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SOLIDARITY-BASED VERSUS LIBERAL POLAND:
JAROSLAW KACZYNSKI'S DISCOURSE OF THIN-CENTERED
POPULISM IN THE LIGHT OF NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH'S CRITICAL
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

MA thesis

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors,
literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been
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1. Introduction

Politics is very commonly perceived as a struggle for advancing particular visions of society and economy over competing ones. In order for the ideas to be successfully promoted, politicians resort to strategies which are meant to formulate and disseminate their goals in the most compelling and attractive way which increases their chance to become resounding with the citizens and attract votes at the expense of other candidates. Once political agenda representing such goals is set up, politicians do not content themselves solely with verbalizing it, but seek for ways to instill their understanding of surrounding reality with all its socio-economic aspects upon possibly biggest number of people. In order to do so, they develop narratives which are meant to exploit already existing shortcomings of the state in providing environment fostering well-being of the public and create sense of unfair treatment of the disadvantaged coupled with abuse of power or negligence in providing social services. Such narratives may also shape imaginary visions of magnified or non-existing problems which would help politicians to win public support and discredit their opponents. These measures, to various extent, are generally attributed to populism which, though considered to be a highly contested concept, is often classified by scholars as a form ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 2-4). Currently, the interest in explaining populism shown by the academic community is associated with the rise of both right and left-wing political parties and their charismatic leaders which operate both in consolidated democracies and post-communist countries alike.

As the matter of fact, Poland has proven to be not entirely immune to populism following the collapse of communist regime in 1989. Throughout its recent history, there were several political parties which were frequently labelled as populist, with right-wing League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*) and Self-Defense party (*Samobrona*) considered the most prominent. However, populism is not limited solely to political ideology, as it is often referred to as a form of rhetoric used by politicians in order to garner popular support. Therefore, populism can be analyzed also as a strategy of generating statements about reality in order to promote certain social attitudes and political program.

Not only does politics require mastering the use of language and transforming it into a sort of art of communicating and persuading, such as rhetoric, but also mobilizes political actors to construct complex forms of language organization which facilitate political identification with their utterers on one hand, and help to garner support on the other. Such undertakings take form of political discourses which, due to their multidisciplinary character, cannot be boiled down to a single conceptualization. In this thesis, discourse, as a part of politics, is studied primarily from the standpoint of political science, without neglecting its linguistic properties as crucial to its manifestation.

As there are multiple definitions of political discourse, the term itself might be used by many scholars in variety of ways. First, discourse, as understood by French philosopher Michel Foucault whose works on the role of discourse in politics constitute a valuable contribution in the field of political philosophy, pertains to historically contingent production of meaning and knowledge which translate into social practice (Foucault, 1972, pp. 135-138). Foucault's concept of discourse is centered around discussion of power and truth as modes of conducting discursive actions and influencing perception of what is true or false, right or wrong etc. Thus, Foucauldian take on political discourse concerns relations of power in politics and ability to construct visions of reality as effective in society rather than uncovering objective truth.

Foucault's interest in the role of discourse in shaping political reality translated into growing popularity of political discourse analysis as a sub-field of political science. From amongst variety of disciplinary approaches differing both in ontological and epistemological properties, one stands out as a combination of study of linguistic properties of speech and its influence on social practice in political realm. This approach is known under the name of Critical Discourse Analysis and draws heavily on Foucault's ideas, but offers a more rigid methodology of study of discourse in both theoretical and practical dimensions. For the purpose of this thesis I have selected Norman Fairclough's theory of CDA as the most appropriate methodological framework for study of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's speeches for the reasons presented below.

First of all, as Henderson points out (Henderson, 2005, pp. 2-5), interdisciplinarity of CDA constitutes its primary asset. Faircloughian approach attaches importance to the use of language often neglected by various studies of power in politics, and offers a

combined analysis of linguistic properties of text and role of ideology in shaping power relations and social practice. Moreover, it presents a multi-faceted model of study for political scientists, linking objectively occurring events and social phenomena with attempts to discover presuppositions which underlie linguistic conventions of social behavior and allow for sustainment or change in power relations. Thus, CDA demonstrates that social phenomena are filtered through language on one hand, by assigning particular meaning to explain, justify or reject them, and linguistic phenomena are partly social phenomena, evincing certain patterns in the selection of wording or rhetorical devices. In other words, Fairclough's model facilitates tracking of linguistic properties of speech not only on intertextual level or frequency of use, but also by looking at how they reverberate within society through social mobilization or reflection of textually-presented social relations in real life. In the case of Kaczynski texts, this will apply especially to the concept of *raison d'état* advocated for in his texts, and social recognition of discursively constructed cleavages based on populist binary opposition, further explicated in the following chapters.

Secondly, CDA provides a comprehensive, three-dimensional model of analysis which can be easily operationalized. On the first level, the analysis of texts enables to discern their linguistic properties and offers insight into structure of texts and their coherence. This, in turn, allows for interpretation of texts, i.e. uncovering of what is expressed directly, what is implied indirectly or remains elliptical. Interpretation helps to define elements of discourse as it demonstrates ways of representing reality and visions of social relations. Finally, on the level of explanation, CDA links social structures (e.g. type of political regime or institutional setting) with social practice. As Henderson points out (Henderson, 2005, p. 6), by incorporating a conceptualization of social practices developed by Harvey (1996) as comprising discourse, social relations, material practices, rituals, routines as well as values, beliefs and desires, Fairclough establishes a dialectical relationship between social events and social structures where both are communicated through social practice. In the case of Kaczynski speeches, relationship between social structures (democracy, EU membership) and social events (advocacy for actions related to or stemming from author's concept of truth as well as advocacy for rebirth of moral values of the state) communicated through discourse becomes a subject of textual analysis, interpretation of meaning, and explanation of their salience for or impact on both

social relations (social cleavage around desirable model of state) and social structures (enactment of legislation).

Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis involves study of power relations in politics and uncovers political role of ideology and values in shaping popular conventions. In line with Foucault's thesis on the productive capabilities of discourse, CDA explores how powerful political actors construct conventions of social interaction and impose standards on language and behavior according to their ideological posture. As this thesis incorporates the concept of thin-centered populism developed by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), Kaczynski's discourse is analyzed by tracking its ideological-populist features and defining its constitutive elements in order to determine whether they make up distinct order(s) of discourse. Minimalistic approach towards populism helps to avoid pitfalls of conceptual stretching, and enables to focus on the role of binary opposition between the people and the elite as essential to contemporary manifestations of populism (Mudde, 2004, pp. 560-561), including Law and Justice and Kaczynski's populism, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

Finally, another strength of applying CDA to investigate Kaczynski's speeches consists in the adoption of speech act theory, proposed by Austin (1962). The author grouped utterances into three separate categories of locution, illocution and perlocution on the basis of their linguistic properties and purpose. Additionally, Austin developed a more detailed classification of illocutionary acts which Fairclough's CDA complements with three values of discourse (experiential, relational and expressive), thus placing them in the context of discourse analysis of their impact on social interaction. Hence, conceptualization of speech acts is operationalized through Critical Discourse Analysis as it explicates how semantic properties of texts add up to the creation of conventions of meaning which can be interpreted and explained (second and third level of CDA) in relation to their social implications.

1.1. Selection of cases

For the purpose of this thesis, I have selected following speeches by Jaroslaw Kaczynski:

- Electoral victory speech delivered on 25th of October 2015,

- Speech delivered on 10th April 2016 at the rally commemorating 6th anniversary of the Smolensk airplane crash,
- National Flag Day speech delivered in the Sejm on 2nd May 2016,
- Independence Day speech delivered on 11th November 2016,
- Speech delivered on 1st July 2017 at the 5th Party Congress

The author of these speeches is considered one of the most charismatic and influential figures in the history of the post-1989 Poland (Cienski, 2016). He has been elected a member of parliament for 7 out of 8 tenures of the Sejm and served as Prime Minister of Poland in 2006-2007. He has been a chairman of Law and Justice party since 2003, having a large impact on its political orientation and performance as prescribed by the party charter. Currently, Kaczynski is considered to be a mastermind behind political success of PiS in 2015, though he did not assume any public office and remains an *eminence grise* of contemporary Polish politics (Cienski, 2015).

I have established several criteria for the selection of speeches for analysis. First, as Law and Justice party was able to secure an overall majority of seats in the Sejm in 2015 and exercise power unprecedented in the history of post-1989 Poland, all speeches evoked in this paper were delivered within timespan of 2 years (2015 – 2017). This facilitates gaining an insight into how anti-establishment discourse of thin-centered populism promoted by PiS after it came to power was put to work by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, notwithstanding the fact that he had been a prominent figure associated with political elite in Poland since the beginning of democratic transition. Furthermore, selected texts analyzed in the following chapters share a set of concepts which traverse all of them, and make them crucial elements of Kaczynski's discourse even though they differ in terms of circumstances in which they were delivered. Finally, selection of cases was possible thanks to their availability online in full rather than in extracts or quotes. I have excluded parliamentary debates from the analysis as they present a different, less continuous form of political expression due to strict time limitations on one hand, while often involving reiteration of statements made during party conferences and public speeches on the other. Three of selected speeches were delivered during organized events (electoral convention, party congress, parliamentary celebrations on the occasion of National Flag Day) or more

spontaneous ones such as the rally for commemoration of Smolensk airplane crash and the Independence Day anniversary. The character of these speeches depended also on the context – the electoral victory speech features a laudatory form, praising common effort of the party members, Smolensk catastrophe speech is commemorative and moralistic in character, party Congress speech includes motivational accents while the two speeches delivered on national holidays are more celebratory – moralistic.

All speeches were transcribed in Polish from video recordings. Extracts selected for the analysis have been translated into English.

1.2. Research objective and questions

The main research questions which I am going to discuss can be formulated as follows:

- What are the properties of Kaczynski's discourse in light of Fairclough's CDA?
- How is the ideational (conceptually thin-centered) and discursive (understood as a rhetorical measure) populism reflected in selected speeches and what assumed beliefs and conventions does it generate?
- How is Kaczynski's discourse institutionalized?

Drawing on the analysis of textual properties of Kaczynski's speeches, I am going to investigate how core elements of Kaczynski's discourse correspond to the concept of thin-centered populism, and how they translate into promoted conventions and beliefs about society and political elites. This will allow me to demonstrate empirical implications for Polish politics, especially with regard to the legislation adopted by PiS-dominated parliament.

1.3. Thesis organization

This Master's thesis is divided into four chapters. In chapter 1, I shall present various understandings of political discourse, its properties and component parts, and discuss its salience for political science. In separate subsections, I am going to explain what bearing contextual use of language has on political phenomena and (re)presentation of reality as well as what role the concepts of truth, power and ideology perform in discourse. Next, I shall focus specifically on providing characteristics of Critical

Discourse Analysis as the main concept underlying my study, its background, premises and conceptual framework. Alongside its methodology, I am going to discuss what philosophical and scientific approaches to study of politics and discourse are brought together in Fairclough's theory, and how such conflation of concepts is put to work.

In chapter 2, I shall proceed to discuss problematic conceptual issues related to populism and advocate for a thin-centered definition of populism as avoiding pitfalls of concept stretching and operationalization difficulties. Furthermore, I am going to highlight differences between ideational and discursive notion of populism and demonstrate how these can overlap.

Third chapter provides an outline of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's political record in post-1989 Poland and reasons for his status of prominent figure in domestic politics. In this part of my thesis, I shall make an attempt to identify Kaczynski's political rationale, describe axiological foundations of his discourse and his party's ideological orientation. Next, I am going to analyze how the populism represented by Kaczynski matches with the thin concept of populism developed by Mudde and Kaltwasser, and explain its contribution to the landslide electoral victory by PiS in 2015.

In chapter 4, I am going to focus on conducting textual analysis of Kaczynski's populist discourse by analyzing extracts of selected speeches, and providing interpretation thereof. The study is organized along principles and values identified in Kaczynski's texts; this allows to reflect on the core elements of his discourse and conclude what speech acts are used, what social conventions his discourse rests on/formulates as well as what orders of discourse, i.e. clusters of conventions underpinning social practice (in case of selected speeches, advocacy for action) can be detected.

Final chapter draws on previous textual analysis and interpretation of Kaczynski's speeches but focuses on possible impact these texts may have on social structures, as per Fairclough's understanding. Therefore, in this chapter I shall exemplify how Kaczynski's discourse permeates legislative action and manifests itself in various pieces of domestic legislation in Poland.

2. Chapter One – Methodological framework

In this chapter, I shall introduce theoretical framework of Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis and discuss conceptualizations of discourse and threefold construct of social life as consisting of social events, social practices, and social structures. My explanation of CDA shall be preceded by a short description of underlying understanding of political discourse and its elements as well as a brief cross-disciplinary overview of approaches towards language and language use as drivers behind social perception of the reality and social change. Furthermore, I am going to reflect on a three-dimensional model of operationalization of CDA, speech act theory, and argumentative-deliberative character of politics.

2.1. What is political discourse analysis?

It is of high importance to explain what the political discourse analysis actually is before I move to analyze the chosen texts. Although it is rather a wide concept with various understandings depending on the field of study or an emphasis a researcher wishes to put in order to highlight its particular features and properties, there are several points that should be listed as its pillars. In the case of political discourse analysis, as Theun van Dijk argues (van Dijk, 1997, p. 11), it is crucial to determine and explain the circumstances in which the adjective *political* can be applied – it is linked with issues which can be found on political agendas or characterize politics itself understood as a way of decision-making over issues pertaining to society. The first such notion is power in politics. In defining it, Fairclough draws on Foucauldian understanding of power in relation to knowledge production which is conveyed to the public through discourse (Fairclough, 1989, p. 213). Since politics does not exist in separation from society, power relations between political actors are covered by discourses and explained by discourse analyses. Moreover, various demonstrations of power such as dominance, abuse of power or struggle for power are the core element of both politics itself and political discourses which serve as a verbal externalization of power relations in the society. All of them can also be reproduced by discourses (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 11-12). According to Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 1989, p. 1), discourse analysis has two significant values – it underscores the role of language, as an often underestimated driver behind production,

preservation and change in the socio-political life, and makes people aware of its impact on the unequal social relations between individuals and within groups. Therefore, discourses cannot emerge without political actors who create and (re)shape them, and need to involve some group of addressees or recipients, as van Dijk puts it, in order to perform their communicative role (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 13-14). Furthermore, it is important to stress that political discourses are not ends in themselves and cannot be applied without taking into account the context of utterances. Thus, they are means that political actors resort to in order to achieve particular goals in a given political context (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 13-14). Although we can think of some groups as seemingly non-political or not involved directly in politics, they become politicized once they are placed on the public debate agenda. Political discourse, thus, includes two components - contextual use of language and social practice, i.e. manifestations of enforced discourses in social relations and domination of some representations of reality over competing ones.

Social interaction, as Fairclough argues (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 2-3), is founded upon certain common-sense assumptions which are implicit and often hard to discern. They can be, however, manifested in conventions which people use in their everyday communication. Fairclough defines such assumptions as ideologies. They are closely linked to power and reflect the characteristics of social behavior which is inscribed in the conventions used in social interactions, also in linguistic terms since language is the primary tool for conveying messages. Therefore, discourse analysis attempts to display ideological patterns in texts which have political consequences in the form of socially shaped and maintained conventions which contribute to the range of diverse social phenomena such as inequality, hierarchy, dominance, oppression etc. According to Chilton (Chilton, 2004, pp. 6-7), socialization becomes a mode facilitating the rise of groups and coalitions which attempt to pursue their interests by implementing communicative/discursive techniques in order to gain advantage over the others.

2.2. The role of language and language use in discourse

Political parties are one type of groups actively employing discursive instrumentation. As Paul Chilton points out (Chilton, 2004, pp. 18-19), language itself and the choice of wording becomes a crucial tool of communication for politicians, but its function extends far beyond managing the flow of information and encompasses also

the design of political agenda and delivery of ideologized message in spite of tacit downplaying of the role of language by politicians themselves. Furthermore, people are generally able to not only represent things and social phenomena but also meta-represent them, i.e. reproduce, interpret, identify valid information and evaluate its credibility by means of language. Chilton argues, following Hockett's claim, that language provides individuals with symbols which are detached from their referent. At this point, it is useful to invoke the model elaborated by a Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure which allows for a more comprehensive grasp of the idea of language as consisting of two parts – *langue* and *parole*. The author views the former as a system or structure universal for all members of a given community that provides them with instruments to express their thoughts verbally. *Parole*, on the other hand, is a language use which Saussure believes to be a linguistic variation of the way individuals apply *langue*. However, as Fairclough contends (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 20-22), the use of language does not depend entirely on the choice made by an individual and underscores the role of social interaction as the main factor determining communication. What is more, *langue* itself is hardly a unitary and invariable structure and the access to or use of standardized forms of language can encounter some social or geographical limitations. Therefore, if language use and the language itself are socially determined, any changes regarding its application are also contingent on the social change.

Another important part of the Saussurian model is the difference between what he calls *signifiant* and *signifie*, i.e. signifier and what is signified. The relationship between these two elements is arbitrary and the production of meaning stems from social conventions rather than from intrinsic nature of words. Signs are engaged in the interplay through which they can obtain meaning differing from other signs. They are incorporated into language structure and are made applicable through *parole*. In the light of Saussure's theory, social conditions are excluded and substituted by networks of signs which are shaped in relation to others. Their applicability can, however, be random or invalidated over time, that is why the notion of *langue* becomes a primary focus for linguistic studies (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 9-11)

Discourse analysis steps in to provide a feasible alternative to the limitations of Saussure's constructionist approach (exclusion of social conditions of language production) and its exclusion of social factors. In order to understand its historical

premises, it is crucial to invoke the works by Michel Foucault as the theoretical background for further analysis.

