Sirvi Autor "Kilp, Alar" järgi

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Church authority in society, culture and politics after Communism
(2012-06-22) Kilp, Alar
Ajaloolist lähenemist ja võrdlevat meetodit kasutav uurimus hindab kommunistlike režiimide mõju traditsioonilise kiriku võimu langusele avalikul alal. Kiriku võimu langust ühiskonnas, kultuuris ja poliitikas käsitleb uurimus ainsa ja määrava tunnusena, mis kaasneb kaasajal sotsiaalse, kultuurilise ja poliitilise sekulariseerumisega. Põhitähelepanu all on üheksa läänekristliku kultuuritaustaga postkommunistlikku ühiskonda, mille kultuurilised rahvusliikumised algasid 19. sajandil. See oli aeg, mil Euroopa ühiskonnad olid olulisel määral juba sekulariseerunud ning avalikke funktsioone täitev kristlus oli muutunud piibellikust ja dogmaatilisest, müütilisest ja konfessionaalsest, kultuur-, tsiviil- ja rahvusreligiooniliseks. Kiriku avalikku võimu on kommunismiaegsetest riigi ja kiriku suhetest enam mõjutanud kaks kommunismieelset riigi ja kiriku suhete mustrit – kultuuriline konfessioon (luterlik või katoliiklik) ning 19. sajandil kujunenud kiriku suhted rahvusliikumisega. Sõltumata sellest, kas kommunistlik kirikupoliitika oli kaasav või repressiivne, nõrgendas ta veelgi neid rahvuse ja kiriku vahelisi suhteid, mis oli nõrgad ka varem, ning tugevdas rahvuse ja kiriku liitu seal, kus vastavad suhted olid tugevad juba kommunistliku režiimi eel. Kirikute võim on erakordsel määral nõrgenenud kõigis luterliku traditsiooniga postkommunistlikes ühiskondades, kuid traditsiooniliselt katoliiklikest ühiskondadest vaid sellistes, milles kirikul puudub positiivne side rahvuskultuuriga. Kahel kaudsel moel on kommunistlikud režiimid aidanud ka kaitsta traditsiooniliste kirikute avalikku võimu. Kommunistlikud režiimid ei soodustanud religiooni individualiseerumist ja kaasajastumist ehk protsesse, mis samaaegselt Lääne-Euroopa liberaaldemokraatlikes ühiskondades kirikute võimu nõrgendasid. Lisaks on homoseksualismi taunimine säilinud kommunistlike režiimi väärtushoiakulise pärandina ka sellistes ühiskondades, kus kodanike sidemed traditsiooniliste kirikutega on lagunenud.
Estonia: Religious Association Restrictions of Same-Sex Couple Religious Rights
(Krakow: NOMOS, 2017) Kilp, Alar
EU law on same-sex unions (SSU) expects Member States to legally recognize the family life of same-sex couples in the form of marriage, partnership, or cohabitation. The normative expectation, which in about 2010 became a principled position of the EU institutions and the European Court of Human Rights, has not been endorsed by one Western European Member State (Italy) as well as the majority of the post-Communist Member States (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). There are a number of causes behind the failure to enact SSU laws: the legacies of the communist regimes, the prevalence of a certain interpretation of Christian doctrine, the medium level of economic affluence, and an unfavorable balance of power between the change and blocking coalitions of social, religious, and political actors. Unlike Western European countries, where the family life of same-sex unions was legally recognized primarily due to pressures from below (due to changes in public opinion and shifts in cultural values), governments and legislatures in most Central and Eastern European Member States are encouraged more from above (by the European Union and the Council of Europe). Therefore, the prospects for legal recognition of same-sex unions are slim in countries where the European normative agenda meets no significant support from domestic social values or religious and political actors. This conflict of national and EU forces is most likely to persist in Member States which are post-Soviet, culturally Orthodox, not shifted from materialist to post-materialist values, and governed by right-wing governmental coalitions.
Face to face with conservative religious values: Assessing the EU's normative impact in the South Caucasus
(London, New York: Routledge, 2018) Berg, Eiki; Kilp, Alar
The article analyzes how Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia react to the EU’s soft power, which is mainly based on its human rights policy including the freedom of religion and the promotion of pluralism. The EU has limited soft power in the South Caucasus. It remains attractive but only to a relative degree. The EU’s normative power is challenged by conservative value orientations which are backed up by religious institutions and politicians seeking to maximize their political gains.
Implementing EU's Normative Agenda in the South Caucasus: Contradictory effects
(Tbilisi: Georgian Institute of Politics, 2017) Berg, Eiki; Kilp, Alar
It is not a secret that the EU has sought to influence regional developments by imposing liberal democratic norms on the third countries interested in closer relations with the union. Given that this soft power approach may effect change, we analysed the role of EU normative powers in influencing human rights dialogues. We also saw how both the political establishments and societies at large have adapted to these new circumstances. Further to the east, the lever for Europeanization seems to be eroding. To that end, the EU has continuously reaffirmed that its support for and cooperation with target countries must be conditional on the promotion of civil liberties and democratic reforms. While there is concern that the EU’s normative policies may be ineffective if they are not fully implemented on the ground, it is possible that the prospect of EU integration could prove to be an attractive aspiration for large segments of these societies. Fully implementing EU norms, however, may drive these countries into conflict with the conservative mores sustained by the state/religious institutions.
