SV Euroopa Liidu rahastatud projektid
Selle valdkonna püsiv URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/10062/58019
Sirvi
Sirvi SV Euroopa Liidu rahastatud projektid Autor "Berg, Eiki" järgi
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Kirje Bridging the divide between parent states and secessionist entities: a new perspective for conflict management?(Routledge, 2018) Berg, EikiThis paper departs from the contested nature of the border that separates each side in secessionist conflict – the parent state considers this as an internal administrative line; the de facto state, conversely, sees this as an international border. The argument made builds upon the theoretical aspects of the bordering practices in the current literature, and then examines three cross-border cases – Mainland China-Taiwan, Cyprus-Northern Cyprus and Moldova-Transnistria, to demonstrate different patterns of cross-border interactions and their achieved outcomes. It questions why border-crossing practices have either brought about normalization in degrees, or with a questionable value? This paper makes the conclusion that although border-crossing practices have normalized relations between adversaries, they have also simultaneously brought along self-perpetuating separation as most of the divisions still persist today. Redefining borders and facilitating cross-border interactions has only had a limited contribution to conflict management.Kirje Conceptual Framework for Engagement with de facto States(London, New York: Routledge, 2018) Berg, Eiki; Ker-Lindsay, JamesSecessionist de facto states, by their very nature, sit outside of the international system. Having unilaterally declared independence from their parent state, they are invariably prevented from joining the United Nations, and thus taking their place as members of the community of universally recognised countries. While the reasons for such punitive approaches have a logic according to prevailing political and legal approaches to secession, it is also recognised that isolation can have harmful effects. Ostracising de facto can not only hinder efforts to resolve the dispute by reducing their willingness to engage in what they see as an asymmetrical settlement process, it can also force them into a closer relationship with a patron state. For this reason, there has been growing interest in academic and policy circles around the concept of engagement without recognition. This is a mechanism that provides for varying degrees of interaction with de facto states while maintaining the position that they are not regarded as independent sovereign actors in the international system. As is shown, while the concept has its flaws, it nevertheless opens up new opportunities for conflict management.Kirje Face to face with conservative religious values: Assessing the EU's normative impact in the South Caucasus(London, New York: Routledge, 2018) Berg, Eiki; Kilp, AlarThe article analyzes how Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia react to the EU’s soft power, which is mainly based on its human rights policy including the freedom of religion and the promotion of pluralism. The EU has limited soft power in the South Caucasus. It remains attractive but only to a relative degree. The EU’s normative power is challenged by conservative value orientations which are backed up by religious institutions and politicians seeking to maximize their political gains.Kirje How do you tailor diplomatic training? Sizing up peer institutions and their training practices for the Diplomatic School of Armenia(2016) Berg, EikiThe Diplomatic School of Armenia (est. in 2009) explored how its peer institutions were organized, how they tailored their training programmes and how any existing structures and practices could be suited for Armenia. This paper reviews part of a comparative study which was carried out in 2013–2014. We include a sample of 14 institutes and training centres, ranging from countries which had diplomatic training fully integrated into the ministerial structures to those where the institute had become an entirely separate entity; including states where training focused strictly on skills development, as well as those cases where the focus had turned to offering post-graduate studies. It appears that all peer institutions have followed unprecedented development paths, becoming today’s diplomatic training centres, schools and academies. This made the tailoring exercise for Armenia even more challenging.Kirje Implementing EU's Normative Agenda in the South Caucasus: Contradictory effects(Tbilisi: Georgian Institute of Politics, 2017) Berg, Eiki; Kilp, AlarIt is not a secret that the EU has sought to influence regional developments by imposing liberal democratic norms on the third countries interested in closer relations with the union. Given that this soft power approach may effect change, we analysed the role of EU normative powers in influencing human rights dialogues. We also saw how both the political establishments and societies at large have adapted to these new circumstances. Further to the east, the lever for Europeanization seems to be eroding. To that end, the EU has continuously reaffirmed that its support for and cooperation with target countries must be conditional on the promotion of civil liberties and democratic reforms. While there is concern that the EU’s normative policies may be ineffective if they are not fully implemented on the ground, it is possible that the prospect of EU integration could prove to be an attractive aspiration for large segments of these societies. Fully implementing EU norms, however, may drive these countries into conflict with the conservative mores sustained by the state/religious institutions.Kirje Introduction(2016) Berg, Eiki; Riegl, Martin; Doboš, BohumilKirje Introduction: A Conceptual Framework for Engagement with de facto States(Routledge, 2018) Ker-Lindsay, James; Berg, EikiSecessionist de facto states, by their very nature, sit outside of the international system. Having unilaterally declared independence from their parent state, they are invariably prevented from joining the United Nations, and thus taking their place as members of the community of universally recognised countries. While the reasons for such punitive approaches have a logic according to prevailing political and legal approaches to secession, it is also recognised that isolation can have harmful effects. Ostracising de facto can not only hinder efforts to resolve the dispute