2.3. Truth as an element of discourse

First of all, Foucault makes several important remarks regarding the interplay between relations of power and knowledge which determines what is considered as truth. In an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino, he conceptualizes truth in terms of its society-derived procedures which have effects of power on politics. As he explains (Foucault, 1988, pp. 131-132), each society generates its own regime of truth which take a form of discourse types serving as benchmarks to distinguish true and false statements about reality. Politics is viewed by the author as a *battle around truth* rather than *battle for truth*; regime of truth can emerge when the true is separated from the false in discourse where the former is assigned with effects of power, i.e. marking its social and economic significance for state politics. Therefore, truth manifested in discourse is a system of statements which can be regulated and reproduced by the power holders on one hand, and enable to change or sustain power relations on the other. Thus, knowledge about what is true and false is seen not merely as a product of observation of objective reality but can also be shaped discursively in various representations of the world out there.

For Foucault, power as a concept cannot be limited solely to juridical mechanisms which circumscribe and delineate acceptable scopes of action (Foucault, 1988, p. 119) (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 12-13). He rejects such repressive quality of power and focuses on power understood as a capability to permeate social structures and produce knowledge which is communicated to the public through discourses. As Jorgensen & Phillips point out (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14), as truth is constructed discursively as a product of power, a search for the universal truth is rendered futile since the purpose of analysis of political discourses in Foucauldian terms is to identify their properties and explain how they are produced and diffused in the society, and not whether they accurately reflect surrounding reality. Therefore, as Foucault sees power as productive rather than repressive (Foucault, 1977, p. 194), it has a bearing on shaping people's desires and needs. Power-generated knowledge is inculcated in the society by structures of norms and rules which are constructed in order to promote desirable types of behaviors. However, as Daldal points out (Daldal, 2014, pp. 164-167) Foucault shies away from

seeing power relations as vertical, top-down imposition of power by the rulers over the ruled. Instead, he acknowledges production of information as occurring on various levels and not being derived and confined to any state ideology. For instance, Foucault sees data collection on the population carried out by the police as a necessary bottom-up contribution to the development of knowledge which can be used by the powerful in the *battle around truth* as explained earlier in this chapter. Moreover, Foucault remains skeptical about the role of ideology in power relations (Simons, 2015, p. 63) as he sees it only as representations of ideal world rather than materializing in rules governing people's behavior, though he does not reject it as irrelevant to production of knowledge. In general, however, his understanding differs slightly from Althusser's approach as presented below.

As another important contribution to the understanding of discourse thanks to its focus on the interplay of power and ideology, Louis Althusser's structuralist theory focuses on the ideological state apparatus and interpellation (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 15-16). According to his theory, individuals become subjects of ideology through interpellation, i.e. the use of language which attributes a social position to them. The ideology itself is defined as a system of representation which obfuscates real relations between members of society and constructs imaginary ones as a result of ideological domination. Interpellation is employed as an act of exercising hegemony, and places various degree of discourse production and distribution within various social groups depending on power relations and ability of agents to turn individuals into subjects of ideology.

Although Althusser's vision of the state power may resemble the concept of repressive power rejected by Foucault, the author draws distinction between repressive (police) and ideological state apparatuses (church, schools etc.) with the proviso that their practices can evince elements of both (Simons, 2015, pp. 64-65). Therefore, when Althusser discusses the role of ideology in the state apparatus, he claims that ideology can be materialized via social practices, and not only in normative legal acts. As a matter of fact, interpellations in Althusser's theory refer to social practices which, in Foucault's terms, contribute to the emergence or sustainment of regimes of truth by promoting particular discourse, i.e. system of statements about truth. Moreover, as discourse presupposes systemic arrangements or *system of statements*, Althusser's definition of

interpellations, though formulated chronologically earlier to the philosophy of Foucault, meshes with the latter's concept of regime of truth as acceptance for truth as a representation of family relies strongly on successful interpellation of individuals and mobilization to act according to discursively prescribed modes of behavior.

Although there are several divergent points in the theories described above, they are all an important contribution to the field of discourse analysis thanks to their acknowledgment of substantial role language performs in shaping the perception of the world and emergence of regime of truth reinforcing a particular vision of reality and social relations. It becomes a part of social practice (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 22-23), i.e. it is internalized in social relations and becomes a socially conditioned process. Power relations bring about the imposition or domination of one discourse over another and both ascribe and validate certain roles and features to individuals and groups accordingly. Even though the existence and role of any universal truth is a matter deserving further debate, one can surely state that truth production and representation becomes a primary focus of political discourse in achieving domination. However, Fairclough argues (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 4) that such measures notwithstanding, it is the political advocacy for a particular agenda which requires contextual use of language and generation of regime of truth in the production of prevailing meaning and representations. Therefore, what agents do is of primary importance for Fairclough's discourse analysis.

2.4. Critical Discourse Analysis – sources, goals and conceptual framework

Having described generally what political discourse is and deals with, it is important to move on and focus on the type of discourse analysis selected for this thesis, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). However, before I proceed to explain the elements of this approach, its premises and goals deserve to be highlighted and focused upon in the first place. Following van Dijk's remarks (van Dijk, 1995, pp. 17-18), there are several crucial features which are striking with regard to the conceptual grounding of Fairclough's model. First of all, strength of CDA is a problem-oriented rather than paradigm-oriented approach – it is concerned with phenomena which are present in modern societies such as inequality, dominance, xenophobia etc. Its main purpose is to identify patterns in texts and talk which account for the presence of veiled presuppositions and conventions which strengthen and enforce them upon various members and groups

of society. Since CDA has to do with a broad range of issues having an impact on the society, it offers a multidisciplinary orientation towards their disclosure and description of its consequences for social cognition, politics and culture. Furthermore, it helps to explicate ideological aspects of those social phenomena and techniques which allow powerful agents to enact and legitimize a desired state of affairs which works best to their advantage or facilitates accomplishment of their particular political goals. Thus, CDA attempts to reveal manipulation and manufacture of consent (van Dijk, 1997, p. 25), as van Dijk puts it, in order to demonstrate the ways of exercising control and influencing people's consciousness with regard to the perception of reality.

Therefore, CDA constitutes what Warzecha calls a semiotic starting point in studying social processes where discourse is both constituted by and constitutive to them (Warzecha, 2014, pp. 169-170). As Encarnacion Hidalgo Tenorio argues (Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, pp. 187-188), CDA became a way of questioning and challenging the status quo by providing individuals with incentives for self-reflection on the modes of ascribing meaning and generating conventions of social behavior through language and ideology. To quote the author, "*CDA seeks to expose the manipulative nature of discursive practices, and improve communication and well-being by removing the barriers of assumed beliefs legitimized through discourse*" (Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, pp. 187-188). CDA aspires to make recipients aware of discourses being both constitutive in terms of various perceptions of the world as well as constituted by social relations (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61).

CDA is by no means a unified and homogenous way of analyzing discourses, it is rather a common name for a variety of approaches developed by different scholars who tried to link textual analysis with a study of socio-political phenomena. Amongst the most prominent ones should be listed Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Discourse Analysis, Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Duisburg School, Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational Discourse Analysis, and many others. In the case of the last model, a social conflict viewed in semiotic terms constitutes a basis for the analysis of social processes. Therefore, the meaning of statements is studied by taking into account its scope and dimension, and is complemented by adding structural analysis of context in order to discern the patterns of discourse application in socio-political actions (Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, p. 190). Fairclough contends (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 23-24) that politics has an

apparent linguistic nature since political struggles are manifested in language on one hand, and concern the language on the other. Texts are a product of a wider process of social interaction which gives a platform to the development of discourses. Moreover, political discourses cannot occur outside of political context, i.e. they are constituted and sanctioned by the institutions which allow political agents to make their political agenda resounding in the society due to its societal implication and impact on the life of other members of society (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 17-18). Therefore, textual analysis of political utterances cannot be carried out without paying close attention to the processes of meaning production and interpretation as well as conditions under which they occur (Fairclough, 1989, p. 25).

As social life is a basis for the emergence of discourses, Fairclough proposes a three-dimensional framework for its conceptualization (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 82). The author claims that social life is comprised of social events, structures and practices. The latter perform a role of mediator between social events which are seen as examples of actions or behavior occurring within social structures, which serve as systemic drivers behind social action and change, for instance politics. Social practices in this model are equivalent to ways of acting and representing locked within frames and conventions (public debate, conference etc.) Fairclough and Fairclough differentiate between various types of social practices such as genres (ways of acting), styles (ways of being) and, most importantly, discourses (ways of representing).

Critical discourse analysis is centered around language manifested in political discourse and social practice. Therefore, it requires an analytical framework which reconciles various levels of forming and use of discourse. Fairclough operationalizes these levels in a three-dimensional model which consists of description, or analysis of textual properties, interpretation, where analyzed texts become a resource in the process of deliberation of meaning, and explanation, as the manifestation of context-embedded ramifications of discourse implementation and social interaction (Fairclough, 1989, p. 26).




Figure 1

In order to analyze discourse without separating it from its social setting, Fairclough introduces the concept of orders of discourse which is meant to cast more light on the conventions which underlie the shape of the discourse itself (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 29-31). The author speaks about orders of discourse and social orders as interrelated networks which are structured around particular modes of action taking place in a social space. Both types of orders pertain to different examples of practice, though the former can actually be seen as a type of social order *per se* because it encompasses these practices which have discursive character. The application of various discourses within a given order of discourse depends on the institutional backdrop and relations of power between individuals or groups which are subjected to discursive action. At this stage, conventions began to play an important role since they are templates which guide agents' behavior and allow for a choice of an appropriate mode of communication. Therefore, orders of discourse can be categorized according to the clusters of conventions based on their frequency. However, it is not only social conditions and conventions they generate that influence discourse itself; such relation works also the other way around. Discourses may have an impact on social conditions because once it becomes institutionalized and promoted by powerful agents, it may contribute to social change through discursive practice. Moreover, if discourses are created within social structures on one hand, and can influence them on the other, they can also be reproduced in the case of shifts inside society which have an impact on institutions and social relations themselves. Therefore, as Fairclough argues (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 37-40), the relationship between structures and

discursive practices is dialectical – both influence promotion of a particular mode of reasoning.

2.5. Power and ideology in Critical Discourse Analysis

Power as defined in CDA is closely related to knowledge production and dissemination of social conventions of interaction. There are three types of power constraints listed by the author – constraints upon content, relations, and subjects. In the first case, what can be done or said is limited by the prevailing narrative enforced by powerful actors. The other two are closely interlinked since the relations become conventionalized and confined in terms of applicability of certain types of utterances and behavior, whereas subjects refer to the subject positions which participants are meant to occupy in these relations (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 45-46). Furthermore, power can be accumulated *behind* discourse through the consolidation of social order of discourse which leads to the standardization of a particular type of language that reflects power relations in the society. The access to discourses is controlled and can be constrained by the powerful agents by erecting institutional barriers which preclude other people from entering, and thus disrupting the process of discourse-shaping. The main instrument limiting the access to discourses is formality which entails the elaboration of an institutional routine which helps to decide on granting the possibility to *enter* discourse for these individuals who meet unilaterally introduced requirements. Formality is expressed in language conventions and its use which validate the communication process (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 55-65).

Another important part of Fairclough's model includes ideology as an underlying concept of political discourse. As an introduction to the analysis of its role in exercising power and domination over the members of society, the author invokes the notion of common sense presented by American sociologist Harold Garfinkel, who viewed it as constitutive for the perception of the world expressed in common assumptions and expectations voiced by people. In his understanding, manifestations of common sense serve as a setting for all actions undertaken by the members of society as well as the interpretation of such actions made by them. These assumptions and expectations are often expressed subconsciously and their utterers are deemed to take them for granted. Therefore, Fairclough argues (Fairclough, 1989, p. 83) that common sense becomes a

powerful mechanism used in the implementation of discourses due to its implicit character.

A particular understanding of common sense can be generated by ideologies. Its basic function is concentrated around sustaining unequal power relations in the society in order to impose discourse upon weaker actors. Once individuals become aware of the workings of ideology, it loses its commonsensical feature, becomes compromised and may not be able to prevent the state of inequality of power from being altered. Successful functioning of ideology requires ensuring its implicitness and depends on the degree of public consciousness regarding the motivations and reasons of promotion and advocacy of topics offered by discourses. Ideologies can work only if they are presented as background assumptions which are not subject of dispute; rather they constitute the basis upon which deliberation takes place. Therefore, formulation of assumptions in texts should lead to the desired interpretation of them by their addressees (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 84-85). It comes as a result of what Fairclough defines as a discursive struggle (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 85-92), i.e. capacity of ideology employed in discourses to win advantage over other ideologies and dominate them or contain them by appropriating some elements of oppositional discourses, distorting them and imposing a deflected understanding of their premises and postulates upon them. If the dominance is achieved and alternative discourses are stifled, the prevailing discourse and its ideology becomes naturalized and seen as an objective reflection of the world. Naturalization of discourse can be seen as means to achieve the common sense in discursive terms. Moreover, a fixed meaning is the primary product of naturalization of discourses. The conventions embodied in the routines of communication adopted by the members of society become commonsensical in terms of their understanding and interpretation. The closure of meaning and creation of a consistent language shared by other people within society becomes a clear sign of discursive dominance.

2.6. Values in Critical Discourse Analysis

Discourses oftentimes reflect the values championed by their creators who seek to promote them at various levels of communication. Fairclough distinguishes three such values – experiential, relational and expressive. In the case of experiential values, discourses serve as means of expressing and externalizing their makers' experience of the

society and nature of things they bring up in their utterances. Therefore, the constraints which discourses impose upon the contents of interaction may be affected by some personal perception of affairs they pertain to, as externalized by the powerful agents who generate them. Next, the relational value is to do with the social relationships *which are enacted via text in the discourse* (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112) Perception of social roles and relations of power are a primary feature to which this kind of value refers. Finally, expressive value is related to the presentation and evaluation of social phenomena which may have their roots in culture or can be a product of historical events which had an impact on social relations and sense of group or national belonging. Thus, the categorization of the values can be presented as in Figure 2 (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 74, 112)

Dimensions of meaning and constraints	Values	Structural effects
Contents	Experiential	Knowledge and beliefs
Relations	Relational	Social relations
Subjects	Expressive	Social identities

Table 2

As Fairclough contends (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 114-119), words can be classified on the basis of their quantity and repetitiveness. The extensive use of the same words or synonyms which amounts to the so-called *overwording* is a sign of a particular emphasis which their authors put on chosen aspects of reality which they deem to be ideologically crucial to the successful conveyance of their message. In this sense, products of discourse have experiential value. Furthermore, the choice of wording has its consequences for the social relations since it may entail enforcement of particular conventions and advocacy of a state of affairs which is ideologically desirable for its promoters. They may present and support their vision of society by showing alternative developments to which negative impact is attached. The expressive values step in when this juxtaposition becomes a subject of evaluation through the application of the set of expressions which the author believes to be the most effective in inculcating and maintaining the type of identity which is the most desirable.

The values which I described above become operative once a social interaction occurs. Texts feature various values which are embedded in the common-sense assumptions. However, when it comes to the reception and interpretation of texts, their addressees resort to what Fairclough calls members resources (MR), or background knowledge, though it is more precise to talk about assumptions and conventions rather than knowledge in the strict understanding of this word (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 140-141)

2.7. Level of interpretation

The process of interpreting texts takes place at multiple levels. The most basic one relates to the interpreter's familiarity with the language structure in which the text is created. It encompasses the knowledge of grammar, vocabulary and phonology. The second level is of highly semantic character since it is to do with the meaning of words, i.e. the identification of information which the word carry within grammatical structures. The next level relates to what Fairclough calls a *local coherence* which is tantamount to the production of coherent interpretation based on the analysis made at previous levels. The adjective *local* refers here to a particular part of the text being studied and explained. Finally, the analysis of the overall text structure allows for drawing conclusions with regard to its *global coherence* or determination of the key points upon which the argumentation is elaborated and advanced throughout the text (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 143-144).

However, there is a range of other important factors which influence the production and shape of texts as well as settle them within a particular social setting. As Fairclough points out (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 153-155), it is indispensable to see political discourse as based upon historical events which have had an impact on the current political developments which are reflected in the texts and speeches delivered by politicians. Texts can also draw on their *predecessors* in order to manifest ideological continuity and coherence through years, and create a base in a form of presuppositions to which their producers and addressees can resort while interpreting the contents. Therefore, the ability of powerful political actors to incorporate the elements of intertextuality, i.e. drawing upon the legacy of earlier texts, may translate into ability to determine presuppositions. The historical context within which a particular text is set has

an impact both on the MR (members' resources) and interpretation of texts by the recipients.

2.8. Speech act theory and Critical Discourse Analysis

Speech act theory, as a part of CDA, constitutes an important part of the study of selected Kaczynski's speeches as it provides a classification of speech acts according to which elements of his discourse can be identified and categorized. Speech acts are seen as a crucial part of pragmatics which deals with the meanings discourse participants ascribe to various elements of a text according to their MR (Fairclough, 1989, p. 155). Speech acts can be defined as utterances which are voiced in a particular context, and with a certain intention such as statement, warning, promise etc. John L. Austin, British philosopher of language, offered a typology of speech acts depending on their purpose. The author lists three of them - locution, illocution and perlocution. Locutionary act is equivalent to uttering a sentence with a given semantic meaning whereas illocutionary and perlocutionary acts refer to the intention of a speaker (informing, warning and so on), and the reception and reaction of the utterance by an addressee (for instance persuasion, dissuasion and convincing) respectively (Austin, 1962, pp. 108-109).

