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**Countering the Russian Military Threat in the Baltics: Implementation of  
Asymmetric Non-Linear Defense Model by the Estonian Defense League**

MA thesis

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# **Countering the Russian Military Threat in the Baltics: Implementation of Asymmetric Non-Linear Defense Model by the Estonian Defense League**

Taavi Linnus

## **Abstract**

The recent conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria have demonstrated that the Russian Federation is willing to use armed forces to achieve foreign policy goals. The next possible target for Russia's expansionist foreign policy could be the Baltic states. To meet this challenge, the Baltic states are seeking to bolster their deterrence capabilities. The Estonian voluntary military organization, the Estonian Defense League, has taken a different approach from conventional by strengthening the Estonian defense posture by adopting an asymmetric non-linear defense model. The aim of this thesis is to examine how that model should be implemented. To do this, I examined the developments of the Russian Armed Forces since the military reform of 2008, established key capability areas and demonstrated how non-linear defense model can counter those capabilities.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AAD – Air Assault Division

A2D2 – Anti-Access and Area Denial

BTG – Battalion Tactical Group

CAA – Combined Arms Army

COD – Centre of Gravity

EDF – Estonian Defense Forces

EDL – Estonian Defense League

EMS – Electromagnetic Spectrum

EW – Electronic Warfare

ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

FALWD – Finnish Army Land Warfare Doctrine

FDF – Finnish Defense Forces

IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle

ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer

RAF – Russian Armed Forces

RGF – Russian Ground Forces

TDG – Tactical Decision Game

UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

WMD – Western Military District

## **1.Introduction**

Due to the ongoing crises in Ukraine, NATO and its member states have started to realize the potential threat of Russian Federation. The next possible target for Russia's expansionist foreign policy could be the Baltic states. This is the reason why the Baltic states have actively sought the presence of NATO allies on their territories to bolster their deterrence capabilities. NATO has responded by establishing a trip-wire force in the Baltic states and Poland. These are battalion-sized units contributed by the allies. However, it is not certain if these forces would be capable of deterring possible Russian aggression and in the case of aggression, it is clear that the battalion sized units are not enough to successfully withhold Russian advance.

Several security experts believe that the Baltic security environment should be strengthened. The RAND corporation conducted a research based on military wargames which concluded that Russian forces would be capable of reaching the outskirts of Riga and Tallinn within 60 hours (Shlapak, Johnson 2016:1). Although the independent defense capabilities of the Baltic states themselves have been largely neglected in the research, the overall message is important: Russian Federation is capable of capturing Baltic states before NATO could send in reinforcements.

Even though cooperation within NATO is essential for creating a credible deterrence posture, Baltic states must build up their own defense forces to resist any possible aggression. In case of Estonia, the state has overcome first hardships in creating its Defence Forces and military expenditures are already above 2% of GDP. Defence Forces is based on conscript service and the number of reserves is increasing each year. This constitutes for the conventional force in form of two infantry brigades.

Additionally, Estonia has a unique voluntary structure called the Estonian Defence League (EDL). EDL defines itself as a „voluntary national defense organization operating in the area of government of the Estonian Ministry of Defence which is organized in accordance with military principles, possesses weapons and holds exercises of a military nature“ (EDL



webpage 2020). EDL with its suborganizations has around 26 000 members out of whom around 10 000 are combatants who can be used in military operations. With the recent changes in the leadership of the EDL the organization has taken a different approach to strengthening the Estonian defense posture. This has started a debate of how to use a voluntary organisation effectively in military operations.

Before the summer of 2019, when the command of the EDL went over to brigadier-general Riho Ühtegi, the organization mostly focused on conventional warfare capabilities. This meant that Estonia was (and still is) divided into four military districts: northern, northeastern, western and southern. Each of these districts was tasked to provide a battalion-sized battlegroup that would be incorporated to the first or second infantry brigade based on their location. With the change of command, there has also been a change of thought process within the organization. There is an understanding that the EDL will provide a military structure to the Defence Forces that will perform territorial defense duties. This means that the EDL battle groups will no longer be incorporated within the infantry brigades but will act as a conventional force using non-linear methods of fighting in their assigned territories.

Non-linear method of fighting implies the rethinking of conventional front lines of the battlefield and concentrates on attacking the sides and rear of enemy units even if the first units have passed through the first lines of defense. The concept is based on small units that use mobility and surprise to ambush and attack enemy units. Even if enemy forces have captured an area, the surrounding area is still under the control of friendly forces (Ühtegi 2020:10). For example, when the enemy units have pushed back Estonian conventional units from Võru county and are controlling the main highways and cities, the EDL units still hold control over the forested area and smaller villages. These areas can be used for bases of operation to harass enemy units. This method is also called the chaos strategy, best used by Napoleon during the Napoleonic wars. The core of the strategy was to divide and decentralize army into smaller groups which can act and decide independently according to the general mission and end state given to them by the commander. This approach offers greater mobility, creativity and motivation for the officers and soldiers and enabled Napoleon to crush the Austrian general Karl Mack before the battle of Austerlitz (Greene 2016:67-73).

Non-linear method of fighting entails the dispersion principle. According to the dispersion principle, operations are conducted with small units on a large area. The main benefit of this approach in asymmetric conflict is that it denies enemy utilizing their strength in conventional capabilities as they cannot fix and destroy friendly units. The aim of dispersed combat activity is not to control any area but to constantly harass and attack enemy forces to break down their morale and damage their units (Ühtegi 2020:10). It requires units to be flexible and relocate after each engagement to minimize the risk of being captured or destroyed. This approach requires information of enemy movements on lowest command level and puts greater responsibility to the small unit leaders as they must be capable of planning and executing operations independently. By no means is this approach passive and requires aggression against enemy units to reach the aim.

Another important principle in this thinking is the three “V” principle. The three “V” principle means that there are *võitlejad* (combatants), *võimendajad* (amplifiers) and *võimaldajad* (enablers) and the use of these elements in the EDL structure will increase its efficiency. The combatants are those EDL members who choose to defend the country with arms, the men in front. They receive training and equipment based on their tasks during a conflict and engage enemy units as required (Ühtegi 2019: 10). To increase their efficiency, they are backed by different networks of territorial defense, the amplifiers. These networks include observation, communication, logistics and supply tasks and they can be performed by people who necessarily do not have the physical durability to be combatants but still want to contribute (Ühtegi 2020:10, 2019:10). The enablers are the members of supportive local community and environment. Their resources can be used to multiply the tactical effect. For example, the use of harvesters and logs can create a difficult obstacle for the invading forces that slows them down.

This direction has significant impact for the EDL. In the context of conventional warfare, light-infantry platoons and companies are used to fighting within close proximity of a larger friendly force that could support them with supplies and additional military capabilities when necessary. In case of non-linear fighting method, the same platoons and companies will be using small-unit tactics ranging from squad to company and the main method of impacting

the enemy forces is through ambushes and raids. (Ühtegi 2020:11). The decentralized nature of this fighting method forces the EDL members to have a shift in their mindset and concentrate on small unit tactics and survival, possibly without support from a larger unit.

Although general Riho Ühtegi states that non-linear method is not the same as guerilla warfare on the basis that non-linear operations begin immediately after the first enemy units have moved through, there are clear similarities. Both methods entail small-unit tactics with a strong emphasis on the element of surprise. Each concept also requires advanced knowledge in camouflage, reconnaissance, leadership skills and the ability to use civilian population for your cause. There are also several difficulties with guerilla tactics. Namely, guerilla tactics have mainly been used by non-state actors with little regard to international law. Such prospect is unacceptable for the EDL. Another issue is that larger states see guerilla forces more in the realms of terrorists than combatants. This raises the question of how to effectively use non-linear/guerilla methods of fighting within the EDL?

The aim of this thesis is to examine how have the capabilities within Russian Armed Forces (RAF) developed since the military reform of 2008 and how can non-linear methods counter those developments. The thesis has three research questions: (1) What are the essential elements of non-linear/guerilla methods; (2) What are the key developments within the RAF since the 2008 military reform; (3) How can non-linear defense counter RAF capabilities? One of the possible results of this thesis is to give the Estonian Defense League recommendations on what sort of training should be emphasized in order to prepare combatants for non-linear method of fighting.

This research is a single case study, which allows the author to analyze the EDL non-linear defense model specifically in relation to the developments of RAF. Even though the RAF has been involved in several conflict such as Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, those cases present differences compared to the Baltic context and therefore can only serve as examples of how RAF can act.

The literature of this thesis relies on contemporary authors. The theory of how weak actors can beat conventionally stronger enemies has been academically rather poorly studied. A.

Mack suggests that this relation is based on relative interest (Mack 1975). I. Arreguin-Toft enhanced the theory by introducing strategic interaction elements such as direct and indirect approach, where the direct approach relates to the destruction of military power and indirect approach relates to the destruction of adversaries will (Arreguin-Toft 2001). O. Fabian agrees with Arreguin-Toft in a sense that weaker actors should embrace asymmetry of power and rely on professional irregular army to defeat stronger actors (Fabian 2005).

Possible use of small-units tactics in defense of the Baltic states has been discussed by K. Salum and J. Wither. Salum reaches the conclusion that if any such method is implemented, it must receive additional resources for successful implementation (Salum 2014). J. Wither suggests that the use of small units equipped with modern technologies can create numerous difficulties for conventionally stronger enemies while in urban environment (Wither 2018).

The literature on RAF developments created some issues for the author. Most of the information available for EDL members is classified as „for official use only“ and could not be referenced. Same issue applied to thesis defended in Estonian Defense Academy. Therefore the literature used to bring out RAF developments is based on publicly available sources such as U.S Army handbooks, academic literature and reports compiled by relevant organizations.

The relevance of this thesis is practical and theoretical. Practical due to the fact that the non-linear defense approach for EDL members is new and there is confusion regarding its implementation. Therefore, this thesis can help to understand how non-linear defense model could be implied and what skill- and mindset is necessary to fight against conventionally stronger enemy. Theoretically, this thesis will contribute to the literature of how weaker opponents should fight against conventionally and technologically superior enemy, considering contemporary developments on the battlefield.

This thesis is structured in four chapters. The introduction provides a general approach to the new EDL concept and states the research puzzle and objective of this research with an overview of existing literature. Second chapter focuses on the conceptualization of non-linear defense. This chapter includes a theoretical framework of how conventionally weaker actors

can beat stronger adversaries, explains the terminology related to non-linear defense, examines the theory of guerilla warfare and explains the Swiss and Finnish security approaches. Third chapter focuses on the developments of Russian Armed Forces since the military reform of 2008 and analyses how EDL combatants should counter those threats. The thesis ends with the conclusion, list of bibliography and one appendix.

## **2. Asymmetric Non-Linear Defense**

The relationship between Russia and Baltics has been tense throughout history. From the conquest of Tartu by Yaroslav the Wise in 1030, the attempt of seizing control over the Baltics in the Livonian war struggles by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, the successful policy of „carving a window“ to the west by Peter the Great in the start of the 18th century to the ruthless occupation of the Baltics by Stalin in 1940, the Russian authorities seem to seize the opportunity to control the Baltics when given the opportunity.

In most cases, the wars conducted in the Baltics have been wars between major actors in the international arena at those times – Teotonic order, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and Russia. The indigenous people of the Baltics were forced submit to the stronger powers until 1918, when using the momentum of the First World War, Baltic states started the victorious War of Independence against the Soviet Russia. Even though the victories of the Baltic states are more accredited to the chaos in the midst of the Soviet Russia and the weakness of the Red Army during that period, the Baltic states enjoyed a brief period of independence until 1940.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the regained independence of the Baltic states, the new security situation requires dealing with the potential threat from the Russian Federation. However, unlike during the War of Independence, the Russian Federation has vast capabilities concerning conventional forces. The Russian Western Military District can operate with around 22 well-equipped battalions (tabel 1) with the ability to reinforce them from other military districts (Shlapak, Johnson 2016:4). In comparison, Baltic states are capable of mustering seven mostly light infantry battalions with lower firepower to counter them (tabel 2).

Type	Location	Quantity
Maneuver battalions	Western MD	25
Artillery battalions	Western MD	10
Missile battalions	Western MD	4
Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion		6

Tabel 1. Russian ground forces (Shlapak, Johnson 2016:5)

Country	Unit type (battalion)	Quantity
Estonia	Infantry/light infantry	5
Latvia	Light infantry	2
Lithuania	Mechanized infantry	4

Tabel 2. Baltic ground forces (Shlapak, Johnson 2016:4)

The difference between the armed forces means that any conflict between the actors would be asymmetrical in its nature because there is a “disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and liabilities” (Tomes 2004: 20). The asymmetry between actors does not mean that the weaker side is compelled to yield to the will of the stronger actor but implies to the necessity of understanding the strategic environment and making relevant corrections to the defense plan according to that environment.

## **2.1. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars**

The question of why larger states lose wars against smaller powers is rather poorly studied in academia. The pioneer in this field was Andrew Mack with “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” (Mack 1975). Mack argues that asymmetric conflict outcome is based on relative interest. The stronger the interest for a desired outcome the better chances for victory regardless the power asymmetry between the actors. (Mack 1975).

As the relative interest in conflict outcome is the key variable according to Mack, it is imperative that the smaller power in the conflict has a larger interest for victory. This interest is based on survival. In asymmetric conflict, the strong external power has no immediate threat from the weaker side. The survival of the weaker actor however is at risk as any occupation would certainly mean negative consequences for all groups for the weaker actor. This means that for the stronger actor, the interest in an asymmetric conflict is lower and the war is “limited” in its nature. As the survival of the weaker side is at stake, the interest for the weaker side is higher and the war is “total” (Mack 1975:181-184).

The difference between the conflictual relationship in the war could have wide implications for the outcome of the conflict. As the stronger side sees the war as “limited” it means, that the war effort does not take automatic superiority over other goals that society wants to achieve. To put it simply: not all resources can be attributed towards the conflict outcome and any additional request for resources give ground for internal division for the stronger actor. (Mack 1975: 184). The weaker actor does not have the same issues. As the conflict is “total,” then the war effort takes all the primacy over other goals for that society. The conflict can also promote national unity against one external actor which in turn can strengthen the resolve for victory (Mack 1975:182).

The idea behind the small actor victory against the more powerful actor is that such conflict should not be fought in military perspective but political. If the insurgency is capable of surviving and imposing “a steady accumulation of costs” towards the stronger actor’s resolve



and political motivation to continue, then the conflict will degrade over time. Any additional resources contributed by the stronger power will put more pressure on domestic support and criticism for being involved in the conflict will rise as the economic costs and casualties rise (Mack 1975: 185). As the conflict continues and demands more resources, it is the domestic opposition of the stronger actor that will eventually lead to the victory of the weaker actor. This phenomena was well seen in the Vietnam conflict and Mack argues that “as war escalated in Vietnam, the progressive escalation of domestic opposition to the war created deep divisions within U.S. society which ultimately lead to the withdrawal of troops and the victory for the Viet Cong” (Mack 1975:184). This interest based theory of asymmetric conflict outcome was challenged by Ivan Arreguin-Toft as he stated that the better indication for asymmetric conflict outcome is the strategic interaction between actors.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft in “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict” reveals essential insights on how the small states should answer to their adversary’s stronger military capabilities (Arreguin-Toft 2001). Arreguin-Toft brings out that there are two distinct strategic approaches to a conflict: direct and indirect where direct approaches aim to “target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight” and indirect approaches “seek to destroy adversary’s will to fight”. (Arreguin-Toft 2001:105). These approaches relate to the essentials of conventional and unconventional warfare strategies.

Arreguin-Toft argues that if adversaries use same approach interactions (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) then the weaker actor is compelled to lose because it is not capable of mitigating strong actors power advantage. However, when adversaries use opposite approach strategies (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), the weaker side gains an advantage as it is capable of “deflecting or dodging strong actor’s power advantage.” (Arreguin-Toft 2001:105). Arreguin-Toft tested these arguments by analyzing asymmetric military conflicts between 1800-1998 and established three key findings: 1) Strong actors are more likely to lose opposite-approach strategic interactions. 2) Opposite approach interaction conflicts take longer to resolve and 3) The frequency of opposite approach interactions has increased in proportion to strong-actor failure over time. (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 112). These correlations show that weak actors should emphasize on the use of opposite approach strategies while

planning their defense. More precisely, as the Baltic states and Russian Federation face asymmetry based on the strength of the Russian conventional forces, the Baltic states should base their defense plans on the assumption that in case of a conflict, Russian strategic approach would be direct and adopt their strategic approach to indirect.

