Before and after the invasion: securitizing Russian influence in Estonia and the shifting discourses of Russian-speaking audiences

dc.contributor.advisorMakarychev, Andrey, juhendaja
dc.contributor.authorKozlov, Egert Markus
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste valdkondet
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituutet
dc.date.accessioned2025-06-13T09:58:48Z
dc.date.available2025-06-13T09:58:48Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.description.abstractSecuritization is a process in which the political actors frame issues as existential threats, therefore justifying extraordinary measures to combat the threats. This thesis explores the transformation of Estonia’s securitization of Russian influence, with a particular focus on Russian-speaking audiences' reactions. Despite a long-standing exposure and acknowledgement of Russian influence, explicit securitization acts were only accelerated following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The research addresses the puzzling question of why were the rapid securitization processes delayed until 2022 and how the discourses have transformed between two key periods: 2014 to 2022 and post-2022. Drawing on the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School and its extensions by Balzacq and Côté, the research sees the audience as an active agent in the securitizaiton process. Particularly, a focus has been placed on audience agency, including desecuritizatoion and counter-securitization moves. A post-structural discourse analysis is applied to parliamentary transcripts and media content, allowing for an analysis of securitization strategies and audience reactions between the two periods. The research concludes that the earlier securitization moves prioritised integration and inclusion, whereas the latter period saw more explicit exclusion and prohibition of Russian influence. While the previous period provided alternatives for the Russian-speaking audience, the post-2022 timeframe left little room for bargaining and for exceptions. Furthermore, the post-2022 period was illustrated by greater resistance from the Russian-speaking audience through desecuritization attempts, which included ignoring the issue, reconstructing the threat and counter-securitizing the state. The research contributes theoretically by advancing a more nuanced model of securitization acts and highlights the importance of the audience. It also encourages further investigation into post-Soviet securitization processes, particularly those involving minority-related discourses.en
dc.description.urihttps://www.ester.ee/record=b5755616*est
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10062/111342
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherTartu Ülikoolet
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estoniaen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/
dc.subject.othermagistritöödet
dc.subject.otherVenemaa-Ukraina sõda, 2014-et
dc.subject.othermõjudet
dc.subject.otherintegratsioonet
dc.subject.otherjulgeoleket
dc.subject.otherjulgeolekustamineet
dc.subject.othervenekeelsedet
dc.subject.othervähemusrahvusedet
dc.titleBefore and after the invasion: securitizing Russian influence in Estonia and the shifting discourses of Russian-speaking audiencesen
dc.typeThesisen

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