The forms of memory: biosemiotic modelling of alloanimal episodic semiosis
Date
2024-09-12
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Abstract
Kus sa olid ja mida tegid kolm päikeseloojangut tagasi? Millal sa viimati toidupoes käisid ja milliseid asju sa sealt ostsid? Millal ja kus sa viimati oma parima sõbraga kohtusid? Millal ja kus sa kõige tõenäolisemalt kõike ülalnimetatut uuesti teed?
Kui suudad neile küsimustele vastata ilma kõrvalise abita, võib öelda, et sul on episoodiline mälu. See omapärane pikaajaline neurokognitiivne süsteem tugineb sinu võimele teadlikult uuesti läbi elada varasemaid isiklikke kogemusi ja ette näha võimalikke tulevikustsenaariume. Episoodiline mälu esineb ka loomadel, näiteks varestel, harakatel, tuvidel, rottidel, hiirtel, gorilladel, šimpansidel, orangutanidel, koertel, elevantidel, delfiinidel, kaheksajalgadel ja paljudel teistel.
Käesolev doktoritöö selgitab, kuidas need loomaliigid, sarnaselt inimestele, on võimelised vastama mis-kus-millal küsimustele neile omasel viisil. Selle uurimistöö peamine järeldus on, et loomade episoodiline mälu sõltub tähendusloome protsessist, mida ma nimetan "episoodiliseks semioosiks". Läbi tõlgenduse ühendab see protsess vaimsed kujundid ja aegruumilised stsenaariumid. Teisisõnu, loomade episoodiline mälu annab tunnistust mälu struktuurist, mälu sisust ja mälu paindlikkusest.
Termini episoodiline mälu võttis kasutusele episoodilise mälu teooria isaks peetud Kanada-Eesti eksperimentaalpsühholoog Endel Tulving (1927–2023). Tulvingu ja tema kolleegide teedrajav töö selgitab, miks on olemas kaks erinevat pikaajalise mälusüsteemi vormi. Esimene neist on semantiline mälu, mis vastutab faktilise ja kontseptuaalse teabe talletamise eest. Teine on episoodiline mälu, mis vastutab elatud kogemuste ja nende aegruumilise konteksti mäletamise või rekonstrueerimise eest.
Näiteks on sinu sünnikuupäeva ja -koha teadmine võimalik tänu semantilisele mälule, isegi kui sinu episoodilisel mälul puudub sellest autobiograafilisest sündmusest subjektiivne mälestus. Tänu oma episoodilisele mälule on sul omakorda võimalik eredalt meenutada esimest korda, kui sa keskkoolis uue sõbraga kohtusid, isegi kui sinu semantiline mälu selle sündmuse täpset kuupäeva ja kohta ei tea. Episoodilise mäluga loomadel on ka semantiline mälu. Kuigi loomade semantiline teadmine ei väljendu verbaalselt, saab seda väljendada läbi käitumise. Doktoritöö selgitas ka episoodilise mälu vastastikust sõltuvust semantilisest mälust ja teistest loomariigis esinevatest mäluvormidest.
Doktoritöö uuris episoodilist mälu biosemiootilisest vaatenurgast, selgitades, kuidas episoodilise mäluga loomad tajuvad ja muudavad oma ökosüsteemi tähendusrikkaks maailmaks. Kasutades etoloogilisi tõendeid, koostasin ma nende meeltest, harjumustest ja tegevustest biosemiootilised "kaardid" või "mudelid". Nende mudelite eesmärk oli vastata neljale põhiküsimusele. (1) Kas väljaspool inimese episoodilist mälu on episoodilisi nähtusi? (2) Milline seos on semioosi ja elatud kogemuste vahel loomade episoodilises mälus? (3) Kas biosemiootilist fenomenoloogiat tuleks praktiseerida puhta teooriana või on see rakendatav ka loomade episoodilise mälu eksperimentaalsete uuringute puhul? (4) Kuidas saab biosemiootika aidata kaasa fenomenoloogia mõistmisele loomade episoodilises mälus?
Dissertatsiooni järeldused võib jagada neljaks ideeks. (1) Episoodilise mälu olemust ei saa kindlaks teha uurides ainult inimesi, eriti kui arvestada episoodilise mälu mitmeliigilist konteksti (2) Loomade episoodilise mälu kõige olulisem omadus ei ole see, et tal "puudub" midagi inimlikku (nt keel), vaid asjaolu, et loomade episoodilise mälu kaudu on võimalik inimese episoodilise mälu tõelise semiootilise olemuse mõistmine ja võrdlemine. Inimese episoodiline mälu ei ole ei astmelt ega olemuselt "kõrgem".
