Delegation and efficiency: comparison of Telecom Single Market negotiations under the Italian and Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU
| dc.contributor.advisor | Ehin, Piret, juhendaja | |
| dc.contributor.author | Pilar, Klaus-Erik | |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste valdkond | et |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut | et |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-20T08:44:23Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-06-20T08:44:23Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis aims to study why some Member States are more efficient in mediating the negotiations during the Presidency of the Council of the European Union than others. To fill the gap in current academic research, the emphasis is put on how the model of coordination between the presiding country’s capital and Permanent Representation in Brussels affects the performance of the Presidency. Rational choice institutionalism provides the opportunity to conceptualise efficiency of the Presidency as the advancement of the negotiations on a priority initiative, rather than protection of national preferences as defined conventionally. The principal-agent model offers the necessary analytical tools to examine different models of coordination for European Union policies. This theoretical approach provides also the adequate analytical tools to study the link between model of coordination and efficiency of the Presidency, leading to the hypothesis that Brusselsbased Presidencies are more efficient in leading the negotiations on a priority initiative than the Presidencies that have adopted capital-based models. In the empirical part of the study qualitative comparative method is used to compare the performance of Italian and Latvian Presidencies in advancing the negotiations on Telecom Single Market proposal. The analysis of written documents and input from interviews indicate quite clearly that Latvian Presidency was much more efficient in its role as the mediator of the negotiations on this dossier. The findings also demonstrate that there is significant variation in the adopted model of coordination. Whereas Italy opted for a capital-based Presidency, Latvian Presidency was Brussels-based. To large extent the assumptions presented in the theoretical part of the thesis were confirmed. The Latvian Brussels-based Presidency was able to make decisions much faster and on spot, whereas Italian Permanent Representation had to endure extensive interventions from the capital, which made the progress slower. The findings also indicate that Latvian Presidency was able to act as an “honest broker” and go beyond its national preferences in order to reach a compromise. Additionally, it was confirmed that Brussels-based model enables better cooperation with other actors due to higher level of trust. However, the premise that the Brussels-based Presidency is more efficient due to better cooperation with the Council Secretariat was not proven. All in all the findings of the study show that the main hypothesis is correct and Brussels-based Presidencies are more efficient in advancing the negotiations on priority initiative. | en |
| dc.description.uri | http://www.ester.ee/record=b4684733*est | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10062/56848 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
| dc.subject.other | magistritööd | et |
| dc.subject.other | Euroopa Liit | et |
| dc.subject.other | delegeerimine | et |
| dc.subject.other | efektiivsus | et |
| dc.subject.other | liikmesriigid | et |
| dc.subject.other | eesistumine | et |
| dc.subject.other | koostöö | et |
| dc.subject.other | Läti | et |
| dc.subject.other | Itaalia | et |
| dc.title | Delegation and efficiency: comparison of Telecom Single Market negotiations under the Italian and Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |