Engaged, yet unofficial? Patterns of engagement without recognition of EU member states with the Republic of Kosovo (2008–2024)
dc.contributor.advisor | Berg, Eiki, juhendaja | |
dc.contributor.author | Poure, Joris Charlie | |
dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste valdkond | et |
dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut | et |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-16T10:02:44Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-16T10:02:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
dc.description.abstract | Kosovo’s relationship with the European Union and its desire for membership is one of its most defining characteristics, shaping both domestic and foreign policy. Brussels expresses a duality, being both one of Pristina’s closest allies but also counting among its member states five countries which do not recognise Kosovar independence from Serbia following its 2008 unilateral declaration of independence. Still, EU states and Kosovo are in contact, as displayed by the 2024 visa liberalisation regime with Pristina. At a time where de facto states play a large in shaping the European geopolitics (as displayed by Russia’s recognition of the Georgian and Ukrainian de facto states, near instantly followed by invasions of their neighbours’ territory under international law), our assumption is that such entities need to be studied with attention; Kosovo in particular, as its existence is both a topic of contention at EU level and has been used by a belligerent Moscow as a precedent justifying their actions abroad . This thesis aims to study why non-recognisers (of which were retained three as case studies divided in two groups: Cyprus, Greece, and Spain) have refused to recognise Kosovo since 2008, and how (if they do) do they engage with Pristina and its nationals. For hard non-recognisers, we found political engagement to be limited but not null for both Cyprus and Spain, the former surprising by displaying remarkably high economic engagement levels, and non-recognition being based on fears of precedent setting for secessionism at home justified under the guise of morals, international law, and friendship with Serbia. For our soft-recogniser case Greece, we found expectations-exceeding levels of diplomatic engagement with Kosovo bilaterally and at EU level, the states’ relation being similar to that of two confirmed states. Non-recognition here is found to be due to diplomatic relations with both historical ally Serbia and kin state Cyprus. | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10062/102449 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Estonia | en |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ee/ | |
dc.subject.other | magistritööd | et |
dc.title | Engaged, yet unofficial? Patterns of engagement without recognition of EU member states with the Republic of Kosovo (2008–2024) | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
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