While direct attack and direct defense strategies employ mostly conventional methods of warfare, meaning that the outcome is mostly decided upon the strength of the armed forces, the indirect strategies convert to unconventional methods of warfare. For the stronger actor, this refers to use of “barbarism” as “the systemic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a military or political objective.” (Arreguin-Toft 2001:101). As any indirect strategy aims for the destruction of adversary’s will to fight, it relates to methods such as bombing campaigns against civilian infrastructure, the use of concentration camps against civilian population, deportation and murders of civilians. Historic examples include the bombings of London and Dresden during World War II and the deportation and collectivization campaigns performed by the Soviet Union in 1949 against the Baltics to crush local guerilla movements.

Indirect defense strategy involves the use of guerilla warfare as a fighting method against the stronger actor. Guerilla warfare relates to a “form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offense in selected forms, times and places” (Kalyanaraman 2003: 172). The use of guerilla warfare as fighting method against stronger actor is seen as a possible alternative to traditional approaches by Sandor Fabian. In Fabian’s research “Irregular Warfare: The Future Military Strategy for Small States” he concludes that due to larger economic capacity the larger states have gained advantages in conventional power (Fabian 2015:323). This has created issues for the small states as they pursue “sameness” in the sense of “competition in the arts and the instruments of force” (Waltz 1979:127).

Fabian argues that historically there have been four general choices for a small state to form a defense strategy. These include 1) The build-up of traditional military force; 2) Joining an alliance; 3) Adopting neutrality and 4) Obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Fabian 2015: 3-5). Each solution comes with distinguished negative aspects for small states. The build-up of traditional military force can be economically expensive and the value could diminish while comparing it to the stronger actor. The issue with alliances is that their

strength is tested at the beginning of a conflict and there is no guarantee that alliance members would meaningfully contribute to the conflict. Neutrality works only if the aggressor agrees to the neutrality. The declaration of neutrality by the Baltic states during World War II had no effect on the Soviet leadership as they occupied the states. WMD-s are hard to obtain and their potential economic and political cost could out-weigh their deterrence values (Fabian 2015: 3-5).

Similarly, to Arreguin-Toft, Fabian argues that the best way for a small state to protect themselves is through “embracing asymmetry” (Fabian 2015: 325). Fabian suggests that “if a small state faces an enemy with superior military capabilities, the only way for the small state to win during a conflict is to take away its opponent’s advantages or make them irrelevant” (Fabian 2015: 54). This idea entails the use of professional irregular army. Fabian suggests that the armed forces of small states should focus their training and equipment on irregular warfare and that “necessary resources have to be allocated towards one single goal: to serve the irregular homeland defense strategy” (Fabian 2015: 60). This concept requires further understanding of irregular warfare and those terms related to it.

## **2.2. Irregular/Unconventional Warfare**

The term “irregular warfare” was created after the events of 9/11 when the U.S. policy officials “identified a need to create a description for what to many appeared to be a new form of warfare” (Maxwell 2013). According to the United States’ Army’s irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, IW is a “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will” (JOC 2007:6). It is important to understand, that irregular warfare is a method of fighting, a tool in the strategic thinking. As Colin S. Gray points out: “There are no such things as irregular or regular wars. There are

only wars. In search of advantage or, as often, to avoid disadvantage, warfare may be waged by methods that contemporary norms regard as irregular” (Gray 2007: 40).

To this end, irregular warfare has existed as long as war and the only distinctive character in history is the understanding of what is regarded as regular and what is not. The uprising led by Spartacus against Rome or the use of earlier mentioned chaos strategy by Napoleon against Karl Mack offer good examples as how former norms of regularity were used against themselves. Contemporary history shows us that the use of irregular methods can prove vital for a small state to successfully defend itself against stronger adversary. These examples include the Soviet-Afghanistan struggle, the First Chechen War and the Second Lebanese war.

Gray offers several distinguishing lines between regular and irregular warfare. These include: 1) Irregular warfare is waged in a style that is not mainly used by regular army; 2) Irregular warfare is waged to gather the support of local people and maintaining that is fundamental for victory; 3) Military behavior must be conducted for its political effects; 4) Irregular warfare needs an ideology; 5) Culture is the key – the contest for the loyalty of locals is based on their beliefs and traditions; 6) Time is a weapon – irregulars expect to win by not losing because they believe that they can outlast you (Gray 2007: 44-45). This entails that the basic pillars for irregular warfare are the support of the population, the capability to use military attacks for political gains and means to outlast your enemy.

According to the U.S. IW JOC there are 14 different operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW (JOC 2007:9). Among them is the unconventional warfare method (UW). According to the U.S. Department of Defense, UW is defined as “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” (Maxwell 2014). As the IW JOC states that “indigenous or surrogate forces are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source,” the U.S. understanding of UW is as a method to use on foreign soil. An example of this happened in Afghanistan in 2001 when U.S. Special Forces operators, working together with the CIA, were sent to the Northern Alliance to persuade them in going to war against

the Taliban. The U.S. operators trained and guided insurgents which lead the Northern Alliance into a victorious war (Ühtegi 2014).

However, the Estonian definition for UW holds a different perspective that is in correlation with the three “V” principle. According to MILITERM, UW is defined as “A form of warfare in a denied territory, in which military, political or economic goals are achieved by the use of guerilla or underground activities with the possible inclusion of local population and resources” (EKI). This entails that UW can be used as a defense strategy against an invading enemy force. Furthermore, the similarities to the three “V” concept are clear. The combatants could act as the guerilla force, underground movements or special operation forces (SOF) members as amplifiers and the local population with its resources as enablers.

Therefore, there is a confusion with terminology as different states and scholars define and use terms in unclear manner. For example, Jan Osburg suggests that “unconventional” options refer to “training and equipping independently operating local defense units, preparing infrastructure for demolition and instructing members of the military, as well as the general public, in how to effectively participate in resistance activities” (Osburg 2016:2). These are the same principles that general Ühtegi advocates in context of the EDL asymmetric warfare with no hint that these activities are unconventional (Ühtegi 2019, 2020: 10). Karl Salum states that “terms applied to UW participants and their activities can be viewed as clouds of words” (Salum 2014: 48). Salum defines UW as does the U.S. Department of Defense and discusses it as a principle in asymmetric warfare. This thesis relies on the definitions provided by general Ühtegi. This means that the new EDL concept is not a form of irregular or UW warfare but asymmetrical conventional warfare that applies the principles of non-linearity, dispersion and “3V”. As there is overlapping in terminology, concepts discussed in this thesis must be seen as contributors to asymmetric warfare concept.

The question of utilizing UW potential in the national defense plans for small states and in particular for the Baltics has been discussed by academia and military strategists. Karl Salum states that there are three options for small states to consider when applying UW in national defense. Option one is to integrate UW into a conventional defense strategy. The conventional defense plan would still be plan A, but in case that conventional forces are

overrun, the UW options can still provide resistance against the aggressor. This entails strong preparation and resource allocation for UW during peacetime as otherwise it would most probably fail (Salum 2014: 50). The second option would be to use UW as plan A in small state security. This means that “UW needs to be fully integrated into a small state’s national security enterprise as the crucial element of total defense.” It requires a mindset that operational losses in battlespace and resources are acceptable and that those losses will be reverted as the conflict protracts and the aggressor can not sustain its political ambitions. The third option is to use UW as a deterrence strategy either by punishment or denial. It requires a degree of openness for it to work as the potential aggressor “receives a glimpse of what he will most likely face during hostilities” (Salum 2014: 50-51).

In any case, there are several presumptions for a UW strategy to work. First, the development of UW capabilities has to achieve same authority and resources as conventional capabilities. When we consider the EDL to be the UW structure for Estonia in the future, it must be equipped and trained accordingly. Second, preparations for UW must be made during peace time. This means that participating structures know their roles and responsibilities. It entails coordination between conventional forces and UW forces, which comes through training exercises. There is a need for coordination between external partners and allies so that they know how to contribute to the UW effort. As any UW effort would most probably seen as “terrorist activity” by the invader, the allies must understand the legal situation of the conflict zone. Final presumption is that “the general population has to remain at least neutral towards the UW effort and not actively work against it.” (Salum 2014: 65).

### **2.3. The Swiss Approach**

The use of UW as strategy against a stronger enemy has been conceptualized by the Swiss during the Cold War. As the Cold War progressed, the Swiss became worried about a potential invasion by the USSR and developed a plan to counter it, manifesting in the “Total Resistance” handbook (Dach Bern 1957). The Swiss approach relied on three key elements:

1) Preparing for infrastructure denial; 2) Preparing for unconventional military resistance operations and; 3) Preparing for civilian resistance activities (Osburg 2016:2). These elements were designed to make occupation of Switzerland indigestible and create a situation where enemy forces would obtain continuous casualties.

The denial of infrastructure was designed to delay aggressors advance and buy time for resistance to form. This meant that the Swiss prepared every tunnel, bridge and major road near the borders for demolition by “integrating explosives into the structure during construction or creating caches by engineers so that retreating regular forces could install them quickly” (Osburg 2016: 4). Furthermore, the Swiss handbook offers detailed methods of sabotaging infrastructure such as railroads, fuel depots, power lines and communication lines (Dach Bern 1957: 39-71). In other words, the Swiss counted on destroying anything that could slow down enemy forces. The same principles could be adopted in the Baltics. However, the Swiss countryside is mountainous whereas the Baltics is mostly flatland. This entails that infrastructure denial could be beneficial but the inherent effect would probably be smaller.

The use of unconventional military resistance refers to the use of guerilla warfare in the Swiss context. According to Swiss understanding, Guerilla units are based on surviving members of the regular armed forces and volunteers with unit sizes ranging from squad to battalion. In fact, the recommended structure by the Swiss is 400 members strong battalions that are divided into three companies. This offers a balance between strength and mobility as “units that are too small cannot strike effectively against many targets, but the larger a unit, the harder it is to keep it supplied and the easier it is to detect” (Osburg 2016: 5). These company sized units live and operate independently with decentralized command structure and only come together to perform larger attacks. These guerilla units conduct raids and ambushes against enemy units and support the principle of infrastructure denial by sabotage and demolition. However, it is notable that the Swiss see guerilla operations taking place in rural areas. The Swiss approach also emphasizes on small-unit leadership qualities, the procurement of weapons and on the relations with population (Bach Bern 1957: 11-21).

The third component in the Swiss model is the preparation for civilian resistance activities that takes place in urban areas. The aim of the civilian resistance is to “gather intelligence, offer logistical support, document atrocities perpetrated by the invaders, produce propaganda and counterfeit documents” (Osburg 2016: 6). Due to spies, the recruitment into passive resistance units is difficult and therefore these groups should remain smaller than guerilla groups. Another important requirement is that these groups do not have public figures enlisted as attention to them is stronger by the aggressor. For these elements to work, preparations must be made during peacetime. Information operations (IO) campaigns must be conducted to offer instructions to the citizens before the conflict. These instructions include information to conduct military and civilian resistance operations with specific guidance for self-directed actions (Osburg 2016: 4).

In the context of Baltic states, there are several lessons that can be learned from the Swiss approach. So far, only Lithuania has produced a manual on emergency response and civilian resistance, which outlines “measures citizens can pursue following an invasion.” These include how to cope with enemy actions and how to support armed resistance without necessarily using a weapon. (Flanagan et al 2019: 12). Same action could be made by Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, the Swiss approach advocates keeping equipment used in conscript service at home, including rifles. The Baltic state have much stricter controls on possession of firearms. The EDL members can bring their rifles home but the process has not caught on for most of the members of the organization. Lighter restrictions on weapons possession could have positive effects on resistance but it can also create threats for the society.

## **2.4. The Finnish Approach**

The Winter War of 105 days from November 1939 to March 1940 is one of the best examples of David and Goliath fight. Fighting against the 600 000 strong Soviet Army, Finnish defensive forces were less than half of that with very limited resources of tanks and aircraft. Against overwhelming odds, the Finns were capable of inflicting more than ten times the



casualties inflicted to them and managed to preserve their independence during the Second World War. The Winter War had two different forms: conventional positional conflict among the Mannerheim Line and a guerilla war waged by Finnish ski troops against Soviet columns deep in the forested regions of Finland's interior (Rehman 2016). The Finnish ski units used "Motti tactics" based on higher mobility. The Soviet armored columns were confined to narrow roads in densely forested areas, where they were halted and destroyed. This was possible due to harsh weather conditions and excellent knowledge of the terrain.

The use of geography and lessons learned from history are key pillars in Finnish defense strategy today. Finnish land defense is described as "activities which help safeguard society's vital functions and carry out territorial surveillance over the land area making it possible to slow down and wear out the aggressor's land attack in selected terrain and ultimately defeat him" (Government's Defence Report 2017: 34). All services and civilian authorities prepare for territorial defense in depth that emphasizes delay, resilience, stealth and deception (Withers 2018). The recent cuts in the Finnish defense budget have put the defense planners into situation, where the defense of Finland had to be achieved with fewer resources. This created a need for a Finnish Army Land Warfare Doctrine (FALWD) reform.

FALWD reform integrated similar concepts to the EDL reform. The Finnish Defense Forces (FDF) abandoned the old understanding of holding an area and focused on non-linear defense. The aim is to inflict maximum amount of damage while retraining own fighting capabilities (Finnish Army Doctrine (FAD) 2015). This is achieved by initiative, mobility and flexibility. The main idea is that invading enemy forces are allowed to move through countryside and worn down by ambushes and raids. There is a strong need for preparation as the positions must be constructed before enemy units enter the area. This offers flexibility as troops have many positions where they can engage enemy. After engaging enemy, troops deploy into a new position to avoid losses. The use of fortifications, diversions and decoys are further methods of reducing casualties.

The FDF new doctrine also puts emphasis on new equipment such as drones, command systems, night vision capabilities, explosive devices and AT/AA capabilities. Emphasis is put on the command systems which means that squad leaders are provided with terminals

that provide them real time tactical awareness. The idea is to create a decentralized control structure that would offer better conditions for initiative. The decentralized nature of command structure means that “At all levels the leader is given the objective, the mission and the resources but the execution is up to the leader” (FAD 2015). The structure of the FDF changed with the new doctrine. Squads have nine members with increased firepower. The number of platoons in one company and the number of companies in one battalion is increased from three to four. The idea behind this is to make infantry units more resilient to losses as “future war will call for bigger units to make them able to maintain their combat ability” (Frisk 2018).

The Finnish approach is a mixture between *sissi* (guerilla) and maneuver warfare which embodies the same characteristics as the new EDL approach. Non-linearity, dispersion and increasing combat effectiveness through auxiliaries are key concepts in both approaches. The nature of those three principles is well manifested in the basic assumptions of guerilla warfare. Therefore, to understand the changes coming, there is a need to understand key concepts relating to guerillas.

## **2.5. Guerilla Warfare**

The basic pillar of UW method on a tactical level is the use of guerilla warfare. To understand the possible implications for the EDL, it is important to identify the basic fundamentals of guerilla warfare. This research will identify most important lessons from guerilla warfare theorists such as Mao Zedong, Ernesto „Che“ Guevara and General Vo Nguyen Giap. This offers the historical context of how guerilla warfare has successfully been used and what are the main pillars in using guerilla methods. Another important aspect for this thesis is how to use guerilla methods in contemporary environment. To understand the challenges of guerilla activities in the 21st century, the concept of „modern guerilla“ will be explained.

„Guerilla“ means little war. The term „Guerilla Warfare“ was established during the Napoleonic Wars when the Spanish and Portuguese irregulars or *guerrilleros* operated

against French occupation armies. Samuel Huntington defines guerilla warfare as a „form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places.“ As such, it is „the weapon of the weak and never chosen in preference to regular warfare“ (Kalyanaraman 2003: 172).

The first contributor to the understanding of guerilla warfare theory is Mao Zedong and his work „On Guerilla Warfare“ (Tse-tung 1937). Mao does not consider guerilla operations as independent form of warfare but sees them as one aspect in the entire war, closely linked with regular armed forces. Mao considers the conventional forces to be the primary importance and sees guerilla operations as means to support the conventional army in producing favorable outcome (Tse-tung 1939: Ch 2). According to Mao, the guerilla strategy must be based on alertness, mobility, attack and embodies flexibility as „it must be adjusted to the enemy situation, terrain, existing lines of communication, relative strenghts, weather and the situation of the people“ (Tse-tung 1937: Ch 1).

The nature of guerilla warfare is perhaps best described by Mao as he states that „in guerilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision“ (Tse-tung 1937:Ch 1). The idea behind this approach is that guerilla forces are incapable of fighting a conventionally stronger enemy head-on. Guerillas must understand the environment around them and use that to their advantage. As they attack enemy lines, they must not be pinned down as it would most probably result in the destruction of the unit. Another important aspect is that guerilla units rely on the element of surprise. If conventionally stronger enemy units are capable of predicting guerilla attacks or movements, countermeasures can be established and the influence of guerillas negated.

