When risk does not trigger policy change: the case of Georgia's approach to the protection of critical infrastructure

Abstract

As the world becomes more dependent on technology and interconnected systems, the need for robust critical infrastructure protection measures has become increasingly important for countries worldwide. Protecting critical infrastructure, such as pipelines, railways, networks of telecommunication, and many more, is vital for safeguarding essential systems and services from different threats, such as cyber-attacks, physical threats, natural disasters, and so on, ensuring the continuity of daily life and national security. Against this background, this study seeks to explore the continuity of policy in Georgia regarding critical infrastructure protection, or in fact the absence of a policy for critical infrastructure protection, since in time period of interest for this study, no such policy has been developed. The fact that there is no legal framework that regulates this issue seems puzzling, given both the rising significance of this all over the world and the security threats faced by Georgia in the last two decades. In order to understand the reasons behind the continued absence of a legal framework for critical infrastructure protection, this thesis employs the theories of policy change and non-change to look for possible factors hindering policy change in Georgia. Utilizing elite and expert interviews together with legal documents of Georgia, this thesis came to the conclusion that the prime reason for the enduring absence of a policy framework regarding critical infrastructure protection, are historical legacies of Georgian policy-making, which contains in itself several themes and topics such as general neglect towards security issues and path-dependent nature of institutions. This means that the historical institutionalist account seems particularly well suited to account for the enduring absence of such a policy framework in Georgia.