Filosoofia osakonna magistritööd – Master's theses

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Infoökoloogia rakendamine raamatukogus (Tartu O. Lutsu nim. Linnaraamatukogu näitel)
(Tartu Ülikool, 2007) Kozõreva, Tamara; Konsa, Kurmo, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Õpikeskkond ja selle arenguperspektiivid TÜ Iuridicumi teabekeskuses
(Tartu Ülikool, 2007) Avalo, Sille; Plaksi, Sille; Must, Ülle, juhendaja; Must, Aadu, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
TÜ väitekirjade elektrooniline publitseerimine
(Tartu Ülikool, 2009) Bachmann, Signe; Leping, Vambola, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Religious reasons as a basis for political justification?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2010) Volberg, Mats; McLaughlin, Paul, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Imestuse küsimus Edmund Husserli fenomenoloogias
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Hellerma, Juhan; Matjus, Ülo, juhendaja; Merz, Philippe, kaasjuhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Martha Nussbaumi eetiline kosmopolitism - naiivne illusioon või kaasaegne ideaal?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Tamm, Jana; Piirimäe, Eva, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Differance’i avanemisest teises Jacques Derrida filosoofia
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Maiste, Eva-Maria; Parhomenko, Eduard, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis
(Tartu Ülikool, 2014) Ross, Madli; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In a nutshell, the general problem of my thesis is concerned with the role of morality in life. If we agree with Wolf about principle-based moral theories leading us to the ideals that are not our ideals, then can moral values keep their position as the most important ones in the hierarchy of values? Maybe we can reach the good life when we look for a balance between different aspects of our lives as a maximum instead of maximizing one single principle and one set of values in our lives. When the latter holds, is there a hierarchy of values in the first place?
Testing intuitions about reference: what conclusions should be drawn from the experimental data?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2014) Zeigo, Henri; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Teoreetilise filosoofia õppetool
In this thesis I am going to argue against the interpretation that experimental philosophers offered as an account of their empirical findings concerning philosophical intuitions about reference. Their empirical findings seem to exhibit that philosophers’ and folk intuitions are sensitive to various factors and that these sensitivities cause diversity in the intuitive responses within and between different people and cultures (Machery, Stich, Mallon, Nichols 2004). It has been noticed that Western people are more likely to show intuitive responses that can be associated with a causal-historical view of reference, while East Asians are inclined to show intuitive responses which are associated with a descriptivist view of reference. The experimental philosophers argue that if there is such diversity in intuitions we cannot be sure that our intuitions provide us with reliable data that is needed for theory choice in philosophy of language. This means that our intuitions cannot serve as a foundation for theories of reference.
Teaduse kvaliteedi hindamine: filosoofiline vaatenurk
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Šor, Kairit; Lõhkivi, Endla, juhendaja; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Minu magistritöö eesmärk on välja selgitada, kas ja milles teadlaste ja rahastajate vaated teaduse kvaliteedile kattuvad ning kui ei kattu, siis kas see võiks olla probleem. Ja kui vaated kvaliteedile kattuvad, milles siis ikkagi on probleem, et nii üks kui teine osapool sageli ei ole otsuste või nende langetamise viisiga rahul? Teadust on teadusfilosoofias uuritud mitmest vaatenurgast lähtuvalt. Teaduse mõistet on konstrueeritud, pidades silmas ideaali – mis peaks teadus olema ja kuidas see peaks funktsioneerima. Teadust on püütud ka kirjeldada ja nö tagantjärele konstrueerida selle struktuuri ja toimimise viise. Minu magistritöö teemast lähtuvalt on olulisimad teadusfilosoofid olnud Karl Raimund Popper, Thomas Samuel Kuhn, John Ziman ja Sergio Sismondo. Samuti ka sotsioloogid ja teised uurijad, nagu Loet Leydesdorff ja Sven Hemlin kui nimetada ainult mõnda. Nende kõigi töö on olnud väga oluline selleks, et mõista, mis on teadus, kuidas see toimib ja kuidas teadust nähakse ja vastu võetakse. Teadust on uuritud nii seesmiselt kui välispidiselt, uurides nii selle struktuuri ja käitumist kui ka teaduse kohta ühiskonnas ja teaduse rolli tavainimese igapäevaelus. Sealhulgas on teadust püütud allutada normidele ja reeglitele ning ka uuritud, millised on teaduse enda sisemised normid ja reeglid. Püüan oma magistritöös kokku viia teadusele väljastpoolt esitatavad nõuded ja teadlaste enda poolt teadusele esitatavad nõuded.