Mao continues with describing the nature of guerilla warfare as “When guerillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated” (Tse-tung 1939: Ch 1). This entails that the nature of guerilla warfare is to constantly be in contact with enemy units. These contacts are not

necessarily fire contacts where one side is trying to inflict casualties upon the other, but observation of enemy units. The availability of adequate reconnaissance data is essential to the planning and carrying out guerilla operations.

One of the essential pillars to achieve this goal is the command structure. According to Mao, guerilla units may vary in size from squad to regiment of several thousand (Tse-tung 1939: Ch 2). The important aspect is how the units are commanded. In the conventional army, there is a strict chain of command with limited options for initiative due to the necessary alignment of battle plans. All units and all supporting arms must co-ordinate to the highest degree to achieve the effect that the conventional army wishes. In the case of guerilla strategy, the centralized command structure does not work. According to Mao, “the small units acting independently play the principal role and there must be no excessive interference with their activities” (Tse-tung 1939: Ch 2). The decentralized command structure puts pressure on the small-unit commanders, which entails that their selection and training is of utmost importance.

The organization of guerilla forces is different from conventional army. Mao states that guerilla units can be created from five different voluntary sources: local population, conventional military units, local militias, deserters from the ranks of the enemy and criminals. The preferred source are the conventional military units that are permanently tasked for guerilla activities (Tse-tung 1937: Ch 5). These recruits will form squads, platoons, companies, battalions and regiments that operate within the territory that they are given. Territories for guerilla actions must be divided beforehand so that the actions would not interfere with one another, although guerilla units must be capable of concentrating its forces against isolated enemy targets. Mao also discusses the importance of equipment for guerilla forces. He sees that the only way to guarantee mobility is using light equipment such as rifles and demolitions equipment to destroy infrastructure. Mao states that any standardization of equipment is not necessary as it can be gathered from the enemy (Tse-tung 1937: Ch 5).

Mao emphasizes on the importance of support by the population for guerilla warfare. Without that support any guerilla activities are bound to fail. Popular support is necessary for recruitment, establishment of bases and procurement of resources. Mao states that guerillas

should also protect commerce and businesses and only demand monetary, food and equipment contribute “in proportion to the resources the population has” (Tse-tung 1937: Ch 7).

According to Mao, guerilla warfare has three general phases. The first phase is the organizational phase, where guerilla units are formed, trained and bases are created. The second phase is conducting guerilla operations. These include ambushes, raids and attacks on infrastructure, communication lines and supply lines. The third phase is the destruction of enemy units and driving them out. During this phase, guerilla forces concentrate into conventional force (Tse-tung 1937: Ch 1 and 7). These phases have similarities with the EDL non-linear method as the preparations are done during peace, non-linear methods embody guerilla tactics in the second phase and the goal is to push the potential adversary out.

The second contributor is Ernesto “Che” Guevara with “Guerilla Warfare” in which he gives his theory about guerilla warfare (Guevara 1964). Guevara emphasizes on the revolutionary aspect of guerilla fighting but gives important insights to the methods and organization. According to Guevara, the most important elements for the guerillas to survive are constant mobility, vigilance, wariness and skills in military tactics. He emphasizes the heroism of the guerillas as the most difficult aspects of guerilla fighting are not physical but mental. Guerilla fighting in Guevara’s understanding is ultimate as the guerillas either achieve their goal or die trying. “They have no alternative but death or victory, at times when death is a concept a thousand times present and victory a myth that only a revolutionary can dream of” (Guevara 1964: 18).

The theory of Guevara and Mao are similar in many aspects. Guevara also emphasizes on the popular support for any guerilla campaign. He also agrees with Mao that the best terrain for guerilla activities is rural. Rural terrain offers a distinct advantage. The economy of rural areas is based on agriculture, which is primitive in its essence. The enemy has hard time targeting agricultural economy as it is in most cases dependent on it. The economy of the enemy however is industrial, which offers targets for sabotage (Taber 1970: 37). Both authors also agree on the importance of adaptability in guerilla fighting and state that during the final

phase of hostilities, guerillas must be capable of organizing their bands into regular armed forces.

Guevara and Mao have certain differences in their theories. The level of preparation needed for a successful guerilla campaign is one of these. Mao states that during organizational phase, establishment of the conditions for guerilla war must be done. These include recruitment, training and propaganda. Guevara argues that not all conditions must be met. His understanding is that political conditions are more important than military ones. Even though there needs to be a level of preparedness by the defensive forces at the beginning of hostilities, Guevara sees that the insurrection can create necessary conditions for the revolution (Fabian 2015: 25). These conditions can be achieved through understanding that guerillas are “The vanguard of the people, who create the necessary political conditions for the establishment of a revolutionary power based on the full support of the masses” (Guevara 1964: 19). When growth of the guerilla movement reaches a point where there are too many men in one region, it should initiate a bee-hive action. This entails that a commanding officer in the guerilla force moves to another region and repeats the process of building up forces which will eventually lead to the victory of the guerillas (Guevara 1964: 20).

Another important distinction between Mao and Guevara is the control mechanism of the guerillas. While Mao states that the decentralized control of the guerillas is the key to success, Guevara puts the emphasis on strategic control. As the final outcome should be the annihilation of the enemy, Guevara suggests that “all new zones that have been created and the forces operating in the principal cities should be under a unified control” (Guevara 1964: 20). This shows that according to Guevara, the organization is closely linked. The guerilla forces carry out the orders given by the central command, although the means of how they influence the target are still decided by that unit. This offers better control over the guerilla activities with the downside of possible initiative loss by the units.

According to Guevara, there are three stages in guerilla war. First stage is the strategic defense during which guerilla units emphasize on the survival. However, the defense itself should be very active, meaning that guerillas use limited attacks on enemy targets that they can successfully influence. Once guerilla forces are established, the operations move to the

second stage called equilibrium. During this phase, guerillas adopt to the tactics of maneuver and carry out attacks against the enemy forces with larger groupings. It is important to note that it is only one form of action taken by the guerillas and function of sabotage against the defensive capabilities of the enemy is still crucial. The third stage begins when the defensive capabilities of the enemy have been reduced to a point, where guerilla forces can “crystallize into a people’s army with the goal of overrunning the repressive army, capture of big cities and the total annihilation of the enemy” (Guevara 1964: 21).

The third contributor to this thesis is general Vo Nguyen Giap with “People’s War. People’s Army” (Giap 1961). General Giap was an army general in the Vietnam People’s Army in the First Indochina War against France and in Vietnam War against the U.S. At the early stages of the First Indochina War he understood that the balance between the opposing forces of Vietnam and France favors the latter. This led him to the understanding that the only way to defeat the French is through long-term resistance and guerilla warfare (Giap 1961: 12). General Giap’s guerilla theory is linked to Mao’s theory as he studied and tested it in combat situations. This allowed Giap to analyze the weaknesses and strengths of Mao’s theory and make corrections to the theory based on the conditions in Vietnam.

Similarly to Mao, general Giap divided the struggle into three main phases. Phase one was the “stage of contention” where guerilla units form bases and start harassing the enemy. During this phase only those attacks with guaranteed success can be carried out. The aim of these attacks is to “exhaust little by little by small victories the enemy forces and at the same time to maintain and increase ours” (Giap 1961:23). It is imperative that during the first phase the loss of manpower is avoided even if it means losing ground. The unit strength used during the first phase was from a platoon to company. During this phase, the guerillas targeted the enemy’s economy and inflicted as much damage to manpower as possible. An important aspect is that general Giap focuses on the destruction of enemy’s manpower rather than communication or supply lines (Giap 1961: 23).

The second phase is “period of equilibrium.” During this phase the hostilities are practiced through guerilla methods and conventional mobile warfare. It is essential that guerilla units are capable of concentrating into larger formations to attack stronger enemy units such as

companies. The aim of this stage is to balance the opposing sides manpower and to enforce successes made by guerilla units by using conventional units to destroy and capture strategically important locations (Giap 1961: 53). This entails the formation and use of conventional units earlier than Mao does. The stage of equilibrium entails that there is a shift in tactical thinking. As the first phase emphasizes guerilla activities, the second phase eventually leads to the use of conventional army as principal units while maintaining guerilla activities.

The third phase is the “stage of counteroffensive.” During this stage the guerilla war “gradually moved to regular war with the forms of guerilla warfare, mobile warfare and entrenched camp warfare” (Giap 1961: 55). Giap saw the necessity of holding important locations with positional warfare in rural and urban areas. This is an important distinction from Mao’s theory. Holding positions meant that the enemy forces had to react against those positions and the placement of resources gave tactical advantages in other areas. For example, during the 1954 campaign the French made preparation to attack the Fifth zone. General Giap’s answer was to leave a small detachment against the French to protect the rear-lines and concentrate his main forces on the attack against Western Highlands which resulted in victory (Johnson 1967: 443). It is important to note that general Giap emphasizes on the importance of switching back and forth between different types of warfare according to the time and space where hostilities are taking place (Fabian 2015: 27).

Giap stresses the importance of strong leadership during all three phases. He states that the backbone of any successful army are the trained and capable officers who “must not only guide their men in work and studies, but take an interest in their life and take into consideration their desires and initiatives” (Giap 1961: 28). Strong teams lead by competent leaders seem to be essential according to all the theorist in this thesis. However, general Giap sees the command structure more similarly to Guevara than Mao. Giap stresses the importance of discipline amongst the guerillas and sees the centralized leadership and unified command as key pillars to success (Giap 1961: 28). The discipline among the troops is gained through “internal democracy” which means that even though there are differences in ranks



and offices, the political equality of the troops is the same. According to Giap this will strengthen the bond between troops (Giap 1961: 28).

Giap also points out the importance of equipment and training of the troops. The Vietnamese People's Army encountered difficulties while equipping against the French due to lack of industry and potential for manufacturing armaments. The only way out according to Giap was to "use war to feed war" by capturing enemy weapons and shoot the enemy with his guns. This policy was successful as Giap states that "The French Expeditionary Corps practically became carriers engaged in supplying our army with U.S arms" (Giap 1961: 48, 67). Similarly, the main method of training was engaging enemy troops. As the troops were constantly engaging enemy units, there was little time for constant training which meant that the guiding principle was to "train and learn while we fight." This entailed that the training was "in accordance with the next day's fighting" (Giap 1961:68). Any victory or defeat was seen as an important learning point for the training of troops and adjustments were made accordingly.

## **2.6. Modern Guerillas**

Mao, Guevara and Giap are the fundamental theorists for guerilla warfare and their principal lessons are still applicable today. However, "with the advancement of technology and recent campaigns by non-state groups such as Hezbollah and Islamic State fighters have shown that well-trained and highly motivated irregular fighters can confront powerful conventional militaries and deny them quick victories based on their superior fire power and technology" (Wither 2018). This has started a debate whether the best option for a small state to organize its defense should be by modern guerillas. Jim Thomas defines modern guerillas as "small, highly distributed irregular resistance forces with prepositioned concealed weapons and clandestine support networks and auxiliaries." These units are equipped with modern anti-tank and fire support capabilities combined with good mobility that allows them to conduct quick maneuvers, ambushes and sabotages (Thomas 2015).

James K. Withers offers more precise definition for the Baltic conditions. According to Withers modern guerillas refer to “state forces that employ new technology and asymmetrical methods of warfare. These fighters are defined by their warfighting methodology and, therefore could include regular armed forces and SOF, as well as territorial defense units and local militias” (Withers 2015). This definition has many similarities to the new concept of the EDL as non-linear units up to the size of company use hit and run methods of engagement.

Some analysts have argued that the emergence of new technology favors the use of guerilla tactics by state and non-state actors in the form of 4<sup>th</sup> generation warfare (Lind et al 1989). This technology includes robotics, remotely piloted vehicles and artificial intelligence combined with precision targeting weapons such as anti-tank and anti-air weaponry. The emergence of technology allows “very few soldiers to have the same battlefield effect as a brigade” (Lind et al 1989). This puts a larger effort on the skills of small units. Unit members will need to be proficient in both tactics and technology. According to Lind, there is also a shift in the structure of units as the main emphasis will combine reconnaissance and strike functions. Another important aspect is the use of media against the aggressor as a “major target of the 4<sup>th</sup> generation warfare is the enemy population’s support of its government and the war” (Lind et al 1989).

The use of modern guerilla methods and territorial defense requires a state to prepare for total defense. Total defense means that “The mental, physical, economic and other potential of government structures, local governments, defense forces and the entire nation must be in continued state of preparedness to manage a situation of crises and to act as one in order to prevent and avert danger or attack and to preserve the nation” (Laaneots 2002). The elements of total defense are psychological defense, civil defense, economic defense, civil preparedness and military defense. These elements include factors necessary to solve any crisis such as the will of the population, preservation of the functions of the government, preservation of material resources and military resistance in case of war (Laaneots 2002). The society functions as a whole with one goal of eliminating the crises and the united struggle will “hinder the ability of the revisionist to achieve a low-cost *fait accompli* or to

make that *fait accompli* difficult to hold” (Grygiel and Mitchell 2014). Even if a state is undefendable, the aim is to make aggression indigestible.

In the Baltic context, Rand Corporation has conducted a study that establishes key requirements for equipment to bolster total defense capabilities in the case of Russian aggression (Flanagan et al 2019). The study divided the activities of resistance into four categories: high-end violent action, low-end violent action, UW support and nonviolent action (Flanagan et al 2019: 16). The EDL combatants belong to the high-end violent action category as their main task would be to conduct ambushes and raids against enemy units. The equipment deemed necessary for high-end violent action includes night vision devices, secure mobile communications, video cameras, man-portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, all-terrain mobility vehicles (ATV-s or dirtbikes), UAVs, demolitions and mines (Flanagan et al 2019: 21). The cost of equipping 100 high-end action squads would be approximately \$ 51 million across three Baltic states (Flanagan et al 2019: 21). At the assumption that all three Baltic states would have the same number of squads, each country would have to invest \$ 3,4 million to achieve these capabilities in the period of five years. This would require some trade-offs with conventional forces but the advancement of capabilities for modern guerillas could be worth it.

Another important question for the conduct of guerilla operations is the terrain. There is a common assumption that Baltic states are not well defendable due to lack of natural defensive positions. On a closer look, this assumption is not entirely correct. Even though the Baltic states do not have large mountain ranges within their territory, it does not mean that the terrain does not offer protective elements. The region holds “around 7000 lakes and countless peat bogs, swamps and marches with a multitude of rives with densely wooded areas” that can offer tactical bottlenecks (Bater 1998). This type of terrain often makes “the off-road movement of mechanized units difficult, sometimes even impossible” that allows the channeling of enemy forces to larger roads (Wallin and Anderson 2001: 99). The destruction of bridges and roads can severely hamper the ability to move. It is also conceivable that any potential Russian aggression would be based on speed and the rural areas are given less attention. This offers possibilities for guerillas to create bases of operations. The issue is that

modern surveillance and intelligence equipment can make operating in rural terrains difficult as they could “hinder the ability to hide, maneuver or concentrate undetected” (Withers 2018). This can be true but there are still several reasons why rural areas could work for guerilla activities. The main method of detecting troop movements is through thermal cameras mounted on UAV-s which work well within certain conditions. However, weather, terrain and concealment can reduce their effectiveness. For example, thermal UAV-s have difficulties identifying targets that are under dense trees or thermal covers. Another relevant capability to counter adversary’s observation is using caches to reduce the time and space when and where EDL combatants can be identified as combatants.

The question of mobility and concentration in rural areas is more difficult which can mean that modern guerilla operations in urban areas become more important. Urban terrain offers concealment and good lines of sight to influence the enemy. Well thought through urban activities could potentially tie advancing enemy forces in place for extended periods and force them to use additional resources to clear these areas (Withers 2018). However, there are numerous difficulties while fighting in urban areas. The risk of causing severe civilian casualties and the destruction of infrastructure could potentially be devastating to morale. In case of Baltics there is also the issue of ethnic Russian population in the border areas and capitals. In Estonia the Russian population counts for 36% in Tallinn and 74% in the northeastern Ida-Viru county (Statistikaamet 2020). Even though 64% of the Russian population in Estonia is willing to “certainly or probably participate in defense activities in case of an aggression against Estonia” there is a proportion of the population that is not willing to participate in case of aggression (Kivirähk 2017: 28-31). This could bring further difficulties while conducting guerilla operations in urban areas.

