Filosoofia osakonna magistritööd – Master's theses

Selle kollektsiooni püsiv URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/10062/35473

Sirvi

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Infoökoloogia rakendamine raamatukogus (Tartu O. Lutsu nim. Linnaraamatukogu näitel)
(Tartu Ülikool, 2007) Kozõreva, Tamara; Konsa, Kurmo, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Õpikeskkond ja selle arenguperspektiivid TÜ Iuridicumi teabekeskuses
(Tartu Ülikool, 2007) Avalo, Sille; Plaksi, Sille; Must, Ülle, juhendaja; Must, Aadu, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
TÜ väitekirjade elektrooniline publitseerimine
(Tartu Ülikool, 2009) Bachmann, Signe; Leping, Vambola, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Religious reasons as a basis for political justification?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2010) Volberg, Mats; McLaughlin, Paul, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Kutseõppijate infovajaduste rahuldamist soodustavad ja pärssivad tegurid : (Võrumaa Kutsehariduskeskuse raamatukogu näitel)
(Tartu Ülikool, 2012) Pungits, Ülle; Einasto, Olga, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Differance’i avanemisest teises Jacques Derrida filosoofia
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Maiste, Eva-Maria; Parhomenko, Eduard, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Martha Nussbaumi eetiline kosmopolitism - naiivne illusioon või kaasaegne ideaal?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Tamm, Jana; Piirimäe, Eva, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Imestuse küsimus Edmund Husserli fenomenoloogias
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Hellerma, Juhan; Matjus, Ülo, juhendaja; Merz, Philippe, kaasjuhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Testing intuitions about reference: what conclusions should be drawn from the experimental data?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2014) Zeigo, Henri; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Teoreetilise filosoofia õppetool
In this thesis I am going to argue against the interpretation that experimental philosophers offered as an account of their empirical findings concerning philosophical intuitions about reference. Their empirical findings seem to exhibit that philosophers’ and folk intuitions are sensitive to various factors and that these sensitivities cause diversity in the intuitive responses within and between different people and cultures (Machery, Stich, Mallon, Nichols 2004). It has been noticed that Western people are more likely to show intuitive responses that can be associated with a causal-historical view of reference, while East Asians are inclined to show intuitive responses which are associated with a descriptivist view of reference. The experimental philosophers argue that if there is such diversity in intuitions we cannot be sure that our intuitions provide us with reliable data that is needed for theory choice in philosophy of language. This means that our intuitions cannot serve as a foundation for theories of reference.
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis
(Tartu Ülikool, 2014) Ross, Madli; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In a nutshell, the general problem of my thesis is concerned with the role of morality in life. If we agree with Wolf about principle-based moral theories leading us to the ideals that are not our ideals, then can moral values keep their position as the most important ones in the hierarchy of values? Maybe we can reach the good life when we look for a balance between different aspects of our lives as a maximum instead of maximizing one single principle and one set of values in our lives. When the latter holds, is there a hierarchy of values in the first place?
Richard Rorty ja Hans-Georg Gadamer: järjepidevus või katkestus?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Laulik, Jakob; Tool, Andrus, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. FIlosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Käesolev magistritöö käsitleb kahe filosoofi, Richard Rorty ja Hans-Georg Gadameri vahekorda. Täpsemalt öeldes uuritakse, kuidas on Rorty tõlgendanud Gadameri hermeneutilist filosoofiat ning inkorporeerinud selle enese õpetusse. Peamiseks küsimuseks on: kus esinevad katkestused ning kus saab kõnelda relevantsest järjepidevusest? Mõlema filosoofi mõtlemisest on antud ülevaade ning seejärel neid kriitiliselt võrreldud, et teha kindlaks, kui adekvaatne on olnud Rorty tõlgendus ja kuidas nad üldisemalt teineteisega suhestuvad. Välja on toodud, kuidas mõningatest ühistest arusaamadest hargnevad arvukad ja põhimõttelised erinevused lähtuvalt kummagi mõtleja erinevatest motivatsioonidest. Lisaks on töös püütud leida viise, kuidas, vaatamata nendele pealtnäha suurtele erinevustele kahe mõtleja vahel, Rortyt ja Gadameri siiski lepitada ja kokku tuua annaks. Selleks on pöördutud laiema konteksti poole ning püütud leida filosoofide vahelist järjepidevust esmalt nende praktilisest filosoofiast, eeskätt ühiskondlik-poliitilisest aspektist. Teise variandina vaadeldakse Rortyt ja Gadameri läbi retoorikatraditsiooni, täpsemalt läbi Gadameri poolt rehabiliteeritud retoorikaprisma.
Can contempt serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against the damage wrought by superbia? A critical analysis of Macalester Bell's account of contempt