Austin proposes also a classification of speech acts which can be useful for the current analysis of Kaczynski's texts. The five main categories mentioned in his work are *verdictives*, *exercitives commissives*, *behabitives* and *expositives* which are differentiated on the basis of their contextual use. *Verdictives* refer to judgements, *exercitives* pertain to the instances of exercising power and exerting influence through speech, *commissives* are linked to the expression of intention and obligation, *behabitives* are equaled to externalization of feelings, attitudes and dedication, whereas *expositives* refer to the development of argumentation (Oishi, 2006, p. 3). All of these are important with regard to the Critical Discourse Analysis because they carry not only semantic meaning, but are also, to some extent, a reflection of contextually embedded conventions motivated by power relations. On top of that, Fairclough does not introduce his categorization of values as an attempt to replace Austin's classification, but in order to provide a common denominator to these statements which possibly may fall into various categories, depending on their contextual use.

2.9. Politics in Critical Discourse Analysis

Finally, it is important to explicate the characterization of politics which can be found in the texts of the prominent political discourse analysts mentioned above. As Fairclough & Fairclough argue (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 22), politics is *oriented towards decision-making which can ground action*. Decision-making is supported by argumentation and becomes important to Fairclough's CDA model since it is viewed by the author as a *complex speech act* containing both illocution and perlocution. On the one hand, argumentation is perlocutionary in the sense of advocating for actions and not being an action in itself, but on the other it envisages the implementation of illocutionary acts such as warning or admonition which would support its cause (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 23). The authors claim that argumentation can be understood as "*a social and rational activity of attempting to justify or refute a certain claim and aiming to persuade an interlocutor [...] of the acceptability (or unacceptability) of a claim*" (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 36). For the purposes of a successful argumentation, rhetoric seen as a *study of aiming for effectiveness* is employed. In line with this definition is the idea of rhetoric being means to convince the audience in favor of a particular mode of action rather than provide people with logically sound argumentation. Political agents decide to implement rhetoric as a part of their discourse in order to draw attention and shape perception of citizens about issues they are interested in (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 57-58). In Fairclough's understanding, practical argumentation aims at generating proposals for action on the basis of arguments presented through rhetoric. Any argumentation, even if it is not based on solid, logically proved premises, maintains its strength and capability to influence people's opinions as long as it is not rebutted by a more persuasive and convincing one (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 66). This falls in line with the Foucauldian concept of regime of truth, where truth itself is not confined merely to the observation of objective reality, but is considered a groundwork for development of system of statements and proliferation of knowledge inferred from it.

CDA incorporates the idea of imaginaries as discursive representations of the world which is actually not there, but which is deemed to be an ideal one. Both the representation of the actual, existing world and of the one which is presented by

imaginaries take shape of discourses thanks to their semiotic features. They can be employed by argumentation through presenting the imaginary as actual, or real, in order to gain recognition for these veiled imaginaries. Once the non-actual is recognized by the public, it can get perpetuated through institutionalization of imaginaries. As Fairclough and Fairclough put it (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 108), *an institutional reality that is collectively recognized assigns deontic powers to people and gives them reasons for action*. The performative power of imaginaries is projected by creating a system which generates the rules limiting or enabling human action. Therefore, the ability to present imaginaries as manifestations of an actual world as well as enforcement of recognition and compliance with the premises are clear examples of power and domination exercised in the society (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 109-110). However, there is another important factor which is deemed to be necessary to make discourses work – legitimization. Following van Leeuwen’s proposition, Fairclough and Fairclough classify four different types of legitimation – through authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 109-110). Authorization is made by invoking the opinion of experts which supports proposed actions, moral evaluation seeks to attach a positive meaning which would validate them, rationalization can be applied in order to present the actions as useful or effective, and mythopoesis involves mythmaking. Finally, when Fairclough and Fairclough speak about deontic powers in terms of the theory of argumentation, they mean a type of power which is based on reasons independent from actual desires of the people. Instead, what matters is the recognition of the need for action and its legitimization granted by the audience irrespectively of their private inclinations (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 114).

2.10. Summary

All in all, CDA as proposed and developed by Fairclough is an eclectic concept, combining various philosophical and scientific disciplines and theories with their premises. It incorporates the linguistic perspective of Saussure’s and Austin’s works as a basis for the analysis of various political implications of the language use in social relations. The constructionist approach contributes to this type of CDA by highlighting a distinction between a language structure (*langue*) and use of words (*parole*). Moreover, Fairclough incorporates Austin’s speech act theory as a useful methodological tool

allowing for a classification of utterances into three categories – locutions, illocutions, perlocutions, and five subcategories, what is particularly handy in systematizing analysis of speech acts used in political discourse as well as provides. Apart from the linguistic part, philosophical take on the role of discourses in the society is also present in CDA. Fairclough draws on the works by Foucault, Althusser, Garfinkel, from which he derives a variety of concepts that are constitutive to his model of CDA – the perception of truth as a product of discourse rather than an objective entity, ideology as a product of hegemony manifested in interpellations and formation of social conventions, Garfinkel's notion of common sense as well as argumentation theory. Finally, the three-dimensional conceptualization of social life as social events, structures and practices, the interplay between social reality and formation of discourses, introduction of the concept of orders of discourse as influencing and influenced by social orders and categorization of values which influence knowledge, beliefs, social relations and social identities as well as the modes and conditions of interpretation, all allow for operationalization and application of Fairclough's methodology in practice, i.e. analysis of political texts and its implications in the socio-political context.

Fairclough's model of CDA is valid for the study of Kaczynski's speeches for several reasons:

- It brings together a textual (speech acts) analysis, interpretation (argumentation theory) and socio-political impact,
- It provides a set of conceptualizations and categorizations which enable to systematize the study and its outcomes
- As it provides a critique of the phenomena existing *out there*, CDA helps to identify how thin-centered populism is operationalized not only in political speeches, but as a result of real-life results of political action, in this case as a legislation.

3. Chapter Two – Populism and its relation with discourse

In this chapter I am going to investigate populism as a highly contested phenomenon in terms of its conceptualizations and highlight its relationship with discourse. By discussing populism and opting for a minimal approach to studying it, I attempt at providing a clear understanding of the core element of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's political discourse as based on the irreconcilable interests of the people and the establishment. Populism is, therefore, a concept for the analysis of discourse on one hand, and a central feature of PiS chairman's texts on the other, and as such deserves much attention.

3.1. *Populism - conceptual framework*

Populism as an analytical concept, constitutes another crucial part of this paper. Although often perceived by many as *the main buzzword of 21st century* (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 1-2) a blurry notion of populism has been studied in its relation to democracy. The latter may be defined according to its procedural or systemic characteristics, i.e. boiled down to *a combination of popular sovereignty and majority rule* where emphasis is put on a mode of collective decision-making or encapsulated as a political system which, besides procedures, fosters institutions safeguarding rights and liberties of citizens. This broader understanding of democracy pertains to liberal democracy (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 80). As far as populism is concerned, it is not intrinsically undemocratic; rather populists oppose the institutional system of checks and balances as contradictory to the principle of people's rule. Therefore, populism may not be considered a threat to democracy itself by many, but it challenges liberal character of modern democracies, undermining their pillars by rejecting pluralism and driving a wedge between various social groups or demonizing minorities. Populism, while fostering procedural aspect of democracies by mobilizing people to use democratic process to exercise their authority, comes as a peril to liberal democracy since by privileging *the will of the people*, it may lead to escalation of social conflicts by prioritizing majority rule over equality of rights, and moralization of politics which substitutes problem-solving through public deliberation with stigmatization of dissenting

voices that are excluded from the *volonte generale* (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 82-84) In fact, the opposition between the people and the others, or rather the *moral* and the *immoral* is essential to the type of populism which will be discussed more broadly in this chapter, and particularly concerns Kaczynski's populism.

Populism is inextricably linked with the analysis of speech which comes as a valid criterion in determining what and who can be called populist. In order to get their message across, populists use discourse as a way of instilling ideational conventions about socio-political reality in a form of rhetoric. Populist discourse, as defined in terms of binary opposition between the people and the elite, needs to be vocalized by a charismatic leader which is discussed later in this chapter.

As Paul Taggart argues, populism permeates modern representative democracies as an element of tense competition between plurality of worldviews which seek to challenge system that gave rise to them (Taggart, 2004, p. 269). However, unlike classical ideologies which are traditionally placed on the right-left scale, populism often neither represents a consistent set of political values nor does it always have a capability to sustain momentum and take roots in party politics. Therefore, political scientists provide a very diverse selection of definitions of what may be called populism. One such conceptualization is draws upon a distinction between feelings-driven politics and rationalism. As Mudde puts it, *populism refers to the politics of the Stammtisch (the pub), i.e. a highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the gut feelings of the people* (Mudde, 2004, p. 542). On the other hand, populism becomes synonymous to demagoguery or political technique of collecting votes by offering ready-made solutions and clear division of the good and the evil (Mudde, 2004, p. 543), However such definitions are difficult to operationalize as it is problematic to measure emotions or rationalism in politics. Yet, it is possible to discern several features of populism which various contributions to the study of this phenomenon share.

As Taggart contends, populist groups often grow quickly, manage to mobilize dissatisfied voters around couple of postulates, celebrate a dazzling but short-lived success, only to vanish due to inability to keep their popularity (Taggart, 2004, p. 270). Therefore, due to its volatility, populism seems to be an all-encompassing term for certain abnormalities which disrupt political landscape before and shortly after elections, but are

not able to dwell long due to shifts of public support or lack of core values. However, populism can be analyzed also as a defining feature of particular political system. Following Canovan's taxonomy, Taggart lists four cases – populist democracy, populist dictatorship, reactionary populism and politician's populism. All of them share one component which becomes crucial for narrowing down its conceptualization – appeal to the people and resentment towards the elite. Taggart argues that populism can become a political force when it is sanctioned by institutions of representative democracy; otherwise it remains just a technique of attracting voters' attention (Taggart, 2004, pp. 272-273). As Ben Stanley points out, antagonism between the people and the elites draws on the idea of popular sovereignty, and therefore takes on an ideational rather than structural form (Stanley, 2008, p. 95). Therefore, populists, as advocates of a sovereign people, seek to ensure a better government rather just a bigger representation, and thereby challenge the mandate of elite to govern (Taggart, 2004, p. 273). Sovereignty itself is based upon premise that the people are the source of authority, yet it remains unclear whether the term *people* pertains to some collectivity or just group of individuals (Canovan, 2004, p. 250).

The term *people* itself is quite vague and may have various connotations – it may be synonymous to nation as a community of shared history, culture and language, or pertain to any undefined segment of society. On the other hand, as Mudde argues, it presents also a rhetoric tool which populists use in order to attract more public attention (Mudde, 2004, p. 545). Interestingly, Taggart favors a term *heartland* instead of *the people* when he discusses what populists attempt to represent. In author's opinion, *heartland* stands for a romanticized vision of the past as a repository of fundamental values which should serve as a guidance to the people, but are currently under threat posed by the elites. It is by no means a unitary concept as it lacks core values and cannot be classified as an ideology; rather, it is based on a rejection of otherness and desire to break with a current system (the establishment) which exploits the weak (the people). The role of oppressor can be ascribed to domestic government officials or supranational bodies and foreign bureaucrats, as in the case of Euroscepticism. Thus, a return to the values of heartland is postulated against the background impression of moral crisis and institutional incapability to deal with extraordinary situations (Taggart, 2004, pp. 274-275). Obviously, the feelings

of fear, social injustice, moral decay of the elites etc. may be imaginary and do not correspond to the reality; they need to be activated by populist leaders.

Populists usually prefer to be referred to as grassroots movements uniting various social groups rather than political party, and need charismatic leader in order to maintain their popularity. Although they reject party nomenclature and gain support by voicing criticism towards bureaucratized forms of authority, populist movements are no less organized than classical political party which is dictated by their very nature – by relying on charisma of one leader, they face a problem of succession which would be hard to resolve without robust, many-tiered structures which do not differ much from classical political parties (Taggart, 2004, p. 276). Furthermore, populist leaders often emphasize a democratic mode of individual, conscience-based decision-making among party ranks, while, at the same time, relying on their authority as the representatives of the people who dare to confront the establishment and advocate for the weak. Thus, by showing their dedication to the people's democracy and support for procedural instruments of direct democracy such as referendums, populists present themselves as empowering people and transferring more authority to them.

Jaroslav Kaczynski can be considered a populist charismatic leader for a number of reasons. First, as Mudde and Kaltwasser point out (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 62-64), populist leader possesses qualities enabling him to establish a cult of leader and construct an image of a man of action truly representing the people's voice. Discourse of populist leaders draws heavily on creating a sense of crisis which requires an immediate action based on popular common sense. Therefore, their charisma relies on the ability to mobilize electorate on the basis of personality traits on one hand, while providing a rationalization of ready-made solutions which appeal to possibly the broadest number of people. The strength of Kaczynski's charisma, as a long-standing head of Law and Justice party, is based on his ability to present himself as a statesman and a talented speaker, who, however, takes on a role of political mastermind behind government actions and does not assume any political position (Cienski, 2016; Foy, 2015). At the same time, in his speeches, he manages to articulate what he claims to be the people's will (citizen-friendly state apparatus, improved social protection and security provided by the state, emphasis on the sovereignty vis-à-vis democratic deficit in the EU and presence of values in public life associated with broadly understood patriotism), and exploit public dissatisfaction

with political elite and appeal to the rising ambitions of Poles, especially Polish middle class.

Therefore, the quality of state and democracy remains crucial to populists. Indeed, democratic deficit is another important element on populist agenda. As populists claim to represent the people, they speak in favor of direct democracy. Thus, they present themselves as mediators in the process of transferring authority back to citizens. As Canovan points out, populists tend to prioritize referendums as universal modes of popular decision-making, by-passing *professional politicians* and undermining their legislative and executive mandate (Canovan, 2004, p. 242).

Euroscepticism is another constitutive feature of modern populism in Europe. As Taggart argues, populists often present regional integration as a threat to the heartland, i.e. core values upon which people identify and sovereignty rests. An idyllic picture of heartland is juxtaposed with a complex bureaucracy of the EU as a foreign body which does not possess legitimacy of the people. By delegating certain authority to this institutional leviathan, the elites are believed to trade sovereignty in exchange for personal benefit. Moreover, adoption of many attributes of modern state such as common currency, removal of internal trade barriers, free access to the territory and labor market of other states/provinces of the EU resembles an establishment of a super-state in which national identities dissolve (Taggart, 2004, pp. 277-279). Although populists do not deny advantages of close economic cooperation, they put forward *Europe of nations* as an alternative concept to the supranational EU.

Currently populism is viewed as a constant element of political landscape in Europe. It became a part of mainstream politics both as a technique and thin ideology. A mediatization of politics manifested in growing commercialization and independence of (social) media outlets coupled with cognitive mobilization of voters made populism a part of mainstream politics. Not only did new populist parties emerge and challenge a discourse of incumbents, but they also forced them to adopt similar rhetoric in order to maintain public support and appeal to other segments of population than their traditional electorate (Stanley, 2008, p. 96). Populism develops its own vocabulary which facilitates voters' identification with political parties, and makes their message more resounding across various social groups. Gidron and Bonikowski, following Hawkins'

conceptualization, define populism as Manichean discursive style which *assigns a binary moral dimension to political conflicts* (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, pp. 7-8). Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, due to discursive properties of populism, I will discuss the two approaches in more detail.

First of all, as I stated earlier in this chapter, populism is not a full-fledged ideology which builds on core normative values. It does not seek to explain complicated social processes, neither does it seek to develop a consistent narrative. Therefore, Mudde and Kaltwasser propose to define populism as a “*thin-centered ideology, that is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people*” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Similarly, Stanley argues that *the thinness of populism ensures that in practice “it is a complementary ideology: it does not so much overlap with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies”* (Stanley, 2008, p. 107). This means that populism has a capability to adhere to other ideologies and influence them with a set of simplified, ready-made assumptions which may underlie promotion of a particular political action. As based on contestation, it also provides a morphology which can be easily assimilated into other ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Populism is a *thin* concept because its ontological basis boils down to binary division between the good and the evil. Therefore, it encapsulates the following – the distinction between the people and the elite, antagonistic relations between these two groups based on the privilege of people to demand and exercise their sovereignty as well as positive valorization of the former and negative of the latter group (Stanley, 2008, p. 102).

The ideological distinction described above may seem quite fragile once populists are elected and assume public offices. This would mean that populist have become a part of establishment by forming an opposition towards the *old elite*, and thereby undermine their legitimacy to exercise public mandate to govern. However, as Mudde and Kaltwasser argue, such claim misses the point as the core distinction between the people and the elite is based on morality, rather than socio-political circumstances. Electoral victory does not mean a substantial change in anti-establishment stance of populists – it brings about a need to redefine the elite. They keep their anti-elitist rhetoric by focusing on an alleged economic leverage and international connections of the old elite which

enable them to exert pressure on the new government and sabotage its policies. The establishment is portrayed as conspiring, pursuing interests of foreign powers and trying to foment national crisis. Thus, populists often transform from the representatives of the people to protectors of the state, promoting siege mentality and claiming a right to use democratic mandate and extend their authority in order to resist influence of the corrupt elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 12-14).

