The European Parliament’s framing of the Russian invasions in the shared neighbourhood in 2008, 2014 and 2022
dc.contributor.advisor | Zubek, Marcin, juhendaja | |
dc.contributor.advisor | Braghiroli, Stefano, juhendaja | |
dc.contributor.author | Chachanidze, Soso | |
dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste valdkond | et |
dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut | et |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-11-05T09:25:40Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-11-05T09:25:40Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis discusses the evolution of the European Parliament’s framing of the Russian military aggressions in the shared neighbourhood – in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. The research analyses the similarities and changes in the way the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) framed Russia’s role in the military conflicts in these three occasions. Additionally, the thesis aims to understand how the European Union’s (EU) role and its policies towards Russia were perceived by the MEPs in the light of these invasions. The dissertation employs framing theory, specifically from the scope of agenda setting, to address the European Parliament’s (EP) role in the EU foreign policy creation and better understand the process and reasons of frame formation. As primary sources of data, the thesis investigates the first plenary debates that preceded the EP’s motions for resolution for each of these three conflicts. The research finds that during the analysed debates, the processes of framing Russia and the EU’s policies were taking place simultaneously. Framing process involved both, rational and value-based arguments. Framing of Russia in a certain way generally resulted in proposing specific policy options for the EU. The research concludes that while Moscow was framed as an aggressor in each case, the degree to which it was pictured as a sole initiator of the conflict was different. On the other hand, the thesis argues that the EP had more clarity on its policy preferences towards Kremlin in 2014 than in 2008 and 2022. In these two cases, more effort was directed towards discussing the development of adequate policies than using existing tools. The thesis contributes to the discussion on framing of Russia in the EU and specifically in the EP, as well as the EP’s role in the EU foreign policy making. | en |
dc.description.uri | https://www.ester.ee/record=b5711409*est | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10062/105825 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia | en |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/ | |
dc.subject.other | magistritööd | et |
dc.subject.other | Euroopa Liit | et |
dc.subject.other | Euroopa Parlament | et |
dc.subject.other | välispoliitika | et |
dc.subject.other | sõjalised konfliktid | et |
dc.subject.other | Venemaa-Ukraina sõda, 2014- | et |
dc.subject.other | Vene-Gruusia sõda, 2008 | et |
dc.title | The European Parliament’s framing of the Russian invasions in the shared neighbourhood in 2008, 2014 and 2022 | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
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