De facto state-patron state relations in two-level game theory: a case study on de facto states in Croatia and Bosnia during the Yugoslav wars
De facto states are political entities that control territory and maintain all the requirements expected of a state except one, they lack international recognition. What they do have, in many cases, is the patronage of a recognized state that will help them to survive in a hostile world. So close is the relationship between patron and de facto states, that many dismiss de facto states as simply being puppets under the total control of the patron state. In this thesis I show how a genuine de facto state can be identified and differentiated from a puppet state; a true de facto state will be able to come to its own decisions rather than simply following dictates from their patron. To do this I examined the cases of the two Serbian-backed de facto states that emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and, through the use of two-level game theory, determine whether they accepted or rejected specific peace plans favored by their patron state based on internal political decisions or were simply carrying out the orders of the patron state.