Mudde and Kaltwasser list several advantages of ideational approach to populism presented in this chapter. First of all, its conceptual thinness allows it to permeate classical ideologies such as nationalism or socialism by providing a simplistic dichotomy between the virtuous and the villains. Second, it demonstrates the supply and the demand side of domestic politics – it provides a version of reality with straightforward separation of roles through generic, evaluative wording selection and identifies voters' susceptibility to its slogans. Finally, it helps to understand a vast mobilization and support of various segments of population under the same postulates (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 19-20).

Populism can be also defined as rhetoric or form of political discourse. Similarly, to ideational approach, it is based on Manichean distinction between the righteous people and the corrupt elite, and is juxtaposed to pluralist (diverse) and elitist (emphasizing intellectual superiority of the elite) vision of the world (Kocijan, 2015, p. 74). However, as Gidron and Bonikowski note, defining populism as discourse shifts focus from the underlying binary distinction in favor of gradation, i.e. measuring the degree of populism. The authors contend that *“the degree of populism that a given actor employs may vary across contexts and over time, whereas the actor's explicit ideological positions are likely to be more constrained by concerns over credibility”* (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 9). Therefore, populism becomes a mode of expression which can be studied on the basis of its frequency/intensity, or by applying Austin's classification of speech acts as a matrix for analysis.

Both ideational and discursive approach to populism are reconcilable as populism is about drawing sharp lines between what is good and bad, and needs to employ discourse in order to externalize dichotomous relationship between the pure people and the corrupt elite. Therefore, populism can be a simplistic ideational vision of the world

communicated to the public by means of a set of rhetorical devices easily identifiable for potential electorate. By combining these two approaches, it is possible to analyze how core ideas of a given type of populism are associated with selection of expressions and statements preferable to populist leaders. Furthermore, as populism have an inclusionary and exclusionary character, i.e. permits and denies access to the group it seeks to represent, it needs to generate discourse to sustain or adjust to changes within society and politics. As populism is a thin ideology, it does not need to be logically sound in order to become popular; rather, it provides simple answer to the complexity of mechanisms of representative democracy.

3.2. *Summary*

In this chapter I have discussed variety of conceptualizations of populism and indicated how its use as a thin ideology by powerful actors (charismatic leaders) to shape common assumptions and conventions. I have outlined a twofold, textual – contextual model developed by Fairclough and presented Austin’s theory of speech acts as which I am going to use in order to investigate patterns of populist rhetoric in selected texts. Despite conceptual pitfalls which the phenomenon of populism presents, I have explained various approaches towards it, and decided for a combination of ideational – rhetorical as the most appropriate for further analysis. Following Fairclough’s argument that discourse cannot be separated from the social setting in which discursive action takes place, I am going to present a historical background of Jarosław Kaczyński’s activity as a key figure of the Porozumienie Centrum (*Centre Agreement*) party, and the head of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (*Law and Justice*, also known by its abbreviation *PiS*) party as the former’s political successor.

4. Chapter Three – Jaroslaw Kaczynski's solidarity-based Poland – historical overview, axiology and relation to thin-centered populism

Having conceptualized what political discourse and populism are, I am going to highlight historical background and axiological characteristics of Law and Justice party which will help to understand elements of the relationship of ideational populism and populist discourse in this case. Moreover, before I proceed with textual analysis, it is crucial to cast more light on Jaroslaw Kaczynski himself as a prominent political figure who has had a significant impact on the shape of the post-1989 political life in Poland. This will enable to understand why Jaroslaw Kaczynski can be considered a charismatic populist leader whose political discourse is essential to gain understanding of ideological cleavages in Polish society which come up as a discursive construct in academic works (Bajorowicz, 2017; Gdula, 2018).

4.1. Kaczynski's role in the post-1989 politics in Poland

In the early 1980s, Jaroslaw Kaczynski along with his twin brother Lech, the president of Poland in 2005-2010, became engaged in the activity of the *Solidarity* movement as pro-democratic oppositionists. After the establishment of the so-called Contract Sejm as a result of the Round Table Agreement which gave momentum to the democratic transition of the state, Kaczynski brothers established the Centre Agreement (*Porozumienie Centrum*) party in 1990, which successfully ran in the first free parliamentary election in 1991, winning 8,7% of the votes (Migalski et al, 2006, p. 65). The party adopted a strongly Christian democratic profile and free-market orientation (Migalski et al, 2006, p. 39). Since the onset of the III Polish Republic, Kaczynski has become known for his direct criticism with regard to the post-Roundtable transition process which he regarded as a success of communists who escaped punishment for their past crimes and become incorporated into a newly-born political elite of the state process. Throughout his early political career in 1990s, he advocated for the idea of decommunization of state apparatus and called for extensive background screening of public officials which sometimes took a form of non-institutionalized vetting campaigns which launched a series of mostly unconfirmed accusations of alleged cooperation of high-profile politicians, representatives of judiciary, journalists and businessmen with the communist internal secret intelligence service (*dzika lustracja*). At the same time,

Kaczynski underscored a need for pro-European course of Polish politics and supported accession to NATO and prospective membership in the European Economic Community. After a period of remaining in a non-parliamentary opposition (1993 – 1997) and frequent party affiliation changes during the 4th Sejm tenure (1997-2001) Kaczynski became a co-founder of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party, a successor party of Centre Agreement. PiS was initially headed by Lech Kaczynski until 2003, when Jaroslaw took over the chairmanship. The new party kept its conservative character and free-market orientation mixed with moderate state interventionism. PiS spoke in favor of state control over strategic sectors of economy and promoted social equality while supporting hardline penal policy at the same time (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 49-50). In 2005, the party won parliamentary election for the first time in history and formed a coalition government together with nationalist Self-Defense party and the League of Polish Families. When Lech Kaczynski assumed office of the President of Poland in the same year, he accepted the nomination of his brother for the post of Prime Minister, despite a high popularity of the incumbent PM Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz who had been dismissed after serving one year in the office. Shortly thereafter, due to an internal conflict within the coalition, the government headed by Jaroslaw Kaczynski collapsed in 2007 and the party suffered a defeat from the opposition Civic Platform party in the subsequent parliamentary election. Following the death of president Lech Kaczyński in the Smolensk airplane crash in 2010, Jaroslaw ran in the early presidential election finishing second and conceding defeat to the candidate fielded by the ruling Civic Platform - Bronisław Komorowski. However, 2015 marked two electoral victories for the Law and Justice party headed by Kaczynski – party's candidate Andrzej Duda won the presidential campaign, followed by the party winning an overall majority in the Polish parliamentary in October, for the first time in the history of post-1989 Poland.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski has been present in the politics of the Third Polish Republic since its very beginning. He has remained an active politician for 29 years now, performed duties of the party chairman since 2003 and served as Prime Minister in 2006-2007. Moreover, even though he did not assume any government office after 2015, he is viewed as the main figure influencing the shape of country's internal and external policies (Foy, 2016). His strong position within Law and Justice party is stipulated by the party's charter granting the chairman with supreme executive power, coupled with the authority to

propose lists of candidates for the elections at county, parliamentary, presidential and European level, chair the meetings of the PiS Political Council, which is a supreme resolution-passing body, convene party's Congress and Political Council as well as chair and supervise the work of party's Political Committee tasked with representing PiS externally (PiS Charter, 2016, pp. 11-15). Therefore, Kaczynski as a party leader has a decisive say in both legislative and executive issues of the party. Furthermore, a top-down hierarchy and centralization of power feed into the dominance of central party decision-making bodies over its local branches. As political decisions are adopted in the form of resolutions, central authorities of PiS limit independence of local party structures by claiming a right to repeal decisions which do not fall in line with leadership's expectations or interests. Local structures are tasked with coordination of electoral campaigns and socio-political actions on various administrative levels while conforming with the party stance regarding implementation of policies which are determined by party headquarters (Habuda, 2010, p. 68). For instance, art. 22, para 8 of the party charter allows regional councils on the level of voivodeship (*województwo* – the highest administrative unit in Poland), which are regional representative bodies of the party, to discuss issues raised by local authorities but does not empower them to issue binding decisions in this respect (PiS Charter, 2016). Kaczynski himself admits that *we organized the party in this way in order to prevent it from disintegration. In order to prevent it from an external pressure. We are not embedded in the state apparatus, in the establishment, in media. We need to defend ourselves* (Habuda, 2010, p. 68). This statement is particularly interesting in terms of discourse employed by Kaczynski, the axiological premises of which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

4.2. Axiology of Kaczynski's Law and Justice party

As Migalski et al. argue, PiS is ideologically a conservative, Christian democratic party which emphasizes the role of Western Catholicism and its teachings in shaping modern Polish democratic society. It favors a model of democracy based upon a state-enforced social solidarity while rejecting economic and moral liberal dogmatism (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 49-50). It acknowledges the need to complete democratic transition through a major systemic overhaul, denial of access to the public offices for people linked with communist authorities, and strengthening of social justice under state

tutelage. Moreover, it emphasizes an active role of the state in the fight against corruption, organized crime and systemic pathologies.

Such vision of state as a supreme good, repository of moral values and guarantor of social justice is best manifested in Jaroslaw Kaczynski's definition of *raison d'état*. In his article *Polish raison d'état*, Law and Justice party chairman calls for political reinstatement of the concept at hand, understood as a set of values which would constitute a normative basis for policy standards followed by Polish authorities, as a non-disputable guidebook for political decision-makers. He contends that unitary nation state is an irreplaceable form of popular sovereignty which provides a framework for the most effective use of national resources and accomplishment of national interests in relations with other states. The state is a supreme form of social organization as it creates and executes the rules according to which democratic civic society can operate (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 27). Next, Kaczynski focuses on multi-dimensional security as another aspect of Polish *raison d'état*. The author introduces a distinction between external and internal security. He argues that a properly developed armed forces and system of alliances *are an absolute imperative* for countering external threat. In such system, the primacy is given to hard security, i.e. military security combined with a state control over strategic resources and their diversification. Moreover, Kaczynski supports an active diplomatic engagement in shaping foreign policy of the EU towards Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 30). In terms of internal security, Kaczynski builds his narrative upon an assumption that Polish politics is a subject of foreign influences, featuring *a high degree of external controllability in variety of fields* (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 31), and calls for *change of ownership in media outlets* as well as a shift in attitude of the elites towards raising social awareness about this problem (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 31). Kaczynski often refers to Germany and its economic dominance as posing a risk to implementation of his concept of *raison d'état*, and criticizes current elite for what he regards as institutionalized clientelism of Poland towards Germany. Financial support of educational projects in Poland through German foundations or German ownership claims with regard to pre-war estates located on the territories which were incorporated to post-1945 Poland, are viewed by him, though not openly admitted, as a foreign interference and breach of state's sovereignty (Kaczyński, 2010, pp. 25, 31-32). Therefore, he regards sovereignty and international recognition of *an appropriate international status* as two another crucial

dimensions of Polish *raison d'état*. Although Kaczynski devotes a separate paragraph to these issues, they go hand in hand with the earlier notion of security. The author argues for rejection of what he calls *image of Poland as a small nation* which, as he contends, is *present in Polish political thought and widespread in other countries*, and supports the idea of delegating some authorities to the EU level as long as member states can *benefit from the accomplishment of certain tasks* (Kaczyński, 2010, pp. 32-33). Kaczynski contends that the EU, as a community of sovereign states, should grant its citizens more influence with regard to decision-making processes while respecting their national, cultural and moral distinctiveness. It is interesting how such distinctiveness becomes a basis for Kaczynski's denial of adoption of these union laws which he labels as *foreign and incongruent with our tradition of legal regulations and practices* (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 33). Therefore, he views nation as an entity with some predominant form of morality which applies to all its members and makes it distinct from other nations and their moral codes. Furthermore, such distinctiveness has its historical foundations and becomes politicized by Kaczynski in the form of politics of memory constituting a fifth pillar of his concept of *raison d'état*. The author posits that *today Poland is a witness of decades-long foreign campaigns of vilification. They inflict a great deal of harm to our state, nation and every citizen; unfortunately, they also have an impact on the attitude of some opinion-making circles. It is the task of numerous public institutions and Polish intelligentsia to counter this situation in a well thought-over and organized way* (Kaczyński, 2010, pp. 33-34). The head of Law and Justice party proposes a type of politics of memory of a dual, defensive and offensive character as a remedy for such state of affairs. The former corresponds with his call for domestic institutional engagement in raising awareness about national history through education while the latter refers to promotion of Polish history and national achievements abroad. All in all, these elements of *raison d'état* constitute a minimum upon which a consensus over national interests can be built (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 34).

4.3. Populism of Kaczynski's Law and Justice party – core elements

Keeping in mind the axiological characteristics of Law and Justice party described in the previous section, it is important to demonstrate how its elements correlate with the notion of populism. In order to understand it, a brief historical background of current

political scene in Poland should be explained. As Maciej Gdula points out (Gdula, 2018, pp. 14-15), post-1989 Polish politics was marked with a lack of viable alternative for neoliberal economic course introduced by Balcerowicz in 1990. At the beginning of 2000s, a coalition government dominated by Alliance of Democratic Left made a series of surprising reforms, given its ideologically left-wing orientation, by de-regulating labor law, introducing controversial civil contracts (or fee-for-task agreements) which contributed to job insecurity of workers, cutting down state subsidies to small enterprises, and shutting down alimony fund for single mothers. These changes accounted for a skyrocketing unemployment coupled with growing economic disparity in Poland. As a result of economic hardship, new center and right-wing parties like Civic Platform and Law and Justice gained much popularity among voters. What is interesting, however, they capitalized on public disapproval for economic policies of the left rather than divergent approach towards ideology or lifestyle issues. Gdula contends (Gdula, 2018, p. 17) that 2005 marks a significant change in this picture since the current binary opposition between two dominant ideational narratives about preferable model of the state derives its origins from the presidential race which took place at that time. During his campaign, Lech Kaczyński, Law and Justice party candidate, used slogans referring to the juxtaposition of two concepts of Poland – solidarity-based and liberal, the latter embodied by his then-opponent Donald Tusk, head of liberal Civic Platform party. It is then that the political discourse of PiS has become centered around a number of key issues – social justice, elite change, and rejection of otherness exemplified by a negative attitude towards sexual minorities. However, after conservatives secured a double electoral victory in 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, the ruling coalition spearheaded by Law and Justice party did not reverse changes made by previous government, but caused much public uproar by its heavy-handed style of ruling and use of force to put down strikes staged by labor unions (so called *białe miasteczko* – *the white town strike*) (Gdula, 2018, pp. 17-18). Moreover, picking nationalist Self-Defense party and the League of Polish Families as its coalition partners, dismissal of Marcinkiewicz, and tense relationships inside the coalition brought about a substantial decline in party's popularity among voters (Public Opinion Research Center CBOS, 2011, pp. 2-3). This led to the collapse of government in 2007, and early parliamentary elections.

Throughout the eight-year period of ruling coalition created by Civic Platform and Polish People's Party in office (2007 – 2015), Kaczynski's party, as the leading opposition force in the Sejm, has become known for its vocal criticism of liberal course adopted by incumbents, and a consistent social rhetoric encapsulated in their concept of solidarity-based state. According to Antoszewski (Antoszewski, 2011, pp. 86-88), early elections in 2007 deepened a polarization of Polish political system into two competing camps as many voters became mobilized by Civic Platform to cast their ballots against PiS rather than in favor of any consolidated ideological message countering Law and Justice's rhetoric. Moreover, a fairly good electoral result by PiS coupled with a leverage provided by presidential right to veto bills proposed by the ruling coalition which the latter was unable to override (this required garnering 3/5 of total parliamentary votes) enabled Kaczynski's party to secure a position of the major critic of government. Therefore, Law and Justice party preserved its ability to delineate ideological axis of political debate in Poland for the next two tenures. In the view of bipartisan hegemony (both Civic Platform and PiS won 81,52% of total seats in 2007), the latter did not have a strong competitor which would dethrone it as a leader of parliamentary opposition.

Along with the imposition of binary distinction between liberal and solidarity-based Poland, PiS managed to take over some of political postulates traditionally associated with the left. Kaczynski's party attracted conservative voters with its dedication to Christian values and traditional model of family, while appealing to those with left-wing orientation by emphasizing a need for state interventionism and criticizing unconstrained privatization of public property. This ideological fixedness of PiS throughout its term allowed it to reach beyond its traditional electorate and attract voters of smaller parties (Antoszewski, 2011, p. 89).

The Smolensk airplane crash and death of president Lech Kaczynski is regarded by some scholars to be of immense importance for the post-2010 political identity and discourse of Law and Justice party. This deadly accident which killed 96 representatives of Polish authorities, heads of public institutions and notable figures of anti-communist opposition who were on the way to the commemoration ceremony of the victims of 1941 Katyn massacre, led to early presidential election in which Jaroslaw Kaczynski was narrowly beaten by Bronisław Komorowski, fielded by the ruling Civic Platform. The Smolensk airplane crash, popularly known as *Smolensk tragedy*, became widely used by

PiS chairman to ignite public dispute on causes of the airplane crash. As Arkadiusz Nyzio points out (Nyzio, 2016, p. 413), the approach towards official investigation conducted by a group of experts established by the ruling coalition led to the formation of two opposing narratives – a deliberate assassination plotted by Polish government along with Russian authorities (favored by Kaczynski and PiS), or pilot error (supported by Civic Platform). Ever since the Smolensk crash, it has become a vital part of the political discourse of Law and Justice party and is best manifested in its concept of morality and truth, and elite change imperative which will be explained in next chapters.

