State-(re)building in the Donbas 2015-2021: how and why de facto states do things differently

Abstract

Academic literature on de facto states has observed and described post-conflict state-building in all de facto states in Eurasia. This body of research has highlighted shared commonalities shared between non-recognized states in their endeavors to build and maintain state-like structures. These commonalities can be viewed as defining of de facto statehood. The present research adds to the existing scholarship by testing these criteria in the youngest de facto states to see if they can account for and explain observed behavior. To do so, this research first compares state-building in the non-recognized “DLPR” to Ukrainian state-rebuilding in government-controlled territory of Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts. The stark differences in state-(re)building on either side of the conflict line are then contextualized and explained by process-tracing the de facto independence / lack of recognition to shortcomings in state-building in the de facto “People’s Republics”. The starkest differences revealed in the comparative analysis include the poor economic rebuilding, weak institution building, weak independence due to excessive meddling of a foreign power, and violent and authoritarian control in the Donbas de facto states. Overall, this thesis strengthens de facto state scholarship which proved useful in the analysis and also identifies gaps in de facto state research that need bridging and further development.