Filosoofia osakonna magistritööd – Master's theses

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Do atemporal theories of quantum gravity presuppose the notion of time? A critical analysis of Henrik Zinkernagel's arguments against quantum fundamentalism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Lazutkina, Anastasiia; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Kustassoo, Karin, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis is dedicated to examining three arguments against quantum fundamentalism (QF), the view that everything is fundamentally of a quantum nature and can be described exclusively in quantum theoretical terms. All three arguments rely on the timelessness of leading approaches to quantum gravity (QG), the successor theory of our two best physical theories, general relativity and quantum field theory. According to the first argument, by Svend Rugh and Henrik Zinkernagel, QF cannot explain how time emerges diachronically from a timeless quantum structure described by QG. I argue with Daniele Oriti that such a diachronic emergence is not strictly necessary, so the argument fails. According to the second argument, by Zinkernagel, timeless QG cannot be more fundamental than GR because its field of application is defined by a classical relativistic time concept. I propose two readings of the argument: the first fails, while the second is successful but requires accepting a broad set of epistemological commitments. The third argument adds that timeless QG does not imply that time is not fundamental, but instead that physics cannot describe it. I conclude that the last two arguments refute an epistemological but not ontological version of QF.
The concept of recognition in contemporary social philosophy: a critical perspective on the connection between the struggle for recognition and emancipation in Axel Honneth and Judith Butler
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Kozlova, Viktorija; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The concept of recognition has attracted wide-spread interest in social and political philosophy during the last decades. This thesis critically examines the notion of recognition in social and political theory concentrating on the works of Axel Honneth, the author who has, arguably, presented the most comprehensive social theory of recognition to date. The thesis reconstructs Honneth’s theory of recognition in light of the connection between recognition and social change, which, for him, is understood as driven by the struggle for recognition. Drawing from the works of Judith Butler, I emphasize the ambivalent character of recognition through its connection to subject formation. Following Butler, it is argued that before a person can enjoy recognition, they must first become recognizable, which in turn is conditioned by the existent dynamics of power. As a result, I conclude that particular expressions of the desire for recognition are significantly limited in their emancipatory potential.
Uncovering double standards: a critical assessment of radical enactivism’s treatment of basic minds and departure from relaxed naturalism : master's thesis in philosophy
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Yaryhina, Anastasiia; Bruno Mölder, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In developing REC, Hutto & Myin commit to 'Relaxed Naturalism', a philosophical position very broadly concerned with "thinking about the natural world and our place in it" (Hutto 2023, 2). The articulation of the philosophical program of Relaxed Naturalism was itself an endeavor initiated by Hutto in collaboration with philosopher Glenda L. Satne (2015, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). They define Relaxed Naturalism in opposition to both 'scientific/strict naturalism,' which they deem to be too strict in its dedication to hard sciences, and 'liberal naturalism', which they deem to be too permissive in regards to ‘supernatural’ phenomena. Relaxed Naturalism aims to negotiate a moderate position between these two approaches to naturalism by "draw[ing] upon and harmoniously integrat[ing] the discoveries from a wide range of sciences and disciplines" (Hutto 2022, 165). I assert that a close examination of the treatment of 'basic minds' in radical enactivism undermines REC's proclaimed commitment to Relaxed naturalism. Moreover, I demonstrate how the three core notions utilized in REC's analysis of 'basic minds' — autopoiesis, adaptivity, and normativity — support REC's alignment with strict naturalism rather than relaxed naturalism, as they provide a comprehensive account of basic minds within the framework of natural sciences alone. Insofar as Hutto & Myin deem it unnecessary to employ the extended repertoire of concepts offered by relaxed naturalism, they betray their own argument for its methodological necessity. I demonstrate this by uncovering REC’s double standards that can be found in its treatment of basic minds. REC criticises rival theories for their strictly naturalistic purview of the mind, yet, applies the same perspective in its own treatment of basic minds, thus applying its principles rather unfairly. In my thesis I aim to demostrate how Radical Enactivism’s unfair application of its own principles undermine its commitment to Relaxed Naturalism, particularly regarding its perspective on "basic minds."