Can contempt serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against the damage wrought by superbia? A critical analysis of Macalester Bell's account of contempt
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Meriste, Heidy; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis is focused on whether contempt could serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against superbia. My analysis is largely built on and developed in critical dialogue with a thesis put forward by Macalester Bell in her monograph “Hard feelings: the moral psychology of contempt” (2013). Bell is one of the few modern moral philosophers who have defended contempt as an emotion that has an important role to play in our moral lives. Even though contempt has often been rejected as a nasty and immoral emotion and it is not particularly difficult to come up with cases where contempt would indeed be unjustified, I find it hard to deny that there is a grain of truth in saying that the virtuous agent will love the good and hate the evil1. If we are to be consistent and wholeheartedly value morality, and we agree that emotions are important mediums through which we value things (as it is assumed by the current mainstream theories of emotion), then there seems to be a prima facie case for at least some hard feelings―understood as emotions that help us hold other people accountable for their wrongdoing, or, in case of superbia (which is more to do with character rather than some isolated acts of wrongdoing), their “badbeing” (Bell 2013: 39).
Richard Rorty ja Hans-Georg Gadamer: järjepidevus või katkestus?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Laulik, Jakob; Tool, Andrus, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. FIlosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Käesolev magistritöö käsitleb kahe filosoofi, Richard Rorty ja Hans-Georg Gadameri vahekorda. Täpsemalt öeldes uuritakse, kuidas on Rorty tõlgendanud Gadameri hermeneutilist filosoofiat ning inkorporeerinud selle enese õpetusse. Peamiseks küsimuseks on: kus esinevad katkestused ning kus saab kõnelda relevantsest järjepidevusest? Mõlema filosoofi mõtlemisest on antud ülevaade ning seejärel neid kriitiliselt võrreldud, et teha kindlaks, kui adekvaatne on olnud Rorty tõlgendus ja kuidas nad üldisemalt teineteisega suhestuvad. Välja on toodud, kuidas mõningatest ühistest arusaamadest hargnevad arvukad ja põhimõttelised erinevused lähtuvalt kummagi mõtleja erinevatest motivatsioonidest. Lisaks on töös püütud leida viise, kuidas, vaatamata nendele pealtnäha suurtele erinevustele kahe mõtleja vahel, Rortyt ja Gadameri siiski lepitada ja kokku tuua annaks. Selleks on pöördutud laiema konteksti poole ning püütud leida filosoofide vahelist järjepidevust esmalt nende praktilisest filosoofiast, eeskätt ühiskondlik-poliitilisest aspektist. Teise variandina vaadeldakse Rortyt ja Gadameri läbi retoorikatraditsiooni, täpsemalt läbi Gadameri poolt rehabiliteeritud retoorikaprisma.
The Problem of Dirty Hands in Transitional Justice
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Krisheminska, Iuliia; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis explores the connection between the problem of dirty hands in political philosophy and transitional justice in political science. Respectively, it is divided into two parts. In the first part the problem of dirty hands is considered in historical perspective. I take Walzer’s description of the problem and try to find the elements of the problem in works of different philosophers. Among all philosophers who wrote on the topic I distinguish those who recognized feeling guilty for political decisions from those who presented justifications for actions. In the second part I use the precedent of the Nuremberg trials to stress on the individual criminal responsibility for political actions as there are crimes for which wrongdoers should be punished regardless the circumstances or feeling guilty. I take the case of contemporary Russia to see whether the wrongdoers of the previous regime were prosecuted. I proposed the problem of dirty hands in transitional justice as related to choosing the best timing for implementing justice against perpetrators of the past. In the end, I advocate postponed justice as a compromise solution for the case of Russia.