While considering the defense of the Baltic states, the most important element is time. The main line of thought in how to protect Baltic states is linked with the enforcement of NATO article five and the arrival of Allied armed forces to take back any possible territorial gains that Russian aggression has achieved. The arrival of Allied forces could be more difficult as democratic procedures take time and Russia has strong anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which take time to overcome. This entails that Baltic states have to conceptualize

their defense strategy so that they can independently hold off Russian advancement for several weeks. The author of this thesis suggests that the most probable way to do so is through the combination of conventional brigades and modern guerillas. Even though the traditional guerilla theory suggests that guerillas are best used in protracted conflicts, the protraction of conflict can also mean that the enemy's initial thrust does not achieve its goals and enemy is forced to make adjustments to their battle plan, which buys time.

As Russian aggression will most probably rely on speed and firepower, the non-linear tactic that employs principles of dispersion and non-linearity are the natural counters. Decentralized command structure and small-unit tactics does not allow enemy units to fix Baltic forces into position and destroy them with indirect fire. Furthermore, by using the idea of territorial defense, modern guerillas can inflict casualties against the invader from all sides, utilizing swarming tactics. This means that the invading force must allocate more resources to defend its flanks and supply lines. It could create conditions for channeling enemy units to few larger roads that they can operate within. Possible delay on those roads could hamper the enemy's ability to continue aggression. Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis is: Estonian Defense League non-linear approach, combined with conventional brigades, is suitable strategy to counter conventionally stronger Russian Armed Forces.

### **3. Developments of Russian Armed Forces and Countermeasures**

#### **3.1. Methodology**

To narrow the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to create a context in which non-linear defense method operates. According to S. Flanagan, the defense of a state during a military conflict can be divided into six main phases (Flanagan 2019: 15). The first phase is shaping the environment and deterring aggression, where the focus is on countering foreign operatives instigating ethnic unrest. The second phase is countering unconventional warfare attack by denying hostile paramilitary forces targeting key infrastructure. The third phase is delaying or countering conventional invasion by the use of armed forces. The fourth phase is resisting occupation by preventing permanent annexation of occupied territory and demonstrating that the occupied country is not defeated. The fifth phase is assisting counterattack and defeating occupiers by supporting allied counterattack. The sixth phase is supporting a sustainable peace (Flanagan 2019: 15-16). These phases are remarkably similar to the ones described by Mao, Guevara and Giap.

Although EDL combatants serve their purpose in all six phases, the non-linear defense model can successfully be implemented from stages three to five. This entails that the context in which the thesis operates within starts with the mobilization order for EDL combatants signed to non-linear defense model and persists through conventional invasion and occupation attempts by the foreign power until a counterattack by allied forces is conducted.

##### **3.1.1. Research Methodology**

To answer the research questions, the author conducted a qualitative study. As the idea for this thesis came during the time when the new EDL territorial defense concept was introduced, clarity was needed regarding its implication. The research question of „what are

the key elements in non-linear/guerilla warfare“ was established to answer this question. The author had two approaches to answer this question.

The first approach was by conducting an interview with General Riho Ühtegi. The goal of the interview was to achieve a better understanding of how EDL non-linear units will fight and what are the key elements for their success. The interview was semi-structured, which allowed the author to ask additional questions when necessary. The face-to-face interview took place on the 28th of August 2020 in Tartu and the length of the interview was 58 minutes. The interview was audio-recorded, transcribed and added to this thesis as Appendix 1. The interview was successful for the author as several key elements for the non-linear defense model were elaborated.

The second approach was by creating a theoretical framework in the first chapter of this theses. The aim was to bring historical guidelines of guerilla warfare experts such as Mao, Guevara and Giap and link them to modern circumstances by introducing the modern guerilla concept to the thesis. It showed that the basic principles of guerilla warfare have remained the same and modern necessities mostly include the provision of technology and influencing the enemy through media.

To answer the second research question (what are the key developments within the Russian Armed Forces since the 2008 military reform), the author divided developments of the RAF into seven categories: rapid-deployment, nuclear, in-direct fire, long-range precision strike, electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles and maneuver force developments. These categories were picked based on their probable influence on EDL non-linear defense model. The author conducted a qualitative research based on publicly available literature to map the key developments in these capabilities.

To answer the third research question ( how can non-linear methods counter those developments), the author analyzed the RAF key developments and their possible impact on EDL non-linear defense model with examples taken from Russian involvement in conflicts. Possible counter-measures for each of RAF capabilities were then derived.

### **3.1.2. Research Design**

This thesis is a single case study, which allows the author to directly compare how should non-linear defense be implemented against the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. The research provides tactical examples from recent conflicts where Russia has been involved in. However, these conflicts have differences compared to the Baltic context.

While looking at Chechnyan and Georgian wars, the conflicts occurred before the military reform of 2008 and therefore did not encompass the modern capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. In fact, these conflicts created the understanding that modernization was needed. Donbass creates difficulties from the limited Russian involvement aspect and by differences in economic capabilities combined with stronger public sympathy towards Russia. Syria represents a conflict where the Russian Armed Forces are fighting against a non-state actor. In addition, none of these conflict participants are members of NATO and the geographical differences are noteworthy. Therefore, the Baltic environment presents a unique environment.

### **3.2. Developments in the Russian Armed Forces**

The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview concerning the developments in the Russian Armed Forces (RAF). The chapter focuses on the developments of rapid-deployment, long-range strike, nuclear, indirect fire, electronic warfare (EW), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and ground-force capabilities with their possible impact on EDL non-linear defense model. Even though Russian recent capability developments are focused on countering U.S and NATO forces, they have an impact on regional security environment.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, described by President Putin as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” (Reuters: 2018), the Russian Federation has aimed to regain its influence in the international arena. The interventions in Chechnya,



Georgia, Ukraine and Syria have demonstrated, that Russia seeks to “force a revision of global order and attain enduring recognition as a great global power whose voice must be heard in all major international crises” (Blank 2019: x). These conflicts have assured Moscow that the use of force is successful in gaining political and international goals.

Another important aspect of these conflicts is the development of the RAF. Chechnya and Georgia proved to be important milestones for the RAF and brought out serious inefficiencies within the organization. The inability of a mass-mobilization army to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century security threats provoked the largest military reform the Russian Army had seen within 150 years. In *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (2012), Putin stated that “There was only one way out. We had to build a new army” (Golts 2019: 268). The results of the military reform, starting in 2008, can be seen in Ukraine and Syria. RAF have achieved strong capabilities in rapid deployment, EW, long-range ballistic missiles and UAV-s. In words of Geir Giles: “The Russian military as a challenge continues to be not a static, but a rapidly developing phenomenon” (Giles 2019: 287). This requires a further insight within the reform of 2008 and its effects on Russian Armed Forces.

### **3.3. Changes in Personnel**

One of the core intentions in the RAF with the reform of 2008 was to move from mass-mobilization army to a setting that supports conducting regional operations with highly skilled and rapidly deployable forces. Prior to the reform, RAF personnel policy was based on Soviet era Cold War doctrine that any major conflict would require large quantities of manpower. Even though Boris Yeltsin tried to reform the RAF in the 1990s, the results were not satisfactory. The military reforms in the 1990s managed to trim down the conscript-based army from the Soviet high of 5 000 000 soldiers but failed to address the structural issues of the RAF. The largest issue was that the RAF had a boosted officer core that commanded thousands of divisions, regiments and battalions. These were “skeleton units”, which meant that in case of a mobilization they would be filled with reservists and become operational

(Bartles, Grau 2016: 27). However, it takes several weeks for a battalion of reservists and conscripts to become operational. The effects of this policy were seen in the second Chechnyan war, where the entire 1 400 000 strong RAF on paper, was capable of assembling a force of 55 000 combat-ready troops across the entire country (Golts 2019: 268). The military reform of 2008 focused on fixing that issue by removing those skeleton units and reducing the officer core by 135 000 from 355 000. The number of units within the RAF was reduced from 1187 to 189 (Golts 2019: 268).

The modern RAF consists of a hybrid system. On one hand, the RAF is enlisting a growing number of contract soldiers. On the other hand, the system holds conscription as one of the key pillars to create reserve force needed for potential mobilization. In 2017, the RAF consisted of approximately 993 000 soldiers, of which about a fifth are officers, a third professional enlisted and a third of conscripts who serve a one-year term (Radin et al 2019: 42). Another innovation is the creation of contract non-commissioned officers (NCO). NCO-s in the RAF have a different purpose than within the Western structures. In the RAF, the NCO-s usually do not have leadership or training responsibilities within the unit. RAF NCO-s are specialists in their field and have a rather unique career path, where specialization and technical expertise is in value. For example, NCO-s could operate drones within the RAF (Bartles, Grau 2016: 8-9). These changes in military personnel have created a situation, where RAF has created two sets of capabilities. The well-trained, smaller and rapidly usable contingent that is largely staffed by professional enlisted soldiers and a larger, lower readiness force comprised of conscripts (Radin et al 2019: 43).

The development of rapidly deployable units has been the priority for the RAF. Over the past several years, the RAF have conducted at least 18 large-scale exercises, some of which have involved more than 100 000 troops. Closest to the Baltics, the Zapad 2013 military exercise involved over 70 000 troops from different branches of the RAF (Gouré 2019: 84). The aim of these exercises has been to check and rehearse rapid-deployment and operational readiness. During 2014, President Putin announced “snap-inspection” exercises during the Ukraine conflict with the alleged participation of 150 000 (NATO estimates 30 – 40 000) troops from Western and Central Military Districts. Within three days, the Russian General

Staff was capable of moving these forces and getting them operationally ready close to the Ukrainian border. Similar deployment was practiced in the Tsentr 2015 exercises (Golts 2019: 265-266). These results are impressive achievements for the RAF and pose a threat to the Baltic security environment.

The capability of rapid deployment of large number of troops by the RAF poses significant challenges to the Baltic defense forces. RAF has several high readiness units in the Western Military District, for example the 76<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Division. The main issue with rapidly deployable units from the Baltic perspective is the probable reduction in early warning capabilities. Today, the warning period is estimated to be around two weeks with main indicators of logistics preparations, troop deployment, nuclear readiness and propaganda activities on the home front (Muzyka 2020a: 8-13). The RAF can limit the transparency of some of these indicators through the use of military exercises, which can create confusion and reduction in early warning. In the example of Estonia, the mobilization of reserves into two infantry brigades and reaching operational readiness can take more time than available. This entails that an important part of the early defense has to be conducted by EDL units in the form of delay. The light infantry units can not sustain blocking positions to halt enemy movement. However, it is possible to gain time through another method.

Winning time can be done through the denial of infrastructure as earlier described in the Swiss approach. Even though Estonian landscape does not have mountain ranges, the forested and flooded landscapes can provide bottlenecks. For example, demolition of culverts in suitable locations, combined with ambushes can severely hamper the movement of tracked vehicles. Furthermore, it would force any invading force into contact drills to secure the immediate area and it consumes time. However, there are several prerequisites for this tactic to work. EDL non-linear units must put enough time and effort to study their area of operations during peace time. This does not only mean practicing tactical skills during weekend exercises, but systematically mapping their area. It includes locations for ambushes, natural or human made bottlenecks, culverts and the explosives needed to destroy them, infiltration and exfiltration routes and probable enemy movement routes in their area.

### 3.4. Long-Range Strike Capabilities

One of the key development patterns within the RAF has been the development of long-range conventional strike capabilities. Developments in this area are important, because long-range conventional strike capabilities can help to ensure regional dominance. With estimated investment of 40 billion rubles to the Iskander program between 2012 and 2020 (Radin et al 2019: 57), the RAF has significantly improved their long-range conventional strike capabilities. Today the RAF has the ability to use “long-range missiles with precise targeting from real-time intelligence data” (Muzyka 2020a: 7). The precision of Iskander missile is reportedly 10-30 meters from target location (Bartles, Grau 2016: 263). This capability offers the RAF advantages in the early stages of a conflict, due to its ability to degrade possible opposition by destroying command and mobilization centers, regional airports, harbors and civilian infrastructure such as power plants or bridges.

Currently, the Russian Western Military District possesses several of Iskander platforms, with confirmed deployment to the Kaliningrad oblast and Luga (Muzyka 2020b: 19). With the probable range of 700 km, the Iskander can cover Baltics; Poland; and portions of Germany, Denmark and Sweden and Finland (figure 1).



Figure 1. Iskander Missile Range from Kaliningrad (Gardiner 2019: 758).

The long-range strike capability offers numerous difficulties from the perspective of Baltic defense. The use of Iskander platform can complicate the reinforcement of Baltic defense forces by NATO as it creates opportunities for anti-access and area denial (A2D2) by targeting airports, harbors and important road networks. These examples include the Ämari airport and larger harbors among the Baltic Sea. The long-range strike capability severely endangers the mobilization process within the Baltic states by possible targeting of military infrastructure, such as the home of the 1st infantry brigade in Tapa or the mobilization center for the second brigade in Luunja. Therefore, it is crucial for the EDL defense units to counter this threat.

One of the better ways to ensure the deployment of EDL forces on the field is through dispersion. Not only dispersion on the battlefield, but also dispersion during mobilization. The centralized mobilization from one starting point with the entire unit is unthinkable. Therefore, every company, platoon and squad leader must think through the process of mobilization for their units. The designation of several different mobilization points is a key factor. These points should not be near obvious military infrastructure to ensure survival. Each squad should have different mobilization location that is in compliance with the general mobilization area for the platoon. Another aspect is that units must think through communications while forming, with the assumption that cellphones do not work. This entails the use of alternative communication such as use of couriers.

Another vital aspect is equipment and ammunition. Dispersion in formation necessitates that EDL combatants can secure their areas of formation, which in turn requires weaponry and ammunition to be held in homes. Although this already is a possibility in the EDL today, most of the members do not use it. This is a clear area, where improvements can be made similarly to the Swiss model. Every leadership level should promote individual weapons to be held at home. This does not only include squad or platoon commanders, but enhanced focus on the district level. Another issue is the ammunition. Currently, the information concerning the reception of ammunition for rifles, machine-guns or anti-tank weaponry is regarded as classified. Since all the platoon commanders within the EDL are volunteers, they do not have the access to this information. This in turn can create issues during formation

and further operations as any planning requires information regarding further actions. Therefore, it is necessary to make the information regarding ammunition available to the platoon commander level.

### **3.5. Nuclear Capabilities**

The Russian Federation is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its national security approach. In 2000, president Putin signed the new Military Doctrine, which declares that “De-escalation of aggression is forcing the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons” (Schneider 2019: 306). This doctrinal approach can offer means for the Russian Federation to achieve its goals in the Baltic region. While using conventional forces to achieve operational success in the Baltics, the Russian Federation can test the resolve of NATO’s member states by the threat of nuclear war in case of an intervention. In this way, the Russian Federation can create a deterrence effect by asking if NATO is willing “to exchange Riga for New York” (Shlapak, Johnson 2016: 7).

To this end, the Russian Federation has modernized its nuclear forces with two aims: 1) to achieve the capability of first strike with low-yield/low-collateral damage warheads and 2) to create a threat of massive destruction in case of U.S/NATO retaliation (Schneider 2019: 306). To achieve these goals, the Russian Federation has increased its nuclear capabilities both in quantity and quality. By 2025, Russia is estimated to have 2500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads with improved capabilities in delivery systems such as the Tu-160 bombers, Topol-M ICBMs, or KH-101 nuclear capable air-launched missile (Schneider 2019: 317). New types of nuclear warheads are being developed such as low-yield tactical nuclear warheads, which can “penetrate 30-40 meters into rock and destroy buried targets such as troop command points or nuclear munitions storage facilities” (Schneider 2019: 323).

The use of nuclear forces in Russian military exercise is consistent with nuclear escalation strategy. Zapad military exercises have frequently demonstrated the use of first-strike nuclear capabilities against NATO forces. During the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia launched “a massive nuclear exercise under the direct control of President Putin” (Schneider 2019: 314). These exercises demonstrate that Russia is seeing its nuclear arsenal as an important element to regional operations. From the perspective of EDL non-linear defense model, the Russian nuclear capabilities do not pose a direct threat. Small units and their headquarters are not credible targets for nuclear capabilities. These capabilities can however create a probable scenario, where NATO forces are not able to reinforce the Baltic theatre. This means that local defense forces must be capable of prolonging the conflict until a breakthrough is achieved. It entails survival and reserve for the EDL non-linear defense system.