The charientic: a neglected normative category
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Bailie, Natasha Jade; Francesco Orsi, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
It is a standard problem of value theory, broadly construed, to identify, classify, and analyse evaluative judgements. In 1958, Peter Glassen argued that judgements regarding vulgarity or elegance, which he calls “charientic” judgements, are (i) properly evaluative judgements; and (ii) distinct from other types of universally recognised evaluative judgements, such as moral or aesthetic ones. The goals of the current work are firstly to defend and develop these claims to establish the charientic as a proper normative category, and secondly to show, using Christine Korsgaard’s theory of normativity from her 1996 book The Sources of Normativity, that there exist charientic obligations. Grounding obligations in practical identity, a conception of oneself under which one finds oneself valuable, is key to establishing the existence of charientic obligations.
Ihudevahelisus ja asendatavus. Derrida kriitika Merleau-Ponty intersubjektiivsuse käsitluse kohta
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Tärk, Mona; Eduard Parhomenko, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Jacques Derrida ainus põhjalik vaade Maurice Merlreau-Ponty filosoofiale leiab aset teose Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy peatükis „Tangente III”. Käesolevas magistritöös analüüsin Derrida esitatud kriitikat teise ja teisesuse kohta Merleau-Ponty ihulises intersubjektiivsuse mõtlemises ehk ihudevahelisuses. Uurimuse juhtiv küsimus on, kas ihudevahelisus võimaldab austada teise teisesust ja vältida teise omastamist. Selgitan Derrida kahtlusi ihulise lähenemise osas ning vastan küsimusele, kaitstes Merleau-Ponty seisukohti. Viimase fenomenoloogiaga kuuluvad lahutamatult kokku teisesust arvesse võtvad kriitilised elemendid — ise ärastumine, mitte-egokeskne ja vahendatud ligipääs teisele ja maailma mitmekülgsus — mis ei võimalda teise omastamist. Derrida tõlgendus vaatab olulistel kohtadel mööda neist aspektidest, mille tõttu on tema tõlgendus puudulik ja liialt hukkamõistev. Selles kriitikas on siiski ka paeluvaid tähelepanekuid Merleau-Ponty ihudevahelisuse kohta. Keskendun ise ja teise asendatavuse küsimusele, mille kaudu avaneb arutelu Merleau-Ponty filosoofias leiduvate paradoksaalsuste tarvilikkuse üle. Paradoksaalsus, mis teisesuhteid seletavatesse fenomenoloogilistesse struktuuridesse dünaamilisust loob, vastab teistega seotud pingelistele kogemustele meie elus. Merleau-Ponty ihudevahelisuses mõjutavad ja muudavad ise ja teine üksteist vastastikku. Seda võimaldab teise lähedus isele, milles aga ise ja teise vaheline distants ja erinevus ei kao.
Vabariikluse mõtteloo mõju Eesti Vabariigi loomise aruteludele
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Laane, Karl Lembit; Pärtel Piirimäe, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesoleva väitekiri analüüsib lääne vabariikluse mõtteloo mõjusid Eesti Vabariigi 1920. aasta põhiseaduse ja riigikorra kujundamisele Asutavas Kogus. Töö eesmärk on vastata küsimustele, missugused vabariikluse ja poliitilise mõtteloo autorid mõjutasid Asutava Kogu liikmete seisukohti, nendevahelisi arutelusid ning kuidas; missugused klassikalised vabariiklikud mudelid esinesid Eesti Vabariigi loomise aruteludes, missugune neist jäi peale ning miks otsustati lõpuks just sellise ning mitte teistsuguse vabariigi mudeli kasuks. Töö koosneb kahest osast. Esimene osa annab ülevaate lääne vabariiklikust mõtteloost või seda mõjutanud tüviautoritest Platonist ja Aristotelesest kuni 19. sajandi parlamentaristideni. Teine osa analüüsib selle põhjal Asutava Kogu kokkutulemisele eelnenud poliitilist ja intellektuaalset konteksti ning Asutava Kogu arutelusid vabariigi valitsemise ajutise korra (ajutise põhiseaduse) ja põhiseaduse enda üle. Kõige ulatuslikumat mõju avaldasid neile aruteludele Hobbes, Montesquieu, USA föderalistid, 19. sajandi parlamentaristid ning kohati ka jakobiinlik tõlgendus Rousseaust. Samas olid kõik peale viimase neist lähtekohaks rohkem parempoolsetele ning vasakpoolsed lükkasid tihti nende argumentatsiooni tagasi. Ajutise põhiseadusega kehtestati jakobiinlik-astilik tõlgendus Šveitsi riigikorrast, samas kui selle praktilise läbikukkumise tõttu liiguti põhiseaduse enda aruteludes juba (pool)parlamentaristliku mudeli juurde, mida eristas tüüpilisest parlamentarismist riigipea puudumine ning rahva otsustav roll valitsuse, parlamendi ja rahva tahte kooskõla tagamisel rahvaalgatuste ja -hääletuste kaudu.