(3) Inimese episoodilise mälu areng on ainulaadne, nagu on seda ka loomade episoodilise mälu liigispetsiifilised omadused. See tähendab, et need erinevad teineteisest ainult mõne aspekti või võimekuse poolest. (4) Inimese episoodilise mälu ja loomade episoodilise mälu ontoloogilist eristamist ei tohiks taandada millekski "vaimseks" (nt mentaalne ajarännak). Episoodilise mälu "tõelist olemust" ei mõisteta mitte siis, kui me looma sellest "välja ajame" või "eemaldame" (nt instinktid), vaid siis, kui tunneme ära inimeste loomupärase loomalikkuse. Just sel viisil saame minna kaugemale inimeste episoodilise mälu psühholoogilistest ja looma episoodilise mälu käitumuslikest selgitustest.
Biosemiootiline arusaam episoodilisest mälust on loomaühiskondade antropogeensete mõjude keskel ülioluline. Kultuurilised harjumused, jagatud teadmised ja arbitraarsed koodid on omadused, mis sõltuvad keerukatest mäluvormidest, mis ei ole geneetiliselt päritud, vaid elu jooksul õpitud. Sellest tulenevalt on biosemiootika kohustus näha loomi mitte kui ellu jäävaid organisme, vaid mõistusega olendeid, kes omavad elusid.
Where were you and what were you doing three sunsets ago? When were you last at the grocery store, and what items did you buy there? When and where did you last meet your best friend? When and where, most likely, will you do each of the above again? If you can answer these questions without the help of external information, it could be said that you possess Episodic Memory (EM). This peculiar long-term neurocognitive system relies on your capacity to consciously relive past personal experiences, and pre-live probable future scenarios. Some animals have EM too, such as crows, magpies, pigeons, rats, mice, gorillas, monkeys, chimpanzees, orangutans, dogs, elephants, dolphins, octopi, and many others. This doctoral dissertation explains how these animal species, similarly to humans, are capable of answering what-where-when questions in their own particular ways. The main finding of this research is that animal EM depends on a meaning-making process I call “episodic semiosis”. This process connects mental images and non-present spatiotemporal scenarios by means of interpretation. In other words, animal EM displays a Memory Structure, Memory Content, and Memory Flexibility. The term EM was coined by Endel Tulving (1927–2023), a Canadian-Estonian experimental psychologist considered the father of EM theory. The pioneering work of Tulving and his colleagues explains why there are two different forms of long-term memory systems. The first one is Semantic Memory (SM), responsible for knowing factual and conceptual information. The second one is EM, responsible for remembering or reconstructing lived experiences and their spatiotemporal context. For example, knowing the date and place of your birth is possible thanks to SM, even if your EM lacks a subjective recollection of that autobiographical event. In turn, vividly recalling the first time you made a friend at high school is possible thanks to your EM, even if your SM does not necessarily know the exact date and place of that event. Animals with EM also possess SM. Although the semantic knowledge of animals is not expressed verbally, it can be expressed through behaviour. The dissertation also explained the interdependence of EM with respect to SM, and other forms of memory present in the animal kingdom. The dissertation studied EM from a biosemiotic perspective. It explained how animals with EM sense and modify their ecosystem as a meaningful world. Using ethological evidence, I created biosemiotic ‘maps’ or ‘models’ of their senses, habits, and actions. These models were designed to answer four main questions. (1) Are there episodic phenomena beyond human EM? (2) What is the relation between semiosis and phenomena in animal EM? (3) Should a biosemiotic phenomenology be practiced as pure theory, or as applicable for experimental studies in animal EM? (4) How can biosemiotics contribute to understanding phenomenology in animal EM? The conclusions of the dissertation can be divided into four ideas. (1) The nature of EM cannot be determined by studying humans alone, especially if we consider the multi-species context of EM. (2) The most important characteristic of animal EM is not that it ‘lacks’ something human (e.g., language), but the fact that it is necessary for understanding and comparing the true semiotic essence of human EM. Human EM is neither ‘higher’ in degree nor ‘superior’ in kind. (3) The development of human EM is unique in its own ways, and so are the species-specific features of animal EM. This means that both merely differ from one another in some respects or capacities. (4) The ontological distinction between human EM and animal EM should not be reduced to something ‘mental’ (e.g., Mental Time Travel). The ‘true nature’ of EM is not understood when we ‘expel’ or ‘remove’ the animal from it (e.g., instincts), but when we recognize the intrinsic animality of humans. It is in this way that we can go beyond psychological accounts of human EM and behavioral accounts of AEM. A biosemiotic understanding of EM is crucial amidst the anthropogenic disruption of animal societies. Cultural habits, shared knowledge, and arbitrary codes are features that depend on complex forms of memory that are not genetically inherited but learned during a lifetime. Under these terms, it is concluded, biosemiotics has the responsibility to recognize episodic experimental subjects as rather being subjects of a lifetime.
Where were you and what were you doing three sunsets ago? When were you last at the grocery store, and what items did you buy there? When and where did you last meet your best friend? When and where, most likely, will you do each of the above again? If you can answer these questions without the help of external information, it could be said that you possess Episodic Memory (EM). This peculiar long-term neurocognitive system relies on your capacity to consciously relive past personal experiences, and pre-live probable future scenarios. Some animals have EM too, such as crows, magpies, pigeons, rats, mice, gorillas, monkeys, chimpanzees, orangutans, dogs, elephants, dolphins, octopi, and many others. This doctoral dissertation explains how these animal species, similarly to humans, are capable of answering what-where-when questions in their own particular ways. The main finding of this research is that animal EM depends on a meaning-making process I call “episodic semiosis”. This process connects mental images and non-present spatiotemporal scenarios by means of interpretation. In other words, animal EM displays a Memory Structure, Memory Content, and Memory Flexibility. The term EM was coined by Endel Tulving (1927–2023), a Canadian-Estonian experimental psychologist considered the father of EM theory. The pioneering work of Tulving and his colleagues explains why there are two different forms of long-term memory systems. The first one is Semantic Memory (SM), responsible for knowing factual and conceptual information. The second one is EM, responsible for remembering or reconstructing lived experiences and their spatiotemporal context. For example, knowing the date and place of your birth is possible thanks to SM, even if your EM lacks a subjective recollection of that autobiographical event. In turn, vividly recalling the first time you made a friend at high school is possible thanks to your EM, even if your SM does not necessarily know the exact date and place of that event. Animals with EM also possess SM. Although the semantic knowledge of animals is not expressed verbally, it can be expressed through behaviour. The dissertation also explained the interdependence of EM with respect to SM, and other forms of memory present in the animal kingdom. The dissertation studied EM from a biosemiotic perspective. It explained how animals with EM sense and modify their ecosystem as a meaningful world. Using ethological evidence, I created biosemiotic ‘maps’ or ‘models’ of their senses, habits, and actions. These models were designed to answer four main questions. (1) Are there episodic phenomena beyond human EM? (2) What is the relation between semiosis and phenomena in animal EM? (3) Should a biosemiotic phenomenology be practiced as pure theory, or as applicable for experimental studies in animal EM? (4) How can biosemiotics contribute to understanding phenomenology in animal EM? The conclusions of the dissertation can be divided into four ideas. (1) The nature of EM cannot be determined by studying humans alone, especially if we consider the multi-species context of EM. (2) The most important characteristic of animal EM is not that it ‘lacks’ something human (e.g., language), but the fact that it is necessary for understanding and comparing the true semiotic essence of human EM. Human EM is neither ‘higher’ in degree nor ‘superior’ in kind. (3) The development of human EM is unique in its own ways, and so are the species-specific features of animal EM. This means that both merely differ from one another in some respects or capacities. (4) The ontological distinction between human EM and animal EM should not be reduced to something ‘mental’ (e.g., Mental Time Travel). The ‘true nature’ of EM is not understood when we ‘expel’ or ‘remove’ the animal from it (e.g., instincts), but when we recognize the intrinsic animality of humans. It is in this way that we can go beyond psychological accounts of human EM and behavioral accounts of AEM. A biosemiotic understanding of EM is crucial amidst the anthropogenic disruption of animal societies. Cultural habits, shared knowledge, and arbitrary codes are features that depend on complex forms of memory that are not genetically inherited but learned during a lifetime. Under these terms, it is concluded, biosemiotics has the responsibility to recognize episodic experimental subjects as rather being subjects of a lifetime.
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