Currently, there is no reserve overlap for the EDL units, meaning that when units sustain casualties on the battlefield, they can only be replaced by local recruitment (Appendix 1: 81). One of the solutions is to ask the Defense Forces to give additional reserve for the Defense League from the infantry brigades. However, this solution can have its negative impacts on the efficiency of non-linear defense. One issue is that during conscript service, these combatants are trained to be effective in conventional warfare and less so in non-linear defense, which requires different skill- and mindset. The author proposes another solution – the conscript system considers the need to train EDL reserve and allocates training centers, where it can be done. For example, the Kuperjanov infantry battalion trains three companies of infantry annually (Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion Webpage). One of these companies could be transformed to provide training for non-linear defense and therefore create a sustained reserve for the non-linear defense model. Even if these conscripts would not be capable of conducting training exercises in their war-time operation areas, they can receive adequate training to perform their war-time duties. It would reduce the pressure put on EDL combatants to train units during wartime. This approach can find opposition from the Defense Forces as they would miss out on some of the reserve designated for the infantry brigades. However, as K. Salum and J. Wither point out – if there is a desire to create an effective

unconventional defense model in the Baltic states, the conventional and unconventional forces must receive equal contributions in terms of training and equipment.

### **3.6. Indirect Fire Capabilities**

Indirect fire capabilities are one of the core strengths of the RAF. While NATO forces see that artillery has the function of supporting maneuver, the RAF has an opposite understanding – maneuver supports artillery. This means that ground forces are used to gain ground so that artillery units can be effectively emplaced and employed against enemy units as “the decisive finishing hand” (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016: 21). Furthermore, as the RAF sees artillery is as the “God of War”, the modernization of this capability has been a priority for Russia to “project combat power more effectively” (Bartles, Grau 2016: 260).

The Russian artillery has a different mindset compared to NATO. While NATO forces prefer precision strikes, the RAF prefers to use artillery in volume with limited accuracy. The accuracy is compensated with intensity and number of guns available for fire missions. This entails that Russian artillery can cover an area larger than 1 km<sup>2</sup> and inflict massive casualties against a moving or stationary target by the massive number of shells hitting the ground (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016: 23). To understand the importance of artillery in RAF, it is important to note that most Russian units have indirect fire systems integrated within their structure. Based on unit size and mission, these can include mortars, automated grenade launchers (AGS-17) or self-propelled artillery (SPG) units. For example, the Russian battalion tactical group usually has an allocated SPG battery unit of six guns combined with heavy mortars and AGS-17 systems on company level. This threat can be enhanced by allowing the battalion tactical group use indirect capabilities of higher units such as brigade or division. In comparison, NATO forces possess a fewer number of indirect fire capabilities integrated within their structures.

Another important feature of indirect capabilities the RAF possesses is the number of guns capable for engaging target area. The force posture is designed in a way that at every given



moment, there are guns available for fire missions. This is possible due to the depth of emplacement and range of indirect fire units. For example, the first indirect support unit for the maneuver forces are mortars or AGS-17 systems ranging from 700 – 7500 meters. The second layer of indirect fire support comes from allocated SPG units, such as the 2S3 or 2S1 with effective range of around 13 km. The third layer of indirect fire support comes from higher unit support. Weapon systems such as the 2S19M1 can engage enemy units from distance of 25 km, which can be supported by rocket artillery units such as the Grad, Uragan or Šmertch ranging from 25 km up to 70 km (figure 2). The range and number of different indirect capabilities offers the RAF a distinctive advantage in conventional warfare against the Baltic states or NATO forces.




Figure 2. Russian Forces Indirect Capabilities (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016: 22).

As indirect fire capabilities are of utmost importance within the RAF, there is a great emphasis put on the modernization of artillery. The Russian way of thinking is somewhat different from the Western prospective. There are three major routes of development. The first is the creation of new generation platforms such as the 152mm SPG 2S35 Koalitsiya that can fire 16 shells per minute “allowing each Koalitsiya to achieve the same effects as an

artillery battery with six howitzers using older guns” (Bartles, Grau 2016: 260). However, this platform is still in the development phase and no confirmation of allocating these platforms to artillery units has been noticed.

Another route of development for indirect capabilities is through upgrading existing platforms with modern technology. This is a cost saving method for the RAF. Upgrading existing platforms can be done with the fraction of the cost than the purchasing of new systems. Although there are some capability drawbacks, the cost effectiveness of this approach allows Russian artillery units to reach modern capabilities without creating a massive pressure on the budget. For example, there is a substantial overlap in parts and components that are used in new and refurbished vehicles (Bartles, Grau 2016: 260). The third development pattern is the integration of modern command and control systems (C4ISR) with the emphasis on using UAV targeting systems (Radin et al 2019: 52).

Indirect fire capability is the core strength of the RAF and imposes a lethal threat against the Baltic defense forces. The EDL non-linear defense model is designed to counter this threat through dispersion. While the fire power of the RAF is impressive, it has a unique weakness related to it. The use of large caliber artillery pieces is built upon the principle of destroying important military objectives. However, when the number of these objectives is limited or non-existent, the relative importance of indirect weapons becomes lower and the effects gained from fire missions can be mitigated to an extent. For example, while the dispersed EDL combatants fight in squad or team formations, the effect on ordering an artillery strike on 5-10 combatants does not have the same effect as ordering an artillery strike on an assembled company of 100 combatants. To secure these areas, the enemy is forced to bring in additional manpower. It requires resources and if we can exploit this situation and deny the enemy his objectives, he will soon face a dilemma of how to proceed (Appendix 1: 78).

Even in case of lowered threat from the indirect fire capabilities of the RAF, the primary goal of any guerilla type warfare as explained by Mao, Guevara and general Giap is survival. This is especially important in the Baltic context, where casualties are harder to replace due to small population numbers. The best way of promoting survival against an artillery strike is through digging units into ground. Ukraine demonstrated the difference between dug-in unit

survival against those who did not. For example, when an artillery battalion fires four times against an enemy target, the expectation of losses is 85% if the target is not dug in and 25% if the target is dug in (Korhonen 1999). Although, these lessons have been available since the Crimean War, the training of combatants to dig in during resting periods is an effective way to reduce casualties during war.

Another possibility to reduce the effectiveness of the RAF indirect fire is to be near enemy units. This tactic was used by the Chechens during the First Chechen war and it proved to be successful. Close-quarters battle creates difficulties for using indirect fire due to the possible threat to friendly forces. The accuracy of indirect fire is dependent on several factors including the precision of the fire order, weather and the distance of the artillery units from target area. This makes every fire order within several hundred meters “danger close” meaning that the shells could potentially cause harm to the friendly forces. Potential harm to friendly forces can make the commander of those units to think twice before ordering in a strike, which in turn mitigates some of the threat posed by indirect fire. This tactic can work while fighting in urban areas as infrastructure can provide exfiltration routes. For example, the Chechens used the sewage system for movement. The issue with implementing it in rural areas is that usually there are very few natural exfiltration routes that can provide cover. This creates a threat that EDL combatants would be tied down to their positions and destroyed by enemy firepower.

### **3.7. Electronic Warfare Capabilities**

Electronic warfare (EW) refers to “military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy” (Joint Publication 2012: GL-8). As military operations are becoming more complex, the need for electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) increases and devices using EMS become more common. These devices are used for intelligence, communications, positioning, navigation, sensing, command and control, attack, ranging, data transmissions and information storage and

processing (Joint Publication 2012: I-1). The purpose of EW is either to protect these assets or make them unavailable for enemy forces to gain a tactical or operational advantage. The simplest examples in EW include jamming communications and GPS spoofing (figure 3).




Figure 3. Electronic Warfare capabilities (McDermott 2017: 4).

Maneuver warfare relies on the use of communications and the capability to reposition. As the RAF sees U.S. its adversary, it has invested in development of systems that can counter their advantages. Even though the proportion of investments going into development of EW capabilities is rather low, the spectrum has “evolved into a formidable combat support asset in recent years” (McDermott 2017: 1). A number of EW systems have been delivered to the Ground Forces on the company, battalion and brigade levels, which seek to jam VHF radio, radio-controlled fuses and GPS systems (Radin et al 2019: 55). This illustrates the importance

of EW in Russian military thinking and indicates that Russian brigades do not conduct operations without the support of EW units (McDermott 2017: 5).

The development of EW capabilities has been important to the RAF since the Chechnyan war, which provided important lessons in jamming and reconnaissance capabilities of the EW. Since the military reform after Russo-Georgian war, the RAF has achieved a steady procurement and development of modern EW technology. Therefore, it is important to note that the strategy to modernize EW capabilities dates prior to the Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent deterioration in Russian-NATO relations (McDermott 2017: 14). Ukraine and Syria have offered RAF numerous opportunities to test these systems. Since then, there have been several upgrades to the existing systems and their capabilities. For example, the brigade level command and control system *Bylina* that “analyses the situation in a combat area in real time, detects and identifies targets, chooses how to suppress these and then issues relevant orders to EW forces on the field” or the *Borisoglebsk-2* tactical EW system that can “suppress twice the frequency bandwidth of its predecessor up to 100 times faster”(McDermott 2017: 15).

The use of EW is not only effective against technologically superior opponents, but it can effectively be used against technologically less advanced opponents. While the main focus of EW in Chechnya was jamming enemy communications, conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine offer examples of progression in the field. During the Georgian conflict, the RAF used EW capabilities to suppress Georgian air defense systems, which allowed them to gain air superiority (Bartles, Grau 2016: 289). During the Ukrainian crisis, the RAF EW component was confirmed to possess the ability to perform direction finding of electromagnetic signals. This means that based on electronic intercepts of radio signals, the RAF can triangulate the position from which the signal came from and influence it with accurate indirect fire. An example of this capability was confirmed in Eastern-Ukraine while “a Ukrainian army unit was broadcasting a radio message when it received accurate artillery fire, sustaining multiple casualties. The Ukrainian unit then received text messages on their cell phones asking how they liked the artillery” (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016: 18).

There are several weaknesses related to the EW capabilities for the RAF. One of these weaknesses is that even though the procurement of EW technology has been rather steady within the RAF, the number of units is still limited and replacing destroyed equipment is complicated. This entails that EW units will most likely be used during major operations for a limited time-window to reduce their vulnerability. Another issue is that the RAF does not have enough trained specialists to operate this technology. The training for EW units takes longer than the time available during conscription period. It means that most of the specialists must be contract soldiers in order to effectively operate these platforms.

The EDL combatants must be ready to address the issues that EW capabilities bring to the battlefield. EW capabilities are not developed to counter large numbers of dispersed small units but to endanger the command and control functions of staffs and larger units. This being said, the EW capabilities will most probably offer difficulties for specialty units such as reconnaissance platoons, whose main mission is to detect and track enemy movement. As the time-window for critical information sharing and probable EW attack align with the advancement of enemy maneuver troops, it is crucial to seek alternative communication possibilities to ensure the arrival of information in timely manner. One possible solution is creating an observation network via the “3V” amplifiers as did the Chechens. This lowers the amount of manpower needed for observation posts and trained combatants can focus on the gathering, confirming, analyzing and redistributing of the information.

The reduction of EMS footprint is a key counter measure to mitigate some of the risks associated with EW capabilities. Modern armies focus on the procurement of technology that can be influenced through EW. For example, the Finnish model of land defense relies in part on the procurement of terminals that provide real-time tactical information for squad leaders. This innovation has advantages and disadvantages. The RAF EW capabilities are not constant meaning that they cannot influence EMS signals in all regions simultaneously. It creates opportunities to use such equipment to increase awareness. However, the trends in the development of EW capabilities show that it is important to go back to the roots of military training. Skills such as navigation based on a physical map and compass combined with the knowledge of enemy tactics and independent decision-making are the foundations of a

modern successful small unit. It offers any leadership level the means of having the information needed to conduct operations with minimal necessity of showing EMS footprint. Another necessity is to collect all cellphones from combatants by the commanders of the unit as they admit EMS signals and the discipline of combatants cannot be trusted while family members can be only one phone call away.

### **3.8. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Capabilities**

Since the Georgian conflict in 2008, Russian military leadership has paid increasing attention to the combat potential and development of UAV systems (McDermott 2020). UAV systems can accomplish a variety of tasks on the battlefield – reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence (ISR), indirect fire targeting, EW and kinetic operations. Russia values this potential and plans to introduce a UAV company to every brigade (Giles 2017: 6). The RAF has received valuable lessons from Ukraine and Syria and has achieved modern capabilities in the field with clear distinctions between Russian and Western approaches.

While the U.S UAV approach emphasizes on “prolonged surveillance punctuated by occasional precision strikes, the appearance of Russian UAVs is swiftly followed by intense artillery bombardment” (Giles, Hartmann 2016: 9). The conflict in Ukraine demonstrated that UAVs were used to locate enemy positions, give the location to the command post, observe incoming rounds of artillery, and then make correction to the artillery based on the UAV feed (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016: 27). This approach was effective as Ukrainian troops noted that “when they see certain types of UAVs, they know in the next 10-15 minutes, there are going to be rockets landing on top of them” (Giles, Hartmann 2016: 9).

Russian UAVs operate in pairs. One UAV flies on a lower altitude to draw fire from troops and another one at higher altitude to fix the enemy positions and give coordinates for artillery (Giles, Hartmann 2016:9). Layering UAVs to enhance ISR capabilities seems to be the way forward for the RAF. Kavkaz 2020 military exercise demonstrated the rehearsals of “multiple drones flying together at varied altitudes to assist in targeting enemy forces” (McDermott

2020). This approach allows to gain more precise intelligence on enemy positions and movement as different altitudes and angles provide a better understanding of the territory.

The Kavkaz 2020 exercise demonstrates that RAF prioritizes on the ISR rather than strike capability development. Russia does not possess surgical drone strike capabilities such as the Predator. The platform designed to fill this role is the S-70 Okhotnik, but its development is not complete and it does not seem to be a high priority (McDermott 2020a). However, the RAF is interested in developing kamikaze drones demonstrated in the Azerbaijan and Armenia conflict in 2016 and 2020. These UAVs are designed “not to carry anti-armor weapons but to be the weapon themselves by destroying enemy vehicles through direct top impact” (Giles 2017:7). Similar conceptualization was demonstrated in Ukraine, where drones were used to drop aerial munitions on rear echelon positions and fragmentation grenades on soldiers (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016: 27-28). Even though these capabilities exist, it is unknown how far the development for weaponized UAV platforms is within the RAF, but future developments are expected.

Another distinct area of operations for Russian UAVs is the EW spectrum. UAV systems are capable of “intercepting, jamming or spoofing civilian cell phone communications, including broadcasting content to smartphones (Giles 2017: 6). This capability has been used in Ukraine and Syria by broadcasting SMS-messages to the opposing side. These messages are intended to demoralize enemy units by detailing “how much their commanders earn and where their bank accounts are and where they go on holiday.” Similar attacks have already been made against NATO servicemen (Giles 2017: 7). It entails that the RAF has the detailed information regarding the combatants on the front lines and could pose a significant security threat.

The fast procurement of modern UAV technology by the RAF poses a threat to the non-linear defense model and EDL combatants must take these threats into consideration and apply counter measures. One of the approaches in dealing with an enemy UAV is to attempt to shoot it down. However, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Russian UAVs fly in pairs and firing upon them reveals your position immediately, which invites counter-fire (Giles, Hartmann 2016: 10). As survival is essential in non-linear defense model, this approach is not advised.



EDL combatants must be informed about this threat. Another way of countering UAVs is through technology. Counter UAV technology is becoming more available in form of laser weapons and EW platforms that “make use of directed electronic attack to jam GPS and other radio signals to a drone, causing it to land or hover” (Giles, Hartmann 2016: 10). However, these technologies will probably not be in the inventories of EDL combatants due to their cost and priorities given on other developments. This leaves EDL combatants with passive measures to combat enemy UAV capabilities.

Russian UAVs mostly use video and thermal imagers to provide ISR data (Bartles, Grau 2016: 376). These platforms are effective in open terrain where there is little natural cover. However, the forested Baltic environment presents difficulties for this capability. For example, during winter periods trees absorb heat during day and create a natural blanket against thermal imaging. This effect can be enhanced by covering unit locations with additional thermal covering by creating a cool air pocket between the body heat and the cover. With minimal movement, the detection probability by UAV is low. This approach entails that EDL combatants have it as part of their standard operational procedure and give up resting in heated tents as they are a major source of thermal signature.

UAV detection becomes an issue during unit movement. However, there are ways to minimize the exposure to the risk. While planning their movement, EDL combatants should avoid open terrain and roads as there is little or no natural cover from thermal signature. Another way of reducing risk of detection is by dividing the squad into teams and use different routes with a link-up point at the destination. Even though these methods do not guarantee complete protection from thermal imaging, they do reduce thermal signature.