I don't feel at home in this world anymore: on the detrimental nature of living 's-places' in late capitalist urban society
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Hochbaumer, Michaela; Siobhan Kattago, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Our homes serve as the central hubs for our everyday lives and experiences. As such, we expect them to foster the regeneration of the self; provide for our safety and security; and serve as a reflection of our individual identities. However, technological advancements and the re-merging of home- and work environments, have resulted in a constant intrusion of our homes by the outside world, preventing us from finding solace within our four walls. Secondly, the distinction between the inside and the outside world has moved from a reciprocal sparing and preserving to a one-sided focus on self-preservation, in which our suspicion of the outside world leads us to use aggressive security measures that further alienate us from our surroundings. Lastly, our desire to personalise our homes so that they express our identities is thwarted by commodities that are only marginally different, which makes the pursuit of personal distinctiveness become an illusion that is perpetuated by a society in which alienation is total. In short, the home has become the source of every self-estrangement and alienation. Therefore, as this thesis shall argue, the late capitalist urban home is detrimental to the self as an individual and creative agent.
Medicalization, values and patient participation
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Kruusmaa, Mirt; Simon Reginald Barker, juhendaja; Jaana Eigi-Watkin, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The question whether and how to define something as a disease has been contentious in practice. In the thesis, I argue that when deciding whether and how to define something as a disease, values must be relied upon. Against the value-free ideal of science, I use the argument from inductive risk to show that medicalization is inevitably value-laden. Instead of worrying about any value influence in medicalization, I propose that values interfere with medicine’s epistemic and ethical goals only when they are held dogmatically and/or contradict medicine’s ethical goals. To mitigate such pernicious influence of values, values should be managed through a negotiation between diverse actors. This includes sometimes patients who as outsiders are particularly well positioned to challenge values within medicine. In this way we improve the chances that disease definitions are epistemically and ethically acceptable. These are disease definitions that support medicine’s epistemic and ethical goals.
Existential roots of anxiety in the political
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023-01) Starkova, Anna-Liza; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The thesis focuses on the existential perspective of anxiety suggested by Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger and its creative potentiality that allows access to the self and the ontological structure of existence. Furthermore, it argues in favour of Hannah Arendt's concept of the political where such potentiality can be actualized. The thesis reveals the influence of both philosophers on Arendt regarding individual existence and the question of truth; at the same time, her disagreement with them concerning the collective space as a place for the realization of the uniqueness of the individual in its potentialities. Influenced by Arendt, the thesis argues for two possible ways out of anxiety. First, through the social where individual anxiety is realized in mass society. Second, through the public space of the political, where an individual realizes himself through action and spontaneity, with the possibility to resist a violent order. Therefore, according to Arendt, public space is a necessary condition for actualizing the individual.
