Ohutõrjeõigus politsei- ja korrakaitseõiguses: kooskõla põhiseadusega
Date
2015-04-14
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Abstract
Eesti õiguskorras on politsei ja teiste organite läbi viidava riikliku järelevalve menetluse aluseks ohutõrje kontseptsioon. Tegemist on Eesti õigussüsteemis küllaltki uue fenomeniga, kuna korrakaitseseadus jõustus 1. juulil 2014. Ohutõrjeõigus on klassikaline riivehaldus, kuna see annab õiguse piirata isiku põhiõigusi ja vabadusi. Seadus jätab korrakaitseorganitele ulatusliku kaalumisruumi ohu tuvastamisel ja sobilike meetmete valimisel. Riivehalduse meetmete rakendamise eelduseks on määratlemata õigusmõisted (nt oht, avalik kord, avaliku korra eest vastutav isik). Riigikohus on oma arvamustes märkinud, et korrakaitseseadusega üle võetud ohutõrje kontseptsioon ei ole Eesti õigusruumile kõige parem lahendus. Autor seab eesmärgiks vastata küsimusele, kas korrakaitseseaduses sätestatud ohutõrjeõiguse doktriin ja tema üksikud elemendid (nt eraõigusklausel, üldvolitus) on kooskõlas põhiseadusega ning millised piirangud seab põhiseadus ohutõrjeõigusele. Esiteks järeldab autor, et ohutõrjeõiguse põhiseadusliku õigustusena (legitiimse eesmärgina) saab käsitada riigi sisemist rahu ja julgeolekut (tegemist on põhiseadusliku väärtusega) ning riigi kohustust garanteerida isikute põhiõigused. Teiseks järeldab autor, et põhiseadus ei luba erasektorile intensiivseid riivemeetmeid delegeerida; riikliku järelevalve menetlust kohaldada süüteomenetluse eesmärkide saavutamiseks. Lisaks on põhiseaduse kohaselt problemaatiline, kui korrakaitseorganil on õigus sekkuda eraisikute vahelisse vaidlusesse üksnes siis, kui selleks esineb avalik huvi. Samuti tuleks ohukahtluse korral hoiduda ohutõrje meetmete rakendamisest. Kummutamaks üldvolituse põhiseaduspärasuse problemaatilisust, on põhjendatud piirata üldvolituse rakendamise eelduseid sellega, et tegemist oleks olukorraga, kus tõkestatakse kuritegu, väärtegu, põhiseaduskorra rasket rikkumist või kõrvaldatakse see tagajärg või tõrjutakse ohtu isiku elule, tervisele, isiku vabadusele või asja kahjustamisele.
In the Estonian legal system, the regulation of state supervision proceedings of the police and of other authorities and inspectorates are based on the danger aversion law doctrine. It is rather novel phenomenon in the Estonian legal space while the Order Protection Act entered into force on 1 July 2014. Danger aversion law is a classic case of infringement administration while it creates the material basis for the infringement of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. The law allows extensive discretionary powers for order protection bodies to identify and avert dangers with appropriate measures. The law ise based also on undefined legal concepts (e.g., danger, public order, persons liable for public order), which are used as prerequisites of implementing an infringement measure in the danger aversion law. In the opinions expressed by the Supreme Court, the court did not consider the concept of danger aversion to be transposed with the Order Protection Act as the best solution. The author aims to answer the question of whether the danger aversion law doctrine set out in the Order Protection Act and its individual elements (e.g. private law clause, general authorisation) are consistent with the Constitution and what limitations the Constitution places on the danger aversion law. Firstly the author concluded that ensuring internal peace and security (which are constitutional values) and the function of guaranteeing of fundamental rights can be treated as the constitutional justifications (legal aim) of the danger aversion law doctrine. Secondly the author concluded that with the Constitution is not compliant the delegation of an intense infringement measure duty to use police and order protection force to the private sector; application of state supervision proceedings to achieve the goals of offence proceedings; and the requirement of absolute public interest, set forth in the private law clause, as a prerequisite of police and order protection agency intervention. Constitutionaly is also very problematic to apply measures that aim to avert dangers in case of a suspected danger, such circumstances should be avoided. In order to alleviate problems related to the constitutionality weighing the general authorisation, it is justified to restrict the prerequisites of implementing a general authorisation to a situation where the measure prevents a crime, misdemeanour, serious violation of the constitutional order or eliminates the consequence, or averts danger to the life, health, personal freedom or damage to an object.
In the Estonian legal system, the regulation of state supervision proceedings of the police and of other authorities and inspectorates are based on the danger aversion law doctrine. It is rather novel phenomenon in the Estonian legal space while the Order Protection Act entered into force on 1 July 2014. Danger aversion law is a classic case of infringement administration while it creates the material basis for the infringement of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. The law allows extensive discretionary powers for order protection bodies to identify and avert dangers with appropriate measures. The law ise based also on undefined legal concepts (e.g., danger, public order, persons liable for public order), which are used as prerequisites of implementing an infringement measure in the danger aversion law. In the opinions expressed by the Supreme Court, the court did not consider the concept of danger aversion to be transposed with the Order Protection Act as the best solution. The author aims to answer the question of whether the danger aversion law doctrine set out in the Order Protection Act and its individual elements (e.g. private law clause, general authorisation) are consistent with the Constitution and what limitations the Constitution places on the danger aversion law. Firstly the author concluded that ensuring internal peace and security (which are constitutional values) and the function of guaranteeing of fundamental rights can be treated as the constitutional justifications (legal aim) of the danger aversion law doctrine. Secondly the author concluded that with the Constitution is not compliant the delegation of an intense infringement measure duty to use police and order protection force to the private sector; application of state supervision proceedings to achieve the goals of offence proceedings; and the requirement of absolute public interest, set forth in the private law clause, as a prerequisite of police and order protection agency intervention. Constitutionaly is also very problematic to apply measures that aim to avert dangers in case of a suspected danger, such circumstances should be avoided. In order to alleviate problems related to the constitutionality weighing the general authorisation, it is justified to restrict the prerequisites of implementing a general authorisation to a situation where the measure prevents a crime, misdemeanour, serious violation of the constitutional order or eliminates the consequence, or averts danger to the life, health, personal freedom or damage to an object.