4.4. Euroscepticism of PiS

As I argued in the previous chapter, Euroscepticism is another important component of modern populism. However, Eurosceptic stance of Jaroslaw Kaczynski and the Law and Justice party is an interesting phenomenon given their unequivocal support for NATO's strong presence in Europe (including establishing permanent military bases in Poland). Since the very beginning, PiS took a quite ambiguous approach towards Poland's prospective membership in the EU as Kaczynski has always been a proponent of a strong unitary state aspiring to the role of regional political and economic leader. In early 2000s, a dominant narrative of the party focused on communicating an oblique message regarding country's membership in the EU, and giving primacy to the rhetoric of nation as a sovereign, i.e. appealing to the right of nation to determine its future and respect its choice. Probably the most direct statement of the PiS chairman read as follows: *"I would vote in favor of the accession, but, as a politician, I would comply with a different decision of the nation in this matter. I would vote against, if Poland was supposed to be a second-class member state"* (Migalski et al, 2006, p. 112). Moreover, Kaczynski spoke in favor of conducting a comprehensive research, weighing pros and cons against his vision of a sovereign and unitary state, as a precondition for putting this matter to the vote. A project of Constitution for Europe which was being consulted only few months after Poland had joined the EU was met with a strong domestic opposition of PiS when Kaczynski considered it as an attempt to impose political and economic hegemony of old union members upon Eastern European states and declared that Poles *have a right to feel deceived*. Since then, Law and Justice party has begun advocating for acknowledging a supremacy of domestic law over the EU one, and inviolability of foreign and economic

policy of Poland as the right to pursue national interests (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 112-113).

Kaczynski perceives European integration as an attempt to form a common European identity, and ultimately – dissolution of nations. He juxtaposes it with the notion of community of sovereign states with solidarity as its core value. Therefore, PiS does not question the need to be part of the EU, but views international integration primarily instrumentally, as a mode of bridging the economic gap between Eastern and Western Europe. Such attitude stems from party's ideological orientation and emphasis on the primacy of Christian values in Polish and European common political heritage over liberal ones (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 114-114). Therefore, Kaczynski's Euroscepticism originates to some extent from his party's axiological footing. As an anti-federalist, he denounces what he sees as *a hegemonic EU liberal – left consensus* of European elites remaining in conflict with his view on Polish *raison d'état*. Moreover, Kaczynski spares no criticism towards the mainstream EU bureaucracy and its politics which he views as representing hegemonic interests of Germany (Szczurbiak, 2015).

Law and Justice's Euroscepticism can be also viewed as a response to the pro-European stance of Civic Platform under Donald Tusk when he served as Prime Minister of Poland in 2007-2014. A wiretapping scandal that took place in Poland in June 2014, and seriously undermined public trust towards incumbents was used by Kaczynski in order to promote his claim for change of elites. As Tusk vacated the post of Prime Minister and assumed the office of chairman of the European Council shortly after the scandal broke out, Kaczyński presented him as a member of demoralized political class who used his premiership for the purpose of advancing his political career on the EU level (Kaczyński o kolejnych nagraniach..., 2015). This created an impression of general moral decay of liberal elites both on domestic and EU level as Tusk was presented as a political *fugitive* warmly welcomed by liberal European bureaucrats in Brussels.

4.5. Electoral victory of 2015 – reasons behind high public support for PiS

As Critical Discourse Analysis requires contextualization of analyzed materials, the study of Kaczynski's texts cannot be conducted in separation from various political developments which they reinforce or give rise to. Therefore, in order to understand

Kaczynski's discourse, one should look at its contribution and effect on bolstering a set of attitudes towards socio-political problems which become a subject of public debate.

According to Gdula, a spectacular success of PiS in 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections can be attributed to several factors. First, Kaczynski's party benefitted from vulgarization of public debate promoted by media outlets as a response to the development of alternative sources of information. In the past, as Gdula argues, a high structuralization of Polish political parties throughout 1990s enabled them to develop their narratives around opinion of key politicians – experts, who communicated it through mass media, which the latter validated as authoritative. Such monopoly of traditional press, radio and television was broken by commercial media outlets and internet-based news platforms. Therefore, a shift from a mere opinion-shaping function towards profit-oriented popularization of information as a mode of increasing viewership ratings was given priority. The format of political debates based on pluralist exchange of worldviews has been substituted by an emotional clash of antagonistic opinions aimed at discrediting political opponents. Nowadays, political actors prefer to build their discourse around key events which have an impact on popularity scores of particular parties (for example Smolensk airplane crash, wiretapping scandal in 2014 etc). Gdula contends (Gdula, 2018, pp. 29-30) that events can contribute to the formation of political discourse as long as political actors are able to use them discursively, i.e. create a sense of crisis and show readiness to tackle it. Therefore, Kaczynski's strength stems from his ability to shape narrative of events in line with his rhetoric of thin-centered populism.

Effective identification and responsiveness to the public expectations constitute another important factor explaining Law and Justice's success in 2015. Gdula explains this electoral victory on the basis of his concept of stratification of Polish society. The author builds his analytical framework upon non-dichotomous classification of social classes, derived partly from Bourdieu's works, and distinguishes three of them – people's class, characterized by closeness of interpersonal relations, straightforward sociability, affirmation of self-esteem through affiliation with like-minded people, altruistic readiness to help relatives on the basis of non-reciprocity, appreciation of frugality and resourcefulness, and conservative, live-and-let-live tolerance; middle class, characterized by its propensity to value order on various levels (work-life balance, norms of social conduct and governance quality), and self-discipline through career planning and

upgrading life standards; finally, upper class as defined through its anti-collectivism and reservation towards social actions, individual autonomy in determining value of practices, and readiness to sacrifice personal life for achievement of professional objectives (Gdula, 2018, pp. 42-44). An increase of demand for well-qualified white-collar workers which is a constant trend since the establishment of capitalist economy in post-1989 Poland, coupled with free higher education resulted in numerical growth of middle class and dissemination of attitudes towards career-planning, common for this part of society. Although the fact of belonging to the middle class does not automatically mean better income or living standard than in the case of people's class, expansion of lifestyle typical for members of middle class as well as market demand for university graduates make it crucial element of Polish socio – economic landscape (Gdula, 2018, pp. 46-49). Therefore, middle class represents a highly attractive target for politicians due to its share in labor market. Moreover, possible tensions between upper (including politicians themselves) and middle class, and higher economic fragility of the latter make it the most volatile group of voters in Poland. Market saturation caused by a large number of people with high education, inability to achieve economic independence due to affordable housing shortage and financial obligations such as long-term loans, as well as deregulation of labor market and growing insecurity made the members of this segment of society realize that their life expectations and professional ambitions cannot be accomplished within a relatively short period of time. This stands in a stark contrast with safe economic situation of representatives of upper class which contributes to the sense of injustice and rejection of current state of affairs. Thus, a rhetoric of crisis finds a fertile ground, and allows parties such as PiS to garner much support amongst members of middle class (Gdula, 2018, pp. 57-59).

Indeed, Law and Justice's spectacular success in 2015 parliamentary election can be explained by looking at popularity of Kaczynski's party across various social strata. During its campaign, PiS often invoked rising aspirations of Poles and presented itself as an advocate of long-standing political and economic change. It proposed a series of social benefit programs for less well-off citizens, changes to tax law (lowering tax-free amount), labor law (lowering retirement age), and rising minimum wage. Such left-wing policy was coupled with voicing respect for traditional values and patriotism on one hand, and populist promises of bringing power back to the people on the other. Such image of

comprehensive systemic overhaul in conservative packaging overcame social differences of lower and middle class by combining calls for elite change with responsiveness to the public needs (Gdula, 2018, pp. 68-69).

Law and Justice party's rhetoric is particularly resounding among representatives of middle class since it reinforces a sense of injustice while simultaneously satisfying a popular desire to take back control of one's life path from those who do not deserve to dictate it. Such narrative resounding among those who experienced a material deprivation related to the loss of job or necessity to pay off mortgage. Because they feel disadvantaged, they are more likely to support rhetoric based on clear juxtaposition between the good and the evil, even if systemic changes offered go far beyond initial promises. However, economic factors are not the only motivation for members of middle class to back PiS anti-elitist stance. Some of them focus on non-materialist values, and, in the context of political events such as wiretapping scandal involving representatives of state authorities in 2014, claim moral superiority over compromised officials and politicians (Gdula, 2018, pp. 72-76). Therefore, Kaczynski's discourse mobilized the people to reclaim their state from incompetent/immoral elite and addresses their ambitions.

4.6. Summary

In this chapter, I have focused on outlining key features of Kaczynski's Law and Justice party ideological profile and summarized briefly its historical record on Polish political scene. First, I sketched a short biography of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and underscored his importance as a party leader vested with broad executive and legislative authority. Next, I moved to explain Law and Justice party's axiology heavily shaped by Kaczynski's understanding of *raison d'état* and highlighted core elements of party's populism manifested in its ideology and political discourse. I paid a special attention to its ability to impose the binary distinction between a solidarity-based and liberal model of the state as a main axis of political debate in Poland. Moreover, I demonstrated a thin character of its populism which to a large extent follows Mudde and Kaltwasser's proposal, and its use as a discursive tool in domestic and foreign policy. Finally, I explained its high popularity across social strata as an effect of the universality of its

discourse and ability to address fears and hardship of Polish citizens and succeed in delivering a message centered around restoration of dignity and sovereignty.

5. Chapter Four – Operationalization of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's political discourse

In previous chapters, I have provided a comprehensive conceptual framework for the analysis of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's speeches and explained historical, social and economic circumstances which contributed to its effectiveness in terms of garnering public support for PiS program and securing a double electoral victory by this party in 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. Although some elements of Kaczynski's discourse have already been outlined especially in relation to the concept of populism, they constitute a starting point for a broader study of selected texts which help to navigate through the nuances of a more complex reality presented by Kaczynski in different contexts and on different occasions. For the purpose of this MA thesis, I have selected five speeches:

- Electoral victory speech delivered on 25th of October 2015,
- Speech delivered on 10th April 2016 at the rally commemorating 6th anniversary of the Smolensk airplane crash,
- National Flag Day speech delivered in the Sejm on 2nd May 2016,
- Independence Day speech delivered on 11th November 2016,
- Speech delivered on 1st July 2017 at the 5th Party Congress

All selected speeches were given on various occasions. The first speech has a laudatory character, as it was delivered shortly after the official announcement of parliamentary electoral results which gave Law and Justice party an overall majority of seats in the Sejm and Senate, as the first party in the history of Polish post-communist parliamentarism. In the second speech, Kaczynski addresses a group of party supporters gathered in front of Presidential Palace in Warsaw, which had seen spontaneous gatherings after the Smolensk airplane crash in 2010 when Poles turned out *en masse* to pay tribute to the victims; these gatherings had been transformed into political rallies by PiS and used regularly for political agitation in the following years. The third speech was delivered to the members of parliament and veterans of communist-era opposition movements during party celebrations of official national holiday. The fourth speech was delivered at the PiS party celebrations of the Independence Day. Finally, in the last speech

Kaczynski addressed representative of central and local party authorities at the agenda-setting party congress in the town of Przysucha.

As one can see, selected speeches vary according to the context in which they were delivered. Considering that Kaczynski addresses an audience consisting of party supporters (first and second case) or party members (third, fourth and fifth speech), some of them have a predominantly laudatory (electoral victory speech), celebratory and moralistic (speeches delivered on the occasion of national holidays) or nearly commemorative character (the Smolensk crash). However, all of them feature common elements of the same political discourse which will be analyzed in the subsequent sections.

At this point, I am going to analyze core concepts which appear in selected texts. This will help to understand whether it is possible to identify cohesive and consistent discursive patterns in Kaczynski's speeches.

5.1. Morality, memory and truth

The concept of morality appears in Kaczynski's speeches in various contexts, and can be regarded as fundamental to the development of binary populist opposition between the people and the elite. It is formulated in close relationship with three other notions – responsibility, memory and truth, which pertain to the quality of state as a producer and supplier of goods and services as well as its legislature where it is manifested in the activity of public institutions. Therefore, morality plays an important role in those speeches, where it is contextually required, i.e. commemorative and celebratory ones.

Kaczynski sets out his understanding of morality in three out of five selected texts, the most comprehensive of which is presented in the 10th April 2016 speech at the rally commemorating the Smolensk crash.

Example 1:

They wanted to kill our memory. They wanted to kill it, because they feared it. Because someone is responsible for this tragedy, at least morally, no matter what were the causes of it. And this responsibility lies with the previous government [...] And they did everything, breaking the rules in every possible manner, to make this memory perish. But their actions were unsuccessful, unsuccessful from the beginning. This memory lasted

already on the first days. The first memorials appeared, commemorations took place, independent press and independent media covered this topic.

This fragment contains several interesting features of the interplay between morality, memory and truth. Kaczynski views memory as a carrier of identity and uses possessive determiner *our* in order to indicate that it constitutes a collective good. As the government is presented as manipulating it, it is judged primarily on moral premises of its political action. Moreover, memory, or rather commemoration as its manifestation, becomes a general moral imperative which overshadows the establishment of real facts (*someone is responsible... no matter what were the causes*); the readiness to advocate for memory and voice opposition towards *de facto* manipulative actions of previous government enables PiS chairman to legitimize its rhetoric as a proponent of memory and pursuit of truth. Kaczynski seeks to monopolize a uniform (*our*) understanding of memory by claiming the right to interpret and represent moral standards of the collectivity while rejecting possible argumentations which do not encompass moral dimension of memory.

By announcing a failure of manipulative actions of the government, Kaczynski puts much emphasis on the expressive value of manifestations of memory which allows it to be acknowledged in public. At the same time, his utterances have verdictive features, i.e. enable him to make judgements with regard to the government treatment of the memory as well as subjective assessment of its consequences (successful – unsuccessful) based on exposure of memory to the public. He ascribes a particular importance to uniform media coverage and public presence of memorials in uncovering systemic transparency deficit which the elite seeks to preserve in order to preclude the people from gaining access to the truth:

Example 2:

The [new – author's note] names of streets, squares, roundabouts are needed, we must execute a proper commemoration of those who died, among whom there were many remarkable people. We must do it against Polish establishment, against those, who claim to have right to control both Poland and Polish memory. They shall not win! We must win!

Therefore, memory is validated once it becomes tangible, i.e. present in the public space. Kaczynski creates an impression of a moral conflict between the establishment and righteous people which rests on dichotomy of values. The people's wish to pay tribute to notable representatives of the nation who died serving their country is viewed as an indisputable imperative which should be free from political consideration because it is a common moral imperative of the Polish nation. However, as it cannot be executed due to objections on the part of the elite, their mandate to represent the people should be revoked since they fail to follow nations expectations.

Moral imperative is expressed in this part of the text by the modal verb *must* which stands for undertaking a collective effort vis-à-vis an organized opposition to challenge the unacceptable status quo. The establishment is interpellated into the role of villain who does not allow to exercise public will to pay tribute to deceased important figures of the elite which stands in opposition to generally accepted form of commemoration. Therefore, by categorizing such situation as conflict between two attitudes of which one can only prevail (*they cannot win, we must win*), Kaczynski performs a perlocutionary act as his utterances aim at persuading the public to take action in favor of change exemplified by disruption of status quo as well as de-legitimization of the establishment.

In Kaczynski's understanding, if memory is a common good, it needs to be made publicly available as well. Therefore, it is the role of the state to make it known to everyone:

Example 3:

This truth can be defined as public truth, state truth, truth in textbooks, truth in books, truth in media, in the generally available media, truth in the awareness of Poles, as millions of Poles, including the righteous ones, do not know what happened, do not understand it all. We must explain it to them. We must use the possibilities we have today in order to make Poles realize and understand it. Today, as the research shows, almost 25% of young people cannot answer the question – Who is responsible for the Katyn massacre? Today, we cannot let it happen in the case of Smolensk [crash – author's note].

Here, the concept of truth is in a way blended with memory as Kaczynski presents lack of awareness about historical events (with its assessment of who is responsible for

the Katyn massacre rather than who committed it). As the truth becomes another moral value, the role of the state is to preserve it through institutionalization. The omnipresence of truth, as postulated by Kaczynski, comes along with implementation of certain policies in the field of education, media and culture, which are designed to raise public awareness. Moreover, once again Kaczynski draws a line between *us*, who know the truth, or rather seek its validation by the state, and *them*, i.e. those segments of society who do not possess/know it yet, but the quality of being righteous renders them eligible to be informed about it. It is a reflection of an essential presupposition embraced by the populists – a hostility between the people and the establishment who try to manipulate unaware segments of population. Therefore, the author invalidates other narratives which emerge in response to the Smolensk crash by repealing them as a sort of misconception inculcated by the establishment on people whose desire is to find out what happened but do not possess means to do it. Furthermore, Kaczynski compares the level of current historical knowledge about Katyn within a certain segment of population with the awareness about what tragic event of Smolensk catastrophe, which implies that it is may be effect of purposeful policy by the elite/former government (just as it was in the case of communist regime concealing the truth about Soviet responsibility for massacre of Polish officers in Katyn which would jeopardize ideological relationships with the USSR). Therefore, such measure is designed to undermine the legitimacy of establishment as those who implement a strategy of whitewashing crimes, just as communist-era leadership did in the case of Katyn massacre on one hand, and depict previous government as complicit in the death of the *real elite* headed by president Lech Kaczynski on the other. Therefore, the data on young people's awareness of historical events invoked by Kaczynski is meant to corroborate his claim that raising awareness about the truth falls into competencies of the state and contrast it with possible effects of what he sees as manipulation in the case of Smolensk airplane crash.

