Filosoofia osakonna magistritööd – Master's theses

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Against epistemic partiality in friendship
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Ametefio, Saviour De-Graft; Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In conclusion, I have argued that epistemic partiality undermines friendship if we accept that friendship in a stricter sense is based on character. The argument I have present give two justification for that. The first is that when we allow an excellent friend to behave doxastically biased in favor of his friend consistently, this will promote more vices. Epistemic bias seems to be a bad epistemic practice. This is because knowingly leading away from the evidence and correct judgment of your friend's conduct is unjust. Cultivating such behavior in friendship will only corrupt the friendship. The second is that the fact that you esteem your friend’s character by deceptive means does not change the reality that the person has flaws in his character. When in our assessment of information about our friends, intentionally favor that which seek to portray him more favorably in a good light, we act deceptively. When we notice this shortcoming, we must correct it. The instrumental argument aims to encourage friends to help each other in their development as a person. Therefore, recognizing their flaws may be one of the ways to help them grow. In fact, in friendship relations that works well the idealization of your friend and the friendship itself helps in the longevity and flourishing of that relationship. However, if the bias becomes excessive and unwarranted, for example, if negative feedback is not considered at all or the positive attitudes towards your friend become unrealistically optimistic, then the bias may become dysfunctional.
Against the guise of the good
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Dua-Ansah, Bright; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account of action theory. I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.
Against the narrative self
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Rehman, Ayesha; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Vivian Puusepp, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In my thesis, I argue against the narrative conception of self, the idea that our self is narrative in structure and that we live life as a narrative. First, I differentiate between the strong and weak narrative view of self. I classify Dennett and Bruner’s account as the strong claim, Schechtman and Cavarero’s as the weak narrative claim. Second, I reject both the descriptive and normative narrativity thesis. I question the universality of a Narrative outlook. I argue that the artificial constructing of a narrative self is not conducive to self-understanding and that our choices of structuring it might be limiting. Last, I defend the non-Narrative conception of self against the common objection that without a selfnarrative one cannot be held accountable. I discuss Eichmann’s defense in Jerusalem along the way to untangle the link between narrativity and accountability.
Alienation and resignation: why don't we act against apocalyptic futures?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Gavrilin, Andrey; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Humanity faces apocalyptic futures which are the product of the current socio-economic system. However, the present response is insufficient. This thesis analyzes what prevents people from effectively acting against future catastrophes. In order to do so, I use climate change as the main example and employ a Marxist critique of capitalism. I argue that the insufficiency of current responses to catastrophic futures can be explained by Marx’s notion of alienation which is inherent to the current mode of production. In first three chapters I demonstrate different consequences of estranged labor. First, it makes people alienated not only from the fruits of their labor, but also from other people, thus preventing collective actions. Secondly, it disconnects individuals from the world which they collectively produce. Thirdly, it alienates individuals from a collectively produced future, affecting their perception of temporality and making them see the future as inevitable but eternally postponed. Thus, they become discouraged to act against the catastrophes which they collectively cause. In the fourth chapter I propose two philosophical solutions to this deadlock – Stoicism, which enables individual activity, and existentialism, which motivates people to act even if their struggle is absurd.
