Multiple veto-players in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the effect on relations with the European Union

Abstract

The problem of poor compliance of the Western Balkan nations with the accession requirements has particularly come to the fore in the recent years now that the EU is prioritizing the countries as the candidates next in line. The political science scholarship has identified various obstacles blocking the way of smooth and effective politico-economic integration of the Western Balkan nations, with some emphasizing state capture and high corruption levels (Vachudova, 2018) and others accentuating economic and social factors (Darbrowski, Myachenkova, 2018). However, existing research investigating the problems associated with the European accession has tended to overlook the internal institutional challenges impeding reforms and impairing chances of integration. This thesis, in turn, delves into the veto-players-laden Bosnian political system, thereby providing a key to a more thorough understanding of the mechanisms that serve as a stumbling block to accession progress of the country. The thesis uses veto-player theory by George Tsebelis as the main theoretical concept to unravel the constellation of veto players in the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and attains its objective by relying on process-tracing as the main research method to analyze the reform progress. The results of the analysis reveal the direct detrimental effect of the convoluted political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina on reform progress and relations with the EU. The number of veto-players and the (non-alignment) of their strategic interests prove sufficiently substantial to prevent change and retain status quo, thereby hampering the EU accession progress. In sum, the study contributes to the literature on EU accession and Europeanization by highlighting how the candidate-country institutional set-ups can impede reform progress and EU accession.