### **3.9. Capabilities of Maneuver Forces**

To understand the capabilities of Russian maneuver forces from the perspective of Baltic defense, it is important to show what forces are near the Baltic borders. Since officially announced structural reform in 2010, the neighboring Russian military district is the Western

Military District (WMD). The WMD holds the most numerous and capable fighting forces within the RAF due to its perceived threat from the West. WMD holds two combined arms armies (CAA) – the 20<sup>th</sup> CAA located near Ukraine and the 6<sup>th</sup> CAA located opposite the Baltic States and the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army, located near Moscow (Muzyka 2020a: 6). The 6<sup>th</sup> CAA is the least developed army in the WMD with two maneuver brigades – the 25<sup>th</sup> Motor Rifle Brigade based in Pskov and the 138<sup>th</sup> Motor Rifle Brigade based in Kamenka (figure 4).



Figure 4. Units under the command of the 6<sup>th</sup> CAA (Muzyka 2020:14).

These brigades have one tank battalion and the maneuver companies are based on MT-LB armored track vehicles. Another source of maneuver force comes from the 76<sup>th</sup> Air Assault

Division (AAD) located in Pskov, which holds three airborne regiments based on BMD – 2 and BMD – 4 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and a tank battalion. Based on these units, the RAF maneuver capability near Baltic states is around 100 tanks, 200 MT-LB-s and 300 BMD-2/ BMD-4 IFVs with around 20 -25000 personnel.<sup>1</sup> These maneuver forces can be reinforced from other WMD units.

The RAF has steadily modernized its maneuver capability since the military reform of 2008. The Russian Ground Forces receive around 15% from the Russian defense budget (Radin et al 2019: 34). Compared to the size of the Ground Forces, they receive a rather small proportion of the allocated resources. Due to the fact that the Ground Forces do not have enough resources to invest into new generation equipment such as the T-14 Armata tank, they have modernized their ground forces by implementing modern technology on Soviet era platforms such as the T-72B3 tank. As a result of providing these platforms with fire control and active protection, these systems “can be made almost as effective as new generation platforms with a fraction of the cost” (Radin et al 2019: 52). Another important aspect is that the RAF can install different functions on the same platform. For example, the MT-LB tracked personnel carrier can be fitted with different turrets that can perform anti-air, anti-tank or indirect fire functions. These possibilities lower the cost of modernizing maneuver forces. Today, the modernization process for the ground forces is satisfactory. While the Russian ground forces are not capable of modernizing their maneuver forces with new generation platforms, the cost-efficient upgrades on existing platforms have been successful.

The crisis in Ukraine demonstrated the rise of a new phenomenon within the Russian Ground Forces (RGF) – the battalion tactical group (BTG). The BTG is a “modular tactical organization created from a garrisoned Russian Army brigade to deploy combat power to conflict zones” (Fiore, no date: 1). A BTG is created to fulfil a certain mission and is allocated resources for its successful completion. Therefore, the structure of a BTG is dependent upon mission requirements. Usually a BTG is enforced with a tank company, additional indirect fire and EW capabilities. The use of BTGs proved successful in Ukraine in terms of “translating tactics and weapons into successful national strategy while being cost-efficient

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<sup>1</sup> Estimated calculations made by the author based on the structures of RAF forces.

in terms of minimizing casualties and lost equipment” (Fiore, no date: 7). This has led many scholars and military analysts to believe that the BTG is the main Russian ground combat unit.

There is reason to believe that the BTG will not be the main structure used against the Baltic states. Even though BTGs can be well equipped, there are numerous disadvantages linked to it. To start with, the BTG only holds three mechanized infantry companies as maneuver forces, making it vulnerable to losses against a terrain controlling opponent. This threat can be amplified by limited intelligence capabilities. Another issue with the low amount of mechanized infantry is that the BTG might not be able to provide enough protection for its flanks and thus is vulnerable to raids and counter attacks (Fiore, no date: 1-2). The use of BTGs was justified in Ukraine mostly by two factors: the lack of manpower and equipment to mount full brigades and the necessity to deny Russian involvement in the conflict. Therefore, against a formidable opponent, the use of BTGs as main ground combat unit is not justified. In order to maintain flexibility and maneuverability, the RAF brigades are better suited for the Baltic environment (Muzyka 2020: 6).

To effectively utilize non-linear territorial defense, the EDL combatants must know how enemy forces behave, study their tactics and discover their weaknesses and strengths. Learning about their weaknesses and strengths offers knowledge concerning the center of gravity (COG). The COG is “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (U.S DoD). Understanding the COG of enemy forces enables commanders to identify the targets that enemy forces need to fulfil their objective. The COG can change in time and battlespace. In the example of RAF BTG, the COG could be their maneuver forces, meaning that in order to stop the enemy forces from achieving their objective, the RAF small units should emphasize on targeting enemy maneuver forces and conduct ambushes against MT-LBs. In the case of a brigade structure, the COG most probably lies in the logistic support that the RAF has. In this case the destruction of tanker trucks or ammunition carriers can halt the advancement of maneuver forces.

Studying enemy forces offers information on when and where valuable enemy targets appear on the battlefield. For example, Ukraine has demonstrated that the closest assets of EW are

located 1-3 km from the kinetic action. (McDermott 2017: 26). As the EDL combatants will perform combat operations behind enemy lines, they will have the opportunity and probable access to destroy high-valued targets, which will significantly complicate enemy forces achieving their targets. RAF reconnaissance units operate 15-25 km before enemy main forces. The reconnaissance units are followed by forward security force (usually one platoon). EDL combatants can conduct an operation against both these forward units in a manner, where the enemy is not capable of supporting those units. This blocks their freedom of action and maneuver (Appendix 1: 79). This level of operating entails high knowledge of enemy tactics. As the new concept of EDL introduces modular training (Appendix 1: 73), the author of this thesis recommends that every combatant should go through a module that teaches enemy structures and tactics on a better level than thus far. Additional emphasis should be put on tactical decision games (TDG). The TDGs help unit commanders to understand the larger picture that will unroll on the battlefield and offers more practical way to fixate information. TDGs are cheap to produce and can be made available to a large group of people through platforms such as Ilias.

Even though knowledge concerning enemy forces will help to identify and estimate high value targets, the author of this theses does not suggest that EDL combatants should focus on them. The theory of guerilla and asymmetric warfare suggest that the weaker actor must use psychology against the stronger actor. This means that the enemy units can not feel safe during conflict and constant flow of casualties and lost equipment is necessary to lower their morale. This principle entails an aggressive posture from the non-linear defense model. While looking at the maneuver forces that the RAF can send against the Baltic states, they can probably achieve operational success in the area. However, to control this area, they would need a force posture that is 40 times larger than the defending forces (Appendix 1: 78). This makes them vulnerable to losses and is the reason why EDL combatants should not emphasize on only destroying high valued targets, but also engage against enemy maneuver forces when possible.

As the “major target of the 4<sup>th</sup> generation warfare is the enemy population’s support of its government and the war (Lind et al 1989),” the EDL combatants must incorporate the use of

media to the non-linear defense model. This entails photographing and filming contacts that EDL combatants initiate. It also creates the need for media training. Combatants must learn what information to upload and to which channels.

An important aspect in fighting against RAF maneuver forces is weaponry and equipment. RAF maneuver capability has two important characters – armor and firepower. Armored vehicles are usually covered with a layer of explosive reactive armor, which does not allow projectiles to penetrate the vehicle. This was successfully implemented in Ukraine as it took multiple hits from Ukrainian tanks to defeat Russian T-72B3 tanks (Fiore, no date: 4). This renders the shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons that EDL combatants use ineffective against RAF tanks, making tanks unadvisable targets for EDL combatants. However, these systems can be used against weakly armored vehicles such as MT-LBs and BMP-2s, which form the majority of the mechanized force. As the concentration of armored vehicles is high in the RAF, EDL combatants must be equipped with anti-tank capabilities. Today there is little information regarding the weaponry allocated to the new structure of EDL. However, as the standard squad size will be ten combatants (Appendix 1: 73), the author suggests that each squad should be equipped with two anti-tank weapons. This offers squad leaders flexibility in planning their operations. Squad can be divided into two teams that can simultaneously ambush enemy forces in different locations, which amplifies the effects non-linear defense model desires. Even though, the procurement of anti-tank weaponry is a priority for the EDL, the focus of the EDF remains on developing conventional capabilities, which can create difficulties for the successful implementation of the non-linear defense model (Appendix 1: 80-81). Additionally, the firepower of RAF maneuver forces outmatches that of the EDL small units. Therefore, fire-contacts with enemy forces must be short in duration, otherwise EDL units will be pinned down, unable to move and under the risk of being destroyed.

#### 4. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to examine how have the capabilities within Russian Armed Forces developed since the military reform of 2008 and how can non-linear methods counter those developments. The thesis had three research questions: What are the essential elements in using non-linear/guerilla methods; What are the key developments within the RAF since the 2008 military reform; How can non-linear defense counter RAF capabilities? One of the possible results of this thesis was to offer the Estonian Defense League recommendations on what sort of training should be emphasized in order to prepare combatants for non-linear method of fighting.

This thesis created a theoretical framework based on the theory of why weaker actors win against conventionally stronger adversaries, clarified the modern terminology used regarding non-linear approach, introduced Swiss and Finnish security approaches and discussed the concepts of guerilla warfare and modern guerillas. The theoretical framework lead to the hypothesis of „Estonian Defense League non-linear approach combined with conventional brigades is the suitable strategy to counter conventionally stronger Russian Armed Forces.” After that, a single case study of Russian Armed Forces developments and capabilities was conducted with emphasis put on how can those capabilities influence Estonian Defense League non-linear defense model.

To answer the first research question (what are the essential elements in using non-linear/guerilla methods), the author described the historical experiences of guerilla warfare by Mao Zedong, Ernesto „Che“ Guevara and General Vo Nguyen Giap and the concept of how modern guerillas operate. These elements include the following principles: designated areas of operations with decentralized command system; strong support by the local population that allows to use them as enablers; survival; ability to concentrate attacks in selected forms, times and places with the element of surprise; knowledge of the enemy behavior; and mobility. The modern guerilla concept adds two key elements – use of media and modern equipment that allows small units to achieve battlefield effects disproportionate to their size.

To answer the second research question (what are the key developments within the Russian Armed Forces since the 2008 military reform), the author identified several capability developments such as nuclear, indirect fire, EW, UAV, rapid-deployment and maneuver force. The author concludes that the RAF has developed into a modern conventional army that can outmatch Western capabilities in some aspects such as EW. However, the force posture of the RAF shows that the developments have been made to fight an adversary in conventional war and the threats to non-linear defense model are not related to RAF maneuver force developments, but EW and UAV capabilities. These capabilities are limited and their effects can be mitigated.

To answer the third research question (how can non-linear defense counter RAF capabilities), the author brought up several countermeasures. While the key principles of guerilla warfare are still mandatory to follow in the Baltic context, the RAF developments have created a necessity to adopt to modern circumstances. The capability of long-range precision strike makes it imperative to use dispersion in mobilization, the allocation of formation points during peace-time and practice during exercises. This entails the necessity of weaponry and ammunition to be held at homes and information regarding platoon and squad equipment shared to relevant levels.

EDL combatants must be trained to create conditions for infrastructure denial in case of a reduced warning time. This entails training in explosives and systematical mapping of their operation areas during peace. Additional emphasis must be put on concealment both from air and EW spectrum. During training, the idea that a unit is being watched constantly should be brought to the attention of combatants. Additional training of RAF behavior is recommended for all combatants in forms of tactical decision games.

Survivability and reserve of the EDL combatants play a key role in the effect that the non-linear defense model hopes to achieve. Therefore, the Estonian Defense Forces and the EDL need to create that reserve either from existing reservists or by allocating resources and training centers so that conscript service could train the necessary reserve with adequate skillset.



To sum these findings up, the hypothesis of this thesis turns to be correct. Correct in a way that non-linear defense model is proper counter strategy to work against the current force posture of the RAF, which relies on conventional superiority. However, as several authors pointed out, the introduction of a non-linear strategy to a state's defense policy requires additional resources. As the focus of the Estonian Defense Forces remain on the development of conventional capabilities, those resources are probably not found in the near future. To achieve the desired effects of non-linear defense, the anti-tank weaponry capabilities of the EDL must be upgraded

The research necessity of how non-linear defense should be implemented in the Baltic context is by no means exhausted with this thesis. The author suggests two main themes for further research. The first would be to test combined effects of conventional and non-linear defense in computer wargame simulators. These results could give essential knowledge on how to plan and implement non-linear defense model. Another research direction could be related to RAF tactics in attack, defense and during movement to analyze and detect key strengths and vulnerabilities that the friendly side could exploit.

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## Appendix 1

### Interview with the Commander of the Estonian Defense League Riho Ühtegi

**Linnus: Kas ja kuidas muutub territoriaalkaitset teostavate üksuste struktuur? Milliseid võimekusi kaob ära või tekib juurde jao,- rühma,- või kompaniitasandil?**

Ühtegi: Kõige suurem muutus on kindlasti see, et kaovad ära lahinggrupid, välja arvatud Põhja kaitseringkond, kuna seal peame vaatama sõjapidamist pisut teisiti. Aga kõigis teistes piirkondades kaovad nad ära. Teine suur muudatus on see, et seni “kollasteks” üksusteks nimetatud üksused saavad enam-vähem sama varustuse, mis on täna “rohelistel” üksustel. Ehk siis täiskomplektse sõjaväelise varustuse.

**Linnus: Kui me võtame jao struktuuri, siis klassikaline jalaväejagu on 10 meest, luurejagu 6-8 meest. Kas seal hakkab ka mingeid erisusi sisse tulema?**

Ühtegi: Väga ei tule. Meil on piirid ees, mis on seotud transpordivahenditega. Klassikaline 10 jääb. Arutlusi on olnud 12-mehelisest ja 8-mehelisest jaost, aga praegu keskmine jagu on 10. See ei välista, et mõnede üksustele ei tee teistsuguseid jagusid. Tahame teha üsna palju sihtüksuseid. Ehk üksuseid, millel on oma kindel eesmärk, oma relvatüübid, mida nad kasutavad ja võib-olla ka erinev taktika teistest üksustest. Kaitseliidus on seda võimalik teha tänu sellele, et siin on võimalik väljaõpet anda märksa pikemal perioodil kui ajateenistuses. Seetõttu on seda vaja teha, sest kui vabatahtlik liitub Kaitseliiduga, siis ta tahab saada koguaeg midagi uut. Me näemegi seda uut progresseeruvalt. Tavalisest laskurist võib saada näiteks tippnaaber, millega käib kaasas taktika, üksused ja loomulikult relvasüsteemid.

**Linnus: Ehk siis üksuse siseselt hakkab tekkima spetsialiseerumine nagu ka tänaseni olnud?**

Ühtegi: Just. Kaitseliidu puhul on see probleem, et kaitseliitlased käivad väljas väga erinevalt. Seaduse järgi peab käima 48 tundi aastal. On neid, kes käivadki 48 tundi, aga ka neid, kes käivad 12-15 nädalavahetust. Vastavalt sellele on neid võimalik ette valmistada. See ei tähenda seda, et kes 48 tundi väljas käib, see heidetakse kõrvale või hakatakse tõrjuma. Vastupidi. Me teame tema võimekust ja spetsiifikat. Tänu sellele, et ta oskab lasta, sütikut ühendada lõhkekehaga, oskab panna miini, saame teda kasutada. Me ei saa panna teda varitsust või reidi tegema, aga tema teadmised on täpselt sellised, et talle võib anda positsiooni, laskesektori ja mõningaid ülesandeid.

**Linnus: Kas Kaitseliidus rühmade või üksuste väljaskäimine hakkab mõjutama ka seda, milliseid ülesandeid nad sõjaajal hakkavad saama?**

Ühtegi: Just. Väljaõppesüsteemi ehitame ülesse selliselt, et ta ei ole küll võistlev, aga selleks, et saada järgmisele tasemele, peab olema läbitud eelnev. Sellele lisanduvad täiendväljaõppemoodulid, mida me püüame teha põnevateks, et sinna tahetakse minna. Aga ka seal peavad olema eelnevalt läbitud moodulid. Näiteks mõne mooduli puhul võib eelduseks olla jao taktika mooduli läbimine.