A frequent repetition of the noun *truth* bears certain degree of illocutionary force as its use informs and assures the public of what is the desirable state of affairs with regard to the preservation of memory and identity. When Kaczynski speaks about explaining the truth to a group of unaware citizens, he does not advocate for any clear mode of action; rather, he makes a statement of commitment to the cause and presents the scope of the problem as the idea of omnipresence of truth presupposes a high deficit thereof. Thus,

Kaczynski signalizes that by assuming state power, PiS is entitled to make far-reaching changes in the public domain.

As state constitutes a supreme moral value which should reflect a dominant national morality based on pursuit of truth and preservation of collective memory, it assumes a regulatory function in order to recognize these values and implement them through policies it produces. Kaczynski sets out such vision in the speech delivered during Independence Day celebrations on 11 November 2016:

Example 4:

The white-red flag is a symbol of our state, a symbol stipulated in the constitution. Symbols are meant to build unity, to create unity. But simultaneously symbols are meant to remind, to make aware that there is a direct relationship between public sphere/state sphere, and sphere of values. A fundamental truth is at stake. Not only is the state an organization covering certain territory; the state should constitute a moral quality. We have talked about it for over 20 years. I wish to repeat it now once again. This moral quality, to put it somehow differently, means a legitimacy of the state.

In this fragment, Kaczynski puts an emphasis on the quality of state, but also refers indirectly to the role of memory when he invokes national symbols as its carriers. Since symbols are viewed as unifying all citizens, they stand for a uniform set of values represented by the state and its institutions which authorize them. Moreover, as the state authority should reach far beyond regulatory functions and assume moral position, it sanctions certain modes of behavior or attitudes and bans others. As long as the stance of the state externalized in normative acts matches with morality of the people, it can be called legitimate.

In terms of textual properties, the author uses syntactic parallelism in order to underscore theme and context of his speech, as visible in its original version. Repetition of the noun *symbol* draws attention to the variety of purposes they can be applied for, though their role does not constitute the focal point of Kaczynski's argumentation. The main axis of argument is concentrated around the relationship of state and quality-setting values, though the author uses only expositive speech act (he *wishes to repeat* what the

party have highlighted for years) when he attempts to reassert Law and Justice's linear continuity of thought throughout years of its existence.

As Kaczynski argues, although PiS have firmly supported a value-centric concept of state, moral deficiencies have not been filled. Therefore, in the following part of the speech, he develops a three-fold concept of state legitimacy:

Example 5:

We can talk about two types of legitimacy, except the one which is very important to democracy and which, by no means, I intend to ignore, namely formal legitimacy, i.e. the legitimacy which stems from electoral regulations, law-making regulations, from all this what is the most crucial to democracy and which we do not dispute. But there are legitimacies which are deeper, so to say. We can talk about two such legitimacies. The first one is of historical – moral character. It pertains to the history, tradition, language, culture codes, common understanding and understanding of meaning. This legitimacy is extremely important as it is linked to social awareness; but in the case of Poland, Polish tradition, it pertains to some clearly stated postulates. These postulates are – freedom, equality and justice.

The second type of legitimacy, which may be called a pragmatic one, concerns all these things which the state is supposed to provide. In other words, it means everything what the state does in order to satisfy the needs of citizens and of the community. These issues can be described in various ways but I believe that the most appropriate, the most accurate would be to discuss them in relation to a broadly taken security. The history of states, the history of their formation as a sort of political phenomenon demonstrates this best. Today, as far as modern form of the state is concerned, such legitimacy has 5 dimensions: internal, external, social security of the modern state, economic turnover security, or economic security in modern understanding, and finally a peculiar type of the security of the self which the state ought to ensure for its citizens. The state is, after all, entitled to use coercion, but it is also a supplier of goods.

Apart from democratic mandate based on procedural principles, Kaczynski lists two other legitimacies: historical – moral and pragmatic as indispensable for modern state. In the first case, legitimacy is externalized through manifestations of freedom to and

equality in expressing cultural and national affiliation. This means that nursing public awareness of national historical legacy and culture becomes a moral imperative of a state. As morality is a quality of the state in Kaczynski's terms, the state may also act immorally, and thus illegitimately, as long as its actions, or inaction, do not lead to dissemination, or rather imposition of truth aimed at increasing social identification with it. Therefore, history becomes a subject of moral judgement under state tutelage and constitutes a determinant of present state of public awareness based on the historical – moral continuity carried by various state-sanctioned manifestations of memory in public space. Tradition, on the other hand, provides a set of indisputable values which serve as a benchmark for such moral judgements.

Pragmatic legitimacy pertains to the role of the state as a producer and supplier of goods which ensure existential security of its citizens. Such state model functions somehow in separation from the citizens themselves – once the state is legitimized, it performs its duties according to the moral principles of solidarity, freedom and equality, which, however, cannot be accomplished without yielding primacy to the security-first tenet. Kaczynski posits that social life in Poland is driven by some urgent need for security due to its historical record of suffering from devastating wars and long periods of externally imposed dependence, and places past experiences in the context of current political developments. Along with classical understanding of hard security coupled with soft dimensions of security such as economy and social security, Kaczynski lists an obscure category of state security of the self. Although such understanding is not extensively elaborated in the text, a sense of tradition-based moral distinctiveness of the nation championed by Kaczynski is closest to the concept of ontological security proposed by Jennifer Mitzen. As the author argues, nations define their distinctiveness in relation to other nations which allows them to develop and preserve identity coherence; similarly, states seek to routinize their relations with other states in order to provide citizens with a sense of ontological security, i.e. preserve self-identity. States project self-images which are meant to bind their citizens together and solidify a nation-state-centric self-definition of their inhabitants (Mitzen, 2006, p. 352). Therefore, any shift in social identity brought about by the influx of *foreign* values and ideas can be perceived as an attack on identity and generate a sense of uncertainty. As far as Kaczynski's take on security is concerned, the confrontation between solidarity-based and liberal Poland has

many features of a battle for ontological security, especially when it comes to divergent attitudes towards desired status of Poland in the EU. Therefore, the security of the self pertains to measures of reassertion of national – ideological identity consolidated vis-à-vis some common enemy.

Textual analysis of the cited fragment allows for indicating several important points about construction of the text. First, what stands out is Kaczynski's care of local textual cohesiveness of his typology of legitimizations. The author draws a clear distinction between a more conventional type of legitimacy related to democratic character of the regime, and two types of legitimacy that remain at the center of his argumentation. Although conceptualizations of historical – moral legitimacy and legitimacy of the state-as-a-provider or state-as-a-producer are clearly stated and exemplified, Kaczynski does not offer much insight into measurement of the legitimacy, leaning towards general dichotomous distinction between presence and absence thereof. However, as these legitimacies are *deeper* than purely democratic one, as he puts it, he primarily focuses on describing his typology while largely neglecting clarification of their relationship with democracy itself. Instead, he presents the two legitimacies as all-encompassing, stretching his concept to include numerous aspects of social life which seem to be closer to the people, such as security, freedom, sense of equality and justice. Therefore, the analyzed fragment does not feature an extensive use of illocutionary acts, except expositives enabling Kaczynski to justify prioritization of his typology over conventional alternative and develop his (and his party's) argumentation accordingly (*we* intend not to ignore democracy, *we* do not dispute democracy, but *I* believe security is the most important aspect of legitimacy of the state-as-a-provider).

5.2. Core values

Kaczynski's discourse of solidarity-based Poland which emerges in the response to the spread of liberal values in Polish politics and society, relies heavily on three components - freedom, equality and justice through solidarity. This multi-faceted model is manifested best in two speeches delivered during celebrations of the official state holidays of 2nd May 2016 (the State Flag Day) and 11th November 2016 (Independence Day) as well as at the electoral victory speech of 25th October 2015. All of them are deeply embedded in the previously discussed understandings of the paramount role of Polish

state in strengthening moral values in the society and promoting a peculiar type of morally binding truth, and fit into the scheme of thin populism represented by Kaczynski. They constitute a set of core values which can be viewed as a reflection of desired public status of peculiar type of truth advocated for by Law and Justice party chairman as well as manifestation of moral duties of the state. Moreover, they contribute to the populist image of Kaczynski himself as they fall in line with the socio-political antagonism between the people and the establishment.

Just as in the case of morality discussed in previous section, Kaczynski discusses the problem of freedom from the historical perspective. It becomes a central issue in the struggle to exercise the right for self-determination:

Example 6:

[We have drawn conclusions from– author’s note] 100 years, when Poland had been established, lived as an independent state, lost this independence, had been subjugated by the murderous Hitler’s regime, German regime, Soviet regime, communism came next and finally came freedom.... freedom that we must protect. We must protect it because freedom and independence is not given forever. This is the task, this is the challenge we must be constantly reminded of. Our celebration is a celebration of memory, but it has to be a kind of active memory, such memory that translates into current actions, a memory from which we draw motivation, wisdom, experience for our future actions.

The most striking point of this fragment of Kaczynski’s Independence Day speech is the image of Poland as an organic entity which *lives*, can be stripped of its independence but eventually is able to regain it. Therefore, as the state is presented as a uniform entity, the author does not address personal liberties which may translate into a sense of general freedom of citizens. Although Poland was established, it somehow existed independently, lived its life until it has been subjected to systemic annihilation. Kaczynski depicts Poland as an organism which had been denied its freedom to develop by more powerful foreign systems which, however, did not manage to wipe it out despite continuous efforts to do so. Interestingly, the author uses adjectives Nazi and German together, which gives an impression of continuity of historical guilt by emphasizing German origins of Nazi totalitarianism which deserve condemnation even today. This is particularly important in the context of combined Euroscepticism and anti-German

sentiments vis-à-vis a desired status of Poland in international politics, which will be discussed in next section.

As freedom is considered to be volatile and cannot be taken for granted, Kaczynski translates past experiences into current sense of insecurity encapsulated in the conflict between the people and the elite as a common feature of all selected speeches. Denial of freedom is re-contextualized and employed as a bugbear in case *we* (the people) do not actively oppose those who wish to suppress *our* memory. Kaczynski, in response to such threat, sees politicization of memory and victimization as essential instruments of executing Polish *raison d'état* both internally and externally. As traumatizing events provide a moral justification for rejection of foreign values which may turn out to conceal their totalitarian character, the people must be mobilized in order to preserve distinctiveness and sovereignty.

This part of Kaczynski's speech is characterized by an extensive use of syntactic parallelism, which is also employed to a lesser degree than in the Example 4. Frequent in-text repetitions coupled with the use of the same words at the end of preceding and at the beginning of following sentences are used in order to intensify the message and present issues at hand as urgent. Moreover, the use of commissives in the form of declaration of obligation (*we must protect...*, *we must be constantly reminded of.....*) attributes the form of speech presented by Example 4 with a relatively high illocutionary force in addition to the structural properties.

Kaczynski elaborates most extensively on the importance of core values in the Flag Day speech where they are discussed as a reason of conflict between two opposing camps – patriotic and liberal:

Example 7:

I think that one might say that today, what Poles expect from the state are security, freedom, equality and justice, which, in Poland, is always related to solidarity. [One might say – authors note] that these are especially important expectations. Today, we celebrate the Flag Day, the Constitution Day, national holiday, is tomorrow. I believe this is the best moment to reflect on how these issues are currently addressed in Poland. I will start with the issue of awareness, I will start with good news, with what is positive,

with something that makes us glad. The great work of patriotic circles, the great work of late president Lech Kaczynski has born fruits. The offensive of the pedagogics of shame, the offensive of all these things that were meant to put common, national values in jeopardy is failing. It is failing across all generations, especially in the youngest one. The good is distinguished from the evil, everything that has been done to blurry the boundaries between the two is in retreat.

Kaczynski claims that security, freedom, equality and justice are universal values which are shared by Poles while, at the same time, they remain crucial elements of the social supply – demand equilibrium. Interestingly, the author does not proceed to reflect on them immediately, but focuses on state of public awareness instead. Such measure is applied in order to highlight the importance of social awareness as a common denominator for all listed values as the expectations regarding prioritization of security, freedom, equality or justice cannot be formulated if citizens do not realize how important they are. National holidays celebrations make such expectations more vocal because amid the aura of crisis they serve as a symbol of rebirth and time of mobilization vis-à-vis potential threats to common values. The crisis emerges as a result of organized action taking a form of *pedagogics of shame* which endangers core values through their systematic distortion by means of a fragmentary presentation of historical events impinging on revision of collective national memory. The term *pedagogics of shame* itself is not a novelty to political scientists – it has been analyzed by looking into the role of myths in shaping politics, also in Poland. As Eugeniusz Ponczek argues (Ponczek, 2017, pp. 42-43), *pedagogics of shame* can be analyzed as a part of historical – political discourse which arouses ambivalent feelings externalized in the form of emotional criticism of historical events or historical record of certain attitudes which are subjectively deemed as unacceptable. This may lead to questioning patriotism as a source of national myths and re-formulation of national – ethnic identity. Therefore, Kaczynski devotes much attention to social awareness as a crucial factor enabling development of alternative *pedagogy of pride* bringing together members of all generations and safeguarding core values from what he sees as an attack on national unity. This seems to fit into a textbook populist concept of the good and the evil, the moral people and the mendacious elite. Kaczynski creates an ideal-type of patriotic camp centered around a discursive construct of political legacy of late president Lech Kaczynski as a cornerstone of values which

opposes competing historical narratives and dismisses its negative elements. The electoral victory speech of 25th October 2015 gives a brief account of distinctive features of such approach:

Example 8:

10 years and 2 days ago, Lech Kaczynski was elected president of the Republic of Poland. I am not mentioning this solely because we are marking 10th anniversary. I am mentioning this because without him, the United Right would not exist now, Law and Justice party would exist now. Those, who opposed the establishment in Poland would not have any chance to succeed. He was able to prevail despite a huge media attention favoring his opponents and fostering popularity of their image; he managed to win election in Warsaw, he won general presidential election in Poland, having worked as the Minister of Justice what helped us to establish Law and Justice party. He created a political momentum which led to the establishment of the party. He showed that the spirit is stronger than the flesh, he demonstrated that genuineness, high professional competences, beautiful biography and such a deep dedication to Poland, and, above all, to all workers, this was something convincing to the people. We must remember of him, we must remember also at this moment. And when he reported to me “Mr. Chairman, the mission has been accomplished”, I wish to do the same today – Mr. President, the mission has been accomplished!

Kaczynski introduces his deceased brother as a founder and key figure of political community of PiS members and its supporters, and constructs an image of a successful figure, which gave people incentives to stand up to political establishment. In this discourse, President Kaczynski is presented as a political underdog-turned-president, who fought his way through without putting a spin on his image and staying *genuine*. He is portrayed as a confident and goal-oriented politician who, in order to win the David-and-Goliath battle against the establishment (including media) based his campaign on hard work rather than electoral marketing and publicity which helped him to succeed. He is at the same time a statesman and one of the crowd, exceptional in his persistence in pursuit of goals and ability to appeal to the people. Moreover, when Kaczynski employs the metaphorical antithesis of spirit and flesh, he indirectly invokes tragic circumstances in which the presidential tenure, depicted as a great work of his brother's life, ended after

Lech Kaczynski's death in Smolensk airplane crash in 2010. By creating a romanticized image of Lech Kaczynski as a wise leader of high competences and beautiful biography, he seeks to underline his loyalty and adherence to the values that he ascribes to his brother, and show continuity of his work. Furthermore, when Kaczynski announces a landslide electoral victory in parliamentary election of 2015, he depicts it as a fulfillment of president Kaczynski's legacy and the end of certain epoch. Thus, latest electoral success is presented by PiS chairman as a landmark where the construct of Lech Kaczynski's legacy not only remains a guidebook of patriotism-driven politics, but is also placed among the Pantheon of Polish statesmen and becomes a part of political rhetoric of reform strongly linked with the discursive offensive of morality. The figure of president Kaczynski combined all values underscored by his brother which add up to moral foundations of solidarity-based Poland – justice, thanks to his service as a Minister of Justice which earned him popularity and allowed to claim victory in local and parliamentary elections; equality since Lech Kaczynski is portrayed as a statesman deriving his political roots from pro-democratic mass Solidarity movement or even being its leading figure (hence his close relationship with the workers is emphasized in Kaczynski's speech); and finally freedom, as he left a legacy which provides the people with moral motivation to act in defense of core values.

There are several interesting conclusions which can be associated with laudatory character of the analyzed extract of this speech. As Kaczynski devotes much attention to his deceased brother whom he depicts as a crucial figure both for PiS and for Poland, he uses commissive speech act (*we must remember...*) in order to show dedication to the legacy of the president, but also claim his share in its preservation when he uses intertextuality as a rhetorical device to declare electoral victory the way Lech Kaczynski did that after the outcome of the successful presidential run was announced on 23rd November 2005 (*Mr. Chairman – the mission has been accomplished!*). This measure allows Jaroslaw Kaczynski to conclude the process of discursive mythization of Lech Kaczynski and his accomplishments (*he prevailed..., he won..., he managed to..., he created..., he showed... etc.*) as well as consolidate his programmatic thin-centered ideology of moral and value-driven under a kind of patron figure of the patriotic camp and common citizens.

