Denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice

Abstract

In this thesis we explore the idea of denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice. We start by defining what we consider are the relevant factors of an epistemic injustice and why we consider that the denial of coevalness can be thought of as a kind of epistemic injustice, we then proceed to tackle the idea of denial of coevalness produce by two studies, one by Johannes Fabian, the other by Walter Mignolo; we highlight the fundamental epistemic injustice that denial of coevalness produces, trying to understand how it came to be and how it is maintained, then we confront our reflections with the concept of coevalness as proposed by José Ortega y Gasset, building from this three projects so that we can, not only identify denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice, but point out a possible solution as well.