Kas utilitarism on rahuldav teooria moraalsete dilemmade tuvastamiseks ja lahendamiseks?
Kuupäev
2024
Autorid
Ajakirja pealkiri
Ajakirja ISSN
Köite pealkiri
Kirjastaja
Tartu Ülikool
Abstrakt
Töö eesmärgiks oli vastata küsimusele, kas utilitarism on rahuldav teooria moraalsete dilemmade tuvastamiseks ja lahendamiseks? Küsimuse lahendamise jaoks oli oluline selgitada dilemma ja utilitarismi mõisted. Moraalne dilemma kujutab endast olukorda, kus tegutseja on kohustatud tegema mõlemat kahest või enamast tegevusest, tegutseja võib teha mõlemat tegevust, kuid tegutseja ei saa teha mõlemat või kõiki tegevusi. Samuti moraalse dilemma puhul ei kaalu ükski valik teineteisest üle ning tegutseja on õigustatud tundma peale valiku tegemist püsivat kohustust teha see valik, mis jäi tegemata. Utilitarism, täpsemalt teoutilitarism, mida käsitlesime siin töös, põhineb suurima õnne printsiibil, mille kohaselt need teod mis maksimeerivad õnne on moraalsel õiged. Tähtis on leida parim balanss õnne ja ebaõnne mõttes.
Kirjeldus
The aim of the paper is to answer the question: is utilitarianism a satisfactory theory for identifying and resolving moral dilemmas? Moral dilemma has five requirements, which are, (1) the agent must choose between two actions, (2) the agent is able to do both actions, (3) the agent cannot do both actions, (4) no choice is superior and finally (5) the agent feels a lasting obligation after making the choice. Utilitarianism is based on the principle of utility or the greatest happiness. The work is based on act-utilitarianism, according to which those actions that maximize overall happiness are morally right. The first counterargument called ‘’impossible right choices’’ argues that utilitarianism does not recognise moral failures. In defence I show that utilitarianism in claiming that something is morally right, is in fact the same thing as moral failure. The second counterargument called ''minimal difference’’ claims that utilitarianism is inconsistent with ordinary people's sensibilities because the minimally better choice immediately eliminates the moral dilemma. I defend the argument by showing that theories that use rules would make the same choices in such situations. I also argue that utilitarianism not seeing moral dilemmas in many situations show the effectiveness of the theory not its inefficiency. The final counterargument called ''indifference problem'' argues that, given choices of equal weight, makes it indifferent which choice the agent makes. In defence, I gave an example of how this problem also extends to other moral theories that have a single basic principle.
Märksõnad
filosoofia, philosophy, utilitarism, utilitarianism