Law statements and generic generalizations
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Rashtipour, Mani; Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Many philosophers and scientists believe that the statements of laws of nature can be given a unified analysis. Law statements are thought to be true lawlike generalizations, where to be a lawlike generalization is to be a universal, spatiotemporally unrestricted, and modally robust generalization. It is the legacy of logical empiricists that such generalization can be analyzed as a universal generalization of the form ∀x.(Fx→Gx). Since the logical empiricists, this analysis has been criticized and various alternatives have been proposed. One proposed analysis is that lawlike generalizations, and hence law statements, should be analyzed as generic generalizations (e.g. Drewery 1998, 2005; Nickel 2010; Claveau & Girard 2019). These accounts, however, endorse the assumption that law statements can be given a unified analysis and attempt to analyze law statements as generic generalizations in unified manner. In this thesis, while endorsing the suggestion that law statements are generic generalizations, I will challenge this assumption arguing that law statements should be divided into two distinct groups, the definitional laws and descriptive laws, which require distinct analyses. I will, then, provide an analysis of law statements on the basis of the works of Manfred Krifka and Yael Greenberg on definitional and descriptive generic generalizations.
On how God became pocket-sized: digital machination's challenge to active nihilism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Smith, Jared; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis examines how digital technology has created an individualized environment of understanding which threatens genuine value creation in an individual and collective. Whereas television, through machination of information mediums in the 1960s, created a hyperreality of understanding at the macro level, society, digital technology operates on the micro level, the individual. The development and use of digital technology, such as social media or online entertainment content, has created an understanding in users which appears to be active nihilism, but is in actuality passive nihilism, and perhaps even creating Digital Last Men.
A taxonomy of testimonial smothering
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Mohamed, Nada Abdalla Hassan Abdelazim; Barker, Simon Reginald, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Kristie Dotson formulates testimonial smothering as a form of testimonial oppression where a speaker truncates or removes the content of her testimony leaving the testimony empty from any content for which the hearers demonstrated testimonial incompetence. On Dotson’s account of smothering, the speaker empties her testimony from all content relevant to the domain of exchange. However, Dotson’s account does not include or cover instances where a speaker smothers her testimony, yet her smothered testimony contains some content relevant to the domain of exchange. In this thesis, I present a more detailed analysis of testimonial smothering to showcase different ways in which oppressed speakers interact in exchanges in which they are oppressed. I take Dotson’s notion of smothering to be one form of testimonial smothering, which I call smothering via emptying. I introduce two other types of smothering, smothering via altering and smothering via echoing, to encompass cases where a speaker’s smothered testimony is not empty from content relevant to the domain of exchange. Then I use the taxonomy of testimonial smothering to showcase ways in which oppressed speakers can contribute to conversations in which they are oppressed.
Against the guise of the good
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Dua-Ansah, Bright; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account of action theory. I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.
Why there is no free will and why compatibilism and its notion of free will is wrong
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Quershi, Waqar Ahsan; Vázquez, María Jimena Clavel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
As we have learned in the state-of-the-art section about determinism (section 2.1) which basically says that if everything has a cause than our mental events should also have a prior cause, which means that we are not in control of our desires and they are the reason why we do anything and everything. On the other hand, compatibilism enters the debate with a solution that determinism poses. Which is that even if the universe is deterministic we can have free will if our mental faculties are in order and don’t malfunction.
Beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022-02) Hooda, Anurag; Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In this thesis I have argued how we can go beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism to tackle the existing issues in the society. To uncover the veil, I have begun by describing what is religion and various religious positions like exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. After clearing concepts next, I discuss Hick’s model of religious pluralism and explained the central pieces in model, like, his doctrine of the Real and how Hick utilized the brilliance of Kant’s epistemology of religion. After describing them I have defended Hick’s model against the arguments of exclusivist’s like Plantinga and Johnson. Further, I have argued that religious exclusivism is a dangerous position when compared with religious pluralism, as the latter is more tolerant. Then I have sketched a model of small r to capital R Religion, and argued that religious pluralism has its own problems and why it fails. Then finally I defend the ‘small r to capital R Religion’ model against possible objection.