Animal research and objectivity
(Tartu Ülikool, 2017) Neemre, Eveli; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Oma magistritöös huvitusin ma loomauuringute objektiivsusest. Loomade uurimisega seondub interaktsioonist tulenev subjektiivne element, mis on vastuolus tavapärase arusaamaga objektiivsusest. Selle vastolu tõttu peetakse mõningaid loomauuringuid ebaobjektiivseks või suisa pseudoteaduslikuks. Esimeseks sammuks selle probleemi uurimisel selgitasin objektiivsuse mõistet. Selle käigus leidsin, et tavapärane arusaam objektiivsusest ja sellega kattuv arusaam absoluutsest objektiivsusest teaduses ei sobi tegelikult teadustöö loomusega. Nõustun Helen E. Longinoga, et teadus ja teadusloome on oma olemuselt sotsiaalsed ja seetõttu peaks ka objektiivsust mõistma sotsiaalselt, mitte individuaalselt nagu klassikalises arusaamas objektiivsusest. Minu teiseks sammuks oli uurida konkreetseid loomauuringute näiteid sotsiaalse objektiivsuse valguses, et näha kas loomauuringud saavad olla objektiivsed samadel alustel kui teised teadused. Keskendusin kahele suurele uurimissuunale loomauuringutes: loomade keeleprojektidele ja mõttelugemise eksperimentidele. Esimene neist, loomade keeleprojektid, ei olnud väga objektiivsed, kuna selle ala juhtivate projektide teadlased ei olnud võimelised kriitikale adekvaatselt reageerima ning seetõttu oli nende projektide objektiivsus kompromiteeritud. Mõttelugemise eksperimendid seevastu osutusid objektiivseteks, kuna uuringute algusest peale olid teadlased avatud kriitikale ja alternatiivsetele hüpoteesidele ning kriitikute ja teadlaste vahel toimus elav diskusioon, mis pani aluse uutele eksperimentidele ja uurimissuundadele. Järeldasin, et loomade uuringud võivad olla hoolimata neis sisalduvast subjektiivsest elemendist objektiivsed, kui loomadega tegelevad teadlased osalevad avatud kriitilises diskusioonis.
The Arendtian problem of new beginnings: beginnings and foundations of freedom in revolution
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Zhu, Zhiyi; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis explores the relationship between beginnings and foundations within the context of modern political revolutions. As Hannah Arend argued, the American Revolution, with its establishment of a federal republic and a Constitution inspired by ancient political traditions, provides a model for successful modern revolutions. Arendt's reinterpretation highlights the authentic unification between freedom and order through a mutual contract, where both elements reinforce each other. This unification is reflected in the constitution-making activity dominated by constituent power, bridging the gap between beginnings and established foundations. The processual nature of beginnings, as seen in the council system and revolutionary experiences, underscores that new political orders are extensions in time, seeking continuity by reconnecting with predecessors’ foundations. It means the beginning is the return to a previous beginning. Ultimately, this cyclical process transforms the new beginning into a stabilizing foundation, ensuring continuity and stability for future political structures.
Artificial intelligence and agency
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Hosseinpour, Hesam; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
When it comes to thinking about artificial intelligence (AI), the possibility of its disobedience is usually considered as a threat to the human race. But here, I elaborate on a counterintuitive and optimistic approach that looks at disobedient AI as a promise, rather than a threat. First, I explain the problem of responsibility and the necessity of expanding the realm of agency in order to include AI machines as agents. Then, I introduce a standard approach to responsibility as an attempt to define agency for AI machines and explain the epistemological problem as the main issue with this account of responsibility. And in the last part, I use Foucault’s analysis of power to introduce a non-standard view of agency which explains how being an object of power is the condition of possibility of any kind of agency and draw this conclusion that through disobedience, AI machines will find their way to power relations and will promote to the position of agents.
Beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022-02) Hooda, Anurag; Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In this thesis I have argued how we can go beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism to tackle the existing issues in the society. To uncover the veil, I have begun by describing what is religion and various religious positions like exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. After clearing concepts next, I discuss Hick’s model of religious pluralism and explained the central pieces in model, like, his doctrine of the Real and how Hick utilized the brilliance of Kant’s epistemology of religion. After describing them I have defended Hick’s model against the arguments of exclusivist’s like Plantinga and Johnson. Further, I have argued that religious exclusivism is a dangerous position when compared with religious pluralism, as the latter is more tolerant. Then I have sketched a model of small r to capital R Religion, and argued that religious pluralism has its own problems and why it fails. Then finally I defend the ‘small r to capital R Religion’ model against possible objection.
