Against the narrative self
Date
2018
Authors
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Journal ISSN
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Publisher
Tartu Ülikool
Abstract
In my thesis, I argue against the narrative conception of self, the idea that our self is
narrative in structure and that we live life as a narrative. First, I differentiate between the
strong and weak narrative view of self. I classify Dennett and Bruner’s account as the
strong claim, Schechtman and Cavarero’s as the weak narrative claim. Second, I reject
both the descriptive and normative narrativity thesis. I question the universality of a
Narrative outlook. I argue that the artificial constructing of a narrative self is not conducive
to self-understanding and that our choices of structuring it might be limiting. Last, I defend
the non-Narrative conception of self against the common objection that without a selfnarrative
one cannot be held accountable. I discuss Eichmann’s defense in Jerusalem along
the way to untangle the link between narrativity and accountability.
Description
Keywords
narrative, self, practical philosophy