Leibnizi teodiike kui lahendus kurjuse probleemile
| dc.contributor.advisor | Roomet Jakapi, juhendaja | et |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Riin Sirkel, juhendaja | et |
| dc.contributor.author | Kirpu, Grete | |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond | et |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond | et |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-06-30T14:30:51Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-06-30T14:30:51Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026 | |
| dc.description | This bachelor’s thesis examines the problem of evil within Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s theodicy, with particular focus on the explanation of moral evil. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how Leibniz attempts to reconcile the existence of evil with the classical attributes of God (omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness), while also preserving human free will and moral responsibility. The thesis first introduces the classical formulation of the problem of evil and distinguishes between metaphysical, physical, and moral evil in Leibniz’s framework. Special attention is given to moral evil, since it directly concerns human actions and moral responsibility. The role of free will is also analyzed as a necessary condition for moral evil. The second part of the thesis focuses on Leibniz’s solution, particularly the principle of sufficient reason and the idea of the best possible world. It is shown how Leibniz argues that evil is not accidental but rather a part of a rationally structured and optimal world. The final part of the thesis critically evaluates Leibniz’s position through the objections of John Leslie Mackie and David Hume. Mackie challenges the logical consistency between God’s attributes and the existence of evil, while Hume questions whether humans have sufficient epistemic grounds to judge the world as the best possible one. The thesis concludes that although Leibniz’s theodicy is internally coherent and systematic, its overall plausibility remains debatable, particularlty regarding the justification of moral evil and human moral responsibility. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Käesolevas bakalaureusetöös käsitlen kurjuse probleemi Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnizi teodiike kontekstis, keskenduses moraalse kurjuse seletamisele. Minu eesmärk oli näidata, kuidas Leibniz püüab säilitada Jumala klassikalised omadused ja inimeste vaba tahte. Analüüsin Leibnizi käsitluses erinevaid kurjuse liike, tema vaba tahte käsitlust ning ka tema lahendust, mis tugineb küllaldase aluse printsiibile ja parima võimaliku maailma ideele. Samuti käsitlen enda töös John Leslie Mackie ja David Hume’i kriitikat. Järeldan, et Leibnizi teodiike on küll süsteemne, ent see ei ole lõpuni veenev. | et |
| dc.description.uri | https://ester.ester.ee/record=b6059499 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 20.03.02 KIRp 01 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10062/122765 | |
| dc.language.iso | et | |
| dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/ | |
| dc.subject | filosoofia | et |
| dc.subject | philosophy | en |
| dc.subject | kurjuse probleem | et |
| dc.subject | teodiike | et |
| dc.subject | moraalne kurjus | et |
| dc.subject | Leibniz | |
| dc.subject.other | bakalaureusetööd | et |
| dc.title | Leibnizi teodiike kui lahendus kurjuse probleemile | et |
| dc.title.alternative | Leibniz's theodicy as a solution to the problem of evil | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
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