5.3. Euroscepticism

Although Kaczynski avoided stating clear position vis-à-vis Poland's membership in the EU prior to the accession referendum in 2003, traces of his Euroscepticism can be observed by looking at the situation that ensued after ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon which significantly decreased country's ability to influence decision-making process in the EU (Piłka, 2018). Interestingly, as the document was signed by president Lech Kaczynski which has become a deep crack on the image of Law and Justice as party presenting itself as an advocate of Polish national interests in the EU, Jaroslaw Kaczynski claimed later that the treaty had been ratified under time pressure in view of growing popularity of liberal parties in the expense of PiS and the then-incumbent president, which, as he believed, would not have been able to negotiate better provisions of the treaty (Kaczynski, 2015). At the same time, Kaczynski voiced harsh criticism towards the leading role of the French – German duo in shaping European politics which became more resounding after the outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015 coupled with Merkel's open-door immigration policy and the conflict over Nord Stream 2 pipeline project bypassing Poland. Despite this, Kaczynski does not neglect a positive role of European financial aid of which Poland has been the biggest beneficiary so far, and avoids the use of term Eurosceptic in regards to his party's ideological stance. Rather, Kaczynski's Euroscepticism emerges as a conflict of moral values between Poland and the West which is boiled down to the fight for preservation of national distinctiveness against a widespread proliferation of Western lifestyle as well as standards of liberal democracies which Kaczynski sees as incompatible with Poland's conservative – Catholic cultural background. Therefore, a type of Euroscepticism that dominates in Kaczynski's speeches, can be defined as *soft*, following Taggart and Szczerbiak's original binary classification of hard – soft Euroscepticism in which, as they argue, "*there is no principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that national interest is currently at odds with the EU trajectory*" (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003 , p. 6). In the case of Kaczynski's Euroscepticism, such opposition is based also on the moral premises regarding promotion of state interests and state values which he views as irreconcilable with certain EU policies.

Although Kaczynski does not advocate for any form of hard dissociation with the EU, he actually depicts it as a distant foreign body, a sort of decision-making center consolidated by economic hegemons which seek to pursue their interests and colonizing smaller states politically and economically. Therefore, the fact that throughout his discourse Kaczynski puts a particular emphasis on a broadly understood security ensured through the membership in NATO and the EU seems quite paradoxical; although Kaczynski criticizes Germany as a prominent agent of prioritizing hegemonic interests of the few at the expense new member states which joined the EU in 2004 and later, he does not deny a positive role of economic support of the EU which is predominantly financed by the members of the old union, including Germany is the main net contributor (Rothwell, 2016). Rather, he prefers to present Polish membership in the EU and possibility to gain financial benefits from it as a demonstration of long-awaited historical justice and compensation for what is still viewed by many Poles as Western betrayal at the Yalta conference of 1945 which put Eastern Europeans under Soviet yoke for nearly five decades. This claim can be found in Kaczynski's speech delivered at the party congress:

Example 9:

As the Law and Justice party, we supported joining the EU even when the referendum was taking place. In short, no one can accuse us of anti-Europeanism, despite what is being told about us. Moreover, we attach a great value to the European financial support. We value it a lot because it makes all types of investments possible, but also [...] it overcame the inability of the Third Republic to undertake any kind of major enterprises. This inability was striking as during first decades nothing had been done in these vast fields that require joint effort [...]. And that's right, financial support helped to achieve a breakthrough in this case. And I would like to repeat that we value them. But it does not mean that we lose the right to judgments of various kinds, including those which pertain to the historical and economic context in which financial support is provided. From historical perspective, it is important to recall, and our Western critics should be reminded of it, that Poland was the first country which opposed German Hitlerism militarily (applause). And later, only 17 days later, we were attacked by another genocidal totalitarian regime – the Soviet Union. And here comes the question – have we received any compensation for those gigantic damages from which we have not fully

recovered yet, as it is actually impossible to recover from casualties, especially among the elite, which cannot be recovered through up to 5 or 7 generations? The answer is no!

Interestingly, Kaczynski prefers to use a much broader term anti-European than Eurosceptical when he repeals the criticism regarding Law and Justice's relationship with the EU as accusatory and unjustified. PiS chairman shies away from stating Eurosceptical character of his party discourse as Euroscepticism itself bears a negative connotations which are strongly associated in Poland with right-wing radicalism with which it shares its set of moral values and anti-establishment rhetoric, but does not adopt a hard form of Euroscepticism with regard to country's membership in the EU as it would be too unpopular with many voters who prefer a moderate approach towards Brussels; they might be critical vis-à-vis transferring of decision-making power onto the supranational level, but they accept a prominent role of the EU in infrastructural modernization of Poland. Therefore, Kaczynski prefers to align with the moderate voices by recognizing importance of the EU-sponsored economic support to Poland but re-contextualizes the reasons why the state is entitled to receive them. First, they are depicted as helping to compensate the shortcomings of economic policies of previous governments and general deficit of governance on the state level. Infrastructural development and improvements in the quality of public services translate into a desirable lifting of international status of the republic. Furthermore, and most importantly, they are presented as a form of historical justice vis-à-vis tragic fate of Poles under Nazi and Soviet yoke. Kaczynski posits that the economic support of the West cannot overshadow its past wrongdoings and remains a subject of moral judgment inalterably also today. As Poland fell victim to the expansionism of two hegemonic regimes as the first country during the Second World War, current financial support is viewed as an act of late and yet disproportionate compensation for its military effort to oppose totalitarianisms, years of national suffering under Nazi – Soviet occupation and rejection of financial aid offered by the Marshal plan under duress of communists. By accepting EU funds, Poland is exercising its moral right to claim full compensation from the West as its ability to preserve and follow the core values of freedom and sovereignty had been denied earlier by Western hegemon on one hand, and ignored by the Allies at the Yalta conference. Therefore, in Kaczynski's discourse, the EU is expected to take the responsibility for historical record of their member states if it is to be viewed as an organization complying with the values of

equality, freedom and justice. As Kaczynski often sees Germany as a key driving force behind EU policies, his Euroscepticism is often based on criticism of purported German hegemony in the EU which is morally unacceptable from a standpoint of Polish *raison d'état*, where politics of history plays a major role.

This seemingly history-centric form of Euroscepticism notwithstanding, Kaczynski's discourse is by no means based solely on victimization stemming from Poland's tragic past as it also exploits popular fears and discontent with some of the EU policies. Consideration of what can be defined as *rights and duties* of the EU member states which results in the dispute over sovereignty and transfer of authority is employed by Kaczynski in order to create a sense of crisis and mobilize his followers through demonization of others. Mass influx of refugees and illegal migrants from outside Europe which generated a problem of fair distribution and relocation across the EU has become a bone of contention between countries which adopted open-door migration policy and those which reject it as a breach of sovereignty and serious security concern. What is more, mechanisms of relocation are viewed by many political leaders, including Kaczynski, as an attempt to interfere in domestic affairs of their countries, or exercise hegemonic influence and make smaller states abide by the rules of the mighty. Such rhetoric can be found in the following fragment of the party congress speech of 1st July 2017:

Example 10:

As far as European financial support is concerned, companies from these countries [Western countries – author's note] use it to large extent and that is the way they make their profit. Polish companies, or rather companies located in Poland, transfer billions of Polish zloty to the West every year, without taxes. And, Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the context that we must take into account [...] Therefore I would like to reiterate this – no one shall put us in the position where we will be forced to decide for a social catastrophe (applause). All of you have already guessed that I am talking about immigrants who are flooding into Europe and their forced relocation. According to the approval issued by Prime Minister Kopacz [Prime Minister affiliated with Civic Platform, in office 2014 – 2015 – author's note], there would be 7000 refugees in Poland now. I would like to remind you of the case of Finland which took in 100 and has had 26 000 by

now, i.e. the proportion is 1-260. In our case, a smaller proportion would be enough to cause a huge security problem, and I am not talking about terrorism, Ladies and Gentlemen... it is about a common, everyday security. There is no reason to decrease radically our standard of life, standard of life of Poles (applause). [...] Therefore, I would like to tell you today that we did not exploit the countries from which these refugees come to Europe. We did not use them as workforce. And finally, we did not call them to come to Europe. We have a full moral right to say NO to them!

Kaczynski makes a distinction between economic and political role of granting European financial support to Poland, emphasizing a conflictual relationship between them. Although EU funds help develop infrastructure and services, they also support foreign enterprises on Polish soil which are meant to increase their revenue while largely ignoring state interests through tax evasion etc. Therefore, foreign businesses operating on Polish market are perceived by Kaczynski as agents representing interests of their countries of origin which do not serve the cause of strengthening sovereignty of Poland but make it more dependent on major economic powers. Economic leverage of European hegemons operationalized through the control of vast segments of domestic market is seen as a sign of declining international status of Poland and growing susceptibility to external political pressure in the process of outlining and implementation of common policies of the EU which may undermine this status even further. In this context, reference to the refugee crisis is supposed to expose imperialist mindset of the West treating Eastern Europe as a colonized periphery which it saddles with self-made problems. By yielding to the will of the powerful, Poland would jeopardize its security, and thus decrease a living standard of its citizens. The example of Finland, though used arbitrarily and without any solid argumentation vis-à-vis scarcity of common socio-economic features it shares with Poland, is invoked with its perlocutionary force as Kaczynski presents what he sees as inevitable damage to the well-being of its citizens if Poland decides to take in refugees in comparison to the desirable sense of security, and quality of life. Demonization of others as well as otherization of irresponsible elites (Prime Minister Kopacz and her cabinet) provide an incentive to consolidate around key components of PiS ideal-type organic national morality and voice objection towards what is perceived as neocolonial policy of the European superpowers.

5.4. Conclusions

Texts selected for the purpose of discourse analysis in this chapter feature a set of ideological components characteristic to thin populism, operationalized through a national, value-oriented populist rhetoric promoted by Kaczynski. In line with Mudde and Kaltwasser's definition of populism, the author embraces a binary opposition between the people and the elite as irreconcilable conflict of interests. A need for change in power relations is driven by subjectively acknowledged expectations of citizens with regard to moral (ideal) and pragmatic (normative) qualities of state and sense of statesmanship. Therefore, Kaczynski's statements in this respect can be regarded as a manifestation of experiential value of his discourse since he presents his experience of the society derived from importance traditionally attached to moral values in politics by Law and Justice party. Furthermore, as those premises are considered universal and mandatory to secure legitimacy, any non-compliance is regarded as a form of de-legitimization as it does not match with the core values shared by the people. The elite, as portrayed in Kaczynski's speeches, does not recognize such norms and, by doing so, acts against the popular will what renders it illegitimate vis-à-vis the citizenry. The conflict that ensues concerns representation as a key feature of political regime advocated for by Kaczynski – although the emphasis on people's will as a source of legitimacy is characteristic to the concept of direct democracy as a form of popular rule, it is confronted with a notion of nationalist type of good government which respects and shares moral values of the people, but also offers a major overhaul in the understanding of the relationship between the people and the state where the latter emerges as a quasi-organic entity and serves as a producer and provider of goods for the former. The state is thus functionally detached from the people. Therefore, Kaczynski seems to favor a strong, state-centric vision of Polish politics, manifested best in his concept of *raison d'état*, in which the state gains its legitimacy by embracing moral values of the people as own and generally binding, and satisfying public needs. Kaczynski does not seek, however, to return the power to the people – he reaffirms it as the source of legitimacy, but invests the state with the power and authority to exercise it.

For Kaczynski, truth constitutes one of the most important elements of the set of moral values appearing in his speeches. In order to be validated, truth needs to be

manifested in the public space, and citizens must be made aware of it. As truth is tantamount to the subjective understanding of socio-political events, the state in Kaczynski's view assumes a position of the agent of truth – it disseminates it and controls it on the basis of moral imperative imposed upon it by the popular will. Therefore, the primary accusation Kaczynski makes against the elite is related to the immoral aspect of its intentions which renders it ineligible to act as representatives of the people.

As the binary opposition between the people and the elite extends far beyond the boundaries of domestic politics, Kaczynski's populism manifests itself in his Euroscepticism and definition of the EU as community of sovereign nations. Kaczynski sees Poland's membership in this organization as a threat to country's sovereignty in economic and political areas. Although he avoids harsher criticism towards European financial support for Polish infrastructure and state services, he highlights threats the EU's liberal policies pose to national moral values, distinct Polish identity and existential security of Poles. Furthermore, Kaczynski perceives delegation of power to the supranational level as an attempt to impose diktat of Western hegemonic powers on Poland (with Germany as the archenemy), unacceptable in the view of Law and Justice's take on politics of history and moral obligation of the West to make amends for past crimes.

Identification of core components of Kaczynski's populism allows for grouping them into orders of discourse according to their specific features with the proviso that all of them should be categorized as populist since they reflect the hostility between the people and the establishment. The first order of discourse concerns moral evaluation of the state as a producer and supplier of goods, and which I shall define as a discourse of moral state. As mentioned above, Kaczynski acknowledges state as a supreme value which provides instruments to implement decisions based on the will of the sovereign. As the state apparatus is captured or appropriated by the elite, it loses popular legitimacy based on the concept of democratic representation as it stops reflecting people's will. By regaining control over the state, people regain footing for preservation of their identities and distinctiveness vis-à-vis other nations. This sense of control is validated through rejection – the moral state, as detached from the people, derives its morality both as a result of common values of people, such as memory and truth, but also from evaluation of history. Poland, as a moral state, in line with Kaczynski's reasoning, acts morally when

it counters Western dominance on the basis of tragic past experience. Growing interdependence and supranational decision-making stands in direct contradiction with morality-based state-centrism of Kaczynski's populism. Therefore, an alienation of the elite as representatives of foreign interests and proponents of the *pedagogics of shame* renders them immoral due to rejection of common national values on their part.

Another order of discourse is related to the sense of crisis, and thus can be formulated generally as a discourse of crisis. In the context of Kaczynski speeches cited in this chapter, crises inextricably accompany an imaginary people's struggle for preservation of memory and acknowledgment of public truth by the establishment. Crisis serves here not only as a mode of mobilization but also consolidation of the narrative around several issues central to all selected texts. As the matter of fact, sense of crisis in Kaczynski's discourse pertains to variety of issues – Smolensk tragedy and its commemoration, common legacy or EU membership, all of which are intertwined. In the first instance, crisis emerges due to state's inability to enforce *popular belief* about complicity of establishment in bringing about the airplane crash. Any lack of validation of such belief in a form of manifestations of state-sanctioned commemoration in public space is perceived as a deliberate concealment of truth, which extends far beyond the issue of Smolensk catastrophe and becomes a key feature defining hostility towards the elite in general. Moreover, domestic crisis develops on the level of national psyche, as actions of the establishment prohibit access to truth as a common good on one hand, but also encroach on the legacy of a so-called patriotic camp on the other. Similarly, crisis can be overcome only by recapturing the state and implementing a sole patriotic moral narrative about truth in order to defuse the crisis. On the level of international relations, however, crisis is related to unsatisfactory political and economic status of Poland. Although European financial support is perceived by Kaczynski as an act of historical justice for suffering hardships in the past, it is not equal to improvement of international position of the state. Therefore, in his reasoning, Poland is able to reach a desirable political status only as a sovereign, morality-guided state. In the context of international relations, morality is applied in Kaczynski's discourse as a defensive aspect of countering diffusion of decision-making which he sees as primary manifestation of EU's neocolonialism in Central and Eastern Europe.

Finally, there are several conclusions one can draw with regard to the presentation of reality based on illocutionary acts used by Kaczynski in his speeches. First of all, outlining binary opposition between the good and the evil requires use of verdictives as manifestations of judgements and proclamations. In the context of Kaczynski's speeches, Example 1 features the use of verdictive speech acts with regard to his subjective moral evaluation of actions undertaken by the establishment vis-à-vis the role of truth in Polish society. Second, in order to develop his argumentation which supports his construct of the socio-political reality, Kaczynski resorts to illocutionary force of expositives which systematize his narrative and highlight premises upon which he visualizes current and desirable state of political affairs. The use of expositives are best demonstrated in Example 4 and 5 where PiS chairman discusses typology of state legitimacies derived from moral imperative of public truth. Finally, an extensive use of commissives by Kaczynski enables to show his dedication to trigger off a shift in power relations between the people and the elite and indicate most appropriate modes of action in this regard.

6. Chapter Five - Empirical implications of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's thin-centered populism

Social structures are the key element in Fairclough's model of CDA, and thus, along with analysis of discourse practice, deserve proper attention. Having analyzed textual properties of Kaczynski's discourse and having conducted interpretation of extracts of selected speeches, I shall proceed to discuss how ideas laid out by PiS chairman are reflected in a more tangible form of state legislation, and what socio-political impact they may have. As pointed out in the chapter 1, since political discourses cannot be studied without taking political context into consideration, Kaczynski's discourse should not be analyzed retrospectively, i.e. focusing solely on the links between political ideology championed by Law and Justice party throughout years of its presence in Polish politics and Kaczynski's current discourse, but also, in line with Foucault's concept of productive function of power, by looking into products of populist discourse which was strengthened by a landslide victory in parliamentary election of 2015 as well as an ability to secure an overall majority of the new incumbents enabling them to exercise legislative power to unprecedented degree in the history of post-1989 Poland.