Kiriku ja riigi suhted Ameerika Ühendriikide põhiseaduse esimese paranduse valgusel
(Tartu Ülikool, 2000) Kilp, Alar; Saumets, Andres, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Usuteaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Ajaloolise usuteaduse õppetool
Making Identity Count: Estonia 1990
(2025) Kilp, Alar
In 1990, Estonian national identity strongly centered on independence, unity, and cultural heritage, with cultural symbols like national literature, holidays, and traditions playing a critical role. While independence was the primary goal, uncertainty persisted due to divisions among the political establishment, fears of being a small state dominated by great powers, and differing views between the Congress of Estonia and the Supreme Soviet regarding the path forward. The public admired both national traditions and Western culture but criticized ineffective governance amid a deepening economic crisis, rising crime, and social inequality. The Soviet Union was overwhelmingly viewed in negative terms for its role in occupation, repression, and environmental damage. While some nostalgia for the stagnation era remained, aspirations for national independence were underpinned by a strong anti-colonial sentiment, as the Soviet Union was portrayed as a colonial occupier. Russian speakers in Estonia had not yet formed a distinct social or political identity, as they were largely identified with the Soviet regime, its institutions (such as the Soviet army), or pro-Soviet movements like the Intermovement.
Making Identity Count: Estonia 1995
(2025) Kilp, Alar
In 1995, hegemonic identity discourses were centred on the market economy and nationalism. Neoliberal market hegemony was primarily (re)produced by elites and remained unchallenged by popular discourses, which generally took market reasoning and meritocratic justice for granted. Instead, public concerns focused on increasing social status stratification and the welfare state, with democracy often assessed on the basis of socio-economic outcomes rather than formal parliamentary institutions and being identified more strongly than the elite with traditions, conservative values and rural life. Nationalism functioned as a true ‘collective identity’, shared and positively valued by both elites and the masses. In particular, ethnic and cultural nationalism served as a filter through which contemporary and past periods of independence, as well as the most relevant historic Others (Imperial Russia and Baltic Germans), were evaluated.
Making Identity Count: Estonia 2000
(2025) Kilp, Alar
This report analyses the discursive construction of Estonian national identity in the year 2000, drawing from both elite and mass perspectives. While shared ideals – such as cultural heritage, state sovereignty, responsible governance, and social cohesion – formed common ground, crucial divergences emerged. Elite discourse emphasised patriotism, national culture, and modernisation, whereas popular narratives were more ambivalent, particularly towards nationalism and the political elite. National identity was framed through historical continuity, cultural institutions, language preservation, and symbolic markers such as the national currency (the kroon). Integration debates centred on concerns regarding the Russophone minority and the impact of EU accession on sovereignty and agriculture. Northern Europe, especially Finland and Sweden, was viewed as a normative reference. The legacy of the Soviet Union, imperial Russia, and Baltic Germans remained central to historical self-understanding. The Estonian language, education, and moral values were seen as essential to continued national survival. Overall, identity discourse revealed a dual dynamic: on the one hand, a forward-looking aspiration to become a typical meritocratic, neoliberal market-state; on the other, lingering anxieties tied to the hardships of economic transition, Estonian emigration to the West, persistent poverty, and growing societal insecurity.
Making Identity Count: Estonia 2010
(2025) Kilp, Alar
In 2010, Estonia’s national identity was framed around cultural nationalism and a sense of indigenous independence, embraced by both elites and the broader population. Widespread disillusionment with the political elite was evident, alongside a shared demand for better social welfare and reduced regional inequality. Value debates largely reflected consensus between elites and the public. Both groups supported issues like environmental sustainability but remained divided or uncertain on conservatism and traditional gender roles. An elite-led identity project emphasized economic development, austerity as a marker of effective governance, and digital modernization, culminating in Estonia’s adoption of the euro in January 2011. In contrast, popular discourse focused more on Estonian language, the presence of Russians in Estonia, poverty, inequality, and skepticism toward the market economy. “Significant Others” included the West and the EU—favored more by elites—as well as the Soviet Union and Russia, generally viewed in a negative light. However, the Soviet era was occasionally credited for high living standards and conservative values, while historical Russia was sometimes viewed as supportive of Estonian national aspirations.
Poliitika uurimine, õppimine ja õpetamine: riigiteaduste 2017 aastakonverentsi ettekannete kogumik
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Kilp, Alar; Laane, Karl Lembit; Urmann, Helen; Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut
Religion enters politics: the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-communist countries : master thesi
(Tartu Ülikool, 2002) Kilp, Alar; Mikkel, Evald, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Sotsiaal- ja haridusteaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Sotsioloogia ja sotsiaalpoliitika instituut
Sekulaarne fundamentalism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2009-03-25T08:35:22Z) Kilp, Alar
BeSt programmi toetusel loodud videoloeng kursusel "Religioosne fundamentalism"(USUS.02.080)
The Harmonization of Laws on Same-Sex Unions in Post-Communist Post-Accession Countries
(2017) Kilp, Alar
EU law on same-sex unions (SSU) expects Member States to legally recognize the family life of same-sex couples in the form of marriage, partnership, or cohabitation. The normative expectation, which in about 2010 became a principled position of the EU institutions and the European Court of Human Rights, has not been endorsed by one Western European Member State (Italy) as well as the majority of the post-Communist Member States (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). There are a number of causes behind the failure to enact SSU laws: the legacies of the communist regimes, the prevalence of a certain interpretation of Christian doctrine, the medium level of economic affluence, and an unfavorable balance of power between the change and blocking coalitions of social, religious, and political actors. Unlike Western European countries, where the family life of same-sex unions was legally recognized primarily due to pressures from below (due to changes in public opinion and shifts in cultural values), governments and legislatures in most Central and Eastern European Member States are encouraged more from above (by the European Union and the Council of Europe). Therefore, the prospects for legal recognition of same-sex unions are slim in countries where the European normative agenda meets no significant support from domestic social values or religious and political actors. This conflict of national and EU forces is most likely to persist in Member States which are post-Soviet, culturally Orthodox, not shifted from materialist to post-materialist values, and governed by right-wing governmental coalitions.