Valged valed ning nende eetilise normaliseerimise kriitika
| dc.contributor.advisor | Heidy Meriste, juhendaja | et |
| dc.contributor.author | Väliste, Oskar | |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond | et |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond | et |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-06-30T15:00:27Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-06-30T15:00:27Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026 | |
| dc.description | This philosophical thesis critically examines the ethical status of so-called white lies and challenges their widespread moral and social acceptance. White lies are typically understood as minor or benevolent untruths told for reasons such as politeness, empathy, or the preservation of social harmony. In everyday moral reasoning, they are often treated as harmless exceptions to otherwise strict norms of honesty. However, this thesis argues that such an understanding is philosophically naive and ethically problematic. Drawing on major traditions in moral philosophy such as Aristotelian virtue ethics, kantianism, utilitarianism, and W. D. Ross’ theory of prima facie duties – the thesis demonstrates that none of these frameworks provide a the necessary justification for the use of white lies. While these theories differ significantly in their moral foundations, they converge on the view that truthfulness is a central moral commitment and that deviations from it demand strong and carefully justified reasons, which everyday white lies rarely provide. The thesis further argues that the category of white lies is conceptually unstable and highly dependent on perspective, often functioning as a form of moral self-justification rather than as a genuine ethical distinction. Finally, the analysis examines the psychological and social mechanisms such as self-justification and cognitive dissonance that contribute to the normalization of white lies. As an alternative, the thesis proposes tactful honesty as a morally and communicatively superior practice that preserves autonomy, trust without resorting for deception. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Käesolev bakalaureusetöö uurib valgete valede eetilist staatust ja näidustab, miks valgede valede eetiline normaliseerimine on problemaatiline. Töös argumenteeritakse, et domineeriv arusaam valgetest valedest kui kahjututest ja altruistlikest tööriistadest on filosoofiliselt naiivne. Analüüsides valgeid valesid aristotellikku vooruseetika, kantianismi, utilitarismi ning W.D. Rossi prima facie kohustuste teooria raamistikus, näidatakse, et ükski neist ei paku valgetele valedele piisavat eetilist õigustust. Lisaks käsitletakse valgete valede normaliseerimise psühholoogilisi ja ühiskondlikke mehhanisme. Alternatiivina pakutakse välja taktitundeline ausus kui eetiliselt ja kommunikatiivselt parema lähenemine. | et |
| dc.description.uri | https://ester.ester.ee/record=b6059502 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 20.03.02 VÄL 01 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10062/122768 | |
| dc.language.iso | et | |
| dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/ | |
| dc.subject | filosoofia | et |
| dc.subject | philosophy | en |
| dc.subject | valged valed | et |
| dc.subject | white lies | en |
| dc.subject | valetamine | et |
| dc.subject | lying | en |
| dc.subject | praktiline filosoofia | et |
| dc.subject | practical philosophy | en |
| dc.subject | eetika | et |
| dc.subject | ethics | en |
| dc.subject | taktitundeline ausus | et |
| dc.subject | tactful honesty | en |
| dc.subject.other | bakalaureusetööd | et |
| dc.title | Valged valed ning nende eetilise normaliseerimise kriitika | et |
| dc.title.alternative | White lies and a critique of their ethical normalisation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
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