A non-moral critique of the norm of assumed objectivity

Abstract

Sally Haslanger (2013) has described a particular norm of objectivity, the norm of Assumed Objectivity, that she considers as morally problematic. This norm, when correctly applied, permits one to form essentialising beliefs about women. According Haslanger, under the conditions of gender inequality, adopting hurts the interest of women while serving the interests of men. Rae Langton (1993), in contrast, has argued that a moral critique of the norm has its shortcomings: if a particular norm is bad for some and good for others, then the grounds for rejecting the norm are weak. Thus, Langton has provided a non-moral critique of the norm that pertains to the rationality of the norm. She argues that the norm should be rejected because it fails to yield knowledge. Evangelia Papadaki (2008) has pointed to an inconsistency in Langton’s argument thereby concluding that the norm evades Langton’s non-moral critique. In this thesis, I will set out to argue the norm is vulnerable to a non-moral critique. I will argue that the beliefs arrived at fail to constitute knowledge, which gives us a rational justification to reject the norm of Assumed Objectivity