domestication), Mette Böll (evolution of empathy), Dominique Lestel (on the expression of negation among animals), Gottfried Suessenbacher (mythology and evolutionary psychology), Aleksei Turovski (semiometabolism of animal associations), Timo Maran (mimicry and mimesis in the biosemiosphere), Mark Vian (biotic integrity, ecosystemic archetypes, and the boundary of self), Morten Tønnessen (umwelt ethics), Tiberiu Mustata (the semiotic substance of homeopathy), Sune Frølund (teleology and the natural history of signification in Hans Jonas), Torsten Rüting (on Jakob von Uexküll archive), and others.

The final session in Tallinn Zoo included an excursion guided by an Estonian zoosemiotician Aleksei Turovski, who described the zoo as a field of reestablishing semiotic boundaries.

The additional information about the event, and information about the past and coming meetings in biosemiotics is available at the web site of the Gatherings in Biosemiotics.[4] The *Gatherings in Biosemiotics 3* will take place in Copenhagen, in July 11–14, 2003. The Fourth Gatherings will be held in Prague, 2004.

In 2002, there have taken place several other biosemiotic meetings too, in addition to the annual gatherings. Among these, let me mention just two.

In May 16–17, 2002, a meeting "Biosemiotik: Praktische Anwendung und Konsequenzen für die Einzeldisziplinen" took place in Jena, in Ernst-Haeckel-Hause, as organised by Joachim Schult and his colleagues. The papers were given by K. Kull, J. Schult, M. Schmitt, S. Bradler, J. Hoffmeyer, A. Fürlinger, S. Thiessen, M. Kunert, A. Roepstorff, and S. Artmann.

In June 29–30, 2002, a workshop "Zoosemiotics: from Clever Hans to Kanzi in memory of Tom Sebeok (1920–2001)" took place in San Marino, organised by the International Center for Semiotic and Cognitive Studies as headed by Patricia Violi. The contributors included U. Eco, S. Savage-Rumbaugh, S. Gozzano, F. Cimatti, and K. Kull).

The context of all these meetings, of course, is influenced by the recent publications. Thus, few words about biosemiotic publications in 2002.

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[4] At http:// www.zbi.ee/~uexkull/biosemiotics/.

First, a new edition of M. Barbieri's *Organic Codes* (1st, in Italian, 2000; 2nd, in English, 2001) has appeared (Barbieri 2003), and an English edition of A. Markoš' book on hermeneutics of living (Czech edition in 2000, by Vesmir, Prague) has been published (Markoš 2002). Neither of them carry the term 'biosemiotics' in title, however, both books are a remarkable contribution to semiotic biology. Also, D. Martinelli's dissertation (Martinelli 2002) has made an interesting attempt to find further internal connections between zoology and music, in a zoosemiotic context.

The collection of papers from the first Gatherings has been published in volume 30(1) of the journal *Sign Systems Studies*. In addition to these, among many others, it's worthwhile to mention D. Lestel's (2002) recent paper.

Also, a booklet by Emmeche *et al.* (2002) needs mentioning. Intended as a *Festschrift* for a Danish biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer, this book provides also a brief introduction to semiotic biology as approached by Tartu–Copenhagen group in the field. In the chapter *A biosemiotic building: 13 theses*, the authors formulate the biosemiotic approach in the form of 13 brief statements. The book includes a glossary of terms and the list of Hoffmeyer's publications.

2002 has been the first year without T. A. Sebeok. Among the thoughts influenced by him and outspoken in the Gatherings of Biosemiotics in 2002, has been this definition — biosemiotics is a biology of sympathy.

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