6.1. Preservation of memory – elements of Kaczynski's discourse in the amended bill on the Institute of National Remembrance

Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) was established in 1998 as a state-affiliated agency tasked with collecting data and conducting research on the modern history of Poland, with a special focus on the period of World War II and communist rule in 1944 – 1989. Polish government assigned IPN a range of educational-analytical-investigative competences related to the preservation of national memory about victims of German – Soviet occupation and post-war communist terror, protection and publication of documents left after the dissolution of pre-1989 state security agencies as well as investigation of crimes against the Polish nation and conducting background checks of public officials with regard to their alleged cooperation with communist-time secret service. Moreover, the institute was granted powers allowing prosecution of war crimes, crimes against peace and mankind (Institute of National Remembrance, 2018). However, despite its statutory non-partisanship, IPN has faced criticism for taking form of a quasi-

ministry involved in re-writing national history and slandering some of the anti-communist oppositionists and aligning with the political right (Stola, 2012). As the matter of fact, the role of IPN in Polish politics has become a subject of fierce debates about politicization of memory and promotion of political discourse based on nationalism and victimization of Poles. The amendment of law on the National Remembrance Institute, often referred to as the *Holocaust law* (which seems to be an oversimplification, as approach towards the Holocaust is just one of many issues brought up in the text of new law) has contributed to this image.

As Grzebyk argues (Grzebyk, 2017, pp. 288-290), the amendments introduced into the law on IPN constituted a Polish government's response to the shift in contemporary public discussion on World War II from concentrating on the scope of Nazi crimes in this period towards the extent of collaboration with occupants and complicity in crimes perpetrated against local populations. The enactment of amended bill entailed a general penalization of denial of Nazi crimes but did not provide a clear definition thereof. Moreover, the new law criminalized statements indicating general complicity of Poles in Nazi crimes and unilaterally applied the term *genocide* in the context of mass killings of ethnic Poles by Ukrainian nationalists on the territory of Volhynia, but failed to apply the same criteria of definition in the case of extermination of Jews. However, the most controversial provisions prescribed in the law (Art 55a & 55b) concerned legal liability to a fine or restriction of liberty of a person who uses terms prohibited by law as defamatory unintentionally or as a result of misinformation, as well as the applicability of law irrespective of the place of commission of the prohibited act and offender's nationality (it pertains to Polish citizens and foreigners alike). Therefore, as critics of the amended law contended (Machcewicz, 2018) it would result in limiting general debate on sensitive historical issues and legitimize only IPN-sanctioned selection and presentation of facts.

Although the two most controversial provisions were repealed in June 2018, the rationale which underpinned proposed amendments to the law on IPN is reminiscent of Kaczynski's discourse of truth. In an interview for the Polish Radio on 29th June 2018, PiS chairman stated that although new regulations remain *dead* and *could not be applied without causing negative consequences for our country*, they were an expression of what he called *our story on the World War II that is essentially true*. He also believed that

thanks to the amended law, Poland was able to *achieve the goal called truth* and called it a *success* (Kaczynski, 2018). When asked about criticism towards the new law and lack of public discussion prior to the enactment of Art 55a and 55b, Kaczynski argued it stemmed from *a lack of farsightedness* regarding potential results of open debate since, as he put it, *there would be forces in the world, which would block it* (Kaczynski, 2018). Furthermore, in the response to the question on public outcry it triggered abroad, PiS chairman highlighted that opposition against the new law was a result of a growing international status of Poland as a country delineating alternative path to the European mainstream politics. Finally, when asked whether the record of Polish diplomacy and Polish politics of history could have been different had similar legal changes been made in the past, Kaczynski argued that rejection of *pedagogics of shame which shatters Polish sense of confidence and Polish sense of nationality* would have had positive impact on country's political position in the world as Poland has *a crucial argument [in international politics – author's note] – this argument is truth* (Kaczynski, 2018).

As a part of politics of history, truth and preservation of memory were a crucial factor behind the adoption of new legislation. On the basis of Kaczynski's words cited above, it can be concluded that formalization of a uniform discourse of memory was a means to strengthen political status of Poland in the international relations and counter discourses regarded as foreign, mendacious and harmful to the reputation of Poland as a victim state of the WWII and events that followed it. Although the law turned out to be quite counterproductive, as Kaczynski admitted himself, its success was ascribed with purely demonstrative value – as long as the truth was expressed, the law proved effective. Therefore, highlighting agency of the state in pursuit of truth embedded, as per his words, in *our story* became an apparent manifestation of discourse which permeated legislation in order to achieve political goals. Moreover, as can be concluded from Kaczynski's statements, as politics of memory seems to be conducive to the competition of narratives and does not to attach importance to the consultation of historical facts between political partners as it presupposes that truth lies only with one of them, a rhetoric of such politics is meant to reverberate domestically and internationally but does not leave much room for open discussion since, as Kaczynski put it, any wider debate on history is perceived as standing substantially in sharp opposition to the purposes of politics of memory itself;

it becomes a battle around truth, in Foucauldian terms, rather than a presentation of sound argumentation derived from solid premises.

These controversial provisions of the new law which provide for punishment of deliberate and unintentional distortion or denial of historical facts alike seem to serve the purpose of domestic consolidation around state-sanctioned discourse. As Kaczynski puts a major emphasis on countering other discourses defined under the term pedagogics of shame, historical narratives are designed in order to safeguard contemporary interests of the state vis-à-vis its citizens, i.e. inculcation of a uniform story which can be adopted as *ours* by the latter. Therefore, politics of history comes about as a useful instrument to foster identification of individuals with the state on the basis of absorption of state-generated historical imaginaries as a set of simplified, re-contextualized assumptions which come in handy in explaining current political relations and facilitate identifying them as peoples' own.

6.2. Elements of Kaczynski's discourse in judicial reforms in Poland

Re-writing history is often accompanied by demonization of certain group which is considered immoral, corrupt or immune to political changes, and deepening of binary opposition between the good and the bad, the righteous and the villains. As Kaczynski's political discourse rests heavily on a populist juxtaposition of the people and the elite on one hand, and concept of a peculiar state-centrism combining state interventionism with a variety of spheres of socio-economic public activity (the notion of the state as producer and supplier of goods) and nationalist, often isolationist political orientation on the other, a political program of major systemic overhaul which is frequently referred to as *the good change* (Polish *dobra zmiana*) has become known as a synonym of purging officials critical of the incumbents from public institutions in order to *heal* the state, i.e. consolidate power over its apparatus. As Stanley Bill argues (Bill, 2018), since 2015, Polish judicial system has been one of the sub-systems of tripartite separation of powers most affected by legal changes in series of laws concerning proceedings of Polish Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, merging of competences of Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General as well as extension of power as per the new Act on the Public Prosecutor's Office. Moreover, the new Act on Common Courts granted Minister of Justice an authority to dismiss and appoint new local court presidents. This measure brought about an

unprecedented wave of institutional purge, replacing around one-third of heads of local courts. Last but not least, PiS politicized the National Council of the Judiciary, an constitutional advisory body which includes heads of the Supreme Court, Supreme Administrative Court, Minister of Justice, as well as representatives of Polish parliament and local courts of various kinds (administrative, civil, military etc.), by changing rules of appointment and giving the authority to appoint 15 out of 25 counselors who are mostly party affiliates.

As explaining the extent of judicial reforms in Poland is beyond the scope of this Master's thesis, I have highlighted briefly the character of changes and most prominent legal amendments in order to provide background for further discussion of Kaczynski's discourse which is strongly linked with current remaking of country's courts. The major argument used by the PiS chairman in favor of the top-down overhaul of judicial system stems from his vision of corrupt judicial elite which needs to be replaced. In an interview for the Polish Radio on 10th February 2017, Kaczynski stated that PiS would *get rid of widespread pathologies in the judicial system* and its policies are based on *rejection of all these things that stem from previous political system and post-1989 pathologies* (Kaczynski, 2017). As he pointed out, *judiciary as a part of Polish society has been corrupted by the hybrid democratic – post-communist political system which needs to be cured* (Kaczynski, 2017).

The judicial reform provides another example how Kaczynski's discourse feeds into adoption of a new legislation. As judiciary as a whole is presented as a closed circuit or clique which was incorporated into a new state apparatus after the fall of communism and seeks to preserve its privileges it was entitled to for many years, a major systemic overhaul cannot be accomplished without changing the judicial system since it remains a constitutive element of the binary opposition between the righteous people and the corrupt elite. In the interview quoted above, Kaczynski often refers to the judiciary as a stronghold of post-communism which generates practices unacceptable from the standpoint of the people; as long as interests of the people are neglected by some judges, the judiciary as a collectivity is expected to bear a joint accountability for it. Furthermore, the perception of the post-1989 Poland as a corrupt *hybrid democratic – post-communist political system* (Kaczynski, 2017) may reinforce the image of democracy as incapable of bringing post-communist elites to account and boil it down to a purely procedural

mechanism legitimizing the rule of the incumbents but limiting the efficiency of proper vetting of public officials. All this accounts for a failed de-communization and preservation of *pathologies*, in Kaczynski's terms, and requires an immediate action by the government truly representing the people's will. Therefore, politicization of judicial system is presented as a legitimate operation which the incumbents carry through thanks to their democratic mandate to represent the people.

6.3. Summary

This chapter provided an inquiry into how Kaczynski's populist discourse translates into pieces of legislation adopted by the Law and Justice party. The legal acts presented herein concern the problems of identity-making (the law on the Institute of National Remembrance) and exchange of elites which was an underpinning reason for a series of legal acts influencing the current shape of Polish courts, starting from the Constitutional Court through local common courts and ending up with the advisory bodies such as the National Council of the Judiciary.

In the first case, the use of discourse was limited to the construction of selective historical narrative based on victimization of the Polish nation vis-à-vis German, Soviet and Ukrainian crimes committed during World War II and its legal legitimization in a form of generally binding penal regulations. As such, the law on IPN seems to be aimed at mobilizing the public around revisionist politics of history promoted by the ruling party, and thus providing incentives for Poles to embrace the PiS-driven isolationist attitude in international relations with other European countries on one hand, and promote a vision of state as a repository of collective memory and an advocate of truth on the other.

The reasons behind re-shaping Polish judicial system are slightly different. The recent changes which heavily affected country's judiciary seem to originate from Kaczynski's discourse of crisis and the crucial role of the binary opposition between the people and the elite in his vision of politics. Since Polish judges are depicted as an alienated clique benefitting from the drawbacks of an incomplete democratic transition, and thus constitute part of the post-communist elite, they do not possess popular legitimacy to perform public duties. Therefore, the current position of judiciary reflects moral crisis of the state apparatus and stands in opposition to Kaczynski's vision of state-

centrism because it enjoys constitutionally protected independence from the executive and remains immune to the external influences. As its direct responsiveness to the popular will is limited, the need for more public control and exchange of elite is reinforced.

7. Conclusions

In this Master's thesis I have attempted to determine characteristics of Jarosław Kaczyński's political discourse based on the selection of 5 speeches delivered on various occasions, and investigate their relationship with a thin-centered concept of populism. In order to conduct my study, I have employed a methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis developed by Norman Fairclough which enabled to embed my research in a comprehensive, three-dimensional model encompassing the analysis on the level of text, discursive practice, i.e. production and interpretation of texts, and social practice involving its impact on the society and political processes. The analysis has brought several interesting results.

Among the core concepts upon which Kaczyński's political discourse rests I have identified the following:

- Morality as a concept underpinning the emergence of the populist binary opposition between the people and the elite,
- Truth viewed as a moral quality fundamental to the politics of memory and national identity,
- The idea of collective memory as a carrier of truth upon which Kaczyński builds his concept of offensive and defensive politics of memory
- State-centrism intertwined with the notion of organic state as a producer and supplier of goods that enjoys popular legitimacy, but exercises sovereign power and authority on behalf of the people,
- Core values – freedom, equality and justice are listed by Kaczyński as constitutive to the concept of solidarity-based Poland as a counterbalance to liberalism.

Textual analysis of selected speeches have brought several interesting results. First, selected texts feature a high degree of repetitions which strengthen communication of author's ideas given the context of their delivery. Among the most frequent ones are those which serve the presentation and reinforcement of the juxtaposition between the people and the elite. Kaczyński often employs a pronoun *we* or possessive determiner *our* vis-à-vis *they* and *their* in reference to the preservation of *our* memory or dedication to *our* state. What is distinctive of the speeches invoked in this thesis is that Kaczyński very

often uses modal verbs together with the pronouns *we* and *they* in order to express obligations and build his argumentation upon presentation of alternative options or aftermath of inaction (*we must win, we must explain, we must protect, we must remember, they cannot win*). Second, as concepts of morality, memory and truth are of crucial importance for creation of imaginaries in his discourse, they are frequent points of reference for Kaczynski's rhetoric, as the adjective *moral* appears five times across the texts, *memory* – six, and *truth* – eight. Finally, his account of the state-centrism makes the word *state* one of the most extensively used throughout analyzed texts, as it is mentioned seventeen times.

In line with Austin's classification of speech acts, a wide range of illocutions can be found in selected texts. As Kaczynski discourse draws on moral judgements of intentions and actions on both sides of the populist binary opposition, the role of verdictives is crucial to the creation of imaginaries about political reality. Furthermore, Kaczynski employs expositives as a part of his argumentation for challenging existing status quo and advancing own vision of elite change and state-centrism which is supported by an extensive use of commissives, i.e. demonstration of commitment to proposed changes.

As far as the question of ideational and discursive populism is concerned, political relations are depicted according to the binary opposition which renders co-existence of the people and the elite irreconcilable due to their political aims. Although Kaczynski speaks from the position of the leader of party in power, he stretches his concept of the establishment to include representatives of opposition, the EU, Polish judiciary etc., in order to highlight a spectrum of behind-the-scenes operations to deny access to power for representatives of the people. Kaczynski presents his experience of the nation and the state as uniform, morality-driven entities, the values of which do not correspond to liberalism. Therefore his ideational populism rests on the thin-centered populism, or rather its ideological thinness, whereas the discursive populism manifests itself through a range of rhetorical measures with ideational populism in its core, such as claiming the right to speak on behalf of citizens, legitimization of own action and de-legitimization of those undertaken by others based on a subjective sense of morality, development of the victimization narrative and pursuit of historical justice in relations with foreign countries

as well as selective use historical events in order to promote current political interests, as exemplified by the politics of memory.

Given the importance of social practice in Fairclough's model, Kaczynski's speeches as social events are intertwined with social practice as they translate into legislative actions undertaken by the ruling party and agencies *de facto* subordinate to it. The pieces of legislation invoked in the last chapter demonstrate how Kaczynski's interpretation of people's desires for political change is reflected in reality. As demonstrated by the adoption of amendments to the law on the Institute of National Remembrance and the major legislative overhaul of Polish judicial system, Kaczynski's populist concept of the people – elite cleavage as well as construction of a new national – moral identity supported by a range of state-imposed values has an important bearing on the provisions of newly-enacted legislation as they are built upon the axis of memory – morality – truth.

The law on IPN envisages penalization of attaching blame to the Polish nation and the state for Nazi war crimes committed on the territory of Poland and criminalizes both intentional and unintentional distortion or denial of historical record of German, Soviet and Ukrainian war crimes. Although the original law was meant to safeguard reputation of Poles as victims of totalitarian occupation and counter false accusations of general complicity of Poland in the World War II crimes, the amendments introduced by the ruling Law and Justice party served as an instrument of national consolidation around the narrative of victimization, and provided countermeasures against the so-called pedagogics of shame, i.e. belittling historical achievements of Poland and criticism (often emotional) of historical events seen as revisionist, breaking up national unity and damaging national identity of Poles. In light of Kaczynski's rhetoric, the new law seemed to constitute an effort to fend off competitive discourses through a state-sanctioned mythmaking and selective presentation of historical facts. Furthermore, as politics of memory remains crucial to Kaczynski's understanding of *raison d'état*, history becomes a common platform for bolstering a uniform set of historical *truths* which can be re-contextualized according to political needs of the moment.

As stated above, far-reaching judicial reforms were underpinned by slightly different motivations. Polish judges are presented by Kaczynski as a clique consisting of

people with communist past who kept their posts as a result of moral decay of democratic elites. Thus, judiciary as a whole fell victim to Kaczynski's discourse of populism as it was presented as a part of alienated establishment benefitting from their offices, and placed on the side of elite as per the binary opposition essential to Kaczynski's thin-centered populism. Furthermore, the image of judiciary supports necessity of major systemic change as a part of the moral battle around the state – as long as the state is gains legitimacy from the people in order to perform its functions of producing and disseminating goods and services, this legitimacy seems to be unilaterally cancelled by the people if, in Kaczynski's terms, it acts against the morality of its citizens. As a result of de-legitimization of elites, the new government introduced a number of reforms which, however, do not empower the people and enable them to exercise a direct authority, but in a way detach the state from its source of legitimization while providing the people with incentives to choose in favor of interventionist solidarity-based model of government.

All in all, a study of Kaczynski's speeches in light of Critical Discourse Analysis contributes to a broader understanding of the influence of populism as a thin ideology on public discourse and political developments alike. However, even though an analysis of social cleavages remains beyond the scope of this Master's thesis, a phenomenon of rifts between proponents of the solidarity-based and liberal Poland as a product of Kaczynski's political discourse deserves much attention as it may complement the research on the impact it has on perceptions of the Polish state and society itself and a study of political discourse in Poland.

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