**Linnus: Kas need moodulid hakkavadki olema üksiksõduri, jao, rühma ja kompaniitase?**

Ühtegi: Seal on erinevad. On nii üksikvõitleja moodulid kui ka üksuse moodul. Põhimõtteliselt kui me räägime sellisest üldisest territoriaalkaitse mudelist, siis võiks olla nii, et me arendame ühtepidi spetsialiste järjest paremaks. Teiselt poolt arendame juhte. Esimene NAK (nooremallohvitseride kursus) on üldine, et ta oskab jagu juhtida. Kuid teine NAK, sellele järgnev väljaõppe moodul on see, kus ta suudab juba iseseisvalt operatsioone läbi viia. Sest territoriaalkaitsest rääkides on just väikeüksuste iseseisvus äärmiselt oluline. Samal ajal jao võitlejad omandavad oma oskuseid ja läbi selle tekib see jagu, mis väljaõppemoodulite käigus saab lihvida oma oskuseid. Näiteks öised lahinglaskmised ühel nädalavahetusel. Täiendõppemoodulid on suhteliselt lühikesed, aga nad on kõik keskendunud mingitele kindlatele oskustele. Kui see moodul on läbi tehtud, siis oskus on saavutatud. Järgmistele harjutustele minnes võib sinna sisse lülitada ja öiseid tegevusi, kuna see moodul on läbitud.

**Linnus: Kui me räägime väikeüksuste taktikast, siis kas tulevikus hakatakse üksuseid treenima nagu luuret või võitlusgruppe siamaani?**

Ühtegi: Pisut võib võrrelda võitlusgrupiga. Me omal ajal alustasime võitlusgrupi metoodika väljatöötamisega ja panime rõhu väikeüksuste taktikale. Sarnaselt SOF-ile. Kõige tähtsam element on meeskond, mis on võrdne võitlusgrupi jaoga. Kui me räägime hajutatud lahingutegevusest, siis otsuse langetamise protsess ja operatsiooni ülesse ehitamine peab tulema võimalikult madalale tasandile. Vahemaad on suured, side probleemne. Juhid peavad olema suutelised iseseisvalt oma üksustega opereerima.

**Linnus: Kas ja kuidas muutub Kaitseliidus territoriaalkaitset teostavate kombatanide varustus? Milliseid võimekusi tuleb juurde või täiendatakse?**

Ühtegi: Varustus ühtlustub üsna palju konventsionaalsete üksuste omaga. Kui me räägime individuaalsest varustusest ennekõike. Põhimõtteliselt peaks tulevikus olema individuaalvarustuse komplektid identsed nii ühele kui teisele. Vahetame välja ka relvastuse. Ehk siis kui täna on R-20 tulemas teatud koguses Kaitseliitu, siis järgmise hankega me relvastame kogu Kaitseliidu R-20tega ära. Täiendavalt näeme snaiprivõimekuse suurendamist, kergekuulipildujate sissetoomist jagudesse, eraldiseisvate raskekuulipildujate ja muude toetusüksuste moodustamise. Miinipildujate puhul on nii, et 120 mm miinipildujate rühmad jäävad kahes kohas alles põhilistes lahingusuundades. 81 mm miinipildujad on enam-vähem igas ringkonnas. Tankitõrjele otsime praegu lahendust. Kui see TT relv, mis meil praegu on nüüd ikkagi tuleb maha kanda, siis mida me asemele saame? Tegelikult relvastus paraneb ja varustuse osas samamoodi. Iga sõdur saab selga korraliku vormi ja varustuse. Mida tahaks muuta ja kuidas edasi minna: mina leian, et maakaitseväelane ei vaja kõike seda, mida on vaja konventsionaalsel sõduril. Sellepärast, et nemad on siiski planeeritud siiski tegutsema erinevates tingimustes. Nad on mobiilsed, liiguvad ühest kohast teise, neil peab olema kaasas varustus selliselt, et seda on võimalik selga võtta ja viia. Maakaitseväes seda selliselt teha ei ole vaja. Me ei jõua seda üleminekut kiiresti teha, aga see on kindlasti järgmise paari aasta teema. Ehk siis optimeerima maakaitseväelase varustuse. Ei ole mõtet koormata maakaitseväelast varustusega, mida tal kunagi vaja ei lähe.

**Linnus: Mis varustus see võiks olla?**

Ühtegi: Toome kõige lihtsama näite. Tegelikult on sõduril vaja patrullseljakotti, mitte seda hiigelsuurt kotti. Varustuse võib panna ju ka torukotti, sest me seda seljas ei kanna. See on kõige lihtsam näide. Seal on teisi elemente veel. Kui me vaatame laiemalt, siis ka logistika on teema. Hästi palju

poleemikat on olnud transpordi ja pioneeri osas ja me näeme, et peame lahendused leidma teisiti, sest senine lahendus on kallis. Selle peaks kätte saama läbi sundkoormiste ja rekvireerimise maakaitsevägele. Transpordivahenditega samamoodi. Milleks meil suuri veoautosid vaja on kui meil on vaja inimesi liigutada suhteliselt väikestel vahemaadel? Tsiiviilsõidukid on palju vähem silmatorkavamad, lihtsamad kasutada ja hooldada.

#### **Linnus: Hiluxid ja ATV-d on tulevik?**

Ühtegi: Hilux tuleb kõne alla ja siin on erinevaid lahendusi. Kaitseliitlase puhul tahaks kindlasti omapoolset initsiatiivi rohkem näha selle poolest, et kaitseliitlased hakkavad ise varustust hankima. Peame seda soodustama. Lõppude lõpuks on nii, et sundkoormistega otsime näiteks kastikaid, siis lihtsam on tulla oma masinaga, kui see masin lõppkokkuvõttes ära anda. Tulevikku vaadates on igasuguseid ideid, aga nendest on vara rääkida. Aga soodustama peab maakaitseväge vahendite hankimist sellisena, et igapäevaselt on see ese inimese enda käibes, aga ta teab, et ta on saanud selle soodustusega ja sellega peab ta ka sõtta minema. Kaitseliitlase puhul ei ole see üldse haruldane. Õppustele tullakse tavaliselt välja oma masinaga. Samamoodi võib rääkida relvadest ja muust varustusest. Mul ei ole midagi selle vastu, kui kaitseliitlased soetavad endale ise varustust. Kui me sõdima hakkame, siis me sõdime lõppude lõpuks ikkagi selles varustuses, millega meil mugav on ja tihti mitte selles, mis meile välja on antud. Sellega kaasneb ka varustusest suurem hoolimine ja saame kokku hoida.

#### **Linnus: RAND korporatsiooni uuringutes tuuakse välja MANPAD-ide vajalikkus territoriaalkaitstes. Kas nende soetamine on tulevikus mõeldav?**

Ühtegi: Kui me räägime tankitõrjest, siis jah. Selge on see, et 90 mm kahurid on efektiivsed, kuid nendele laskemoona enam eriti saada ei ole. Ühel hetkel tuleb need maha kanda ja asendada. Asendame need kaasaskantavate raketisüsteemidega. Laual on olnud Javalinid ja Spiked. Nende tulekuga tõstame lahinguvõimet oluliselt ja vähendame meeskondade suuruseid. Õhukaitsega on keerulisem. Õhk on koht, mida ka liitlased tahavad kasutada ja seetõttu vaadatakse väga ettevaatlikult, millised õhutõrjesüsteemid on. Ei ole ju saladus, et Gruusia sõjas on lasti mõlemalt poolt kõike, mis lendab. Lennukid olid samad ja liputunnust ei vaadatud eriti ja võib täitsa arvata, venelasid lasid oma lennukuid alla ja grusiinid omasid. Seda liitlased ei taha. Täna ei ole näha, et neid süsteeme kuskilt tulemas oleks, justnimelt lühimaad. Keskmaa ja pikamaa süsteemidest räägitakse, aga mitte lühimaa omadest.

#### **Linnus: Millist rolli hakkavad senised ringkonna erialaüksused nagu luure ja tankitõrje rühmad mängima?**

Ühtegi: TTRR-ile jäävad kindlasti omad ülesanded alles. On olulisi maastikupunkte, kus saab selliseid üksuseid kasutada. Samuti ka teisi spetsiifilisi üksuseid nagu miinipildujarühmad. Meil on ka teisi võimekusi, mida saab kasutada. Me ei taha, et see oskus kaob. Vastupidi, me loome juurde veel selliseid üksuseid. Näiteks praegu käivad läbirääkimised suurtükiväe üksuse loomise üle. Väga palju sõltub sellest, millised on Kaitseliidu liikmed ja mida nad teha oskavad ja tahavad. Kui oskus sobitub maakaitseksse, on see tervitatav. Tuletoetus on maakaitstes olematu, kuid seda on vaja teatud punktides. Oleme vaadatud ka väikemate kaliibrite osas ehk siis kuulipildujate tuletoetust teatud kohtades. Efektiivse kombineerimise, miinisõja ja tule kombineerimisega on võimalik päris palju ära teha. Nii et neile jääb koht alles. Ringkonna alluvusse jäävad need üksused alles, aga mitte lahinggrupi koosseisus, vaid maleva juurde.

**Linnus: Kas sinna tekib juurde mingisugune uus staabielement, mis seda kontrollib?**

Ühtegi: Ringkonna staap on see, kes juhib malevaid ja maleva staabid. Varasemalt ei mänginud malev mingisugust rolli. Täna on nii, et malev mängib kesksel rollil kohaliku tegevuse mõttes. Ehk siis malev juhib territoriaalsuseid ja tema käes on ka mobiilne üksus ehk jalaväekompanii. Seda saab vajadusel ka ringkond kasutada. Malev juhib ka mittesõjalist poolt Kaitseliidus, mis jääb alles. Maleva pealik on kahe mütsiga: ta vaatab neid elemente, mis on sõdivad ja ka neid, mida ta saab kasutada sõdiva poole toetuseks. Ehk siis see „3V“ printsiip, mida juba kindral Kiili sõnastas, ehk siis võitlejad, võimendajad ja võimaldajad. Võitlejad on need üksused, mis maastikul sõdivad, võimendajad on need, kes aitavad sõdida ja võimaldajad on kohalik keskkond ehk elanikud ja vahendid, mida on võimalik kasutada, et vastupanu osutada.

**Linnus: Milline seos võiks olla territoriaalkaitset teostavate kombatanide ja tsiviilisikute vahel? Arvestades totaalkaitse printsiipi, mida saab Kaitseliit teha, et seda koostööd tõhustada?**

Ühtegi: Laias laastus kui me võtame Kaitseliidu täiskasvanud liikmeskonna, siis me võime ta pooleks jagada. Pool sellest on kombatanid ja pool on tsiviilisikud ehk mittekombatanid. Nii nagu me anname sõjaaja ülesandeid kombatanidele, peame me neid andma ka teisele poolele. Totaalkaitse tähendab seda, et mitte ainult me ei sõdi, vaid totaalselt kaitseme Eesti iseseisvust kogu spektris. Ehk siis peaksid võimalikult kaua vastu pidama kõik institutsioonid kogu Eesti territooriumil. Tsiviil poolega saamegi aidata seda funktsiooni täita. Toome mõne näite. Näiteks evakuatsioon, teavitustöö, meditsiiniabi, korrahoidmine, objektide valvamine, informatsiooni kogumine jne. Enne oli ka küsimus luureüksuste kohta. Jah, see on küll paljuki ringkonna otsustada millist ja kui palju tal luuret vaja on. Täna oleme luurerühmad sisse kirjutanud. Aga suur info peaks tulema mitte luureüksustelt, vaid võrgustikelt, mida on vaja ülesse ehitada. Keskkond peaks meid pidevalt informeerima sellest, mis toimub ümberringi. See töötab Eestis päris hästi. Kui ma olin erioperatsioonides, siis seda infot ei olnud raske saada. Kui tegutsesime Ida-Eestis, siis ei olnud raske saada informatsiooni selle kohta, mis toimub Lääne-Eestis samal hetkel. Me oleme luurekeskusega arutanud luureüksuste loomist ja on ka koostatud luurekontseptsioon, kus leidis, et Kaitseliit peaks looma luureüksuseid. Ma olen seletanud neile, et nende üksuste loomine malevates ei ole otstarbekas läbi selle, et esiteks meil ei ole vahendeid ja teiseks igal asjal peab olema eesmärk. Kunagi räägiti kaugluureüksuste loomisest. Esitasin seal küsimuse, et mis on nende üksuste eesmärk? Kas me saadame nad piiri taha? Ei saada. Okei. Kui ei saada ja me tahame neid kasutada Eestis, siis miks me loome kaugluureüksuse, keda me peame kuskile saatma, vaid me võiksim inimesed sinna jätta, kes informatsiooni meile annavad. Pigem tuleb see asi ülesse ehitada sedapidi. Luureskeem peaks olema ülesse ehitatud võrgustikele nii nagu ka logistika.

**Linnus: Ma olen ise seda suurõppustel praktiseerinud ning üheks probleemiks oli inimeste vähene teadlikkus meie valdkonnast. Ehk siis neid tuleb harida. Kas ringkonna luurerühmasid ei või kasutada selleks, et neid võrgustikke luua?**

Ühtegi: See on üks võimalus, aga see eeldab süstemaatilist tööd. Hetkel oleme välja mõelnud selle, et tekitame õpiväljundi. Loomes instruktorite grupi, kellele me õpetame õpetama vaatlust ja arusaamist. Siis me hakkame õpetama neid inimesi välja. Selles suhtes on teil täiesti õigus, et nendele inimestele on vaja anda väljaõpet. Ma olen ise näinud, kuidas sõdur tuleb ja kannab ette, et nägi tanki ja kui küsitlesid teda, siis tuli välja, et tegemist oli ratassoomukiga. Seetõttu on oluline täpsus ja et osataks ette kanda. Ilmselt mõtleme välja mingi koodisüsteemi, mille alusel on masinaid lihtne

määratleda. Ja see ongi nende ülesanne. Neist ei saa kunagi kombatandid, aga nad oskavad ära tunda masina selle silueti järgi. See puudutab ka mere ja õhuvaatlust. Võib arvata, et visuaalne õhuvaatlus on mõttetu, aga kui Peipsi järve kaldal inimene kuuleb ja näeb lennukeid teatud suunast tulemast ja teatud suunda minemast ja kui ta sellest ette kannab, siis Kesk-Eestis on sellest kasu ikka küll.

**Linnus: Leedu näitel on väljastatud tsiviiliskutele raamat, mis sätestab ka tsiviilidele selle ära, mida nad konflikti olukorras tegema peaksid. Kas Eesti võiks ka midagi sarnast teha?**

Ühtegi: Jah. Esimesed sammud on tehtud. Naiskodukaitse on loonud appi ja siit me lähme edasi. Kui me räägime arengutest, siis see aasta on põhifookuses sõjaline pool, et me saaksime siin väljaõppesüsteemi paika ja struktuurid muudetud. Järgmine aasta keskendume tsiviilpoolele. Neid käsiraamatuid on vaja toota ja kavatseme seda teha.

**Linnus: Kui me võtame ühelt poolt hajutuse printsiibi ja teiselt poolt VF võimekuse sidet maha suruda, siis kuidas hakkab juhtimine toimima? Millised on mitte-lineaarse territoriaalkaitse juhtimise alused?**

Ühtegi: Mitte-lineaarne juhtimine eeldab väga suurt iseseisvust. Kokkulepitud põhimõtteid kasutatakse seni kuni ei ole muud öeldud. Territoriaalkaitstes on see hästi kasutatav, kuna kõigil on sisuliselt olemas oma operatsioonialad. Alast välja minek eeldab koordineerimist. Kui nad jäävad oma alasse ja iseseisvalt seal opereerivad, siis nad saavad seal suurepäraselt hakkama ka ilma ülevaate tulevate korraldusteta. Me peame selleks valmis olema. Hästi tähtis on iseseisvate juhtimisoskuste koolitus, sest otsustusprotsess ja valmidus on tähtis. Ma olen näinud missioonil, kuidas on surma saanud sõdurid seetõttu, et ülem ei julge otsust vastu võtta. Juba jaoülem tase saab operatsioonide läbiviimiseks iseseisva otsustusõiguse.

**Linnus: Me räägime siis detsentraliseeritud juhtimisest?**

Ühtegi: Just. Kuigi kindlasti ehitame ülesse ka side ja kasutame seda iga kord kui seda võimalik kasutada on. Informatsioonivajadus on äärmiselt tähtis. Eestis on lisaks õhule ka alternatiive olemas. Eesti on üsna kaablit täis. Kindlasti mingeid kanaleid saab kombineerida omavahel ehk siis õhk ja kaabel omavahel ühitada. Sidevaldkonnas tehakse päris head tööd. Me ei saa öelda, et allüksustega ei ole sidet. Kui me räägime vahenditest, siis kõike ei ole võimalik maha suruda. On teatud deposioonid, mida ei ole võimalik maha suruda. Selle mahasurumine eeldaks ka seda, et ta surub enda side maha.

**Linnus: Sarnaselt Tšetšeeniale on siis variant kasutada ka lähedust vastasele. Ehk siis ta ei saa kasutada enda side mahasurumise eelist ega ka kaudtuld.**

Ühtegi: Just. Kui sa oled tal külje all, siis on küll suurem risk, aga ta ei saa kasutada oma tulevõimekust sinu vastu nii nagu ta tahaks.

