On Separation of State from Taxes
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The work argues for a conceptual possibility of the view, according to which the state is justified but taxation is unjustified. The argument is constructed through the defense of two following claims: (1) There is an argument which justifies the state but only if it does not engage in taxation. (2) The argument described in (1) does not pick out an empty set of possible states. The first claim is defended by exploring Lockean concept of state of nature. It is argued that while the justification of the state which Locke himself proposes and which relies on the notion of the universal consent of citizens to the state may fail, there is an alternative possibility to justify the state by its compliance with the law of nature. Such justification, however, would render justifying taxation impossible. The second claim is defended by exploring and rejecting two objections, according to which the state, justified in a proposed fashion, is put under incompatible requirements: that such state would not have the resources to enforce the law of nature and that it would not be able to track the law of nature correctly.
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