A semiotic of motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu semiotics
Kuupäev
2022-02-10
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Abstrakt
Kõrvutades Kenneth Burke'i (1897–1993) ja tänapäeva semiootika võtmekontseptsioonie, uurib käesolev töö motiivi kriitilist rolli tähenduse arenemisel ja avastamisel inimkogemuses. Analüüsime Burke’i töid motiivi rollist inimese tähendusloomes, mida ta kirjeldas kui aktiivset, tahtelist protsessi. Tuginedes eriti Burke’i nn Motivorumi seeria teostele (A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives ja Symbolic of Motives), täiendame Burke'i kontseptuaalset skeemi semiootilise raamiga, tuletades selle John Deely üldsemiootika ja Tartu koolkonna teooria, mida esindab käesolevas eelkõige Kalevi Kull, ristumiskohast. Tulemuseks on analüütiline raamistik, mis jälgib motiivi vajalikkust alates bioloogilisele eesmärgile orienteeritusest kuni inimmõtte formaalsete piirideni. Kasutades Burke'i terministlike ekraanide mõistet, mida käsitletakse siin kui hierarhilise modelleerimise vormi, näitame, et tegelikkuse kohta järelduste tegemiseks peame selle kirjeldamisel kasutama valitud mõisteid, mis samas tähendab nendega kokkusobimatute võimaluste tagasilükkamist. Mõned tähendused tehakse võimalikuks, teised aga sõelutakse semiootiliselt välja. Nii võib tähenduse ja kogemuse osas saada väga erinevaid tulemusi– eriti kontekstides, mida juhivad nn jumalaterminid ehk terministlike ekraanide maksimaalsed vormid. Meie valikud, mis konkretiseerivad motiive, tekitavad kogemuse semiootilise filtri, misläbi kujuneme aja jooksul ise oma valikute ja motiivide märgiks. See on vastuolus modernismi paradigmaga, mis käsitleb motiveeritud järeldusi põhjuslike protsesside tagajärgedena. See vastuolu tuleneb modernismi semiootilisest vundamendist; me kasutame oma Burke'i-semiootilist raamistikku selle aluse, tema motiivide ja tulenevate tähenduste analüüsimiseks. Me väidame, et modernismi sisemised vastuolud põhjustavad realismi ja idealismi kollapsi, mille tulemuseks on kaks tavaliselt seisukohta: (1) naiivne realism, mida praktikas dikteerivad võimuinstitutsioonid, ja (2) naiivne relativism, mille dikteerib üksikagent. Alternatiivina pakume välja teleoloogilise meetodi, mis vaatleb kokkusobimatute tähendusvõimaluste erinevaid trajektoore, jälgib nende (entelehhiaalseid) lõpp-punkte ja näeb neid lõpp-punkte agendi valikute alusena – eriti suure olulisusega tähenduskontekstides. Küsimused on seega järgmised: „Milleni see valik viib? Millise kogemusliku maailma see avab või sulgeb? Milline motiiv selle aluseks on? Mille märgiks ma tahan olla?”
By laying in parallel key concepts from Kenneth Burke (1897–1993) and contemporary semiotics, this work explores the critical role that motive plays in the development and discovery of meaning within human experience. We highlight Burke’s thought regarding the role of motive in human meaning-making, which he highlighted as an active, volitional process. Drawing especially from the so-called Motivorum works (A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, and the nebulous Symbolic of Motives), we enrich Burke’s conceptual schema within an explicitly semiotic frame, derived from an intersection between John Deely’s general semiotics and the Tartu School approach, represented especially by Kalevi Kull. The result is an analytical framework that traces out the necessity of motive from biological goal-orientation to the formal boundaries of human thought. Employing Burke’s notion of terministic screens, treated here as a form of hierarchical modeling, we show that in order to make conclusions about reality, we must use some terms to describe it, which also entails rejecting other incompatible options. Some meanings are made possible, while others are semiotically screened out, which can lead to quite different results for meaning and experience – especially in contexts governed by God-terms, the maximal form of terministic screens. Our choices, which concretize motives, result in a semiotic filter for experience, and over time we become signs of our choices and motives. This runs counter to the Modern paradigm, which treats its motivated conclusions as deterministic entailments. That contradiction arises from Modernism’s semiotic foundation, and we employ our Burkean-semiotic framework to analyze this foundation, its underlying motives, and its meaning results. We argue that Modernism’s internal contradictions result in a collapsing of realism and idealism, with two commonly resulting stances: (1) naive realism, in practice dictated by institutions of power, and (2) naive relativism, dictated by the individual agent. Contrastively, we suggest a teleological method that looks at the various trajectories of incompatible meaning possibilities, traces out their (entelechial) end points, and uses those end points as the basis for which the agent will choose – especially in high-stakes meaning contexts. The questions asked are thus: “What does this choice lead to? What kind of experiential world will it open or close? What kind of motive underlies it? What do I want to be a sign of?”
By laying in parallel key concepts from Kenneth Burke (1897–1993) and contemporary semiotics, this work explores the critical role that motive plays in the development and discovery of meaning within human experience. We highlight Burke’s thought regarding the role of motive in human meaning-making, which he highlighted as an active, volitional process. Drawing especially from the so-called Motivorum works (A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, and the nebulous Symbolic of Motives), we enrich Burke’s conceptual schema within an explicitly semiotic frame, derived from an intersection between John Deely’s general semiotics and the Tartu School approach, represented especially by Kalevi Kull. The result is an analytical framework that traces out the necessity of motive from biological goal-orientation to the formal boundaries of human thought. Employing Burke’s notion of terministic screens, treated here as a form of hierarchical modeling, we show that in order to make conclusions about reality, we must use some terms to describe it, which also entails rejecting other incompatible options. Some meanings are made possible, while others are semiotically screened out, which can lead to quite different results for meaning and experience – especially in contexts governed by God-terms, the maximal form of terministic screens. Our choices, which concretize motives, result in a semiotic filter for experience, and over time we become signs of our choices and motives. This runs counter to the Modern paradigm, which treats its motivated conclusions as deterministic entailments. That contradiction arises from Modernism’s semiotic foundation, and we employ our Burkean-semiotic framework to analyze this foundation, its underlying motives, and its meaning results. We argue that Modernism’s internal contradictions result in a collapsing of realism and idealism, with two commonly resulting stances: (1) naive realism, in practice dictated by institutions of power, and (2) naive relativism, dictated by the individual agent. Contrastively, we suggest a teleological method that looks at the various trajectories of incompatible meaning possibilities, traces out their (entelechial) end points, and uses those end points as the basis for which the agent will choose – especially in high-stakes meaning contexts. The questions asked are thus: “What does this choice lead to? What kind of experiential world will it open or close? What kind of motive underlies it? What do I want to be a sign of?”
Kirjeldus
Märksõnad
subjects, semiosis, semiosphere, Christianity, modernism, teleology, semiotics