Turvalised ja efektiivsed mix-netid
Failid
Kuupäev
2016
Autorid
Ajakirja pealkiri
Ajakirja ISSN
Köite pealkiri
Kirjastaja
Abstrakt
Mix-net on süsteem, mis võimaldab saavutada anonüümsuse arvutite vahelises suhtluses. Mix-net võtab sisendiks kasutajate krüptogrammid ja väljastab krüptogrammid juhuslikult segatud järjekorras. Mix-net'id võimaldavad turvalise e-valimise ning paljude teiste anonüümsust vajavate rakenduste konstrueerimist. Mix-net'ide ehitamisel on oluline võimalus veenduda, et segamine toimuks korrektselt. Samas ei saa mix-net avaldada, kuidas segamine toimus, kuna sellega kaoks anonüümsus. Võimalik lahendus sellele probleemile on nullteadmusprotokolli kasutamine.\n\r\n\rAntud magistritöös uuritakse J. Furukawa 2005. aastal välja pakutud nullteadmusprotokolli krüptogrammide segamise jaoks. Esiteks antakse detailne ja kergemini loetav kirjeldus Furukawa segamise ja segamis-dekrüpteerimise nullteadmusprotokollidest. Lisaks pakutakse välja kaks uut permutatsioonimaatriksi kirjeldust ning kaks lihtsat muudatust segamise protokollile, mis aitavad vähendada ajalist keerukust.
Mix-net is a system that can provide anonymity in a computer network. Mix-net takes as an input user's ciphertexts and outputs them in a shuffled order. Secure e-voting and variety of other applications can be built on top of mix-net architecture.\n\r\n\rMajor challenge of constructing mix-nets lies in efficiently proving that shuffling was done correctly. Mix-net cannot reveal the permutation because that would break the anonymity. One solution is to provide a zero-knowledge proof.\n\r\n\rThis thesis studies a zero-knowledge shuffle argument proposed by J. Furukawa in 2005.\n\r\n\rFirstly, we provide a more detailed and easily readable description of the shuffle and shuffle-decryption zero-knowledge protocols than in the original paper. Secondly, we provide two new characterizations of a permutation matrix and two simple modifications of\n\rthe shuffle protocol that reduce the computational complexity.
Mix-net is a system that can provide anonymity in a computer network. Mix-net takes as an input user's ciphertexts and outputs them in a shuffled order. Secure e-voting and variety of other applications can be built on top of mix-net architecture.\n\r\n\rMajor challenge of constructing mix-nets lies in efficiently proving that shuffling was done correctly. Mix-net cannot reveal the permutation because that would break the anonymity. One solution is to provide a zero-knowledge proof.\n\r\n\rThis thesis studies a zero-knowledge shuffle argument proposed by J. Furukawa in 2005.\n\r\n\rFirstly, we provide a more detailed and easily readable description of the shuffle and shuffle-decryption zero-knowledge protocols than in the original paper. Secondly, we provide two new characterizations of a permutation matrix and two simple modifications of\n\rthe shuffle protocol that reduce the computational complexity.