Constructing identities in Georgia’s foreign policy: the Georgian “Self” and the Russian “Other” under UNM and GD (2008-2021)

Abstract

Explaining Georgia’s foreign policy, particularly its refusal to bandwagon with Russia and its decision to align with the West, has been a long-standing focus of scholarly inquiry. However, after Georgian Dream (GD) took office in October 2012, some have noted a shift to a seemingly pro-Russian foreign policy. Most explanations point towards identity – whether elite, state, national or party – as an explanatory variable for this shift. Instead, this thesis is grounded in poststructuralist theory, which posits that identity is formed through linking and differentiation between the “Self” and the “Other.” The research purpose is to identify how the Georgian “Self” and Russian “Other” have been constructed by United National Movement (UNM) and GD between 2008 and 2021, and to explore whether there has been a change in construction of the Russian “Other.” I conduct a poststructuralist discourse analysis of official foreign policy documents, government programs, speeches (both domestic and international), and statements made by key officials (prime minister, president, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs). I identify six discursive formations on which UNM relies for its identity construction of Georgia and Russia: International Law; Role of the International Community; Historical Legacy; (Future) Russo-Georgian Relations; August 2008 War; and Georgian Statehood. In UNM’s construction, the Georgian “Self” and the Russian “Other” as complete opposites. In contrast, I identify four discursive formations that GD uses for its identity construction of Georgia and Russia: International Law; Actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Role of the International Community; and Commitment to a Peaceful Solution. Although GD relies on fewer discursive formations, the portrayal of Russia is more complex. Overall, I identify four significant changes in the construction of the Russian “Other:” a shift in attribution of blame for the August 2008 War; a more positive tone towards Russia; the construction of a mutual willingness to solve the conflict; and the portrayal of compatibility of the West and Russia.