Zur Rolle der Freiheit in Kants (Moral-)Philosophie

dc.contributor.author	Geismann, Georg
dc.date.accessioned	2024-04-23T09:34:55Z
dc.date.available	2024-04-23T09:34:55Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.description.abstract	The focus of this paper is on the concepts of practical and transcendental freedom, their relation to each other, and their role in Kant’s (moral) philosophy. It is argued that there is in this regard neither an inconsistency or contradiction between the Dialectic and the Canon of the first Critique nor a break between the first and the second Critique. The Canon’s claim that we cognize practical freedom through experience must by no means be understood as implying that Kant held a “naturalized” concept of freedom. The paper also reveals the preparatory role of the first Critique with respect to the moral philosophy that Kant, beginning in the Groundwork, presented in the following years.
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10062/98293
dc.language.iso	de
dc.relation.ispartof	Kant-Studien, 111 (2020) 386-422
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject	practical and transcendental freedom
dc.subject	speculative and practical use of reason
dc.subject	causality of nature and of reason
dc.subject	deduction of the fundamental law of pure practical reason
dc.subject	deduction of transcendental freedom
dc.title	Zur Rolle der Freiheit in Kants (Moral-)Philosophie
dc.type	Article

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