Does Conciliationism Carry a Problematic Commitment to Uniqueness?
In my thesis, I defend Conciliationism from an objection first articulated by Kelly (2010). He argues that Conciliationism is not compatible with Permissivism, and, for this reason, Conciliationism commits one to the Uniqueness Thesis (Uniqueness). Kelly sees this as a significant liability, because, as he argues, Uniqueness amounts to an extremely strong and unobvious view. I show that Kelly’s argument is ambiguous between two incompatible versions of Permissivism: Options Permissivism and Background-Relative Permissivism. When Permissivism in understood in the former way, Kelly, in fact, establishes that Conciliationism implies a version Uniqueness. However, this version of Uniqueness is a moderate and plausible position. The other reading of Permissivism will be compatible with Conciliationism and will not imply Uniqueness. I conclude that Kelly’s argument fails to pose a problem for Conciliationism.