by reducing their willingness to engage in what they see as an asymmetrical settlement process, it can also force them into a closer relationship with a patron state. For this reason, there has been growing interest in academic and policy circles around the concept of engagement without recognition. This is a mechanism that provides for varying degrees of interaction with de facto states while maintaining the position that they are not regarded as independent sovereign actors in the international system. As is shown, while the concept has its flaws, it nevertheless opens up new opportunities for conflict management.Kirje Introduction: Secession and Recognition in the Twenty-first Century(Springer International Publishing, 2017) Berg, Eiki; Doboš, Bohumil; Riegl, MartinQuestions of identity, secession, and (international) recognition are inherently interconnected.Kirje Quest for Survival and Recognition: Insights into the Foreign Policy Endeavours of the Post-Soviet de facto States.(Routledge, 2018) Vits, Kristel; Berg, EikiThere is lack of proper accounts of the foreign policy practices of de facto state authorities. There is no common understanding for whether de facto states have their own agency, or if these fledgling states are used as pawns within the context of wider strategic manoeuvring. This work proceeds from the assumption that de facto states are ‘states’ which, above all, seek to secure their physical survival, as well as to gain the status of legal subjectivity. For de facto states that depend on the effects of ‘smallness’; patron–client relations; and the opportunities provided by the engagement without recognition policy framework, this should ideally be the backbone of their foreign policy strategies. This comparative study on post-Soviet de facto states reveals that there are more opportunities to conduct an independent foreign policy than de facto states are able and willing to utilize. Once these entities have ensured their survival, this study demonstrates that the next steps towards gaining additional recognition might be perceived as no longer necessary.Kirje Scrutinizing a Policy of “Engagement Without Recognition”: US Requests for Diplomatic Actions With De Facto States(2018) Berg, Eiki; Pegg, ScottDe facto states are conventionally perceived as illegal entities, usually ignored by the rest of the world and therefore also isolated and severely sanctioned in most cases. We investigate US foreign-policy engagement with Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, and Transnistria and explore when, why, and how interactions between the United States and “places that do not exist” has taken place. This is done by extensively using WikiLeaks diplomatic cables from 2003– to 2010 as a primary information source. We assume that by engaging and not recognizing, the US has sought to increase its leverage and footprint in conflicts that somehow affect its national interests. This engagement approach is presumably most successful when targeted adversaries turn out to be agents of peace and stability, or when strategic calculus outweighs the rationale for the conventional treatment of sovereign anomalies.Kirje The Do-or-Die Dilemma Facing Post-Soviet De Facto States(PONARS Eurasia, 2018) Vits, Kristel; Berg, EikiThis memo discusses the “do or die” dilemma of post-Soviet de facto states. Our examination looks in to patron-client relations that are highly unequal and asymmetric in terms of resources and capabilities: Russia vis-à-vis Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, and Armenia vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh. While relying entirely on a militarily and economically resourceful external patron is often seen as the only viable option, de facto states may be risking the loss of their “independence.” Hence their “do or die” dilemma that structures many of their policies.Kirje The politics of unpredictability: Acc/secession of Crimea and the blurring of international norms.(Routledge, 2018) Berg, Eiki; Mölder, MartinThis article focuses on prominent recent episodes where Russia has put sovereignty, the obligation to refrain (O2R) from using force, and self-determination to the test. Most recently in the Crimean context, we see that Russia’s systematic instrumental use of these norms does not contest the norms as such, but as their application becomes more contingent and arbitrary, their meaning is nevertheless blurred. We additionally explore how other justifications were applied alongside self-determination, which were all linked to interference in the internal political processes of another state, facilitating secession and incorporating part of the territory of the latter. We introduce the concept of blurring and show how the production of floating signifiers has become Russia’s preferred strategy in the international war of interpretations. This politics of unpredictability has led Russia to act in self-defence unilaterally and outside of the framework of the United Nations (UN), going against not only some of its own declared principles while following others, but also further strengthening the discursive gap with the West.Kirje Why the International Community Should Be More Accommodating to De Facto States(PONARS Eurasia, 2018) Vits, Kristel; Berg, EikiDe facto states are notorious for their pariah status, constant security deficit, and embryonic institutions, producing the perception that they are states-in-the-making perpetually striving for sheer survival. Their reliance on a patron is considered proof that they would not be viable states and thus are incapable of having independent agency. Without the freedom of choice, these entities lack deliberate will for action, and without capacity to do, they can hardly be in a position of exerting power. A focus on agency allows us to ask how far and in what ways these unrecognized entities have been able to act in the international system. We demonstrate that, despite their limited capacity, de facto states do display some agency, and that their foreign policy choices are sometimes not remarkably different from recognized small states or micro-states. Even imperfect agency may bring relief for local policymakers who are supposed to alleviate anarchy and chaos in their daily practices. The international community, we argue, should thus be more accommodating to de facto states; if their agency is continuously denied, they will be both increasingly reliant on their patron and separated from the international community.