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Meriste, Heidy; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis is focused on whether contempt could serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against superbia. My analysis is largely built on and developed in critical dialogue with a thesis put forward by Macalester Bell in her monograph “Hard feelings: the moral psychology of contempt” (2013). Bell is one of the few modern moral philosophers who have defended contempt as an emotion that has an important role to play in our moral lives. Even though contempt has often been rejected as a nasty and immoral emotion and it is not particularly difficult to come up with cases where contempt would indeed be unjustified, I find it hard to deny that there is a grain of truth in saying that the virtuous agent will love the good and hate the evil1. If we are to be consistent and wholeheartedly value morality, and we agree that emotions are important mediums through which we value things (as it is assumed by the current mainstream theories of emotion), then there seems to be a prima facie case for at least some hard feelings―understood as emotions that help us hold other people accountable for their wrongdoing, or, in case of superbia (which is more to do with character rather than some isolated acts of wrongdoing), their “badbeing” (Bell 2013: 39).
Teaduse kvaliteedi hindamine: filosoofiline vaatenurk
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Šor, Kairit; Lõhkivi, Endla, juhendaja; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Minu magistritöö eesmärk on välja selgitada, kas ja milles teadlaste ja rahastajate vaated teaduse kvaliteedile kattuvad ning kui ei kattu, siis kas see võiks olla probleem. Ja kui vaated kvaliteedile kattuvad, milles siis ikkagi on probleem, et nii üks kui teine osapool sageli ei ole otsuste või nende langetamise viisiga rahul? Teadust on teadusfilosoofias uuritud mitmest vaatenurgast lähtuvalt. Teaduse mõistet on konstrueeritud, pidades silmas ideaali – mis peaks teadus olema ja kuidas see peaks funktsioneerima. Teadust on püütud ka kirjeldada ja nö tagantjärele konstrueerida selle struktuuri ja toimimise viise. Minu magistritöö teemast lähtuvalt on olulisimad teadusfilosoofid olnud Karl Raimund Popper, Thomas Samuel Kuhn, John Ziman ja Sergio Sismondo. Samuti ka sotsioloogid ja teised uurijad, nagu Loet Leydesdorff ja Sven Hemlin kui nimetada ainult mõnda. Nende kõigi töö on olnud väga oluline selleks, et mõista, mis on teadus, kuidas see toimib ja kuidas teadust nähakse ja vastu võetakse. Teadust on uuritud nii seesmiselt kui välispidiselt, uurides nii selle struktuuri ja käitumist kui ka teaduse kohta ühiskonnas ja teaduse rolli tavainimese igapäevaelus. Sealhulgas on teadust püütud allutada normidele ja reeglitele ning ka uuritud, millised on teaduse enda sisemised normid ja reeglid. Püüan oma magistritöös kokku viia teadusele väljastpoolt esitatavad nõuded ja teadlaste enda poolt teadusele esitatavad nõuded.
Teadmine, moraal ja religioon Michel de Montaigne'i essees "Apoloogia Raimond Sebond'ile"
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Tamme, Ada; Jakapi, Roomet; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Magistritöö „Teadmine, moraal ja religioon Michel de Montaigne’i essees „Apoloogia Raimond Sebond’ile ““ on filosoofia ajaloo alane 1 ja selle eesmärk on avada Michel de Montaigne’i mõtlemist selle mitmekesisuses ja vastuolulisuses. Esiteks lahkan ma Montaigne’i peateosega Esseed (1588) seotud tõlgenduste paljusust, millest sõltub hinnang ka esseele „Apoloogia”. Kokkuvõttes näitan, kuidas hoolimata harjumuspärasest vastandavast interpretatsioonist on tegu peatükiga, mis on kooskõlas Esseede tervikuga. Teiseks analüüsin ma antud esseed, lähenedes selle filosoofilistele ideedele nii epistemoloogia, religiooni kui moraali aspektist. Esitlen oma nägemuse sellest, kuidas teadmine ja religioon moodustavad Montaigne’i jaoks kooskõlalise terviku, kus vastupidiselt käibearusaamale ei ole oluline kõikehõlmav skeptiline kahtlus, vaid inimesest ja Jumalast lähtuva moraalifilosoofia elluviimine ebakindlas maailmas.
Moral and Legal Status of Animals: Why Animals Should Have Legal Rights
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Jalagania, Beka; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In the presented thesis I defend the claim that all sentient animals should have legal rights. The arguments I offer in support of this claim are based on the moral and legal status of animals. I try to show that all sentient animals are ends in themselves for the reason that they are beings with their own interests, and their capacity for having welfare and the fact that there are things that are good and bad for them impose certain duties on us. Our duties should be reflected in the law, that is – animal interests should be protected by the legal means. I argue that some animals are moral subjects and because of their admirable ability to act for moral reasons and show moral concern towards their counterparts they intrinsically deserve the highest level of protection of their vital interests that is – they deserve legal rights. I also contend that all sentient animals who are moral patients should have legal rights for the same reason human infants and profoundly mentally impaired adults are granted some basic legal rights.
The non-identity problem: accounting for future people and animals
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Proover, Marika; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In this thesis I have argued for adopting the de dicto meaning of future individuals in non-identity cases. Although many philosophers adopt de re meaning in the non-identity cases, there is no de re reading available before making an identity-fixing decision, we can only start taking de re individuals into account after conception. Adopting the de dicto meaning is the only way to take the future individuals – people and animals – into account before their identity is fixed while making decisions that will concern them. I have proposed that in situations where there is only the de dicto meaning available and where decision maker has special responsibilities toward de dicto, the de dicto harm might be significant enough to make the decision or action at least morally problematic. To better account for the animal examples introduced by Clare Palmer, I suggested to bring another layer to the non-identity cases and consider harms on the population level where appropriate. While considering harms to population (species or breed) might appear to consider harms to a third party, in procreative context, the individual cannot be viewed as totally separate from the populations they belong to.
