Knowledge and practice: a criticism of epistemology
Date
2024-11-12
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Abstract
Teadmisi on traditsiooniliselt määratletud kui õigustatud tõelist uskumust. See määratlus jääb tavaliselt kahtluse alla. Traditsiooniline definitsioon jätab problemaatiliseks selle, kuidas saab teadmist inimesele arusaadavalt omistada: näib, et uskumus võib olla ka ilma seda manifesteerimata, samuti tundub, et uskumust saab avaldada ka ilma seda omamata. Seega on raske kindlaks teha, kas keegi midagi teab.
Veelgi enam, peavoolu epistemoloogid nõustuvad kitsa, vaesunud kogemuse mõistega, mis hõlmab ainult vaatlust. Tegevust ja harjumuse loomist ignoreeritakse ilma põhjenduseta. Traditsiooniline teadmiste määratlus ignoreerib ka neid. Seega ei suuda peavoolu analüütiline epistemoloogia tabada eksperimentaalse praktika tähtsust.
Väidan, et teadmised on praktika. See lahendab kaks ülalmainitud probleemi. Esiteks avaldub praktika soorituses, mis võimaldab agendile teadmisi arusaadavalt omistada. Teiseks on eksperimenteerimine üks praktika teiste seas. See loobub üleintellektuaalsest teadmistest. Ma lähtun klassikalisest pragmatismist.
Järgin John Deweyt ja Karen Baradit ning defineerin kogemust kui organismi–keskkonna sisetegevust. Definitsiooni järgi on kogemus kahesuunaline ja nii "subjektiivne" kui ka "objektiivne" korraga. See hõlmab vaatlust, tegutsemist ja harjumuse loomist. Kogemus leiab aset terviklikus olukorras ja iga olukord erineb vähemalt potentsiaalselt teistest. Seetõttu on kogu kogemus ekslik ja seega ka eksperimentaalne. Kogemus esitab probleeme, mida tuleb lahendada, ja lahenduse leidmine on meie enda teha. Kogu kogemus on episteemiliselt problemaatiline. Seetõttu tuleb kogemust käsitleda andmetena või märkidena millestki muust, mida see võib esindada.
Märkide analüüs näitab, et sooritus on teadmise märk. See õigustab (eksimatut) järeldust jõudlusest teadmisteni. Kuid siis tuleb teadmisi pidada praktikaks.
Knowledge has traditionally been defined as justified true belief. This definition usually goes unquestioned. The traditional definition leaves it problematic, how knowledge can be intelligibly ascribed to a person: it seems that one can have a belief without manifesting it, and it also seems that one can manifest a belief without having it. Thus it is difficult to determine whether anybody knows anything. Moreover, mainstream epistemologists subscribe to a narrow, impoverished notion of experience that only encompasses observation. Action and the establishment of habit are ignored without justification. The traditional definition of knowledge ignores them too. Thus mainstream analytic epistemology is unable to capture the importance of experimental practice. I argue that knowledge is practice. That solves the two problems mentioned above. First, practice is manifest in performance, which makes it possible to intelligibly ascribe knowledge to the agent. Second, experimentation is one practice among others. That relinquishes the overintellectual notion of knowledge. I draw from classical pragmatism. I follow John Dewey and Karen Barad and define experience as organism—environment intra-action. By definition, experience is bidirectional and both “subjective” and “objective” at once. It encompasses observation, action, and the establishment of habit. Experience takes place within an integral situation, and each situation is at least potentially different from others. Therefore all experience is fallible and hence also experimental. Experience presents problems to be solved, and the construction of a solution is up to us. All experience is epistemically problematic. Therefore experience must be considered as data, or signs of something else that it might represent. An analysis of signs shows that performance is a sign of knowledge. That justifies a (fallible) inference from performance to knowledge. But then knowledge must be considered as practice.
Knowledge has traditionally been defined as justified true belief. This definition usually goes unquestioned. The traditional definition leaves it problematic, how knowledge can be intelligibly ascribed to a person: it seems that one can have a belief without manifesting it, and it also seems that one can manifest a belief without having it. Thus it is difficult to determine whether anybody knows anything. Moreover, mainstream epistemologists subscribe to a narrow, impoverished notion of experience that only encompasses observation. Action and the establishment of habit are ignored without justification. The traditional definition of knowledge ignores them too. Thus mainstream analytic epistemology is unable to capture the importance of experimental practice. I argue that knowledge is practice. That solves the two problems mentioned above. First, practice is manifest in performance, which makes it possible to intelligibly ascribe knowledge to the agent. Second, experimentation is one practice among others. That relinquishes the overintellectual notion of knowledge. I draw from classical pragmatism. I follow John Dewey and Karen Barad and define experience as organism—environment intra-action. By definition, experience is bidirectional and both “subjective” and “objective” at once. It encompasses observation, action, and the establishment of habit. Experience takes place within an integral situation, and each situation is at least potentially different from others. Therefore all experience is fallible and hence also experimental. Experience presents problems to be solved, and the construction of a solution is up to us. All experience is epistemically problematic. Therefore experience must be considered as data, or signs of something else that it might represent. An analysis of signs shows that performance is a sign of knowledge. That justifies a (fallible) inference from performance to knowledge. But then knowledge must be considered as practice.