Sirvi Autor "Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja" järgi

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Against the guise of the good
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Dua-Ansah, Bright; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account of action theory. I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.
Are Reasons for Action Agent’s Psychological States or Facts of the World
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Reiljan, Merike; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
A critical analysis of "born this way" and "not a choice" arguments for the acceptance of queer sexualities
(Tartu Ülikool, 2020) Kaling, Anna; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Building on the criticism of the good track record argument, I presented an alternative argument for the acceptance of queer sexualities based on the personal freedom to engage in consensual non-heterosexual behaviour, that is not susceptible to the status versus conduct distinction. While the behaviour-based argument I presented does not rely on both philosophically and scientifically contested concept of sexual orientation and thus has several advantages in regard to it (such as greater potential for generalizability), I did not question the usefulness of the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual identity in this thesis. I also did not consider the role of choice in determining sexual orientation. An interesting analysis of these issues could be provided, for example on the basis of William S. Wilkerson’s fusion theory (Ambiguity and Sexuality, 2007) and his argument regarding the role of interpretation in determining sexual orientation (Wilkinson, 2009).
A defence of the existence of emotions in birds
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) York, Kyle; Puusepp, Vivian, juhendaja; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis demonstrates that (at least some) birds can feel emotions. First, it gives a methodological justification for how one can make such attributions in the first place. Then supplies behavioral and physiological evidence for emotions such as fear, anger, and affection. It goes on to defend the idea that birds have the neurological and cognitive capacities for emotions. It next turns towards cognitive and mental considerations, including intentionality, mental content, language-like thought, and making attributions of propositional attitudes and evaluative judgments to birds. It concludes by considering whether birds have human-like emotions or bird-relative ‘schmemotions’.
The ethical design of sex robots
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024-08) Mizrak, Ezgi; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis examines ethical concerns arising from the development and use of sex robots, advocating for a harm reduction model rather than a complete ban or complete deregulation. The analysis compares ethical arguments for and against sex robots. According to the findings, it argued that sex robots can be more beneficial than harmful for women and disadvantaged groups through ethical design choices. In particular, this thesis argues that sex robots should be designed to include a consent module to mimic and teach users about morally appropriate consent negotiation. Finally, the thesis defends sexual technology by aiming to increase the visibility of female sexuality and desire by discussing how the right ethical design choices can be made to maximize the benefits and minimize the harm of sex robots.
Feminist perspectives on cybersex
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Babash, Anastasiia; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In my thesis, I am arguing that cybersex does bring real and actual benefits to some individual women in terms of expansion of their sexual autonomy, but these benefits (for the moment at least) affect only some individual women in their online life. However, the negative phenomena of cybersex such as rape, sexual objectification, and coerced prostitution systematically affect women as a social group both in their online and offline lives. I am defending my thesis by, firstly, giving the definition of cybersex and researching how it affects our understanding of sexuality. Secondly, I am considering all positive effects that cybersex brings to women and arguing that they can be summarized as the expansion of women's sexual autonomy. Thirdly, I am researching negative phenomena of cybersex and how they are limiting women's sexual autonomy. Fourthly, I am describing other feminist views on cybersex (the empowerment approach by Doring and the relative indifference view by Collins) to show how they are different from my view.
Kas utilitarism on rahuldav teooria moraalsete dilemmade tuvastamiseks ja lahendamiseks?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Ojatamm, Kristi; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Töö eesmärgiks oli vastata küsimusele, kas utilitarism on rahuldav teooria moraalsete dilemmade tuvastamiseks ja lahendamiseks? Küsimuse lahendamise jaoks oli oluline selgitada dilemma ja utilitarismi mõisted. Moraalne dilemma kujutab endast olukorda, kus tegutseja on kohustatud tegema mõlemat kahest või enamast tegevusest, tegutseja võib teha mõlemat tegevust, kuid tegutseja ei saa teha mõlemat või kõiki tegevusi. Samuti moraalse dilemma puhul ei kaalu ükski valik teineteisest üle ning tegutseja on õigustatud tundma peale valiku tegemist püsivat kohustust teha see valik, mis jäi tegemata. Utilitarism, täpsemalt teoutilitarism, mida käsitlesime siin töös, põhineb suurima õnne printsiibil, mille kohaselt need teod mis maksimeerivad õnne on moraalsel õiged. Tähtis on leida parim balanss õnne ja ebaõnne mõttes.
Moral and Legal Status of Animals: Why Animals Should Have Legal Rights
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Jalagania, Beka; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In the presented thesis I defend the claim that all sentient animals should have legal rights. The arguments I offer in support of this claim are based on the moral and legal status of animals. I try to show that all sentient animals are ends in themselves for the reason that they are beings with their own interests, and their capacity for having welfare and the fact that there are things that are good and bad for them impose certain duties on us. Our duties should be reflected in the law, that is – animal interests should be protected by the legal means. I argue that some animals are moral subjects and because of their admirable ability to act for moral reasons and show moral concern towards their counterparts they intrinsically deserve the highest level of protection of their vital interests that is – they deserve legal rights. I also contend that all sentient animals who are moral patients should have legal rights for the same reason human infants and profoundly mentally impaired adults are granted some basic legal rights.