In Defence of Logical Omniscience
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Lõbus, Indrek; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Estrada González, Luis, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The most controversial consequence of Robert Stalnaker’s (1984) theory of propositional attitudes is that subjects of propositional attitudes are logically omniscient. What makes this consequence problematic is that it seems to conflict with the fact that subjects of propositional attitudes are also deductive reasoners. Stalnaker’s solution to this problem consists in two complementary theories. According to the metalinguistic theory, deductive information is metalinguistic, and according to the integration theory, deductive reasoning proceeds via integration of dispositions to act. In my thesis I will defend Stalnaker’s solution against two arguments, namely the translation argument (Moore 1995, Nuffer 2009) and the argument from logical oversight (Moore 1995, Jago 2014). In my responses I will rely on a Tractarian distinction between signs and symbols, showing that it brings out a similar flaw in both arguments. The flaw in the first is the assumption that the same sentence cannot be written in two different languages, and the flaw in the second is the assumption that two different logical connectives cannot be written in the same way. In my response to the first of these arguments, I will also develop a variation of Stalnaker’s metalinguistic theory that accounts for the sign/symbol distinction.
From Defining Empathy to Mapping Empathy
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Reiljan, Merike; Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja; Bohl, Vivian, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Empathy has gained a lot of attention over the last decades in philosophical, psychological, neuroscientific, and medical research and this interest is constantly growing. However, the research is overshadowed by a long ongoing debate over what empathy is and an agreement does not seem forthcoming. The dissertation is a careful analysis of possible options for overcoming the terminological issues with an emphasis on a critical assessment of a solution provided by Amy Coplan. This solution is to avoid conflation and confusion of phenomena that have important differences, by defining empathy narrowly. The dissertation is a criticism of Coplan’s approach and a defence of the view that there is a plurality of kinds of empathy. I argue that the best way forward for empathy research is to create a systematised taxonomy of kinds of empathy and empathetic processes and that the best tool for this purpose is a map that presents the kinds of empathy and their interrelations. I have called this tool an empathy map. The thesis includes a preliminary empathy map and illustrative examples of how the map could take shape, lead to progress in empathy research and provide better understanding of the relevance of different types of empathy in diagnosing mental disorders and in everyday social relations.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in Predictive Brains
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Vaus, Sander; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The debate over whether perception is cognitively penetrable, in order to remain philosophically interesting and relevant, should be unpacked in terms of discerning whether propositional states can directly modulate the low-level phenomenal features of one’s perceptual experience. For this, it should also engage with cognitive science, and it is by proposing a scientifically feasible mechanism of how cognitive penetrability could obtain that there is even a reason for considering it. The predictive coding model of perception provides a framework within which such a mechanism can be motivated. By framing perception as a process of probabilistic inference, wherein top-down models of the world are tested against bottom-up error signals, we can discern whether propositional attitudes could affect the inhibitory and excitatory signaling of sensory neurons in a way that either promotes or inhibits the top-down predictive model that constitutes one’s perceptual experience, all the while preserving the necessary kind of relation between perception and cognition. In a three dimensional variation of the Ebbinghaus illusion, this can in fact be shown to happen, establishing cognitive penetrability of perception and a working mechanism by which this could take place.
The Problem of Dirty Hands in Transitional Justice
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Krisheminska, Iuliia; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis explores the connection between the problem of dirty hands in political philosophy and transitional justice in political science. Respectively, it is divided into two parts. In the first part the problem of dirty hands is considered in historical perspective. I take Walzer’s description of the problem and try to find the elements of the problem in works of different philosophers. Among all philosophers who wrote on the topic I distinguish those who recognized feeling guilty for political decisions from those who presented justifications for actions. In the second part I use the precedent of the Nuremberg trials to stress on the individual criminal responsibility for political actions as there are crimes for which wrongdoers should be punished regardless the circumstances or feeling guilty. I take the case of contemporary Russia to see whether the wrongdoers of the previous regime were prosecuted. I proposed the problem of dirty hands in transitional justice as related to choosing the best timing for implementing justice against perpetrators of the past. In the end, I advocate postponed justice as a compromise solution for the case of Russia.

Sirvi

Sirvi Filosoofia osakonna magistritööd – Master's theses Kuupäev järgi