**Linnus: Kas ja kuidas suudab mitte-lineaarne territoriaalkaitse koostöös brigadidega võita aega NATO vägede saabumiseks Eestisse?**

Ühtegi: Kõige olulisem on kindlasti see, et kui me räägime regionaalsest pildist, siis me peame olema suutelised sõtta jääma. Ehk siis juhtub midagi, et meie NATO partnerid ei tule kohe, vaid viivitusega, siis on neil palju raskem siia tulla kui sõda on läbi. Kui me oleme endiselt sõjas, siis on neil moraalne ja füüsiline õigus ja üksused, mis meil maastikul on, toetavad neid. Teine asi on see, et mitte-lineaarse

sõjapidamise mõte on rääkida konfliktist, mis toimub kogu territooriumil. Ükskõik kus vastase väed liiguvad, on nad ohus. Kui eesmised üksused jõuavad näiteks Tallinnasse, siis tagumised üksused, mis on näiteks Vastseliina juures, saavad pasunasse. Kogu see maa on nende jaoks probleem. Vene sõjakäsiraamatutes on kirjeldatud, et selleks, et olla rünnakus efektiivne, peab olema kolmekordne ülekaal. Selleks, et territooriumi hoida, peab olema 40-kordne ülekaal. Kui me lähme ka heidutuse juurde tagasi, siis mida tõsisemalt võetavana me paistame sellisena, et me kavatseme igal sammul vastu hakata ja niimoodi sõdida, et tal on meid keeruline lüüa, kuna gravitatsioonikeset ei ole olemas ja kõik on hajutatud, siis suurte võimsate relvade põhimõtted on ikkagi ülesse ehitatud sellele, et lüüa olulisi sihtmärke. Kui neid ei ole, siis on nende kasutamine suhteliselt mõttetu. Tänapäeval kasutatakse aina rohkem kaudtuld ka positsioonide pihta, kus on 3-4 meest. Seda teha frustratsioonist. See põhimõte ongi selles, et see 3-4 meest ei ole kompanii, vaid see ongi 3-4 meest. Seal ongi efekti vahe. Koondatud üksuse baasilt hävitatakse kompanii, aga hajutatuse puhul 3-4 meest. Selle efektiga ei tunne vastane ennast kindlana ja et olukorda stabiliseerida, peab ta järjest juurde tooma uusi vägesid, mida tal varsti enam võtta ei ole. Siis on ta dilemma ees, et mida teha. Isegi kui keegi ei tuleks appi, siis ka sellisel puhul on võimalik seda sõda võita. Nii nagu võideti Afganistanis.

**Linnus: Küsimus ka raskuskeseme kohta ehk mida me peaksime ründama. On olemas kaks erinevat teooriat. Üks on seotud Vene reformidega alates 2008-st aastast kuni tänapäevani, mis sätestab Vene armee professionaliseerumise ning seetõttu raskuskese võib minna tehnika pealt elavjõu peale. Kui tal uue ešloni üksused sisse tulevad, siis nende treeningutase on oluliselt madalam. Teine teooria ütleb siiski, et nende struktuurist tuleb välja, et nende nõrkuskoht on tagala, logistika ja pioneer ning sinna tuleks rõhk panna. Mis see olla võiks?**

Ühtegi: Tegelikult kui me räägime asümmeetrilisest lähenemisest laiemalt, siis siin ei tohiks tekkida mustrit. Peaksime ründama kõike, millele hammas peale hakkab. Alates vastase luureüksustest lõpetades logistikaga. Näiteks ründame kütuseveokeid, mis on kahtlemata magus sihtmärk ja kindlasti mõjutab nende efektiivsust edasiliikumisel. Teiselt poolt kui me räägime nende pidurdamisest, siis me peame vaatama psühholoogilist poolt. Kui nad maastikul saavad koguaeg kusagilt lüüa ja nad ei saa tegelikult efektiivselt vastu tegutseda, siis see mõjutab nende psühholoogiat ja muutuvad ettevaatlikuks. Nad jalastuvad, kontrollivad enda ümbrust ja see pidurdab liikumist. See loob meile omakorda uued sihtmärgid, näiteks need samad pehmed veokid, sest nad kulutavad pidevalt ressursi. Seetõttu on väga oluline teada seda, et käitumismudel ei tohi olla maatriksis. Me ei tohi igal pool teha ühte ja sama asja. Ühes kohas on näiteks miinitõkked, teises kohas varitsus, kolmandas kohas rünnatakse tulerühmaga. See tekitab kaootilisust. Teiselt poolt peame me väga hästi teadma vastase taktikat ehk kuidas ta käitub. Mõlemal poolel on ootused kui tema luure satub meie varitsuse peale. Loogiline samm on see, et ta teostab sellepeale manöövri. Näiteks läheb oma julgestusega haarama ja toob suurtüki positsioonile. Aga kui me nüüd teades seda, millised on vahemaad ja ajavahe, paneme ta julgestusele ka varitsuse peale ja segame ta sidet, et ta ei saaks adekvaatset informatsiooni, siis ta ei saa kuidagi toetada ja see oluliselt blokeerib tema tegutsemisvõimalusi ja tal on tõsine probleem sellega. Toon näite. Oli meil 1991. aasta 20. august Teletorni juures. Just hiljuti andis Aadu Jõgiaas välja raamatu selle kohta, kus ta kirjeldab ka raadiovõitlust, mida peeti tollel ajal. Võimalik, et üksusele oleks antud korraldus ka rünnata, aga kuna sidet segati koguaeg, siis nad ei saanudki seda korraldust. Momentum lasti mööda ja lahing oligi kaotatud. Need on need asjad, mida me samamoodi peame tegema.

**Linnus: Mao Zetungi geriljasõja põhimõte et näita, et sa tuleb idast ja siis löö läänest endiselt kehtivad?**

Ühtegi: Jah. Kui me räägime sellest, mis vahe on territoriaalkaitse taktikal ja erioperatsioonide taktikal, kes siis ehitab ülesse partisanisõda, siis kõige suurem vahe on territooriumi tunnetamine. Maakaitse sõdib ennekõike enda territooriumil. Ta loeb selle enda omaks. Ehk siis julgeolekunõuded on tunduvalt madalamad. Kui sa oled vastase tagalas ja tema poolt kontrollitud alal, siis sa peab väga palju tähelepanu pöörama julgeolekule ja sinu efektiivsus sõdimise mõttes väheneb. Sa pead ellu jääma. Meil on see eelis, et me oleme enda territooriumil. Isegi kui vastane läbi läheb ja ta ei kontrolli seda, on see endiselt meie oma. Me kasutame endiselt kõiki neid vahendeid, mis seal territooriumil on ja me ei pea nii palju tähelepanu pöörama julgeolekule.

**Linnus: Kui me vaatame Ukrainat ja Süüriat, siis meie potentsiaalne vastane on seal läbi viinud väga tugeva informatsioonikampaania. Kuidas me enda kombatante selle eest kaitseme ja kuidas on võimalik meie kombatante kasutada, et vastast sellega lüüa?**

Ühtegi: Üks asi, mida me peame looma ja milles meil puudub kogemus, on infooperatsioonide ülesehitamine. Igat tegevust tuleb näidata kui infooperatsiooni, milles me oleme tagasihoidlikud. Eestlastena me ei kipu end väga näitama. Kui me võrdleme näiteks ISISe kampaaniat, siis nad kasutavad kõiki vahendeid kõigile auditooriumitele ja sellega nad võidavad südameid. Siin ongi probleem selles, et Lääne metoodika infosõjas osas ei ole nii agressiivne kui Idas, kus silma pilgutamata võib valetada ja see töötab. Kuidas sõdureid kasutada? Kui me vaatame laiapinnalist kaitset, siis see mittesõjaline pool on see, kelle ülesanne on kohaliku elanikkonna üle hoolitseda. Riigivõim peab alles jääma nii kaua kui võimalik ja taaskäivituma kui VA väed on läbi läinud, et kohalik elanikkond tunneks, et riik on alles. Kui me selle suudame ära teha ja tekitada elanikkonnale kindlust, on see suur asi. Kui me vaatame laias pildis, siis elanikkond jaguneb kolmeks. Need, kes on nagunii VA poolt, need kes on meie poolt ja kolmas, kes pole poolt valinud. Kogu infosõda käib nende kohta, kes pole poolt valinud. Mõlemad pooled näevad vaeva, et seda mõjutada. Võib-olla vastane üritab seda hirmutamise teha, meie püüame präänikuga ehk humanitaarabi ja muud asjad. See on see koht, kus me sõdime vastasega kõige rohkem, sest see on tavaliselt kõige suurem kontingent. Iga sõdur peab näitama enda hoolivust, meelekindlust. Seetõttu on oluline, et saaksime aru, et riigikaitse ei koosne ainult füüsilisest osast. On kaks valdkonda veel. Üks on kontseptuaalne pool ja teine on moraalne pool ehk tahe. Me peale olema selles tugevad. Maakaitstes on see eriti oluline. Kui me tahame ülesse ehitada iseseisvaid üksuseid, siis peavad need inimesed mentaalselt tugevad olema. Kui me räägime juhtimisest, siis et olla ülem või olla pealik on eri asjad. Need võivad kattuda, aga on selge, et pealikult on palju rohkem võimu kui ülemal.

**Linnus: Kui maakaitseüksus on mingi VA elemendi hävitanud, siis kas selle pildistamine ja filmimine on vajalik?**

Ühtegi: Jah, see peab olema koguaeg kaasas. Ma olen öelnud ka, et esimene Vene tank, kes Narva tuleb, lastakse ära venelaste enda poolt. See peab ka olema meediaoperatsioon.

**Linnus: Millise riigi, organisatsiooni või vastupanuliikumisega uus maakaitsekontseptsioon kõige enam sarnaneb?**

Ühtegi: Tegelikult on Põhjamaades samad põhimõtted olnud Külma sõja ajal, kus ehitati ülesse üsna tõhus vastupanuliikumise süsteem. Me ei ole otseselt kopeerinud kedagi siin. Oleme selle tuletanud.

Oleme vaadanud Põhjamaid, Šveitsi ja õppinud Afganistanist, Iraagist ja teistest konfliktidest, kus me oleme sõdinud. Tšetšeenia loomulikult ja Gruusia ja Ukraina. Ukrainas nägime seda kui olulist rolli mängib elanikkond ja selle tahe. Mitu linna, mis oleks muidu kaotatud, võideti tänu sellele, et kohalik elanikkond ei olnud nõus. Põhimõte on selles, et me oleme õppinud paljudest konfliktidest. Ma ei saa öelda, et meil oleks mingi kindel mudel. Palju sarnasust on ka II MS kasutatud meetodikatest vastupanuliikumiste osas. Eks see mudel on välja kasvanud teatud määral ka vastupanuliikumise mudelist. Ehk siis me alustasime pildi vaatamist selliselt, et kui kõik on halvasti, kuidas me ka siis vastu hakata saame. Tulime sealt sammuke edasi ja küsisime, et miks me seda ainult vastase poolt okupeeritud territooriumil teeme, kui me võiksime seda samamoodi efektiivselt teha juba varem. Afganistanis oleme seda juba teinud ja näinud, et kontrolli all olevat territooriumit on samamoodi võimalik sarnaste meetoditega kaitsta. Ma arvan, et Soome, Rootsi ja Šveits on eeskujudeks. Ehk sümbioos parimatest tavadest.

**Linnus: Nii Karl Salum kui ka James Wither väidavad, et jah, Eestis on võimalik mitte-lineaarset kaitsemudelit ülesse ehitada. Aga kui me räägime efektiivselt mudelist, siis nii konventsionaalse kui ka mitte-lineaarsesse mudelisse peaks minema enam-vähem sama palju ressursse. Kuidas Eestis see tuleviku perspektiivis välja näeb?**

Ühtegi: Ma väga loodan. Täna on ikkagi see, et põhiline osa eelarvest läheb konventsionaalsesse kaitseesse. Sellel on omad põhjendused. Üks põhjendus on see, et olles NATO liige, on meil kohustused organisatsiooni ees. Kohustused luua võimekused, millest ka organisatsioon kasu saab. NATOs on juba muutusi. Järjest rohkem hakatakse rääkima teistsugusest sõjapidamisest, aga laeva on keeruline pöörata. Ilmselt võtab see mõned aastad veel aega, kuni NATO saab aru, mis on maakaitse ja mittelineaarne sõjapidamine. See on seniste sõjapidamismeetodite kõrval, mis NATO-le omane on, väga uudne. Paljuskki on seal ikkagi Külma sõja aegne sõjapidamismetoodika. Loomulikult need konfliktid, kus me NATOga sees oleme olnud, on meid õpetanud. Seetõttu on hakatud palju rääkima uutest sõjapidamisviisidest, aga see ei jõua alati alla välja. Seetõttu kui me räägime globaalsest või regionaalsest sõjast, siis see eeldab üksusi, mida on võimalik paigutada. Ja see nõuab nišivõimekust. NATO küsib meilt, miks me loome õhutõrje, kui me toome teile õhutõrje. Miks teil tanke või ristlejat vaja on kui meie probleem on hoopis meremiinid? Ja väga palju on arenenud ka Eesti kaitseväge selles suunas. Ja täna ka kui me vaatame arenguid, mis toimuvad. Me loome Scoutspataljoni baasil üksust, mis on soomustatud lahingumasinatele, seda toetab soomustatud lintidel suurtükivägi, siis see kõik on hästi kallis ja see efekt tuleb välja siis, kui nad töötavad koos paljude samasuguste üksustega. Territoriaalkaitset me siit kuskile Lätti või Leetu sõdima ei vii, see jääbki siia maha. Järelikult peame seda tegema nii odavalt kui võimalik ja teiselt poolt ei ole territoriaalkaitse ülesanne vastast puruks lüüa, vaid luua tingimused, et kui konventsionaalsed üksused tulevad, on neil lihtsam liikuda, sõdida ja vastast hävitada. Kui me oleks algusest saati panustanud territoriaalkaitse, siis ta oleks võib-olla praeguseks juba nii efektiivne, et oleksime suutelised ise enda eest seisma. Aga siis me poleks NATO liige, sest me poleks neile midagi andnud või panustanud peale oma enda territooriumi. Siin on väikene dilemma või vastuolu selle vahel, et suure koalitsiooni jaoks on Eesti üks operatsioonikast, mida võib ära anda ja siis tagasi võtta. Meie jaoks on ta meie riigi territoorium ja põhiseadus ütleb, et me peame seda kaitsma. Kaitsmine põhiseaduse mõttes tähendab ikkagi seda, et me sõdime siin, mitte mujal. Samas alliansi liikmena võime Eestit kaitsta ka Poolas.



### **Linnus: Kuidas suudame täiendada territoriaalkaitset pidavaid üksuseid?**

Ühtegi: Kaitseliit on tegelikult null ülekattega. Ehk siis meie üksused on nii suured nagu nad on ja kui nad hakkavad vähenema, siis nad vähenevad. Samal ajal me loomulikult viime läbi värbamist. Täna me ei ole saanud kokkuleppele, et me võiksime kasutada täiendavat reservi. Kui sealt tuleb see võimalus, siis me saame end täiendada, aga fakt on see, et kui me võrdleme täiendreservist saanud meest, kes on kunagi saanud relvaväljaõppe ja võrdleme meest, kes paneb 10 nädalavahetust Kaitseliidu üritustele, siis on selge, et nad pole võrdsed. Alati on see maakaitseväelane üle. Seda enam, et ta on kokku töötanud oma üksusega. Lahendus on see, et kui Kaitsevägi annaks meile täiendavat reservi koha pealt. Jao ja rühmaülem võtab need mehed, kes on ta külas ja ajakohastab nende oskusi. Täiendame oma ridu ka läbi värbamise. Värbamine jätkub terve sõjaperioodi. Uskuge mind, kriisi ja sõja ajal see tahe märkimisväärselt kasvab. Peab tekkima võimalus tulla organisatsiooni ja saada kiirelt väljaõpe. Meie juhid peavad olema piisavalt pädevad selleks, et need inimesed võtta ja neid oskuslikult kasutada, teades nende piiratud oskusi. Aga ka nende tugevusi tsiviilmaailmast. Igale inimesele tuleb silma vaadata ja teada, milleks ta võimeline on. Peab arvestama, et maleva juhtkond võib sattuda löögi alla. Me peame asendama neid inimesi võib-olla nende inimestega, kes on väljastpoolt süsteemi. Kohalike liidritega, arvamusiidritega, sest meil ongi teatud kohtadesse vaja inimesi, kes on tuntud ja suudavad inimesi kaasa tõmmata.