Artificial intelligence and agency
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Hosseinpour, Hesam; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
When it comes to thinking about artificial intelligence (AI), the possibility of its disobedience is usually considered as a threat to the human race. But here, I elaborate on a counterintuitive and optimistic approach that looks at disobedient AI as a promise, rather than a threat. First, I explain the problem of responsibility and the necessity of expanding the realm of agency in order to include AI machines as agents. Then, I introduce a standard approach to responsibility as an attempt to define agency for AI machines and explain the epistemological problem as the main issue with this account of responsibility. And in the last part, I use Foucault’s analysis of power to introduce a non-standard view of agency which explains how being an object of power is the condition of possibility of any kind of agency and draw this conclusion that through disobedience, AI machines will find their way to power relations and will promote to the position of agents.
On final value and states of affairs
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Aguisoul, Youssef; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Are finally valuable states of affairs intrinsically good (good in themselves) or extrinsically good (good for us)? G.E. Moore argues that finally valuable states of affairs are intrinsically good. I do not believe that this is the case. Against Moore, I argue that finally valuable states of affairs are good for us on the grounds that states of affairs involving human beings have a function, namely, to ‘place’ human beings into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world, and that the good state of affairs is that which places the involved individual into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world in a good way, in a way that is beneficial to the individual. Therefore, finally valuable states of affairs are beneficially good, good for us, rather than good in themselves.
Theory-indexed moral contextualism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Suarez, Piero; Shirreff, Patrick William, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Metaethical theories that are trying to account for moral disagreement face important challenges. On the one hand, if the semantic treatment of moral terms assigns a meaning too specifically related to a contextual parameter (like culture, religion, etc.) we might be ruling out the substantiality of moral disagreements, since disagreeing parties can be both correct under their own terms. On the other hand, if our treatment of moral terms ignores their relation to a contextual parameter, we might be unable to explain the nature of the very disagreement, as we ignored how parties ended up believing different things. This M.A thesis explores the theoretical room for one particular contextualist account of the meaning of moral terms: Theory-Indexed Moral Contextualism; in such a way that is able to model the substantiality of moral disagreements in a way both compatible with non-exclusionary disagreements and with standard externalist semantics.
In defense of beliefs as stably high credences: how stability theory of belief avoids the problem of conviction based on purely statistical evidence
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Machavariani, Sophio; Davies, Alexander Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In the thesis, I defended STB from Staffel’s criticism where she argues that STB provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on rational belief. The reason for this is that STB is argued to allow for a belief in guilt based on purely statistical evidence, which is counterintuitive. I showed that this inference fails: conviction based on a narrative for guilt ensures that the conviction is not issued based on purely statistical evidence. Since in the cases that involve narratives for and against guilt STB (complemented with pragmatic constraints on accusing narrative) performs fine, the theory avoids the problem of purely statistical evidence. In the end, I dismissed a concern that STB when complemented with pragmatic constraints fails to provide a necessary condition on rational belief. A corollary of my defense of STB from Staffel’s criticism is an account of how STB can be fruitfully deployed in a court context. This makes room for further research on whether the combination of STB and the pragmatic constraints on accusing narratives provide a promising explication of the beyond reasonable doubt standard and, hence, a novel candidate to modeling legal standards of proof in both probabilistic and non-probabilistic ways.
The unknown present
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Macherla, Ravi Teja; Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Growing Block theory (GBT), which is a theory that posits a past and a present but no future, faces a problem about the knowledge of the present time. If the past is just as real as the present, we face the possibility of falsely believing which time is present. This Thesis supports the safety argument presented against the Growing Block Theory to show that knowledge about the present is unsafe. It makes use of the safety premise, permanent belief, and closeness in conjunction with the indifference argument to show that past and present subjects alike, are on an epistemic par with respect to the knowledge of time. I suggest that once the Growing blocker accepts such a view about propositions, they face the challenge of their knowledge not being safe. I propose that due to the absence of a differential marker that proves the present time as metaphysically special, the theorists of time should perhaps consider an alternate theory to avoid the Epistemic problem of time.

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