Sexual Deception and Sexual Consent: A Reply to Tom Dougherty
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Tuckwell, William; Davies, Alexander, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Motivated by a commitment to protect sexual autonomy, Tom Dougherty (2013) has argued that deceiving someone into sex is seriously morally wrong whenever the deception concerns a deal breaker of the victim, i.e. a feature of the sexual encounter to which the other person's will is opposed. While I share both Dougherty's commitment to sexual autonomy and his misgivings about the permissibility of sexual deception, there are elements of his argumentation that require significant amendment if the commitment to upholding sexual autonomy is to be fulfilled. In this paper I argue that if Dougherty is to uphold his commitment to protecting sexual autonomy then he must, firstly, replace his preferred account of consent, which is an attitudinal account of consent that maintains that consent consists solely of the formation of the private intention to consent, with a performative account of consent that maintains that in addition to the formation of the private intention to consent, a communicative act is also required for consent. Secondly, I argue that the performative account of consent ought to be supplemented with a hyper-explicit definition of sexual consent.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in Predictive Brains
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Vaus, Sander; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The debate over whether perception is cognitively penetrable, in order to remain philosophically interesting and relevant, should be unpacked in terms of discerning whether propositional states can directly modulate the low-level phenomenal features of one’s perceptual experience. For this, it should also engage with cognitive science, and it is by proposing a scientifically feasible mechanism of how cognitive penetrability could obtain that there is even a reason for considering it. The predictive coding model of perception provides a framework within which such a mechanism can be motivated. By framing perception as a process of probabilistic inference, wherein top-down models of the world are tested against bottom-up error signals, we can discern whether propositional attitudes could affect the inhibitory and excitatory signaling of sensory neurons in a way that either promotes or inhibits the top-down predictive model that constitutes one’s perceptual experience, all the while preserving the necessary kind of relation between perception and cognition. In a three dimensional variation of the Ebbinghaus illusion, this can in fact be shown to happen, establishing cognitive penetrability of perception and a working mechanism by which this could take place.
Ontology Identification Problem In Computational Agents
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Pärnpuu, Rao; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Ontology Identification Problem is the problem of connecting different ontologies to the system’s goals in such a way that a change in the system’s ontology does not result in a change in its goal’s effect. My thesis is that the Ontology Identification Problem, which has so far been addressed as a single universal problem, can be seen as an umbrella term for a wide range of different problems, each of which has a different level of difficulty, and each requires different methods of approach, in order to overcome. One wide category of this problem is connected to granularity, where the changes in the model are connected to changes in the level of detail. Granularity issues can be divided into cases of simpler reductions, multiple realizability and incommensurability. Another wide area of the problem is related to context. Contextual problems can be divided into problems of environmental context and social context. Special cases of warrantless goals and perverse instantiation also have a direct bearing on the ability to solve ontology identification problems effectively.
In Defence of Logical Omniscience
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Lõbus, Indrek; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Estrada González, Luis, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The most controversial consequence of Robert Stalnaker’s (1984) theory of propositional attitudes is that subjects of propositional attitudes are logically omniscient. What makes this consequence problematic is that it seems to conflict with the fact that subjects of propositional attitudes are also deductive reasoners. Stalnaker’s solution to this problem consists in two complementary theories. According to the metalinguistic theory, deductive information is metalinguistic, and according to the integration theory, deductive reasoning proceeds via integration of dispositions to act. In my thesis I will defend Stalnaker’s solution against two arguments, namely the translation argument (Moore 1995, Nuffer 2009) and the argument from logical oversight (Moore 1995, Jago 2014). In my responses I will rely on a Tractarian distinction between signs and symbols, showing that it brings out a similar flaw in both arguments. The flaw in the first is the assumption that the same sentence cannot be written in two different languages, and the flaw in the second is the assumption that two different logical connectives cannot be written in the same way. In my response to the first of these arguments, I will also develop a variation of Stalnaker’s metalinguistic theory that accounts for the sign/symbol distinction.