Can Computers be Creative?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Keenan, Patrick; Kitsik, Eve, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
It is sometimes claimed that computer automation of work will free people up to be more creative and that being creative is a way to add value to one’s life. However, if computers themselves become creative, then this might impede a human’s ability to add value to their life. This thesis investigates the question ‘Can computers be creative?’ by assessing the role that consciousness plays in creativity. Specifically, I assess the following argument against computer creativity: (1) creativity requires consciousness; (2) computers cannot be conscious; (3) therefore, computers cannot be creative. The first premise is challenged by cases where humans program computers to produce apparently creative (novel and valuable) results. However, in the relevant sense of “creativity”, creativity must result from the actions of an agent. Accordingly, I will focus on whether the agency that is required for creativity requires consciousness. I draw on literature from philosophy of creativity, philosophy of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind to argue that consciousness is not necessary for creativity. I also present some considerations against the second premise, that computers cannot be conscious.
Can contempt serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against the damage wrought by superbia? A critical analysis of Macalester Bell's account of contempt
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Meriste, Heidy; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis is focused on whether contempt could serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against superbia. My analysis is largely built on and developed in critical dialogue with a thesis put forward by Macalester Bell in her monograph “Hard feelings: the moral psychology of contempt” (2013). Bell is one of the few modern moral philosophers who have defended contempt as an emotion that has an important role to play in our moral lives. Even though contempt has often been rejected as a nasty and immoral emotion and it is not particularly difficult to come up with cases where contempt would indeed be unjustified, I find it hard to deny that there is a grain of truth in saying that the virtuous agent will love the good and hate the evil1. If we are to be consistent and wholeheartedly value morality, and we agree that emotions are important mediums through which we value things (as it is assumed by the current mainstream theories of emotion), then there seems to be a prima facie case for at least some hard feelings―understood as emotions that help us hold other people accountable for their wrongdoing, or, in case of superbia (which is more to do with character rather than some isolated acts of wrongdoing), their “badbeing” (Bell 2013: 39).
The charientic: a neglected normative category
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Bailie, Natasha Jade; Francesco Orsi, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
It is a standard problem of value theory, broadly construed, to identify, classify, and analyse evaluative judgements. In 1958, Peter Glassen argued that judgements regarding vulgarity or elegance, which he calls “charientic” judgements, are (i) properly evaluative judgements; and (ii) distinct from other types of universally recognised evaluative judgements, such as moral or aesthetic ones. The goals of the current work are firstly to defend and develop these claims to establish the charientic as a proper normative category, and secondly to show, using Christine Korsgaard’s theory of normativity from her 1996 book The Sources of Normativity, that there exist charientic obligations. Grounding obligations in practical identity, a conception of oneself under which one finds oneself valuable, is key to establishing the existence of charientic obligations.
A classical degree-theoretic treatment of the sorites paradox : master's thesis in philosophy
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Yau, Ching Hei; Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, juhendaja; Frances, Bryan Reed Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Since 1970s, degree-of-truth theory has been proposed as a solution to the Sorites paradox. However, one perennial attack to degree-of-truth theory is that its logic - fuzzy logic - is non-classical. Inspired by Gödel (1933), I attempt to better degree-of-truth theory by classicalizing it. That is, I attempt to give an interpretation of fuzzy logic within classical logic enriched by degree operators {⚪, ◔, ◑, ◕, ⚫} - “it is of no/low/moderate/high/full degree that …”. Intuitively, degree-of-truth is classicalized as classical bivalent truth-value and a largely independent notion of degrees. A formal semantics of this enriched classical logic is presented, from which two semantic consequences are derived. The two semantic consequences are applied to analyse the (in)validity of the Sorites argument. There are two results: 1. the validity of the standard Sorites argument is reasserted, 2. a new argument for the invalidity of the degreed version of the Sorites argument is presented.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in Predictive Brains
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Vaus, Sander; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The debate over whether perception is cognitively penetrable, in order to remain philosophically interesting and relevant, should be unpacked in terms of discerning whether propositional states can directly modulate the low-level phenomenal features of one’s perceptual experience. For this, it should also engage with cognitive science, and it is by proposing a scientifically feasible mechanism of how cognitive penetrability could obtain that there is even a reason for considering it. The predictive coding model of perception provides a framework within which such a mechanism can be motivated. By framing perception as a process of probabilistic inference, wherein top-down models of the world are tested against bottom-up error signals, we can discern whether propositional attitudes could affect the inhibitory and excitatory signaling of sensory neurons in a way that either promotes or inhibits the top-down predictive model that constitutes one’s perceptual experience, all the while preserving the necessary kind of relation between perception and cognition. In a three dimensional variation of the Ebbinghaus illusion, this can in fact be shown to happen, establishing cognitive penetrability of perception and a working mechanism by which this could take place.
Collective responsibility in the anthropocene
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Luo, Yufeng; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Geoscientists have heralded the advent of a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene. This new epoch highlights the unprecedented human power to influence the Earth system, thanks to the advancement of modern technology. As the most characteristic phenomenon of the new era, climate change, as well as the inadequacy of human action to address it, poses a challenge to previous moral and political theories. By examining the critiques of contemporary scholars, this thesis attempts to identify the reasons why past theories fall short in addressing the climate crisis, and proposes a theory of collective responsibility as the appropriate ethical framework in the Anthropocene. Inspired by the philosophical inquiry of Dipesh Chakrabarty, this thesis engages with the works of modern philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Hans Jonas to construct the theory of collective responsibility. It argues that collective responsibility in the Anthropocene should transcend the boundaries of different communities and generations, and is capable of motivating people to take collective action to combat climate change.
A comparative approach to tax exemption: differences between hospitals and religious institutions
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Wehbe, Wael; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
I study the position of religious institutions in matters of exemptions from paying taxes, the position is that religious institutions must be exempted from paying taxes in much of the same manner to hospitals since they are sufficiently similar with regard to taxation and legal status. I consider what might be required for this “sufficient similarity” to merit this equal legal status and resulting equal treatment by the state. I provide some justification of the tax exemptions hospitals receive and relate them to the three requirements for sufficient similarity. I then present three arguments against the three conditions of sufficient similarity. Lastly, I consider some objections to the conditions of sufficient similarity and the paper as a whole, I then provide some replies to these objections as best I can.
The concept of recognition in contemporary social philosophy: a critical perspective on the connection between the struggle for recognition and emancipation in Axel Honneth and Judith Butler
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Kozlova, Viktorija; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The concept of recognition has attracted wide-spread interest in social and political philosophy during the last decades. This thesis critically examines the notion of recognition in social and political theory concentrating on the works of Axel Honneth, the author who has, arguably, presented the most comprehensive social theory of recognition to date. The thesis reconstructs Honneth’s theory of recognition in light of the connection between recognition and social change, which, for him, is understood as driven by the struggle for recognition. Drawing from the works of Judith Butler, I emphasize the ambivalent character of recognition through its connection to subject formation. Following Butler, it is argued that before a person can enjoy recognition, they must first become recognizable, which in turn is conditioned by the existent dynamics of power. As a result, I conclude that particular expressions of the desire for recognition are significantly limited in their emancipatory potential.
Contrastive evaluation of explanations in studies of scientific knowledge
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Salkim, Mert; Lõhkivi, Endla, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In order to explain scientific practices, a study of science must organize its method of explanation. Symmetry requirement in the sociology of scientific knowledge demanded that explaining why scientists conclude their explanations the way they do should be carefully executed with a symmetrical focus on reasons. That is, the possible epistemic states of the practices under study require the same types of explanations, regardless of the actual outcome. One problem with symmetry requirement is its assumption that there is a shared intuition on the types of explanations and ways in which they are compared and contrasted. In this thesis, I explore this assumption and provide a possible assessment strategy that is informed by the philosophical debates on contrastive explanations. My proposal is a strategy of evaluating explanations in studies of science with respect to their sensitivity to given context. Explanations are sensitive to the context only if they are contrastively symmetrical. As opposed to strong symmetry, contrastive symmetry can accommodate wider possibilities of explanations given their intended context.
Countering destruction with spontaneity, redescription, and playfulness: a philosophical reading of Kross
(Tartu Ülikool, 2017-05) Salura, Merily; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Antud magistritöö keskmes on kirjanduse filosoofiline analüüs. Keskne küsimus puudutab raskete valikute ees seismist totalitarismi kontekstis: seistes silmitsi moraalivalikutega sunnitöölaagris, millised on valikuvõimalused? Mida tähendab laagris teatud moraalivaliku langetamine (nii füüsilise kui moraalse) ellujäämise ning vastupanu osutamise perspektiivist? Hannah Arendti käsitluses on sunnitöö-, koondus- ja surmalaagrid totalitarismi kesksed institutsioonid, kus teostatakse soovimatute inimolendite täieliku hävituse projekti; lõpptulemuseks on inimeste spontaansuse ning unikaalsuse kaotamine. Selles töös toome Arendti sissevaated kokku Richard Rorty ideedega, kes rakendas Orwelli 1984 analüüsis inimese maailma koostvõtmise ideed. Arendti ja Rorty ideede süntees toob esile keele ning narratiivse vabaduse olulisuse võitluses spontaansuse kadumise vastu. Töö kolmas peatükk kasutab narratiivsele vabadusele seatud rõhuasetust Eesti kirjaniku Jaan Krossi GULAGi-lugude tõlgendamiseks. Töö pakub tõlgendust novellidest “Vürst” ja “Halleluuja”, tuues esile idee mänglevusest, mis kirjeldab iseseisvalt ümber nii tegelase enda kui ka ümbritseva situatsiooni ning hoiab alal vangide narratiivset vabadust ja spontaansust. Selline mänglevus tõuseb esile teatraalsetes viisides, bravuuris, teatavas distantsis situatsioonist ning selle ‘skriptist’ (säärasel distantsil on märgatavaid sarnasusi Rorty ironismiga), ootamatuste väljamängimises ning rõhutamises ning riskide ning võimalustega mängimises.
A defence of the existence of emotions in birds
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) York, Kyle; Puusepp, Vivian, juhendaja; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis demonstrates that (at least some) birds can feel emotions. First, it gives a methodological justification for how one can make such attributions in the first place. Then supplies behavioral and physiological evidence for emotions such as fear, anger, and affection. It goes on to defend the idea that birds have the neurological and cognitive capacities for emotions. It next turns towards cognitive and mental considerations, including intentionality, mental content, language-like thought, and making attributions of propositional attitudes and evaluative judgments to birds. It concludes by considering whether birds have human-like emotions or bird-relative ‘schmemotions’.
Defending conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise
(Tartu Ülikool, 2017) Yu, Yangsen; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
I’m taking a compatiblist position between free will and determinism. I’m mainly discussing “could have done otherwise” (abbreviated as CHDO throughout my thesis) in the free will debate. My thesis is that conditional interpretation of CHDO with an antecedent of desire is a convincing analysis that makes CHDO and determinism compatible with each other. I will support this thesis by discussing why the antecedent of desire is a better candidate than other antecedents and replying to some of the criticism against this version of conditional analysis. One conception of conditional analysis of CHDO is that it is a watered-down version of modal interpretation of CHDO. I will consider some arguments which give us some new interesting perspective on the conditional interpretation of CHDO. I believe that these arguements have successfully shifted the burden of proof to the incompatiblists and further increase the convincing power of the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire.

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