Why there is no free will and why compatibilism and its notion of free will is wrong
| dc.contributor.advisor | Vázquez, María Jimena Clavel, juhendaja | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Quershi, Waqar Ahsan | |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond | et |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond | et |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-29T08:29:34Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-06-29T08:29:34Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.description.abstract | As we have learned in the state-of-the-art section about determinism (section 2.1) which basically says that if everything has a cause than our mental events should also have a prior cause, which means that we are not in control of our desires and they are the reason why we do anything and everything. On the other hand, compatibilism enters the debate with a solution that determinism poses. Which is that even if the universe is deterministic we can have free will if our mental faculties are in order and don’t malfunction. | en |
| dc.description.uri | https://www.ester.ee/record=b5507743 | et |
| dc.identifier.other | 20.03.01 QUE 01 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10062/82861 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | et |
| dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
| dc.rights | openAccess | et |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | philosophy | en |
| dc.subject | free will | en |
| dc.subject.other | magistritööd | et |
| dc.subject.other | filosoofia | et |
| dc.subject.other | tahtevabadus | et |
| dc.title | Why there is no free will and why compatibilism and its notion of free will is wrong | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | et |