Mystical experiences and mental disorders: what psychedelic research on depression and anxiety can tell us about the nature of mental illness
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Bar, Monika Joanna; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This paper examines the implications of the recent research on psychedelic substances and their effects on mental health. Specifically, the paper analyzes the findings concerning the correlation between a particular state of consciousness reliably induced by ingestion of psychedelics – the so-called “mystical experience” – and long-term improvements in mental health. The central thesis pursued is that the “self-model” of mental suffering – the view that mental illness should be understood primarily as part of that flow of subjective experience that human consciousness and selfhood are grounded in – best accommodates the evidence from psychedelic research, which indicates that the therapeutic effects of psychedelics are achieved through a profound alteration in the conscious self.
The non-identity problem: accounting for future people and animals
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Proover, Marika; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In this thesis I have argued for adopting the de dicto meaning of future individuals in non-identity cases. Although many philosophers adopt de re meaning in the non-identity cases, there is no de re reading available before making an identity-fixing decision, we can only start taking de re individuals into account after conception. Adopting the de dicto meaning is the only way to take the future individuals – people and animals – into account before their identity is fixed while making decisions that will concern them. I have proposed that in situations where there is only the de dicto meaning available and where decision maker has special responsibilities toward de dicto, the de dicto harm might be significant enough to make the decision or action at least morally problematic. To better account for the animal examples introduced by Clare Palmer, I suggested to bring another layer to the non-identity cases and consider harms on the population level where appropriate. While considering harms to population (species or breed) might appear to consider harms to a third party, in procreative context, the individual cannot be viewed as totally separate from the populations they belong to.
On final value and states of affairs
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Aguisoul, Youssef; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Are finally valuable states of affairs intrinsically good (good in themselves) or extrinsically good (good for us)? G.E. Moore argues that finally valuable states of affairs are intrinsically good. I do not believe that this is the case. Against Moore, I argue that finally valuable states of affairs are good for us on the grounds that states of affairs involving human beings have a function, namely, to ‘place’ human beings into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world, and that the good state of affairs is that which places the involved individual into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world in a good way, in a way that is beneficial to the individual. Therefore, finally valuable states of affairs are beneficially good, good for us, rather than good in themselves.
The entrepreneurial theory of ownership
(2024-11-05) Sazonov, Sergei; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Eenmaa, Helen, juhendaja; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond
Käesolevas töös tutvustatakse ettevõtluslikku omanditeooriat – uudset lähenemist omandiõiguste filosoofilisele õigustamisele. Kõnealune lähenemine kuulub laiemasse perekonda, mida tuntakse „ajaloolise õiguse põhiste teooriatena“. Nende vaadete järgi õigustab omandit seos mõne ajaloolise sündmusega, mis hõlmas omanikku ja omatavat eset ning lõi nende vahele moraalse suhte, millest tulenevalt omanik sai ainuõiguse otsustada, kuidas seda eset kasutada – teisisõnu õiguse eraomandile. Ettevõtlusliku omanditeooria keskne idee on see, et loodusvarad ei ole otsekohe kasutatavad. Enne kui saame neid kasutada, tuleb meil teha mõningast ettevalmistavat mõttetööd – meil tuleb välja selgitada, kuidas mõne konkreetse asja looduslikud omadused võivad aidata meil oma eesmärke saavutada. See töö kujutab endast vastava loodusvara avastamise akti. Ettevõtluslik omanditeooria on inspireeritud Israel Kirzneri vaadetest ning väidab, et üksikisikutel, kes loodusvarasid avastavad, on õigus neid valitseda, sest ilma nendepoolse sisendita neid varasid sama hästi kui polekski. Teooria näitab, kuidas avastamine mängib põhirolli nii varasema omanikuta ressursside omandamisel kui ka ressursside ühelt omanikult teisele üleandmisel. Nõnda saab omandiõigusi õigustada üheleainsale normatiivsele põhimõttele tuginedes, hoolimata nende päritolust. Töös arendatakse välja argument ettevõtlusliku omanditeooria kaitseks ning näidatakse, kuidas seda saab rakendada nii eraomandile kui ka ühiskondlikule omandile. Samuti käsitletakse töös kõige tugevamaid varasemaid vastuväiteid ajaloolise õiguse põhistele teooriatele ning näidatakse, kuidas arusaam avastamisest kui omandi põhialusest aitab neid ületada. Viimaks hinnatakse töös seda, millises jõuvahekorras on omanike avastamise aktiga õigustatud moraaliväited ning muud tüüpi moraaliväited.