Erapooletu vaatleja empaatia keskne roll moraalis
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Rajando, Kertu; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesolevas magistritöös on vaatluse all empaatia roll moraalis – moraalse hinnangu andmise, moraalse motivatsiooni ja moraalse arengu juures. Eesmärgiks on uurida, kas leidub mõnda tüüpi empaatiat, mis on oluline moraalse kompetentsuse erinevate aspektide puhul. Esimeses peatükis annan ülevaade erinevatest fenomenidest, mida sageli käsitletakse empaatiana. Selgub, et empaatia mõiste defineerimisel puudub konsensus. Teises peatükis tutvustan Jesse J. Prinzi moraaliteooriat ja empaatia käsitlust. Näitan, et Prinz eitab empaatia rolli moraalis, kritiseerides peamiselt empaatia subjektiivsust ja kallutatavust. Kolmandas peatükis pöördun Adam Smithi moraaliteooria juurde, milles on tähtsal kohal sümpaatia. Smithi poolt kirjeldatud sümpaatia on tänapäeva kontekstis mõistetav empaatiana ning seega on selle käsitluse avamine asjakohane antud magistritöö raames. Smith kasutab sümpaatiat erinevatel viisidel, kuid moraaliküsimustes on kõige olulisem see sümpaatia tähendus, mis eeldab erapooletu vaatleja mehhanismi loomist, arendamist ja rakendamist. Sellisele sümpaatiale toetumine saab omada tähtsat rolli nii moraalsete hinnangute andmisel, moraalse motivatsiooni kui ka moraalse arengu puhul. Neljandas peatükis võrdlen Prinzi empaatia ja Smithi sümpaatia käsitlusi ning selgitan, kuidas suudab smithilik korrigeeritud empaatia ületada probleeme, mis prinziliku empaatia puhul ületamatuteks jäävad. Jõuan järeldusele, et erapooletu vaatleja empaatia on seda sorti empaatia, mis omab keskset rolli moraalis.
Teadmine, moraal ja religioon Michel de Montaigne'i essees "Apoloogia Raimond Sebond'ile"
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Tamme, Ada; Jakapi, Roomet; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Magistritöö „Teadmine, moraal ja religioon Michel de Montaigne’i essees „Apoloogia Raimond Sebond’ile ““ on filosoofia ajaloo alane 1 ja selle eesmärk on avada Michel de Montaigne’i mõtlemist selle mitmekesisuses ja vastuolulisuses. Esiteks lahkan ma Montaigne’i peateosega Esseed (1588) seotud tõlgenduste paljusust, millest sõltub hinnang ka esseele „Apoloogia”. Kokkuvõttes näitan, kuidas hoolimata harjumuspärasest vastandavast interpretatsioonist on tegu peatükiga, mis on kooskõlas Esseede tervikuga. Teiseks analüüsin ma antud esseed, lähenedes selle filosoofilistele ideedele nii epistemoloogia, religiooni kui moraali aspektist. Esitlen oma nägemuse sellest, kuidas teadmine ja religioon moodustavad Montaigne’i jaoks kooskõlalise terviku, kus vastupidiselt käibearusaamale ei ole oluline kõikehõlmav skeptiline kahtlus, vaid inimesest ja Jumalast lähtuva moraalifilosoofia elluviimine ebakindlas maailmas.
Moral and Legal Status of Animals: Why Animals Should Have Legal Rights
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Jalagania, Beka; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In the presented thesis I defend the claim that all sentient animals should have legal rights. The arguments I offer in support of this claim are based on the moral and legal status of animals. I try to show that all sentient animals are ends in themselves for the reason that they are beings with their own interests, and their capacity for having welfare and the fact that there are things that are good and bad for them impose certain duties on us. Our duties should be reflected in the law, that is – animal interests should be protected by the legal means. I argue that some animals are moral subjects and because of their admirable ability to act for moral reasons and show moral concern towards their counterparts they intrinsically deserve the highest level of protection of their vital interests that is – they deserve legal rights. I also contend that all sentient animals who are moral patients should have legal rights for the same reason human infants and profoundly mentally impaired adults are granted some basic legal rights.

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